The opinion
[Cite as In re M.F., 2024-Ohio-2272.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE M.F. :
No. 113525
A Minor Child :
[Appeal by L.F., Father] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 13, 2024
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case No. AD-21904220
Appearances:
Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Abraham Del Rio, III, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:
Appellant L.F. (“Father”) appeals from the juvenile court’s decision
awarding permanent custody of his minor child M.F. (d.o.b. 6/24/2019) to the
Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the
agency”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
On May 19, 2021, the agency filed a complaint for neglect, abuse,
dependency, and temporary custody to the agency with respect to M.F. The
complaint alleged that Mother engaged in acts of domestic violence in M.F.’s
presence, and specifically that Mother assaulted Father1 at a bus stop. The
complaint further alleged that Father had a protection order against Mother as a
result of these incidents, but Mother had violated the protection order.2 The
complaint further alleged that Father has been convicted of attempted disrupting
public service, resisting arrest, and domestic violence against Mother, and that
Father has failed to establish paternity.
The agency also filed a request for predispositional temporary
custody of M.F., which the juvenile court granted.
As of the filing of the first case plan in June 2021, M.F. was placed in
a foster home. Father’s goals pursuant to the initial case plan were to complete
domestic violence and anger management programs and to not engage in any acts
of domestic violence or any type of verbal or physical abuse. According to the first
case plan, Father was incarcerated in June 2021.
1 At the time the complaint was filed, Father had not established paternity of M.F.,
and so was referred to as Alleged Father in the complaint and throughout the lower court
proceedings until paternity was established in late 2021. For clarity, we will refer to
Father as Father throughout this opinion.
2 The complaint included additional allegations that were specific to Mother;
because Mother is not a party to this appeal, our discussion of the facts and our analysis
in this opinion will be limited to Father.
On August 10, 2021, the agency filed an amended complaint.
On August 13, 2021, the court held a telephonic adjudicatory hearing;
both Mother and Father stipulated to the allegations of the amended complaint. On
August 16, 2021, the court adjudicated M.F. neglected and dependent and M.F. was
committed to the temporary custody of the agency.
As part of the case plan, Father was referred for counseling, and
according to the November 2021 semiannual review (“SAR”), his counseling
sessions were to have begun on August 30, 2021. Father began a 12-week domestic
violence program, as part of his probation, on October 23, 2021.
On December 3, 2021, Father filed a motion for legal custody. The
motion stated that Father had established paternity, has been engaged in and
completed all services required by his case plan, and was ready, willing, and able to
assume legal custody of M.F. Also on December 3, 2021, Father filed a motion to
permit his wife, C.F., to attend his visitations with M.F.
On December 9, 2021, the agency filed a brief in opposition to
Father’s motion to permit C.F. to attend visitation. The agency argued that visitation
with both Mother and Father was supervised because of ongoing domestic violence
issues between them. Specifically, Father has been convicted of violent crimes
against Mother, and Mother “has acknowledged threatening Father and his wife,
[C.F.], and is currently being charged with felonious assault against Father and
menacing by stalking against [C.F.]” Further, the agency stated that Mother had
informed CCDCFS that she does not want C.F. to participate in visitation. The
agency ultimately opposed Father’s motion to permit C.F. to attend visitation
because C.F. has no established relationship with M.F., because Mother does not
want C.F. to attend visitation, and because C.F. is not a party to the case.
The court held a hearing on February 15, 2022. Pursuant to a
corresponding journal entry, the parties were in agreement that Father and C.F.
“shall be referred to a parenting coach and have supervised visits” with M.F., and,
therefore, Father’s motion to permit C.F. to attend visitation was moot. The court
held Father’s motion for legal custody in abeyance.
On February 24, 2022, the agency filed a motion to suspend visitation
with C.F. The agency stated that subsequent to the February 15, 2022 hearing,
CCDCFS learned that Father and C.F. “are currently involved in an investigation by
Seneca County Department of Job and Family Services due to an incident of
domestic violence which reportedly took place between Father and [C.F.] in January
2022.”
On February 28, 2022, the court granted the motion and suspended
visitation between M.F. and C.F.
On March 7, 2022, an updated case plan was filed as a result of these
new domestic violence allegations.
On May 3, 2022, CCDCFS filed a motion for a first extension of
temporary custody. On May 10, 2022, the court granted the agency’s motion and
ruled Father’s motion for legal custody moot.
On September 21, 2022, CCDCFS filed a motion to terminate
temporary custody and for an order vesting legal custody of M.F. to Mother and
Father. On October 28, 2022, CCDCFS filed a motion to amend the dispositional
prayer from “Termination of Temporary Custody” to “Legal Custody to Father.” On
December 29, 2022, the trial court denied the agency’s motions and granted
Mother’s oral motion for a second extension of temporary custody to CCDCFS.
On April 13, 2023, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify its temporary
custody to permanent custody. On June 13 and July 23, 2023, Father filed motions
for legal custody.
On December 4, 2023, the court held a dispositional hearing.
The court heard testimony from M.F.’s foster father D.W., who
testified that M.F. had been in his care since March 19, 2021. D.W. testified that he
lived with his wife and his six-year-old adopted son, C.W. D.W. described the
relationship between C.W. and M.F. as a typical sibling relationship, in which they
play together, argue, share a bedroom, and are generally inseparable. According to
D.W., M.F. referred to D.W. as “Dad,” D.W.’s wife as “Mom,” and C.W. as his
brother.
D.W. testified that M.F. was diagnosed with eczema, allergies, and
asthma, and has been hospitalized three times related to these conditions. D.W.
testified that M.F. was enrolled in a Pre-K program, and he enjoys school and is
doing well.
D.W. testified that, with agency approval, he facilitated visitation with
M.F. and both parents; the visits initially occurred weekly. D.W. testified that he
tried to involve Mother and Father in M.F.’s life in other ways, such as informing
them of doctor’s appointments and inviting them to birthday parties. Father went
to M.F.’s birthday party in 2022 and attended at least one of M.F.’s doctor’s
appointments.
D.W. testified that from his observations of Father’s visits with M.F.,
Father’s interactions with M.F. were engaging and appropriate; D.W. described
Father as thoughtful in his interactions with M.F.
D.W. also testified that around March 31, 2023, Father’s wife, C.F.,
sent him photos, including a photo of herself in which she was bloody and appeared
to have been in some sort of physical altercation. D.W. testified that C.F. called him
from jail in Seneca County and told him that she and Father had gotten into a fight,
and shortly after the fight she was arrested.
The court also heard testimony from agency social worker Carol Beck
(“Beck”), who testified that she had been with the agency since June 2021, and had
been assigned to this case since October 2021. Beck testified that CCDCFS first
became involved with the family because of a report that on May 9, 2021, Mother
attempted to run over Father with her car; M.F. was inside the vehicle during this
incident.
Beck testified that Father had seven or eight children, including M.F.,
and Father did not have custody of any of his other children because they were
removed from his custody in January 2021 by Iowa State Children and Family
Services. Beck testified that the issues leading to the removal of Father’s other
children were domestic violence and substance abuse. Specifically, there were
concerns about Father’s substance abuse after one of the children tested positive for
cocaine and concerns about domestic violence based on the volatile relationship
between Mother and Father.3 Beck specifically testified that some of Father’s other
children reported to Iowa and Ohio agency workers that they had nightmares after
witnessing Father assault Mother.
Beck testified that Father completed a domestic violence course in
late 2021 or early 2022, but she did not believe that he benefitted from this because
there have been allegations of abuse with C.F., Father’s current wife, since his
completion of those classes. Beck testified that C.F. sent her messages with photos
and allegations of abuse from Father. Beck testified that these messages included
medical discharge papers and coincided with other allegations of abuse against
Father. Beck testified that charges were filed against Father in Seneca County
related to domestic violence against C.F., but they have been dropped because C.F.
subsequently recanted. Beck testified that although there had not been a domestic
violence incident in approximately eight months, she remained concerned about
domestic violence in Father’s home. According to Beck, domestic violence was the
most significant concern the agency had regarding Father.
3 According to exhibits in the record, the children removed from Father’s care by
the Iowa agency were not Mother’s biological children, but Mother was referred to as
Father’s domestic abuse victim by the Iowa court.
With respect to substance abuse, Beck testified that Father tested
positive for cocaine. Beck testified that while Father completed a substance abuse
assessment and was not referred to any substance abuse programs, she believed this
was because Father misrepresented his history of addiction, domestic violence, and
criminal history during the assessment. Beck further testified that Father did
complete a substance abuse treatment program and has not had a positive drug
screen since November 2022; despite this, Beck testified that she did not believe that
Father achieved his substance abuse case plan goals because he was still on
probation for a July 2022 substance offense.
Beck also testified that Father and C.F. were evicted from their former
home in January 2023, but she had visited them at their current home and she had
no concerns about the apartment. Beck testified that Father participated in
visitation consistently, included unsupervised visitation, until unsupervised
visitation was suspended in April 2023 due to domestic violence allegations. Beck
testified that Father participated in a parenting course and benefited from this
service.
Finally, Beck testified that she visited M.F. weekly at his foster
placement, and M.F. was doing well and had adapted to his foster family.
Ultimately, Beck testified that she believed it would be in M.F.’s best interest to
remain in the care of his foster family, and as such, the agency was requesting
permanent custody.
C.F. also testified briefly. After brief questioning, the court
interrupted C.F.’s testimony in order to allow her to speak with a lawyer regarding
potential self-incrimination issues in her testimony. Subsequently, the assistant
prosecuting attorney for CCDCFS informed the court that C.F. stated she was
uncomfortable testifying and left. As a result, the court struck C.F.’s testimony from
the record.
Finally, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for M.F. testified. The GAL
testified that based on their investigation, as well as the testimony and evidence, she
believed it was in M.F.’s best interest that permanent custody to the agency be
granted. Specifically, the GAL testified that M.F. had been out of the parents’
respective care for over two years, and in that time, regardless of case plan services
that have been identified, neither parent has been able to remedy the conditions that
caused the agency to remove the child from their care initially. The GAL testified
that while M.F. had a good bond with Mother and Father, he was still too young to
clearly articulate his wishes.
On December 7, 2023, the juvenile court issued a journal entry
awarding permanent custody of M.F. to the agency and denying Father’s motion for
legal custody in which it made the following findings:
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that pursuant to
O.R.C. 2151.414(B)(1):
d) The child has been in temporary custody of a public children services
agency or private child placing agency for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two month period.
The child’s continued residence in or return to the home of [Mother]
would be contrary to the child’s best interest.
The Court further finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent
the removal of the child from the home, or to return the child to the
home and finalize a permanency plan, to wit: reunification. Relevant
services provided to the family include: For the Mother, Domestic
Violence, Parenting, Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services. For
the Father, Domestic Violence and Substance Abuse Services.
With respect to the best interest of the child, the Court has considered
the following factors under O.R.C. 2151.414(D)(1):
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, and foster caregivers and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child.
The child has a bond with Mother and Father. The child has a
significant bond with the caregivers and their immediate and
extended family. The child refers to the caregivers as mom and dad.
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child. The child is too young to express his wishes. GAL recommends
permanent custody.
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency or
private child placing agency under one or more separate orders of
disposition for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two
month period. The child has been in the uninterrupted custody of
CCDCFS for two and a half years, more than half his young life.
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody. The child deserves a safe and stable home
environment where his needs can be met and he can thrive, which
cannot be achieved with either parent. No other relative has been
identified as willing or able to care for the child.
(e) Whether any factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply
in relation to the parents and the child. (E)(11) applies to Father-see
exhibit 11.
With respect to the best interest of the child, the court finds that
pursuant to O.R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) that all of the following apply:
(a) The Court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or
more of the factors in division (E) of this section exist and the child
cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable
time or should not be placed with either parent.
(b) The child has been in the agency’s custody for two years or longer,
and no longer qualifies for temporary custody pursuant to division (D)
of section 2151.415 of the Ohio Revised Code.
(c) The child does not meet the requirements for a planned permanent
living arrangement pursuant to division (A)(5) of Section 2151.353 of
the Ohio Revised Code.
(d) Prior to the dispositional hearing, no relative or other interested
person has filed, or has been identified in, a motion for legal custody.
As all of these sections apply, permanent custody is in the best interest
of the child, and this Court as required by this statute, shall commit the
child to the permanent custody of CCDCFS.
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot
be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or
should not be placed with either parent, pursuant to O.R.C.
2151.414(E):
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.
***
(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the
child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the
child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness
to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.
***
(11) The parent (Father) has had parental rights involuntarily
terminated with respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section
or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Ohio Revised Code, or under an
existing former law of this state or any other state, or the United States
that is substantially equivalent to those sections, and the parent has
failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that,
notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally
secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare,
and safety of the child. See Exhibit 11.
***
(16) Any other Factor the Court finds relevant: Mother has three other
kids who were removed from her care and placed in the legal custody
of a relative. Father has 7 children not in his care.
(Emphasis sic.)
Father appeals, presenting two assignments of error for our review.
I. The trial court abused its discretion by granting permanent custody
of M.F. to CCDCFS against the manifest weight of the evidence.
II. The trial court erred by permitting inadmissible hearsay testimony.
Law and Analysis
I. Permanent Custody
Father’s first assignment of error argues that the trial court’s award
of permanent custody to the agency was error because its findings were not
supported by clear and convincing evidence and the decision was not in the best
interest of the child. Specifically, Father argues that the court’s termination of his
parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the factors
the trial court considered weighed against permanent custody.
A parent has a fundamental interest in the care and custody of his
children. In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107708, 2019-Ohio-1343, ¶ 20.
However, parental rights are not absolute: “‘The natural rights of a parent are always
subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling
principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th
Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).
“By terminating parental rights, the goal is to create ‘a more stable life’ for dependent
children and to ‘facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.’” In re R.G.,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104434, 2016-Ohio-7897, ¶ 21, quoting In re N.B., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, citing In re Howard, 5th Dist.
Tuscarawas No. 85 A10-077, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860, 5 (Aug. 1, 1986).
On a motion for permanent custody, a juvenile court must satisfy the
two-prong test set forth in R.C. 2151.414 before it can terminate parental rights and
grant permanent custody to the agency. The juvenile court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that any one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) apply and that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent
custody to the agency. In re R.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108537, 2020-Ohio-3032,
¶ 19-20.
Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “‘that measure or
degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not
to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal
cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or
conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538,
2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469,
120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
The juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
one of the following five conditions applies under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1):
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children service agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1)
of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the
temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the
child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.
(b) The child is abandoned.
(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who
are able to take permanent custody.
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child
has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more
months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in
division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another
state.
(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated
an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions
by any court in this state or another state.
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
Here, the trial court satisfied the first prong of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) by
finding, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that M.F. had been in temporary
custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency for
twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. The trial court
additionally found that M.F. cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable
time or should not be placed with either parent. “R.C. 2151.414(E) provides that if
the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of
the conditions listed exist as to each of the child’s parents, ‘the court shall enter a
finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time
or should not be placed with either parent.’” In re K.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
112036, 2023-Ohio-936, ¶ 34. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.414(E) lists numerous
conditions:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. In determining
whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the
court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric,
psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material
resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of
changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain
parental duties.
***
(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the
child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the
child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness
to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.
***
(14) The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing,
shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child
from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse of physical,
emotional, or mental neglect.
***
(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.
Here, with respect to Father, the court specifically cited R.C.
2151.414(E)(1), (4), (11), and (16) in making its finding that M.F. could not be placed
with either parent in a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.
Following a thorough review of the record, we find that there was sufficient
evidentiary support for these findings.
With respect to Father’s failure to remedy the conditions causing
removal pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the record reflects that while Father
engaged in case plan services related to substance abuse, he also lied about his prior
history of substance abuse, domestic violence, and criminal history when
undergoing a substance abuse assessment. Moreover, Father had ongoing domestic
violence issues related to both Mother and C.F.
With respect to Father’s lack of commitment to M.F. pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(E)(4), while the record generally reflects consistent engagement in his case
plan and consistent visitation with M.F., there were also several recent instances of
Father missing visitation with M.F.
With respect to R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), relating to Father’s parental
rights of other children being terminated, the record reflects that other children of
Father’s were removed from his care following domestic violence and substance
abuse concerns.
Finally, with respect to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), other relevant factors,
the court found that Father had seven children not in his care, largely due to
concerns that mirrored those at issue in this case.
In light of the foregoing findings, all of which were supported by clear
and convincing evidence, the trial court was required by statute to conclude that
M.F. cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be
placed with either parent.
With respect to the second prong of the R.C. 2151.414 test, the court
found that it was in the best interest of M.F. for the agency to be awarded permanent
custody.
R.C. 2151.414(D) provides a list of factors for the court to consider in
determining the best interest of the child. Here, the court considered the factors in
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e):
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division
(D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously
in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parents and child.
Specifically, the court’s journal entry acknowledged that while M.F. had a bond with
Father, he also had a significant bond with his foster family; although M.F. was too
young to express his wishes, the GAL recommended permanent custody; M.F. has
been in uninterrupted agency custody for two and one-half years, more than half his
life; and M.F. deserves a safe and stable home, which cannot be achieved with either
parent.
Our review of the record reveals that all of these findings are
supported by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the
trial court’s permanent custody determination was an abuse of discretion. For these
reasons, Father’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II. Hearsay Testimony
In his second assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court
erred by permitting inadmissible hearsay testimony. Specifically, Father argues that
D.W.’s testimony regarding the text messages he received from C.F. alleging that
Father assaulted her, together with Beck’s testimony about allegations of current
abuse by Father, were inadmissible hearsay.
We generally review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of
discretion; however, because Father did not object to either portion of the trial
testimony he now challenges, he has waived all but plain error on appeal. An
appellate court may recognize an error that an appellant waived only if it constitutes
plain error. In re T.C.K., 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA3, 2013-Ohio-3583, ¶ 16.
The Ohio Supreme Court has admonished courts to limit applying the plain error
doctrine to cases “involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no
objection was made at the court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial process.” Id., quoting Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79
Ohio St.3d 116, 122-123, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997).
This is not a case in which testimony from Beck or D.W. regarding
C.F.’s communications with them seriously affected the basic fairness of the
proceedings. Our review of the record shows that there was ample evidence, outside
of the testimony regarding C.F.’s text messages, that supported the agency’s
significant concern regarding Father’s history of domestic violence. Further, our
review of the record in its entirety shows that the text messages from C.F. were at
least partially corroborated by other evidence in the record. For these reasons,
Father’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE III, J., CONCUR