Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

STARBUCKS CORP. v. MCKINNEY, REGIONAL

DIRECTOR OF REGION 15 OF THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–367. Argued April 23, 2024—Decided June 13, 2024

After several Starbucks employees announced plans to unionize, they in-

vited a news crew from a local television station to visit the store after

hours to promote their unionizing effort. Starbucks fired multiple em-

ployees involved with the media event for violating company policy.

The National Labor Relations Board filed an administrative complaint

against Starbucks alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor prac-

tices. The Board’s regional Director then filed a petition under §10( j)

of the National Labor Relations Act seeking a preliminary injunction

for the duration of the administrative proceedings that would, among

other things, require Starbucks to reinstate the fired employees. The

District Court assessed whether the Board was entitled to a prelimi-

nary injunction by applying a two-part test that asks whether “there

is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have oc-

curred,” and whether injunctive relief is “just and proper.” McKinney

v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 875 F. 3d 333, 339. Applying this

standard, the District Court granted the injunction, and the Sixth Cir-

cuit affirmed.

Held: When considering the NLRB’s request for a preliminary injunction

under §10( j), district courts must apply the traditional four factors ar-

ticulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555

U. S. 7. Pp. 4–11.

(a) Section 10( j) authorizes a federal district court “to grant . . . such

temporary relief . . . as it deems just and proper” during the pendency

of the Board’s administrative proceedings. §160( j). When Congress

2 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Syllabus

empowers courts to grant equitable relief, there is a strong presump-

tion that courts will exercise that authority in a manner consistent

with traditional principles of equity. For preliminary injunctions, the

four criteria identified in Winter encompass the relevant equitable

principles. Nothing in §10( j) displaces the presumption that those tra-

ditional principles govern. Pp. 4–5.

(b) The traditional rule is that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary in-

junction must make a clear showing that “he is likely to succeed on the

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U. S., at 20,

22. “These commonplace considerations applicable to cases in which

injunctions are sought in the federal courts reflect a ‘practice with a

background of several hundred years of history.’ ” Weinberger v.

Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 313. When interpreting a statute that

authorizes federal courts to grant preliminary injunctions, the Court

“do[es] not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from

established principles.” Ibid. Absent a clear command from Congress,

then, courts must adhere to the traditional four-factor test articulated

in Winter.

Section 10( j)’s statutory directive to grant injunctive relief when the

district court “deems” it “just and proper” does not jettison the normal

equitable rules; it simply invokes the discretion that courts have tra-

ditionally exercised when faced with requests for equitable relief. Fur-

thermore, §10( j)’s text bears no resemblance to the language that Con-

gress has employed when it has altered the normal equitable rules.

Pp. 5–8.

(c) The Board argues that statutory context requires district courts

evaluating §10( j) petitions to apply the traditional criteria in a less

exacting way, consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s reasonable-cause

standard. But, the reasonable-cause standard goes far beyond simply

fine tuning the traditional criteria to the §10( j) context—it substan-

tively lowers the bar for securing a preliminary injunction by requiring

courts to yield to the Board’s preliminary view of the facts, law, and

equities. Under the traditional standard, for example, the Board

would have to make a clear showing that it “is likely to succeed on the

merits.” Winter, 555 U. S., at 20. By contrast, the Board may obtain

a §10( j) injunction under the reasonable-cause standard by merely

showing “reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have

occurred.” Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, 875 F. 3d, at 339. Section 10( j)’s

statutory context does not compel this watered-down approach to eq-

uity.

The Board suggests that district courts risk supplanting its adjudi-

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Syllabus

catory authority by conducting an independent assessment of the mer-

its and equitable factors. But no matter how searching the district

court’s merits inquiry or what evidence it considers or credits, the

Board remains free to reach its own legal conclusions and develop its

own record in its administrative proceedings. And, since irreparable

harm and the other equitable factors are not part of the unfair-labor-

practice claim, a district court’s assessment of those factors is irrele-

vant to the Board’s adjudicatory authority.

The Board also reasons that district courts should apply a deferen-

tial standard because the Board’s final decisions are reviewed deferen-

tially by a court of appeals. But the views advanced in a §10( j) petition

are preliminary and do not represent the Board’s formal position. Def-

erence to what is “nothing more than an agency’s convenient litigating

position” is “entirely inappropriate.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hos-

pital, 488 U. S. 204, 213. The Board’s attempt to salvage the reasona-

ble-cause standard using statutory context thus fails. Pp. 8–10.

77 F. 4th 391, vacated and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ.,

joined. JACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in

part, and concurring in the judgment.

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–367

_________________

STARBUCKS CORPORATION, PETITIONER v.

M. KATHLEEN MCKINNEY, REGIONAL DI-

RECTOR OF REGION 15 OF THE NATION-

AL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FOR

AND ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2024]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The National Labor Relations Board can bring in-house

enforcement proceedings against employers and labor un-

ions for engaging in unfair labor practices. Section 10( j) of

the National Labor Relations Act authorizes the Board to

seek a preliminary injunction from a federal district court

while these administrative enforcement proceedings take

place. The question in this case is whether the traditional

four-factor test for a preliminary injunction articulated in

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S.

7 (2008), governs the Board’s requests under §10( j). We

conclude that it does, and therefore vacate and remand.

I

A

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits em-

ployers and unions from engaging in certain “unfair labor

2 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of the Court

practice[s].” 49 Stat. 452, 29 U. S. C. §§158(a), (b). The Na-

tional Labor Relations Board enforces that prohibition.

§160(a). The Board’s “authority kicks in when a person files

a charge with the agency alleging that” an employer or la-

bor union has engaged in an unfair labor practice. Glacier

Northwest, Inc. v. Teamsters, 598 U. S. 771, 775 (2023) (cit-

ing 29 CFR §101.2 (2021)). A regional Director then inves-

tigates the charge. §101.4 (2023). And, “[i]f the charge ap-

pears to have merit,” the director institutes a formal action

against the offending party by issuing an administrative

complaint. §101.8. This complaint triggers adjudicatory

proceedings within the agency, first before an administra-

tive law judge, and then before the Board itself. See 29

U. S. C. §§160(b), (c); 29 CFR §§101.10 to 101.12. A federal

court of appeals may review the Board’s final order, if an

aggrieved party seeks judicial review or if the Board seeks

enforcement of its order. 29 U. S. C. §§160(e)–(f ). On re-

view, the Board’s findings of fact are “conclusive” “if sup-

ported by substantial evidence.” Ibid.

Because the Board’s administrative proceedings take

years, Congress vested the Board with authority to seek a

preliminary injunction in federal court while the proceed-

ings unfold. Section 10( j) of the NLRA provides that, “upon

issuance of a complaint,” the Board may “petition any

United States district court . . . for appropriate temporary

relief.” §160( j). A district court considering a §10( j) peti-

tion may “grant to the Board such temporary relief . . . as it

deems just and proper.” Ibid.

B

Starbucks is the world’s largest coffeehouse chain, with

over 34,000 locations. In 2022, six employees at a Memphis,

Tennessee, location announced plans to unionize the store

and formed an organizing committee. Several employees,

including some members of the organizing committee, in-

vited a news crew from a local television station to visit the

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Opinion of the Court

store after hours to promote their unionizing effort. The

news crew interviewed the employees about their reasons

for organizing and what they hoped to achieve. The next

day, store management learned about the media event and

launched an investigation. Starbucks ultimately fired mul-

tiple employees involved with the media event for violating

company policy. These included the members of the organ-

izing committee who were in attendance. The union coor-

dinating with the employees filed charges with the Board.

The union alleged that Starbucks unlawfully interfered

with the employees’ right to unionize and discriminated

against union supporters, in violation of 29 U. S. C.

§§158(a)(1) and (3). After investigating the allegations, the

Board issued a complaint against Starbucks. The regional

Director then filed a §10( j) petition in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seek-

ing a preliminary injunction that would, among other

things, require Starbucks to reinstate the fired employees.

To assess whether the Board was entitled to a prelimi-

nary injunction under §10( j), the District Court applied the

two-part test established by Sixth Circuit precedent. That

test asks whether “there is reasonable cause to believe that

unfair labor practices have occurred,” and whether injunc-

tive relief is “just and proper.” McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey

Logistics, LLC, 875 F. 3d 333, 339 (2017) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted). The Board could establish reasonable

cause by simply showing that its “legal theory [was] sub-

stantial and not frivolous.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks

omitted). And, relief would be just and proper if it were

“necessary to return the parties to [the] status quo pending

the Board’s proceedings in order to protect the Board’s re-

medial powers under the NLRA.” Ibid. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Applying this standard, the District Court

granted an injunction to the Board. 2022 WL 5434206, *12

(WD Tenn., Aug. 18, 2022). And, applying Circuit prece-

dent, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 77 F. 4th 391, 400–401

4 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of the Court

(2023).*

Not all courts evaluate petitions for §10( j) injunctions un-

der the standard applied by the Sixth Circuit. Some courts

instead apply the four-part test for preliminary injunctions

articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 555 U. S. 7. See, e.g., Hooks v. Nexstar Broadcasting,

Inc., 54 F. 4th 1101, 1114 (CA9 2022); McKinney v. South-

ern Bakeries, LLC, 786 F. 3d 1119, 1122 (CA8 2015); Muf-

fley v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F. 3d 534, 542–543 (CA4

2009); Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc.¸ 276 F. 3d 270, 286

(CA7 2001). That familiar standard requires a plaintiff to

make a clear showing that “he is likely to succeed on the

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities

tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public in-

terest.” Winter, 555 U. S., at 20, 22. We granted certiorari

to resolve the Circuit split about what standard governs the

Board’s requests for preliminary injunctions under §10( j),

601 U. S. ___ (2024), and now vacate and remand.

II

Section 10( j) authorizes a federal district court “to grant

. . . such temporary relief . . . as it deems just and proper”

during the pendency of the Board’s administrative proceed-

ings. §160( j). When Congress empowers courts to grant

equitable relief, there is a strong presumption that courts

will exercise that authority in a manner consistent with tra-

ditional principles of equity. For preliminary injunctions,

the four criteria identified in Winter encompass the rele-

vant equitable principles. Nothing in §10( j) displaces the

presumption that those traditional principles govern. We

——————

*Other courts have applied a similar two-part test when assessing

§10( j) petitions. See, e.g., Kinard v. Dish Network Corp., 890 F. 3d 608,

612 (CA5 2018); Chester v. Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F. 3d 87, 89–90

(CA3 2011).

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

Opinion of the Court

therefore conclude that district courts must use the tradi-

tional four-part test when evaluating the Board’s request

for a preliminary injunction under §10( j).

A

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary” equitable

remedy that is “never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555

U. S., at 24. Its purpose “is merely to preserve the relative

positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be

held.” University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 395

(1981). The default rule is that a plaintiff seeking a prelim-

inary injunction must make a clear showing that “he is

likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that

the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunc-

tion is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U. S., at 20, 22.

“These commonplace considerations applicable to cases in

which injunctions are sought in the federal courts reflect a

‘practice with a background of several hundred years of his-

tory.’ ” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 313

(1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329

(1944)); see also Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402, 406

(1792) (opinion of Iredell, J.); id., at 407 (opinion of Blair,

J.).

When interpreting a statute that authorizes federal

courts to grant preliminary injunctions, “we do not lightly

assume that Congress has intended to depart from estab-

lished principles.” Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 313; see

also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 398

(1946). This Court has consistently employed this pre-

sumption when interpreting a wide variety of statutes that

authorize preliminary and permanent injunctions. See,

e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coopera-

tive, 532 U. S. 483, 496 (2001) (Controlled Substances Act);

Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 312–313 (Federal Water Pol-

lution Control Act); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480

6 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of the Court

U. S. 531, 542–544 (1987) (Alaska National Interest Lands

Conservation Act); Hecht, 321 U. S., at 329 (Emergency

Price Control Act). Thus, absent a clear command from

Congress, courts must adhere to the traditional four-factor

test.

Nothing in §10( j)’s text overcomes the presumption that

the four traditional criteria govern a preliminary-injunc-

tion request by the Board. Section 10( j) authorizes a dis-

trict court “to grant to the Board such temporary relief . . .

as it deems just and proper.” We do not understand the

statutory directive to grant relief when the district court

“deems” it “just and proper” to jettison the normal equitable

rules. To the contrary, the phrase “just and proper” invokes

the discretion that courts have traditionally exercised when

faced with requests for equitable relief. As a matter of or-

dinary meaning, the word “just” means “fair” and “right-

eous.” Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 1334

(1942); see also Webster’s New International Dictionary

1348 (2d ed. 1934) (“righteous” and “equitable”). And, the

word “proper” means “appropriate,” “suitable,” or “correct.”

Id., at 1983. Crafting “fair” and “appropriate” equitable re-

lief necessitates the exercise of discretion—the hallmark of

traditional equitable practice. See Hecht, 321 U. S., at 329

(“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of

the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the

necessities of the particular case”); see also 77 F. 4th, at 403

(Readler, J., concurring); Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F. 2d

485, 491 (CA7 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Section 10( j) tells

the district court to do what’s ‘just and proper’, which we

read as a statement that traditional rules govern”).

This Court’s precedent also counsels against reading

§10( j) to supplant the traditional equitable principles gov-

erning injunctions. In Hecht, the Court interpreted the

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942’s instruction that an

injunction “shall be granted” if the Office of Price Admin-

istration shows that a defendant “has engaged or is about

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 7

Opinion of the Court

to engage” in a prohibited act. 321 U. S., at 322 (quoting

ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U. S. C. App. §925 (1940 ed., Supp.

II)). This language is far more favorable to the agency than

§10( j) because it seemingly suggests that courts must grant

injunctive relief where the agency makes the required

showing. Yet, the Court refused to read the Emergency

Price Control Act to create such “a major departure from

th[e] long tradition” of equity. 321 U. S., at 330. The Court

reasoned that “if Congress desired to make such an abrupt

departure from traditional equity practice . . . , it would

have made its desire plain.” Ibid. If the Emergency Price

Control Act did not displace the presumption that tradi-

tional equitable principles apply, then §10( j)’s discretion-

inviting directive to grant injunctive relief as district courts

“dee[m] just and proper” does not either.

Finally, §10( j)’s text bears no resemblance to the lan-

guage that Congress has employed when it has altered the

normal equitable rules. Some statutes increase the burden

for obtaining an injunction. Another provision in the NLRA

itself, for example, makes it harder for the Government to

obtain an injunction against union strikes and lockouts by

requiring a showing that the strike or lockout “affects an

entire industry or a substantial part thereof ” and “im-

peril[s] the national health or safety.” 29 U. S. C. §178(a).

And, courts evaluating preliminary-injunction requests un-

der the Prison Litigation Reform Act must “give substantial

weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the opera-

tion of a criminal justice system.” 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(2).

Other statutes expressly relieve the party moving for an in-

junction from showing that he can satisfy one of the tradi-

tional criteria. For instance, plaintiffs alleging trademark

violations are entitled to “a rebuttable presumption of ir-

reparable harm . . . upon a finding of likelihood of success

on the merits.” 132 Stat. 2208, 15 U. S. C. §1116(a). Unlike

these statutes, §10( j) omits any specific instruction that

suggests Congress altered the traditional equitable rules.

8 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of the Court

It simply invites courts to grant equitable relief where they

deem it “just and proper.” And, in exercising this discre-

tionary authority, courts must “be guided by sound [equita-

ble] principles.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In sum, because nothing in §10( j)’s text overcomes the

presumption that traditional equitable principles govern,

district courts considering the Board’s request for a prelim-

inary injunction must apply the Winter framework, which

embodies those traditional principles.

B

Rather than contest that traditional equitable crite-

ria govern, the Board recasts the dispute as one about how

statutory context informs the application of those criteria.

The Board highlights that Congress made the Board, not

federal courts, responsible for adjudicating charges of un-

fair labor practices in the first instance and that courts of

appeals must review the Board’s final decisions deferen-

tially. According to the Board, these contextual considera-

tions require district courts evaluating §10( j) petitions to

apply the traditional criteria in a less exacting way, and the

Sixth Circuit’s reasonable-cause standard appropriately ac-

counts for context. The partial dissent also asserts that “a

district court’s preliminary look at the merits” of a §10(j)

petition “should be far less searching than normal” for sim-

ilar reasons. Post, at 14 (JACKSON, J., concurring in part,

concurring in judgment, and dissenting in part). We disa-

gree.

The reasonable-cause standard goes far beyond simply

fine tuning the traditional criteria to the §10( j) context—it

substantively lowers the bar for securing a preliminary in-

junction by requiring courts to yield to the Board’s prelimi-

nary view of the facts, law, and equities. Nowhere is this

more evident than with what the Board, as movant, must

show about the merits of its claims. Under the traditional

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 9

Opinion of the Court

standard, the Board would have to make a clear showing

that it “is likely to succeed on the merits.” Winter, 555 U. S.,

at 20. And, in assessing that likelihood, a district court

must evaluate any factual conflicts or difficult questions of

law. 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure §2948.3 (3d ed. 2013). By contrast, the

Board may obtain a §10( j) injunction under the reasonable-

cause standard by merely showing “reasonable cause to be-

lieve that unfair labor practices have occurred.” Ozburn-

Hessey Logistics, 875 F. 3d, at 339 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Board “need not convince the court of

the validity of [its] theory of liability, as long as the theory

is substantial and not frivolous.” Gottfried v. Frankel, 818

F. 2d 485, 493 (CA6 1987). And, “[i]n reviewing the sup-

porting facts, a district court may not resolve conflicting ev-

idence or make credibility determinations.” 77 F. 4th, at

397.

There is an obvious difference between having the Board

show that it is “likely” to succeed on the merits and having

it show only that its theory of the case is “substantial and

not frivolous,” without having to convince the court that its

theory is likely meritorious. In fact, it is hard to imagine

how the Board could lose under the reasonable-cause test if

courts deferentially ask only whether the Board offered a

minimally plausible legal theory, while ignoring conflicting

law or facts. As Judge Readler explained, if the reasonable-

cause standard were “applied in the traditional civil litiga-

tion setting, any complaint that could withstand Rule

12(b)(6) would automatically be deserving of injunctive re-

lief as well, rendering the court more a spectator than a ref-

eree when it comes to matters of equity.” Id., at 408 (con-

curring opinion). Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts that apply

the reasonable-cause standard freely acknowledge that the

threshold merits showing is “significantly lower than a re-

quirement to show . . . ‘likelihood of success’ ” under the tra-

ditional standard. Overstreet v. El Paso Disposal, L.P., 625

10 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of the Court

F. 3d 844, 851, n. 10 (CA5 2010); see also Fleischut v. Nixon

Detroit Diesel, Inc., 859 F. 2d 26, 29 (CA6 1988) (character-

izing the Board’s burden to show reasonable cause as “rela-

tively insubstantial” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 10( j)’s statutory context does not compel this wa-

tered-down approach to equity. The Board and the partial

dissent are correct that §10( j) proceedings are different

from ordinary preliminary-injunction proceedings insofar

as the Board, not the district court, will adjudicate the

claims in the first instance. But, they do not explain why

this difference should matter. The Board suggests that dis-

trict courts risk supplanting its adjudicatory authority by

conducting an independent assessment of the merits and

equitable factors. But, no matter how searching the district

court’s merits inquiry or what evidence it considers or cred-

its, the Board remains free to reach its own legal conclu-

sions and develop its own record in its administrative pro-

ceedings. See Camenisch, 451 U. S., at 395. Also, since

irreparable harm and the other equitable factors are not

part of the unfair-labor-practice claim, the district court’s

assessment of those factors is completely irrelevant to the

Board’s adjudicatory authority.

The Board and the partial dissent also reason that dis-

trict courts should apply a deferential standard because the

Board’s final decisions are reviewed deferentially by a court

of appeals. But, none of the views advanced in a §10( j) pe-

tition represent the Board’s formal position—they are

simply the preliminary legal and factual views of the

Board’s in-house attorneys who investigated and initiated

the administrative complaint. And, deference to what is

“nothing more than an agency’s convenient litigating posi-

tion” is “entirely inappropriate.” Bowen v. Georgetown

Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 213 (1988). The Board’s at-

tempt to salvage the reasonable-cause standard using stat-

utory context thus fails.

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 11

Opinion of the Court

III

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that district courts

must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter

when considering the Board’s requests for a preliminary in-

junction under §10( j). We therefore vacate the judgment of

the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further pro-

ceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–367

_________________

STARBUCKS CORPORATION, PETITIONER v.

M. KATHLEEN MCKINNEY, REGIONAL DI-

RECTOR OF REGION 15 OF THE NATION-

AL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FOR

AND ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2024]

JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in part, concurring in the

judgment, and dissenting in part.

“When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforce-

ment of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment,

it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic

power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the

statutory purposes.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry,

Inc., 361 U. S. 288, 291–292 (1960). Accordingly, when in-

terpreting a statute that authorizes equitable relief, like a

preliminary injunction, this Court typically employs what

amounts to a two-part inquiry focused on congressional in-

tent. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 328–331

(1944). First, we determine whether Congress has stripped

courts of their traditional equitable discretion by “a clear

and valid legislative command.” Porter v. Warner Holding

Co., 328 U. S. 395, 398 (1946). Second, if no such clear com-

mand is found, we look to the statutory context to assess

how courts should exercise their equitable discretion “ ‘as

conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which

Congress has sought to protect.’ ” Weinberger v. Romero-

Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 320 (1982) (quoting Hecht, 321 U. S.,

2 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

at 330).

Today, the Court correctly applies the first step, but ig-

nores the second. I agree with the majority that nothing in

the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) clearly strips

courts of their equitable discretion to determine whether to

issue a so-called §10(j) injunction. And I concur in the con-

clusion that we should vacate and remand for the Sixth Cir-

cuit to reevaluate this case under our traditional four-factor

test for assessing requests for preliminary injunctions. But

I cannot join the majority in ignoring the choices Congress

has made in the NLRA about how courts should exercise

their discretion in light of the National Labor Relations

Board’s authority over labor disputes. Because the major-

ity chooses the simplicity of unfettered judicial discretion

over the nuances of Congress’s direction, I respectfully dis-

sent in part.

I

The question in this case is how district courts should

evaluate the Board’s request for a preliminary injunction in

light of Congress’s intentions. See 29 U. S. C. §160(j) (au-

thorizing a district court to issue “such temporary relief or

restraining order as it deems just and proper”). The major-

ity suggests a sharp dichotomy: Either courts retain all of

their equitable discretion, or the Board gets undue defer-

ence. See ante, at 8–10. But, “[w]hen Congress invokes the

Chancellor’s conscience to further transcendent legislative

purposes, what is required is the principled application of

standards consistent with those purposes,” not unbridled

equitable discretion, “ ‘which varies like the Chancellor’s

foot.’ ” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417

(1975) (alteration omitted).

Our Hecht case is instructive, for it establishes the frame-

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

work we have long used to assess whether an injunction au-

thorized by a statute should issue.1 In Hecht, the Court was

asked to determine whether the Emergency Price Control

Act’s direction that an injunction “ ‘shall be granted’ ” after

a violation was found displaced a court’s equitable discre-

tion. 321 U. S., at 322. As the majority acknowledges, after

finding no clear indication that Congress intended to dis-

place equitable discretion, the Hecht Court concluded that

the answer was no. See ante, at 7.2

But Hecht did not end there. The Court emphasized that

the mere fact that the Emergency Price Control Act lacked

an “unequivocal statement” displacing courts’ equitable dis-

cretion did not “imply that courts should administer [the

Act] grudgingly.” 321 U. S., at 329–330. Instead, the Court

explained, courts should see themselves as partners of the

agency that administered the Act. Congress “entrusted”

each “with a share of . . . responsibility” for effectuating its

goals. Id., at 331. In other words, “[c]ourt and agency are

the means adopted to attain the prescribed end, and so far

——————

1 As Judge Friendly explained, “Mr. Justice Douglas’ classic opinion in

Hecht” is “a decision of such widely recognized significance that it is not

unreasonable to attribute knowledge of it to at least some of the framers

of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 in which [§]10(j) . . . originated.” Dan-

ielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit and Allied Garment Workers’ Union, 494

F. 2d 1230, 1240 (CA2 1974).

2 The majority correctly states this holding, but its analysis of Hecht

Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944), misleadingly suggests a near-unob-

tainable standard for displacement. Hecht does not hold that the statu-

tory phrase “shall be granted” is insufficiently clear to displace a court’s

equitable discretion. Contra, ante, at 6–7. Rather, the Hecht Court found

that such language was “less mandatory than a literal reading might

suggest” because of two other indicia of congressional intent. 321 U. S.,

at 328. First, the statute itself gave courts discretion to enter an injunc-

tion “or other order,” as they deemed fit. Ibid. And, second, the legisla-

tive history suggested that courts should retain their equitable discretion

to provide the relief “ ‘proper in the circumstances of each particular

case.’ ” Id., at 329 (quoting S. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 10

(1942)).

4 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, those

words should be construed so as to attain that end through

coordinated action.” Id., at 330. Therefore, a court’s “dis-

cretion . . . must be exercised in light of the large objectives

of the Act.” Id., at 331.

Hecht’s two-step framework is still in use today. We only

rarely find that a statute clearly displaces courts’ equitable

discretion. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 193–195

(1978) (finding such displacement in the Endangered Spe-

cies Act). So, in most cases in which equitable relief is au-

thorized by statute, the movant must contend with the

court’s equitable authority. In statutes that involve prelim-

inary injunctive relief, that means the party seeking relief

“must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits,

[2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the ab-

sence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities

tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public

interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008).

Even so, under the Hecht framework, we have consist-

ently held that courts’ exercise of equitable discretion is in-

formed by congressional intent. Put simply, “a court sitting

in equity cannot ‘ignore the judgment of Congress, deliber-

ately expressed in legislation.’ ” United States v. Oakland

Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 497 (2001)

(quoting Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U. S.

515, 551 (1937)). For each of the four factors, then, courts

must look to the choices made by Congress for guidance.

See Oakland Cannabis, 532 U. S., at 497 (“ ‘Once Congress,

exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of

priorities in a given area, it is . . . for the courts to enforce

them when enforcement is sought’ ” (quoting Hill, 437 U. S.,

at 194)).

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

II

A

Here, the choices Congress has made regarding how labor

disputes are to be resolved—including its decision to au-

thorize preliminary injunctive relief in some circum-

stances—are clear and comprehensive. As briefly explained

below, Congress has long sought to contain the unbounded

exercise of judicial discretion to issue injunctions in the con-

text of labor disputes, leaving the resolution of those partic-

ular conflicts primarily in the hands of the Board. See Brief

for Service Employees International Union as Amicus Cu-

riae 4–11.

That is for good reason. To put it bluntly, courts exercis-

ing their equitable discretion amidst labor disputes today

do so against the backdrop of an ignominious history of

abuse. See generally F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, The La-

bor Injunction (1930). “In the early part of [the 20th] cen-

tury, the federal courts generally were regarded as allies of

management in its attempt to prevent the organization and

strengthening of labor unions.” Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail

Clerks, 398 U. S. 235, 250 (1970). “Injunctions figured in

virtually every railroad strike; in most strikes in which in-

dustrial unionism, ‘amalgamation,’ or ‘federation’ was at is-

sue; in most major organizing and recognition strikes, boy-

cotts, closed shop or sympathy strikes or anti-union/open-

shop lockouts of significant magnitude; and in a small but

still significant and growing portion of ordinary mine-run

strikes.” W. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor

Movement, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1152 (1989). “[I]n this

industrial struggle the injunction became a potent weapon

that was wielded against the activities of labor groups.”

Boys Markets, 398 U. S., at 250.

Congress reacted to this antidemocratic “ ‘government by

injunction’ ” by seeking to cabin courts’ power to intervene.

Milk Wagon Drivers v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311

U. S. 91, 102 (1940). Its initial attempt, in the Clayton Act

6 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

of 1914, was unsuccessful, due in large part to judicial frus-

tration of congressional intent. See BE&K Constr. Co. v.

NLRB, 536 U. S. 516, 543 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in

part and concurring in judgment). Its next attempt, the

Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, was impossible to ignore.

There, Congress “deprive[d] the courts of jurisdiction to is-

sue an injunction in any case involving or growing out of a

labor dispute, except” under specified circumstances and

with particular procedural checks. New Negro Alliance v.

Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 561–562 (1938); see

also Marine Cooks v. Panama S. S. Co., 362 U. S. 365, 369

(1960) (“The language [of the Norris-LaGuardia Act] is

broad because Congress was intent upon taking the federal

courts out of the labor injunction business except in very

limited circumstances”).

Three years later, in 1935, Congress passed the National

Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq. The Act aimed

to “eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions

to the free flow of commerce” by protecting workers’ rights.

§151. To achieve this aim, the NLRA codified “[e]mploy-

ees[’] . . . right to self-organization,” to form and join unions,

to collectively bargain, and to strike. §157. It also made it

unlawful for employers and unions to engage in particular

unfair labor practices. See §158. Employers, for example,

cannot interfere with employees’ efforts to organize a union

or engage in collective bargaining. See §§157, 158(a). Sim-

ilarly, unions cannot, inter alia, coerce employees to join a

union or refuse to engage in collective bargaining. See

§158(b).

Notably, though, Congress did not leave it to courts to

protect the rights established in the NLRA. See Phelps

Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 193 (1941). Instead,

Congress created an expert agency, the National Labor Re-

lations Board, to investigate, adjudicate, and stop unfair la-

bor practices. See 29 U. S. C. §160(a). The agency is headed

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 7

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

by a five-member board that is charged with resolving un-

fair labor practice cases, see §153(a); the enforcement role

is occupied by a General Counsel, see §153(d). The General

Counsel is charged with investigating and prosecuting un-

fair labor practice cases, as well as overseeing Regional Of-

fices that carry out much of the day-to-day work of enforc-

ing labor law and policy. See ibid.; see also NLRB v. Food

& Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112, 117–118 (1987).

To evaluate and remedy unfair labor practices, the Board

follows a four-step process. See ante, at 2. First, a charge

is filed and investigated, with parties generally permitted

to present evidence and arguments related to the alleged

violation. See 29 CFR §§101.2, 101.4 (2023). Second, if the

investigation yields sufficient information to show an un-

fair labor practice, the Regional Director can issue a com-

plaint. See §101.8. Third, an administrative law judge

holds a hearing and issues a decision on the merits of the

complaint, which a party can then appeal to the Board. See

§§101.10 to 101.12. Finally, if the unfair labor practices al-

leged in the complaint are sustained, the Board can seek

enforcement of the order, and any aggrieved party can seek

review, in a federal court of appeals. See 29 U. S. C.

§§160(e), (f ); 29 CFR §101.14.

B

Crucially for present purposes, Congress recognized that

delay in vindicating labor rights “during the ‘notoriously

glacial’ course of NLRB proceedings” can lead to their de-

feat. Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F. 2d 485, 491 (CA7

1989). This case is illustrative of the problem. In February

2022, Starbucks fired five of six members of an organizing

committee, along with two other union-aligned workers,

just as a campaign for unionization was building momen-

tum. The Board took up the workers’ complaint soon after.

Now, more than two years later, their case remains pend-

ing.

8 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

To respond to situations such as this one, Congress gave

the Board specific power to seek preliminary injunctive re-

lief. These injunctions are generally referred to as Ҥ10(j)

injunctions,” named after the section of the Taft-Hartley

Act of 1947 in which they were originally introduced. See

29 U. S. C. §160(j). There is broad consensus about why

Congress allowed the Board to seek §10(j) injunctions. As

summarized in the Senate Report on Taft-Hartley:

“Time is usually of the essence in [labor disputes], and

consequently the relatively slow procedure of Board

hearing and order, followed many months later by an

enforcing decree of the circuit court of appeals, falls

short of achieving the desired objectives—the prompt

elimination of the obstructions to the free flow of com-

merce and encouragement of the practice and proce-

dure of free and private collective bargaining. Hence

we have provided that the Board, acting in the public

interest and not in vindication of purely private rights,

may seek injunctive relief in the case of all types of un-

fair labor practices.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st

Sess., 8 (1947).

See also, e.g., Kinney, 881 F. 2d, at 488 (Easterbrook, J.)

(quoting this passage); Miller v. California Pacific Medical

Center, 19 F. 3d 449, 455, n. 3 (CA9 1994) (en banc) (same);

Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit and Allied Garment

Workers’ Union, 494 F. 2d 1230, 1241–1242 (CA2 1974)

(Friendly, J.) (discussing similar legislative history).

In short, Congress designed §10(j) “ ‘as a means of pre-

serving or restoring the status quo as it existed before the

onset of unfair labor practices’ ” so that the Board’s ultimate

ability to remedy an unfair labor practice would not be im-

peded. NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F. 3d 1559, 1575

(CA7 1996).

In addition to authorizing §10(j) injunctions, Congress

made two other pertinent choices in the statute. First, it

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 9

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

granted the Board power to seek a §10(j) injunction. See 29

U. S. C. §160(j). No private party has authority to seek

§10(j) relief. See Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers

Co., 348 U. S. 511, 517 (1955). And, by the statute’s own

terms, power is left to the Board itself, rather than the Gen-

eral Counsel or another member of the prosecutorial branch

of the agency. That is unlike a closely related section of the

statute, §10(l), which authorizes the relevant “officer or re-

gional attorney” to file for preliminary relief in cases involv-

ing certain unfair labor practices by unions. See 29 U. S. C.

§160(l). Second, Congress granted the Board discretion to

determine whether or not to seek preliminary injunctive re-

lief. See §160(j). Thus, the Board need only seek §10(j) re-

lief when it deems doing so appropriate or necessary.

Again, by contrast, requests for relief under §10(l) are man-

datory once an investigation yields “reasonable cause to be-

lieve” that an unfair labor practice has occurred. See

§160(l).

The NLRA does not specify how the Board should exer-

cise its discretion to seek §10(j) injunctions. But the agency

has crafted an extensive, and strikingly deliberative, stand-

ard operating procedure. See Brief for Respondent 4 (citing

Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Section 10(j) Manual

(Mar. 2020)). First, the Regional Director must submit a

written memorandum to the General Counsel explaining

why temporary relief is appropriate in a given case. Second,

the General Counsel must review the memorandum and de-

termine whether the request for relief is warranted. Third,

if the General Counsel determines that a §10(j) injunction

should be sought, then she must present a recommendation

to the Board. Fourth, and finally, the Board must either

accept or reject the recommendation. It is only after the

Board approves the filing of a request for a §10(j) injunction

in this fashion that the General Counsel or relevant Re-

gional Director files that request in federal district court.

When the district court receives the Board’s application

10 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

for a §10(j) injunction, the statutory scheme kicks back in.

“Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause

notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon

shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary

relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.” 29

U. S. C. §160(j). If granted, a §10(j) injunction returns

workers, unions, and employers to the status quo as it ex-

isted before the alleged NLRA violation. See Electro-Voice,

Inc., 83 F. 3d, at 1575.

III

A

What standard should district courts use to decide

whether granting the Board’s §10(j) request for interim re-

lief is “just and proper”? That is the question this case pre-

sents, and as I previously explained, we use Hecht’s frame-

work to answer. So, first, we determine whether Congress

has clearly displaced courts’ equitable discretion. And, sec-

ond, if no such clear statement exists, we evaluate how that

discretion should be exercised in light of Congress’s choices

in the NLRA.

At step one, the parties here do not dispute that §10(j)’s

text, context, and legislative history lack the clear congres-

sional intent required to preclude district courts from exer-

cising equitable discretion. See Brief for Petitioner 15;

Brief for Respondent 9. Also, no Circuit, not even the Sixth

Circuit below, holds that §10(j) deprives district courts of

their equitable discretion. See, e.g., Gottfried v. Frankel,

818 F. 2d 485, 493–494 (CA6 1987) (“The granting of injunc-

tive relief under this ‘just and proper’ standard, is a matter

committed to judicial discretion” (some internal quotation

marks omitted)). I agree with the majority that courts faced

with a Board petition for a §10(j) injunction should evaluate

that request using all four factors in our established Winter

test. See Winter, 555 U. S., at 20; see also ante, at 6.

The remaining question—Hecht’s second step—is the

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 11

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

more challenging one. To the extent the majority addresses

it at all, it has done an insufficient job of explaining how

district courts’ equitable discretion is channeled by Con-

gress’s choices within the NLRA.

The fact that this needs to be done is uncontroversial.

“Obviously,” Starbucks says, “ ‘statutory context is relevant

to the consideration of equitable relief.’ ” Reply Brief 10

(quoting Brief for Respondent 15); see also Brief for Re-

spondent 9; Reply Brief 2; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20–24, 33–35.

And every relevant Circuit, including those that use the

standard four-factor test, understands district courts’ equi-

table discretion to issue a §10(j) injunction has to be in-

formed by the statutory context of the NLRA. See, e.g., Pye

v. Sullivan Bros. Printers, Inc., 38 F. 3d 58, 63 (CA1 1994);

Hoffman v. Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 247 F. 3d 360, 368

(CA2 2001); Chester v. Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F. 3d 87,

98–100 (CA3 2011); Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co., 570

F. 3d 534, 543 (CA4 2009); McKinney v. Creative Vision Re-

sources, LLC, 783 F. 3d 293, 296–297 (CA5 2015); Ahearn

v. Jackson Hospital Corp., 351 F. 3d 226, 237–239 (CA6

2003); Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F. 3d 270,

287–288 (CA7 2001); McKinney v. Southern Bakeries, LLC,

786 F. 3d 1119, 1122–1123 (CA8 2015); Miller, 19 F. 3d, at

459–460; Sharp v. Webco Industries, Inc., 225 F. 3d 1130,

1133–1136 (CA10 2000); NLRB v. Hartman and Tyner, Inc.,

714 F. 3d 1244, 1249–1250 (CA11 2013). But the Court to-

day provides little helpful guidance on this front.

B

Given our precedents and the statute’s text, the interac-

tion between Congress’s choices in the NLRA and a district

court’s equitable assessment of a request for §10(j) relief is

straightforward for three of the four equitable factors.

To show irreparable harm, the Board must establish that

its ability to remedy a violation of labor rights will likely be

precluded absent interim relief. See, e.g., Frankl v. HTH

12 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

Corp., 650 F. 3d 1334, 1362 (CA9 2012) (“In the context of

the NLRA, permitting an alleged unfair labor practice to

reach fruition and thereby render meaningless the Board’s

remedial authority is irreparable harm” (alteration and in-

ternal quotation marks omitted)). When evaluating the

balance of the equities, district courts may consider harms

to an opposing party, but they are prohibited from crediting

a party’s desire to continue engaging in an alleged violation

of the NLRA. See Oakland Cannabis, 532 U. S., at 498

(“[W]hen a court of equity exercises its discretion, it may

not consider the advantages and disadvantages of nonen-

forcement of the statute”). When addressing the public in-

terest, courts must defer to Congress’s articulation of that

interest in the NLRA itself. See 29 U. S. C. §151 (“It is . . .

the policy of the United States to . . . encourag[e] . . . collec-

tive bargaining and . . . protec[t] the exercise by workers of

full freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-

tion of representatives of their own choosing”); see also Vir-

ginian R. Co., 300 U. S., at 552 (“The fact that Congress has

indicated its purpose . . . is in itself a declaration of public

interest and policy which should be persuasive in inducing

courts to give relief ”).

The final factor—the likelihood of success on the merits—

is more difficult to evaluate. That factor can be articulated

in “a bewildering variety of formulations,” but, at core, it

asks courts to predict how likely it is that a party seeking

preliminary relief will ultimately prevail on the merits of

their claims. 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure §2948.3, p. 197 (3d ed. 2013); see

also id., at 201 (“All courts agree that a plaintiff must pre-

sent a prima facie case but need not show a certainty of

winning” (footnote omitted)). In my view, three aspects of

the NLRA’s scheme should inform this evaluation.

First, as described above, the NLRA makes the Board,

not district courts, the primary adjudicator of labor dis-

putes and the central expositor of labor policy. See 29

Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 13

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

U. S. C. §160(a); see also Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437

U. S. 483, 500 (1978) (“It is the Board on which Congress

conferred the authority to develop and apply fundamental

national labor policy”); Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485,

490 (1953) (“Congress . . . confide[d] primary interpretation

and application of its rules to a specific and specially con-

stituted tribunal,” the Board). This means that, unlike in

the typical preliminary injunction context, the district court

is not making a predictive judgment about how it will rule

on the merits itself. Instead, the court is predicting the fu-

ture decision of the Board. See Miller, 19 F. 3d, at 460;

Bloedorn, 276 F. 3d, at 288.

Second, as I previously explained, §10(j) empowers the

Board—acting in its adjudicatory capacity—to seek injunc-

tive relief. 29 U. S. C. §160(j); see also Brief for Respondent

28–29; Tr. of Oral Arg. 50, 63–64. When it does so, the

Board is not acting as a party to the underlying dispute.3

We also have evidence that the Board’s screening process

for determining when to seek a §10(j) injunction is exceed-

ingly rigorous: Of the roughly 20,000 unfair labor practice

charges filed last year, the Board authorized the filing of a

petition for §10(j) relief only 14 times. See Brief for Re-

spondent 39. This means that, by the time the district court

gets a (rare) §10(j) request, the Board has already deemed

an unfair labor charge likely meritorious, and has deter-

mined that preservation of the status quo is needed to facil-

itate its own likely judgment.

Finally, the NLRA gives federal courts only a limited role

——————

3 If it were, then, of course, the majority would be correct to observe

that the Board should have to demonstrate the merits of its claims under

the traditional test. See ante, at 8. What the majority fails to adequately

address is the unique position of the Board when it seeks a §10(j) injunc-

tion, per Congress’s directives. Unlike other similar movants for interim

relief, the Board is the decider of the merits of the underlying dispute.

So all that the Board is requesting from the district court is a legally

enforceable means of preserving the status quo until it can render its

decision.

14 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

in reviewing the Board’s decisions. In the court of appeals,

the Board’s factual findings are “conclusive” if supported by

substantial evidence. See §§160(e), (f ). We have also long

recognized that the Board’s legal interpretations are to be

accorded “considerable deference.” NLRB v. City Disposal

Systems, Inc., 465 U. S. 822, 829 (1984); see also Ford Motor

Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant) v. NLRB, 441 U. S. 488, 497

(1979) (“Of course, the judgment of the Board is subject to

judicial review; but if its construction of the statute is rea-

sonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely because

the courts might prefer another view”); NLRB v. United Ins.

Co. of America, 390 U. S. 254, 260 (1968) (same for “appli-

cation of law to facts”). What is more, absent highly unu-

sual circumstances, district courts play no role in the review

process at all. See §160(e) (allowing the Board to file en-

forcement orders in district courts only if “all the courts of

appeals to which application may be made are in vacation”).

These three features of the statutory scheme necessarily

mean that a district court’s preliminary look at the merits

when considering the Board’s petition for interim relief un-

der §10(j) should be far less searching than normal. A §10(j)

injunction request simply does not present the district court

with an opportunity to wade into the midst of an ongoing

labor dispute (over which it otherwise has no say) and offer

its own take about how the merits should be decided. In-

stead, in deference to Congress’s choices as codified in the

NLRA, the district court’s task is much simpler: to evaluate

a petition for a §10(j) injunction in a manner that accounts

for the statutory scheme authorizing such relief and the dis-

trict court’s proper role within it. Thus, so long as the Board

has presented “some evidence to support the unfair labor

practice charge, together with an arguable legal theory,” a

district court should find this final factor satisfied. Miller,

19 F. 3d, at 460.

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Opinion of JACKSON, J.

C

The majority’s contrary conclusion on the likelihood-of-

success factor is based on various misrepresentations about

the Board’s authority under the NLRA. For example, in ad-

dition to mistakenly consigning the Board to the status of a

mere party movant, see n. 3, supra, the majority misstates

the Board’s role in seeking §10(j) relief generally, see ante,

at 10 (“[T]he views advanced in a §10(j) petition . . . are

simply the preliminary legal and factual views of the

Board’s in-house attorneys who investigated and initiated

the administrative complaint”). Similarly, the majority

misrepresents the Board’s arguments in this case regarding

how the statutory scheme informs district courts’ analysis.

Far from failing to explain the relevance of district courts’

lack of jurisdiction over labor disputes, ibid., the Board has

offered a detailed argument, consistent with our precedent

and the longstanding decisions of the lower courts, for why

this structural feature of the NLRA is important and why

it might well be dispositive of the likelihood of success anal-

ysis. See Brief for Respondent 26–29, 35–36; see also Tr. of

Oral Arg. 35–36. The majority also completely misses the

significance of the limited role that federal courts of appeal

play in reviewing the Board’s decisions. See ante, at 2, 10.

Unfortunately, today’s decision appears to be another in-

stallment in a series of labor cases in which this Court has

failed “to heed Congress’s intent with respect to the Board’s

primary role in adjudicating labor disputes.” Glacier North-

west, Inc. v. Teamsters, 598 U. S. 771, 814 (2023) (JACKSON,

J., dissenting). And, like its earlier decisions, “[t]he Court’s

ruling is likely to cause considerable confusion among the

lower courts,” which have been for decades exercising their

equitable discretion informed by the NLRA. Ibid. I recog-

nize that, as a practical matter, the majority’s decision here

may make little difference, since requests for §10(j) relief

are rare. But that fact is more a function of the Board’s

gatekeeping role than anything else. Now that the Court

16 STARBUCKS CORP. v. McKINNEY

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

has concluded the Board’s authorization to seek §10(j) in-

terim relief is of no moment, the Board may find it unnec-

essary to play the gatekeeping role Congress designed for it

in this context. As a result, today’s decision might force not

just courts, but also the Board, to disregard Congress’s di-

rection.

* * *

A petition for §10(j) relief serves a straightforward, but

significant purpose: “to preserve the NLRB’s remedial

power while the Board resolves an unfair labor practice

charge.” Miller, 19 F. 3d, at 452. Today, the majority casts

a district court’s decision regarding a §10(j) request as one

that invokes the full sweep of a court’s traditional equitable

discretion—without regard for the Board’s authority or the

statutory scheme that authorizes courts to issue such in-

terim relief in the first place. In doing so, “the Court un-

necessarily and casually substitutes the chancellor’s

clumsy foot for the rule of law.” Weinberger, 456 U. S., at

335 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I am loath to bless this ag-

grandizement of judicial power where Congress has so

plainly limited the discretion of the courts, and where it so

clearly intends for the expert agency it has created to make

the primary determinations about both merits and process.