Opinion

Golding v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Court: District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed: Jun 2, 2023
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 17.2%

holding a claimant’s subjective allegations cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective allegations]”

How later courts described this case

holding a claimant’s subjective allegations cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective allegations]”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

LISA GOLDING PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 4:22-cv-04116

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lisa Golding (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social

Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision

of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for

a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Act.

The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all

proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and

conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court

issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

1. Background:

Plaintiff protectively filed her disability applications on September 28, 2020. (Tr. 11-24).

In these applications, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to occipital nerve damage, fibromyalgia,

neuropathy in her hands and arms, a bulging disc, bone degeneration, and anxiety. (Tr. 340).

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The

transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document

filed at ECF No. 10. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF

page number.

Plaintiff alleges an onset date of October 15, 2018. (Tr. 11). These applications were denied

initially on December 17, 2020, and these applications were denied again on reconsideration on

April 1, 2021. Id.

After these denials, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, and this hearing request

was granted. (Tr. 31-55). Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on December 6, 2021, and

this hearing was held in Shreveport, Louisiana. Id. Plaintiff was present and was represented by

Greg Giles at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Christina Beatty-Cody

testified at this hearing. Id.

On December 13, 2021, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully

unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr. 8-30). The ALJ found Plaintiff met the

insured status requirements of the Act through March 31, 2020. (Tr. 13, Finding 1). The ALJ

determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since October 15,

2018, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 13, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff has the following

severe impairments: degenerative disc disease/spondylosis of the lumbar/thoracic spine;

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine with headaches; neuropathy; a right shoulder injury;

obesity; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 13-14, Finding 3). Despite being severe,

the ALJ also determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 14-15, Finding 4).

The ALJ determined Plaintiff was forty-eight (48) years old on her alleged disability onset

date. (Tr. 22-23, Finding 7). Such an individual is defined as a “younger individual” under 20

C.F.R § 404.1563(c) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) on her alleged disability onset date. Id. The ALJ

determined Plaintiff had at least a high school education. (Tr. 23, Finding 8). In this decision, the

ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and determined her Residual Functional Capacity

(“RFC”). (Tr. 15-22, Finding 5). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the following RFC:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can stand/walk for a total combined time of

four hours in a workday. She can occasionally push/pull with the dominant right

upper extremity and frequently push/pull with the left upper extremity. She can

occasionally climb ramps/stairs but never ladders/ropes/scaffolds. In addition, the

claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch but cannot crawl. She

can frequently perform reaching, handling, and fingering bilaterally. Furthermore,

the claimant can maintain attention and concentration for noncomplex, routine

tasks. She can have occasional public contact and cannot perform teamwork-related

tasks. She can tolerate occasional supervision except for periods of instruction.

Finally, the claimant can maintain a work routine consistent with noncomplex tasks

with explanation provided for changes.

Id.

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff was

unable to perform any of her PRW. (Tr. 22, Finding 6). The ALJ then considered whether Plaintiff

retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national

economy. (Tr. 23-24, Finding 10). In making this determination, the ALJ relied upon the

testimony of the VE. Id. Based upon the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained

the capacity to perform the following occupations: (1) collator operator (light, unskilled) with

39,800 such jobs in the nation; (2) router (light, unskilled) with 31,400 such jobs in the nation; and

(3) tabber (light, unskilled) with 10,300 such jobs in the nation. Id. Because Plaintiff retained the

capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability,

as defined by the Act, from October 15, 2018 through the date of her decision or through December

16, 2021. (Tr. 24, Finding 11).

Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable disability

determination. (Tr. 1-5). On November 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1.

The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on December 1, 2022. ECF No. 5. This

case is now ready for decision.

2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than

a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir.

2001).As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that

would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case

differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the

record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those

positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young

v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least

one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox

v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The

Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve

consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses

the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)

whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment

listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work

experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his

or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts

to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant

can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only

considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final

stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

3. Discussion:

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raised the following three arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ’s

RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; (2) the ALJ erred in

discrediting her subjective complaints; and (3) the ALJ’s mental RFC assessment was inadequate.

ECF No. 14 at 1-21. Because the Court finds the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations and in assessing her RFC, the Court will only address Plaintiff’s second argument for

reversal.

The Court notes that in assessing the subjective allegations of a claimant, the ALJ is

required to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.

1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979,

983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the

duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See

Polaski, 739 at 1322.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective

allegations of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as

the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective

allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly

applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations are not entirely reliable, the ALJ’s determination of subjective allegations is entitled to

deference. See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot

discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations “solely because the objective medical evidence does not

fully support them [the subjective allegations].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s subjective allegations of pain, the ALJ must make a specific

determination regarding that claimant’s subjective allegations, articulating the reasons for

discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See

Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or

discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the

2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis

of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for

relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve

your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour,

sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not

yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983

(2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes

the performance of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th

Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the Court finds the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for

discounting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. In her opinion, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s

subjective complains for the following reasons: