holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”
How later courts described this case
- holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. PLAINTIFF
vs. Civil No. 1:22-cv-01046
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL DEFENDANT
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Arthur Williams, Jr., (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his
application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability application on October 30, 2019. (Tr. 16). In the
application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to Type 2 diabetes, neuropathy in hands, feet and
legs, and high blood pressure. (Tr. 197). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of August 1, 2019. (Tr.
1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document
filed at ECF No. 12. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF
page number.
16). This application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff
requested an administrative hearing, and that hearing request was granted. (Tr. 91-143).
On March 12, 2021, the ALJ held an administrative hearing. (Tr. 30-51). At this hearing,
Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, Matthew Golden. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational
Expert (“VE”) William Stampley testified at this administrative hearing. Id.
On September 27, 2021, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully
unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 16-25). In this decision, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since October 30,
2019. (Tr. 18, Finding 1). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: diabetes, peripheral neuropathy, lumbar spondylosis, chronic pain syndrome, and
obesity. (Tr. 18, Finding 2). Despite being severe, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 19, Finding 3).
In her decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr.
20-23, Finding 4). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work
except limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; occasional balancing, stooping,
kneeling, crouching, or crawling; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and needs to change
position for one to two minutes per hour without being off task or away from the workstation. Id.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 23, Finding 5). The
ALJ determined Plaintiff had no PRW. Id. However, the ALJ found there were jobs in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 23, Finding 9). With the help
of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the representative occupations of (1) price marker
with approximately 283,200 jobs in the nation, (2) router with approximately 54,500 jobs in the
nation, and (3) cafeteria attendant with approximately 139,500 jobs in the nation. Id. Based upon
this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been disabled since October 30, 2019. (Tr. 24,
Finding 10).
Plaintiff requested the Appeal’s Council’s review of this unfavorable decision. (Tr. 5-10).
The Appeals Council denied this request. Id. Thereafter, on August 15, 2022, Plaintiff appealed
his administrative case to this Court. ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this
Court. ECF No. 5. Both Parties have filed their appeal briefs, and this matter is now ripe for
consideration. ECF Nos. 18, 20.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,
the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would
have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently.
See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is
possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d
1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least
one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox
v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff
must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve
consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts
to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only
considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final
stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in assessing his subjective allegations.
ECF No. 18 at 1-5. In response, Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of her findings. ECF
No. 20.
The Court notes that in assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to
examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or
from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983
(2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration,
frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739
at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective
complaints of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long
as the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective
complaints. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly
applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference.
See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount
2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your
pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms
(e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).”
However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these
additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the
analysis of these additional factors in this case.
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully
support them [the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not perform a full consideration of the Polaski factors.
(Tr. 20-23). In her opinion, the only Polaski factor the ALJ considered was Plaintiff’s daily
activities. Id. Instead of fully considering the Polaski factors, the ALJ provided the following
statement:
After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could have reasonably been expected to
produce symptoms. However, in evaluating the claimant’s symptoms, including
pain, under the factors described in 20 CFR 416.929(c)(3) and Social Security
Ruling 16-3p, the undersigned finds the claimant’s allegations as to the nature,
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of those symptoms are not fully
substantiated by the medical signs, laboratory findings and other evidence of record
as discussed below.
(Tr. 21).
Although the ALJ referenced “other evidence,” she did not provide what that “other
evidence” was, apart from Plaintiff’s medical records. Based upon this review, the Court finds the
ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322
(holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective
medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because
the ALJ provided an insufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case
must be reversed and remanded.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. As such, this case is reversed and remanded for further findings
consistent with this opinion. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
ENTERED this 17th day of May 2023.
Barry A. Bryant
/s/
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE