Opinion

Henson v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Jun 28, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.2%

district court summarily affirmed the ALJ

How later courts described this case

  • district court summarily affirmed the ALJ

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

ROY C. HENSON PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 21-cv-3047

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner DEFENDANT

Social Security Administration

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Roy C. Henson, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial

review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner)

denying his claims for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), and

supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act

(hereinafter “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). In this judicial review, the

Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support

the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).

Plaintiff protectively filed his applications for DIB and SSI on October 11, 2018. (Tr. 13).

In his applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning on August 17, 2017, due to a broken

ankle, depression, and arthritis. (Tr. 13, 257). An administrative hearing was held via telephone on

August 18, 2020, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 33–91). A vocational

expert (“VE”) also testified. Id.

On November 3, 2020, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision. (Tr. 9–32). The ALJ

found that, from August 17, 2017, through May 21. 2019, Plaintiff had the following severe

impairments: right fibula and talus fractures status post-multiple surgeries, osteoarthritis of the

right ankle and foot, complex regional pain syndrome of the right lower extremity, major

depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 18). The ALJ found Plaintiff’s

impairments met the severity of listing 1.06 of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 from

August 17, 2017, through May 21, 2019, and found Plaintiff was disabled during this time period.

(Tr. 18–19, 21). The ALJ found medical improvement occurred on May 22, 2019, and his

disability ended on that date. (Tr. 23). The ALJ found Plaintiff had not developed any new severe

impairments since May 21, 2019, and continued to have the same severe impairments listed above,

but they no longer met or medically equaled the severity of any of the impairments listed in 20

CFR Part 404. (Tr. 21, 23). The ALJ found that, as of May 22, 2019, Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (RFC) to:

[P]erform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§404.1567(a) and 416.967(a)

except the claimant can only occasionally climb ramps and/or stairs and can never

climb ladders, ropes, and/or scaffolds; the claimant can only occasionally balance

and stoop; the claimant cannot kneel, crouch, or crawl; the claimant cannot push

and/or pull or operate foot controls with his right lower extremity; and the claimant

must avoid concentrated exposure to temperature extremes, humidity, and hazards

including no driving as part of work. The claimant can further perform work where

interpersonal contact is routine and tasks involve more than one or two steps, but

are not complex, where the complexity of tasks is learned by experience, with

several variables and use of judgment within limits, and where supervision required

is little for the routine tasks but detailed for non-routine tasks.

(Tr. 23–26).

The ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any of his past relevant work. (Tr. 26).

With the assistance of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the representative

occupations of eyeglass frame polisher, printed circuit board touch up screener, and tube operator.

(Tr. 27). The ALJ found Plaintiff’s disability ended on May 22, 2019, and Plaintiff had not become

disabled again since that date, through the date of his decision. (Tr. 27).

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (ECF No. 2). This case is before the undersigned

pursuant to the consent of the parties. (ECF No. 8). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the

case is now ready for decision. (ECF Nos. 15, 16).

This Court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F. 3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the

Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists

in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have

decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other

words, if after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the

evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ

must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff raises the following points on appeal: 1) whether the ALJ erred in failing to find

Plaintiff’s obesity to be a severe impairment; and 2) whether the ALJ’s findings were supported

by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 15). Defendant argues the ALJ was not required to find obesity

to be a severe impairment as, despite BMI findings noted in the record within the obesity range,

Plaintiff was never diagnosed with obesity. (ECF No. 16). Defendant argues that while Plaintiff’s

physician recommended weight loss and core strengthening to address pain, he did not indicate

Plaintiff was obese or that his weight was causing any functional limitations. Finally, Defendant

argues the ALJ had already limited Plaintiff to sedentary work with additional limitations, and

Plaintiff had failed to show how obesity would cause additional limitations beyond the scope of

the above RFC.

The Court has reviewed the entire transcript and the parties’ briefs, and agrees with

Defendant’s assertion that this decision was supported by substantial evidence. While Plaintiff's

BMI in medical records was in the obese range on several occasions, his own physicians did not

diagnose him with obesity and treated him for weight loss only upon his request for a weight loss

prescription. (Tr. 749-53). For the reasons stated in the ALJ’s well-reasoned opinion and in the

Defendant’s brief, the Court finds Plaintiffs arguments on appeal to be unpersuasive and finds the

record as a whole reflects substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly, the

ALJ’s decision is hereby summarily affirmed, and Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with

prejudice. See Sledge v. Astrue, 364 Fed. Appx. 307 (8th Cir. 2010)(district court summarily

affirmed the ALJ).

IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of June 2022.

isi Assit _Comateck

HON. CHRASTY COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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