The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
TRAVIS WOODRUFF, JR. PLAINTIFF
vs. Civil No. 2:20-cv-02200
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL DEFENDANT
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Travis Woodruff, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his
application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of
the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 4.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability application on August 1, 2018. (Tr. 10). In this
application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to left knee pain, right knee pain, neck pain, carpal
tunnel syndrome in his right arm, dyslexia, diarrhea, and Barrett’s esophagus. (Tr. 234). Plaintiff
1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document filed at ECF No. 15. These
references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF page number.
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alleges an onset date of July 1, 2015. (Tr. 10). This application was denied initially and again
upon reconsideration. (Tr. 91-133).
On June 8, 2020, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable
decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 7-23). The ALJ determined Plaintiff last met the
insured status requirements of the Act on December 31, 2019. (Tr. 12, Finding 1). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff did not engage in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) during the period
from his alleged disability onset date, July 1, 2015, through his date last insured or through
December 31, 2019. (Tr. 12, Finding 2).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis and
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, status post-three surgeries; degenerative disc
disease and scoliosis of the thoracic and lumbar spines; left ulnar sensory mononeuropathy;
hyperthyroidism; insomnia; obstructive sleep apnea periodic limb movement disorder; and a
history of bilateral knee surgeries and bilateral cubital and carpal tunnel surgeries. (Tr. 13-14,
Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ also determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 15-16, Finding 4).
In his decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 16-21, Finding 5). Specifically, the ALJ found
Plaintiff retained the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through
the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that he could occasionally
climb ramps and stairs but could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The
claimant could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He could
occasionally reach overhead and perform overhead work bilaterally. The claimant
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could frequently, but not constantly, reach in all other directions, and could
frequently, but not constantly, handle and finger bilaterally. He had to avoid
concentrated exposure to temperature extreme, humidity, and hazards, including no
driving as part of work.
Id.
The ALJ found Plaintiff was forty-nine (49) years old, which is defined as a “younger
individual” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (2008), on his alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 21,
Finding 7). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had at least a high school education and was able to
communicate in English. (Tr. 21, Finding 8).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and found that, through his
date last insured, Plaintiff was unable to perform any of his PRW. (Tr. 21, Finding 6). The ALJ
then considered whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 22-23, Finding 10). Plaintiff and the VE
testified at the administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id.
Based upon that testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform
work as a Cashier II (light, unskilled) with 800,000 such jobs in the national economy; marker
(light, unskilled) with 300,000 such jobs in the national economy; and furniture retail clerk (light,
unskilled) with 50,000 such jobs in the national economy. (Tr. 22). Because Plaintiff retained the
capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability,
as defined by the Act, at any time from July 1, 2015 (alleged onset date) through December 31,
2019 (date last insured). (Tr. 23, Finding 11).
Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ unfavorable disability
determination. On September 30, 2020, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s
disability determination. (Tr. 1-3). On November 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF
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No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on November 10, 2020. ECF No. 4.
This case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,
the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would
have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently.
See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is
possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d
1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least
one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox
v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff
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must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve
consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts
to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only
considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final
stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff raises two arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ’s RFC
determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (2) the ALJ’s Step Five
determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 17 at 1-20.
Because the Court finds the ALJ erred in assessing his subjective complaints, the Court will only
address Plaintiff’s first argument for reversal.
The Court notes that in assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to
examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or
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from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983
(2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration,
frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739
at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective
complaints of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long
as the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective
complaints. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly
applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference.
See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully
support them [the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your
pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms
(e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).”
However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these
additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the
analysis of these additional factors in this case.
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a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the Court finds the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for
discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. In his opinion, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s
medical records and discounted those subjective complaints based upon the medical records.
Specifically, the ALJ explained his reasoning as follows:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the
reasons explained in this decision. As for the claimant’s statements about the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his or her symptoms, they are
inconsistent because the evidence of record does not rise to the level of the
limitations alleged. While there are some functional deficits caused by his
impairments, the longitudinal evidence demonstrates that he experienced
improvement in his symptoms with ongoing treatments such as medications and
physical therapy as well as surgeries.
(Tr. 17) (emphasis added).
Indeed, even though the ALJ referenced “other evidence in the record,” the ALJ did not
explain what “other evidence” detracted from his subjective complaints. Because the ALJ supplied
insufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case must be reversed
and remanded.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s RFC determination and credibility
analysis are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. As such, this case is reversed and
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remanded for further findings consistent with this opinion. A judgment incorporating these
findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
ENTERED this 2nd day of July 2021.
Barry A. Bryant
/s/
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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