Crumley v. Jail Nurse Jody Woods

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

PLAINTIFF

STEPHANIE NICOLE CRUMLEY

V. CASE NO. 3:19-cv-03005

SHERIFF MIKE MOORE; JAIL

ADMINISTRATOR JASON DAY;

NURSE JODY WOODS; and

OFFICER GENE ATWELL DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She proceeds pro se and

in forma pauperis. Currently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) for failure

to state a claim filed by Separate Defendants Sheriff Mike Moore and Jail Administrator

Jason Day, in both their individual and official capacities, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Boone County Detention Center (“BCDC”).

According to the allegations of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 16).1 when Plaintiff was

arrested on November 8, 2018, officers put their knees on her back despite her saying

her back was hurt. After she complained of her back hurting, Plaintiff alleges the officers

1 Prior to the Motion to Dismiss being filed, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended

complaint. Plaintiff was told to, among other things, name each defendant who violated

her constitutional rights; state exactly what each defendant did or failed to do; state how

the action or inaction of each defendant was connected to the violation of Plaintiff's

constitutional rights; and state what specific injury she suffered because of each

defendants’ conduct. (Doc. 11). As the Amended Complaint was to state in more

particularity what each Defendant did, the Court is analyzing it under Rule 12(b)(6).

pushed down harder. When she arrived at the BCDC, Plaintiff alleges she was forced to

walk despite her complaint that her back was “broken” and her leg hurt. Plaintiff maintains

the jailers were only concerned with the fact that she had staples in her leg.

Upon arrival at the BCDC, Plaintiff alleges Nurse Woods removed the staples.

Plaintiff believes she should have been referred to an orthopedic doctor and undergone

physical therapy. She does state that an x-ray was taken that showed no obvious break

in her back. She indicates she now walks “with [a] pronounced limp & sideways.” Plaintiff

alleges she has burning pain in her foot and lower back, and her legs go numb.

Finally, Plaintiff contends she suffered a head injury in an accident in August of

2018, prior to her arrest. She maintains that when she was in jail in November of 2018,

she passed out and hit the call button, but received no help.

As relief for her claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. She

indicates she will need medical treatment to repair the damage to her body, as well as

physical therapy.

il. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “In order to meet this standard, and survive a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(internal quotations omitted)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. While the Court will

liberally construe a pro se plaintiffs complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to

support her claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).

lil. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of

law, of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”

of the United States. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege

that defendant acted under color of state law and that he violated a right secured by the

Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007,

1009 (8th Cir.1999). The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice

to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).

A. Sherriff Moore — Individual & Supervisory Liability Claims

Sheriff Moore argues that even accepting Plaintiffs allegations as true, the

Amended Complaint fails to state facts showing that he committed any wrongful activity

or caused any damage or injury. “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to,

and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the

supervisory defendant, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or

direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons v.

_ Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Mo., 442 F.3d 1128,

1132 (8th Cir. 2006)); Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (no evidence

that the defendants were doctors or were personally involved in making medical decisions

about treatment); Mark v. Nix, 983 F.2d 138, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1993) (section 1983 liability

requires some personal involvement or responsibility). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that

Sheriff Moore was present during the arrest, was even aware that Plaintiff was injured in

any way, or was involved in deciding the medical care she should receive. Plaintiff has

established no causal link or direct responsibility of Sheriff Moore to the alleged

deprivation of rights. Based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, Sheriff Moore

is not liable in his individual capacity.

A claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a respondeat

superior theory of liability. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 654, 694 (1978).

“IA] supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s

unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994); see a/so

Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In a § 1983 case, □□

official is only liable for his own misconduct and is not accountable for the misdeeds of

his agents under a theory such as respondeat superior or supervisor liability’) (internal

quotations omitted); Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d at 1314 (“general responsibility for

supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish the personal involvement

required to support liability”). Sheriff Moore is not liable for the alleged misdeeds of his

staff.

B. Administrator Day — Individual and Supervisory Liability Claims

Just as with Sheriff Moore, there are no allegations that Administrator Day was

personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, was even aware of Plaintiff's

injuries, or was involved in any way in the treatment decisions. No individual-liability claim

is stated against Administrator Day.

Likewise, the allegations of the Amended Complaint provide no grounds on which

Administrator Day may be held liable for the actions of his staff. No supervisory liability

claim is stated against Administrator Day.

C. Sheriff Moore and Administrator Day — Official Capacity Claims

Official capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing

governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir.

2010). In this case, the official capacity claims against Sheriff Moore and Administrator

Day are treated as claims against Boone County. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868,

873 (8th Cir. 2010).

. A plaintiff “seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 [must] identify

[an unconstitutional] policy or custom that caused the plaintiffs injury.” Bd. of Cnty.

Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). “There are two basic

circumstances under which municipal liability will attach: (1) where a particular municipal

policy or custom itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so; and, (2) where

a facially lawful municipal policy or custom was adopted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to

its known or obvious consequences.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817-18 (8th Cir.

2009) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible “policy” claim, as she has not pointed to “any

officially accepted guiding principle or procedure fhat was constitutionally inadequate.”

Jenkins v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). Merely alleging a use

of excessive force is insufficient. Plaintiff has not pointed to a “deliberate choice of a

guiding principle or procedure made by the institution’s official who has final authority in

such matters.” /d. The same is true for the denial of medical care claim. She has not

alleged the existence of any policy that resulted in her suffering constitutional injury.

“[A] custom can be shown only by adducing evidence of a continuing, widespread,

persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct.” /d. at 634 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Plaintiff has not asserted facts sufficient to state a plausible claim

that there was any widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct. The

official-capacity claims against Sheriff Moore and Administrator Day are dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) filed by Sheriff Moore and

Administrator Day is GRANTED, and all claims against them are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Sheriff Moore and a. Day are terminated as Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this day of April, 2079.

| ~ ge

Te

J MOV \. BROOKS

_“ UMFED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE