holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”
How later courts described this case
- holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
CAMILLIA LITCHFORD PLAINTIFF
vs. Civil No. 2:18-cv-02098
NANCY A. BERRYHILL DEFENDANT
Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Camillia Litchford (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and a period of
disability under Titles II and XVI of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability applications on January 22, 2015. (Tr. 143). In these
applications, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder,
PTSD, right foot pain, and obesity. (Tr. 341). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of May 29, 2013. (Tr.
143). These applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 83-110).
1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
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After Plaintiff’s applications were denied, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on
these applications, and this hearing request was granted. Plaintiff’s first administrative hearing was
held on October 27, 2015. (Tr. 58-82). Thereafter, the ALJ entered an unfavorable disability
determination on December 11, 2015. (Tr. 139-155). The Appeals Council remanded Plaintiff’s
case back to the ALJ. (Tr. 156-160). The ALJ then held a second administrative hearing on May
16, 2017. (Tr. 58-82). This hearing was held in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Id. At this hearing, Plaintiff
was present and was represented by Mike Hamby. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Jim
Spraggins testified at this hearing. Id. The ALJ determined Plaintiff was thirty-eight (38) years old,
which is defined as a “younger individual” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c)(2008) (SSI) and 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1563(c) (2008) (DIB). (Tr. 35). Plaintiff also testified she had completed high school. Id.
On August 9, 2017, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable
decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr. 12-21). The ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements of the Act through June 30, 2017. (Tr. 17, Finding 1). The ALJ found Plaintiff
had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since May 29, 2013, her alleged onset date.
(Tr. 17, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: chronic
lower back pain syndrome, plantar fasciitis, obesity, and depression. (Tr. 17, Finding 3). Despite
being severe, the ALJ also determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 17-18, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC.
(Tr. 18-21). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and largely discounted them.
Id. Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the following RFC:
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After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except limited to performing simple tasks with
simple instructions.
Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff retained
the capacity to perform her PRW as a poultry eviscerator. (Tr. 21, Finding 6). Because Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform her PRW, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a
disability, as defined by the Act, from May 29, 2013 through the date of the ALJ’s decision or
through August 9, 2017. (Tr. 21, Finding 7).
Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable disability
determination. On May 3, 2018, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s disability
determination. (Tr. 1-6). On May 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The
Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on May 29, 2018. ECF No. 5. This case is now
ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
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supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
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the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff alleges her RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record. ECF No. 14. Upon review, the Court finds the ALJ’s evaluation of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. As such, the
Court will only address this issue.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
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See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead, the
ALJ based his credibility determination almost entirely upon the fact that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not supported by her medical records. (Tr. 19-21). In his opinion, the ALJ
summarized Plaintiff’s medical records and discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because
they were not supported by her objective medical records and stated the following:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this
decision.
(Tr. 19).
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Based upon this review, the Court finds the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
based upon her medical records. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant’s subjective
complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully
support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ provided an insufficient
basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case must be reversed and remanded.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 7th day of March 2019.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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