Nicholson v. Helder

- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JOHNNY RAY NICHOLSON PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 5:18-cv-05103

SHERIFF TIM HELDER;

DR. R. KARAS; and

KARAS HEALTH CARE DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Johnny Ray Nicholson, a detainee at the Washington County Detention

Center (“WCDC’), has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”).

The case is before the Court for pre-service screening pursuant to the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA’”). The PLRA modified the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, to

require the Court to screen complaints for dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court

must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (a) are frivolous or

malicious; (b) fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted; or, (c) seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

|. BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the Complaint (Docs. 1 & 7), on May 15, 2018,

Plaintiff became ill after finding a spider in his food. He alleges the food was not properly

inspected before it was given to him. Plaintiff requested medical care as a result of being

sick from the food. Plaintiff alleges it took Karas Health Care two days to see him.

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ll. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process

being issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims

that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or, (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a

pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).

However, mere conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are

insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based. Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151,

1153 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). “[A] pro

se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged

injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out

a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hail v. Belfmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.

1991 (citations omitted). .

2.

lll. DISCUSSION

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the

defendant acted under color of state law and that he violated a right secured by the

Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009

(8th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the

imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.’ U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “[W]hen the State

takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution

imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and

general well-being.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998) (citation

omitted). The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it

permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “The Eighth

Amendment prohibits punishments that deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). Jail or prison

officials must provide reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic

materials, food, and utilities. Prison conditions claims include threats to an inmate's health

and safety. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

To state an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must allege that prison officials

acted with “deliberate indifference” towards conditions at the detention facility that created

a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The deliberate indifference

' Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee. However, the Eighth Circuit has consistently applied the

Eighth Amendmentto conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees. See,

e.g., Davis v. Oregon Cnty., Mo., 607 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Pretrial detainees are

entitled to the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as imprisoned convicts

receive under the Eighth Amendment’)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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standard involves both an objective and subjective component. The objective component

‘requires an inmate to show that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial

risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted); see also Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 2 (1992) (the objective component is “contextual and responsive to

contemporary standards of decency’) (quotation omitted). To satisfy the subjective

component, an inmate must show that prison officials had “a sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951,

954-55 (8th Cir. 1994). The subjective component “requires proof of a reckless disregard

of a known risk.” Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

In this case, Plaintiff's only allegation is that he was served food containing a spider

on asingle occasion. Plaintiff does not allege he was routinely served contaminated food

or that food was routinely prepared in a manner presenting an immediate danger to his

health. See, e.g., Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Wishon has

presented no evidence that the food he was served was nutritionally inadequate or

prepared in a manner presenting an immediate danger to his health, or that his health

suffered as a result of the food.”).

"In islam v. Jackson, 782 F. Supp. 1111, 1114-15 (E.D. Va. 1992), the court held that

serving one meal contaminated with maggots and meals prepared under unsanitary

conditions for thirteen days was not cruel and unusual punishment. In George v. King, 837

F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1988), the court held that “a single incident of unintended food

poisoning, whether suffered by one or many prisoners at an institution, does not constitute

violations of the constitutional rights of the affected prisoners.” /d. Plaintiff's allegations

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that he was served food containing a spider on a single occasion and became temporarily

ill as a result are insufficient to state a claim of constitutional dimension.

Additionally, as mentioned earlier, Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the named

Defendants directly participated in the alleged unconstitutional violation. “Liability under

§ 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”

Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has

made no such allegations in this case; instead, only stating that the inspection of the food

was negligent. More is needed.

The same deliberate indifference standard applies to a denial of medical care claim.

Plaintiff must prove that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “Constitution does not

require [medical personnel] to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate

might wish.” Jenkins v. Cnty. of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). The

objective seriousness of a delay in treatment must be measured by reference to the effect

of the delay, which must be shown by verifying medical evidence in the record. Laughlin

v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has made no allegation that the

delay in treatment adversely impacted his health.

Further, with respect to Sheriff Helder, the law is that“[a] supervisor is not vicariously

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity.” White v.

Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994). Instead, the supervisor must be personally

involved in the alleged constitutional violation or his corrective inaction must constitute

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deliberate indifference towards the constitutional violation. Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968

(8th Cir. 1995).

In George, the Fifth Circuit stated that “[i]f prisoners regularly and frequently suffer

from food poisoning with truly serious medical complications as a result of particular,

known unsanitary practices which are customarily followed by the prison food service

organization, and the authorities without arguable justification refuse to attempt remedial

measures, the requisite indifference might well be manifested or inferred.” /d. at 707. In

this case, Plaintiff has made no allegations sufficient to establish a basis for supervisory

liability.

Plaintiff's official capacity claims are the equivalent of claims against Washington

County. “Official-capacity liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 occurs only when a constitutional

injury is caused by ‘a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or

by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.”” Grayson v.

Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 810-811 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of any custom or policy of

Washington County that was a moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations.

IV. CONCLUSION

No plausible claims are stated. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)\(i-ii) (in forma pauperis action, or any portion of it, may be

dismissed at any time due to frivolousness or for failure to state a claim).

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The dismissal of this case constitutes a strike within the meaning of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act. The Clerk is DIRECTED to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on this

case. th

IT IS SO ORDERED on this_|9 day of July, 201 |

er □

VIOJAY BROOKS

UNITED STAFES*DISTRICT JUDGE

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