Vaughn v. Day

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

AMBER VAUGHN PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 3:18-CV-03053

JASON DAY, Administrator, Boone

County Detention Center; and BOONE

COUNTY DETENTION CENTER DEFENDANTS

OPINION

Plaintiff Amber Vaughn filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. She

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The case is before the Court for preservice

screening under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

|. BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the Complaint (Doc. 2), on April 13-15, 2018,

Plaintiff was refused sanitary pads, which were sold for ten cents each, because she

did not have any money in her account. Officer Honeyman, who is not a named

Defendant, advised Plaintiff that she had to pay for the sanitary pads. Plaintiff alleges

this was “demoralizing,” “degrading,” and “inhumane,” to force her to bleed on herself.

On April 16, 2018, Plaintiff was told that the jail would provide free feminine

hygiene jproducts. The Sheriff irdicateci 1e would get tie issue resolved. At: trat point,

however, Plaintiff alleges her menstrual cycle was over.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages “due to the [extreme] humiliation.”

She also asks that the policy be officially changed, as sanitary pads are a necessity.

ll. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen a case prior to service of process

being issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains

claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or, (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating

whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.”” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).

However, mere conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are

insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based. Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d

1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).

[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding

his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether

he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,

1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

Ill. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color

of law, of a citizen's "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws" of the United States. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law and that he violated a

right secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v.

Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). The deprivation must be intentional;

mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right

under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.

344 (1986).

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition

of cruel and unusual punishment.’ U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids conditions that involve the

“wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,” or are “grossly disproportionate to the

severity of the crime.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

“(Wyhen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his

will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility

for his safety and general well-being.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee. However, the Eighth Circuit has consistently applied

the Eighth Amendment to conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial

detainees. See, e.g., Davis v. Oregon Cnty., Mo., 607 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2010)

(“Pretrial detainees are entitled to the same protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment as imprisoned convicts receive under the Eighth Amendment”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

(1998) (citation omitted). The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but

neither does it permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).

“The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that deprive inmates of the minimal

civilized measure of life's necessities.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir.

1996). Jail or prison officials must provide reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation,

bedding, hygienic materials, food, and utilities. Prison condition claims include threats to

an inmate’s health and safety. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted).

To state an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must allege that prison officials

acted with “deliberate indifference” towards conditions at the detention facility that created

a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Conditions of confinement,

however, constitute cruel and unusual punishment ‘only when they have a mutually

enforcing effect that produces deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as

food, warmth, or exercise.'” Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994)

(quoting Wilson v. Sieter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)).

The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and subjective

component. The objective component requires an inmate to show that “he is incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(citations omitted); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 2 (1992) (finding that the

objective component is “contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of

decency’) (quotation omitted). To satisfy the subjective component, an inmate must show

that prison officials had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(citations omitted); see also Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951, 954-55 (8th Cir. 1994). The

subjective component “requires proof of a reckless disregard of a known risk.” Crow v.

Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

In this case, Plaintiff's only allegation is that she was forced to go without sanitary

pads for a period of three days. Plaintiff does not allege that she was routinely denied

sanitary pads, that she lacked access to other hygiene supplies, or that there was an

immediate danger to her health.

In general, courts have held that the temporary denial of bedding, exercise,

clothes, showers, or hygiene products is not unconstitutional. See, e.g., O'Leary v.

lowa State Men’s Reformatory, 79 F.3d 82, 83-8 (8th Cir. 1996) (four days without

underwear, blankets, mattress, exercise and visits not a constitutional violation);

Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) (four days without clothes, mattress,

running water, bedding, mail, hot food, and hygienic supplies not a constitutional

violation); Whitnack v. Douglas Cnty., 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (deplorably filthy

and patently offensive cell with excrement and vomit not unconstitutional because

conditions lasted only twenty-four hours). In this case, after Plaintiff was denied

sanitary pads for a three-day period, she was informed that she would be provided with

sanitary pads and that the issue had been resolved. There is no argument that the

Plaintiff was regularly or routinely denied sanitary napkins. See, e.g., Dawson v.

Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1288-89 (D.C. W. Va. 1981) (regular denial of hygiene

materials including sanitary napkins for female prisoners may constitute an Eighth

Amendment violation). No plausible constitutional violation has been stated.

Further, Plaintiff does not mention Jason Day’s involvement in the alleged denial

of the sanitary napkins. “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and

direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the

supervisory defendant, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in,

or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of [her] constitutional rights.” Clemmons v.

Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has made no

such allegations. In fact, Jason Day is not mentioned in the body of the Complaint.

Finally, the Boone County Detention Center is not a person subject to suit under

§ 1983. See, e.g., Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992)

(West Memphis Police Department and Paramedic Services are departments or

subdivisions of the City government and not separate juridical entities); Dean v. Barber,

951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that police and sheriff's departments are

not usually considered legal entities subject to suit); Powell v. Cook Cnty. Jail, 814 F.

Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (jail not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983).

IV. CONCLUSION

No plausible claims are stated. Therefore, this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-ii) (in forma pauperis action, or any

portion of it, may be dismissed at any time due to frivolousness or for failure to state a

claim).

The dismissal of this case will count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The

Clerk is directed to put a § 1915(g) Sake on the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this ae, of June, tT

VN

. MOTHY/L. BRO®KS

nteD STaTBSo1STrCT JUDGE