Lovell v. Hope School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

MARY ANN LOVELL PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:17-cv-04101

HOPE SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANT

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Hope School District. ECF No. 6.

Plaintiff Mary Ann Lovell (“Plaintiff”) has filed a response. ECF No. 9. The Court finds this matter

ripe for its consideration. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds no exceptional

circumstances exist that would warrant abstention in this case. Accordingly, Hope School District’s

motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination action stemming from the non-renewal of Plaintiff’s

employment contract with Hope School District. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the following facts.

Plaintiff is a 74-year-old African-American female who was employed as a teacher at Yerger

Middle School in Hope, Arkansas. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that she entered into an

employment contract with Hope School District for the period of August 1, 2016, through May 26,

2017. Id. at ¶ 7. According to the complaint, Plaintiff was an award-winning school teacher who had

been employed with Hope School District for fifteen years, meeting the expectations of her employer

each year of her employment. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff further alleges that she was assigned to teach a new

reading program for seventh and eighth grade students for the 2016-17 school year, and that her

counterpart, a Caucasian female teacher, was not required to teach the new curriculum during the same

school year. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.

Plaintiff claims that, despite no prior history of student mismanagement or problems in the

classroom, the Superintendent of Hope School District, Bobby Hart, chose not to renew her

employment contract due to alleged poor job performance. Id. at ¶¶13, 17. Plaintiff alleges that

Superintendent Hart made the decision without a valid performance evaluation on file to assess

Plaintiff’s performance in accordance with Hope School District’s policies and procedures. Id. at ¶ 10,

16. Plaintiff further alleges that the Board of Directors upheld Superintendent Hart’s decision to not

renew Plaintiff’s contract on March 29, 2017. Id. at ¶ 17. According to the Complaint, Superintendent

Hart later visited Plaintiff’s classroom and informed her that she was no longer employed with Hope

School District, stating “You are no longer employed by this School District. You are retired!” Id. at

¶ 18.

On June 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Hempstead County,

Arkansas, against Hope School District alleging that she was terminated in violation of her contractual

rights under the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-1510. Plaintiff subsequently filed

a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) on August 21, 2017. Id. at ¶ 19. The EEOC issued a Notice of Suit Rights to Plaintiff on

or about August 24, 2017. Id. at ¶ 20. On November 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq.; and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

On December 18, 2017, Hope School District filed the instant motion arguing that the Court

should exercise its discretion and abstain from considering Plaintiff’s Complaint, pursuant to the

Colorado River abstention doctrine, given the pendency of the action filed in Hempstead County

Circuit Court. In response, Plaintiff asserts that no exceptional circumstances exist in this matter that

would warrant abstention under the Colorado River doctrine. Thus, the primary issue before the Court

is whether the Colorado River abstention doctrine is appropriate in this case.

II. DISCUSSION

In general, “[f]ederal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the

jurisdiction given them,’ even when there is a pending state court action involving the same subject.”

Mountain Pure, LLC v. Turner Holdings, LLC, 439 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Colorado

River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Under the Colorado River

abstention doctrine, “a federal court may divest itself of jurisdiction by abstaining only when parallel

state and federal actions exist and exceptional circumstances warrant abstention.” Fru-Con Const.

Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 534 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at

817-18).

A. Parallel Proceedings

In evaluating whether exceptional circumstances exist to warrant the applicability of the

Colorado River abstention doctrine, a district court must first determine if the matter pending in federal

court is parallel to the action pending in state court. Id. at 535. The Eighth Circuit has explained that

in determining whether the state and federal proceedings are parallel, “[t]he pendency of a state claim

based on the same general facts or subject matter as a federal claim and involving the same parties is

not alone sufficient.” Id. (citing Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Elec. Coop., Inc., 48 F.3d 294,

297 (8th Cir. 1995). “Rather, a substantial similarity must exist between the state and federal

proceedings, which similarity occurs when there is a substantial likelihood that the state proceeding

will fully dispose of the claims presented in the federal court.” Id. (citation omitted). The district

court’s analysis should focus “on matters as they currently exist, not as they could be modified.” Id.

(citation omitted). “To determine whether parallel proceedings exist,” courts within the Eighth Circuit

consider “sources of law, required evidentiary showings, measures of damages, and treatment on

appeal for each claim.” Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238, 1245 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotations

omitted). “[J]urisdiction must be exercised if there is any doubt as to the parallel nature of the state

and federal proceedings.” Fru-Con Const. Corp., 574 F.3d at 534 (citation omitted).

In the present case, the Court finds that the Colorado River abstention doctrine is inapplicable,

as Hope School District has failed to establish that the state and federal proceedings are so substantially

similar that the state court proceedings will fully dispose of the case at bar. It is undisputed that the

defendant in the state court proceeding—Hope School District—is the same defendant in the federal

proceeding. It is further undisputed that both the state and federal court proceedings arise from the

nonrenewal of Plaintiff’s employment contract. However, the similarities between the two proceedings

end there.

In the federal complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she was retaliated against and received less

favorable treatment in the conditions of her employment as compared to similarly situated persons on

account of her race, gender, and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq. In addition,

Plaintiff’s federal complaint asserts a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hope School

District for creating a hostile and abusive work environment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. In contrast, Plaintiff’s state court complaint asserts that Hope School

District did not strictly comply with the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-1510(d),

when it chose not to renew her employment contract for the 2017-18 school year. Thus, resolution of

Plaintiff’s state proceedings against Hope School District for failure to strictly comply with the Teacher

Fair Dismissal Act will in no way dispose of her discrimination claims in the federal proceeding.

B. Exceptional Circumstances

Assuming, arguendo, that the state and federal actions are parallel, the Court must next

determine if “exceptional circumstances” warrant abstention pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine.

See Northport Health Servs. of Arkansas, LLC v. Cmty. First Tr. Co., No. 2:12-CV-02284, 2013 WL

2151546, at *2 (W.D. Ark. May 16, 2013) (citing Fru–Con Const. Corp., 574 F.3d at 534). The Eighth

Circuit has developed six non-exhaustive factors to assist district courts in determining whether

exceptional circumstances warrant abstention in the case of parallel state and federal court proceedings.

Fru-Con Const. Corp., 574 F.3d at 534. These factors are as follows:

(1) whether there is a res over which one court has established jurisdiction, (2) the

inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) whether maintaining separate actions may

result in piecemeal litigation, unless the relevant law would require piecemeal litigation

and the federal court issue is easily severed, (4) which case has priority—not

necessarily which case was filed first but a greater emphasis on the relative progress

made in the cases, (5) whether state or federal law controls, especially favoring the

exercise of jurisdiction where federal law controls, and (6) the adequacy of the state

forum to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights.

Id. (citing Mountain Pure, 439 F.3d at 926). “When examining the factors, ‘the balance [is] heavily

weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.’” Mountain Pure, 439 F.3d at 926 (quoting Moses H.

Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983)).

Here, an evaluation of the above six factors demonstrates that application of the Colorado River

abstention doctrine would be inappropriate in this case. The first factor is not implicated in this action

because there is no question of jurisdiction concerning a piece of property. In its motion and brief in

support, Hope School District does not argue that this Court would provide a less convenient forum

than the state court. The Court finds no evidence to suggest that this forum would be any less

convenient than the Hempstead County Circuit Court. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor

does not weigh in favor of abstention.

Hope School District has also failed convince the Court that maintaining both proceedings

would result in piecemeal litigation because. “Piecemeal litigation occurs when different tribunals

consider the same issue, thereby duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.” Bank of

Okla., N.A. v. Tharaldson Motels II, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (D.N.D. 2009) (citation omitted).

As discussed above, the state court proceeding will not resolve Plaintiff’s discrimination claims in the

federal proceeding. Thus, the Court finds that the third factor also does not weigh in favor of

abstention.

Hope School District argues that the fourth factor, regarding the order in which the proceedings

were filed, weighs in favor of abstention because the state court proceeding was filed several months

prior to the federal court case and was scheduled for trial on January 24, 2018. However, “‘priority

should not be measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how

much progress has been made in the two actions.’” Mountain Pure, 439 F.3d at 927 (quoting Moses

H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26). In addition, the trial in the state court proceeding did not commence as

scheduled on January 24, 2018, and it is unclear from the present record how much has occurred in

that case. The Court, thus, finds that the fourth factor does not weigh in favor of abstention.

The fifth factor, regarding whether federal or state law controls, weighs against abstention

because Plaintiff raises only federal claims in her federal complaint. Lastly, the Court finds that the

sixth factor is neutral because Plaintiff’s rights can be adequately protected in this court or the

Hempstead County Circuit Court. See Fru-Con Const. Corp., 574 F.3d at 539 (noting that “this factor

counts for or against abstention and dismissal only where one of the forums is inadequate to protect a

party’s rights.”).

Accordingly, based on a balance of all six factors, the Court concludes that no exceptional

circumstances exist that would warrant application of the Colorado River abstention doctrine in this

matter.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Hope School District’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF

No. 6) should be and hereby is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of May, 2018.

/s/ Susan O. Hickey

Susan O. Hickey

United States District Judge