holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”
How later courts described this case
- holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
PATSY BECK PLAINTIFF
vs. Civil No. 4:17-cv-04018
NANCY A. BERRYHILL DEFENDANT
Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Patsy Beck (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for a
period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application on November 7, 2013. (Tr. 26). In this
application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled from a neck and back injury due to a car accident. (Tr.
180). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of May 3, 2013. (Tr. 26). Her application was denied initially
and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 78-96).
Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied application. (Tr. 103-104). This
hearing request was granted, and Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on October 16, 2015
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in Shreveport, Louisiana. Id. At this hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel.
Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Mr. Rousey1 testified at this hearing. Id.
On January 4, 2016, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision
denying Plaintiff’s DIB application. (Tr. 23-32). The ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2017. (Tr. 28, Finding 1). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) from her alleged onset
date of May 3, 2013. (Tr. 28, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: cervical radiculopathy, mild cervical disc bulges, Chiari malformation, degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine, and mild carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 28, Finding 3). The ALJ
also determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet
or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart
P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 28-29, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 29-31, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’
subjective complaints and found they were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff had the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) except sit/stand option.
Id.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 32, Finding 6).
1 Mr. Rowsey’s first name was not included in the transcript.
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Considering this RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform her PRW as a
counter clerk, light. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under
a disability (as defined by the Act) from May 3, 2013 through the date of her decision or through
January 7, 2016. (Tr. 32, Finding 7).
Plaintiff sought review with the Appeals Council. (Tr. 18-22). On January 24, 2017, the
Appeals Council denied this request for review. (Tr. 1-3). On March 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed a
Complaint in this case. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs and have consented to the
jurisdiction of this Court. ECF Nos. 5, 13-14. This case is now ready for determination.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
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It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
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3. Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the following: (1) the ALJ erred in assessing her
impairments under the Listings; (2) the ALJ erred in assessing her non-exertional limitations; (3) the
ALJ erred in discrediting her subjective complaints; and (4) the ALJ erred in failing to present a
complete hypothetical to the VE. ECF No. 13 at 1-19. Upon review, the Court finds the ALJ has
not a supplied a sufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Thus, the Court
will only consider Plaintiff’s third argument for reversal.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
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five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead, the
ALJ based her credibility determination upon the fact Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not
supported by her medical records. (Tr. 29-31). The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s medical records and
made the following finding regarding her subjective complaints:
The medical records discussed above do not provide a basis to support the level of
severity as alleged by the claimant. Despite complaints of pain, there are no objective
findings of muscle atrophy or deformity or loss of range of motion in any extremity
or joint. . . .
(Tr. 31) (emphasis added). Such a finding was improper. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding
a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical
evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ
provided an insufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case must be
reversed and remanded.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 22nd day of March 2018.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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