holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”
How later courts described this case
- holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
CLARENCE BUCKLEY PLAINTIFF
vs. Civil No. 6:16-cv-06087
NANCY A. BERRYHILL DEFENDANT
Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Clarence Buckley (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his applications for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and period of
disability under Titles II and XVI of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 9. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability applications on October 24, 2013. (Tr. 9). In these
applications, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to two hip replacements and being unable to move
or stand for long. (Tr. 233). Plaintiff’s alleged an onset date of September 25, 2013. (Tr. 9). His
applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 82-83, 130-131).
Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his denied applications. (Tr. 148). This
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request was granted, and Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on March 3, 2015. (Tr. 23-50).
At this hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by Michael Angel. Id. Plaintiff and
Vocational Expert (“VE”) Dianne Smith testified at this hearing. Id. During this hearing, Plaintiff
testified he was forty-eight (48) years old, and had graduated from high school. (Tr. 29).
On July 24, 2015, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable
decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr. 9-18). The ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2016. (Tr. 11, Finding 1). The ALJ also
determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since September 25,
2013, his alleged onset date. (Tr. 11, Finding 2).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: bilateral hip
replacements due to avascular necrosis; hypertension; and intermittent left shoulder pain. (Tr. 11,
Finding 3). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the
requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No.
4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 11, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his RFC.
(Tr. 12, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found his claimed
limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the RFC to lift
and carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; stand and walk for two hours
in an eight-hour workday, with standing intervals of the entire two hour period and waling intervals
of no more than a few minutes at a time; sit in intervals of 30 minutes for six hours in an eight-hour
workday; and push and pull 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently. The ALJ
also found Plaintiff cannot perform repetitive foot controls; can occasionally climb stairs, but should
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avoid crouching, crawling, climbing ladders or scaffolds, and can occasionally stoop, but not all the
way down to reach the floor level.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and found Plaintiff did not
retain the capacity to perform any of his PRW. (Tr. 17, Finding 6). The ALJ then considered
whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy. (Tr. 17, Finding 10). The VE testified at the administrative hearing regarding this
issue. (Tr. 45-46). Based upon this testimony and considering his RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform the following jobs: (1) lock assembler with approximately 8,600
such jobs nationally and 1,600 regionally and (2) ornament setter and semi conductor assembler with
approximately 11,400 such jobs nationally and 2,800 regionally. (Tr. 18). Because Plaintiff retained
the capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability,
as defined by the Act, at any time from September 25, 2013 through the date of the decision. (Tr.
18, Finding 11).
Plaintiff sought review with the Appeals Council. On August 1, 2016, the Appeals Council
denied his request for review. (Tr. 1-3). On August 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in his case.
ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 18, 19. This case is now ready for
determination.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
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support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year
and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel, 160
F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a
“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her
disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the
familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
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listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or
her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record because the ALJ erred in the credibility determination of Plaintiff.
ECF No. 18. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No.
19.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20
C.F.R. § 416.929.1 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are as
follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3)
the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
1 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
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The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies,
and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The
inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled
within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a
Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v.
Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead of
complying with Polaski and considering the Polaski factors, the ALJ specifically discounted
Plaintiff’s alleged limitations for the sole reason that they were not supported by his medical records.
(Tr. 12-17). Notably, the ALJ recited he had considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and then
stated the following:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
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alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements considering the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the
reasons explained in this decision.
(Tr. 13).
The “reasons” outlined in the decision, however, were truly only one reason: Plaintiff’s
allegations were not supported by his medical records. Indeed, the ALJ repeatedly referenced the
“objective medical evidence” as being a basis for discounting Plaintiff’s allegations. (Tr. 14-16).
The ALJ also summarized his findings as follows: “In sum, the above residual functional capacity
assessment is supported by the objective medical evidence .” (Tr. 17) (emphasis added).
The Court finds the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints without a
sufficient basis was improper under Polaski. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant’s
subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not
fully support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ provided no valid
reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case must be reversed and remanded.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 2nd day of November 2017.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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