SSR 84-22c: SECTION 205(b) (42 U.S.C. 405(b)) DISABILITY -- INVALIDITY OF JUDICIALLY IMPOSED DEADLINES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS PROCESS

20 CFR 404.907-404.921 and 404.929-404.961

SSR 84-22c

Heckler v. Day et al., _____ U.S. _____, 104 S.Ct. 2249 (1984)

POWELL, Supreme Court Justice:

The question presented is the validity of an injunction issued on behalf

of a statewide class that requires the Secretary of Health and Human

Services to adjudicate all future disputed disability claims under Title

II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401 et. seq. , according to

judicially established deadlines and to pay interim benefits in all cases

of noncompliance with those deadlines.

I

Title II of the Social Security Act [Act] was passed in 1935. 49 Stat.

622, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 401 et. seq . (1976) ed. and Supp. V).

Among other things, it provides for the payment of disability insurance

benefits to those whose disability prevents them from pursuing gainful

employment. 42 U.S.C. 423. [1] Disability benefits also are payable under the Supplemental Security

Income [SSI] program established by Title XVI of the Act, 76 Stat. 197, as amended , 42 U.S.C. 1381 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The disability

programs administered under Titles II and XVI "are of a size and extent

difficult to comprehend." Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 399

(1971). Approximately two million disability claims were filed under these

two titles in fiscal year

1983. [2] Over 320,000 of these

claims must be heard by some 800 administrative law judges each

year. [3] To facilitate the

orderly and sympathetic administration of the disability program of Title

II, the Secretary and Congress have established an unusually protective

four-step process for the review and adjudication of disputed claims.

First, a state agency determines whether the claimant has a disability and

the date the disability began or

ceased. [4] 42 U.S.C. 421(a); 20

CFR 404.1503 (1983). Second, if the claimant is dissatisfied with that

determination, he may request reconsideration of the determination

ave established an unusually protective

four-step process for the review and adjudication of disputed claims.

First, a state agency determines whether the claimant has a disability and

the date the disability began or

ceased. [4] 42 U.S.C. 421(a); 20

CFR 404.1503 (1983). Second, if the claimant is dissatisfied with that

determination, he may request reconsideration of the determination. This

involves a de novo reconsideration of the disability claim by the state

agency, and in some cases a full evidentiary hearing. Id. ,

404.907-404.921. Additional evidence may be submitted at this stage,

either on the request of the claimant or by order of the agency. Third, if

the claimant receives an adverse reconsideration determination, he is

entitled by statute to an evidentiary hearing and to a de novo review by

an Administrative Law Judge [ALJ]. 42 U.S.C. 405(b) (Supp. V); 20 CFR

404.929-404.961 (1983). Finally, if the claimant is dissatisfied with the

decision of the ALJ, he may take an appeal to the Appeals Council of the

Department of Health and Human Services

[HHS]. [5] Id. ,

404.967-404.983. These four steps exhaust the claimant's administrative

remedies. Thereafter, he may seek judicial review in federal district

court. 42 U.S.C. 405(g).

In this class action, the named plaintiffs sought declaratory and

injunctive relief from delays encountered in steps two and three above.

The action was initiated by Leon Day in November 1978 after his disability

benefits were terminated and he suffered substantial delays in obtaining a

reconsideration determination and in securing a hearing before an

ALJ. [6] After suffering similar

delays, Amedie Maurais intervened in the

action. [7] On June 14, 1979, the

District Court certified a statewide class consisting of:

ove.

The action was initiated by Leon Day in November 1978 after his disability

benefits were terminated and he suffered substantial delays in obtaining a

reconsideration determination and in securing a hearing before an

ALJ. [6] After suffering similar

delays, Amedie Maurais intervened in the

action. [7] On June 14, 1979, the

District Court certified a statewide class consisting of:

Plaintiffs argued before the District Court that the delays they had

experienced violated their statutory right under 42 U.S.C. 405(b) (Supp.

V) to a hearing within a reasonable

time. [8] Both parties submitted

the case to the District Court on motions for summary judgment. On the

basis of the undisputed evidence, the District Court held that, as to all

claimants for Title II disability benefits in Vermont, delays of more than

90 days from a request for hearing before an ALJ to the hearing itself

were unreasonable. [9] It granted

partial summary judgment to the plaintiff class on that issue in December

1978.

After the submission of additional evidence, the District Court

considered motions for summary judgment concerning the reasonableness of

delays in the reconsideration process. The additional evidence also was

undisputed. It consisted of factual summaries of 77 randomly selected

disability cases submitted by the Secretary. The District Court noted that

the "summaries support the positions of both parties. They show the

reconsideration process is often time consuming and complex. They also

show that the process is replete with unexplained delay; other requests

are processed with commendable dispatch." App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. In

27 of the 77 cases, reconsideration determinations took longer than 90

days. In each of these 27, the District Court concluded that the delays

were caused by agency inefficiencies and were not justified by the

"necessary steps in the reconsideration process." App. to Pet. for Cert.

28a

lained delay; other requests

are processed with commendable dispatch." App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. In

27 of the 77 cases, reconsideration determinations took longer than 90

days. In each of these 27, the District Court concluded that the delays

were caused by agency inefficiencies and were not justified by the

"necessary steps in the reconsideration process." App. to Pet. for Cert.

28a. On the basis of this survey, the District Court concluded that, as a

rule, delays of more than 90 days in making reconsideration determinations

were unreasonable and violated the claimant's statutory

rights. [10] In August 1981,

the District Court granted summary judgment for respondents on the

reconsideration aspect of the case.

In November 1981, the District Court issued an injunction in favor of the

statewide class that "ordered and directed [the Secretary] to conclude

reconsideration processing and issue reconsideration determinations within

90 days of requests for reconsideration made by

claimants." [11] The injunction

also required ALJs to provide hearings within 90 days after the request is

made by claimants. [12] Finally, it ordered payment of interim benefits to any claimant who did

not receive a reconsideration determination or hearing within 180 days of

the request for reconsideration or who did not receive a hearing within 90

days of the hearing

request. [13] The Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's determination

that the challenged delays violated the statute and upheld the District

Court's remedial order. Day v. Sckweiker , 685 F.2d 19 (CA2 1982).

We granted certiorari to consider whether it is appropriate for a federal

court, without statutory authorization, to prescribe deadlines for agency

adjudication of Title II disability claims and to order payment of interim

benefits in the event of noncompliance. _____ U.S. _____

lated the statute and upheld the District

Court's remedial order. Day v. Sckweiker , 685 F.2d 19 (CA2 1982).

We granted certiorari to consider whether it is appropriate for a federal

court, without statutory authorization, to prescribe deadlines for agency

adjudication of Title II disability claims and to order payment of interim

benefits in the event of noncompliance. _____ U.S. _____

(1983). [14] We conclude that

the legislative history makes clear that Congress, fully aware of the

serious delays in resolution of disability claims, has declined to impose

deadlines on the administrative process. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment below.

II

The Secretary does not challenge here the determination that 405(b)

requires administrative hearings to be held within a reasonable time. Nor

does she challenge the District Court's determination that the delays

encountered in the cases of plaintiffs Day and Maurais violated that

requirement. [15] She argues

only that a statewide injunction that imposes judicially prescribed

deadlines on HHS for all future disability determinations is contrary to

congressional intent and constitutes an abuse of the court's equitable

power. She argues in the alternative that even if the injunction is

appropriate, the order requiring payment of interim benefits in cases of

noncompliance is not. The Secretary looks primarily to legislative history

to support both arguments.

A

deadlines on HHS for all future disability determinations is contrary to

congressional intent and constitutes an abuse of the court's equitable

power. She argues in the alternative that even if the injunction is

appropriate, the order requiring payment of interim benefits in cases of

noncompliance is not. The Secretary looks primarily to legislative history

to support both arguments.

A

The Secretary correctly points out that Congress repeatedly has been made

aware of the long delays associated with resolution of disputed disability

claims and repeatedly has considered and expressly rejected suggestions

that mandatory deadlines be imposed to cure that

problem. [16] She argues that

Congress expressly has balanced the need for timely disability

determinations against the need to ensure quality decisions in the face of

heavy and escalating workloads and limited agency resources. In striking

that balance, the Secretary argues, the relevant legislative history also

shows that Congress to date has determined that mandatory deadlines for

agency adjudication of disputed disability claims are inconsistent with

achievement of the Act's primary objectives, and that the District Court's

statewide injunction flatly contradicts that legislative determination. We

find this argument persuasive.

Congressional concern over timely resolution of disputed disability

claims under Title II began at least as early as

1975. [17] It has inspired

almost annual congressional debate since that

time. [18] The consistency with

which Congress has expressed concern over this issue is matched by its

consistent refusal to impose on the Secretary mandatory deadlines for

resolution of disputed disability claims.

ern over timely resolution of disputed disability

claims under Title II began at least as early as

1975. [17] It has inspired

almost annual congressional debate since that

time. [18] The consistency with

which Congress has expressed concern over this issue is matched by its

consistent refusal to impose on the Secretary mandatory deadlines for

resolution of disputed disability claims.

In 1975, the House Social Security Subcommittee held hearings on the

delays encountered in resolving disputed Social Security

claims, [19] and sixty members

of the House sponsored a bill imposing statutory deadlines for each step

in the administrative review of disputed SSA

claims. [20] Expressions of

concern were voiced in both the Senate and the House over the "huge

backlog of some 103,000 cases awaiting hearing" before an ALJ. S. Rep. No.

94-550, p. 3 (1975); accord H. R. Rep. No. 94-679, pp. 1-2

(1975). [21] Despite this

concern, the Staff of the House Subcommittee advised against statutory

deadlines because of the potential "adverse effect on the quality and

uniformity of disability adjudication which is already somewhat suspect."

Staff of the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways &

Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Appeals Process: Areas of Possible

Administrative or Legislative Action 1-2 (Comm. Print 1975)

[hereinafter 1975 Staff

Report]. [22] Congress agreed

and refused to impose statutory deadlines on the Secretary.

and

uniformity of disability adjudication which is already somewhat suspect."

Staff of the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways &

Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Appeals Process: Areas of Possible

Administrative or Legislative Action 1-2 (Comm. Print 1975)

[hereinafter 1975 Staff

Report]. [22] Congress agreed

and refused to impose statutory deadlines on the Secretary.

Bills proposing statutory deadlines have been proposed almost annually

since 1975, [23] and

congressional concern over the delay problem has remained high. For

example, in 1980 Congress directed the Secretary to submit a report

recommending the establishment of appropriate and realistic deadlines for

resolution of disputed SSA claims. It ordered the Secretary in doing so to

consider "both the need for expeditious processing of claims for benefits

and the need to assure that all such claims will be thoroughly considered

and accurately determined." Pub. L. 96-265, 94 Stat. 458, note following

42 U.S.C. 401 (Supp. V). The Senate Report explained that "Congress could

then evaluate the recommendations for consistency with the elements it

wishes to emphasize and, if needed, take further action next year." S.

Rep. No. 96-408, p. 59

(1979). [24] The Secretary

submitted a report in October 1980, suggesting deadlines of 150 days for

reconsideration determinations and 165 days from hearing to post-hearing

decision, both subject to certain exceptions. Report of the Department of

Health & Human Services 1 (October 21, 1980). The Secretary, however,

cautioned Congress that budget and staff limitations and burgeoning

workloads "mitigate against the Department meeting its proposed time

limitation objectives in every instance." Id. , at 2. Since

receiving the Secretary's report, Congress has refused to impose mandatory

deadlines on the Secretary, or to direct her to promulgate them

herself.

(October 21, 1980). The Secretary, however,

cautioned Congress that budget and staff limitations and burgeoning

workloads "mitigate against the Department meeting its proposed time

limitation objectives in every instance." Id. , at 2. Since

receiving the Secretary's report, Congress has refused to impose mandatory

deadlines on the Secretary, or to direct her to promulgate them

herself.

Certainly in Congress the concern that mandatory deadlines would

jeopardize the quality and uniformity of agency decisions has prevailed

over considerations of timeliness. In its most recent comment on the

subject, the House Committee on Ways and Means expressly disapproved

mandatory hearing deadlines and indicated disagreement with recent

judicial decisions imposing such time restrictions. Criticizing the

decision in Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW , No. C75-0185L(A) (W.D.

Ky. May 6, 1976), which had imposed judicially prescribed hearing

deadlines on the Secretary and ordered the payment of interim benefits in

the event of

noncompliance, [25] the

Committee reported:

Finally, the Secretary points out that judicially imposed deadlines may

vary from case to case and from state to state, requiring HHS to shuffle

its staff nationwide. Not only would this tend seriously to disrupt agency

administration, but wide variations in judicially imposed deadlines also

would prevent realization of Congress' oft-repeated goal of uniform

administration of the Act. See, e.g. , S. Rep. No. 96-408, pp. 52-56

dicially imposed deadlines may

vary from case to case and from state to state, requiring HHS to shuffle

its staff nationwide. Not only would this tend seriously to disrupt agency

administration, but wide variations in judicially imposed deadlines also

would prevent realization of Congress' oft-repeated goal of uniform

administration of the Act. See, e.g. , S. Rep. No. 96-408, pp. 52-56

(1979) (emphasizing concern over "state-to-state" variations and

expressing hope that current legislation would "both improve the quality

of determinations and ensure that claimants throughout the Nation will be

judged under the same uniform standards and procedures ") (emphasis

added.). [27]

B

Legislation enacted by Congress in 1980 and 1982 is fully consistent with

the repeated rejection of proposals for mandatory deadlines and with

efforts by Congress to ensure quality and uniformity in agency

adjudication. In 1980, Congress amended 405(b) to require that every

initial determination of ineligibility contain an easily understandable

discussion of the evidence and the reasons for the determination. Pub. L.

96-265, 94 Stat. 457, 42 U.S.C. 405(b) (Supp. V). At the same time,

Congress added 421(h) to require a tri-annual assessment of the continuing

eligibility of recipients of disability benefits. Pub. L. 96-265, 94 Stat.

460, 42 U.S.C. 421(h) (Supp. V). Congress also included in the 1980

amendments a requirement that the Secretary review at least 65% of all

determinations of eligibility made by state agencies in any fiscal year

after 1982. Pub. L. 96-265, 94 Stat. 456, 42 U.S.C. 421(c)(2), (3) (Supp.

V). [28] Before 1972, the

Secretary had reviewed the majority of state determinations as a matter of

course. A growing workload required the Secretary to abandon this practice

for a sample review only 5% of the state agency determinations. H.R. Rep.

No. 96-100, p. 10 (1979)

de by state agencies in any fiscal year

after 1982. Pub. L. 96-265, 94 Stat. 456, 42 U.S.C. 421(c)(2), (3) (Supp.

V). [28] Before 1972, the

Secretary had reviewed the majority of state determinations as a matter of

course. A growing workload required the Secretary to abandon this practice

for a sample review only 5% of the state agency determinations. H.R. Rep.

No. 96-100, p. 10 (1979). The 1980 amendment, requiring review of a

substantially higher percentage of state agency disability determinations,

presumably will have an effect on the timely resolution of disputed

disability claims. [29]

Finally, in 1982 Congress provided that effective January 1, 1984, an

initial determination that previously granted disability benefits should

be terminated entitles the claimant not only to a de novo review on

reconsideration, but to a full evidentiary hearing as well. Pub. L.

97-455, 96 Stat. 2499, 42 U.S.C. 405(b)(2). All of these changes will

impose additional duties on the Secretary and her heavily burdened staff.

In light of Congress' continuing concern that mandatory deadlines would

subordinate quality to timeliness, and its recent efforts to ensure the

quality of agency determinations, it hardly could have contemplated that

courts should have authority to impose the very deadlines it repeatedly

has rejected. [30]

C

Persuasive evidence of the intention of Congress also is found in the

distinction it has made between the resolution of SSI claims for old-age

and survivor benefits and SSI claims for disability benefits. Section

405(b), governing eligibility determinations under Title II, and

1383(c)(1), governing eligibility determinations under Title XVI, are

virtually identical. In the event of adverse determinations, both require

the Secretary to provide claimants with "reasonable notice and opportunity

for a hearing." In the case of disputed SSI claims

enefits and SSI claims for disability benefits. Section

405(b), governing eligibility determinations under Title II, and

1383(c)(1), governing eligibility determinations under Title XVI, are

virtually identical. In the event of adverse determinations, both require

the Secretary to provide claimants with "reasonable notice and opportunity

for a hearing." In the case of disputed SSI claims. This provision makes

two things clear: (i) Congress will establish hearing deadlines when it

deems them appropriate; and, (ii) Congress has determined that it is

inappropriate to subject disputed disability claims to mandatory

deadlines. [31]

III

The Secretary also contends that quite apart from the congressional

rejection of the mandatory deadlines discussed above, the District Court's

order unduly intruded upon the discretion with which Congress has granted

the Secretary to adopt rules and procedures for the adjudication of

claims. See Heckler v. Campbell , 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1957, (1983); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers , 453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981); Batterton

v. Francis , 432 U.S. 413, 425 (1977). We need not reach this broader

contention, however, because of repeated congressional rejection of the

imposition of mandatory deadlines on agency adjudication of disputed

disability claims. [32] In

light of the unmistakable intention of Congress, it would be an

unwarranted judicial intrusion into this pervasively regulated area for

federal courts to issue injunctions imposing deadlines with respect to

future disability claims. [33] Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand

the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. [34]

It is so ordered .

Justice Powell was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Burger and

Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Marshall filed a

dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens

joined.

[1] Section 423(d) defines

"disability" as:

gment of the Court of Appeals, and remand

the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. [34]

It is so ordered .

Justice Powell was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Burger and

Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Marshall filed a

dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens

joined.

[1] Section 423(d) defines

"disability" as:

"(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."

Any disability benefits payable under 423 are paid out of the Federal

Disability Insurance Trust Fund, which is funded by payroll taxes. 42

U.S.C. 401(b) (Supp. V).

[2] Social Security

Administration Annual 1983 Report to Congress 43-44 (1983).

[3] Office of Hearings &

Appeals, Key Workload Indicators 1, 16 (May 1983) [hereinafter Key Workload Indicators ]. In May 1983, the average number of cases

pending per administrative law judge stood at a record 221. Id. , at

1.

[4] The state agency acts under

the authority and control of the Secretary. See 42 U.S.C. 421(a).

[5] New material evidence may be

submitted to the Appeals Council. The Council then reviews all the

evidence and will reverse the ALJ's determination only if it finds that

the determination is "contrary to the weight of the evidence currently in

the record." 20 CFR 404.970(b) (1983).

[6] Day was forced to wait 167

days for a reconsideration determination. He received a hearing before the

ALJ 173 days after his hearing request. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a-14a.

[7] Maurais waited 215 days for

a reconsideration determination after his disability benefits were

terminated. He was given a hearing before an ALJ 65 days after his hearing

request. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a.

[6] Day was forced to wait 167

days for a reconsideration determination. He received a hearing before the

ALJ 173 days after his hearing request. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a-14a.

[7] Maurais waited 215 days for

a reconsideration determination after his disability benefits were

terminated. He was given a hearing before an ALJ 65 days after his hearing

request. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a.

[8] That section provides that

after any unfavorable determination of disability, the claimant, on

request, shall be entitled to "reasonable notice and opportunity for a

hearing with respect to such decision."

[9] The evidence submitted by

the government showed that 57% of the hearings requested in Vermont after

January 1978 were scheduled within 90 days, with a range of delays varying

between two and nine months. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a. The District

Court rejected the Secretary's claim that the delays were necessary to

ensure quality decisions and to protect the limited resources of the

Social Security program. It held that "[w]hile the SSA has made admirable

strides in reducing the average length of delay experienced by claimants a

few years ago, we [believe] . . . that the SSA is not warranted in forcing

claimants to endure such lengthy delays without benefits, while it puts

its administrative appeals process in order." App. to Pet. for Cert.

17a-18a.

[10] There is no express

statutory requirement that reconsideration determinations be conducted

within a reasonable time. The District Court reasoned, however, that

because the reconsideration determination was an "administrative

prerequisite" to an administrative hearing, "[u]nreasonable delays in the

reconsideration procedures trench on the statutory duty to provide a

hearing within a reasonable time." App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. That

reasoning is not challenged here.

[11] The order exempted

reconsideration determinations from the 90-day deadline in the following

circumstances:

App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a.

e

prerequisite" to an administrative hearing, "[u]nreasonable delays in the

reconsideration procedures trench on the statutory duty to provide a

hearing within a reasonable time." App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. That

reasoning is not challenged here.

[11] The order exempted

reconsideration determinations from the 90-day deadline in the following

circumstances:

App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a.

[12] The order exempted

hearing requests from the 90-day deadline in the following

circumstances:

App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a.

[13] Because the District

Court held that the challenged delays violated 405(b) of the Act, it did

not reach plaintiffs' claims that the delays violated the Administrative

Procedure Act or their due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

[14] We note at the outset

that the District Court had jurisdiction to consider respondents'

statutory claim under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). There are two prerequisites to

405(g) jurisdiction. Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749, 763-767 (1975). The non-waivable

jurisdictional requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been

presented to the Secretary has been met here. The jurisdictional

requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is waivable. In the

present case, the Secretary has not challenged the sufficiency of

respondents' efforts to exhaust administrative remedies. We interpret this

to be a waiver by the Secretary of the exhaustion requirement under

405(g). See Salfi , 422 U.S., at 767.

[15] Nor do we understand the

Secretary to dispute the District Court's determination that the 27 sample

cases it studied evidenced statutory violations of the reasonableness

requirement.

the sufficiency of

respondents' efforts to exhaust administrative remedies. We interpret this

to be a waiver by the Secretary of the exhaustion requirement under

405(g). See Salfi , 422 U.S., at 767.

[15] Nor do we understand the

Secretary to dispute the District Court's determination that the 27 sample

cases it studied evidenced statutory violations of the reasonableness

requirement.

[16] The delays are not a

recent development. In fiscal year 1973, the median time between hearing

request and post-hearing disposition was 174 days. The mean processing

time reached a high in fiscal year 1976 at 288 days. At the time this

action was filed in district court (November 1978), the mean processing

time was 151 days. Key Workload Indicators 1. As the District Court

observed, "the [Secretary] has made admirable strides in reducing the

average length of delay experienced by claimants a few years ago." See n.

9, supra .

[17] See Delays in Social

Security Appeals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the

House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter

1975 Hearings].

[18] See, e.g. ,

Disability Insurance Program: Public Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the

Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 2d

Sess., 341-343 (1976); Administrative Law Judges, HEW Executive Level

Positions, and Salary Adjustment for Director of Office of Management

& budget: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employee Ethics and

Utilization of the House Comm. on Post Office & Civil Service, 95th

Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, 16-17 (1977); Disability Insurance Program --

1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Social Security of the House

Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17, 97-99 (1978).

[19] See 1975 Hearings.

ector of Office of Management

& budget: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employee Ethics and

Utilization of the House Comm. on Post Office & Civil Service, 95th

Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, 16-17 (1977); Disability Insurance Program --

1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Social Security of the House

Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17, 97-99 (1978).

[19] See 1975 Hearings.

[20] H.R. 5276, 94th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1975). That bill proposed the following deadlines: 90 days for

an initial determination of eligibility; 90 days for a reconsideration

determination; 120 days from hearing request to post-hearing decision; and

120 days for a decision by the Appeals Council.

[21] By the end of fiscal year

1975, there was a backlog of 111,169 cases, and a mean processing time of

262 days from hearing request to post-hearing decision. Key Workload

Indicators 1.

[22] The concern was expressed

throughout the House hearings that mandatory deadlines would worsen the

situation of an already overburdened staff, thereby jeopardizing the

quality of agency decisions. See, e.g. , 1975 Hearings 8 ("Equally

important as speed of processing of cases, is the question of the quality

of adjudication"); id. , at 17 ("Heavier work loads and efforts to

increase individual ALJ production place more strain on quality of

adjudication").

[23]

See H.R. 12466, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 5151, 95th Cong., 1st

Sess. (1977): H.R. 12672, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 747, 96th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4775, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

e question of the quality

of adjudication"); id. , at 17 ("Heavier work loads and efforts to

increase individual ALJ production place more strain on quality of

adjudication").

[23]

See H.R. 12466, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 5151, 95th Cong., 1st

Sess. (1977): H.R. 12672, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 747, 96th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4775, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

[24] In requesting

recommendations from the Secretary, Congress faced opposition from those

who continued to press for statutory deadlines. See Disability Insurance

Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House

Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 114 (1979) (Statement of

Dennis M. Sweeney & Laura W.S. Macklin on Behalf of the Administrative

Law Center, etc.) ("[T]he problem of delays in the Social Security hearing

system has been before Congress repeatedly and for a number of years. . .

. At this point, HEW is well aware of the problems in this area. . . .

[W]e respectfully submit that this is not the time to further study the

delay problem. A provision in this bill suggesting a study from HEW . . .

can only be read as an invitation to further delay cleaning up the hearing

process and getting rid of the unreasonable and unnecessary delays").

[25] The District Court's

original unpublished memorandum opinion required the Secretary to comply

with a hearing request within 90 days. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit reversed that order and remanded for the Secretary to issue

regulations promulgating mandatory deadlines. Blankenship v. Secretary

of HEW , 587 F.2d 329 (CA6 1978). On remand, the Secretary attempted to

promulgate such regulations, but concluded that unpredictable caseloads

made deadlines impossible. The Secretary then petitioned the District

Court for relief from the requirement that she promulgate deadlines. The

District Court refused and ordered the Secretary to promulgate the

regulations. Blankenship v

cretary

of HEW , 587 F.2d 329 (CA6 1978). On remand, the Secretary attempted to

promulgate such regulations, but concluded that unpredictable caseloads

made deadlines impossible. The Secretary then petitioned the District

Court for relief from the requirement that she promulgate deadlines. The

District Court refused and ordered the Secretary to promulgate the

regulations. Blankenship v. Secretary of Health & Human

Services , 532 F. Supp. 739 (WD Ky. 1982). The Sixth Circuit affirmed

on appeal. Blankenship v. Schweiker , Nos. 82-5130, 82-5204

(December 1, 1983). JUSTICE O'CONNOR has stayed the District Court's order

requiring the Secretary to promulgate regulations pending our decision in

this case. Heckler v. Blankenship , _____ U.S. _____ (1984).

[26] This clear expression of

congressional disapproval refutes the dissent's suggestion that Congress

implicitly has endorsed judicially mandated deadlines by failing to

repudiate those judicial decisions that have imposed them. See post , at 7. There is simply no basis for the dissent's proposition

that this passage "when read in context, supports only the inference that

Congress chose not to 'assert its power to give the district court's more

specific direction.'" Post , at 8, n. 9 (quoting White v.

Mathews , 559 F.2d 852, 861 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908

(1978)).

[27] The dissent's suggestion

that Congress meant to prohibit only nationwide and not statewide deadlines is unpersuasive. The legislative history

suggests no distinction between the two. Moreover, injunctive orders

imposing varying deadlines from state to state would defeat the express

congressional goal of uniformity. See S. Rep. No. 96-408, 52-56 (1979).

[28] The 1980 amendments also

authorized the Secretary to review determinations of ineligibility on her

own motion. 42 U.S.C. 421(c)(1).

s unpersuasive. The legislative history

suggests no distinction between the two. Moreover, injunctive orders

imposing varying deadlines from state to state would defeat the express

congressional goal of uniformity. See S. Rep. No. 96-408, 52-56 (1979).

[28] The 1980 amendments also

authorized the Secretary to review determinations of ineligibility on her

own motion. 42 U.S.C. 421(c)(1).

[29] The legislative history

of this amendment suggests that Congress was concerned that undue emphasis

on expediting resolution of disputed claims had resulted in a marked loss

of quality and uniformity in agency decisions. See, e.g. , S. Rep.

No. 96-408, pp. 52-56 (1979).

[30] The suggestion made by

the dissent that this legislative history "has little relevance to the

task before us," post , at 6, is mistaken. The legislative history

set forth in this opinion demonstrates far more than simple congressional

inaction in the face of acknowledged delays; it explicitly shows that

Congress has rejected repeated demands for mandatory deadlines. We rarely

see as clear an expression of congressional intent.

[31] As early as 1967,

Congress recognized the difference between old-age and disability

claims:

"The process of making disability determinations is significantly

different from the retirement and survivors insurance claims process. In

the disability process[,] State vocational rehabilitation agencies are

involved importantly in the making of the decision[,] and in the

borderline cases[,] lengthy and extensive development of facts of a

medical nature is often required." S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.

107 (1967).

inations is significantly

different from the retirement and survivors insurance claims process. In

the disability process[,] State vocational rehabilitation agencies are

involved importantly in the making of the decision[,] and in the

borderline cases[,] lengthy and extensive development of facts of a

medical nature is often required." S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.

107 (1967).

[32] In view of Congress's

unequivocal determination that mandatory deadlines are inappropriate, the

repeated references in the dissenting opinion to the "reasonableness" of

the injunctive order at issue here are simply irrelevant. See post ,

at 3, n. 1, 13-14, 15-16. The dissent states that the injunction at issue

is "narrowly crafted," and assumes that the Secretary would have no

difficulty complying with it. Even if this assumption were correct, it

hardly suggests that this Court should disregard the considered

determination of Congress that mandatory deadlines are inappropriate.

[33] We make clear that

nothing in this opinion precludes the proper use of injunctive relief to

remedy individual violations of 405(b). Our decision in this case

is limited to the question whether, in view of the unequivocally clear

intent of Congress to the contrary, it is nevertheless appropriate for a

federal court to prescribe mandatory deadlines with respect to the

adjudication of disability claims under Title II of the Act. We understand

that the courts below were moved by long delays that well may have caused

serious deprivations. But this does not justify imposing absolute periods

of limitations applicable to all claims -- limitations that Congress

repeatedly has declined to enact.

[34] The District Court's

order requiring the payment of interim benefits was conditioned on

noncompliance with the injunction. Because we have held that the

injunction is invalid, we need not address the propriety of that part of

the District Court's order requiring payment of interim benefits.