SSR 84-18: SECTION 216(h)(1)(A) (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(1)(A)) RELATIONSHIP -- VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE -- ESTOPPEL -- OHIO

20 CFR 404.345

SSR 84-18

A question has been raised as to whether the claimant is the worker's

wife under the Act. At issue is whether Ohio, the worker's present

domicile, would look to Mississippi law to determine if the marriage that

took place in Mississippi between the worker and the claimant was valid

and, further, whether Ohio would apply the Mississippi principle of

estoppel, which would preclude the claimant, based on her subsequent

marriage, from denying the termination f her marriage to the worker and

from asserting the validity of that marriage.

The worker and the claimant were ceremonially married in Mississippi on

August 27, 1923. They lived together in Mississippi as husband and wife

until some time in the 1930's when they separated. It appears that they

have had no contact with each other since that time. Neither the claimant

nor the worker has filed for or obtained a divorce and, although the

worker has on occasion stated that his marriage to the claimant was ended

by divorce, he has also provided information to the contrary. Furthermore,

a search of pertinent records has revealed no evidence of a divorce.

The claimant continued to reside in Mississippi until 1940 when she moved

to Tennessee, where she has lived to the present time. In 1940, according

to her own statement, the claimant, knowing that she was not divorced from

the worker, remarried in Arkansas. The claimant alleged that she and her

second husband went through a marriage ceremony but did not have the

marriage officially recorded because they knew that her marriage to the

worker had not ended. Nonetheless, the claimant took the name of her

second husband which she continues to use even though they have been

separated since 1949. There is no indication that either the claimant or

her second husband has sought or obtained a divorce.

went through a marriage ceremony but did not have the

marriage officially recorded because they knew that her marriage to the

worker had not ended. Nonetheless, the claimant took the name of her

second husband which she continues to use even though they have been

separated since 1949. There is no indication that either the claimant or

her second husband has sought or obtained a divorce.

Following his separation from the claimant, the worker remarried in

Mississippi on april 12, 1941. The worker's second wife, however, had been

married previously in Mississippi on December 1, 1929; and although she

and her prior husband had been separated, they were never divorced. The

worker's second wife stated that, at the time of their alleged marriage,

the worker knew that she had been married previously, but not divorced,

and that she was aware that he had been married previously, but not

whether his marriage had been ended by a divorce. the worker and his

second wife lived together as "husband and wife" until 1965 when they

separated. Neither of them has obtained or sought to obtain a divorce, and

they both live in Ohio at the present time.

The claimant filed an application for wife's insurance benefits on the

worker's earnings record on September 28, 1981. her entitlement to

benefits is dependent, however, upon whether, at the time she applied for

benefits, she was the worker's wife within the meaning of section

216(h)(1)(A) of the Act. The statutory section provides that, for purposes

of entitlement to wife's insurance benefits, the question of whether the

claimant is the worker's wife is to be determined in accordance with the

law of the State of the worker's domicile. When the claimant filed her

application, the worker was domiciled in Ohio. Therefore, Ohio law is

applicable in determining whether she is his wife.

t. The statutory section provides that, for purposes

of entitlement to wife's insurance benefits, the question of whether the

claimant is the worker's wife is to be determined in accordance with the

law of the State of the worker's domicile. When the claimant filed her

application, the worker was domiciled in Ohio. Therefore, Ohio law is

applicable in determining whether she is his wife.

In determining the validity of a marriage entered into outside of Ohio,

that State follows the fairly universally accepted rule that it will look

to the law of the State where the marriage occurred. Seabold v. Seabold, 84 N.E. 2nd 521 (1948); In re Zemmick's Estate 76

N.E. 2d 902 (1946). Thus, Ohio will recognize a marriage validly entered

into in Mississippi unless it contravenes Ohio public policy to do dos. Seabold v. Seabold, supra. There are no facts here to

indicate that the claimant's marriage to the worker was invalid;

therefore, with respect to the initial question of the validity of that

marriage when it arose, Ohio would recognize it as valid.

It must now be determined whether Ohio would also, in further assessing

the validity of the marriage, apply the estoppel principle of Mississippi

law which would serve to preclude the claimant, based on her subsequent

marriage, even though bigamous, from denying the termination of her

marriage to the worker and from asserting the validity of that

marriage. [1] In other words,

when presented with the question of the validity of the claimant's

marriage to the worker, would Ohio act in a manner identical to

Mississippi and find the marriage valid when it arose, but estop the

claimant from asserting such validity because of her subsequent

"marriage," even though bigamous? For the reasons set out below, it is

determined that Ohio would not apply the aforementioned Mississippi

estoppel principle.

f the validity of the claimant's

marriage to the worker, would Ohio act in a manner identical to

Mississippi and find the marriage valid when it arose, but estop the

claimant from asserting such validity because of her subsequent

"marriage," even though bigamous? For the reasons set out below, it is

determined that Ohio would not apply the aforementioned Mississippi

estoppel principle.

Unlike the majority of states, of which Mississippi is one, Ohio follows

the minority rule with respect to presumption of marital status. Thus, in

Ohio "it is presumed that once a marriage in entered into it continues

until proof of dissolution. To complement this presumption, it is further

presumed that there was no valid divorce in the first marriage in the

absence of positive proof. Domany v. Otis Elevator Company, 369 F.2d 604 at 610-611 (6th Cir. 1966). Under this minority rule, it is

presumed that the status of the parties to the first marriage continued

and the burden is on the parties claiming the validity of a second

"marriage" to overcome the presumption. Domany v. Otis Elevator

Company, supra. Mississippi and the majority of States, on the other

hand, presume the validity of a subsequent marriage by presuming that the

first marriage has ended in a legal divorce. Under the majority rule, the

legality of the subsequent marriage is presumed even where a spouse of the

former marriage is living. See Domany, supra. The Mississippi

estoppel principle at issue here is a radical extension of the

aforementioned "majority rule;" the majority rule results in a presumption

of the validity of a subsequent marriage, and the estoppel principle, in

fact, effectuates a preclusion of the right to assert the validity of the

prior marriage even when the presumption has been rebutted. Thus, under

Mississippi law, when the presumption has been rebutted and the estoppel

principle is applied, both a prior and a subsequent marriage are, in

effect, rendered invalid

on

of the validity of a subsequent marriage, and the estoppel principle, in

fact, effectuates a preclusion of the right to assert the validity of the

prior marriage even when the presumption has been rebutted. Thus, under

Mississippi law, when the presumption has been rebutted and the estoppel

principle is applied, both a prior and a subsequent marriage are, in

effect, rendered invalid. This concept is unparalleled in Ohio law and

actually appears to contravene the premise of the minority rule followed

in Ohio which presumes the invalidity of subsequent "marriages" while

upholding the validity of a prior marriage.

Ohio law itself does not have a principle analogous to that of

Mississippi, and there have been no cases in which the Ohio courts have

specifically applied the Mississippi estoppel principle or have estopped a

spouse from asserting the validity of a first marriage even when followed

by a bigamous marriage. [2]

Ohio cases involving the general application of estoppel are also at

variance with the underlying premise of the Mississippi estoppel

principle. In Mississippi, the estoppel principle is applied merely

because of the existence of a subsequent bigamous marriage. In Ohio,

however, equitable estoppel may be invoked as a defense only when each of

5 specific elements is present. these elements, as noted by the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, while applying

Ohio law are:

31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 67, p. 254, et seq.; 20 O.Jur.2d 498, et seq.; Gruber v. Savannah River Lumber Co., 4 Cir., 1924, 2F.2d 418, 425; Grouf v. State National Bank, 8 Cir., 1930, 40 F.2d 2, 7; Fleming v. City of Steubenville, 7 Dist., 1931, 44 Ohio App.

121, 184 N.E. 701.

New York Central Railroad Co. v. General Motors Corp., 182

F.Supp. 273 at 288 (N.D.O., 1960). The court in that case further

stated:

* * *

New York Central Railroad Co. v. General Motors Corp. supra at 289. The Ohio Supreme Court has recently stated:

5; Grouf v. State National Bank, 8 Cir., 1930, 40 F.2d 2, 7; Fleming v. City of Steubenville, 7 Dist., 1931, 44 Ohio App.

121, 184 N.E. 701.

New York Central Railroad Co. v. General Motors Corp., 182

F.Supp. 273 at 288 (N.D.O., 1960). The court in that case further

stated:

* * *

New York Central Railroad Co. v. General Motors Corp. supra at 289. The Ohio Supreme Court has recently stated:

The State ex rel. Cities Services Oil Company v. Orteca, 409 N.E.2d 1018 at 1020 (1980). Thus, it appears that unlike the state of

the law in Mississippi which permits, and in fact, mandates the

application of the estoppel principle merely because of the existence of a

subsequent bigamous marriage, the law in Ohio would preclude estoppel in

this case because of each of the essential elements for the appropriate

invocation of estoppel is not present. See also In Re Estate of

Cecere, 242 N.E.2d 701 (1968); Newbern v. Lake Lorelei,

Inc., 308 F.Supp. 407 (S.D.O., 1968).

In determining which law to apply in cases where the laws of several

States might be invoked, [3] Ohio

appears to be following the conflict of laws principle being advanced by

the American Law Institute which advocates application of the law of the

jurisdiction which has the "most significant contacts" and the paramount

interest in the parties and the issues in question. See 16 O.Jur.3d,

Conflict of Laws § 12. Since none of the parties here presently reside in

Mississippi and have not done so for substantial periods of time, and

since the Mississippi law and Ohio law relevant here are so different, it

is therefore determined that, in the absence of a clear mandate to apply

Mississippi law, Ohio courts would determine that Ohio has a greater stake

and interest in the resolution of the question and would apply Ohio law

and not the law of Mississippi.

ssippi and have not done so for substantial periods of time, and

since the Mississippi law and Ohio law relevant here are so different, it

is therefore determined that, in the absence of a clear mandate to apply

Mississippi law, Ohio courts would determine that Ohio has a greater stake

and interest in the resolution of the question and would apply Ohio law

and not the law of Mississippi.

Therefore, since the claimant and the worker were validly married in

Mississippi and since the marriage was never terminated, the claimant is

the worker's wife under Ohio law for Social Security purposes.

[1] Irrespective of the

application of any estoppel principles, the claimant's subsequent

"marriage," which took place in Arkansas, would be considered bigamous and

therefore void pursuant to the laws of both Arkansas and Tennessee.

Similarly, the worker's subsequent marriage was also bigamous, both

because of his prior marriage and because of his second wife's prior

unended marriage. Farrow v. Hopkins , 453 S.W.2d 785 (1970); Smiley v. Smiley, 448 S.W.2d 642 (1970); see Minor v. Higdon , 61 S.2d 350 (1952). The application of the Mississippi

estoppel principle, where appropriate, operates so as to preclude the

bigamist, even though a bigamous marriage is invalid, from asserting the

continuing validity of the prior marriage, even if such prior marriage was

valid when it arose.

[2] It is interesting to note

that effective January 1, 1976, Ohio repealed its statute which barred an

adulterer from dower in the real property of the innocent spouse. Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 2103.05 (Page). Hence, if presented with the present

matter, it appears that the Ohio courts would not bar the claimant, based

on her bigamous relationship, from asserting her dower rights in the

worker's real property.

o note

that effective January 1, 1976, Ohio repealed its statute which barred an

adulterer from dower in the real property of the innocent spouse. Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 2103.05 (Page). Hence, if presented with the present

matter, it appears that the Ohio courts would not bar the claimant, based

on her bigamous relationship, from asserting her dower rights in the

worker's real property.

[3] In determining the intestate

devolution of personal property, Ohio will look to the domicile of the

decedent and not to the situs of the property. Howard v. Reynolds, 283 N.E.2d 269 (1972). Thus, if the worker had died

domiciled in Ohio, the Ohio court would look to its own law for purposes

of determining intestate succession to personal property.