SSR 78-10c: SECTIONS 202(d)(1)(D) and 202(d)(5) (42 U.S.C. 402(d)(1)(D) and 402(d)(5)) CHILD'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- TERMINATION -- MARRIAGE OF DISABLED CHILD TO A NON-BENEFICIARY -- CONSTITUTIONALITY

20 CFR 404.321(d)

SSR 78-10c

Califano v. Jobst, 95 S.Ct. 26 (1977)

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court:

The question presented is whether Congress has the power to require that

a dependent child's Social Security benefits terminate upon marriage even

though his spouse is permanently disabled. Answering that question in the

negative, the District Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(D) and §

402(d)(5) deprive appellee of property without due process of law. 368

F.Supp. 909. We reverse.

Mr. Jobst has been disabled by cerebral palsy since his birth in 1932. He

qualified for child's insurance benefits in 1957, several months after his

father died. In 1970 he married another cerebral palsy victim. Since his

wife was not entitled to benefits under the federal

act, [1] the statute required the

Secretary to terminate his

benefits. [2]

Mr. Jobst brought this suit to review the Secretary's

action. [3] The District Court

held that the statute violated the equality principle applicable to the

Federal Government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v.

Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, because all child's insurance beneficiaries are

not treated alike when they marry disabled persons. Beneficiaries who

marry other Social Security beneficiaries continue to receive benefits

whereas those who marry nonbeneficiaries lose their benefits permanently.

The court held this distinction irrational. 368 F.Supp., at 913.

rtue of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v.

Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, because all child's insurance beneficiaries are

not treated alike when they marry disabled persons. Beneficiaries who

marry other Social Security beneficiaries continue to receive benefits

whereas those who marry nonbeneficiaries lose their benefits permanently.

The court held this distinction irrational. 368 F.Supp., at 913.

The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Noting

that Mr. Jobst and his wife had become entitled to benefits under a newly

enacted statute authorizing supplemental security income for the aged,

blind, and disabled, [4] this

Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of that program. 419

U.S. 811-812. The District Court reviewed the new program, concluded that

it had no relevance to the issues presented by this case, and reinstated

its original judgment. The Secretary again appealed, and we noted probable

jurisdiction. 429 U.S. 1089.

Although the District Court focused on the statutory consequences of a

marriage between two disabled persons, the Secretary argues that the

relevant statutory classification is much broader. We therefore first

describe the statutory scheme, then consider the validity of a general

requirement that benefits payable to wage earner's dependent terminate

upon marriage, and finally decide whether such a general requirement is

invalidated by an exception limited to marriages between persons who are

both receiving benefits.

I

the

relevant statutory classification is much broader. We therefore first

describe the statutory scheme, then consider the validity of a general

requirement that benefits payable to wage earner's dependent terminate

upon marriage, and finally decide whether such a general requirement is

invalidated by an exception limited to marriages between persons who are

both receiving benefits.

I

As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act authorized a

monthly benefit for qualified wage earners at least 65 years old and a

death benefit payable to the estate of a wage earner who died at an

earlier age. 49 Stat. 622-625. In 1939 Congress created secondary benefits

for wives, children, widows, and parents of wage earners. See 53 Stat.

1362, 1364-1366. The benefits were intended to provide persons dependent

on the wage earner with protection against the economic hardship

occasioned by loss of the wage earner's support. Matthews v De

Castro , 429 U.S. 181, 185-186. Generally speaking, therefore, the

categories of secondary beneficiaries were defined to include persons who

were presumed to be dependent on the wage earner at the time of his death,

disability, or retirement.

Specifically, the child's benefit as authorized in 1939 was available

only to a child who was unmarried, under 18, and dependent upon the wage

earner at the time of his death or retirement. 53 Stat. 1364. Since Mr.

Jobst was 23 at the time of his father's death, he would not have been

eligible for a child's benefit under the 1939 Act. Under the statute, the

child's benefit, like the benefits for widows and parents, terminated upon

marriage. Id ., at 1364-1366.

In 1956, Congress enlarged the class of persons entitled to a child's

benefit to include those who, like Mr. Jobst, were under a disability

which began before age 18. [5] For such a person the benefit continued beyond the age of 18 but, as with

other secondary benefits, it terminated upon marriage.

it, like the benefits for widows and parents, terminated upon

marriage. Id ., at 1364-1366.

In 1956, Congress enlarged the class of persons entitled to a child's

benefit to include those who, like Mr. Jobst, were under a disability

which began before age 18. [5] For such a person the benefit continued beyond the age of 18 but, as with

other secondary benefits, it terminated upon marriage.

In 1958, Congress adopted the amendment that created the basis for Mr.

Jobst's constitutional attack. The amendment provided that marriage would

not terminate a child's disability benefit if the child married a person

who was also entitled to benefits under the Act. See 72 Stat. 1030-1031. A

similar dispensation was granted to widows, widowers, divorced wives and

parents. [6] In each case the

secondary benefit survives a marriage to another beneficiary, but any

other marriage -- even to a disabled person unable to provide the

beneficiary with support -- is a terminating event unaffected by the 1958

Amendments.

It was the failure of Congress 1958 to create a larger class of marriages

that do not terminate the child's benefit for disabled persons that the

District Court found irrational.

The provision challenged in this case is part of a complex statutory

scheme designed to administer a trust fund financed, in large part, by

taxes levied on the wage earners who are the primary beneficiaries of the

fund. The entitlement of any secondary beneficiary is predicated on his or

her relationship to a contributing wage earner. If the statutory

requirements for eligibility are met, the amount of the benefit is

unrelated to the actual need of the beneficiary. See, e.g., Matthews v.

De Castro , 429 U.S. 181, 185-186. The statute is designed to provide

the wage earner and the dependent members of his or her family with

protection against the hardship occasioned by his loss of earnings; it is

not simply a welfare program generally benefiting needy persons. Califano v. Goldfarb , 430 U.S

benefit is

unrelated to the actual need of the beneficiary. See, e.g., Matthews v.

De Castro , 429 U.S. 181, 185-186. The statute is designed to provide

the wage earner and the dependent members of his or her family with

protection against the hardship occasioned by his loss of earnings; it is

not simply a welfare program generally benefiting needy persons. Califano v. Goldfarb , 430 U.S. 199, 213-214 (opinion of BRENNAN,

J.).

Nor has Congress made actual dependency on the wage earner either a

sufficient or a necessary condition of eligibility in every

case. [7] Instead of requiring

individualized proof on a case-by-case basis, Congress has elected to use

simple criteria, such as age and marital status, to determine probable

dependency. [8] A child who is

married or over 18 and neither disabled nor a student is denied benefits

because Congress has assumed that such a child is not normally dependent

on his parents. There is no question about the power of Congress to

legislate on the basis of such factual assumptions. General rules are

essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum

of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly

arbitrary consequences in some individual cases. Weinberger v.

Salfi , 422 U.S. 749, 776.

Of course, a general rule may not define the benefited class by reference

to a distinction which irrationally differentiates between identically

situated persons. Differences in race, religion, or political affiliation

could not rationally justify a difference in eligibility for Social

Security benefits, for such differences are totally irrelevant to the

question whether one person is economically dependent on another. But a

distinction between married persons and unmarried persons is of a

different character.

tween identically

situated persons. Differences in race, religion, or political affiliation

could not rationally justify a difference in eligibility for Social

Security benefits, for such differences are totally irrelevant to the

question whether one person is economically dependent on another. But a

distinction between married persons and unmarried persons is of a

different character.

Both tradition and common experience support the conclusion that marriage

is an event which normally marks an important change in economic status.

Traditionally, the event not only creates a new family with attendant new

responsibilities, but also modifies the pre-existing relationships between

the bride and groom and their respective families. Frequently, of course,

financial independence and marriage do not go hand in hand. Nevertheless,

there can be no question about the validity of the assumption that a

married person is less likely to be dependent on his parents for support

than one who is unmarried.

Since it was rational for Congress to assume that marital status is a

relevant test of probable dependency, the general rule which obtained

before 1958, terminating all child's benefits when the beneficiary

married, satisfied the constitutional test normally applied in cases like

this. See Matthews v. De Castro , 429 U.S. 181, 185; Weinberger

v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749, and cases cited at 768-770. That general rule

is not rendered invalid simply because some persons who might otherwise

have married were deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were

burdened thereby. [9] For the

marriage rule cannot be criticized as merely an unthinking response to

stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally disadvantaged

group, [10] or as an attempt to

interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as important as

marriage. [11]

The general rule, terminating upon marriage the benefits payable to a

secondary beneficiary, is unquestionably valid.

III

For the

marriage rule cannot be criticized as merely an unthinking response to

stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally disadvantaged

group, [10] or as an attempt to

interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as important as

marriage. [11]

The general rule, terminating upon marriage the benefits payable to a

secondary beneficiary, is unquestionably valid.

III

The question that remains is whether the 1958 Amendment invalidates this

general rule by carving out an exception for marriages between

beneficiaries.

The exception does create a statutory classification, but it is not as

narrow as that described by the District Court. The District Court

identified the relevant classification as one distinguishing between (1)

the marriage of a disabled beneficiary to another disabled person who is

receiving Social Security benefits and (2) the marriage of a disabled

beneficiary to another disabled person who is not receiving benefits. It

is true that persons in the former category are treated more favorably

than those in the latter category. It is also true that persons in the

latter category may have as great a need for benefits as those in the

former category. But it is not correct to conclude, as the District Court

did, that only disabled persons are affected by the exception, or that the

legislative classification is wholly irrational.

Both the class of persons favored by the 1958 Amendment and the class

which remains subject to the burdens of the general marriage rule include

persons who are not

disabled. [12] The broad

legislative classification must be judged by reference to characteristics

typical of the affected classes rather than by focusing on selected,

atypical examples. When so judged, both the exception and its limits are

valid.

favored by the 1958 Amendment and the class

which remains subject to the burdens of the general marriage rule include

persons who are not

disabled. [12] The broad

legislative classification must be judged by reference to characteristics

typical of the affected classes rather than by focusing on selected,

atypical examples. When so judged, both the exception and its limits are

valid.

The 1958 Amendment reflects a legislative judgment that a marriage

between two persons receiving benefits will not normally provide either

spouse with protection against the economic hardship that would be

occasioned by the termination of benefits. The Secretary submits, and we

agree, that it was reasonable for Congress to ameliorate the severity of

the earlier rule by protecting both spouses from the dual hardship which

it effected. [13]

Mr. Jobst argues, however, that the reason for the amendment applies

equally to his situation. He urges that his hardship is just as great as

that which the amendment avoids when one beneficiary marries another,

because his spouse is also disabled. He therefore attacks the exception as

irrationally

underinclusive. [14] We are

persuaded, however, that even if the benign purpose of the 1958 Amendment

encompasses this case, [15] legitimate reasons justify the limits that Congress placed on it. See Richardson v. Belcher , 404 U.S. 78. The exception, like the general

rule itself, is simple to administer. It requires no individualized

inquiry into degrees of hardship or

need. [16] It avoids any

necessity for periodic review of the beneficiaries' continued entitlement.

In the cases to which the exception does apply, it is a reliable indicator

of probable hardship

s placed on it. See Richardson v. Belcher , 404 U.S. 78. The exception, like the general

rule itself, is simple to administer. It requires no individualized

inquiry into degrees of hardship or

need. [16] It avoids any

necessity for periodic review of the beneficiaries' continued entitlement.

In the cases to which the exception does apply, it is a reliable indicator

of probable hardship. Since the test is one that may be applied without

introducing any new concepts into the administration of the trust

fund, [17] Congress could

reasonably take one firm step toward the goal of eliminating the hardship

caused by the general marriage rule without accomplishing its entire

objective in the same piece of legislation. Williamson v. Lee Optical

Co. , 348 U.S. 438, 489. Even if it might have been wiser to take a

larger step, the step Congress did take was in the right direction and had

no adverse impact on persons like the Jobsts.

It is true, as Mr. Jobst, urges, that the limited exception may have an

impact on a secondary beneficiary's desire to marry, and may make some

suitors less welcome than others. But unless Congress should entirely

repudiate marriage as a terminating event, that criticism will apply to

any limited exception to the general rule. No one suggests that Congress

was motivated by antagonism toward any class of marriages or marriage

partners not encompassed by the exception. Congress' purpose was simply to

remedy the particular injustice that occurred when two dependent

individuals married and simultaneously lost their benefits.

We are satisfied that both the general rule and the 1958 exception are

legitimate exercises of Congress' power to decide who will share in the

benefits of the trust fund. The favored treatment of marriages between

secondary beneficiaries does not violate the principle of equality

embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The judgment is reversed.

sly lost their benefits.

We are satisfied that both the general rule and the 1958 exception are

legitimate exercises of Congress' power to decide who will share in the

benefits of the trust fund. The favored treatment of marriages between

secondary beneficiaries does not violate the principle of equality

embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The judgment is reversed.

[1] Mrs. Jobst was receiving

welfare assistance from the Division of Welfare of the State of Missouri,

but was not receiving any Social Security benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§

401-432.

[2] Section 202 of the Social

Security Act, 49 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V) § 402,

provides in pertinent part:

"(d) (1) Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) of an

individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits or of an

individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child

--

"shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month,

beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such child

becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the month

preceding whichever of the following first occurs --

* * * * *

"such child's entitlement to benefits under this subsection shall,

notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (l) of this subsection but

subject to subsection (s) of this section, not be terminated by reason of

such marriage. . . .

* * * * *

"(s) (2) . . . [S]o much of subsection [] . . . (d)(5) . . . of this

section as precedes the semicolon, shall not apply in the case of any

child unless such child, at the time of the marriage referred to therein,

was under a disability. . . ."

[3] Mr. Jobst first exhausted

his administrative remedies. A hearing examiner found in his favor, ruling

that the denial of benefits was unconstitutional. The appeals council

reversed; it held that an administrative agency has no power to rule on

the constitutionality of the act it administers.

s such child, at the time of the marriage referred to therein,

was under a disability. . . ."

[3] Mr. Jobst first exhausted

his administrative remedies. A hearing examiner found in his favor, ruling

that the denial of benefits was unconstitutional. The appeals council

reversed; it held that an administrative agency has no power to rule on

the constitutionality of the act it administers.

[4] See Title XVI of the Social

Security Act, as added by the Social Security Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat.

1329, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 1381 et seq .

[5] The 1956 Amendment replaced

the requirement that the child be under 18 at the time of application with

a requirement that he be either under 18 or "under a disability . . .

which began before he attained the age of eighteen. . . ." 70 Stat. 807.

In 1972, Congress raised the age before which the child's disability must

begin from 18 to 22. 86 Stat. 1343-1345.

[6] 72 Stat. 1030-1032. The

House Report explained the purpose of this change:

"When a secondary beneficiary marries, such person's benefit is

terminated under present law. If he marries a person who is or who will

become entitled to an old-age insurance benefit, he may qualify for a new

benefit based on the earnings of the new spouse. But if the new spouse is

also receiving a secondary benefit, the benefits of both are terminated

and ordinarily neither beneficiary can become entitled to any new

benefits. Your committee's bill would eliminate the hardship in these

cases by providing that marriage would not terminate a benefit where a

person receiving mother's, widow's, widower's, parent's, or childhood

disability benefits marries a person receiving any of these benefits or

where a person receiving mother's or childhood disability benefits marries

a person entitled to old-age insurance benefits." H.R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1958).

cases by providing that marriage would not terminate a benefit where a

person receiving mother's, widow's, widower's, parent's, or childhood

disability benefits marries a person receiving any of these benefits or

where a person receiving mother's or childhood disability benefits marries

a person entitled to old-age insurance benefits." H.R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1958).

[7] No doubt there are many

distant relatives and unrelated persons who do not qualify for benefits

even though they are actually dependent on a wage earner. Similarly, some

married children and some 19-year-old children remain dependent on their

parents because they are unable to support themselves while their younger

brothers and sisters may be self-sufficient.

[8] The idea that marriage

changes dependency is expressed throughout the Social Security statute.

Most secondary beneficiaries are eligible only if they have not married or

remarried. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(C) (divorced wives); Id ., §

402(e)(1)(A) (widows); id ., § 402(f)(1)(A) (widowers); id .,

§ 402(g)(1)(A) (surviving or divorced mothers); id ., § 402(h)(1)(C)

(parents). With some limited exceptions, id ., §§ 402(e)(4)(5),

marriage or remarriage marks the end of secondary benefits. Id ., §§

402(b)(1)(H), 402(e)(1), 402(f)(1), 402(g)(1), and 402(h)(1). In each

case, however, Congress has excepted marriages to some social security

beneficiaries. Id ., §§ 402(b)(3), 402(e)(3), 402(f)94), 402(g)(3),

and 402(h)(4).

[9] This proposition is not

questioned by appellee. "As a general premise the Secretary undoubtedly

correctly concludes it is reasonable to terminate social security payments

to child beneficiaries in the event of marriage." Appellee's Brief, at

21.

[10] See Weinberger v.

Wiesenfeld , 420 U.S. 636; Jimenez v. Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628; Loving v. Virginia , 88 U.S. 1.

,

and 402(h)(4).

[9] This proposition is not

questioned by appellee. "As a general premise the Secretary undoubtedly

correctly concludes it is reasonable to terminate social security payments

to child beneficiaries in the event of marriage." Appellee's Brief, at

21.

[10] See Weinberger v.

Wiesenfeld , 420 U.S. 636; Jimenez v. Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628; Loving v. Virginia , 88 U.S. 1.

[11] See Whalen v. Roe ,

429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 603. Congress adopted this rule in the course of

constructing a complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with

the intimacies of family life. This is not a case in which government

seeks to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling by banning, or criminally

prosecuting, nonconforming marriages. See Loving v. Virginia , 388

U.S. 1. Congress has simply recognized that marriage traditionally brings

changed responsibilities.

[12] As we have seen, the

burden of the general marriage rule is not limited to disabled

beneficiaries: children, widowers, widows, divorced wives, and parents --

all are affected by the rule. And although the District Court singled out

for analysis marriages to disabled nonbeneficiaries, Congress did not; Mr.

Jobst would also have lost his benefits if he had married an able-bodied

woman who was not receiving Social Security benefits. Finally, the

protection extended by the 1958 Amendment encompasses many more persons

than those described by the District Court. Like the marriage rule itself,

the Amendment affects widows, widowers, parents, and divorced wives, as

well as disabled children. See n. S, supra .

lso have lost his benefits if he had married an able-bodied

woman who was not receiving Social Security benefits. Finally, the

protection extended by the 1958 Amendment encompasses many more persons

than those described by the District Court. Like the marriage rule itself,

the Amendment affects widows, widowers, parents, and divorced wives, as

well as disabled children. See n. S, supra .

[13] The fact that marriage

characteristically signifies the end of a child's dependency on parental

support justifies a general rule terminating benefits when a child

marries. The fact that a marriage between two spouses who are both

receiving dependents' benefits does not characteristically signify a

similar change in economic status justifies the exception. In other words,

since the justifying characteristic of the general class does not apply to

the excepted class, the exception rests on a reasonable predicate. This is

true even though some members of each class may possess the characteristic

more commonly found in the other class.

[14] Even if we were to

sustain his attack, and even though we recognize the unusual hardship that

the general rule has inflicted upon him, it would not necessarily follow

that Mr. Jobst is entitled to benefits. Cf. Stanton v. Stanton , 421

U.S. 7, 17-18; Stanton v. Stanton , 429 U.S. 501. For the vice in

the statute stems from the exception created by the 1958 Amendment; that

vice could be cured either by invalidating the entire exception or by

enlarging it. Since the choice involves legislation having a nation-wide

impact, the equities of Mr. Jobst's case would not control. See

Developments in the Law -- Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065,

1136-1137 (1969). If we were to enlarge the exception, it would be

necessary to fashion some new test of need, dependency, or disability

ither by invalidating the entire exception or by

enlarging it. Since the choice involves legislation having a nation-wide

impact, the equities of Mr. Jobst's case would not control. See

Developments in the Law -- Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065,

1136-1137 (1969). If we were to enlarge the exception, it would be

necessary to fashion some new test of need, dependency, or disability.

Although the District Court only granted relief for persons marrying a

"totally disabled" spouse, its rationale would equally apply to any

marriage of a secondary beneficiary to a needy nonbeneficiary.

[15] We note, however, that

Congress could have rationally concluded that beneficiaries who marry

other beneficiaries present a more compelling case for legislative relief

than beneficiaries who marry need nonbeneficiaries. Secondary

beneficiaries who marry each other lose two sets of benefits and thus may

suffer a greater loss than does a couple that sacrifices only one set of

benefits.

[16] In the very Act that

created the exception for marriages between beneficiaries, Congress showed

its reluctance to use individualized determinations in allocating Social

Security benefits. The 1958 Amendments abolished a requirement that

disabled children over 18 prove their individual dependency on the wage

earner to qualify for benefits. Pub. L. 85-840 § 306, 72 Stat. 1030.

Congress concluded that these beneficiaries should be "deemed dependent"

because "the older child who has been totally disabled since before age 18

is also likely to be dependent on his parents." H.R. Rep. No. 13549, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess., 17.

that

disabled children over 18 prove their individual dependency on the wage

earner to qualify for benefits. Pub. L. 85-840 § 306, 72 Stat. 1030.

Congress concluded that these beneficiaries should be "deemed dependent"

because "the older child who has been totally disabled since before age 18

is also likely to be dependent on his parents." H.R. Rep. No. 13549, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess., 17.

[17] A logical application of

Mr. Jobst's position would permit the Secretary to end benefits only after

an individual determination of disability or need. Congress, however, has

sought to make Social Security payments independent of individual need,

while establishing a separate program to serve those who are needy but

ineligible for Social Security benefits. The Supplemental Security Income

program is a federally funded welfare program administered through the

Social Security Administration. Its purpose is plainly stated by H.R. Rep.

No. 92-231, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 147:

"[S]ome people who because of age, disability, or blindness are not able

to support themselves through work may receive relatively small social

security benefits. Contributory social insurance therefore, must be

complemented by an effective assistance program."

Mr. and Mrs. Jobst became eligible for the Supplemental Security Income

Program as soon as it was instituted. On remand the parties stipulated

that, based on the couple's need, they were receiving monthly payments

only $20 less than the amount they would have been receiving if Mr.

Jobst's child's benefits had been restored.