SSR 77-2c: SECTION 216(h)(3)(C)(ii) (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(3)(C)(ii)) -- CHILD'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- ELIGIBILITY OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD -- LIVING WITH OR CONTRIBUTING SUPPORT

20 CFR 404.1101 and 404.1109

SSR 77-2c

MATHEWS v. LUCAS , 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976)

NORTON v. MATHEWS , 96 S. Ct. 2771 (1976)

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue of the constitutionality, under the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of those provisions of the Social

Security Act that condition the eligibility of certain illegitimate

children for a surviving child's insurance benefits upon a showing that

the deceased wage earner was the claimant child's parent and, at the time

of his death, was living with the child or was contributing to his

support.

I

Robert Cuffee, now deceased, lived with Belmira Lucas during the years

1948 through 1966, but they were never married. Two children were born to

them during these years: Ruby M. Lucas, in 1953, and Darin E. Lucas, in

1960. In 1966 Cuffee and Lucas separated. Cuffee died in Providence, Rhode

Island, his home, in 1968. He died without ever having acknowledged in

writing his paternity of either Ruby or Darin, and it was never determined

in any judicial proceeding during his lifetime that he was the father of

either child. After Cuffee's death, Mrs. Lucas filed an application on

behalf of Ruby and Darin for surviving children's benefits under §

202(d)(1) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1), based upon

Cuffee's earnings record.

II

In operative terms, the Act provides that an unmarried son or daughter of

an individual, who died fully or currently insured under the Act, may

apply for and be entitled to a survivor's benefit, if the applicant is

under 18 years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time

student and under 22 years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning

of the statute, at the time of the parents,

death. [1] A child is considered

dependent for this purpose if the insured father was living with or

contributing to the child's support at the time of death

to a survivor's benefit, if the applicant is

under 18 years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time

student and under 22 years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning

of the statute, at the time of the parents,

death. [1] A child is considered

dependent for this purpose if the insured father was living with or

contributing to the child's support at the time of death. Certain

children, however, are relieved of the burden of such individualized proof

of dependency. Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual,

a child who is legitimate, or a child who would be entitled to inherit

personal property from the insured parent's estate under the applicable

state intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at the time of

the parent's death. [2] Even

lacking this relationship under state law, a child, unless adopted by some

other individual, is entitled to a presumption of dependency if the

decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the

other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but

for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing

had acknowledged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court

to be the child's father, or (d) had been ordered by a court to support

the child because the child was

his. [3]

An Examiner of the Social Security Administration, after hearings,

determined that while Cuffee's paternity was established, the children had

failed to demonstrate their dependency by proof that Cuffee either lived

with them or was contributing to their support at the time of his death,

or by any of the statutory presumptions of dependency, and thus that they

were not entitled to survivorship benefits under the Act. The Appeals

council of the Social Security Administration affirmed these rulings, and

they became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and

Welfare

ee either lived

with them or was contributing to their support at the time of his death,

or by any of the statutory presumptions of dependency, and thus that they

were not entitled to survivorship benefits under the Act. The Appeals

council of the Social Security Administration affirmed these rulings, and

they became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and

Welfare. Lucas then timely filed this action, pursuant to § 205(g) of the

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), in the United States District Court for the

District of Rhode Island on behalf of the two children (hereinafter called

the appellees) for review of the Secretary's decision.

The District Court ultimately affirmed each of the factual findings of

the administrative agency: that Robert Cuffee was the children's father;

that he never acknowledged his paternity in writing; that his paternity or

support obligations had not been the subject of a judicial proceeding

during his lifetime; that no common law marriage had ever been contracted

between Cuffee and Lucas, so that the children could not inherit Cuffee's

personal property under the intestacy law of Rhode Island; and that, at

the time of his death, he was neither living with the children nor

contributing to their support. 390 F. Supp. 1310, 1312-1314 (1975). None

of these factual matters is at issue

here. [4]

A motion for summary judgment, filed by the appellees, relied on Jimenez v. Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628 (1974). It was urged

that denial of Amendment's Due Process Clause, as that provision

comprehends the principle of equal protection of the

laws, [5] because other children,

including all legitimate children are statutorily entitled, as the Lucas

children are not, to survivorship benefits regardless of actual

dependency. Addressing this issue, the District Court ruled that the

statutory classifications were constitutionally impermissible. [6] 390 F. Supp., at 1314-321

on

comprehends the principle of equal protection of the

laws, [5] because other children,

including all legitimate children are statutorily entitled, as the Lucas

children are not, to survivorship benefits regardless of actual

dependency. Addressing this issue, the District Court ruled that the

statutory classifications were constitutionally impermissible. [6] 390 F. Supp., at 1314-321.

Recognizing that the web of statutory provisions regarding presumptive

dependency was overinclusive because it entitled some children, who were

not actually dependent, to survivorship benefits under the Act -- although

not underinclusive, since no otherwise eligible child who could establish

actual dependency at the time of death was denied such benefits -- the

court concluded that the Act was not intended merely to replace

actual support that a child lost through the death of the insured parent. Id. , at 1319-1320. Rather, the court characterized the statute as

one designed to replace obligations of support or potential support lost

through death, where the obligation was perceived by Congress, on the

basis of the responsibility of the relation between the child's parents,

to be a valid one. Thus, the Court concluded, the Act

With this conclusion, the District Court reversed the administrative

decision and ordered the Secretary to pay benefits for both. Juris.

Statement 28a.

The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We noted

probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument with Norton v. Mathews, post, p. [2499-11'. 423 U.S. 819 (1975).

e a valid one. Thus, the Court concluded, the Act

With this conclusion, the District Court reversed the administrative

decision and ordered the Secretary to pay benefits for both. Juris.

Statement 28a.

The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We noted

probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument with Norton v. Mathews, post, p. [2499-11'. 423 U.S. 819 (1975).

The Secretary does not disagree that the Lucas children and others

similarly circumstanced are treated differently, as a class, from those

children -- legitimate and illegitimate -- who are relieved by statutory

presumption of any requirement of proving actual dependency at the time of

death through cohabitation or contribution for children in the advantaged

classes may be statutorily entitled to benefits even if they have never

been dependent upon the father through whom they

claim. [7] Statutory

classifications, of course, are not per se unconstitutional; the

matter depends upon the character of the discrimination and its relation

to legitimate legislative aims. "The essential inquiry . . . is . . .

inevitably a dual one: What legitimate [governmental] interest does the

classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the

classification endanger?" Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety

Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).

Although the District Court concluded that close judicial scrutiny of the

statute's classifications was not necessary to its conclusion invalidating

those classifications, it also concluded that legislation treating

legitimate and illegitimate offspring differently is constitutionally

suspect, [8] 390 F. Supp.,

1318-1319, and requires the judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted in

cases involving discrimination along the lines of

race [9] or national

origin. [10] Appellees echo

this approach. We

disagree. [11]

on invalidating

those classifications, it also concluded that legislation treating

legitimate and illegitimate offspring differently is constitutionally

suspect, [8] 390 F. Supp.,

1318-1319, and requires the judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted in

cases involving discrimination along the lines of

race [9] or national

origin. [10] Appellees echo

this approach. We

disagree. [11]

It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however

defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by

causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears

no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute

to society. The Court recognized in Weber that visiting

condemnation upon the child in order to express society's disapproval of

the parents' liaisons

But where the law is arbitrary in such a way, we have had no difficult in

finding the discrimination impermissible on less demanding standards than

those advocated here. New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Richardson v, Davis, 409

U.S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069

(1972); Weber, supra; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).

And such irrationality in some classifications does not in itself

demonstrate that other, possibly rational, distinctions made in part on

the basis of legitimacy are inherently untenable. Moreover, while the law

has long placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to

the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard to

obligations of support or other aspects of family law, see generally, e.g., H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 21-42 (1971);

Gray & Rudovsky. The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee &

Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. P. L. Rev

in an inferior position relative to

the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard to

obligations of support or other aspects of family law, see generally, e.g., H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 21-42 (1971);

Gray & Rudovsky. The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee &

Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. P. L. Rev. 1, 19-38 (1969), perhaps in

part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of the

parents rather than the

child, [12] and perhaps in part

because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do,

this discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the

severity of pervasiveness of the historic legal and political

discrimination against women and Negroes. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-686 (1973) (plurality opinion).

We therefore adhere to our earlier view, see Labine v. Vincent,

401 U.S. 532 (1971), that the Act's discrimination between individuals on

the basis of their legitimacy does not "command extraordinary protection

from the majoritarian political process," San Antonio Independent

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), which out most

exacting scrutiny would

entail. [13] See Jimenez, 417 U.S., at 631-634, 636; Weber, 406 U.S., at 173,

175-176.

IV

Relying on Weber, the Court, in Gomez v. Perez, 409

U.S. 535, 538 (1973), held that "once a State posits a judicially

enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their

natural fathers there is o constitutionally sufficient justification for

denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural

father has not married its mother." The same principle, which we adhere to

now, applies when the judicially enforceable right to needed support lies

against the Government rather than a natural father. See New Jersey

Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, supra.

there is o constitutionally sufficient justification for

denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural

father has not married its mother." The same principle, which we adhere to

now, applies when the judicially enforceable right to needed support lies

against the Government rather than a natural father. See New Jersey

Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, supra.

Consistent with our decisions, the Secretary explains the design of the

statutory scheme assailed here as a program to provide for all children of

deceased insureds who can demonstrate their "need" in terms of dependency

at the times of the insureds' deaths. Cf. Jimenez, 417 U.S., at

634. He authenticates this description by reference to the explicit

language of the Act specifying that the applicant child's classification

as legitimate, or acknowledged, etc., is ultimately relevant only to the

determination of dependency, and by reference to legislative history

indicating that the statute was not a general welfare provision for

legitimate or otherwise "approved" children of deceased insureds, but was

intended just "to replace the support lost by a child when his father . .

. dies . . .." S. Rep. N. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1965).

Taking this explanation at face value, we think it clear that

conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not

impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom

the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492-497 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). See also Weber, supra, 406

U.S., at 174-175.

that

conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not

impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom

the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492-497 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). See also Weber, supra, 406

U.S., at 174-175.

But appellees contend that the actual design of the statute belies the

Secretary's description, and that the statute was intended to provide

support for insured decedents' children generally, if they had a

"legitimate" claim to support, without regard to actual dependency at

death; in any case, they assert, the statute's matrix of classifications

bears no adequate relationship to actual dependency at death. Since such

dependency does not justify the statute's discriminations, appellees

argue, those classifications must fall under Gomez v. Perez,

supra. These assertions are in effect one and the

same. [14] The basis for

appellees' argument is the obvious fact that each of the presumptions of

dependency renders the class of benefit-recipients incrementally

overinclusive, in the sense that some children within each class of

presumptive dependents are automatically entitled to benefits under the

statute although they could not in fact prove their economic dependence

upon insured wage earners at the time of death. We conclude that the

statutory classifications are permissible, however, because they are

reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death.

A

ense that some children within each class of

presumptive dependents are automatically entitled to benefits under the

statute although they could not in fact prove their economic dependence

upon insured wage earners at the time of death. We conclude that the

statutory classifications are permissible, however, because they are

reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death.

A

Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency

was obviously to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was

unwilling to assume that every child of a deceased insured was dependent

at the time of death, by presuming dependency on the basis of relatively

readily documented facts, such as legitimate birth, or existence of a

support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate

the likelihood of continued actual dependency, Congress was able to avoid

the burden and expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large

number of cases where dependency is objectively probable. Such

presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may

approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case

adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so

long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of

substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S., at

772. [15]

presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may

approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case

adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so

long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of

substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S., at

772. [15]

In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations must be supported at

least by a showing that the Government's dollar "lost" to overincluded

benefit recipients is returned by a dollar "saved" in administrative

expense avoided. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 689

(plurality opinion). Under the standard of review appropriate here,

however, the materiality of the relation between the statutory

classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect

need not be "scientifically substantiated. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972), quoting Roth v. United States , 354

U.S. 476, 501 (1957) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.). Nor, in any case,

do we believe that congress is required in this realm of less than

strictest scrutiny to weigh the burdens of administrative inquiry solely

in terms of dollars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts

devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi 422 U.S., at 784 Finally, while the scrutiny by which

their showing is to be judged is not a toothless one, e.g., Jimenez,

supra; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 691 (concurring

opinions of MR JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE POWELL); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the appellees to

demonstrate the insubstantiality of that relation. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); cf. United

States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).

B

less one, e.g., Jimenez,

supra; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 691 (concurring

opinions of MR JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE POWELL); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the appellees to

demonstrate the insubstantiality of that relation. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); cf. United

States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).

B

Applying these principles, we think that the statutory classifications

challenged here are justified as reasonable empirical judgments that are

consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child's

dependency at the time of the parent's death. To begin with, we note that

the statutory scheme is significantly different from the provisions

confronted in cases in which the Court has invalidated legislative

discriminations among children on the basis of legitimacy. See Gomez v. Perez, supra; New Jersey Welfare Rights

Organization v. Cahill, supra; Weber v. Aetna Casualty &

Surety Co., supra; Levy v. Louisiana, supra . These differences

render those cases of little assistance to appellees. It could not have

been fairly argued, with respect to any of the statutes struck down in

those cases, that the legitimacy of the child was simply taken as an

indication of dependency, or of some other valid ground of qualification.

Under all but one of the statutes, not only was the legitimate child

automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate child was denied

benefits solely and finally on he basis of illegitimacy, and regardless of

any demonstration of dependency or other legitimate factor. See also Griffin v. Richardson. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (Md.), aff'd. 409

U.S., 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588

(Conn.), aff'd 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). In Weber v

ate child

automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate child was denied

benefits solely and finally on he basis of illegitimacy, and regardless of

any demonstration of dependency or other legitimate factor. See also Griffin v. Richardson. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (Md.), aff'd. 409

U.S., 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588

(Conn.), aff'd 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). In Weber v. Aetna Casualty

and Surety Co., supra, the sole partial exception, the statutory

scheme provided for a child's equal recovery under a workmen's

compensation plan in the event of the death of the father, not only if the

child was dependent, but also only if the dependent child was legitimate.

406 U.S., at 173-174 and n. 12. Jimenez v. Weinberger,

supra, invalidating discrimination among afterborn illegitimate

children as to entitlement to a child's disability benefits under the

Social Security Act, is similarly distinguishable. Under the somewhat

related statutory matrix considered there, legitimate children and those

capable of inheriting personal property under state intestacy law, and

those illegitimate solely on account of nonobvious defect in their

parents' marriage, were eligible for benefits, even if they were born

after the onset of the father's disability. Other (illegitimate) afterborn

children were conclusively denied any benefits, regardless of any showing

of dependency. The Court held the discrimination among illegitimate

afterborn children impermissible, rejecting the Secretary's claim that the

classification was based upon considerations regarding trustworthy proof

of dependency, because it could not accept the assertion that

Hence, it was held that

See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645

nefits, regardless of any showing

of dependency. The Court held the discrimination among illegitimate

afterborn children impermissible, rejecting the Secretary's claim that the

classification was based upon considerations regarding trustworthy proof

of dependency, because it could not accept the assertion that

Hence, it was held that

See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645

(1975); cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S., at 539. But this

conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of afterborn

illegitimate children, which belied the asserted legislative reliance on

dependency in Jimenez , is absent here, for, as we have noted, any

otherwise eligible child may qualify for survivorship benefits by showing

contribution to support, or cohabitation, at the time of death. Cf. Vlandis v. Kline , 412 U.S. 441, 452-453 n.9 (1973),

distinguishing Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn.

1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).

It is, of course, not enough simply that any child of a deceased insured

is eligible for benefits upon some showing of dependency. In Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, we found it impermissible to

qualify the entitlement to dependent's benefits of a married woman in the

uniformed services upon an individualized showing of her husband's actual

dependence upon her for more than half his income, when no such showing of

actual dependency was required of a married man in the uniformed services

to obtain dependent's benefits on account of his wife. The invalidity of

that gender-based discrimination rested upon the "overboard" assumption. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975), underlying

the discrimination "that male workers' earnings are vital to the support

of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not

significantly contribute to their families' support." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S., at 643; see Frontiero , 411 U.S., at

689, n. 23

scrimination rested upon the "overboard" assumption. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975), underlying

the discrimination "that male workers' earnings are vital to the support

of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not

significantly contribute to their families' support." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S., at 643; see Frontiero , 411 U.S., at

689, n. 23. Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly discriminate

between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned

to alternative considerations. The presumption of dependency is withheld

only in the absence of any significant indication of the likelihood of

actual dependency. Moreover, we cannot say that the factors that give rise

to a presumption of dependency lack any substantial relation to the

likelihood of actual dependency. Rather, we agree with the assessment of

the three-judge court as it originally ruled in Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (Md.

1973): [16]

"[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of

legitimate children are actually dependent upon their parents for support.

Likewise . . . the children of an invalid marriage . . . would typically

live in the wage earner's home or be supported by him. . . . When an order

of support is entered by a court, it is reasonable to assume compliance

occurred. A paternity decree, while not necessarily ordering support,

would almost as strongly suggest support was ultimately obtained.

Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the imprimatur of a judicial

proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. Men

do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an

illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a man who has

acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it support than one who

does not."

port was ultimately obtained.

Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the imprimatur of a judicial

proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. Men

do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an

illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a man who has

acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it support than one who

does not."

Similarly, we think, where state intestacy law provides that a child may

take personal property from a father's estate, it may reasonably be

thought that the child will more likely be dependent during the parent's

life and at his death. [17] For

in its embodiment of the popular view within the jurisdiction of how a

parent would have his property devolve among his children in the event of

death, without specific directions, such legislation also reflects to some

degree the popular conception within the jurisdiction of the felt parental

obligation to such an "illegitimate" child in other circumstances, and

thus something of the likelihood of actual parental support during, as

well as after, life. [18] Accord, Watts v. Veneman, 155 U.S. App. D.C. 84, 88, 476

F.2d 529, 533 (1973).

To be sure, none of these statutory criteria compels the extension of a

presumption of dependency. But the constitutional question is not whether

such a presumption is required, but whether it is permitted. Nor, in

ratifying these statutory classifications, is our role to hypothesize

independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible

alternative basis for presumption. These matters of practical judgment and

empirical calculation are for Congress. Drawing upon its own practical

experience, Congress has tailored statutory classifications in accord with

its calculations of the likelihood of actual support suggested by a narrow

set of objective and apparently reasonable indicators

irability or feasibility of any possible

alternative basis for presumption. These matters of practical judgment and

empirical calculation are for Congress. Drawing upon its own practical

experience, Congress has tailored statutory classifications in accord with

its calculations of the likelihood of actual support suggested by a narrow

set of objective and apparently reasonable indicators. Our role is simply

to determine whether Congress' assumptions are so inconsistent or

insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions that

individualized factual inquiry in order to isolate each nondependent child

in a given class of cases is unwarranted as an administrative exercise. In

the end, the precise accuracy of Congress' calculations is not a matter of

specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their

detail beyond the evident consistency and substantiality. Cf. United

States, v. Gainey, 380 U.S., at 67. We cannot say that these

expectations are unfounded, or so indiscriminate as to render the

statute's classifications baseless. We conclude, in short, that, in

failing to extend any presumption of dependency to appellees and others

like them, the Act does not impermissibly discriminate against them as

compared with legitimate children or those illegitimate children who are

statutorily deemed dependent.

Reversed.

It is so ordered.

[1] Section 202(d)(1) of the

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1970 and Supp. IV, 1974), provides in

pertinent part:

"Every child (as defined in section 216(e) of this title). . . of an

individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child

--

"(A) has filed an application for child's insurance benefits,

"(B) at the time of such application was filed was unmarried and (1)

either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had

not attained the age of 22 . . . and

"(C) was dependent upon such individual --

"(II) if such individual has died, at the time of such death.

rrently insured individual, if such child

--

"(A) has filed an application for child's insurance benefits,

"(B) at the time of such application was filed was unmarried and (1)

either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had

not attained the age of 22 . . . and

"(C) was dependent upon such individual --

"(II) if such individual has died, at the time of such death.

"shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month,

beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such child

becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits . . ..

Section 216(e), 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (Supp. IV, 1947), includes, under the

definition of child, inter alia, "the child . . . of an

individual," certain legally adopted children, certain stepchildren, and

certain grandchildren and stepgrandchildren. Additionally, § 216(h)(2)(A)

of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), provides:

"In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or

currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the

Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the

devolution of intestate personal property . . . by the courts of the State

in which [such insured individual] was domiciled at the time of his death.

. . . Applicants who according to such law would have the same status

relative to taking intestate personal property as a child . . . shall be

deemed such."

[2] Section 202(d)(3) of the

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3), provides in pertinent part:

"A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or

his mother or adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1)(C) of

this subsection unless, at such time, such individual was not living with

or contributing to the support of such child and --

"(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such

individual, or

)(3), provides in pertinent part:

"A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or

his mother or adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1)(C) of

this subsection unless, at such time, such individual was not living with

or contributing to the support of such child and --

"(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such

individual, or

"(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual." Additionally,

any child who qualifies under § 216(h)(2)(A), see n. 1, supra, is

considered legitimate for § 202(d)(3) purposes, and thus dependent.

[3] Section 202(d)(3) provides

in pertinent part that "a child deemed to be a child of a fully or

currently insured individual pursuant to section 216(h)(2)(B) or section

216(h)(3) . . . shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such

individual," and therefore presumptively dependent. Section 216(h)(2)(B)

provides:

"If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently insured

individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured

individual under § 216(h)(2)(A), such applicant shall nevertheless be

deemed to be the child of such insured individual if such insured

individual and the mother and father, as the case may be, of such

applicant went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported

marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment described in the

last sentence of paragraph (1)(B), would have been a valid marriage." The

specified last sentence of § 216(h)(1)(B), in turn, refers only to

"an impediment (i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of a previous

marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous marriage or its

dissolution, or (ii) resulting in a defect in the procedure followed in

connection with such purported marriage."

Section 216(h)(3) provides:

B), would have been a valid marriage." The

specified last sentence of § 216(h)(1)(B), in turn, refers only to

"an impediment (i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of a previous

marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous marriage or its

dissolution, or (ii) resulting in a defect in the procedure followed in

connection with such purported marriage."

Section 216(h)(3) provides:

"An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured

individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such

insured individual under § 216(h)(2) shall nevertheless be deemed to be

the child of such insured individual if:

"(C) in the case of a deceased individual --

"(i) such insured individual --

"(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or

daughter,

"(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant,

or

"(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the

applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter,

"and such acknowledgment, court decree, or court order was made before

the death of such individual, or

"(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the

Secretary to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured

individual was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant

at the time such insured individual died."

[4] Upon the original petition

for review under § 205(g), the District Court affirmed the administrative

findings that had then been made, but remanded the case to the Secretary

for him to determine the common-law status of the relationship between the

children's parents, a question left unconsidered in the first

administrative proceeding. After an adverse determination on this point

and an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Lucas, on behalf of the

children, again timely sought review in the District Court, presenting the

common-law marriage question and asserting a constitutional challenge to

the Act

of the relationship between the

children's parents, a question left unconsidered in the first

administrative proceeding. After an adverse determination on this point

and an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Lucas, on behalf of the

children, again timely sought review in the District Court, presenting the

common-law marriage question and asserting a constitutional challenge to

the Act. The District Court affirmed the administrative conclusion of no

common-law marriage, and then turned to the constitutional questions that

are the subject of this appeal.

[5] See, c.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974); United States Department

of Agriculture v. Moreno , 413 U.S. 528, 533 n. 5 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973).

[6] The District Court affirmed

the Secretary's factual findings in a "Memorandum and Order" entered

August 30, 1974. Viewing the constitutional claim as one requiring the

convention of a three-judge District Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and

2284, the single district judge did not reach that issue. A three-judge

District Court was convened, but disbanded when appellees' renewed motion

for summary judgment omitted their earlier request for injunctive relief.

The constitutional claim thus was correctly determined by a single

district judge.

[7] It adds nothing to say that

the illegitimate child is also saddled with the procedural burden of

proving entitlement on the basis of facts the legitimate child need not

prove. The legitimate child is required, like the illegitimate, to prove

the facts upon which his statutory entitlement rests.

ief.

The constitutional claim thus was correctly determined by a single

district judge.

[7] It adds nothing to say that

the illegitimate child is also saddled with the procedural burden of

proving entitlement on the basis of facts the legitimate child need not

prove. The legitimate child is required, like the illegitimate, to prove

the facts upon which his statutory entitlement rests.

[8] Appellees do not suggest,

nor could they successfully, that strict judicial scrutiny of the

statutory classifications is required here because, in regulating

entitlement to survivorship benefits, the statute discriminatorily

interferes with interests of constitutional fundamentality. Weinberger v. Salfi, 442 U.S. 749, 768-770 (1975), Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

The Court, of course, has found the privacy of familial relationships to

be entitled to procedural due process protections from disruption by the

State, whether or not those relationships were legitimized by marriage

under state law. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

But the concerns relevant to that context are only tangential to the

analysis here, since the statutory scheme does not interfere in any way

with familial relations.

[9] See Loving v. Virginia , 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

[10] See Oyama v. California , 332 U.S. 633, 644-646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States , 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1913).

context are only tangential to the

analysis here, since the statutory scheme does not interfere in any way

with familial relations.

[9] See Loving v. Virginia , 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

[10] See Oyama v. California , 332 U.S. 633, 644-646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States , 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1913).

[11] That the statutory

classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate children

does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as

discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children. See Frontiero v. Richardson, supra; cf. Weber v. Aetna

Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S., at 169, 172. In view of our

conclusion regarding the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny, we need

not consider how the classes of legitimate and illegitimate children would

be constitutionally defined under appellees' approach.

[12] The significance of this

consideration would seem to be suggested by provisions enabling the

parents to legitimate children born illegitimate. Compare Weber, 406 U.S., at 170-171, with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,

539 (1971). Of course, the status of "dependency" as recognized by the

statute here is wholly within the control of the parent.

[13] In Rodriguez the

Court identified a "suspect class" entitled to the protections of strict

judicial scrutiny as one

"saddled with such disabilities, or subject to such a history of

purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political

powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian

political process." 411 U.S., at 28.

[14] We are not bound to agree

with the Secretary's description of the legislative design if the

legislative history and the structure of the provisions themselves belie

it. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16

tment, or relegated to such a position of political

powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian

political process." 411 U.S., at 28.

[14] We are not bound to agree

with the Secretary's description of the legislative design if the

legislative history and the structure of the provisions themselves belie

it. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16

(1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S., at 634. Appellees

are unable, however, to summon any meaningful legislative history to

support their position regarding the congressional design. They rely

largely upon a section of the House-Senate Conference Committee Report on

the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act, reproduced at 111 Cong.

Rec. 18383, 18387 (1965), partially explaining the addition of §

216(h)(3), set forth in n. 3, supra , to the Act:

"A child would be paid benefits based on his father's earnings without

regard to whether he has the status of a child under State inheritance

laws if the father was supporting the child or had a legal obligation to

do so."

But the clause's reference to legal obligations to support hardly

establishes that the statute was designed to replace any potential source

of lifetime support; in our view the passage appears only to be a partial

description of the actual effect of §§ 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(II) and (III), set

forth in n. 3, supra, not an enunciation of the general purpose of

the Act.

Thus, appellees, in order to make their case, must ultimately rely upon

the asserted failure of the legislative product adequately to fit the

purported legitimate aim.

[15] That these provisions may

thus reflect a "secondary" purpose of Congress is, of course, of no

moment. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 274-277 1973).

[16] Vacated and remanded for

further proceedings in light of Jimenez, 418 U.S. 902 (1974):

reaffirmed, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (Md. 1975); jurisdiction postponed to the

legislative product adequately to fit the

purported legitimate aim.

[15] That these provisions may

thus reflect a "secondary" purpose of Congress is, of course, of no

moment. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 274-277 1973).

[16] Vacated and remanded for

further proceedings in light of Jimenez, 418 U.S. 902 (1974):

reaffirmed, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (Md. 1975); jurisdiction postponed to the

[17] The Secretary, pointing

out that § 202(d)(3) in specific terms provides only that "a child deemed

to be a child of a fully or currently insured individual pursuant to

section 216(h)(2)(B) or section 216(h)(3) . . . shall be deemed to be the

legitimate child of such individual," urges that we misconstrued the

statute in Jimenez, 417 U.S., at 631, n.2, in concluding that an

applicant qualifying as a child under § 216(h)(2)(A) is to considered as a legitimate child and therefore dependent under § 202(d)(3). We have

no question, however, as to the correctness of that conclusion. First, it

is only through operation of § 216(h)(2)(A) that the recognition of

"legitimacy" by state law under § 202(d)(3)A) as giving rise to a

presumption of dependency takes on a consistent operational meaning

Second, §§ 216(h)(2)(B) and (3) specifically exclude any child qualified

under § 216(h)(2)(A); if a § 216(h)(2)(A) child were not considered

legitimate under § 202(d)(3), this would have the anomalous effect that an

illegitimate child who had been acknowledged in a written statement by the

insured father, for example, would be deprived of otherwise established

eligibility for benefits, see § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I), if under applicable

state law such an acknowledgment worked to make the child an intestate

heir. Moreover the legislative history is clear that the Social Security

Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. 86-778, 74 Stat

ld who had been acknowledged in a written statement by the

insured father, for example, would be deprived of otherwise established

eligibility for benefits, see § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I), if under applicable

state law such an acknowledgment worked to make the child an intestate

heir. Moreover the legislative history is clear that the Social Security

Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924, §§ 208(b) and (d),

adding § 216(h)(2)(B) to the Act and inserting the provision in §

202(d)(3) specifying that a § 216(h)(2)(B) child shall be deemed to be a

legitimate, and therefore dependent, child for death benefit purposes,

were intended to have the effect of deeming any § 216(h)(2) child

"legitimate" and thus "dependent." See. S. Rep. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d

Sess., 78-79, 133 (discussing §§207(b) and (d)) (1960); H. R. Rep. No.

1799, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 91-92, 152 (1960).

[18] Appellees do not suggest,

and we are unwilling to assume, that discriminations against children in

appellees' class in state intestacy laws is constitutionally prohibited,

see Labine v. Vincent, supra, in which case appellees would

be made eligible for benefits under § 216(h)(2)(A).