SSR 77-22c: SECTION 202(b)(1) (42 U.S.C. 402(b)(1)) -- WIFE'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- INELIGIBILITY OF DIVORCED WIFE UNDER AGE 62 WITH CHILD IN HER CARE -- CONSTITUTIONALITY

20 CFR 404.313(a)(2)

SSR 77-22c

Mathews v. de Castro, 97 S.Ct. 431 (1976)

STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,

and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.

MARSHALL, J., concurred in the judgment.

Under the Social Security Act a married woman whose husband retires or

becomes disabled is granted benefits if she has a minor or dependent child

in her care. A divorced woman whose former husband retires or becomes

disabled does not receive such benefits. The issue in the present case is

whether this difference in the statutory treatment of married and divorced

women is permissible under the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. [1]

I

Section 202(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (1970

ed. and Supp. V), provides for the payment of "wife's insurance

benefits." [2] To qualify under

this section a woman must be the wife or "divorced

wife" [3] of an individual

entitled to old-age or disability benefits. Then, assuming that she meets

the other statutory requirements, the woman is eligible to receive a

monthly payment if she "has attained age 62 or (in the case of a

wife) has in her care (individually or jointly with [her husband]) a

child entitled to a child's insurance benefit. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §

402(b)(1)(B). As the italicized phrase indicates, a woman under 62 who has

in her care an entitled child [4] must currently be married to the wage earner in order to be eligible to

receive benefits. A divorced woman receives monthly payments if she is

aged 62 or over and her exhusband retires or becomes disabled, but if she

is under 62, she receives no benefits even if she has a young or disabled

child in her care. [5]

phrase indicates, a woman under 62 who has

in her care an entitled child [4] must currently be married to the wage earner in order to be eligible to

receive benefits. A divorced woman receives monthly payments if she is

aged 62 or over and her exhusband retires or becomes disabled, but if she

is under 62, she receives no benefits even if she has a young or disabled

child in her care. [5]

The appellee, Helen de Castro, was divorced from her husband in 1968,

after more than 20 years of marriage. She cares for a disabled child who

is eligible for and receives child's insurance benefits under the Act. In

May of 1971 her former husband applied for and later was granted old-age

insurance benefits. Mrs. de Castro applied for wife's insurance benefits

shortly thereafter. At the time of her application she was 56 years old.

Her application was denied by the Secretary of Health, Education, and

Welfare because no wife's benefits are payable to a divorced wife under 62

years of age.

Mrs. de Castro then filed suit in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, seeking judicial review of the

Secretary's decision. Her complaint alleged that § 202(b)(1)(B) of the

Social Security Act "operates to arbitrarily discriminate against divorced

wives," and prayed for an order directing the Secretary to pay benefits to

her, a declaration that § 202(b)(1)(B) is unconstitutional, and an

injunction against the section's application.

ern District of Illinois, seeking judicial review of the

Secretary's decision. Her complaint alleged that § 202(b)(1)(B) of the

Social Security Act "operates to arbitrarily discriminate against divorced

wives," and prayed for an order directing the Secretary to pay benefits to

her, a declaration that § 202(b)(1)(B) is unconstitutional, and an

injunction against the section's application.

A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282. The

court considered the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and

granted the relief prayed for in the complaint, holding that the wife's

benefits provision "invidiously discriminates against divorced wives . . .

in violation of the Fifth Amendment." 403 F. Supp. 23, 30. Central to the

court's ruling was its determination that "there is no rational basis for

concluding that a married wife having a dependent child in her care has a

greater economic need than a divorced wife caring for such a child." 403

F. Supp., at 28. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court under 28

U.S.C. § 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction, _____ U.S. _____.

II

The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional

challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary

benefits is well established. Governmental decisions to spend money to

improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are "not

confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the

choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of

judgment." Helvering v. Davis , 301 U.S. 619, 640. In enacting

legislation of this kind a government does not deny equal protection

"merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the

classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the

Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with

mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some

inequality.'" Dandridge v

S. 619, 640. In enacting

legislation of this kind a government does not deny equal protection

"merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the

classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the

Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with

mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some

inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams , 397 U.S. 471, 485.

To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must be judged

"is not a toothless one," Mathews v. Lucas , _____ U.S. _____,

_____. But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of

constitutionality. "So long as its judgments are rational, and not

invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor

and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket." Jefferson v. Hackney , 406 U.S. 535, 546-547. It is with this

principle in mind that we consider the specific constitutional issue

presented by this litigation.

The old-age and disability insurance aspects of the Social Security

system do not purport to be general public assistance laws that simply pay

money to those who need it most. That was not the predominant purpose of

these benefit provisions when they were enacted or when they were amended.

Rather, the primary objective was to provide workers and their families

with basic protection against hardships created by the loss of earnings

due to illness or old age. [6]

do not purport to be general public assistance laws that simply pay

money to those who need it most. That was not the predominant purpose of

these benefit provisions when they were enacted or when they were amended.

Rather, the primary objective was to provide workers and their families

with basic protection against hardships created by the loss of earnings

due to illness or old age. [6]

The wife's insurance benefit at issue here is consistent with this

overriding legislative aim: It enables a married woman already burdened

with dependent children to meet the additional need created

when her husband reaches old-age or becomes disabled. Accordingly, the

District Court's observation that many divorced women receive inadequate

child support payments, while undoubtedly true, is hardly in point. The

same can be said of the District Court's statement that "there is no

rational basis for concluding that a married wife having a dependent child

in her care has a greater economic need than a divorced wife caring for

such a child." For whatever relevance these observations might have in a

case involving a constitutional attack on a statute that gave monetary

benefits to women based on their general overall need, that is not this

case.

Section 202(b)(1)(B) of the Act addresses the particular consequences for

his family of a wage earner's old age or disability. Congress could

rationally have decided that the resultant loss of family income, the

extra expense that often attends illness and old age, and the consequent

disruption in the family's economic well being that may occur when the

husband stops working justify monthly payments to a wife who together with

her husband must still care for a dependent child.

age earner's old age or disability. Congress could

rationally have decided that the resultant loss of family income, the

extra expense that often attends illness and old age, and the consequent

disruption in the family's economic well being that may occur when the

husband stops working justify monthly payments to a wife who together with

her husband must still care for a dependent child.

Indeed, Congress took note of exactly these kinds of factors when it

amended the Social Security Act in 1958. Between 1950 and 1958 wives under

retirement age with dependent children received benefits only when their

husbands became entitled to old-age insurance payments. Social Security

Amendments of 1950, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 483. Congress then amended the Act

to provide the same benefits when the wage earner becomes

disabled. [7] Social Security

Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, § 205(b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021. Both

the House and Senate committee reports accompanying the proposed

legislation explained that the purpose of the monthly payments was to give

"recognition to the problems confronting families whose bread-winners"

stop work. The focus was specifically on "adequate protection for [the

husband's] family," and the reports mentioned the high medical expenses

often associated with disability and the possibility that the wife might

have to forego work in order to care for her disabled husband. H. R. Rep.

No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958).

stop work. The focus was specifically on "adequate protection for [the

husband's] family," and the reports mentioned the high medical expenses

often associated with disability and the possibility that the wife might

have to forego work in order to care for her disabled husband. H. R. Rep.

No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958).

In view of the legislative purpose, it is hardly surprising that the

congressional judgment evidently was a different one with respect to

divorced women. Divorce by its nature works a drastic change in the

economic and personal relationship between a husband and wife. Ordinarily

it means that they will go their separate ways. Congress could have

rationally assumed that divorced husbands and wives depend less on each

other for financial and other support than do couples who stay married.

The problems that a divorced wife may encounter when her former husband

becomes old or disabled may well differ in kind and degree from those that

a woman married to a retired or disabled husband must face. For instance,

a divorced wife need not forego work in order to stay at home to care for

her disabled husband. She may not feel the pinch of the extra expenses

accompanying her former husband's old age or disability. In short,

divorced couples typically live separate lives. It was not irrational for

Congress to recognize this basic fact in deciding to defer monthly

payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage earners until they

reach the age of 62.

me to care for

her disabled husband. She may not feel the pinch of the extra expenses

accompanying her former husband's old age or disability. In short,

divorced couples typically live separate lives. It was not irrational for

Congress to recognize this basic fact in deciding to defer monthly

payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage earners until they

reach the age of 62.

This is not to say that a husband's old age or disability may never

affect his divorced wife. Many women receive alimony or child-support

after divorce that their former husbands might not be able to pay when

they stop work. But even for this group -- which does not include the

appellee in the present case -- Congress was not constitutionally

obligated to use the Social Security Act to subsidize support payments. It

could rationally decide that the problems created for divorced women

remained less pressing than those faced by women who continue to live with

their husbands.

In any event, the constitutional question "is not whether a statutory

provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the

factual position which generated the congressional concern reflected in

the statute." Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U. S. 749, 777. We conclude,

accordingly, that the statutory classifications involved in this case are

not of such an order as to infringe upon the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment.

The judgment is reversed.

It is so ordered.

[1] It is well settled that the

Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses equal protection

principles. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749,

768-770.

[2] Title 42 U.S.C. §402(b)(1)

(1970 ed. and Supp. V) provides in full: "(b) Wife's insurance

benefits.

"(1) The wife (as defined in section 416(b) of this title) and every

divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d) of this title) of an

individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such

wife or such divorced wife --

Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749,

768-770.

[2] Title 42 U.S.C. §402(b)(1)

(1970 ed. and Supp. V) provides in full: "(b) Wife's insurance

benefits.

"(1) The wife (as defined in section 416(b) of this title) and every

divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d) of this title) of an

individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such

wife or such divorced wife --

"(A) has filed application for wife's insurance benefits,

"(B) has attained age 62 or (in the case of a wife) has in her care

(individually or jointly with such individual) at the time of filing such

application a child entitled to a child's insurance benefit on the basis

of the wages and self-employment income of such individual,

"(C) in the case of a divorced wife, is not married,

"(D) is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or is

entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits based on a primary

insurance amount which is less than one-half of the primary insurance

amount of such individual, "shall (subject to subsection(s) of this

section) be entitled to a wife's insurance benefit for each month,

beginning with the first month in which she becomes so entitled to such

insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding the first month in

which any of the following occurs --

"(E) she dies,

"(F) such individual dies,

"(G) in the case of a wife, they are divorced and either (i) she has not

attained age 62, or (ii) she has attained age 62 but has not been married

to such individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the date

the divorce became effective,

"(H) in the case of a divorced wife, she marries a person other than such

individual,

"(I) in the case of a wife who has not attained age 62, no child of such

individual is entitled to a child's insurance benefit,

attained age 62, or (ii) she has attained age 62 but has not been married

to such individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the date

the divorce became effective,

"(H) in the case of a divorced wife, she marries a person other than such

individual,

"(I) in the case of a wife who has not attained age 62, no child of such

individual is entitled to a child's insurance benefit,

"(J) she becomes entitled to an old-age or disability insurance benefit

based on a primary insurance amount which is equal to or exceeds one-half

of the primary insurance amount of such individual, or

"(K) such individual is not entitled to disability insurance benefits and

is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits."

[3] The Act defines "divorced

wife" as "a woman divorced from an individual, but only if she had been

married so such individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the

date the divorce became effective." 42 U.S.C. §416(d)(1). The term

"divorce" refers to a divorce "a vinculo matrimonii." 42 U.S.C.

§416(d)(4).

[4] The conditions upon which a

child is entitled to receive "child's insurance benefits" are set out in

§202(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §402(d) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Generally,

the child must be dependent on the wage earner and either under 18 years

old (or a full-time student under 22 years old) or under a disability.

[5] The Act also provides for

the payment of "widow's insurance benefits" and "mother's insurance

benefits." 42 U.S.C. §§402(e), (g) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Divorced and

married women, with or without dependent children, are eligible to receive

monthly payments under the sections in certain circumstances not pertinent

here.

a full-time student under 22 years old) or under a disability.

[5] The Act also provides for

the payment of "widow's insurance benefits" and "mother's insurance

benefits." 42 U.S.C. §§402(e), (g) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Divorced and

married women, with or without dependent children, are eligible to receive

monthly payments under the sections in certain circumstances not pertinent

here.

[6] The old-age and disability

insurance programs are distinct from the provisions for public assistance

to the aged and disabled also contained in the Social Security Act. 42

U.S.C. §§ 301-306, 1351-1355, partially repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-603, §

303(a), (b), 86 Stat. 1484 (1972); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1970 ed.,

Supp. V). The insurance programs are contributory in nature and are

designed to prevent public dependency by protecting workers and their

families against common economic hazards. Congress in 1935 contemplated

that the old-age insurance benefits would be "payable wholly regardless of

the need of the recipient." H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1

(1935). The public assistance for the aged program, on the other hand, was

designed "to provide for old people who are dependent upon the public for

support . . .," id ., at 4, and the statute specifically referred to

"aged needy individuals." Social Security Act of 1935, § 1, 49 Stat. 620.

See also H. R. Rep. No. 615, supra , at 3-6, S. Rep. No. 628, 74th

Cong., 1st Sess., 4-7 (1935); Message of the President Recommending

Legislation on Economic Security, H. R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st

Sess., 20-28 (1935).

upon the public for

support . . .," id ., at 4, and the statute specifically referred to

"aged needy individuals." Social Security Act of 1935, § 1, 49 Stat. 620.

See also H. R. Rep. No. 615, supra , at 3-6, S. Rep. No. 628, 74th

Cong., 1st Sess., 4-7 (1935); Message of the President Recommending

Legislation on Economic Security, H. R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st

Sess., 20-28 (1935).

In 1950 the Act was amended to provide for grants-in-aid to the States so

that assistance could be furnished "to needy individuals eighteen years of

age or older who are permanently and totally disabled." Social Security

Amendments of 1950, § 351, 64 Stat. 555. In 1956 Congress created a

program for disability insurance benefits. Social Security Amendments of

1956, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 815. Again, the insurance program, unlike the

public assistance provisions, was not need based and instead was designed

to protect against the specific economic hardships created by involuntary,

premature retirement. See H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,

27-28, 53-54 (1949); Recommendations for Social Security Legislation.

Reports of the Advisory Council on Social Security, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th

Cong., 2d Sess., 69-70, 95-97 (1949); S. Rep. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d

Sess., 3-4 (1956); H. R. Rep. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-6

(1955).

[7] "Wife's insurance benefits"

first became part of the Social Security Act in 1939. Amendments enacted

that year provided for monthly payments to wives 65 years or older whose

husbands were entitled to old-age benefits. Social Security Amendments of

1939, § 201, 53 Stat. 1362. In 1950 Congress dropped the age requirement

for women with retired husbands and entitled children in their care.

Social Security Amendments of 1950, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 483. In 1958

Congress extended similar benefits to wives of any age who had entitled

children and disabled husbands. Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub.

L. No. 85-840, § 205(b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021

§ 201, 53 Stat. 1362. In 1950 Congress dropped the age requirement

for women with retired husbands and entitled children in their care.

Social Security Amendments of 1950, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 483. In 1958

Congress extended similar benefits to wives of any age who had entitled

children and disabled husbands. Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub.

L. No. 85-840, § 205(b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021. While the legislative history

of the 1950 amendments is sparse, the congressional purpose presumably was

to recognize a family need created when the husband reaches old age and

stops working. Certainly the sole purpose could not have been to allow the

wife to remain at home to take care of the child, as the appellee

suggests, because the presence of the retired husband at home ordinarily

would ensure parental supervision. Similarly, when Congress provided

benefits in 1958 to wives with disabled husbands, it had purposes beyond

the mere encouragement of the wife to stay home and take care of the

children. See H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S.

Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958).