SSR 76-23c: SECTIONS 205(g), 221, and 223 (42 U.S.C. 405(g), 421, and 423) -- DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS -- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TERMINATION OF BENEFITS WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING -- APPEALS PROCESS

20 CFR 404.306, 404.907, 404.909, 404.917, 404.905, and 404.951

SSR 76-23c

Mathews v. Eldridge 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,

and STEWARD, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, J.J. joined BRENNAN, J. filed

a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL,J, joined STEVENS, J. took no part

in the consideration or decision of the case.

The issue in this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security

disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for

an evidentiary hearing.

I

Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods in which they are

completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program

created by the 1956 amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70

Stat. 815, 42 U.S.C. § 423. [1] Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March

1972, he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with

monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the questionnaire,

indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying the medical

sources, including physicians, from whom he had received treatment

recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a

psychiatric consultant. After considering these reports and other

information in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it had

made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972.

The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of

benefits, and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable time in

which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his

condition.

ts and other

information in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it had

made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972.

The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of

benefits, and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable time in

which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his

condition.

In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his

medical condition and indicated that the agency already had enough

evidence to establish his

disability. [2] The state agency

then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May

1972. This determination was accepted by the Social Security

Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July that his benefits

would terminate after that month. The notification also advised him of his

right to seek reconsideration by the state agency of his initial

determination within six months.

Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action

challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures

established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for

assessing whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought an

immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing on the issue of his

disability. [3] 361 F.Supp. 520

(WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that

Eldridge's benefits had been terminated in accordance with valid

administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to

exhaust available remedies. In support of his contention that due process

requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this

Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254 (1970),

which established a right to an "evidentiary hearing" prior to termination

of welfare benefits

rdance with valid

administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to

exhaust available remedies. In support of his contention that due process

requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this

Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254 (1970),

which established a right to an "evidentiary hearing" prior to termination

of welfare benefits. [4] The

Secretary contended that Goldberg was not controlling since

eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare

benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility

and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability entitlement

decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence.

The District Court concluded that the administrative procedures pursuant

to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits abridged his

right to procedural due process. The court viewed the interest of the

disability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistinguishable from

that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg . If further noted that

decisions subsequent to Goldberg demonstrated that the due process

requirement of pretermination hearing is not limited to situations

involving the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U.S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson , 402 U.S.

535 (1971). Reasoning that disability determinations may involve

subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and nonmedical evidence,

the District Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge

must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare

beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act. Id ., at

528. [5] Relying entirely upon

the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge's benefits prior

to an evidentiary hearing. 493 F.2d 1230

ination of benefits Eldridge

must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare

beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act. Id ., at

528. [5] Relying entirely upon

the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge's benefits prior

to an evidentiary hearing. 493 F.2d 1230

(1974) [6] We reverse.

II

At the outset we are confronted by a question as to whether the District

Court had jurisdiction over this suit. The Secretary contends that our

decision last Term in Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749

(1975), bars the District Court from considering Eldridge's action. Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's

duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for surviving wives and

stepchildren of deceased wage earners. We there held that 42 U.S.C. §

405(h) [7] precludes federal

question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial of claimed benefits.

The only avenue for judicial review is 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which requires

exhaustion of the administrative remedies provided under the Act as a

jurisdictional prerequisite.

Section 405(g) in part provides

On its face § 405(g) thus bars judicial review of any denial of a claim

of disability benefits until after a "final decision" by the Secretary

after a "hearing." It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained

full administrative review of the termination of his benefits, yet failed

even to seek reconsideration of the initial determination. Since the

Secretary has not "waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi , supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot properly

invoke § 405(g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We disagree.

earing." It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained

full administrative review of the termination of his benefits, yet failed

even to seek reconsideration of the initial determination. Since the

Secretary has not "waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi , supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot properly

invoke § 405(g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We disagree.

Salfi identified several conditions which must be satisfied in

order to obtain judicial review under § 405(g). Of these, the requirements

that there be a final decision by the Secretary after a hearing was

regarded as "central to the requisite grant of subject matter

jurisdiction. . . ." Id., at

764. [9] Implicit in Salfi,

however, is the principle that this condition consists of two elements,

only one of which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it cannot

be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case. The waivable element is

the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the

Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement that a

claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary. Absent such

a claim there can be no "decision" of any type. And some decision by the

Secretary is clearly required by the statute.

That this second requirement is essential and distinct precondition for §

405(g) jurisdiction is evident from the different conclusions that we

reached in Salfi with respect to the named appellees and the

unnamed members of the class. As to the latter the complaint was found to

be jurisdictionally deficient since it "contained[ed] no allegations that

they have even filed an application with the Secretary. . . ." Ibid . With respect to the named appellees, however, we concluded

that the complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had "fully

presented their claims for benefits 'to their district Social Security

Office, and upon denial, to the Regional Office for reconsideration'" Id ., 764-765

t "contained[ed] no allegations that

they have even filed an application with the Secretary. . . ." Ibid . With respect to the named appellees, however, we concluded

that the complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had "fully

presented their claims for benefits 'to their district Social Security

Office, and upon denial, to the Regional Office for reconsideration'" Id ., 764-765. Eldridge has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite.

Through his answers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in

response to the tentative determination that his disability had ceased, he

specifically presented the claim that his benefits should not be

terminated because he was still disabled. This claim was denied by the

state agency and its decision was accepted by the SSA.

The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the Secretary his

constitutional claim to pretermination hearing is not

controlling. [10] As construed

in Salfi ; § 405(g) requires only that there be a "final decision"

by the Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to benefits.

Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi , App. 11, 17-21. The situation

here is not identical to Salfi , for, while the Secretary had no

power to amend the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, he

does have authority to determine the timing and content of the procedures

challenged here. § 405(a). We do not, however, regard this difference as

significant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider

substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the

behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an

adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider

such a challenge.

es

challenged here. § 405(a). We do not, however, regard this difference as

significant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider

substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the

behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an

adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider

such a challenge.

As the nonwaivable jurisdictional element was satisfied, we next consider

the waivable element. The question is whether the denial of Eldridge's

claim to continued benefits was sufficiently "final decision" with respect

to his constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion

requirement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust the full set of

internal review procedures provided by the Secretary. See 20 CFR §§

404.901, 404.916, 404,940. As Salfi recognized, the Secretary may

waive the exhaustion requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage if

the administrative process, that no further review is warranted either

because the internal needs of the agency are fulfilled or because the

relief that is sought is beyond his power to confer. Salfi suggested that under § 405(g) the power to determine when finality was

occurred ordinarily rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility

for the integrity of the administrative program is his. But cases may

arise where a claimant's interest in having a particular issue resolved

promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judgment is

inappropriate. This is such a case.

fi suggested that under § 405(g) the power to determine when finality was

occurred ordinarily rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility

for the integrity of the administrative program is his. But cases may

arise where a claimant's interest in having a particular issue resolved

promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judgment is

inappropriate. This is such a case.

Eldridge's constitutional challenge is entirely collateral to his

substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there is a crucial distinction

between the nature of the constitutional claim asserted here and that

raised in Salfi . A claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of

constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief cannot be

obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See Regional Rail

Reorganization Act Cases , 419 U.S. 102, 156 (1974). In light of the

Court's prior decisions, see, e.g. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra;

Fuentes v. Shevin, supra , Eldridge has raised at least a

colorable claim that because of his physical condition and dependency upon

the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage him in a

way not recompensable through retroactive

payments. [11] Thus, unlike the

situation in Salfi , denying Eldridge's substantive claim "for other

reasons" or upholding it "under other provisions" at the post-termination

stage, 422 U.S., at 762, would not answer his constitutional challenge.

We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for benefits

constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405(g) jurisdiction over

his constitutional claim. We now proceed to the merits of that

claim. [12]

III

A

stantive claim "for other

reasons" or upholding it "under other provisions" at the post-termination

stage, 422 U.S., at 762, would not answer his constitutional challenge.

We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for benefits

constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405(g) jurisdiction over

his constitutional claim. We now proceed to the merits of that

claim. [12]

III

A

Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions

which deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the

meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.

The Secretary does not contend that procedural due process in inapplicable

to terminations of social security disability benefits. He recognizes, as

has been implicit in our prior decisions, e.g. Richardson v. Belcher , 404 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor , 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an

individual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created

"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy , 416 U.S. 134, 166 (POWELL, J,. concurring); Boards of

Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson , 402 U.S., at 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Rather, the Secretary contends that the existing

administrative procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is

constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of that

interest.

Arnett v. Kennedy , 416 U.S. 134, 166 (POWELL, J,. concurring); Boards of

Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson , 402 U.S., at 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Rather, the Secretary contends that the existing

administrative procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is

constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of that

interest.

This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required

before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e.g. Phillips v. Commissioner , 283 U.S. 589, 596-597 (1931). See

also Dent v. West Virginia , 129 U.S. 114, 124-125 (1889).

The "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of

any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of

criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint

Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath , 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental requirement of due process

is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner." Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). See Grannis v. Ordean , 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge agrees

that the review procedures available to a claimant before the initial

determination of ineligibility becomes final would be adequate if

disability benefits were not terminated until after the evidentiary

hearing stage of the administrative process. The dispute centers upon what

process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending

review.

385, 394 (1914). Eldridge agrees

that the review procedures available to a claimant before the initial

determination of ineligibility becomes final would be adequate if

disability benefits were not terminated until after the evidentiary

hearing stage of the administrative process. The dispute centers upon what

process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending

review.

In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the

extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the

deprivation of some type of property interest even if such a hearing is

provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly ,

397 U.S. 254, 266-271 (1970), has the Court held that a hearing closely

approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some

type of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right the

Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp ., 395 U.S. 337(1969), involving garnishment

of wages, was entirely silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972), the Court said only that in a

replevin suit between two private parties the initial determination

required something more than an ex parte proceeding before a court

clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson , 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971),

held, in the context of the revocation of a state-granted driver's

license, that due process required only that the prerevocation hearing

involve a probable-cause determination as to the fault of the licensee,

noting that the hearing "need not take the form of a full adjudication of

the question of liability." See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc ., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy , 416 U.S. 134 (1974), we sustained the

validity of procedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed for

cause

use determination as to the fault of the licensee,

noting that the hearing "need not take the form of a full adjudication of

the question of liability." See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc ., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy , 416 U.S. 134 (1974), we sustained the

validity of procedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed for

cause. They included notice of the action sought, a copy of the charge,

reasonable time for filing a written response, and an opportunity for an

oral appearance. Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was provided. Id ., at 142-146.

These decisions underscore the truism that "'[d]ue process,' unlike some

legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated

to time, place and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers

Local 473 v. McElroy , 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). "[D]ue process

is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular

situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481

(1972). Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative

procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis

of the governmental and private interests that are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra , at 167-168 (POWELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra , at 263-266; Cafeteria &

Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy , supra , at 895

.S. 471, 481

(1972). Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative

procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis

of the governmental and private interests that are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra , at 167-168 (POWELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra , at 263-266; Cafeteria &

Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy , supra , at 895.

More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the

specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three

distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the

official action, second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the

government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly , supra , 263-271.

We turn first to a description of the procedures for the termination of

Social Security disability benefits, and thereafter consider the factors

bearing upon the constitutional adequacy of these procedures.

B

The disability insurance program is administered jointly by state and

federal agencies. State agencies make the initial determination whether a

disability exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U.S.C. §

421. [13] The standards applied

and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421(b),

who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under the Act to the

SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473.

In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability

benefits a worker must demonstrate that he is unable

ity exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U.S.C. §

421. [13] The standards applied

and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421(b),

who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under the Act to the

SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473.

In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability

benefits a worker must demonstrate that he is unable

To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden of showing, by

means of "medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques," § 423(d)(3), that he has a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that

The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that the worker is no

loner disabled or has returned to work. As Eldridge's benefits were

terminated because he was determined to be no longer disabled, we consider

only the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such

cases. [15]

The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a state agency acting

through a "team" consisting of a physician and a nonmedical person trained

in disability evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with the

disabled worker, usually by mail -- in which case he is sent a detailed

questionnaire -- or by telephone, and requests information concerning his

present condition, including current medical restrictions and sources of

treatment, and any additional information that he considers relevant to

his continued entitlement to benefits. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1,

Disability Insurance State Manual (DISM) §

353.3 [16]

mail -- in which case he is sent a detailed

questionnaire -- or by telephone, and requests information concerning his

present condition, including current medical restrictions and sources of

treatment, and any additional information that he considers relevant to

his continued entitlement to benefits. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1,

Disability Insurance State Manual (DISM) §

353.3 [16]

Information regarding the recipient's current condition is also obtained

from his sources of medical treatment. DISM § 353.4. If there is a

conflict between the information provided by the beneficiary and that

obtained from medical sources such as his physician, or between two

sources of treatment, the agency may arrange for an examination by an

independent consulting

physician. [17] Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative assessment of the beneficiary's condition

differs from his own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits

may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence upon which the

proposed determination to terminate is based, and afforded an opportunity

to review the medical reports and other evidence in his case

file. [18] He also may respond

in writing and submit additional evidence. Id ., § 353.6

The state agency then makes its final determination, which is reviewed by

an examiner in the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 421(c);

CM § 6701(b), (c). [19] If, as

is usually the case, the SSA accepts the agency determination it notifies

the recipient in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision,

and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the state

agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907,

404.909. [20] Upon acceptance

by the SSA, benefits are terminated effected two months after the month in

which medical recovery is found to have occurred. 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) §

423(a).

the agency determination it notifies

the recipient in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision,

and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the state

agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907,

404.909. [20] Upon acceptance

by the SSA, benefits are terminated effected two months after the month in

which medical recovery is found to have occurred. 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) §

423(a).

If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state agency and the

determination is adverse, the SSA reviews the reconsideration

determination and notifies the recipient of the decision. He then has a

right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge. 20

CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadversary, and the SSA is not

represented by counsel. As at all prior and subsequent stages of the

administrative process, however, the claimant may be represented by

counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this hearing results in an

adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary review

by the SSA Appeals Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial

review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 CFR §

404.951. [21]

Should it be determined at any point after termination of benefits, that

the claimant's disability extends beyond the date of cessation initially

established, the worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U.S.C. §

404. Cf. id. , § 423(b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.503, 404.504. If, on

the other hand, a beneficiary receives any payments to which he is later

determined not to be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to

attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances. 42 U.S.C. §

404. [22]

C

cessation initially

established, the worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U.S.C. §

404. Cf. id. , § 423(b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.503, 404.504. If, on

the other hand, a beneficiary receives any payments to which he is later

determined not to be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to

attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances. 42 U.S.C. §

404. [22]

C

Despite the elaborate character of the administrative procedures provided

by the Secretary, the courts below held them to be constitutionally

inadequate, concluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing

prior to termination. In light of the private and governmental interests

at stake here and the nature of the existing procedures, we think this was

error.

Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is awarded full

retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, his sole interest is in the

uninterrupted receipt of this source of income pending final

administrative decision on his claim. his potential injury is thus similar

in nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg , see 397

U.S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal employee in Arnett ,

see 416 U.S., at 146, and the wage earner in Sniadach . See 395

U.S., at 341-342. [23]

Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an

evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized

there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of

subsistence:

g , see 397

U.S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal employee in Arnett ,

see 416 U.S., at 146, and the wage earner in Sniadach . See 395

U.S., at 341-342. [23]

Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an

evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized

there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of

subsistence:

Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon

financial need. [24] Indeed, it

is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or support from many other

sources, such as earnings of other family members, workmen's compensation

awards, [25] tort claims

awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans'

benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other important

programs both public and private, which contain provisions for disability

payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force. . . ." Richardson v. Belcher , 404 U.S. at 85-87 (Douglas, Jr.,

dissenting). See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Mens, Report on

the Disability Program, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 9-10, 419-429 (1974)

(hereinafter Staff Report).

As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that

may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in

assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process. Cf. Morrissy v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The potential deprivation

here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg , although the

degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized,

to remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S.C. § 423, 361 F. Supp., at 523.

Thus, in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett ,

there is little possibility that the terminated recipient will be able to

find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss.

overstated. As the District Court emphasized,

to remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S.C. § 423, 361 F. Supp., at 523.

Thus, in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett ,

there is little possibility that the terminated recipient will be able to

find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss.

As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg , 419 U.S. 379,

389 (1975), "the possible length of wrongful deprivation of . . . benefits

[also] is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action

on private interests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between an

request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge and a decision on

the claim is currently between 10 and 11 months. Since a terminated

recipient must first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite

to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the delay between the

actual cut-off of benefits and final decision after a hearing exceeds one

year.

In view of the torpidity of this administrative review process, cf. id. , at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest resources of the

family unit of the physically disabled

worker, [26] the hardship

imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be

significant. Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than

that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to

private resources, other forms of government assistance will become

available where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or

his family below the subsistence

level. [27] See Arnett v.

Kennedy, supra ; at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at

201-202 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

f a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to

private resources, other forms of government assistance will become

available where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or

his family below the subsistence

level. [27] See Arnett v.

Kennedy, supra ; at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at

201-202 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view of

these potential sources of temporary income, there is less reason here

than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established

by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is

sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.

D

An additional factor to be considered here is the fairness and

reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable

value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. Central to the

evaluation of any administrative process is the nature of the relevant

inquiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 617 (1974);

Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In

order to remain eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate

by means of "medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic techniques," 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(3), that he is unable "to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment. . . ." § 423(a)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). In short,

a medical assessment of the worker's physical or mental condition is

required. This is a more sharply focused and easily documented decision

than the typical determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case,

a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of

witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking

process. Goldberg noted that in such circumstances "written

submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 397 U.S., at

269.

d and easily documented decision

than the typical determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case,

a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of

witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking

process. Goldberg noted that in such circumstances "written

submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 397 U.S., at

269.

By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will

turn, in most cases, upon "routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports

by physician specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S., at 404,

concerning a subject whom they have personally

examined. [28] In Richardson the Court recognized the "reliability and probative

worth of written medical reports," emphasizing that while there may be

"professional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the "specter of

questionable credibility and veracity is not present." Id., at 405,

407. To be sure, credibility and veracity may be a factor in the ultimate

disability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules are

shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as

applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions. The potential

value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the

decisionmaker, is substantially less in this context than in Goldberg.

The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court's conclusion

that written submissions were an inadequate substitute for oral

presentation because they did not provide an effective means for the

recipient to communicate his case to the decisionmaker. Written

submissions were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipients

lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write effectively" and

could not afford professional assistance

onclusion

that written submissions were an inadequate substitute for oral

presentation because they did not provide an effective means for the

recipient to communicate his case to the decisionmaker. Written

submissions were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipients

lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write effectively" and

could not afford professional assistance. In addition, such submissions

would not provide the "flexibility of oral presentations" or "permit the

recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to

regard as important." 397 U.S., at 269. In the context of the

disability-benefits-entitlement assessment the administrative procedures

under review here fully answer these objections.

The detailed questionnaire which the state agency periodically sends the

recipient identifies with particularity the information relevant to the

entitlement decision, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance

from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire. More important,

the information critical to the entitlement decision usually is derived

from medical sources, such as the treating physician. Such sources are

likely to be able to communicate more effectively through written

documents than are welfare recipients or the lay witnesses supporting

their cause. The conclusions of physicians often are supported by X-rays

and the results of clinical or laboratory tests, information typically

more amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf. W. Gellhorn &

C. Byse, Administrative Law -- Cases and Comments 860-863 (6th ed.

1974).

re effectively through written

documents than are welfare recipients or the lay witnesses supporting

their cause. The conclusions of physicians often are supported by X-rays

and the results of clinical or laboratory tests, information typically

more amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf. W. Gellhorn &

C. Byse, Administrative Law -- Cases and Comments 860-863 (6th ed.

1974).

A further safeguard against mistake is the policy of allowing the

disability recipient or his representative full access to all information

relied upon by the state agency. In addition, prior to the cut-off of

benefits the agency informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the

reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evidence that it considers

most relevant. Opportunity is then afforded the recipient to submit

additional evidence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly the

accuracy of information in his file as well as the correctness of the

agency's tentative conclusions. These procedures, again as contrasted with

those before the Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "mold"

his argument to respond to the precise issues which the decisionmaker

regards as crucial.

Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici point to the

significant reversal rate for appealed cases as clear evidence that the

current process is inadequate. Depending upon the base selected and the

line of analysis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the

contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for appealed reconsideration

decisions to an overall reversal rate of only

3.3%. [29] Bare statistics

rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking

process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since the

administrative review system is operated on an open-file basis. A

recipient may always submit new evidence, and such submissions may result

in additional medical examinations

ion

decisions to an overall reversal rate of only

3.3%. [29] Bare statistics

rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking

process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since the

administrative review system is operated on an open-file basis. A

recipient may always submit new evidence, and such submissions may result

in additional medical examinations. Such fresh examinations are held in

approximately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases, either at the

reconsideration or evidentiary hearing stage of the administrative

process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value of reversal rate

statistics as one means of evaluating the adequacy of the pretermination

process is diminished. Thus, although we view such information as

relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case.

E

In striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor to be

assessed is the public interest. This includes the administrative burden

and other societal costs that would be associated with requiring, as a

matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all

cases prior to the termination of disability benefits. The most visible

burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number

of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients

pending decision. No one can predict the extent of the increase, but the

fact that full benefits would continue until after such hearings would

assure the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option. Nor would

the theoretical right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits

result, as a practical matter, in any substantial offset to the added

outlay of public funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of the

probable additional financial cost. We only need say that experience with

the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the

ultimate burden would not be insubstantial.

etical right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits

result, as a practical matter, in any substantial offset to the added

outlay of public funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of the

probable additional financial cost. We only need say that experience with

the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the

ultimate burden would not be insubstantial.

Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether

due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some

administrative decision. But the Government's interest, and hence that of

the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources, is a

factor that must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional

safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to

society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be

outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost or protecting those whom

the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be

found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving

since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are

not unlimited. See Friendly, supra, at 1276, 1303.

But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc weighing of

fiscal and administrative burdens against the interests of a particular

category of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination as to

when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must be

imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness. We reiterate the

wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that differences in the

origin and function of administrative agencies "preclude wholesale

transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have

evolved from the history and experience of the courts." FCC v.

Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)

d upon administrative action to assure fairness. We reiterate the

wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that differences in the

origin and function of administrative agencies "preclude wholesale

transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have

evolved from the history and experience of the courts." FCC v.

Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940). The judicial

model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most

effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of

due process is the requirement that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss

[be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S., at

171-172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). All that is necessary is that the

procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to "the

capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard." Goldberg v.

Kelly, supra, at 268-269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are

given a meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assessing what

process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the

good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the

administration of the social welfare system that the procedures they have

provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of

individuals. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 202 (WHITE, J.,

concurring and dissenting in part). This is especially so where, as here,

the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective

process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but

also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent

judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).

dissenting in part). This is especially so where, as here,

the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective

process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but

also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent

judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).

We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the

termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative

procedures fully comport with due process.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

[1] The program is financed by

revenues derived from employee and employer payroll taxes. 26 U.S.C. §§

3101(a), 3111(a); 42 U.S.C. 01(b). It provides monthly benefits to

disabled persons who have worked sufficiently long to have an insured

status, id., § 423(c)(1)(A), and who have had substantial work

experience in a specified interval directly preceding the onset of

disability. Id ., § 423(c)(1)(B). Benefits also are provided to the

worker's dependents under specified circumstances. Id ., §§

502(b)(d). When the recipient reaches age 65 his disability benefits are

automatically converted to retirement benefits. Id ., §§ 461(2)(D)

423(a)(1). In fiscal 1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received

assistance under the program. Social Security Administration, The Year in

Review 21 (1974).

fits also are provided to the

worker's dependents under specified circumstances. Id ., §§

502(b)(d). When the recipient reaches age 65 his disability benefits are

automatically converted to retirement benefits. Id ., §§ 461(2)(D)

423(a)(1). In fiscal 1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received

assistance under the program. Social Security Administration, The Year in

Review 21 (1974).

[2] Eldridge originally was

disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain. He subsequently was found

to have diabetes. The tentative determination letter indicated that aid

would be terminated because available medical evidence indicated that his

diabetes was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back

movements which would impose severe functional restrictions, and that he

no longer suffered emotional problems that would preclude him from all

work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13 in his reply letter he claimed

to have arthritis of the spine rather than a strained back.

[3] The District Court ordered

reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits pending its final disposition on the

merits.

[4] In Goldberg the Court held

that the pretermination hearing must include the following elements: (1)

"timely and adequate notice detailing the reason for the proposed

termination"; (2) "an effective opportunity [for the recipient] to defend

by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments

and evidence orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired; (4) an "impartial"

decisionmaker; (5) a decision resting "solely on the legal rules and

evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a statement of reasons for the

decision and the evidence relied on, 397 U.S., at 226-271. In this opinion

the term "evidentiary hearing" refers to a hearing generally of the type

required in Goldberg.

ments

and evidence orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired; (4) an "impartial"

decisionmaker; (5) a decision resting "solely on the legal rules and

evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a statement of reasons for the

decision and the evidence relied on, 397 U.S., at 226-271. In this opinion

the term "evidentiary hearing" refers to a hearing generally of the type

required in Goldberg.

[5] The HEW regulations direct

that each state plan under the federal categorical assistance programs

must provide for pretermination hearings containing specified procedural

safeguards, which include all of the Goldberg requirements. See 45

CFR § 205.10(a); n. 4 supra .

[6] The Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit, simply noting that the issue had been correctly decided by

the District Court in this case, reached the same conclusion in Williams v. Weinberger , 494 F.2d 1191 ( per curiam ),

petition for certified, 43 U.S.L.W. 3175 (U.S. Sept. 8, 1974) (No.

74-205)

[7] Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)

provides in full "Finality of Secretary's decision

(h) The findings and decision of the Secretary after a hearing shall be

binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings

of fat or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person,

tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action

against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee

thereof shall be brought under section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any

claim arising under this subchapter."

[8] Section 405(g) further

provides

ties to such hearing. No findings

of fat or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person,

tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action

against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee

thereof shall be brought under section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any

claim arising under this subchapter."

[8] Section 405(g) further

provides

"Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States

for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides or has his

principal place of business or, if he does not reside or have his

principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia. . . . The court

shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the

record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The

findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial

evidence, shall be conclusive.

[9] The other two conditions ar

(1) that the civil action be commenced within 60 days after the mailing of

notice of such decision or within such additional time as the Secretary

may permit, and (2) that the action be filed in an appropriate district

court. These two requirements specify a statute of limitations and

appropriate venue, and are waivable by the parties. Salfi, supra ,

at 763-764. As in Salfi no question as to whether Eldridge

satisfied these requirements was timely raised below, See Fed. Rule Civ.

Proc. 8(c), 42(h)(1), and they need not be considered here.

[10] If Eldridge had exhausted

the full set of available administrative review procedures, failure to

have raised his constitutional claim would not bar him from asserting it

later in a district court. See, e.g. Flemming v. Nestor , 363

U.S. 603, 604, 607 (1960).

ed these requirements was timely raised below, See Fed. Rule Civ.

Proc. 8(c), 42(h)(1), and they need not be considered here.

[10] If Eldridge had exhausted

the full set of available administrative review procedures, failure to

have raised his constitutional claim would not bar him from asserting it

later in a district court. See, e.g. Flemming v. Nestor , 363

U.S. 603, 604, 607 (1960).

[11] Decisions in different

contexts have emphasized that the nature of the claim being asserted and

the consequences of deferment of judicial review are important factors in

determining whether a statutory requirement of finality has been

satisfied. The role these factors may play is illustrated by the intensely

"practical" approach which the Court has adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial

Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), when applying the finality

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which grants jurisdiction to courts of

appeal to review all "final decisions" of the district courts, and 29

U.S.C.§ 1257, which empowers this Court to review only "final judgments"

of state courts. See, e.g., Harris v. Washington , 505 U.S.

55 (1971), Local No. 438 Construction & General Laborers Union v. Curry , 371 U.S. 542, 549, 550 (1963); Mercantile National

Bank v. Langdeau , 371 U.S. 555, 557-558 (1963); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra , at 545-546. To be sure,

certain of the policy considerations implicated in § 1257 and § 1291 cases

are different from those that are relevant here. Compare General Laborers

Union, supra, at 550; Mercantile National Bank, supra , at 558, with McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L.

Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 424-426 (1965). But the

core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, if

possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be

lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered remains

applicable.

tional Bank, supra , at 558, with McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L.

Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 424-426 (1965). But the

core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, if

possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be

lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered remains

applicable.

[12] Given our conclusion that

jurisdiction in the District Court was proper under § 405(g), we find in

unnecessary to consider Eldridge's contention that notwithstanding §

405(h) there was jurisdiction over his claim under the mandamus statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1361, or the Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 701 et

seq.

[13] In all but six States the

state vocational rehabilitation agency charged with administering the

state plan under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 41 State. 735, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 701 et seq. , acts as the "state

agency" for purposes of disability insurance program. Staff of the House

Comm. on Ways and Means, Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess., p. 148 (1974). This assignment of responsibility was

intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts for disabled workers and to

utilize the well-established relationships of the local rehabilitation

agencies with the medical profession H. Rep. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d

Sess., 23-24 (1954).

[14] Work which "exists in the

national economy" is in turn defined as "work which exists in significant

numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several

regions of the country." § 423(d)(2)(A).

rs and to

utilize the well-established relationships of the local rehabilitation

agencies with the medical profession H. Rep. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d

Sess., 23-24 (1954).

[14] Work which "exists in the

national economy" is in turn defined as "work which exists in significant

numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several

regions of the country." § 423(d)(2)(A).

[15] Because the continuing

disability investigation concerning whether a claimant has returned to

work is usually done directly by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance,

without any state agency involvement, the administrative procedures prior

to the post-termination evidentiary hearing differ from those involved in

cases of possible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the

important respect that the process relies principally on written

communications and there is no provision for an evidentiary hearing prior

to the cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry in

certain types of cases, such as those involving self-employment and

agricultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary conducts

an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the predetermination

process. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.2(c).

[16] Information is also

requested concerning the recipient's belief as to whether he can return to

work, the nature and extent of his employment during the past, and any

vocational services he is receiving.

[17] All medical source

evidence used to establish the absence of continuing disability must be in

writing, with the source properly identified. DISM § 353.4C.

al (CM) § 6705.2(c).

[16] Information is also

requested concerning the recipient's belief as to whether he can return to

work, the nature and extent of his employment during the past, and any

vocational services he is receiving.

[17] All medical source

evidence used to establish the absence of continuing disability must be in

writing, with the source properly identified. DISM § 353.4C.

[18] The disability recipient

is not permitted personally to examine the medical reports contained in

his file. This restriction is not significant since he is entitled to have

any representative of his choice, including a lay friend or family member,

examine all medical evidence. CM § 7314. See also 20 CFR § 401.3(a)(2).

The Secretary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under

review.

[19] The SSA may not itself

revise the state agency's determination in a manner more favorable to the

beneficiary. If, however, it believes that the worker is still disabled,

or that the disability lasted longer than determined by the state agency,

it may return the file to the agency for further consideration in light of

SSA's views. The agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment.

[20] The reconsideration

assessment is initially made by the state agency, but usually not by the

same persons who considered the case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security

Disability and Mass Justice 32 (1973). Both the recipient and the agency

may adduce new evidence.

[21] Unlike all prior levels

of review, which are de novo , the district court is required to

treat findings of fact as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

42 U.S.C. 405(g).

[22] The Secretary may reduce

other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or seek the payment

of a refund, unless the beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment

or recovery would defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and

good conscience." 42 U.S.C. § 404(b). See generally 20 CFR §§

404.501-404.515.

if supported by substantial evidence.

42 U.S.C. 405(g).

[22] The Secretary may reduce

other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or seek the payment

of a refund, unless the beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment

or recovery would defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and

good conscience." 42 U.S.C. § 404(b). See generally 20 CFR §§

404.501-404.515.

[23] This, of course, assumes

that an employee whose wages are garnished erroneously is subsequently

able to recover his back wages.

[24] The level of benefits is

determined by the worker's average monthly earnings during the period

prior to disability, his age, and other factors not directly related to

financial need, specified in 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 415 See id ., §

423(a)(2).

[25] Workmen's compensation

benefits are deducted in part in accordance with a statutory formula. 42

U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see Richardson v.

Belcher , 404 U.S. 78 (1971).

[26] Amici cite

statistics compiled by the Secretary which indicate that in 1965 the mean

income of the family unit of a disabled worker was $3,803, while the

median income for the unit was $2,836. The mean liquid assets -- i.e. , cash, stocks, bonds -- of these family units was $4,862; the

median was $940. These statistics do not take into account the family

unit's nonliquid assets -- i.e., automobile, real estate, and the like.

Brief for amici AFL-CIA/Green, at 25 n.29, App. 4a

come of the family unit of a disabled worker was $3,803, while the

median income for the unit was $2,836. The mean liquid assets -- i.e. , cash, stocks, bonds -- of these family units was $4,862; the

median was $940. These statistics do not take into account the family

unit's nonliquid assets -- i.e., automobile, real estate, and the like.

Brief for amici AFL-CIA/Green, at 25 n.29, App. 4a

[27] Amici emphasize

that because an identical definition of disability is employed in both the

Title II Social Security Program and in the companion welfare system for

the disabled, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), compare 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1) with id., (Supp. III) § 1382c(a)(3), the terminated

disability-benefits recipient will be ineligible for the SSI Program.

There exist, however, state and local welfare programs which may

supplement the worker's income. In addition, the worker's household unit

can qualify for food stamps if it meets the financial need requirements.

See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(c), 2014(b), 7 CFR § 271. Finally, in 1974 480,000 of

the approximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security

benefits also received SSI benefits. Since financial need is a criterion

for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who are most

in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI benefits when

disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the SSI program, a

pretermination evidentiary hearing is provided, if requested. 42 U.S.C.

(Supp. III) § 1383(e); 20 CFR § 416.1336(c); 40 Fed. Reg. 1512; see Staff

Report 346.

d is a criterion

for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who are most

in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI benefits when

disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the SSI program, a

pretermination evidentiary hearing is provided, if requested. 42 U.S.C.

(Supp. III) § 1383(e); 20 CFR § 416.1336(c); 40 Fed. Reg. 1512; see Staff

Report 346.

[28] The decision is not

purely a question of the accuracy of a medical diagnosis since the

ultimate issue which the state agency must resolve is whether in light of

the particular worker's "age, education, and work experience" he cannot

"engage in any . . . substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Yet information concerning each

of these worker characteristics is amenable to effective written

presentation. The value of an evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral

presentation, to an accurate presentation of those factors to the

decisionmaker does not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the

inquiry as to the types of employment opportunities that exist in the

national economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of

skills would not necessarily be advanced by an evidentiary hearing. Cf. K.

Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.06 at 429 (1958). The statistical

information relevant to this judgment is more amenable to written than to

oral presentation.

he

inquiry as to the types of employment opportunities that exist in the

national economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of

skills would not necessarily be advanced by an evidentiary hearing. Cf. K.

Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.06 at 429 (1958). The statistical

information relevant to this judgment is more amenable to written than to

oral presentation.

[29] By focusing solely on the

reversal rate for appealed reconsideration determinations amici overstate the relevant reversal rate. As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 383 n.6 (1975), in order fully

to assess the rehability and fairness of a system of procedure, one must

also consider the overall rate of error for all denials of benefits. Here

that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, about 75% of these reversals occur

at the reconsideration stage of the administrative process. Since the

median period between a request for reconsideration review and decision is

only two months, Brief for Amici AFL-CIO/Green, App. 4a, the deprivation

is significantly less than that concomitant in the lengthier delay before

an evidentiary hearing. Netting out these reconsideration reversals, the

overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%. See Supplemental and Reply Brief for

the Petitioner 14.