SSR 76-14c: SECTION 205(g) (42 USC 405(g)) -- JUDICIAL REVIEW -- REFERRAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFIT CASES TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES

20 CFR 404.951

SSR 76-14c

MATHEWS v. WEBER, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 96 S.Ct. 549 (1/14/76)

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court

The question presented in this case is whether the Federal Magistrates

Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 636, permits a United States District Court to

refer all Social Security benefit cases to United States Magistrates for

preliminary review of the administrative record, oral argument, and

preparation of a recommended decision as to whether the record contains

substantial evidence to support the administrative determination -- all

subject to an independent decision, on the record, by the District Judge

who may, in his discretion, hear the matter de novo .

(1)

Respondent Weber brought this action in the United States District Court

for the Central District of California to challenge the final

determination of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that he

was not entitled to reimbursement under the Medicare provisions of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq ., for medical payments

he made on behalf of his wife. Such a suit for administrative review is

authorized by § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and governed by its

standards. The court may consider only the pleadings and administrative

record, and must accept the Secretary's findings of fact so long as they

are supported by substantial evidence.

When respondent's complaint was filed, the Clerk of Court pursuant to

court rule assigned the case to a named District Judge, and simultaneously

referred it to a United States Magistrate with directions "to notice and

conduct such factual hearings and legal argument as may be appropriate"

and to "prepare a proposed written order or decision, together with

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law where necessary or

appropriate" for consideration by District Judge. The Clerk took these

steps pursuant to General Order No

y

referred it to a United States Magistrate with directions "to notice and

conduct such factual hearings and legal argument as may be appropriate"

and to "prepare a proposed written order or decision, together with

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law where necessary or

appropriate" for consideration by District Judge. The Clerk took these

steps pursuant to General Order No. 104-D of the District Court, which

requires initial reference to a Magistrate in seven categories of

administrative review cases, [1] including actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties may object

to the Magistrate's recommendations. After acting on any objections the

Magistrate is to forward the entire file to the District Judge to whom the

case is assigned for decision; the District Judge "will calendar the

matter for oral argument if he deems it necessary or appropriate."

The Secretary moved to vacate the order of reference, arguing (1) that

referral under a general order of this type violated Rule 53(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) that such referral was not

authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act. The Secretary also argued that

the reference was of doubtful constitutionality and in contravention of

the judicial review provisions of the Social Security Act, arguments that

he has expressly declined to make in this Court. The District Court

refused to vacate the order of reference, but certified the reference

question for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

the Federal Magistrates Act. The Secretary also argued that

the reference was of doubtful constitutionality and in contravention of

the judicial review provisions of the Social Security Act, arguments that

he has expressly declined to make in this Court. The District Court

refused to vacate the order of reference, but certified the reference

question for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

The Court of Appeals affirmed. Weber v. Secretary of Health,

Education, and Welfare , 503 F.2d 1049 (CA9 1974). That court stressed

the limited and preliminary nature of the inquiry in review actions

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the limited scope of the Magistrate's

role on reference, and the fact that final authority for decision remained

with the District Judge. "Were the broad provisions of General Order No.

104-D . . . before us, the Secretary might have grounds to complain. As

applied, the rule is not vulnerable to the attack here mounted." 503 F.2d

at 1051. The Court of Appeals thus reached a decision squarely in conflict

with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Ingram v. Richardson , 471 F.2d 1268 (CA6 1972). We granted

certiorari [2] and we affirm.

(2)

After several years of study, the Congress in 1968 enacted the Federal

Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. The Act abolished the office of

United States Commissioner, and sought to "reform the first echelon of the

Federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern scheme of

justice by establishing a system of U.S. Magistrates." S.Rep. No. 371,

90th Cong. 1st Sess., p.8 (1967) (hereinafter Senate Report)

, the Congress in 1968 enacted the Federal

Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. The Act abolished the office of

United States Commissioner, and sought to "reform the first echelon of the

Federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern scheme of

justice by establishing a system of U.S. Magistrates." S.Rep. No. 371,

90th Cong. 1st Sess., p.8 (1967) (hereinafter Senate Report). In order to

improve the former system and to attract the most competent men and women

to the office, the Act in essence made the position analogous to the

career service, replacing the fee system of compensation with substantial

salaries; the Act also gave both full and part-time magistrates a definite

term of office, and required that wherever possible the district courts

appoint only members of the bar to serve as magistrates. Magistrates took

over most of the duties of the Commissioners, and the Act gave them new

authority to try a broad range of misdemeanors with the consent of the

parties.

Section 636(b) of the Act outlines a procedure by which the district

courts may call upon magistrates to perform other functions, in both civil

and criminal cases. It provides:

The three examples § 636(b) sets out are, as the statute itself states,

not exclusive. The Senate sponsor of the legislation, Senator Tydings,

testified in the House hearings:

See also Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act, before the Subcommittee

on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 14, 27 (1967) (hereafter Senate

Hearings).

examples § 636(b) sets out are, as the statute itself states,

not exclusive. The Senate sponsor of the legislation, Senator Tydings,

testified in the House hearings:

See also Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act, before the Subcommittee

on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 14, 27 (1967) (hereafter Senate

Hearings).

Section 636(b) was included to "permit . . . the U.S. district courts to

assign magistrates, as officers of the court, a variety of functions . . .

presently performable only by the judges themselves." Senate Report, p.12.

In enacting this section and in expanding the criminal jurisdiction

conferred upon magistrates, Congress hoped by "increasing the scope of the

responsibilities that can be discharged by that office, to establish a

system capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the Federal

judiciary. . . ." Senate Report, p. 11.

The Act grew from Congress' recognition that a multitude of new statutes

and regulations had created an avalanche of additional work for the

district courts which could be performed only by multiplying the number of

judges or giving judges additional assistance. The Secretary argues that

Congress intended the transfer to magistrates of simply the irksome,

ministerial tasks; respondent urges that Congress intended magistrates to

take on a whole range of substantive judicial duties and advisory

functions. We need not accept the characterization of the Federal

Magistrate as either a "parajudge," as respondent would have it, or a

"supernotary," as the Secretary argues, in order to resolve this case;

finding the best analogy to this new office is not particularly important.

Congress had a number of precedents for this new officer before it;

British masters, justices of peace, and magistrates; our own traditional

special masters in equity; and pretrial

examiners. [3] The office

Congress created drew on all prior experience

ry," as the Secretary argues, in order to resolve this case;

finding the best analogy to this new office is not particularly important.

Congress had a number of precedents for this new officer before it;

British masters, justices of peace, and magistrates; our own traditional

special masters in equity; and pretrial

examiners. [3] The office

Congress created drew on all prior experience. What is important is that

the congressional anticipation is becoming a reality; in fiscal 1975, for

example, the 500 full or part-time U.S. magistrates disposed of 255,061

matters, most of which would otherwise have occupied a district judge.

These included 36,766 civil proceedings, 537 of which were social security

review cases. Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the

United States Courts VIII- 4 (1975). See also Sussman, The Fourth Tier in

the Federal Judicial System: The United States Magistrate, 57 Chicago Bar

Record 134 (1974); Geffen, Practice Before the United States Magistrate,

47 Los Angeles Bar Bulletin 462 (1972); Doyle, Implementing the Federal

Magistrates Act, 39 J. Kansas B.A. 25 (1970).

Congress manifested concern as well as enthusiasm, however, in

considering the Act. Several witnesses, including the Director of the

Administrative Office and representatives of the Justice Department,

expressed some fear that Congress might improperly delegate to magistrates

duties reserved by the Constitution to Article III judges.. Senate

Hearings, 107-128, 241n; House Hearings,

123-128. [4] The hearings and

committee reports indicate that in § 646(b) Congress met this problem in

two ways. First, Congress restricted the range of matters that may be

referred to a magistrate to those where referral is "not consistent with

the Constitution and laws of the United States. . . ." Second, Congress

limited that magistrate's role in cases referred to him under § 636(b)

123-128. [4] The hearings and

committee reports indicate that in § 646(b) Congress met this problem in

two ways. First, Congress restricted the range of matters that may be

referred to a magistrate to those where referral is "not consistent with

the Constitution and laws of the United States. . . ." Second, Congress

limited that magistrate's role in cases referred to him under § 636(b).

The Act's sponsors made it quite clear that the magistrate acts "under the

supervision of the district judges" when he accepts a referral, and that

authority for making final decisions remains at all times with the

district judge. Senate Report, p. 12. "[A] district judge would retain

ultimate responsibility for decision making in every instance in which a

magistrate might exercise additional duties jurisdiction." House Hearings.

Testimony of Senator Tydings, p. 73. See also House Hearings, Testimony of

Assistant Deputy Attorney General Finley, p. 127.

(3)

We need not define the full reach of a magistrate's authority under the

Act, or reach the broad provisions of General Order No. 104-D, in order to

decide this case. Under the part of the order at issue the magistrates

perform a limited function which falls well within the range of duties

Congress empowered the district courts to assign to them. The magistrate

is directed to conduct a preliminary review of a closed administrative

record -- closed because under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), neither party may put any additional evidence before the

District Court. The magistrate gives only a recommendation to the judge,

and only on the single, narrow issue: is there in the record substantial

evidence to support the Secretary's

decision? [5] The magistrate may

do no more than propose a recommendation, and neither the statute nor the

General Order gives such recommendation presumptive weight

y put any additional evidence before the

District Court. The magistrate gives only a recommendation to the judge,

and only on the single, narrow issue: is there in the record substantial

evidence to support the Secretary's

decision? [5] The magistrate may

do no more than propose a recommendation, and neither the statute nor the

General Order gives such recommendation presumptive weight. The district

judge is free to follow it wholly to ignore it, or, if he is not

satisfied, he may conduct the review in whole or in part anew. The

authority -- and the responsibility -- to make an informed, final

determination, we emphasize, remains with the judge.

The magistrate's limited role in this type of case nonetheless

substantially assists the district judge in the performance of his

judicial function, and benefits both him and the parties. A magistrate's

review helps focus the Court's attention on the relevant portions of what

may be voluminous record, from a point of view as neutral as that of an

Article III judge. Review also helps the Court move directly to those

legal arguments made by the parties that find some support in the record.

Finally, the magistrate's report puts before the district judge a

preliminary evaluation of the cumulative effect of the evidence in the

record, to which the parties may address argument, and in this way narrows

the dispute. Each step of the process takes place with the full

participation of the parties. They know precisely what recommendations the

judge is receiving and may frame their arguments accordingly.

We conclude that in the context of this case the preliminary review

function assigned to the magistrate, and at issue her, is one of the

"additional duties" that the statute contemplates magistrates are to

perform. [6]

process takes place with the full

participation of the parties. They know precisely what recommendations the

judge is receiving and may frame their arguments accordingly.

We conclude that in the context of this case the preliminary review

function assigned to the magistrate, and at issue her, is one of the

"additional duties" that the statute contemplates magistrates are to

perform. [6]

(4)

The Secretary argues that the magistrate, in taking this reference,

functions as a special master. From this premise, the Secretary asks us to

hold that a general rule requiring automatic reference in a category of

cases does not comply with the mandate of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53, that

"reference to a master shall be the exception an not the rule," made in

nonjury cases "only upon a showing that some exceptional condition

requires it." He also argues that, for similar reasons, the reference here

is not permissible under our decision in LaBuy v. Howes Leather

Co ., 352 U.S. 249

(1957). [7]

Section 636(b) expressly provides that a district court may, in an

appropriate case and in accordance with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53, call upon

a magistrate to act as a special master. But the statute also is clear

that not every reference, for whatever purpose, is to be characterized as

a reference to a special master. It treats references to the magistrate

acting as master quite separately in subsection (1), indicating by its

structure that other references are of a different sort. Moreover, Rule

53(e) provides that, in nonjury cases referred to a master, the court

shall accept any finding of fact that is not clearly erroneous. Under the

reference in this case, however, the judge remains free to give the

magistrate's recommendation whatever weight the judge decides it merits.

It cannot be said, therefore, that the magistrate acts as s special master

in the sense that either Rule 53 or the Federal Magistrates Act uses that

term

a master, the court

shall accept any finding of fact that is not clearly erroneous. Under the

reference in this case, however, the judge remains free to give the

magistrate's recommendation whatever weight the judge decides it merits.

It cannot be said, therefore, that the magistrate acts as s special master

in the sense that either Rule 53 or the Federal Magistrates Act uses that

term. The order of reference at issue does not constitute the magistrate a

special master.

The Secretary argues that the magistrate will be a master- in-fact

because the judge will accept automatically the recommendation made in

every case. Nothing in the record or within the scope of permissible

judicial notice supports this argument; nor does common observation of the

performance of United States judges remotely lend the slightest credence

to such an extravagant assertion. We express no opinion with respect to

either the wisdom of the validity of automatic referral in other types of

cases; only the narrow portion of General Order No. 104- D that led to

reference of this particular case is before us today. In this narrow range

of cases, reference promotes more focused, and so more careful,

decicionmaking by the district judge. We categorically reject the

suggestion that judges will accept, uncritically, recommendations of

magistrates.

Our decision in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co ., 352 U.S. 249

on of General Order No. 104- D that led to

reference of this particular case is before us today. In this narrow range

of cases, reference promotes more focused, and so more careful,

decicionmaking by the district judge. We categorically reject the

suggestion that judges will accept, uncritically, recommendations of

magistrates.

Our decision in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co ., 352 U.S. 249

(1957) does not call for a different result. In LaBuy , the district

judge on his own motion referred to a special master two complex,

protracted anti-trust cases on the eve of trial. The cases had been

pending before him for several years, he had heard pretrial motions, and

he was familiar with the issues involved. The master, a member of the bar,

was to hear and decide the entire case, subject to a review by the

district judge under the "clearly erroneous" test. The judge cited the

problems attendant to docket congestion to satisfy Rule 53's requirement

that a reference to a special master be justified by "exceptional

circumstances." The Court held that on these facts reference was not

permissible and affirmed the Court of Appeals' supervisory prohibition.

LaBuy, although nearly two decades past, is the most recent of our cases

dealing with special masters, and our decision today does not erode

it. [8] The magistrate here acted

in his capacity as magistrate, not as a special master, under a reference

authorized by an Act passed 10 years after LaBuy was decided. Other

factors distinguish this case from LaBuy as well. The issues here are as

simple as they were complex in LaBuy, and the District Judge had not yet

invested any time in familiarizing himself with the case. The reference in

this case will result in a recommendation that carries only such weight as

its merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants. We are

persuaded that the important premises from which the LaBuy decision

proceeded are not threatened here.

they were complex in LaBuy, and the District Judge had not yet

invested any time in familiarizing himself with the case. The reference in

this case will result in a recommendation that carries only such weight as

its merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants. We are

persuaded that the important premises from which the LaBuy decision

proceeded are not threatened here.

Finally, our decision in Wingo v. Wedding , 418 U.S. 461

(1974), does not bear on this case. The Secretary has abandoned any claim

that the statute giving the District Court jurisdiction of the case in the

first instance, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), precludes reference to a magistrate.

It was the Court's reading of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2243,

that formed that basis for the holding of Wingo v. Wedding .

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this

case.

[1] General Order No. 104-D

provides for reference in the following types of administrative review:

"(A) Actions to review administrative determinations re entitlement to

benefits under the Social Security Act and related statutes, including but

not limited to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

"(B) Actions filed by the United States or a carrier to review, implement

or restrain orders of the interstate Commerce Commission re freight

overcharges, including but not limited to actions under 28 US.C. § 1336

and 49 U.S.C. § 304a.

"(C) Actions, whether in the form of judicial review, habeas corpus or

otherwise for review of orders and other actions of the Immigration and

Naturalization Service. Included, but not by way of limitation, are

actions involving deportation orders, denial of preference classification

visas and denial of petitions to adjust status.

"(D) Actions for review of adjudications by the Civil Service Commission,

or the various departments or agencies, involving personnel actions such

as wrongful discharge, reductions in force, transfers, retirements,

etc.

ce. Included, but not by way of limitation, are

actions involving deportation orders, denial of preference classification

visas and denial of petitions to adjust status.

"(D) Actions for review of adjudications by the Civil Service Commission,

or the various departments or agencies, involving personnel actions such

as wrongful discharge, reductions in force, transfers, retirements,

etc.

"(E) Actions for review of an order of any branch or establishment of the

military service denying discharge of petitioner from the military,

whether such actions are brought in the form of petitions for judicial

review, habeas corpus or actions for declaratory relief or injunction.

"(F) Actions filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923(f)(3) to review

administrative decisions denying applications for licenses to engage in

business as a firearms or ammunition importer, manufacturer or dealer.

"(G) Actions to review administrative decisions by the Department of

Labor denying applications for alien employment certification required

pursuant to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14)."

The petition for certiorari raises only the issue of the propriety of the

part of subsection (A) of the General Order that authorizes reference of

cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we intimate no opinion on the

validity of its other provisions.

[2] Because respondent has

declined to appear, we invited an amicus curiae to support the

decision of the Court of Appeals. 420 U.S. 989.

[3] The administration of the

Act also profits from the British analogy. See Institute of Judicial

Administration, Report of the Committee to Study the Role of Masters in

the English Judicial System (Federal Judicial Center, 1974).

[4] Some courts have manifested

a like concern. See T.P.O. Inc. v. McMillen , 460 F.2d 348 (CA7

1972); Reed v. Board of Election Commissioners , 459 F.2d 121

(CA1 1972). But cf. Palmore v. United States , 411 U.S. 389

h analogy. See Institute of Judicial

Administration, Report of the Committee to Study the Role of Masters in

the English Judicial System (Federal Judicial Center, 1974).

[4] Some courts have manifested

a like concern. See T.P.O. Inc. v. McMillen , 460 F.2d 348 (CA7

1972); Reed v. Board of Election Commissioners , 459 F.2d 121

(CA1 1972). But cf. Palmore v. United States , 411 U.S. 389

(1973). See also Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88

Harv. L. Rev. 779 (1975); Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal

Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 584 (1973). Because we

limit our consideration of the Act and General Order No. 104-D to the

particular reference presented by this case, we need not deal with these

broad constitutional issues. Petitioner expressly declines to rely on any

constitutional argument.

[5] Ordinarily, the parties will

agree as to the legal standard, leaving as the sole issue whether the

Secretary's determination is supported by substantial evidence. In some

cases, the magistrate may preliminarily resolve issues of law before

making a recommendation; in some few cases, the recommendation may turn

wholly upon an issue of law. The parties have not suggested that case in

either of these sub-categories raise issues of statutory interpretation

that require separate treatment, and we do not reach them on this record.

Experience with the magistrate's role under this Act may well lead to the

conclusion that sound judicial administration calls for sending directly

to the District Judge those cases that turn solely upon issues of law.

[6] Though we do not rely upon

subsequently expressed congressional views, the Congress plainly considers

claims such as respondent brought in the District Court as matters that

could appropriately be referred for preliminary review to a magistrate. In

considering magistrates' salaries in 1972, a Senate subcommittee noted:

he District Judge those cases that turn solely upon issues of law.

[6] Though we do not rely upon

subsequently expressed congressional views, the Congress plainly considers

claims such as respondent brought in the District Court as matters that

could appropriately be referred for preliminary review to a magistrate. In

considering magistrates' salaries in 1972, a Senate subcommittee noted:

"Magistrates are judicial officers of the Federal district courts. . . .

They may also be authorized to screen prisoner petitions, hold pretrial

conferences in civil and criminal cases, hear certain preliminary motions,

review social security appeals, review Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act

matters, and serve as special masters. In short, they render valuable

assistance to the judges of the district courts, thereby freeing the time

of those judges for the actual trial of cases." S. Rep. NO. 1065, 92

Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3 (1972) (emphasis added).

The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the statutory body that

supervises the administrative aspects of the Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

604(d)(1), reads that Act in the same way. It has distributed a

"checklist" of magistrate duties that includes review of Social Security

appeals brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial Conference of the

United States, Committee on the Administration of the Federal Magistrate

System, Duties Which Might Be Assigned to U.S. Magistrates (March 14,

1975). The Administrative Office first noted in its 1972 report that

district courts were assigning Social Security Appeals to magistrates

under the 1968 Act. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual

Report of the Director (1972) 250.

he

United States, Committee on the Administration of the Federal Magistrate

System, Duties Which Might Be Assigned to U.S. Magistrates (March 14,

1975). The Administrative Office first noted in its 1972 report that

district courts were assigning Social Security Appeals to magistrates

under the 1968 Act. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual

Report of the Director (1972) 250.

[7] These arguments persuaded

the Court of Appeals in Ingram v. Richardson , 471 F.2d 1268

(CA6 1972). Other federal courts to consider the issue reached a contrary

result. Yascavage v. Weinberger , 379 F.Supp. 1297 (MD Pa.

1974); Bell v. Weinberger , 378 F.Supp. 198 (ND Ga. 1974); Murphy v. Weinberger , Unempl. Ins. Rep. ¶ 17,608 (Conn.

1974).

Several courts have relied upon these arguments to one extent or another

in disapproving references that involved a broader grant of authority to

the magistrate. See, e.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp .,

507 F.2d 1378 (CA7 1974); T.P.O., Inc . v. McMillen , 460 F.2d

348 (CA7 1972); Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs , 459 F.2d

124 (CA1 1972).

[8] See generally Kaufman,

Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Col. L. Rev. 452 (1958); C.A.B. v. Carefree Travel, Inc ., 513 F.2d 375 (CA2 1975).