SSR 75-4c: SECTION 216(h)(3)(B) (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(3)(B)) -- CHILD'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- BAR TO ENTITLEMENT OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD BORN SUBSEQUENT TO ONSET OF WAGE EARNER'S DISABILITY -- CONSTITUTIONALITY

20 CFR 404.1101 and 404.1109

SSR 75-4c

Jimenez et al v. Weinberger , 417 U.S. 628 (1974)

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

A three-judge District Court in the Northern District of Illinois upheld

the constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security Act which

provides that certain illegitimate children, who cannot qualify for

benefits under any other provision of the Act, may obtain benefits if, but

only if, the disabled wage earner parent is shown to have contributed to

the child's support or to have lived with him prior to the parent's

disability. [1] The District

Court held that the statute's classification is rationally related to the

legitimate governmental interest in avoiding spurious claims. Jimenez

v. Richardson . 414 U.S. 1061.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Ramon Jimenez, a wage earner

covered under the Social Security Act, became disabled in April 1963, and

became entitled to disability benefits in October 1963. Some years prior

to that time, the claimant separated from his wife and began living with

Elizabeth Hernandez, whom he never married. Three children were born to

them, Magdalena, born August 13, 1963. Eugenio, born January 18, 1965, and

Alicia, born February 24, 1968. These children have lived in Illinois with

claimant all their lives; he has formally acknowledged them to be his

children, has supported and cared for them since their birth, and has been

their sole caretaker since their mother left the household late in 1968.

since the parents never married, appellants are classified as illegitimate

under Illinois law and are unable to inherit from their father because

they are nonlegitimated illegitimate children. Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 4, §

12.

ged them to be his

children, has supported and cared for them since their birth, and has been

their sole caretaker since their mother left the household late in 1968.

since the parents never married, appellants are classified as illegitimate

under Illinois law and are unable to inherit from their father because

they are nonlegitimated illegitimate children. Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 4, §

12.

On August 21, 1968, Ramon Jimenez, as the father, filed an application

for child's insurance benefits on behalf of these three children.

Magdalena was found to be entitled to child's insurance benefits under the

statute because she had been conceived before Jimenez became disabled and

no issue is presented with respect to her entitlement to benefits. The

claims of Eugenio and Alicia were denied, however, on the grounds that

they did not meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3), since neither

child's paternity had been acknowledged or affirmed through evidence of

domicile and support before the onset of their father's

disability. [2] In all other

respects Eugenio and Alicia are eligible to receive child's insurance

benefits and their applications were denied solely because they are

proscribed illegitimate children born after the onset of the father's

disability.

Appellants urge that the contested Social Security provision is based

upon the so-called "suspect classification" of illegitimacy. Like race and

national origin, they argue, illegitimacy is a characteristic determined

solely by the accident of birth, it is a condition beyond the control of

the children, and it is a status that subjects the children to a stigma of

inferiority and a badge or opprobrium. We need not reach appellants'

argument, however, because in the context of this case it is enough that

we note, as we did in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406

U.S. 164, that

teristic determined

solely by the accident of birth, it is a condition beyond the control of

the children, and it is a status that subjects the children to a stigma of

inferiority and a badge or opprobrium. We need not reach appellants'

argument, however, because in the context of this case it is enough that

we note, as we did in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406

U.S. 164, that

Conversely, the Secretary urges us to uphold this statutory scheme on the

ground that the case is controlled by the Court's recent ruling Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, where we noted that:

However, Dandridge involved an equal protection attack upon Maryland's

Aid to Families with Dependent Children program which provided aid in

accordance with the family's standard of need, but limited the maximum

grant to $250 per family, regardless of size, thereby reducing the per

capita allowance for children of large families. We noted that the AFDC

welfare program is a "scheme of cooperative federalism" and that the

"starting point of the statutory analysis must be a recognition that the

federal law gives each State great latitude in dispensing its available

funds." 397 U.S., at 478. This special deference to Maryland's statutory

approach was necessary because, "[g]iven Maryland's finite resources, its

choice is either to support some families adequately and others less

adequately, or not to give sufficient support to any family," 397 U.S. at

479. Here, by contrast, there is no evidence supporting the contention

that to allow illegitimates in the classification of appellants to receive

benefits would significantly impair the federal Social Security trust fund

and necessitate a reduction in the scope of persons benefited by the Act

uately and others less

adequately, or not to give sufficient support to any family," 397 U.S. at

479. Here, by contrast, there is no evidence supporting the contention

that to allow illegitimates in the classification of appellants to receive

benefits would significantly impair the federal Social Security trust fund

and necessitate a reduction in the scope of persons benefited by the Act.

On the contrary, the Secretary has persistently maintained that the

purpose of the contested statutory scheme is to provide support for

dependents of a wage earner who has lost his earning power, and that the

provisions excluding some after-born illegitimates from recovery are

designed only to prevent spurious claims and ensure that only those

actually entitled to benefit receive payments. Accepting this view of the

relevant provisions of the Act, we cannot conclude that the purpose of the

statutory exclusion of some after-born illegitimates is to achieve a

necessary allocation of finite resources and, to that extent, Dandridge is distinguishable and not controlling.

As we have noted, the primary purpose of the contested Social Security

scheme is to provide support for dependents of a disabled wage

earner. [3] The Secretary

maintains that the Act denies benefits to after-born illegitimates who

cannot inherit or whose illegitimacy is not solely because of a formal,

nonobvious defect in their parents' wedding ceremony, or who are not

legitimated, because it is "likely" that these illegitimates, as a class,

will not possess the requisite economic dependency on the wage earner

which would entitle them to recovery under the Act and because eligibility

for such benefits to those illegitimates would open the door to spurious

claims

because of a formal,

nonobvious defect in their parents' wedding ceremony, or who are not

legitimated, because it is "likely" that these illegitimates, as a class,

will not possess the requisite economic dependency on the wage earner

which would entitle them to recovery under the Act and because eligibility

for such benefits to those illegitimates would open the door to spurious

claims. Under this view the Act's purpose would be to replace only that

support enjoyed prior to the onset of disability, no child would be

eligible to receive benefits unless the child had experienced actual

support from the wage earner prior to the disability, and no child born

after the onset of the wage earner's disability would be allowed to

recover. We do not read the statute as supporting that view of its

purpose. Under the statute it is clear that illegitimate children born

after the wage earner becomes disabled qualify for benefits if state law

permits them to inherit from the wage earner. § 416(h)(2)(A), or if their

illegitimacy results solely from formal, nonobvious defects in their

parents' ceremonial marriage, § 416(h)(2)(B); or if the child is

legitimated in accordance with state law, § 402(d)(3)(A). Similarly,

legitimate children born after their wage-earning parent has become

disabled and legitimate children born before the onset of disability are

entitled to benefits regardless of whether they were living with or being

supported by the disabled parent at the onset of the disability, §

402(d)(1) and (3).

or if the child is

legitimated in accordance with state law, § 402(d)(3)(A). Similarly,

legitimate children born after their wage-earning parent has become

disabled and legitimate children born before the onset of disability are

entitled to benefits regardless of whether they were living with or being

supported by the disabled parent at the onset of the disability, §

402(d)(1) and (3).

In each of the examples just mentioned, the child is by statute "deemed

dependent" upon the parent by virtue of his or her status and no

dependency or paternity need be shown for the child to qualify for

benefits. However, nonlegitimated illegitimates in appellants' position,

who cannot inherit under state law and whose illegitimacy does not derive

solely from a defect in their parents' wedding ceremony, are denied a

parallel right to the dependency presumption under the Act. Their dilemma

is compounded by the fact that the statute denies them any opportunity to

prove dependency in order to establish their claim to support and, hence,

their right to eligibility. § 416(h)(3)(B). The Secretary maintains that

this absolute bar to disability benefits is necessary to prevent spurious

claims because "To the unscrupulous person, all that prevents him from

realizing gain is the mere formality of a spurious acknowledgement of

paternity or a collusive paternity suit with the mother of an illegitimate

child who is herself desirous or in need of the additional cash." Jimenez v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 1356, 1361 (ND Ill.

1973).

ity benefits is necessary to prevent spurious

claims because "To the unscrupulous person, all that prevents him from

realizing gain is the mere formality of a spurious acknowledgement of

paternity or a collusive paternity suit with the mother of an illegitimate

child who is herself desirous or in need of the additional cash." Jimenez v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 1356, 1361 (ND Ill.

1973).

From what has been outlined it emerges that after-born illegitimate

children are divided into two sub-classifications under this statute. One

sub-class is made up of those (a) who can inherit under state intestacy

laws, or (b) who are legitimated under state law, or (c) who are

illegitimate only because of some formal defect in their parents'

ceremonial marriage. These children are deemed entitled to receive

benefits under the Act without any showing that they are in fact dependent

upon their disabled parent. The second subclassification of after-born

illegitimate children includes those who are conclusively denied benefits

because they do not fall within one of the foregoing categories and are

not entitled to receive insurance benefits under any other provision of

the Act.

We recognize that the prevention of spurious claims is a legitimate

governmental interest and that, dependency of illegitimates in appellants'

subclass as defined under the federal statute, has not been legally

established even though, as here, paternity has been acknowledged. As we

have noted, the Secretary maintains that the possibility that evidence of

parentage or support may be fabricated is greater when the child is not

born until after the wage earner has become entitled to benefits. It does

not follow, however, that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of

appellant's subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the

prevention of spurious claims

As we

have noted, the Secretary maintains that the possibility that evidence of

parentage or support may be fabricated is greater when the child is not

born until after the wage earner has become entitled to benefits. It does

not follow, however, that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of

appellant's subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the

prevention of spurious claims. Assuming that the appellants are in fact

dependent on the claimant, it would not serve the purposes of the Act to

conclusively deny them an opportunity to establish their dependency and

their right to insurance benefits, and it would discriminate between the

two subclasses of after-born illegitimate without any basis for the

distinction since the potential for spurious claims in exactly the same as

to both subclasses.

The Secretary does not contend that it is necessarily or universally true

that all illegitimates in appellants' subclass would be unable to

establish their dependency and eligibility under the Act if the statute

gave them an opportunity to do so. Nor does he suggest a basis for the

assumption that all illegitimates who are statutorily deemed entitled to

benefits under the Act are in fact dependent upon their disabled parent.

Indeed, as we have noted, those illegitimates statutorily deemed dependent

are entitled to benefits regardless of whether they were living in, or had

over ever lived in, a dependent family setting with their disabled parent.

Even if children might rationally be classified on the basis of whether

they are dependent upon their disabled parent, the Act's definition of

these two subclasses of illegitimates is "overinclusive" in that it

benefits some children who are legitimated, or entitled to inherit, or

illegitimate solely because of a defect in the marriage of their parents,

but who are not dependent on their disabled parent

might rationally be classified on the basis of whether

they are dependent upon their disabled parent, the Act's definition of

these two subclasses of illegitimates is "overinclusive" in that it

benefits some children who are legitimated, or entitled to inherit, or

illegitimate solely because of a defect in the marriage of their parents,

but who are not dependent on their disabled parent. Conversely, the Act is

"under-inclusive" in that it conclusively excludes some illegitimates in

appellants' subclass who are, in fact, dependent upon their disabled

parent. Thus, for all that is shown in this record, the two subclasses of

illegitimates stand on equal footing, and the potential for spurious

claims is the same as to both; hence to conclusively deny one subclass

benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal

protection of the law guaranteed by the due process provisions of the

Fifth Amendment. Schneider v. Rush, 377 U.S. 163; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499.

In the District Court of the Secretary, relying on the validity of the

statutory exclusion, did not undertake to challenge the assertion that

appellants are the children of the claimant, that they lived with the

claimant all their lives, that he has formally acknowledged them to be his

children, and that he has supported and cared for them since their birth.

Accordingly the case is remanded to provide appellants an opportunity,

consistent with this opinion, to establish their claim to eligibility as

"children" of the claimant under the Social Security Act.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting.

[1] 42 U.S.C. * 416(h)(3).

es, that he has formally acknowledged them to be his

children, and that he has supported and cared for them since their birth.

Accordingly the case is remanded to provide appellants an opportunity,

consistent with this opinion, to establish their claim to eligibility as

"children" of the claimant under the Social Security Act.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting.

[1] 42 U.S.C. * 416(h)(3).

[2] The contested Social

Security scheme provides, in essence, that legitimate or legitimated

children (42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)), illegitimate children who can inherit

their parent's personal property under the intestacy laws of the State of

the insured's domicile (42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)), and those children who

cannot inherit only because their parents' ceremonial marriage was invalid

for nonobious defects (42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(B)), are entitled to receive

benefits without any further showing of parental support. However,

illegitimate children such as Eugenio and Alicia who were born after their

father became entitled to disability or death insurance benefits, and who

do not fall into one of the foregoing categories, are not entitled to

receive any benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3).

[3] See House-Senate Conference

Comm Rep. on 1965 Amendments to Social Security Act. 111 Cong. Record

18387 (July 27, 1965): Report on the Advisory Council on Social Security.

The Status of the Social Security Program and Recommendations for Its

Improvement. 67 (Washington, D.C., 1965).