Regulated Navigation Area: Navigable Waters Within the First Coast Guard District

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[CGD1-98-151]

RIN 2115-AE84

Regulated Navigation Area: Navigable Waters Within the First

Coast Guard District

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to establish a permanent Regulated

Navigation Area (RNA) within the navigable waters of the First Coast

Guard District to increase operational safety for towing vessels and

tank barges. The proposed rule would require four sets of measure for

towing vessels and tank barges operating in the waters of the

Northeastern United States, including positive control for barges,

enhanced communications, voyage planning, and areas of restricted

navigation. These measures should reduce the risk of oil spills from

the many tank barges operating in the waters of the region, and so too

reduce the risk of environmental damage to the unique and extremely

sensitive marine environment.

DATES: Comments must arrive on or before November 12, 1998.

ADDRESSES: You may mail or deliver comments to Commander (m), First

Coast Guard District, 408 Atlantic Ave., Boston, MA 02210-3350. The

First District Commander maintains the public docket for this

rulemaking. Comments, and documents, as indicated in this preamble,

will become part of this docket and will be available for inspection

and copying at the same address between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Lieutenant Rich Klein, c/o Commander (m), First Coast Guard District,

408 Atlantic Ave., Boston, MA 02210-3350; telephone 617-223-8243.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Request for Comments

will become part of this docket and will be available for inspection

and copying at the same address between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Lieutenant Rich Klein, c/o Commander (m), First Coast Guard District,

408 Atlantic Ave., Boston, MA 02210-3350; telephone 617-223-8243.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Request for Comments

The Coast Guard encourages interested persons to participate in

this rulemaking by submitting written data, views, or arguments.

Persons submitting comments should include their name and address,

identify this rulemaking (CGD1-98-151) and the specific section of this

document to which each comment applies, and give a reason for each

comment. Please submit all comments and attachments in an unbound

format, no larger than 8\1/2\ by 11 inches, suitable for copying.

Persons wanting acknowledgement of receipt of comments should enclose

stamped, self-addressed postcards or envelopes. The Coast Guard will

consider all comments received during the comment period. It may change

this proposed rule in view of the comments.

No public meeting is planned. Persons may request a public meeting

by writing to the Project Officer at the address listed under

ADDRESSES. If it is determined that the opportunity for oral

presentations will aid in this rulemaking, the Coast Guard will hold a

public meeting at a time and place announced by a later notice in the

Federal Register.

Background and Purpose

view of the comments.

No public meeting is planned. Persons may request a public meeting

by writing to the Project Officer at the address listed under

ADDRESSES. If it is determined that the opportunity for oral

presentations will aid in this rulemaking, the Coast Guard will hold a

public meeting at a time and place announced by a later notice in the

Federal Register.

Background and Purpose

This rulemaking is proposed to improve the navigational safety for

towing vessels and tank barges operating in the waters of the

Northeastern United States. Between January 1992 and December 1996,

there have been 289 marine casualties involving tank barges in the

First Coast Guard District. Not all of these casualties were major or

significant, but several resulted in oil spills.

During 1996 and 1997, there were 12 marine casualties involving

engine failure with tugs while they were towing tank barges in the

waters of the First Coast Guard District. At least four of those tank

barges were loaded with a combined cargo totaling about 21 million

gallons of petroleum products.

In each of the 12 instances, the towing vessel was able to mitigate the

casualty by switching propulsion to the second engine that was

sufficient to control the barge. None of the casualties resulted in any

pollution.

A recent history of towing vessel casualties is described below,

some of which were potential major pollution incidents.

On January 5, 1994, a tug lost control of its loaded tank barge,

spilling 4,200 gallons of gasoline into the East River, New York.

On April 7, 1994, a steering gear failure aboard a tug caused a

loaded tank barge to ground in New Haven harbor, while carrying a cargo

of 2.1 million gallons of gasoline.

On February 9, 1995, a tug lost control of a tank barge loaded with

714,000 gallons of fuel oil near East Rockaway Inlet, New York.

On April 6, 1995, a tug lost control of a tank barge loaded with

5,376,000 gallons of No. 2 oil in the East River, New York

failure aboard a tug caused a

loaded tank barge to ground in New Haven harbor, while carrying a cargo

of 2.1 million gallons of gasoline.

On February 9, 1995, a tug lost control of a tank barge loaded with

714,000 gallons of fuel oil near East Rockaway Inlet, New York.

On April 6, 1995, a tug lost control of a tank barge loaded with

5,376,000 gallons of No. 2 oil in the East River, New York.

On January 19, 1996, off the coast of Rhode Island, the tug SCANDIA

was towing the loaded single-hull tank barge NORTH CAPE. During the

voyage the tug caught fire causing the crew to abandon the vessel

during a severe winter storm. The barge grounded on Moonstone Beach

spilling about 828,000 gallons of No. 2 oil into Rhode Island Sound.

On February 12, 1996, a tug lost control of a tank barge in the

East River, New York, spilling 4,415 gallons of No. 2 oil into Long

Island Sound.

On August 25, 1998, a loaded tank barge was set adrift off the

Rhode Island coast when the towing hawser was cut by a passing vessel.

A potential major pollution incident was avoided when an assist tug

arrived to take the barge under control.

Development of the Regional Risk Assessment Team (RRAT) Report

On June 5 and 6, 1996, the commander of the First Coast Guard

District hosted a two-day Workshop on Safety of Towing Vessels and Tank

Barges at the Massachusetts Maritime Academy. Nearly 150 people

gathered to discuss goals for the safety of the marine environment, and

economic and operational considerations of the tank barge industry in

the Northeast. The participants represented the Coast Guard, the

industry, the States of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maine,

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and various environmental interests.

The RRAT was chartered and established by the American Waterways

Operators and Coast Guard National Quality Steering Committee on July

10, 1996

siderations of the tank barge industry in

the Northeast. The participants represented the Coast Guard, the

industry, the States of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maine,

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and various environmental interests.

The RRAT was chartered and established by the American Waterways

Operators and Coast Guard National Quality Steering Committee on July

10, 1996. The 25-member team, with similar representative stakeholders

from the two-day workshop, conducted a risk assessment of the tank

barge transportation network in the Northeastern United States, The

RRAT's report, completed February 6, 1997, examined current operational

and navigational practices for towing vessels and tank barges operating

in the Northeast. Although it did not evaluate the measures for cost-

effectiveness, it developed ten measures to improve the safe navigation

of these vessels, eight of which were recommended for rulemaking. This

rulemaking proposes four of those eight measures that are within the

authority of the First District Commander to address. The remaining

recommendations for rulemaking will be addressed as the subject of

national rulemaking.

This rulemaking takes a regional approach responsive to the

particular risks inherent in the transportation of petroleum products

on the waterways in the Northeastern United States. The network of

sounds, estuaries, coastal ponds, and shallow coastal shelves hosts one

of the most prolific habitats for marine life in the nation. This

sensitive region contains 4 of the 20 Estuaries of National

Significance, designated by Section 320 of the Federal Clean Water

Act--Long Island Sound, Narragansett Bay, Buzzards Bay, and Casco Bay--

and 5 of the 22 National Estuarine Research Reserves established to

monitor the health of the nation's most valued estuaries

s one

of the most prolific habitats for marine life in the nation. This

sensitive region contains 4 of the 20 Estuaries of National

Significance, designated by Section 320 of the Federal Clean Water

Act--Long Island Sound, Narragansett Bay, Buzzards Bay, and Casco Bay--

and 5 of the 22 National Estuarine Research Reserves established to

monitor the health of the nation's most valued estuaries. Moreover, the

shelves encompassing the Great South Channel, Massachusetts Bay, and

Cape Cod Bay provide the seasonal habitat for the Northern Right Whale,

one of the world's most endangered species of whale with a population

of only about 300. One of the whale's primary food sources, plankton,

is particularly susceptible to damage from oil spills.

In addition, the fishing grounds of the Northeastern United States

are among the most productive in the world. It is estimated that over

25,000 vessels are employed in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean fisheries

trade. The threat to the productive fishing grounds from a tank barge

spill further supports the need for the measures proposed here.

In the aftermath of the NORTH CAPE oil spill, several states in the

Northeast have drafted or enacted legislation to regulate the tank

barge industry. The Rhode Island legislature enacted an Oil Spill

Pollution Prevention and Control Act, which it amended with a Tank

Vessel Safety Act (codified as Chapter 32 of its Public Laws). Further,

Maine officials are considering a legislative initiative to regulate

the petroleum transportation industry. The States' differing

legislative initiatives may result in inconsistent regulation of the

industry.

The several operating conditions proposed in this rule are intended

to reduce the risks to the marine environment posed by tank barges

transporting oil in the region without imposing undue economic burden

on the industry.

Discussion of RRAT Recommendations

Each of the RRAT recommendations are summarized below.

1. Manning

e initiatives may result in inconsistent regulation of the

industry.

The several operating conditions proposed in this rule are intended

to reduce the risks to the marine environment posed by tank barges

transporting oil in the region without imposing undue economic burden

on the industry.

Discussion of RRAT Recommendations

Each of the RRAT recommendations are summarized below.

1. Manning

For vessel manning, the RRAT recommended that barges being pushed,

or being towed alongside the towing vessel, be considered as the

equivalent to being a manned barge if the towing vessel has a certified

individual in excess of the required manning on the towing vessel. This

recommendation impacts lifesaving equipment and shipboard habitability

issues that are required for manned barges. As such, it is the subject

of national rulemaking.

2. Anchoring and Barge Retrieval System

The RRAT recommended requirements for anchoring and barge retrieval

systems for manned and unmanned barges operating in the Northeast.

These requirements are the subject of the national rulemaking

addressing emergency control systems for tank barges. See 62 FR 52057

(Oct. 6, 1997).

3. Navigational Safety Equipment Aboard Towing Vessels

The RRAT recommended--

(a) The extension of the navigational safety equipment requirements

for towing vessels in 33 CFR part 164 to include all waters beyond

three miles, and not just the navigable waters of the Northeast; and

the national rulemaking

addressing emergency control systems for tank barges. See 62 FR 52057

(Oct. 6, 1997).

3. Navigational Safety Equipment Aboard Towing Vessels

The RRAT recommended--

(a) The extension of the navigational safety equipment requirements

for towing vessels in 33 CFR part 164 to include all waters beyond

three miles, and not just the navigable waters of the Northeast; and

(b) A requirement for Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS)

on towing vessels operating in all waters of the Northeast.

This recommendation is being addressed separately by Commandant (G-

M).

4. Lightering Activities

The RRAT referred to the existing regulations contained at 33 CFR

part 156, subpart B, governing lightering, and recommended only that

individual Captain of the Ports (COTP) develop guidelines that reflect

the best recognized practices for lightering of

petroleum products in their areas of responsibility.

5. Double-Hull Tank Barges

The RRAT acknowledged the expected benefits from the use of double-

hull tank barges but deferred recommendations until after the National

Research Council's review, conducted in accordance with section 4115 of

the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380 (OPA 90), of the

economic and operational impacts of the double-hull requirement on the

marine petroleum transportation industry. Subsequently published in

November 1997, after the RRAT recommendations, the report of the

National Research Council did not recommend any change to the phase-out

schedule for single-hull tank vessels established by OPA 90.

6. Crew Fatigue: The Human Factor

01-380 (OPA 90), of the

economic and operational impacts of the double-hull requirement on the

marine petroleum transportation industry. Subsequently published in

November 1997, after the RRAT recommendations, the report of the

National Research Council did not recommend any change to the phase-out

schedule for single-hull tank vessels established by OPA 90.

6. Crew Fatigue: The Human Factor

The RRAT recommended providing human factors awareness training to

operational and management personnel every two years and ensuring that

records of the training be kept for a period of two years.

The human factor, specifically as it relates to crew fatigue, is a

national issue. Commandant (G-M), through the Coast Guard Research and

Development Center, is currently conducting a study to develop measures

that counteract crew fatigue in the towing industry.

This Coast Guard study, ``Watchstanding Alertness in Towing

Operations,'' will examine the nature and extent of fatigue among

towing vessel crews. Following analysis of the data, measures will be

recommended that the towing industry can implement to counteract crew

fatigue. The results will be presented to the Towing Safety Advisory

Committee.

Discussion of Proposed Rule

The First District Commander has limited delegated authority to

impose operational requirements based upon circumstances peculiar to

his jurisdiction. Design, construction, or equipment standards are

generally subject to national standards. This proposed rule would

require four operational measures to improve the safety of towing

vessels and petroleum laden tank barges operating on the navigable

waters of the First Coast Guard District.

1. Positive Control for Barges

This proposal would require vessels towing single-hull tank barges

carrying petroleum oil as cargo in bulk, to be equipped with twin-

screws and two engines while operating on the navigable waters of the

First Coast Guard District. Each engine must--

(a) Be independent of the other; and

arges operating on the navigable

waters of the First Coast Guard District.

1. Positive Control for Barges

This proposal would require vessels towing single-hull tank barges

carrying petroleum oil as cargo in bulk, to be equipped with twin-

screws and two engines while operating on the navigable waters of the

First Coast Guard District. Each engine must--

(a) Be independent of the other; and

(b) Be capable of maintaining the navigational control of the tank

barge in the event of a casualty to the other engine. Under the

proposed rule, the use of double-hull tank barges precludes the need

for twin-screw, twin engine tugs as a primary towing vessel. Double-

hull vessels provide a greater level of protection than single-hull

vessels. Further, single-hull vessels are being phased-out in

accordance with OPA 90. Therefore, the present use of double-hulls is a

sufficient measure of protection under the proposed rule.

The requirements of the proposed rule for twin screws and two

engines would supplement the language used in 33 CFR 157.460. That rule

requires certain vessels to be equipped with twin-screw propulsion

unless they have installed alternative steering systems. This proposed

rule would require that all towing vessels not equipped with twin-screw

propulsion and two engines, and engaged in towing single-hull tank

barges carrying petroleum oil in bulk on the navigable waters of the

First Coast Guard District, must operate with an escort or assist tug,

or provide an equivalent means of positive control for the barges

acceptable to the COTP, regardless of any secondary or alternative

steering system. Unless the bank barge meets the definition of a

double-hull vessel in 33 CFR 157.03, it is a single-hull vessel. The

Coast Guard believes that the operational conditions proposed in this

rule would significantly reduce the likelihood of an oil spill.

Most of the vessels towing tank barges in the Northeast are already

of the twin-screw propulsion, two-engine type

alternative

steering system. Unless the bank barge meets the definition of a

double-hull vessel in 33 CFR 157.03, it is a single-hull vessel. The

Coast Guard believes that the operational conditions proposed in this

rule would significantly reduce the likelihood of an oil spill.

Most of the vessels towing tank barges in the Northeast are already

of the twin-screw propulsion, two-engine type. This propulsion

redundancy ensures a backup system in the event of engine failure or

fouling of one screw. The Coast Guard would require an escort or assist

tug in those instances when only a single-screw towing vessel is towing

a single-hull tank barge. Such an alternative would enhance safety and

reduce the risk of oil pollution to the marine environment.

On certain restricted routes, however, limited channel depths and

widths may make application of these standards impracticable. In these

instances, the COTP may grant exemptions upon application and

consideration.

Additionally, this proposed rule would require the immediate

calling of additional resources to assist a towing vessel towing any

tank barge if either the tank barge or towing vessel suffers a casualty

that adversely affects its safe navigation or seaworthiness.

Other situations requiring the employment of additional resources

include steering-gear failure and loss of the tow. The requirement to

call on these additional private resources to render emergency

assistance does not negate or otherwise lessen the requirement to

notify the Coast Guard if the tank barge or towing vessel suffers a

reportable marine casualty in accordance with 46 CFR subpart 4.05, or

develops a hazardous condition as defined in 33 CFR 160.215.

2. Enhanced Communications

and loss of the tow. The requirement to

call on these additional private resources to render emergency

assistance does not negate or otherwise lessen the requirement to

notify the Coast Guard if the tank barge or towing vessel suffers a

reportable marine casualty in accordance with 46 CFR subpart 4.05, or

develops a hazardous condition as defined in 33 CFR 160.215.

2. Enhanced Communications

This proposed rule would require that masters of vessels towing any

loaded tank barge initiate and broadcast securite calls identifying

their positions at specific locations during transits in the First

Coast Guard District.

Currently, there are no regulations requiring towing vessel

operators to share operational information or to issue securite calls

at specific locations, Enhanced communications among vessels is

critical in reducing the risk associated with transporting petroleum in

tank barges in the Northeast United States. This proposed rule should

increase situational awareness and enhance communications, thereby

reducing the risk of casualties.

There are recognized areas in Long Island Sound, Block Island

Sound, Narragansett Bay, and Buzzards Bay where the risk of collision

is higher because cross-traffic is more likely to be encountered. These

locations include dedicated ferry routes and areas where the bays and

sounds open to the ocean. Accordingly, this proposed rule contains a

list of locations for initiating securite calls.

3. Voyage Planning

ized areas in Long Island Sound, Block Island

Sound, Narragansett Bay, and Buzzards Bay where the risk of collision

is higher because cross-traffic is more likely to be encountered. These

locations include dedicated ferry routes and areas where the bays and

sounds open to the ocean. Accordingly, this proposed rule contains a

list of locations for initiating securite calls.

3. Voyage Planning

This proposed rule would require that the owner or operator of a

towing vessel employed to tow a tank barge prepare a voyage plan,

addressing specific minimum requirements, before a voyage. The master

would validate the contents of the voyage plan before the voyage,

adjust the plan if necessary, and ensure its proper use. Currently,

there are no regulations requiring the use of voyage plans aboard

towing vessels or tank barges. Proper planning and preparation of the

vessel and crew may identify potential risks, equipment concerns, and

human factors, one or a combination of which may lead to a marine

casualty during a voyage. A comprehensive voyage plan should improve

the prospects for the successful execution and completion of a voyage.

The minimum contents of a voyage plan are as follows:

(1) A description of the type, volume, and grade of cargo.

(2) Applicable information from nautical charts and publications;

including Coast Pilot, Coast Guard Light List, and Coast Guard Local

Notice to Mariners, for the destination(s).

(3) Current and forecasted weather, including visibility, wind, and

sea state for the destination(s).

(4) Data on tides and tidal currents for destination(s).

(5) Forward and after draft for the tank barge, and under-keel and

vertical clearance for the ports(s) and berthing area(s).

(6) Pre-departure checklists.

(7) Calculated speed and estimated time of arrival at proposed

waypoints.

(8) Communication contact at Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) (if

applicable), bridges, facilities and port-specific requirements for

Very High Frequency (VHF) radio.

ity in that area, any spill would quickly spread, reducing the

critical time needed to begin taking protective measures. The Sound has

less risky routes immediately adjacent, which provide for greater

navigational safety of tank barge transits.

As a place with a high level of plankton concentration, the eastern

part of Cape Cod Bay is a breeding ground for the endangered Northern

Right Whale. Any significant oil spill would potentially destroy the

particularly susceptible plankton and have a devastating result on this

important breeding area. Cape Cod Bay is a complex marine ecosystem

that contains a variety of sensitive tidal marshes, flats and estuarine

areas, making protection strategies more difficult in the event of a

significant oil spill.

Regulatory Assessment

This notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory

action under 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and does not require an

assessment of potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of

that Order. It has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) under that Order. It is not significant under the

regulatory policies and procedures of the Department of Transportation

(DOT) (44 FR 11040; February 26, 1979).

A Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation under paragraph 10e of the

regulatory policies and procedures of DOT is available in the docket

for inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES. A summary of

the Evaluation follows:

Summary of Benefits

r. It is not significant under the

regulatory policies and procedures of the Department of Transportation

(DOT) (44 FR 11040; February 26, 1979).

A Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation under paragraph 10e of the

regulatory policies and procedures of DOT is available in the docket

for inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES. A summary of

the Evaluation follows:

Summary of Benefits

The principal benefits of this proposed rule would be reduced

injuries and loss of life, environmental damage caused by navigation-

related incidents of tank barges and towing vessels while under way in

the navigable waters of the First Coast Guard District. Quantifiable

benefits will accrue in the forms of avoided pollution, avoided

injuries and deaths, and avoided damage to vessels and property.

Using information from the database of the Coast Guard Marine

Safety Management System from January 1, 1992, to December 31, 1996, we

reviewed 96 tank barge casualty cases. These casualties involved

vessels that were underway within the boundaries of the First Coast

Guard District which would have been affected by this proposed rule if

it had been in effect. This period is one which represents post OPA-90

experience, is intended to be long enough to survey a significant

number of casualties, and short enough to avoid old problems which are

now solved. These 96 incidents provided the pool from which the

benefits are estimated. During this base period, there was no reported

oil spilled from double-hull barges.

For all four proposed measures, we reviewed each casualty case

report to assess whether the casualty could have been prevented or

diminished in severity by this rule. A team of Coast Guard analysts

assigned an effectiveness degree to which each proposed measure which

would have positively affected each casualty case

this base period, there was no reported

oil spilled from double-hull barges.

For all four proposed measures, we reviewed each casualty case

report to assess whether the casualty could have been prevented or

diminished in severity by this rule. A team of Coast Guard analysts

assigned an effectiveness degree to which each proposed measure which

would have positively affected each casualty case. The Coast Guard

tabulated data on deaths and injuries, oil spillage, and dollar totals

reported for damage to the tank barges, towing vessels, piers, or other

structures, and estimated benefits for each measure adjusted to the

accurate degree of effectiveness.

The assessment indicated that, until the phase-out of single-hull

tank vessels (Sec. 4115(a) of OPA 90), the requirements of this RNA

would bring total benefits of $495,640 in avoided damage to vessels and

property (1998 dollars); $189,276 in avoided deaths (1998 dollars); and

459.76 barrels of oil in avoided pollution.

Summary of Costs

Businesses that use tank barge and towing vessels within the

geographic boundaries of the First District, as well as the tank barge

and towing vessel industries themselves, will bear the majority of the

costs of this proposed rule.

The cost of this proposed rule is the sum of costs from the

requirements for positive control for barges, enhanced communications,

voyage planning, and restricted navigation areas. These anticipated

costs recognize that many of the towing vessels and tank barges

operating within the geographic boundaries of the First District are

already in compliance with these requirements.

proposed rule.

The cost of this proposed rule is the sum of costs from the

requirements for positive control for barges, enhanced communications,

voyage planning, and restricted navigation areas. These anticipated

costs recognize that many of the towing vessels and tank barges

operating within the geographic boundaries of the First District are

already in compliance with these requirements.

(1) Positive Control for Barges: Data from the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers indicated that there are approximately 12,892 transits

occurring within the District each year. Of these transits, we estimate

1.95%, or 251, involve a single-hull, petroleum-laden tank barge being

towed by a tug without twin engines or twin screws, and thus, this

proposal would require an escort or assist tug. The cost of an escort

or assist tug is $300 an hour. It is assumed this escort or assist tug

would, on average, spend 20 hours in round trip service on each

transit. The cost of the tug for a single transit would therefore be

$6,000. Discounting to 1998 dollars, and factoring in the phase-out of

single-hull tank barges, we calculate the costs of these tugs at

$12,796,834.

(2) Enhanced Communications: This proposed rule would require the

operator of a towing vessel to make approximately eight securite calls

during the average transit in the Coast Guard's First District. Each

securite call would take about 30 seconds or 4 minutes each transit.

The securite calls

g in the phase-out of

single-hull tank barges, we calculate the costs of these tugs at

$12,796,834.

(2) Enhanced Communications: This proposed rule would require the

operator of a towing vessel to make approximately eight securite calls

during the average transit in the Coast Guard's First District. Each

securite call would take about 30 seconds or 4 minutes each transit.

The securite calls

will be placed by the person on watch and it is assumed that the master

and the mate each make half of the securite calls. The average daily

billing rate for a towing vessel's master is $400, while the average

daily billing rate for a towing vessel's mate is $270. Based on an

eight hour day, the opportunity cost of the securite call proposal for

each transit is $2.79. The Coast Guard estimated that approximately 55%

of the 12,892 annual transits, 7,091 transits, involve oil-laden tank

barges. With 7,091 transits within the Coast Guard's First District

each year affected by the enhanced communications proposal, discounting

to 1998 dollars, we calculate the opportunity cost of enhanced

communications at $186,892. However, these enhanced communication

requirements do not truly represent a cost upon the towing vessel

operator. The Securite calls will become a routine task of the person

on watch, and will neither cause this person to spend additional time

performing his watch duties, nor detract from the time available for

performing existing duties. Therefore, the total cost of enhanced

communications is $0.

r, these enhanced communication

requirements do not truly represent a cost upon the towing vessel

operator. The Securite calls will become a routine task of the person

on watch, and will neither cause this person to spend additional time

performing his watch duties, nor detract from the time available for

performing existing duties. Therefore, the total cost of enhanced

communications is $0.

(3) Voyage Planning: For each transit, as a representative of the

owner or operator, the master of the towing vessel spends approximately

30 minutes preparing the voyage plan. Again, the average daily billing

rate for a towing vessel's master is $400. The Coast Guard, using data

from the American Waterway Operators, assumes that 90% of transits

already are in compliance with this proposed rule. Further, the Coast

Guard estimates that approximately 55% annual transits involve oil-

laden tank barges. For the 12,892 transits within the First District

each year, voyage planning affects 714 transits. The cost of voyage

planning, discounted to 1998 dollars, would be $167,461.

(4) Navigation Restriction Areas: Currently all towing vessels and

tank barges operating within the geographic boundaries of the First

District, avoid operating in the areas of Fishers Island Sound and the

eastern portion of Cape Cod Bay addressed in this proposal. The cost of

navigation restriction area is $0.

Summary: The total present value of the costs of this proposed rule

(1998 dollars) would be $12,964,345 [$12,796,834 for positive control

of barges + $0 for enhanced communications + $167,461 for voyage

planning + $0 for navigation restriction areas]. In terms of cost-

effectiveness, this rule would prevent future pollution in the Coast

Guard's First District at a cost of $26,708 per barrel of oil not

spilled.

Small Entities

f the costs of this proposed rule

(1998 dollars) would be $12,964,345 [$12,796,834 for positive control

of barges + $0 for enhanced communications + $167,461 for voyage

planning + $0 for navigation restriction areas]. In terms of cost-

effectiveness, this rule would prevent future pollution in the Coast

Guard's First District at a cost of $26,708 per barrel of oil not

spilled.

Small Entities

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), the

Coast Guard considers whether this proposed rule, if adopted, will have

a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small

entities. ``Small entities'' include small businesses, not-for-profit

organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not

dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with

populations of less than 50,000.

The proposed rule would require that all transits involving towing

vessels not equipped with twin-screw and twin-engine propulsion, and

that are engaged in towing petroleum-laden tank barges in the navigable

waters of the First Coast Guard District, employ an escort or assist

tug.

It is primarily the businesses that hire the towing vessels and

tank barges for transporting their goods who directly incurs the costs

of this rulemaking by having to pay for the escort or assist tug.

However, some towing vessel companies, the majority of which are small

entities, may be indirectly affected by the proposed rule if they can

no longer provide tug service at a competitive price due to the

requirement that they employ an escort or assist tug.

These towing vessel companies do have alternatives available

allowing them to use their non-twin-screw and twin-engine towing

vessels, such as pushing barges in narrow rivers or pushing freight

barges. Additionally, with only 5% of all towing vessels not having the

necessary propulsion equipment, nearly all the towing vessel companies

are already in compliance

employ an escort or assist tug.

These towing vessel companies do have alternatives available

allowing them to use their non-twin-screw and twin-engine towing

vessels, such as pushing barges in narrow rivers or pushing freight

barges. Additionally, with only 5% of all towing vessels not having the

necessary propulsion equipment, nearly all the towing vessel companies

are already in compliance. Further, preliminary information from towing

vessel operators indicate that they already select against the use of

their non-twin-screw and twin-engine towing vessels for the practice of

towing petroleum-laden tank barges. Finally, the cost of escort or

assist towing vessels is low in comparison with the cost of replacing

or retro-fitting all their non-twin-screw and twin-engine towing

vessels with a compliant propulsion system.

Therefore, the Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that

this proposed rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small entities. If, however, you

think that your business or organization qualifies as a small entity

and that this proposed rule will have a significant economic impact on

your business or organization, please submit a comment to the Coast

Guard at the address under ADDRESSES explaining why you think it

qualifies and in what way and to what degree this proposed rule will

economically affect it.

Assistance for Small Entities

hink that your business or organization qualifies as a small entity

and that this proposed rule will have a significant economic impact on

your business or organization, please submit a comment to the Coast

Guard at the address under ADDRESSES explaining why you think it

qualifies and in what way and to what degree this proposed rule will

economically affect it.

Assistance for Small Entities

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), the Coast Guard

wants to assist small entities in understanding this proposed rule so

that they can better evaluate its effects on them and participate in

the rulemaking. If your small business or organization would be

affected by this rule and you have questions concerning its provisions

or options for compliance, please call LT Rich Klein at 617-223-8243.

The Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman

and 10 Regional Fairness Boards were established to receive comments

from small businesses about Federal agency enforcement actions. The

Ombudsman will annually evaluate the enforcement activities and rate

each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment

on the enforcement actions of the Coast Guard, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-

888-734-3247).

Collection of Information

This proposed rule provides for a collection of information under

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). As

defined in 5 CFR 1320.3(c), ``collection of information'' includes

reporting, recordkeeping, monitoring, posting, labeling, and other,

similar actions. The title and description of the information

collection, a description of the respondents, and an estimate of the

total annual burden follow. Included in the estimate is the time for

reviewing instructions, searching existing sources of data, gathering

and maintaining data needed, and completing and reviewing the

collection

dkeeping, monitoring, posting, labeling, and other,

similar actions. The title and description of the information

collection, a description of the respondents, and an estimate of the

total annual burden follow. Included in the estimate is the time for

reviewing instructions, searching existing sources of data, gathering

and maintaining data needed, and completing and reviewing the

collection.

Title: Regulated Navigation Area: Navigable waters within the First

Coast Guard District.

Summary of the Collection of Information: The requirement of a

voyage plan would serve as a preventive measure and assist in ensuring

the successful execution and completion of a voyage in the First Coast

Guard District.

Need for Information: The information for a voyage plan would

provide a mechanism for assisting vessels towing tank barges in

identifying those specific risks, potential equipment failures, or

human errors that may lead to accidents.

Proposed Use of Information: The information would focus on the

voyage

planning in the preparation of the crew and vessel for an anticipated

voyage.

Description of The Respondents: The owners or operators of towing

vessels and tank barges in the First Coast Guard District.

Number of Respondents: 709 estimated transits of towing vessels a

year.

Frequency of Response: The frequency of response is once per

transit.

Burden of Response: The owner or operator of a towing vessel

engaged in a towing a tank barge must prepare a written voyage plan

before departure.

Estimated Total Annual Burden: 354.5 hours.

As required by section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of

1995, the Coast Guard has submitted a copy of this proposed rule to OMB

for its review of the collection of information

nce per

transit.

Burden of Response: The owner or operator of a towing vessel

engaged in a towing a tank barge must prepare a written voyage plan

before departure.

Estimated Total Annual Burden: 354.5 hours.

As required by section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of

1995, the Coast Guard has submitted a copy of this proposed rule to OMB

for its review of the collection of information.

The Coast Guard solicits public comment on the proposed collection

of information to: (1) Evaluate whether the information is necessary

for the proper performance of the functions of the Coast Guard,

including whether the information would have practical utility; (2)

evaluate the accuracy of the Coast Guard's estimate of the burden of

the collection, including the validity of the methodology and

assumptions used; (3) enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the

information to be collected; and (4) minimize the burden of the

collection on those who are to respond, as by allowing the submittal of

responses by electronic means or the use of other forms of information

technology.

Persons submitting comments on the collection of information should

submit them both to OMB and to the Commander (m), First Coast Guard

District, where indicated under ADDRESSES by the date under DATES.

Persons are not required to respond to a collection of information

unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. Before the

requirements for this collection of information become effective, the

Coast Guard will publish notice in the Federal Register of OMB's

decision to approve, modify, or disapprove the collection.

Federalism

ere indicated under ADDRESSES by the date under DATES.

Persons are not required to respond to a collection of information

unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. Before the

requirements for this collection of information become effective, the

Coast Guard will publish notice in the Federal Register of OMB's

decision to approve, modify, or disapprove the collection.

Federalism

This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has been determined

that the proposed rulemaking does not have sufficient federal

implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Although the Coast Guard has determined that this proposal does not

warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment, there will be

preemptive impacts on existing state law, specifically the Rhode Island

Tank Vessel Safety Act, 46 Rhode Island General Laws Sec. 12.6. The

proposed regulations on positive control for barges [33 CFR

165.100(d)(1)] will preempt 46 R. I. Gen. Laws Sec. 12.6-8(a)(3). The

proposed regulations on enhanced communications [33 CFR 165.100(d)(2)]

will preempt 46 R. I. Gen. Laws Sec. 12.6-8(b). The proposed

regulations on voyage planning [33 CFR 165.100(d)(3)] will preempt 46

R. I. Gen. Laws Sec. 12.6-8(c). However, Rhode Island law, at 46 R. I.

Gen. Laws Sec. 12.6-12 specifically envisions preemption and

supercession of their laws by the adoption of Coast Guard regulations

on the areas covered by this proposal. No other states within the

proposed regulated navigation area have similar existing provisions.

Thus the Federalism implications of this proposal are expected to be

minimal.

Unfunded Mandates

, Rhode Island law, at 46 R. I.

Gen. Laws Sec. 12.6-12 specifically envisions preemption and

supercession of their laws by the adoption of Coast Guard regulations

on the areas covered by this proposal. No other states within the

proposed regulated navigation area have similar existing provisions.

Thus the Federalism implications of this proposal are expected to be

minimal.

Unfunded Mandates

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), (Pub.

L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48), requires Federal agencies to assess the

effects of certain regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal

governments, and the private sector. UMRA requires a written statement

of economic and regulatory alternatives for proposed and final rules

that contain Federal mandates. A ``Federal mandate'' is a new or

additional enforceable duty imposed on any State, local, or tribal

government, or the private sector. If any Federal mandate causes those

entities to spend, in the aggregate $100 million or more in any one

year, the UMRA analysis is required. This proposed rule would not

impose Federal mandates on any State, local, or tribal governments, or

the private sector.

Environment

The Coast Guard considered the environmental impact of this

proposed rule and concluded that under figure 2-1, paragraphs 34(g) and

(i) of Commandant Instruction M16475.1C, this rule is categorically

excluded from further environmental documentation. A ``Categorical

Exclusion Determination'' is available in the docket for inspection or

copying where indicated under ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165

Marine safety, Navigation (water), Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, Waterways.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes

to amend 33 CFR part 165, as follows:

PART 165--REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS

1. The authority citation for part 165 continues to read as

follows:

ere indicated under ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165

Marine safety, Navigation (water), Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, Waterways.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes

to amend 33 CFR part 165, as follows:

PART 165--REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS

1. The authority citation for part 165 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1231; 50 U.S.C. 191; 33 CFR 1.05-1(g),

6.04-1, 6.04-6 and 160.5; 49 CFR 1.46.

2. Add Sec. 165.100 to read as follows:

Sec. 165.100 Regulated Navigation Area: Navigable waters within the

First Coast Guard District.

(a) Regulated Navigation Area. All navigable waters of the United

States, as that term is used in 33 CFR 2.05-25(a), within the

geographic boundaries of the First Coast Guard District, as defined in

33 CFR 3.05-1(b).

(b) Definitions. Terms used in this section have the same meaning

as those found in 33 CFR 157.03. Single-hull identifies any tank barge

that is not a double-hull tank barge.

(c) Applicability. This section applies to primary towing vessels

engaged in towing tank barges carrying petroleum oil in bulk as cargo

in the regulated navigation area, or as authorized by the District

Commander.

(d) Regulations--(1) Positive Control for Barges. (i) Except as

provided in paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section, a single-hull tank

barge, unless being towed by a primary towing vessel with twin-screw

propulsion and with a separate system for power to each screw, must be

accompanied by an escort or assist tug of sufficient capability to

promptly push or tow the tank barge away from danger of grounding or

collision in the event of--

(A) A propulsion failure;

(B) A parted towing line;

(C) A loss of tow;

(D) A fire;

(E) Grounding;

(F) A loss of steering; or

(G) Any other casualty that affects the navigation or seaworthiness

of either vessel.

(ii) Double-hull tank barges are exempt from paragraph (d)(1)(i) of

this section.

promptly push or tow the tank barge away from danger of grounding or

collision in the event of--

(A) A propulsion failure;

(B) A parted towing line;

(C) A loss of tow;

(D) A fire;

(E) Grounding;

(F) A loss of steering; or

(G) Any other casualty that affects the navigation or seaworthiness

of either vessel.

(ii) Double-hull tank barges are exempt from paragraph (d)(1)(i) of

this section.

(iii) The cognizant COTP may authorize an exemption from the

requirements of paragraph (d)(1)(i) of this section for any tank barge

with a capacity of less than 25,000 barrels, to operate in an area with

limited depth or width such as a creek or small river. Each request for

an exemption under this section must be submitted in writing to the

cognizant COTP.

(iv) The operator of a towing vessel engaged in towing any tank

barge must immediately call for an escort or assist tug to render

assistance in the event of any of the occurrences identified in

paragraph (d)(1)(i) of this section.

(2) Enhanced Communications. Each vessel engaged in towing a tank

barge must communicate by radio on marine band or Very High Frequency

(VHF) channel 13 or 16, and issue securite calls on marine band or VHF

channel 13 or 16, upon approach to the following places:

(i) Execution Rock Light (USCG Light List No. [LLNR] 21440).

(ii) Race Rock Light (LLNR 19815).

(iii) Cable & Anchor Reef Buoy (LLNR 21330).

(iv) Stratford Shoal Middle Ground Light (LLNR 21260).

(v) Old Field Point Light (LLNR 21275).

(vi) Approaching Stratford Point from the south (NOAA Chart 12370).

(vii) Faulkner Island Light (LLNR 21170).

(viii) TE Buoy (LLNR 21160).

(ix) CF Buoy (LL 21140).

cution Rock Light (USCG Light List No. [LLNR] 21440).

(ii) Race Rock Light (LLNR 19815).

(iii) Cable & Anchor Reef Buoy (LLNR 21330).

(iv) Stratford Shoal Middle Ground Light (LLNR 21260).

(v) Old Field Point Light (LLNR 21275).

(vi) Approaching Stratford Point from the south (NOAA Chart 12370).

(vii) Faulkner Island Light (LLNR 21170).

(viii) TE Buoy (LLNR 21160).

(ix) CF Buoy (LL 21140).

(x) PI Buoy (LLNR 21080) and Valiant Rock Buoy (LLNR 19825).

(xi) Approach to Point Judith in vicinity of Block Island ferry

route.

(xii) Buzzards Bay Entrance Light (LLNR 630).

(xiii) Buzzards Bay Midchannel Lighted Buoy (LLNR 16055).

(xiv) Cleveland East Ledge Light (LLNR 16085).

(xv) Hog Island buoys 1 (LLNR 16130) and 2 (LLNR 16135).

(xvi) Approach to the Bourne Bridge.

(xvii) Approach to the Sagamore Bridge.

(xviii) Approach to the eastern entrance of Cape Code Canal.

(3) Voyage Planning. (i) The owner or operator of a towing vessel

employed to tow a tank barge shall prepare a written voyage plan for

each tank barge transit. The master of the towing vessel shall ensure

the proper use of each voyage plan.

(ii) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of this section,

each voyage plan must contain:

(A) A description of the type, volume, and grade of cargo.

(B) Applicable information from nautical charts and publications,

including Coast Pilot, Coast Guard Light List, and Coast Guard Local

Notice to Mariners, for the destination(s).

(C) Current and forecasted weather, including visibility, wind, and

sea state for the destination(s).

(D) Data on tides and tidal currents for the destination(s).

(E) Forward and after drafts of the tank barge, and under-keel

vertical clearances for all port(s) and berthing area(s).

(F) Pre-departure checklists.

(G) Calculated speed and estimated time of arrival at proposed

waypoints.

(H) Communication contacts at Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) (if

applicable), bridges, and facilities, and port-specific requirements

for VHF radio

r the destination(s).

(E) Forward and after drafts of the tank barge, and under-keel

vertical clearances for all port(s) and berthing area(s).

(F) Pre-departure checklists.

(G) Calculated speed and estimated time of arrival at proposed

waypoints.

(H) Communication contacts at Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) (if

applicable), bridges, and facilities, and port-specific requirements

for VHF radio.

(I) The master's standing orders detailing closest points of

approach, special conditions, and critical maneuvers.

(iii) Each owner or operator of a tank barge on an intra-port

transit of not more than four hours may prepare a voyage plan that

contains:

(A) The information described in paragraphs (d)(3)(ii) (C), (D),

and (E) of this section.

(B) The channels of VHF radio to monitor.

(C) Other considerations such as availability of pilot, assist tug,

berth, and line-handlers, depth of berth at mean low water, danger

areas, and securite calls.

(4) Navigation Restriction Areas. Unless authorized by the

cognizant COTP, no tank barge may operate in--

(i) The waters of Cape Cod Bay south of latitude 42 deg. 5' North

and east of longitude 70 deg. 25' West; or

(ii) The waters of Fishers Island Sound east of longitude 72 deg.

2' West, and west of longitude 71 deg. 55' West.

Dated: October 5, 1998.

R.M. Larrabee

Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, First Coast Guard District.

[FR Doc. 27361 Filed 10-9-98; 8:45 a.m.]

BILLING CODE 4910-15-M