Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 Series Airplanes and Model KC-10A (Military) Airplanes

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94-NM-114-AD]

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 Series

Airplanes and Model KC-10A (Military) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model

DC-10 series airplanes and Model KC-10A (military) airplanes. This

proposal would require various modifications of the flight controls,

hydraulic power systems, and landing gear. This proposal is prompted by

a recommendation by the Systems Review Task Force (SRTF) for

accomplishment of certain modifications that will enhance the

controllability of these airplanes in the unlikely event of

catastrophic damage to all hydraulics systems. The actions specified by

the proposed AD are intended to ensure airplane survivability in the

event of damage to fully powered flight control systems.

DATES: Comments must be received by March 1, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 94-NM-114-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be

obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach,

California 90801-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical

Administrative Support, Dept. L51, Mail Code 2-98. This information may

be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California.

1771, Long Beach,

California 90801-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical

Administrative Support, Dept. L51, Mail Code 2-98. This information may

be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mauricio J. Kuttler, Aerospace

Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-131L, FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712; telephone (310) 627-

5355; fax (310) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number

and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All

communications received on or before the closing date for comments,

specified above, will be considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in

light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory,

economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All

comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing

date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested

persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with

the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket. -

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed,

stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments

to Docket Number 94-NM-114-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs-

the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket. -

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed,

stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments

to Docket Number 94-NM-114-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs-

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request

to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules

Docket No. 94-NM-114-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055-4056.

Discussion-

In July 1989, a McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-30 series airplane

was involved in an accident in Sioux City, Iowa, resulting in the

deaths of 110 passengers and one crewmember. The National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) identified the catastrophic

disintegration of the stage 1 fan disk of one of the engines as a

probable cause of the accident. The resulting debris damaged the

hydraulic systems that power the flight controls, resulting in the loss

of virtually all control capability.-

Following the accident, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Administration convened a Systems Review Task Force (SRTF) to

investigate means for enhancing airplane survivability following damage

to fully powered flight control systems. The SRTF formed working groups

to perform these investigations for specific airplane models to

determine what actions could be effective in protecting other transport

category airplanes with powered flight control systems from similar

engine or systems failures.-

The SRTF working group assigned to review Model DC-10 series

airplanes completed its review of the Model DC-10 design, including

existing service bulletins, and issued a report recommending

accomplishment of certain modifications described in 12 Model DC-10

service bulletins. A copy of the report is contained in the Rules

Docket for this AD action.

from similar

engine or systems failures.-

The SRTF working group assigned to review Model DC-10 series

airplanes completed its review of the Model DC-10 design, including

existing service bulletins, and issued a report recommending

accomplishment of certain modifications described in 12 Model DC-10

service bulletins. A copy of the report is contained in the Rules

Docket for this AD action.

Explanation of Relevant Service Documents-

The FAA has reviewed and approved the 12 McDonnell Douglas DC-10

Service Bulletins recommended for accomplishment by the SRTF working

group. Accomplishment of the modifications specified in these service

bulletins will enhance the controllability of the airplane in the

unlikely event of catastrophic damage to all three hydraulic systems in

the tail area of the airplane.

Seven of the 12 service bulletins discussed previously describe

procedures for various modifications of the flight controls:-

1. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-71, Revision 1,

dated February 14, 1973, was issued in response to reports of failures

of the piping of the hydraulic system of the horizontal stabilizer on

Model DC-10 series airplanes that had accumulated as few as 70 flight

hours. The failures were attributed to rapid release of the trim

control handles of the stabilizer, which resulted in pressure surges

that were abnormally high in the hydraulic system of the stabilizer.

Continued high pressure surges and externally induced vibrations could

result in fatigue failure of the hydraulic piping. These conditions, if

not corrected, could result in the loss of fluid, which could render

the affected system inoperative.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for installation of surge

damper assemblies and new piping assemblies in hydraulic systems 1 and

3 of the horizontal stabilizer. Installation of the dampers and piping

will ensure that high pressure surges are absorbed and will prevent

pipe failures.-

2

orrected, could result in the loss of fluid, which could render

the affected system inoperative.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for installation of surge

damper assemblies and new piping assemblies in hydraulic systems 1 and

3 of the horizontal stabilizer. Installation of the dampers and piping

will ensure that high pressure surges are absorbed and will prevent

pipe failures.-

2. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-120, dated February

10, 1975, describes procedures for modification and reidentification of

the trim hydraulic motor assembly of the horizontal

stabilizer. Accomplishment of the modification will minimize the

possibility of fatigue failure of the motor case screws and shuttle

valve screws. (The service bulletin references Sperry Rand Corporation,

Vickers Division, Service Bulletin 390017-27-2, dated December 2, 1974,

as an additional source of service information.) Failure of the motor

case screws and/or failure of the shuttle valve screws, if not

corrected, could result in loss of hydraulic system fluid. Failure of

two shuttle valve screws could cause the shuttle valve to separate from

the trim motor.-

3. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-152, dated August 9,

1976, was issued in response to a report of inoperative horizontal

stabilizer trim due to disengagement of the torsional coupling of the

drive system on Model DC-10 series airplanes that had accumulated

approximately 4,100 flight hours. In addition, during fleet

inspections, loose retaining nuts and locking clips were found on these

airplanes; the torsional nut did not engage adequately to provide

locking action. The inoperative horizontal stabilizer trim was

attributed to failure of the locking clip to prevent the retaining nut

of the torsional coupling from rotating and becoming loose. This

condition could result in the retaining nut becoming loose and allowing

disengagement of the torsional coupling

re found on these

airplanes; the torsional nut did not engage adequately to provide

locking action. The inoperative horizontal stabilizer trim was

attributed to failure of the locking clip to prevent the retaining nut

of the torsional coupling from rotating and becoming loose. This

condition could result in the retaining nut becoming loose and allowing

disengagement of the torsional coupling. This condition, if not

corrected, could result in the loss of horizontal stabilizer trim

capability.

The service bulletin describes procedures for replacing the

existing locking clip on the torsional coupling of the horizontal

stabilizer with a new nut retainer of an improved design.

Accomplishment of this modification will minimize the possibility of

the torsional nut becoming loose.-

4. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-181, Revision 1,

dated May 28, 1981, was issued in response to reports of failure of the

differential drive shear pin in the horizontal stabilizer drive system.

These failures occurred during takeoff climb on Model DC-10 series

airplanes that had accumulated between 4 and 4,201 flight hours.

Investigation revealed that these failures were caused by bending

fatigue of the shear pin due to a loose fit. Failure of the shear pin

could result in an inoperative horizontal stabilizer drive system. This

condition, if not corrected, could result in reduced controllability of

the airplane.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for installation of a

modified chain drive unit on the horizontal stabilizer. The new unit

incorporates a larger shear pin with a single shear point having a

larger diameter with less constraint. Accomplishment of this

modification will increase the reliability of the drive assembly.-

5. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-201, dated December

30, 1985, was issued in response to a report of in-flight loss of

hydraulic systems 1 and 2 shortly after takeoff of a Model DC-10 series

airplane

larger shear pin with a single shear point having a

larger diameter with less constraint. Accomplishment of this

modification will increase the reliability of the drive assembly.-

5. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-201, dated December

30, 1985, was issued in response to a report of in-flight loss of

hydraulic systems 1 and 2 shortly after takeoff of a Model DC-10 series

airplane. Investigation revealed that the loss of hydraulic systems was

caused by blowout of the number 6 tire after gear retraction. The

blowout deflected the keel web structure, which ruptured hydraulic

pipes to the flap lock valves and caused rapid loss of fluid. This

condition, if not corrected, could result in loss of operation of the

hydraulic system.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for replacement of the

hydraulic pipe assemblies of the flap lock valve with new pipe

assemblies having increased flexibility and strength. Installation of

these pipe assemblies will minimize the possibility of rupture of the

pipe assemblies during events such as those described previously.-

6. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-208, dated September

5, 1989, was issued in response to reports of cracking of the end caps

of the trim control valve of the horizontal stabilizer on Model DC-10

series airplanes that had accumulated between 9,800 and 16,000 flight

hours. Investigation revealed that fatigue cracking initiated from

inside the radius of the end cap. Such fatigue cracking, if not

corrected, could result in loss of hydraulic fluid and eventual

shutdown of the hydraulic system.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for replacement of eight

end caps of the trim control valve of the horizontal stabilizer with

new end caps having a larger inside radius. Replacement of the end caps

will minimize the possibility of cracking of the end caps.-

7

fatigue cracking, if not

corrected, could result in loss of hydraulic fluid and eventual

shutdown of the hydraulic system.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for replacement of eight

end caps of the trim control valve of the horizontal stabilizer with

new end caps having a larger inside radius. Replacement of the end caps

will minimize the possibility of cracking of the end caps.-

7. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-209, dated October

20, 1989, was issued in response to reports of failure of the chain

drive fuse of the horizontal stabilizer on Model DC-10 series airplanes

that had accumulated between 4,000 and 18,000 flight hours.

Investigation revealed that a fuse pin within the chain drive unit had

sheared due to loose nuts on the shaft assembly. These conditions, if

not corrected, could result in the horizontal stabilizer drive system

becoming inoperative.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for inspecting the nuts

on the shaft assembly for looseness, proper orientation, excess

backlash, and engagement of the washer locking tab; and replacing the

fuse pin, adjusting backlash, and properly positioning and tightening

the nuts, if necessary. Replacing the fuse pin and tightening the nuts

will minimize the possibility of failure of the chain drive fuse of the

horizontal stabilizer.-

Two of the 12 service bulletins describe procedures for

modifications of certain hydraulic power systems:-

8. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-109, Revision 1,

dated September 22, 1978, was issued in response to reports of rapid

rise in temperature in hydraulic system 3 subsequent to the loss of

hydraulic fluid in hydraulic system 1 or 2. Investigation revealed that

a shutoff valve on the reversible motor pump may fail on one side of

the reversible motor pump and that failure may go undetected. This

failure poses a problem if a failure occurs in the opposite hydraulic

system that causes total loss of that system's fluid

e in temperature in hydraulic system 3 subsequent to the loss of

hydraulic fluid in hydraulic system 1 or 2. Investigation revealed that

a shutoff valve on the reversible motor pump may fail on one side of

the reversible motor pump and that failure may go undetected. This

failure poses a problem if a failure occurs in the opposite hydraulic

system that causes total loss of that system's fluid. If a valve fails

in the open position on one side and fluid is lost from the opposite

hydraulic system, the reversible motor pump will rotate at maximum rpm

(limited by the flow control). This condition, if not corrected, could

result in a rise in temperature in the opposite hydraulic system, which

may necessitate limited use of the engine-drive pumps on that hydraulic

system.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for installation of an

indication system that will allow the flight crew to immediately detect

an inoperative shutoff valve on the reversible motor pump. The

installation of the indication system involves installing two pressure

switches on the reversible motor pumps; installing a ground stud, two

relays, and receptacles on the center compartment electrical rack;

replacing the 6-post terminal strip in the wheel well of the right main

landing gear with an 8-post terminal strip; installing an annunciator

legend on the flight engineer's annunciator panel; installing a circuit

breaker and replacing the nameplate on the flight engineer's circuit

breaker panel; revising the failure indication wiring on the constant

speed drive; and installing indication wiring and associated clamps and

brackets on the reversible motor pump.-

9. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-125, Revision 2,

dated October 23, 1987, was issued in response to reports of complete

loss of fluid from the number 3 hydraulic system. The fluid loss was

caused by a ruptured hi-pressure switch on the hydraulic case drain

he constant

speed drive; and installing indication wiring and associated clamps and

brackets on the reversible motor pump.-

9. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-125, Revision 2,

dated October 23, 1987, was issued in response to reports of complete

loss of fluid from the number 3 hydraulic system. The fluid loss was

caused by a ruptured hi-pressure switch on the hydraulic case drain.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in the loss

of function of the hydraulic system.

The service bulletin describes procedures for modification of the

main hydraulic power system. The modification involves replacing the

hi-pressure switches on the hydraulic case drain on engine numbers 1,

2, and 3 with plugs; removing one relay and one receptacle on the aft

relay panel of the equipment rack; replacing the existing legend in

position 8 on the flight engineer's annunciator panel with a blank

legend; and revising the wiring for indicating the aircraft hydraulic

temperature and pressure. Accomplishment of this modification will

minimize the possibility of loss of hydraulic fluid.-

Three of the 12 service bulletins describe procedures for

modifications of the landing gear:-

10. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 32-134, dated March

22, 1977, was issued in response to reports of damage to the electrical

and hydraulic installations of the aft antiskid manifold on the main

landing gear. The damage resulted from blown tire fragments and debris,

which rendered the antiskid system inoperative and, in one case,

ruptured a hydraulic pipe. Failure of the pipe, if not corrected, could

cause hydraulic system numbers 1 or 3 to become inoperative due to the

loss of hydraulic fluid.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for modification of the

aft antiskid manifold on the left and right main landing gear. The

modification entails installing a protective shield and associated

brackets on the aft antiskid manifold

ydraulic pipe. Failure of the pipe, if not corrected, could

cause hydraulic system numbers 1 or 3 to become inoperative due to the

loss of hydraulic fluid.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for modification of the

aft antiskid manifold on the left and right main landing gear. The

modification entails installing a protective shield and associated

brackets on the aft antiskid manifold. Accomplishment of this

modification will minimize the possibility of damage to the aft

antiskid manifold.-

11. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 32-143, dated August

8, 1978, was issued in response to reports of damage to the brake

piping that is routed between the antiskid manifolds and the swivel

glands of the main landing gear. This damage occurred as a result of

the impact of debris following failure of a tire on the main landing

gear. A ruptured antiskid return pipe could result in loss of fluid

from the affected antiskid system during application of the brakes. A

single failure of a pressure pipe will limit brake performance on a

single system. Failure of brake pressure pipes in both systems, if not

corrected, could result in complete loss of braking capability.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for installation of

protective shields over the brake and the antiskid piping located on

the aft side of the left and right main landing gear. Accomplishment of

this modification will minimize the possibility of brake pressure and

damage to the antiskid return piping caused by failure of a tire on the

main landing gear.-

12. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 32-157, Revision 1,

dated October 29, 1980, was issued in response to a report of damage to

a support bracket on the aileron trim cable and to a flight control

mixer in the wheel well of the centerline landing gear

mize the possibility of brake pressure and

damage to the antiskid return piping caused by failure of a tire on the

main landing gear.-

12. McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 32-157, Revision 1,

dated October 29, 1980, was issued in response to a report of damage to

a support bracket on the aileron trim cable and to a flight control

mixer in the wheel well of the centerline landing gear. Investigation

revealed that the damage was caused by the impact of a tire tread that

was thrown into the open area created by the aft doors on the

centerline landing gear when the landing gear is in the down position.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in damage to components

located in the wheel well of that landing gear.-

The service bulletin describes procedures for installing a doubler

on the web assembly between the wheel wells of the center landing gear

and the right main landing gear; installing a fiberglass deflector

assembly on the shock strut of the centerline landing gear; replacing

the pressure gage manifold of the shock strut; and installing an

instruction plate and adding precaution instruction markings in the

wheel well of the right main landing gear and on the forward door of

the center landing gear. Accomplishment of this modification will

minimize the possibility of damage to components in the wheel well of

the centerline landing gear caused by a thrown tire tread or other

debris.

Explanation of the Proposed Rule-

stalling an

instruction plate and adding precaution instruction markings in the

wheel well of the right main landing gear and on the forward door of

the center landing gear. Accomplishment of this modification will

minimize the possibility of damage to components in the wheel well of

the centerline landing gear caused by a thrown tire tread or other

debris.

Explanation of the Proposed Rule-

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to

exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the

proposed AD would require various modifications of the flight controls,

hydraulic power systems, and landing gear. The actions would be

required to be accomplished in accordance with the McDonnell Douglas

service bulletins described previously.-

The FAA is continuing to review the recommendations of the SRTF

working group for these airplanes and may consider further rulemaking

based on those recommendations.-

As a result of recent communications with the Air Transport

Association (ATA) of America, the FAA has learned that, in general,

some operators may misunderstand the legal effect of AD's on airplanes

that are identified in the applicability provision of the AD, but that

have been altered or repaired in the area addressed by the AD. The FAA

points out that all airplanes identified in the applicability provision

of an AD are legally subject to the AD. If an airplane has been altered

or repaired in the affected area in such a way as to affect compliance

with the AD, the owner or operator is required to obtain FAA approval

for an alternative method of compliance with the AD, in accordance with

the paragraph of each AD that provides for such approvals. A note has

been included in this notice to clarify this requirement.

Cost Impact-

the AD. If an airplane has been altered

or repaired in the affected area in such a way as to affect compliance

with the AD, the owner or operator is required to obtain FAA approval

for an alternative method of compliance with the AD, in accordance with

the paragraph of each AD that provides for such approvals. A note has

been included in this notice to clarify this requirement.

Cost Impact-

There are approximately 427 Model DC-10 series airplanes and Model

KC-10A (military) airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide

fleet. The FAA estimates that 254 airplanes of U.S. registry would be

affected by this proposed AD.-

Approximate work hours to accomplish the proposed actions and costs

for required parts are listed in the following table. The average labor

rate is $60 per work hour.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Estimated Parts cost Total cost

Service bulletin No.- work per per

hours- airplane airplane

------------------------------------------------------------------------

27-71................................ 5 (\1\) $300.00

27-120............................... 3 $68.00 248.00

27-152............................... 1 278.00 338.00

27-181............................... 5 431.00 731.00

27-201............................... 10 7,943.00 8,543.00

27-208............................... 5 3,704.00 4,004.00

27-209............................... 9 N/A 540.00

29-109............................... 101 713.00 6,773.00

29-125............................... 4 498.00 738.00

32-134............................... 3 2,034.00 2,214.00

32-143............................... 3 649.00 829.00

32-157............................... 6 46,463.00 46,823.00

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\1\Required parts would be supplied by the manufacturer at no cost to

operators.-

713.00 6,773.00

29-125............................... 4 498.00 738.00

32-134............................... 3 2,034.00 2,214.00

32-143............................... 3 649.00 829.00

32-157............................... 6 46,463.00 46,823.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\Required parts would be supplied by the manufacturer at no cost to

operators.-

Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the proposed AD on

U.S. operators is estimated to be $18,308,574, or $72,081 per

airplane.-

The total cost impact figure discussed above is based on

assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed

requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish

those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.-

The number of required work hours, as indicated above, is presented

as if the accomplishment of the actions proposed in this AD were to be

conducted as ``stand alone'' actions. However, the 24-month compliance

time specified in paragraph (a) of this proposed AD should allow ample

time for the actions to be accomplished coincidentally with scheduled

major airplane inspection and maintenance activities, thereby

minimizing the costs associated with special airplane scheduling.-

Further, the FAA recognizes that the obligation to maintain

aircraft in an airworthy condition is vital, but sometimes expensive.

Because AD's require specific actions to address specific unsafe

conditions, they appear to impose costs that would not otherwise be

borne by operators. However, because of the general obligation of

operators to maintain aircraft in an airworthy condition, this

appearance is deceptive. Attributing those costs solely to the issuance

of this AD is unrealistic because, in the interest of maintaining safe

aircraft, most prudent operators would accomplish the required actions

even if they were not required to do so by the AD. -

A full cost-benefit analysis has not been accomplished for this

proposed AD

o maintain aircraft in an airworthy condition, this

appearance is deceptive. Attributing those costs solely to the issuance

of this AD is unrealistic because, in the interest of maintaining safe

aircraft, most prudent operators would accomplish the required actions

even if they were not required to do so by the AD. -

A full cost-benefit analysis has not been accomplished for this

proposed AD. As a matter of law, in order to be airworthy, an aircraft

must conform to its type design and be in a condition for safe

operation. The type design is approved only after the FAA makes a

determination that it complies with all applicable airworthiness

requirements. In adopting and maintaining those requirements, the FAA

has already made the determination that they establish a level of

safety that is cost-beneficial. When the FAA, as in this proposed AD,

makes a finding of an unsafe condition, this means that the original

cost-beneficial level of safety is no longer being achieved and that

the proposed actions are necessary to restore that level of safety.

Because this level of safety has already been determined to be cost-

beneficial, a full cost-benefit analysis for this proposed AD would be

redundant and unnecessary.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct

effects on the States, on the relationship between the national

government and the States, or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various levels of government

been determined to be cost-

beneficial, a full cost-benefit analysis for this proposed AD would be

redundant and unnecessary.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct

effects on the States, on the relationship between the national

government and the States, or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this

proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant

the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.-

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed

regulation (1) is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);

and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact,

positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under

the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the

Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules

Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39-

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment-

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend

part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as

follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C.

106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]-

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new

airworthiness directive:

ration proposes to amend

part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as

follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C.

106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]-

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new

airworthiness directive:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket 94-NM-114-AD.-

Applicability: Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, -40, and -

40F series airplanes and Model KC-10A (military) airplanes; as

listed in the following McDonnell Douglas DC-10 service bulletins;

certificated in any category:-

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Service bulletin No. - Revision level - Date issued-

------------------------------------------------------------------------

27-71-................. 1 -.................... February 14, 1973.-

27-120-................ Original-.............. February 10, 1975.-

27-152-................ Original-.............. August 9, 1976.-

27-181-................ 1 -.................... May 28, 1981.-

27-201-................ Original-.............. December 30, 1985.-

27-208-................ Original-.............. September 5, 1989.-

27-209-................ Original-.............. October 20, 1989.-

29-109-................ 1-..................... September 22, 1978.-

29-125-................ 2-..................... October 23, 1987.-

32-134-................ Original-.............. March 22, 1977.-

32-143-................ Original-.............. August 8, 1978.-

32-157-................ 1-..................... October 29, 1980.-

------------------------------------------------------------------------

............. 1-..................... September 22, 1978.-

29-125-................ 2-..................... October 23, 1987.-

32-134-................ Original-.............. March 22, 1977.-

32-143-................ Original-.............. August 8, 1978.-

32-157-................ 1-..................... October 29, 1980.-

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the

preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the

requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,

altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of

this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority

provided in paragraph (b) to request approval from the FAA. This

approval may address either no action, if the current configuration

eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to

address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request

should include an assessment of the effect of the changed

configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no

case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair

remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished

previously. -

To ensure airplane survivability in the event of damage to fully

powered flight control systems, accomplish the following:-

the changed

configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no

case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair

remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished

previously. -

To ensure airplane survivability in the event of damage to fully

powered flight control systems, accomplish the following:-

(a) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, modify

the flight controls, hydraulic power systems, and landing gear in

accordance with paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(12) of this AD, as

applicable.-

(1) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 27-71, Revision 1, dated February 14, 1973: Install surge

damper assemblies and new piping assemblies in hydraulic systems 1

and 3 of the horizontal stabilizer in accordance with the service

bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall

install a pipe assembly, part number AJK7004-641, -642, -643, -644,

-645, -646, -647, or -648 on any airplane. As of the effective date

of this AD, no person shall install a valve assembly, part number

AJG7041-5515 or -5517, on any airplane unless that assembly has been

modified in accordance with the service bulletin.-

(2) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 27-120, dated February 10, 1975: Modify and reidentify the

trim hydraulic motor assembly of the horizontal stabilizer in

accordance with the service bulletin.

Note 2: The McDonnell Douglas service bulletin references Sperry

Rand Corporation, Vickers Division, Service Bulletin 390017-27-2,

dated December 2, 1974, as an additional source of service

information.

Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 27-120, dated February 10, 1975: Modify and reidentify the

trim hydraulic motor assembly of the horizontal stabilizer in

accordance with the service bulletin.

Note 2: The McDonnell Douglas service bulletin references Sperry

Rand Corporation, Vickers Division, Service Bulletin 390017-27-2,

dated December 2, 1974, as an additional source of service

information.

(3) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 27-152, dated August 9, 1976: Replace the existing

retaining nut locking clip on the torsional coupling of the

horizontal stabilizer with a new retaining nut locking clip in

accordance with the service bulletin. As of the effective date of

this AD, no person shall install a locking clip or nut retainer,

part number AJH7259-1, on any airplane.-

(4) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 27-181, Revision 1, dated May 28, 1981: Install a modified

chain drive unit on the horizontal stabilizer in accordance with the

service bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD, no person

shall install a chain drive unit assembly, part number AJH7337-1 or

AJH7337-501; pin, part number AJH7343-1; housing assembly, part

number AJH7345-1; shaft, part number AJH7075-1 or -501; or decal,

part number AJH7347-1; on any airplane.-

(5) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 27-201, dated December 30, 1985: Replace the hydraulic pipe

assemblies of the flap lock valve with new pipe assemblies in

accordance with the service bulletin. As of the effective date of

this AD, no person shall install a pipe assembly, part number

AYK7002-876, -877, -878, -879, -880, and -881; AYK7136-1; and

AYK7137-1; on any airplane.-

d October 20, 1989: Inspect the nuts on the

shaft assembly for looseness, proper orientation, excess backlash,

and engagement of the washer locking tab, in accordance with the

service bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD, no person

shall install a drive assembly, part number AJH7337-505, on any

airplane unless that assembly has been modified in accordance with

the service bulletin.-

(i) If no discrepancy is found, no further action is required by

this paragraph.-

(ii) If any discrepancy is found, prior to further flight,

replace the fuse pin, adjust backlash, and properly position and

tighten the nuts in accordance with the service bulletin.-

(8) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin

29-109, Revision 1, dated September 22, 1978: Install an indication

system on the reversible motor pump in accordance with the service

bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall

install a nameplate, part number ABN7191-1124, -1125, -1126, -872, -

873, -874, -878, or -1084; a support, part number 2394536-509; or a

plate, part number 2710497-1-6; on any airplane.-

(9) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 29-125, Revision 2, dated October 23, 1987: Modify the main

hydraulic power system in accordance with the service bulletin. As

of the effective date of this AD, no person shall install an

annunciator panel, part number 102200-268, or -274, on any airplane

unless that panel has been modified in accordance with the service

bulletin.-

airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 29-125, Revision 2, dated October 23, 1987: Modify the main

hydraulic power system in accordance with the service bulletin. As

of the effective date of this AD, no person shall install an

annunciator panel, part number 102200-268, or -274, on any airplane

unless that panel has been modified in accordance with the service

bulletin.-

(10) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 32-134, dated March 22, 1977: Modify the aft antiskid

manifold on the left and right main landing gear in accordance with

the service bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD, no person

shall install a bracket, part number ARG7291-1, ARG7291-501,ARG7485-

501, or ARG7485-502 on any airplane. As of the effective date of

this AD, no person shall install a main landing gear assembly, part

number ARG7393-(Any Configuration), on any airplane unless that

assembly has been modified in accordance with the service bulletin.-

(11) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 32-143, dated August 8, 1978: Install protective shields

over the brake and antiskid piping located on the aft side of the

left and right main landing gear in accordance with the service

bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall

install a support, part number ARG7551-1 or ARG7552-1, or bracket,

part number AEP8009-25, on any airplane. As of the effective date of

this AD, no person shall install a main landing gear assembly, part

number ARG7393-(Any Configuration), on any airplane unless that

assembly has been modified in accordance with the service bulletin.-

etin. As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall

install a support, part number ARG7551-1 or ARG7552-1, or bracket,

part number AEP8009-25, on any airplane. As of the effective date of

this AD, no person shall install a main landing gear assembly, part

number ARG7393-(Any Configuration), on any airplane unless that

assembly has been modified in accordance with the service bulletin.-

(12) For airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service

Bulletin 32-157, Revision 1, dated October 29, 1980: Install a

doubler on the web assembly between the wheel wells of the center

landing gear and the right main landing gear; install a fiberglass

deflector assembly on the shock strut of the centerline landing

gear; replace the pressure gage manifold of the shock strut; and

install an instruction plate and adding precaution instruction

markings in the wheel well of the right main landing gear and on the

forward door of the center landing gear in accordance with the

service bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD, no person

shall install a manifold, part number AYK7162-501, on any airplane.-

(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the

compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification

Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall

submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal

Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the

Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved

alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

aft Certification

Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall

submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal

Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the

Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved

alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with

sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14

CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where

the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. Issued in Renton,

Washington, on December 28, 1994.

S.R. Miller,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification

Service.

[FR Doc. 95-62 Filed 1-3-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U