Bank Secrecy Act and Sanctions Compliance Standards for FDIC-Supervised Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers

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Federal Register › Vol. 91 › 91 FR 34171

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fdic.gov, Chase Lubbock, Associate Director, (703) 254-0802, clubbock@fdic.gov, Christy Cornell-Pape, Acting Chief, Financial Crimes, (415) 808-8090, acornell-pape@fdic.gov, Division of Risk Management Supervision; Deborah Tobolowsky, Counsel, (571) 309-2415, dtobolowsky@fdic.gov, Chantal Hernandez, Counsel, (202) 898-7388, chhernandez@fdic.gov, Legal Division.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Policy Objectives

The FDIC is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (proposed rule) to implement appropriate BSA and sanctions compliance standards applicable to FDIC-supervised permitted payment stablecoin issuers (PPSIs) pursuant to the GENIUS Act (or the Act). 1 The proposed rule aims to establish appropriate principles-based BSA and sanctions compliance requirements and standards that are tailored to the business model and risk profile of PPSIs and consistent with applicable law, which includes requirements promulgated by the United States Department of Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The FDIC believes the proposed rule would establish supervisory expectations for PPSIs, help combat illicit finance risk, and continue to support the responsible growth and use of digital assets and related technologies in the banking sector. 2

1 Public Law 119-27, 139 Stat. 419 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5901-5916).

2 See Executive Order 14178, Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology, 90 FR 8647 (Jan. 31, 2025).

II. Background and Authority

The GENIUS Act requires the FDIC, along with the other primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators 3 and the Department of Treasury, to implement regulations to carry out the Act's requirements in establishing a Federal payment stablecoin regulatory framework for supervised entities

American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology, 90 FR 8647 (Jan. 31, 2025).

II. Background and Authority

The GENIUS Act requires the FDIC, along with the other primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators 3 and the Department of Treasury, to implement regulations to carry out the Act's requirements in establishing a Federal payment stablecoin regulatory framework for supervised entities. 4 The FDIC is the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulator of PPSIs that are subsidiaries of insured State nonmember banks and State savings associations that have been approved by the FDIC to issue payment stablecoins.

3 The primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators are the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). See 12 U.S.C. 5901(25).

4 See 12 U.S.C. 5913. In developing this proposed rule, the FDIC, as required by section 13 of the GENIUS Act, 12 U.S.C. 5913, coordinated with fellow regulators, as appropriate. The GENIUS Act will become effective on January 18, 2027, or 120 days after the date on which the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators issue any final regulations implementing the Act, if earlier. See 12 U.S.C. 5901 note.

On April 10, 2026, the FDIC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would, among other things, establish a prudential framework pursuant to the GENIUS Act for FDIC-supervised PPSIs, including requirements related to reserve assets, redemption, capital, and risk management standards. 5 This

5 91 FR 18534 (Apr. 10, 2026). In December 2025, the FDIC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking under section 5 of the GENIUS Act that would establish application procedures for insured State nonmember banks and State savings associations to request approval to issue payment stablecoins through a subsidiary. 90 FR 59409 (Dec. 19, 2025).

III

ce standards, that are tailored to the business model and risk profile of PPSIs and consistent with applicable law.

Proposed § 350.6(d) would address compliance with BSA and sanctions standards, such that each PPSI would be required to comply with applicable regulations at 31 CFR Chapter V and 31 CFR Chapter X, including any AML/CFT program, economic sanctions program, and reporting requirements. On April 10, 2026, FinCEN and OFAC issued a separate proposed rule that would implement the GENIUS Act's directive to treat PPSIs as financial institutions under the BSA, as well as impose several obligations specifically required by the GENIUS Act. 7 The FinCEN and OFAC proposed rule would also implement the GENIUS Act's directive to require PPSIs to maintain effective economic sanctions compliance programs. FinCEN and the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators are also issuing a joint notice of proposed rulemaking that would require PPSIs to maintain an effective customer identification program (CIP) as required by the GENIUS Act. Proposed § 350.6(d) would require a PPSI to comply with such CIP requirements.

7 91 FR 18582 (Apr. 10, 2026).

The FDIC requests comment on the requirements contained in proposed § 350.6(d).

B. PPSI AML/CFT Supervision and Enforcement

The FDIC proposes to establish subpart C of part 350 to add supervision and enforcement provisions for PPSI AML/CFT programs. The provisions complement the FDIC's enforcement authorities under the GENIUS Act, section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) (12 U.S.C. 1818), and other applicable law. The proposed rule defines key terms, describes the FDIC's enforcement and supervision approach with respect to AML/CFT program deficiencies, and establishes a consultation process between FinCEN and the FDIC relating to AML/CFT enforcement actions or significant AML/CFT supervisory actions.

1. Definitions (Proposed § 350.200)

Proposed § 350.200 would define several terms used throughout the section

roposed rule defines key terms, describes the FDIC's enforcement and supervision approach with respect to AML/CFT program deficiencies, and establishes a consultation process between FinCEN and the FDIC relating to AML/CFT enforcement actions or significant AML/CFT supervisory actions.

1. Definitions (Proposed § 350.200)

Proposed § 350.200 would define several terms used throughout the section. The term “AML/CFT requirement” would mean a requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act (as that term is defined below) or of the regulations in title 31, chapter X applicable to PPSIs.

The term “AML/CFT enforcement action” would mean any formal or informal action taken by the FDIC under authority of 12 U.S.C. 5905, 12 U.S.C. 1818, or other applicable law that seeks to penalize, remedy, prevent, or respond to noncompliance with past or ongoing violations of, or past or ongoing deficiencies relating to, an AML/CFT requirement. The term includes a cease-and-desist order, written agreement, consent order, or memorandum of understanding, or the assessment of a civil money penalty. It does not include criminal enforcement.

The term “AML/CFT requirement” would mean a requirement provided under (i) the BSA or applicable regulations at 31 CFR chapter X; (ii) 12 U.S.C. 5903(a)(5)(A)(i)-(v), 12 U.S.C. 5903(a)(6)(B), or 12 U.S.C. 5903(f)(1); or (iii) 12 U.S.C. 1818(s) or this section.

The term “Bank Secrecy Act” would mean (i) section 21 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b); (ii) Chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq. ); and (iii) Subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code and notes thereto (31 U.S.C. 5311 et seq. ). This definition is consistent with the definition provided in section 2(2) of the GENIUS Act (12 U.S.C. 5901(2)).

The term “FinCEN” would mean the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of the Treasury

practicable, to requests for additional AML/CFT information from the FinCEN Director regarding the proposed action. The FDIC seeks comments on such a proposed consultation framework.

4. Disclosure of Supervisory Information (Proposed § 350.203)

The FDIC has issued regulations that generally prohibit the disclosure of the FDIC's non-public information, except as provided under such regulations. 8 This prohibition generally applies to disclosure of any portion of a report of examination, supervisory correspondence, and any representations concerning such reports or supervisory correspondence, or their findings, including conclusions regarding compliance with AML/CFT compliance program requirements.

8 12 CFR 309.6.

Consistent with the proposed rule's objective of enhancing FinCEN's role in the AML/CFT enforcement and supervisory process, the proposed rule would clarify that PPSIs may share any information with the FinCEN Director that relates to an existing or potential AML/CFT enforcement action or significant AML/CFT supervisory action. This proposed rule specifically provides that this authorization to share information includes information that would ordinarily be considered non-public information under the FDIC's rules. To qualify for this information sharing, the information at issue must have an appropriate nexus to an existing or potential AML/CFT enforcement action or significant AML/CFT supervisory action. The FDIC is proposing this clarification to ensure that PPSIs can share appropriate information with the FinCEN Director, including in the context of actions subject to the proposed consultation requirement. Otherwise, PPSIs may be unable to provide thorough information to the FinCEN Director, whether proactively or in response to the Director's requests

e alternative approach, referred to as Option 2 in proposed § 350.203, the FDIC would similarly authorize the disclosure of covered information on the FDIC's behalf, as well as similarly authorize the use of such information by the FinCEN Director. The FDIC, however, would expressly require that any such information shared on the FDIC's behalf be contemporaneously disclosed by the PPSI to the FDIC. While the FDIC will necessarily already have access to its own non-public information, this additional requirement is potentially more consistent with the retention of privilege contemplated under 12 U.S.C. 1821(t) and, therefore, potentially provides a greater safeguard against the unintended destruction of privilege. The FDIC also recognizes that PPSIs' willingness to share timely, thorough information with the FinCEN Director is essential to the success of the consultation framework; and requiring PPSIs to contemporaneously disclose to the FDIC the same non-public information they provide to FinCEN may discourage proactive reporting and thereby undermine the proposed rule's objective of enhancing FinCEN's role.

Importantly, both options outlined above permit only the FinCEN Director to use the FDIC's non-public information. This authorization to use the information does not include an authorization by the FDIC to further disclose the received non-public information. Any dissemination by a PPSI to a party other than the FinCEN Director or by the FinCEN Director to any party would be subject to the FDIC's rules governing disclosure of non-public information.

Regardless, the proposed rule would include additional clarifying text intended to preserve all applicable privileges. The destruction of privilege over non-public supervisory information could prove harmful both to the FDIC and the PPSI, so the additional language is intended to prevent such consequences

with the inclusion of a consultation process when the FDIC intends to take an AML/CFT enforcement action or significant AML/CFT supervisory action? For example, should the definition of AML/CFT enforcement action and this framework account for suspension or revocation under section

Question 3: Should the proposed consultation process include an asset threshold— e.g., consultation is required for any significant AML/CFT supervisory actions involving PPSIs with $10 billion or more in outstanding issuance value? In addition, or as an alternative, should the proposed rule not require but instead provide the option for PPSIs to request that the FDIC consult with FinCEN prior to initiating a significant AML/CFT supervisory action, if the PPSI is aware of a potential enforcement action?

Question 4: Notwithstanding the benefits of the proposed consultation described above, the proposal may result in additional review during an examination. How can the consultation process be streamlined and prevent logistical burdens for PPSIs or delays in exam report issuance?

Question 5: The FDIC invites comment on the two options for permitting greater information sharing with the FinCEN Director regarding AML/CFT enforcement actions or significant AML/CFT supervisory actions. In particular, would the disclosure of confidential supervisory information to FinCEN compromise attorney-client privilege, other applicable privileges, or otherwise undermine the preservation of privilege in 12 U.S.C. 1821(t)?

IV. Expected Effects

The proposed rule would implement BSA and sanctions compliance standards as required by the GENIUS Act, as well as establish supervision and enforcement provisions for PPSI AML/CFT programs. In accordance with OMB Circular A-4, 9 the FDIC estimates the economic impact of the proposed rule by comparing expected outcomes under the proposed rule to expected outcomes under a baseline absent the proposed rule

posed rule would implement BSA and sanctions compliance standards as required by the GENIUS Act, as well as establish supervision and enforcement provisions for PPSI AML/CFT programs. In accordance with OMB Circular A-4, 9 the FDIC estimates the economic impact of the proposed rule by comparing expected outcomes under the proposed rule to expected outcomes under a baseline absent the proposed rule. Under the baseline, it is assumed that all other rulemakings implementing the GENIUS Act with respect to FDIC-supervised PPSIs are enacted, 10 allowing the analysis to focus on the effects that would be specific to the proposed rule. For its analysis, the FDIC utilizes all other relevant laws and regulations in effect, as well as the financial and economic conditions of FDIC-supervised entities, 11 as of September 30, 2025.

9 See OMB Circular A-4 at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/E.O./fedRegReview/CircularA4.pdf .

10 These include Approval Requirements for Issuance of Payment Stablecoins by Subsidiaries of FDIC-Supervised Insured Depository Institutions, 90 FR 59409 (December 19, 2025), GENIUS Act Requirements and Standards for FDIC-Supervised Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers and Insured Depository Institutions, 91 FR 18534 (April 10, 2026), Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Compliance Program Requirements, 91 FR 18582 (April 10, 2026).), Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR 18704 (April 10, 2026), and Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Programs 91 FR 18304 (April 10, 2026). While the last two proposed rulemakings would not directly regulate FDIC-supervised PPSIs, the proposed requirements on the parent IDIs would likely change the expected baseline practices of FDIC-supervised PPSIs.

11 Including insured State nonmember banks, insured State-licensed branches of foreign banks, and insured State savings associations

of Terrorism Programs 91 FR 18304 (April 10, 2026). While the last two proposed rulemakings would not directly regulate FDIC-supervised PPSIs, the proposed requirements on the parent IDIs would likely change the expected baseline practices of FDIC-supervised PPSIs.

11 Including insured State nonmember banks, insured State-licensed branches of foreign banks, and insured State savings associations.

Overall, the proposed rule is expected to enhance the effectiveness, consistency, and supervisory clarity of BSA and sanctions compliance for PPSIs supervised by the FDIC, relative to the baseline. Given that all FDIC-supervised PPSIs would be subsidiaries of FDIC-supervised institutions, the proposed rule would not impose significant incremental regulatory burden beyond what parent institutions already incur.

A. Scope of Affected Entities

The entities that fall under the direct scope of the proposed rule are all FDIC-supervised PPSIs. As of the quarter ending September 30, 2025, the FDIC insures 4,388 insured depository institutions (IDIs), supervises 2,778 of these IDIs, 12 and supervises zero PPSIs.

12 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports), September 30, 2025.

The FDIC recognizes the significant uncertainty regarding estimates of the number of FDIC-supervised PPSIs under the proposed rule. Because the regulations governing the application and approval of FDIC-supervised PPSIs are currently under development and have not yet been finalized, 13 the FDIC lacks data on the number of entities that would ultimately fall under the scope of the proposed rule. Recognizing this uncertainty, without predicting the exact population of FDIC-supervised PPSIs, the FDIC estimates for the purposes of this analysis that between 5 and 30 FDIC-supervised IDIs would apply for and receive approval to issue payment stablecoins through FDIC-supervised PPSIs in the first few years after the effective date of the Act

es as the financial system integrates new payment technologies and reduces the frequency and severity of harm caused by sanctioned entities and criminal activity facilitated through a fragmented digital asset regulatory framework. Any reduction in money laundering or terrorist financing is a benefit to society given the nature of the illegal activities that AML/CFT programs are designed to prevent. While it is inherently difficult to estimate the annual reduction in crime generally—or financial crime specifically—that could result from more effective AML/CFT programs, even a very small percentage decrease could result in a meaningful benefit to society.

The proposed rule would generate additional qualitative benefits to FDIC-supervised PPSIs, the industry, and the general public from increased clarity and supervisory coherence, relative to the baseline. Importantly, the proposed rule would reduce regulatory fragmentation by harmonizing the BSA and sanctions requirements for FDIC-supervised PPSIs with the requirements for other FDIC-supervised institutions and other Federally regulated PPSIs. This harmony would facilitate group-wide compliance systems and improve examination efficiency. Additionally, the proposed rule would provide clarity regarding the FDIC's supervisory expectations and enforcement approaches with respect to AML/CFT program implementation deficiencies.

Overall, the proposed rule would reinforce the GENIUS Act's expectation that payment stablecoin issuance occur only under robust Federal oversight, and supports Treasury's parallel regulations establishing BSA, economic

C. Expected Costs

The FDIC recognizes the likelihood of significant variation in compliance costs across the estimated population of FDIC-supervised PPSIs under the proposed rule, given potential differences in size, structure, and internal processes. This variation also exists across FDIC-supervised IDIs

lists: 10 percent; Financial Analysts (13-2051) and Clerical workers (43-0000): 5 percent each. For the ongoing recordkeeping burden associated with the proposed rule, the FDIC estimated the following labor allocation: Executives and Managers: 15 percent; Lawyers: 5 percent; Compliance Officers: 50 percent; IT specialists: 10 percent; Financial Analysts: 15 percent; and Clerical workers: 5 percent. For the ongoing disclosure burden associated with the proposed rule, the FDIC estimated the following labor allocation: Executives and Managers: 15 percent; Lawyers: 10 percent; Compliance Officers: 50 percent; IT specialists: 10 percent; Financial Analysts: 10 percent; and Clerical workers: 5 percent.

The FDIC recognizes that seeking PPSI status and issuing payment stablecoins would be, nonetheless, a voluntary, market driven activity resulting from the strategic decisions to engage in the payment stablecoin market. Therefore, an FDIC-supervised IDI would generally only engage in these activities if the projected revenue generated through, for example, transaction-based fees and/or enhanced customer retention, were expected to outweigh the aggregate operating and compliance costs associated with those activities.

Overall, the FDIC expects that the proposed rule will promote financial integrity, enhance the ability of law enforcement to detect and deter illicit activity involving payment stablecoins, and advance the GENIUS Act's policy objectives, while imposing compliance costs that are modest and consistent with the risk profile and operational characteristics of PPSIs. As such, the expected benefits of the proposed rule justify its expected costs.

The FDIC invites comments on all aspects of the supporting information provided in the Impact Analysis section. The FDIC is particularly interested in comments on any material economic effects that the agency has not identified.

V. Alternatives Considered

The FDIC is proposing to amend its regulations to implement certain provisions of the GENIUS Act

proposed rule justify its expected costs.

The FDIC invites comments on all aspects of the supporting information provided in the Impact Analysis section. The FDIC is particularly interested in comments on any material economic effects that the agency has not identified.

V. Alternatives Considered

The FDIC is proposing to amend its regulations to implement certain provisions of the GENIUS Act. Because the amendments are statutorily mandated, the FDIC has not considered a “no action” alternative. Although the FDIC has not developed any alternative proposals, beyond the options outlined in proposed § 350.203, the FDIC will consider any alternative regulatory approaches raised by commenters, especially any that are directly responsive to the questions for commenters set forth above.

VI. Regulatory Analysis

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires an agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to prepare and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the impact of the proposed rule on small entities. 18 However, an initial regulatory flexibility analysis is not required if the agency certifies that the proposed rule would not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Small Business Administration (SBA) has defined “small entities” to include banking organizations with total assets of less than or equal to $850 million. 19

18 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

19 The SBA defines a small banking organization as having $850 million or less in assets and determines an organization's assets by averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year. See 13 CFR 121.201 (as amended by 87 FR 69118, effective December 19, 2022)

s that the number of FDIC-supervised PPSIs would likely range between 5 and 30 in the first few years after the enactment of the proposed rule. Because an FDIC-supervised PPSI must be a subsidiary of an IDI, the FDIC expects that the initial adopters of this technology will likely be larger institutions with the compliance infrastructure and capital necessary to support payment stablecoin issuance. As such, the FDIC anticipates that most, if not all, FDIC-supervised PPSIs would not be small entities as defined by the SBA.

As discussed in section IV.C, the FDIC expects most, if not all, FDIC-supervised PPSIs would leverage their parent institutions' AML/CFT and sanctions compliance programs. As such, if there were a small FDIC-supervised PPSI, the direct impact of the proposed rule on this PPSI would unlikely be significant.

Based on the preceding statement of factual basis, the FDIC certifies that the proposed rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, an initial regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. 21

21 5 U.S.C. 605(b).

The FDIC invites comments on all aspects of the supporting information provided in this RFA section. The FDIC is particularly interested in comments on any significant effects on small entities that the FDIC has not identified.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

This notice of proposed rulemaking has been reviewed for compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ). In accordance with the PRA, the FDIC may not conduct or sponsor, and an organization is not required to respond to, an information collection unless the information collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. The FDIC has reviewed the notice of proposed rulemaking and determined that it would introduce new information collection requirements pursuant to the PRA

ce with the PRA, the FDIC may not conduct or sponsor, and an organization is not required to respond to, an information collection unless the information collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. The FDIC has reviewed the notice of proposed rulemaking and determined that it would introduce new information collection requirements pursuant to the PRA. The FDIC is seeking a new control number for these information collection requirements and will submit them to OMB for review and approval.

Proposed Information Collection

Title: AML/CFT and Sanctions Requirements for FDIC-Supervised Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers.

OMB Control No.: 3064-NEW.

Type of Review: Regular.

Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.

Description: Section 350.6(d) would require PPSIs to establish and maintain AML/CFT and sanctions programs.

Table 1—Summary of Estimated Annual Burden [OMB No. 3064-NEW] Information collection (IC) (obligation to respond) Type of burden (frequency of response) Number of respondents Number of responses per respondent Average time per response (HH:MM) Annual burden (hours) 1. AML/CFT and Sanctions Requirements for permitted payment stablecoin issuers—Implementation, Section 350.6(d) (Mandatory) Recordkeeping 10 1 40:00 400 2. AML/CFT and Sanctions Requirements for permitted payment stablecoin issuers—Ongoing, Section 350.6(d) (Mandatory) Recordkeeping (Annual) 20 10 1:00 200 Total Annual Burden (Hours) 600 Source: FDIC. Comments are invited on:

(a) Whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the FDIC's functions, including whether the information has practical utility;

(b) The accuracy of the estimate of the burden of the information collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used;

(c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and

Whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the FDIC's functions, including whether the information has practical utility;

(b) The accuracy of the estimate of the burden of the information collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used;

(c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and

(d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments on aspects of this document that may affect reporting, recordkeeping, or disclosure requirements and burden estimates should be sent to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document. Written comments and recommendations for this information collection also should be sent within 60 days of publication of this document to www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain . Find this particular information collection by selecting “Currently under 60-day Review—Open for Public

C. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act

Pursuant to section 302(a) of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (RCDRIA), 22 in determining the effective date and administrative compliance requirements for new regulations that impose additional reporting, disclosure, or other requirements on IDIs, each Federal banking agency must consider, consistent with principles of safety and soundness and the public interest, any administrative burdens that such regulations would place on affected depository institutions, including small depository institutions, and customers of depository institutions, as well as the benefits of such regulations

al reporting, disclosure, or other requirements on IDIs, each Federal banking agency must consider, consistent with principles of safety and soundness and the public interest, any administrative burdens that such regulations would place on affected depository institutions, including small depository institutions, and customers of depository institutions, as well as the benefits of such regulations. In addition, section 302(b) of the RCDRIA requires new regulations and amendments to regulations that impose additional reporting, disclosures, or other new requirements on IDIs generally to take effect on the first day of a calendar quarter that begins on or after the date on which the regulations are published in final form. The FDIC invites comments that further will inform its consideration of the RCDRIA. 23

22 12 U.S.C. 4802(a).

23 12 U.S.C. 4802(b).

D. Plain Language

Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 24 requires the Federal banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rulemakings published in the Federal Register after January 1, 2000. The FDIC invites your comments on how to make this proposed rule easier to understand. For example:

24 12 U.S.C. 4809.

• Has the FDIC organized the material to suit your needs? If not, how could the proposed rule be more clearly stated?

• Are the requirements in the proposed rule clearly stated? If not, how could the proposed rule be more clearly stated?

• Does the proposed rule contain language or jargon that is not clear? If so, which language requires clarification?

• Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, use of headings, paragraphing) make the proposed rule easier to understand? If so, what changes to the format would make the proposed rule easier to understand?

• What else could the FDIC do to make the proposed rule easier to understand?

E

art C—Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer AML/CFT Enforcement and Supervision

350.200 Definitions. 350.201 AML/CFT Supervision and Enforcement Approach. 350.202 FinCEN Consultation. 350.203 Disclosure of Supervisory Information to FinCEN. 350.204 Severability. Subpart C—Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer AML/CFT Enforcement and Supervision

§ 350.200 Definitions. For purposes of this subpart:

(a) AML/CFT enforcement action means any formal or informal action taken under authority of 12 U.S.C. 5905, 12 U.S.C. 1818, or other applicable law, that seeks to penalize, remedy, prevent, or respond to noncompliance with past or ongoing violations of, or past or ongoing deficiencies relating to, an AML/CFT requirement. The term includes—

(1) A cease-and-desist order, written agreement, consent order, or memorandum of understanding; or

(2) The assessment of a civil money penalty.

(b) AML/CFT requirement means a requirement provided under:

(1) the Bank Secrecy Act or applicable regulations at 31 CFR chapter X;

(2) 12 U.S.C. 5903(a)(5)(A)(i)-(v), 12 U.S.C. 5903(a)(6)(B), or 12 U.S.C. 5903(f)(1); or

(3) 12 U.S.C. 1818(s) or this section.

(c) Bank Secrecy Act means:

(1) Section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b);

(2) Chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq. ); and

(3) Subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code and notes thereto (31 U.S.C. 5311 et seq. ).

(d) FinCEN means the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of the Treasury.

(e) Significant AML/CFT supervisory action means any written

(1) That

nce Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b);

(2) Chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq. ); and

(3) Subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code and notes thereto (31 U.S.C. 5311 et seq. ).

(d) FinCEN means the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of the Treasury.

(e) Significant AML/CFT supervisory action means any written

(1) That

(i) Identifies one or more alleged deficiencies, weaknesses, violations of law, or unsafe or unsound practices or conditions relating to an AML/CFT requirement;

(ii) Communicates supervisory expectations to a permitted payment stablecoin issuer regarding actions or remedial measures required to correct the deficiency, weakness, violation, or practice or condition; and

(iii) Contemplates significant or programmatic actions or remedial measures to be taken by the permitted payment stablecoin issuer.

(2) The term does not include examiner observations, suggestions, or other informal comments.

§ 350.201 AML/CFT Supervision and Enforcement Policy. (a) In General. Except with respect to a significant or systemic failure to implement an effective AML/CFT program in accordance with applicable regulations at 31 CFR Chapter X, an FDIC-supervised permitted payment stablecoin issuer that has established an effective AML/CFT program in accordance with applicable regulations at 31 CFR Chapter X will not be subject to an AML/CFT enforcement action or to a significant AML/CFT supervisory action related to the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5318(h)(1), this section, or applicable regulations at 31 CFR Chapter X.

(b) Program establishment violations. Nothing in this subpart C may be construed to restrict an AML/CFT enforcement action or a significant AML/CFT supervisory action with respect to any failure to establish an effective AML/CFT program in accordance with applicable regulations at 31 Chapter X.

underlying the proposed action, including the relevant portions of the draft report or enforcement action, the relevant examination workpapers supporting the proposed action, and the relevant AML/CFT information submitted by permitted payment stablecoin issuer to the FDIC, other than information over which the permitted payment stablecoin issuer may claim privilege under Federal or State law; and

(2) Respond to the extent reasonably practicable to requests for additional information from the Director, FinCEN regarding the proposed action.

§ 350.203 Disclosure of Supervisory Information to FinCEN. [OPTION 1 FOR PARAGRAPH (§ 350.203):]

The FDIC permits a permitted payment stablecoin issuer subject to FDIC jurisdiction, on behalf of FDIC, to disclose to the Director, FinCEN, and permits the Director, FinCEN to use any information of the permitted payment stablecoin issuer relating to an existing or potential AML/CFT enforcement action or significant AML/CFT supervisory action to which the permitted payment stablecoin issuer has access.

[OPTION 2 FOR PARAGRAPH (§ 350.203):]

(a) The FDIC permits a permitted payment stablecoin issuer subject to FDIC jurisdiction, on behalf of the FDIC, to disclose to the Director, FinCEN, and permits the Director, FinCEN to use any information relating to an existing or potential AML/CFT enforcement action or significant AML/CFT supervisory action to which the permitted payment stablecoin issuer has access upon the contemporaneous disclosure of such information to the FDIC.

(b) A permitted payment stablecoin issuer's disclosure of information to the Director, FinCEN under § 350.203 does not waive, invalidate, destroy, or otherwise affect any privilege or protection available under Federal or State law, including the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, the bank-examination privilege, or any other confidentiality or evidentiary privilege.

the FDIC.

(b) A permitted payment stablecoin issuer's disclosure of information to the Director, FinCEN under § 350.203 does not waive, invalidate, destroy, or otherwise affect any privilege or protection available under Federal or State law, including the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, the bank-examination privilege, or any other confidentiality or evidentiary privilege.

(c) Any disclosure made by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer under § 350.203 is made on behalf of the FDIC pursuant to the FDIC's authorization under 12 U.S.C. 1821(t).

§ 350.204 Severability. The provisions of this subpart are separate and severable from one another. If any provision is stayed or determined to be invalid, it is the FDIC's intention that the remaining provisions shall continue in effect.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. By order of the Board of Directors.

Dated at Washington, DC, on May 13, 2026. Jennifer M. Jones, Deputy Executive Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2026-11342 Filed 6-4-26; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6714-01-P

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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