Supervisory Guidance on Board of Directors' Effectiveness

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BOARD OF GOVERNORS

OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20551

DIVISION OF SUPERVISION

AND REGULATION

DIVISION OF CONSUMER AND

COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

SR 21-3 / CA 21-1

February 26, 2021

TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SUPERVISION AT EACH FEDERAL RESERVE

BANK AND TO LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

SUBJECT: Supervisory Guidance on Board of Directors’ Effectiveness

Applicability: This guidance applies to all domestic bank holding companies and savings and

loan holding companies with total consolidated assets of $100 billion or more (excluding U.S.

intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations established pursuant to the

Federal Reserve’s Regulation YY), and systemically important nonbank financial companies

designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council for supervision by the Federal Reserve.

Introduction

The Federal Reserve expects the board of directors (board) of a large financial institution

to be effective in its oversight of the firm because the board serves a critical role in maintaining

the firm’s safety and soundness and continued financial and operational resilience of its

consolidated operations. The attached guidance describes the key attributes of effective boards

at large domestic bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies to: 1) set

clear, aligned and consistent direction regarding the firm’s strategy and risk appetite; 2) direct

senior management regarding the board’s information needs; 3) oversee and hold senior

management accountable; 4) support the independence and stature of independent risk

management and internal audit; and 5) maintain a capable board composition and governance

structure. The guidance also includes illustrative examples of effective board practices.

Overview of Board of Directors Guidance

This guidance focuses on a board’s performance of its core responsibilities in describing

five key attributes of an effective board

ndence and stature of independent risk

management and internal audit; and 5) maintain a capable board composition and governance

structure. The guidance also includes illustrative examples of effective board practices.

Overview of Board of Directors Guidance

This guidance focuses on a board’s performance of its core responsibilities in describing

five key attributes of an effective board. The guidance notes that an effective board:

1. Oversees the development of, reviews, approves, and periodically monitors the firm’s

strategy and risk appetite.

2. Directs senior management to provide directors with information that is sufficient in

scope, detail, and analysis to enable the board to make sound, well-informed decisions

and consider potential risks.

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3. Oversees and holds senior management accountable for effectively implementing the

firm’s strategy, consistent with its risk appetite, while maintaining an effective risk

management framework and system of internal controls.

4. Through its risk and audit committees, assesses and supports the stature and

independence of the firm’s independent risk management and internal audit functions.

5. Considers whether the board’s composition, governance structure, and practices support

the firm’s safety and soundness and promotes compliance with laws and regulations,

based on factors such as the firm’s asset size, complexity, scope of operations, risk

profile, and other changes that occur over time.

Implementation

Firms subject to the large financial institution rating system are assigned three component

ratings: Capital Planning and Positions, Liquidity Risk Management and Positions, and

Governance and Controls.1 The supervisory assessment of board effectiveness is one of the

elements within the Governance and Controls component rating

profile, and other changes that occur over time.

Implementation

Firms subject to the large financial institution rating system are assigned three component

ratings: Capital Planning and Positions, Liquidity Risk Management and Positions, and

Governance and Controls.1 The supervisory assessment of board effectiveness is one of the

elements within the Governance and Controls component rating. As the board effectiveness

guidance builds on the principles set forth in the large financial institution ratings framework, the

Federal Reserve intends to use the board effectiveness guidance in informing its assessment of

the governance and controls at all firms subject to the large financial institution rating system.

Federal Reserve supervision staff will work closely with firms to help them understand the board

effectiveness guidance. In assessing board effectiveness, the Federal Reserve supervisory staff

will continue to review other sources of information, including but not limited to publicly

available information, examinations from other regulators, and firm-provided materials.

Federal Reserve Banks are asked to distribute this letter to large financial institutions in

their districts and to appropriate supervisory staff. In addition, supervised organizations may

send questions via the Board’s public website.2

Michael S. Gibson

Director

Division of Supervision

and Regulation

Eric Belsky

Director

Division of Consumer and

Community Affairs

Attachment:

• Supervisory Guidance for Boards of Directors of Domestic Bank and Savings and Loan

Holding Companies with Total Consolidated Assets of $100 Billion or More (Excluding

Intermediate Holding Companies of Foreign Banking Organizations Established

Pursuant to the Federal Reserve’s Regulation YY) and Systemically Important Nonbank

Financial Companies Designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council for

Supervision by the Federal Reserve

Cross References to:

• SR Letter 19-3 / CA Letter 19-2, “Large Financial Institution (L

00 Billion or More (Excluding

Intermediate Holding Companies of Foreign Banking Organizations Established

Pursuant to the Federal Reserve’s Regulation YY) and Systemically Important Nonbank

Financial Companies Designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council for

Supervision by the Federal Reserve

Cross References to:

• SR Letter 19-3 / CA Letter 19-2, “Large Financial Institution (LFI) Rating System”

1 See SR Letter 19-3 / CA Letter 19-2, “Large Financial Institution (LFI) Rating System.”

2 See https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/contactus/feedback.aspx.

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Supervisory Guidance for Boards of Directors of Domestic Bank and Savings and Loan

Holding Companies with Total Consolidated Assets of $100 Billion or More (Excluding

Intermediate Holding Companies of Foreign Banking Organizations Established Pursuant

to the Federal Reserve’s Regulation YY) and Systemically Important Nonbank Financial

Companies Designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council for Supervision by the

Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve expects the board of directors (also referred to as a firm’s “board”1)

of a large financial institution to be effective in its oversight of the firm. The board serves a

critical role in maintaining the firm’s safety and soundness2 and compliance with laws and

regulations, as well as the continued financial and operational strength and resilience of a firm’s

consolidated operations.3 This guidance describes attributes of effective boards of directors that

have been observed over time in the course of the Federal Reserve’s supervision.

Responsibilities that are typically the purview of senior management, including most daily and

operational decisions, are not described in this guidance.

This guidance adopts a principles-based approach to describe attributes of effective

boards and provides illustrative examples of effective practices

rs that

have been observed over time in the course of the Federal Reserve’s supervision.

Responsibilities that are typically the purview of senior management, including most daily and

operational decisions, are not described in this guidance.

This guidance adopts a principles-based approach to describe attributes of effective

boards and provides illustrative examples of effective practices. This approach reflects the view

that including standardized expectations would not take into account material differences in

activities, risk profile, and complexity among large financial institutions as they relate to boards

of directors.

In developing this guidance, the Federal Reserve considered other statutory and

regulatory authorities that impose requirements and expectations concerning the roles,

responsibilities, and expectations of a firm’s board of directors. For example, the Federal

Reserve reviewed applicable Delaware law,4 rules promulgated by the U.S. Securities and

Exchange Commission, and listing requirements implemented by the New York Stock Exchange

(NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market. This guidance does not supersede or replace any

applicable legal, regulatory, or listing requirements to which firms may currently be subject in

the United States, and nothing herein is believed to conflict with such requirements.

1 The terms “board of directors” and “board” include committees of the board.

2 Federal Reserve regulation and supervision of bank holding companies is authorized under various statutes,

including the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1818 and 12 U.S.C. 1831) and the Bank Holding

Company Act (see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1844).

3 “Financial strength and resilience” is defined as maintaining effective capital and liquidity governance and

planning processes, and sufficiency of related positions, to provide for continuity of the consolidated organization

(including its critical operations and banking offices) through a range of conditions

and 12 U.S.C. 1831) and the Bank Holding

Company Act (see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1844).

3 “Financial strength and resilience” is defined as maintaining effective capital and liquidity governance and

planning processes, and sufficiency of related positions, to provide for continuity of the consolidated organization

(including its critical operations and banking offices) through a range of conditions.

“Operational strength and resilience” is defined as maintaining effective governance and controls to provide for

continuity of the consolidated organization (including its critical operations and banking offices) and to promote

compliance with laws and regulations, including those related to consumer protection, through a range of conditions.

See 83 FR 58724 (November 21, 2018) and 84 FR 4309 (February 15, 2019).

4 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 (2016).

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Attributes of an Effective Board of Directors

1. Set Clear, Aligned, and Consistent Direction Regarding the Firm’s Strategy and Risk

Appetite

An effective board oversees the development of, reviews, approves, and periodically

monitors the firm’s strategy and risk appetite.5 Such a strategy and risk appetite are clear

and aligned, and include a long-term perspective on risks and rewards that is consistent with

the capacity of the firm’s risk management framework. The alignment of strategy and risk

appetite helps the firm to maintain sufficient financial and operational strength and

resilience for safety and soundness and to promote compliance with laws and regulations.

A clear strategy articulates a firm’s strategic objectives for its businesses while helping to

establish and maintain: (a) an effective risk management structure; (b) appropriate processes

and resources for strategy implementation, plans, and budgets for each business line and risk

management or control function; and (c) an effective risk management and control function

aws and regulations.

A clear strategy articulates a firm’s strategic objectives for its businesses while helping to

establish and maintain: (a) an effective risk management structure; (b) appropriate processes

and resources for strategy implementation, plans, and budgets for each business line and risk

management or control function; and (c) an effective risk management and control function. A

clear strategy also provides direction to senior management about how to determine which

business opportunities to pursue consistent with the firm’s risk appetite and risk management

capacity.

A clear risk appetite includes sufficient detail to enable the firm’s chief risk officer

(CRO) and its independent risk management function6 to set firm-wide risk limits.7 A clear risk

appetite specifies the level and types of risk that the board is willing to assume, that the board

believes the firm is capable of managing, and that allows senior management to establish risk

management expectations and monitor risk-taking for the full set of risks. A firm’s strategy and

risk appetite are aligned when they are developed, reviewed, and approved consistent with one

another even though they are not necessarily developed and approved simultaneously.

An effective board also considers the capacity of the firm’s risk management framework

when overseeing aspects of the firm’s strategy and risk appetite. This practice helps to confirm

that strategic plans are commensurate with the firm’s ability to identify and manage risks,

including identifying activities that could pose a material risk to the safety and soundness of the

firm, threaten the financial system, violate the law, or harm consumers

e firm’s risk management framework

when overseeing aspects of the firm’s strategy and risk appetite. This practice helps to confirm

that strategic plans are commensurate with the firm’s ability to identify and manage risks,

including identifying activities that could pose a material risk to the safety and soundness of the

firm, threaten the financial system, violate the law, or harm consumers.

For example, if the firm is considering a new line of business, a clear strategy explains

how conducting the business would be consistent with the firm’s risk appetite and changes that

would need to be made to the firm’s risk management program and its controls to effectively

5 “Risk appetite” is defined as the aggregate level and types of risk the board and senior management are willing to

assume to achieve the firm’s strategic business objectives, consistent with applicable capital, liquidity, and other

requirements and constraints.

6 An “independent risk management function” is responsible for identifying, measuring, aggregating, and reporting

risks in a comprehensive and independent manner.

7 The term “risk limits” refers to thresholds that constrain risk-taking so that the level and type of risks assumed

remains consistent with the firm-wide risk appetite. Internal risk management sets risk limits in aggregate by

concentration and risk type, as well as at more granular levels as appropriate.

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manage different or additional risks posed by the new business. If the strategy calls for

expansion into a new line of business or a new jurisdiction, the board evaluates the increased

level of risk. In addition, an effective board reviews any corresponding risk management or

controls enhancements, including those related to compliance with U.S. laws,8 that are necessary

to align with the risk appetite. The same evaluation is conducted on a regular basis to assess

growth strategies within current businesses and products

a new jurisdiction, the board evaluates the increased

level of risk. In addition, an effective board reviews any corresponding risk management or

controls enhancements, including those related to compliance with U.S. laws,8 that are necessary

to align with the risk appetite. The same evaluation is conducted on a regular basis to assess

growth strategies within current businesses and products.

A firm’s policies, programs, and plans are sufficiently clear regarding the allocation of

responsibilities to enable the board to evaluate senior management’s execution of the firm’s

strategic plan. An effective board reviews and approves significant policies, programs, and

plans based on the firm’s strategy, risk appetite, risk management capacity, and structure. These

include but are not limited to the firm’s capital plan,9 recovery and resolution plans,10 audit

plan,11 enterprise-wide risk management policies,12 liquidity risk management policies,13

compliance risk management program,14 and performance management and compensation

programs. An effective board might review summarized forms of policies, programs, and plans,

with the summarized form including sufficient detail and context for the board to make an

informed decision and to consider consistency with the firm’s strategy, risk appetite, and risk

management capacity.

2. Direct Senior Management Regarding the Board’s Information Needs

An effective board directs senior management to provide directors with information that

is sufficient in scope, detail, and analysis to enable the board to make sound, well-informed

decisions and consider potential risks.

An effective board directs senior management to provide it with information that is

timely, accurate, and well organized. An effective board also evaluates the sufficiency and

quality of information it receives and directs senior management to (a) provide more

8 U.S. laws include, without limitation, the Bank Secrecy Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

and consider potential risks.

An effective board directs senior management to provide it with information that is

timely, accurate, and well organized. An effective board also evaluates the sufficiency and

quality of information it receives and directs senior management to (a) provide more

8 U.S. laws include, without limitation, the Bank Secrecy Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

9 12 CFR 225.8(e)(iii); 12 CFR 252.47(a); SR letter 15-19, “Federal Reserve Supervisory Assessment of

Capital Planning and Positions for Firms Subject to Category II or III Standards;” SR letter 15-18, “Federal

Reserve Supervisory Assessment of Capital Planning and Positions for Firms Subject to Category I

Standards;” and Federal Reserve paper on Capital Planning at Large Bank Holding Companies: Supervisory

Expectations and Range of Current Practice (Federal Reserve Board press release issued on August 19, 2013).

10 12 CFR part 243; SR letter 14-8, “Consolidated Recovery Planning for Certain Large Domestic Bank Holding

Companies;” and SR letter 14-1, “Heightened Supervisory Expectations for Recovery and Resolution Preparedness

for Certain Large Bank Holding Companies - Supplemental Guidance on Consolidated Supervision Framework for

Large Financial Institutions (SR letter 12-17/CA letter 12-14).”

11 SR letter 13-1/CA letter 13-1, “Supplemental Policy Statement on the Internal Audit Function and Its

Outsourcing,” and SR letter 03-5, “Amended Interagency Guidance on the Internal Audit Function and its

Outsourcing.”

12 12 CFR 252.33.

13 12 CFR 252.34(a).

14 SR letter 08-8/CA letter 08-11, “Compliance Risk Management Programs and Oversight at Large Banking

Organizations with Complex Compliance Profiles.”

CA letter 13-1, “Supplemental Policy Statement on the Internal Audit Function and Its

Outsourcing,” and SR letter 03-5, “Amended Interagency Guidance on the Internal Audit Function and its

Outsourcing.”

12 12 CFR 252.33.

13 12 CFR 252.34(a).

14 SR letter 08-8/CA letter 08-11, “Compliance Risk Management Programs and Oversight at Large Banking

Organizations with Complex Compliance Profiles.”

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information, (b) address any concerns regarding the volume, structure, content, or quality of the

information it receives, or (c) improve relevant firm processes and practices for the preparation

of such information.

An effective board seeks, outside of regular board and committee meetings, information

about the firm and its activities, emerging and ongoing risks, personnel, compensation, and other

matters. Such additional inquiries are often conducted through special sessions of the board,

outreach to staff other than the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and his or her direct reports, and

discussions with Federal Reserve senior supervisors. Director training is another way directors

may learn more about topics relevant to their responsibilities and may highlight the need for

further director inquiries.

Directors of an effective board, particularly the lead independent director or independent

board chair and committee chairs, take an active role in setting board and committee meeting

agendas. Directors provide input such that the content, organization, and time allocated to each

topic allow the board and committees to make sound, well-informed decisions. If the board’s

agenda includes a discussion of growth into a new business, an effective board typically

discusses the firm’s risk management and control capabilities that reflect the views of the

independent risk management and internal audit functions.

3

that the content, organization, and time allocated to each

topic allow the board and committees to make sound, well-informed decisions. If the board’s

agenda includes a discussion of growth into a new business, an effective board typically

discusses the firm’s risk management and control capabilities that reflect the views of the

independent risk management and internal audit functions.

3. Oversee and Hold Senior Management Accountable

An effective board oversees and holds senior management accountable for effectively

implementing the firm’s strategy, consistent with its risk appetite, while maintaining an effective

risk management framework and system of internal controls. An effective board executes these

responsibilities consistent with safety and soundness and in compliance with laws and

regulations, including those related to consumer protection, under a range of conditions. An

effective board also oversees and regularly evaluates the performance and compensation of

senior management.

To facilitate accountability, an effective board engages senior management in a variety of

ways. For instance, at board meetings, engagement is supported by allocating sufficient time to

facilitate a candid discussion and debate of information while encouraging diverse views.

Directors consider whether and how senior management’s conclusions and recommendations

align and support the firm’s strategy and risk appetite. If weaknesses or gaps are identified, the

information provided is incomplete, or as otherwise warranted, directors challenge senior

management’s assessments and recommendations. Engagement may also take place outside

board and committee meetings

s.

Directors consider whether and how senior management’s conclusions and recommendations

align and support the firm’s strategy and risk appetite. If weaknesses or gaps are identified, the

information provided is incomplete, or as otherwise warranted, directors challenge senior

management’s assessments and recommendations. Engagement may also take place outside

board and committee meetings.

An effective board engages in robust inquiry into, among other things:

•

Drivers, indicators, and trends related to current and emerging risks;

•

Adherence to the board-approved strategy and risk appetite by relevant lines of

business; and

•

Material or persistent deficiencies in risk management or control practices, whether in

policy or in practice.

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An effective board also reviews reports of internal and external complaints, including

“whistleblower” reports.

An effective board has independent directors who are sufficiently empowered to serve as

an effective check against firm executives who sit on the board and senior management. For

example, if the board has an executive chair, independent directors may be empowered through

the election of a lead independent director with the authority, among others, to call board

meetings with or without the chair present.

A crucial aspect of holding senior management accountable is regular board oversight

and evaluation of the performance and compensation of senior management. An effective board

oversees and evaluates the development and implementation of performance management and

compensation programs that encourage behaviors and business practices consistent with the

firm’s strategy, risk appetite, and safety and soundness. This includes promoting compliance

with laws and regulations, including those related to consumer protection

ensation of senior management. An effective board

oversees and evaluates the development and implementation of performance management and

compensation programs that encourage behaviors and business practices consistent with the

firm’s strategy, risk appetite, and safety and soundness. This includes promoting compliance

with laws and regulations, including those related to consumer protection.

In addition, each component of senior management’s total compensation is informed by

the board’s evaluation of the individual’s performance against performance objectives. An

effective board approves clear financial and nonfinancial performance objectives aligned with

the firm’s strategy and risk appetite for the CEO and business line executives and nonfinancial

performance objectives for the chief risk officer and chief audit executive. Similar performance

objectives are developed for other members of senior management. An effective board of

directors also holds senior management accountable for the implementation of performance

management and compensation programs that promote sound risk management, compliance with

laws, regulations, and internal standards, including for conduct. Performance management and

compensation programs, when combined with business strategies, discourage risk-taking

inconsistent with the firm’s strategy and safety and soundness, including compliance with laws,

regulations, and internal standards, and promote the firm’s risk management goals. Consistent

with safety and soundness, compliance with laws and regulations, and the firm’s strategy, an

effective board oversees succession plans for the CEO, and depending on the size, complexity,

and nature of the firm, the chief risk officer, chief audit executive, or other senior management

officials.15

4

egulations, and internal standards, and promote the firm’s risk management goals. Consistent

with safety and soundness, compliance with laws and regulations, and the firm’s strategy, an

effective board oversees succession plans for the CEO, and depending on the size, complexity,

and nature of the firm, the chief risk officer, chief audit executive, or other senior management

officials.15

4. Support the Independence and Stature of Independent Risk Management and

Internal Audit

An effective board of directors, through its risk and audit committees, assesses and

supports the stature and independence of the firm’s independent risk management and internal

15 This may extend beyond requirements to which firms may be subject under other statutory and regulatory

authorities. For example, the NYSE requires formalized succession planning for the CEO only. See NYSE Listed

Company Manual, section 303A.09. The chief risk officer and chief audit executive are named here given the

independence of those positions and the control function each serves.

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audit functions. An effective risk committee16 and an effective audit committee17 engage in

robust inquiry into, among other matters:

•

the causes and consequences of material or persistent breaches of the firm’s risk

appetite and risk limits;

•

the timeliness of remediation of material or persistent internal audit and supervisory

findings; and

•

the appropriateness of the annual audit plan

unctions. An effective risk committee16 and an effective audit committee17 engage in

robust inquiry into, among other matters:

•

the causes and consequences of material or persistent breaches of the firm’s risk

appetite and risk limits;

•

the timeliness of remediation of material or persistent internal audit and supervisory

findings; and

•

the appropriateness of the annual audit plan.

An effective risk committee supports the stature and independence of the independent

risk management function by:

•

communicating directly with the chief risk officer on material risk management issues;

•

overseeing the appropriateness of independent risk management’s budget, staffing, and

systems of internal controls;

•

coordinating with the compliance function; and

•

providing independent risk management with direct and unrestricted access to the risk

committee.18

After reviewing the risk management framework relative to the firm’s structure, risk profile,

complexity, activities, and size, an effective risk committee effects changes that align with the

firm’s strategy and risk appetite.

An effective audit committee supports the stature and independence of internal audit by

meeting directly with the chief audit executive regarding the internal audit function,

organizational concerns, and industry concerns. The audit committee supports internal audit’s

budget, staffing, and systems of internal controls relative to the firm’s asset size, complexity and

the pace of technological and other changes. The audit committee also reviews the status of

actions recommended by internal audit and external auditors to remediate and resolve material or

persistent deficiencies identified by internal audit, external audit, and findings identified by

supervisors

get, staffing, and systems of internal controls relative to the firm’s asset size, complexity and

the pace of technological and other changes. The audit committee also reviews the status of

actions recommended by internal audit and external auditors to remediate and resolve material or

persistent deficiencies identified by internal audit, external audit, and findings identified by

supervisors.

An effective board monitors the independence and stature of independent risk

management and internal audit and takes action if the views of these functions are not taken into

account when decisions are made, or if these functions are unduly influenced by business lines.

16 The risk committee is responsible for the firm’s global risk management policies and oversight of the firm’s

global risk management framework. 12 CFR 252.33(a). Nonbank financial companies supervised by the Federal

Reserve are required to establish a risk committee pursuant to section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 12 U.S.C.

5365(h)(1). Certain savings and loan holding companies subject to this guidance also have risk committee

requirements. 12 CFR 238.122.

17 See SR letter 13-1/CA letter 13-1. Firms that are publicly traded are subject to the audit committee requirements

contained in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10A-3 (“Rule 10A-3”) under the Exchange Act

of 1934, in addition to any requirements imposed by the applicable stock exchange on which the firm is listed. See,

e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual, sections 303A.06 and 303A.07, and The Nasdaq Stock Market Rules, section

5605(c).

18 See, e.g., 12 CFR 252.33(a)(3).

ittee requirements

contained in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10A-3 (“Rule 10A-3”) under the Exchange Act

of 1934, in addition to any requirements imposed by the applicable stock exchange on which the firm is listed. See,

e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual, sections 303A.06 and 303A.07, and The Nasdaq Stock Market Rules, section

5605(c).

18 See, e.g., 12 CFR 252.33(a)(3).

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5. Maintain a Capable Board Composition and Governance Structure

An effective board considers whether its composition, governance structure, and

practices support the firm’s safety and soundness and the ability to promote compliance with

laws and regulations based on factors such as the firm’s asset size, complexity, scope of

operations, risk profile, and other changes that occur over time. Reflecting these factors, an

effective board establishes a process designed to identify and select potential director nominees

with a mix of skills, knowledge, experience, and perspectives. This process takes into account,

for example, a potential nominee’s expertise, availability, integrity, and potential conflicts of

interest and considers a diverse pool of potential nominees, including women and minorities.19

An effective board maintains a governance structure capable of overseeing senior

management and addressing issues arising from the firm’s size, scope of operations, activities,

risk profile, and resolvability. In addition, an effective board establishes committees and

management-to-committee reporting lines to support effective oversight, timely access to

information, and sound decision-making. An effective board also has the capacity to engage

third-party advisors and consultants, when appropriate, to supplement the board’s knowledge,

expertise, and experience and support the board in making sound, well-informed decisions

board establishes committees and

management-to-committee reporting lines to support effective oversight, timely access to

information, and sound decision-making. An effective board also has the capacity to engage

third-party advisors and consultants, when appropriate, to supplement the board’s knowledge,

expertise, and experience and support the board in making sound, well-informed decisions.

An effective board evaluates on an ongoing basis its strengths and weaknesses, including

the performance of the board committees, particularly the risk, audit, and other key committees.

An effective board adapts its structure and practices to address identified weaknesses or

deficiencies and as the firm’s asset size, scope of operations, risk profile, and other

characteristics change over time.

19 “Final Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and

Practices of Entities Regulated by the Agencies,” 80 FR 33016 (June 10, 2015). The use of the term “minority” is

consistent with the use of such term in this interagency policy statement and in section 342(g)(3) of the Dodd-Frank

Act.