State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for Transmission Facilities News Release

175 FERC ¶ 61,225

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. PL21-2-000]

State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for Transmission Facilities

(June 17, 2021)

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of policy statement.

SUMMARY: This policy statement addresses state efforts to develop transmission

facilities through voluntary agreements to plan and pay for those facilities. We clarify

that Voluntary Agreements are not categorically precluded by the Federal Power Act or

the Commission’s existing rules and regulations.

DATES: This Policy Statement is effective June 17, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

David Tobenkin (Technical Information)

Office of Energy Policy and Innovation

(202) 502-6445

david.tobenkin@ferc.gov

Lina Naik (Legal Information)

Office of the General Counsel

(202) 502-8882

lina.naik@ferc.gov

Jay Sher (Technical Information)

Office of Energy Market Regulation

(202) 502-8921

jay.sher@ferc.gov

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

175 FERC ¶ 61,225

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Richard Glick, Chairman;

James P. Danly, Allison Clements,

and Mark C. Christie.

State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for

Transmission Facilities

Docket No. PL21-2-000

POLICY STATEMENT

(June 17, 2021)

This policy statement addresses state efforts to develop transmission facilities

through voluntary agreements to plan and pay for those facilities (Voluntary

Agreements). Voluntary Agreements include agreements among: (1) two or more states;

ristie.

State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for

Transmission Facilities

Docket No. PL21-2-000

POLICY STATEMENT

(June 17, 2021)

This policy statement addresses state efforts to develop transmission facilities

through voluntary agreements to plan and pay for those facilities (Voluntary

Agreements). Voluntary Agreements include agreements among: (1) two or more states;

(2) one or more states and one or more public utility transmission providers; or (3) two or

more public utility transmission providers. We clarify that Voluntary Agreements are not

categorically precluded by the Federal Power Act (FPA)1 or the Commission’s existing

rules and regulations, and encourage interested parties considering the use of such

agreements to consult with Commission staff. To the extent that states, public utility

transmission providers, or other stakeholders believe that the relevant tariffs impose

barriers to Voluntary Agreements, the Commission is open to filings to remove or

otherwise address those barriers.

1 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.

Docket No. PL21-2-000

- 2 -

Developing cost-effective and reliable transmission facilities remains a priority of

this Commission.2 Voluntary Agreements can further those goals by, for example,

providing states with a way to prioritize, plan, and pay for transmission facilities that, for

whatever reason, are not being developed pursuant to the regional transmission planning

processes required by Order No. 1000.3 In addition, in some cases, Voluntary

Agreements may allow state-prioritized transmission facilities to be planned and built

more quickly than would comparable facilities that are planned through the regional

transmission planning process(es).

2 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and

Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 76 FR 49842 (Aug. 11, 2011), 136 FERC

¶ 61,051, at P 2 (2011), order on reh’g and clarification, Order No

transmission facilities to be planned and built

more quickly than would comparable facilities that are planned through the regional

transmission planning process(es).

2 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and

Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 76 FR 49842 (Aug. 11, 2011), 136 FERC

¶ 61,051, at P 2 (2011), order on reh’g and clarification, Order No. 1000-A,

77 FR 32184 (May 31, 2012), 139 FERC ¶ 61,132, order on reh’g and clarification,

Order No. 1000-B, 77 FR 64890 (Oct. 24, 2012), 141 FERC ¶ 61,044 (2012), aff’d sub

nom. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (instituting reforms to

ensure more efficient and cost-effective regional transmission planning); see also Elec.

Transmission Incentives Pol’y Under Section 219 of the Federal Power Act, 170 FERC

¶ 61,204, at P 31 (2020) (Transmission Incentives NOPR) (noting “FPA section 219(a)

requires that the Commission provide incentive-based rates for electric transmission for

the purpose of benefitting consumers by ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of

delivered power by reducing transmission congestion”). The Commission noted in the

Transmission Incentives NOPR that there is a need for existing and new transmission

facilities to help facilitate integration of a variety of types of resources. Transmission

Incentives NOPR, 170 FERC ¶ 61,204 at P 28.

3 Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 146. Order No. 1000 established rules

and regulations addressing, among other things, regional transmission planning,

interregional transmission coordination, and cost allocation methods for new transmission

facilities. This includes requiring each public utility transmission provider to participate

in a regional transmission planning process that produces a regional transmission plan

and complies with certain transmission planning principles.

addressing, among other things, regional transmission planning,

interregional transmission coordination, and cost allocation methods for new transmission

facilities. This includes requiring each public utility transmission provider to participate

in a regional transmission planning process that produces a regional transmission plan

and complies with certain transmission planning principles.

Docket No. PL21-2-000

- 3 -

Nevertheless, we are concerned that confusion regarding the relationship between

Voluntary Agreements and Commission rules and regulations may be deterring such

agreements. Accordingly, in this policy statement, we clarify that neither the FPA nor

the Commission’s rules and regulations categorically preclude Voluntary Agreements

among: (1) two or more states; (2) one or more states and one or more public utility

transmission providers; or (3) two or more public utility transmission providers to plan

and pay for new transmission facilities. In particular, we note that Order No. 1000 allows

market participants, including states, to negotiate voluntarily alternative cost sharing

arrangements that are distinct from the relevant regional cost allocation method(s).4

As an illustration, we note that the Commission accepted certain non-Order

No. 1000, alternative cost sharing arrangements in the context of Order No. 1000

compliance filings.5 In the case of PJM, the Commission held that it “need not find that

4 See id. PP 561, 724; Order No. 1000-A, 139 FERC ¶ 61,132 at PP 728-729;

see also Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 209 n.189 (“[W]e strongly encourage

states to participate actively in the identification of transmission needs driven by Public

Policy Requirements

the context of Order No. 1000

compliance filings.5 In the case of PJM, the Commission held that it “need not find that

4 See id. PP 561, 724; Order No. 1000-A, 139 FERC ¶ 61,132 at PP 728-729;

see also Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 209 n.189 (“[W]e strongly encourage

states to participate actively in the identification of transmission needs driven by Public

Policy Requirements. Public utility transmission providers, for example, could rely on

committees of state regulators or, with appropriate approval from Congress, compacts

between interested states to identify transmission needs driven by Public Policy

Requirements for the public utility transmission providers to evaluate in the transmission

planning process.”). While we focus here on Voluntary Agreements as a potential tool

for states to advance state policy goals, the policy statement does not alter market

participants’ ability to pursue such arrangements absent state involvement.

5 For example, the Commission accepted PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (PJM)

State Agreement Approach to transmission planning, which is a transmission planning

and cost allocation mechanism supplementary to PJM’s Order No. 1000 regional

transmission planning process. Through the State Agreement Approach, one or more

state governmental entities authorized by their respective states, individually or jointly,

may agree voluntarily to be responsible for the allocation of all costs of a proposed

transmission facility that addresses state public policy requirements identified or accepted

mentary to PJM’s Order No. 1000 regional

transmission planning process. Through the State Agreement Approach, one or more

state governmental entities authorized by their respective states, individually or jointly,

may agree voluntarily to be responsible for the allocation of all costs of a proposed

transmission facility that addresses state public policy requirements identified or accepted

Docket No. PL21-2-000

- 4 -

the State Agreement Approach and corresponding cost allocation method comply with

Order No. 1000.”6 Specifically, with regard to PJM’s State Agreement Approach, the

Commission found the approach supplemented and did “not conflict or otherwise

replace” PJM’s Order No. 1000 process to consider transmission needs driven by public

policy requirements.7

More recently, the Commission approved a study agreement that initiated a

Voluntary Agreement process in PJM. There, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

(New Jersey Board), acting pursuant to PJM’s State Agreement Approach, issued an

order formally requesting that PJM open a competitive proposal window to solicit

proposals for transmission facilities to expand the PJM transmission system and to

identify system improvements to interconnect and provide for the deliverability of

7,500 MW of offshore wind generation into New Jersey by 2035. The New Jersey Board

and PJM entered into a study agreement directing PJM to solicit proposals for possible

transmission facilities and analyze them to determine the more efficient or cost-effective

by the relevant state(s) in the PJM region. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 142 FERC

¶ 61,214, at PP 142-143 (2013), order on reh’g and compliance, 147 FERC ¶ 61,128,

at P 92 (2014); PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, sched. 6, section 1.5.9(a)

(State Agreement Approach) (26.0.0)

le

transmission facilities and analyze them to determine the more efficient or cost-effective

by the relevant state(s) in the PJM region. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 142 FERC

¶ 61,214, at PP 142-143 (2013), order on reh’g and compliance, 147 FERC ¶ 61,128,

at P 92 (2014); PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, sched. 6, section 1.5.9(a)

(State Agreement Approach) (26.0.0). Similarly, ISO New England Inc.’s (ISO-NE)

tariff includes a voluntary process that enables the New England States Committee on

Electricity (NESCOE) and state public utility regulators to plan and pay for transmission

facilities. See ISO New England Inc., 143 FERC ¶ 61,150, at P 121 (2013); ISO-NE, ISO

New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, sched. 12, section B.6

(Public Policy Transmission Upgrade Costs) (7.0.0).

6 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 142 FERC ¶ 61,214 at P 142.

7Id.

Docket No. PL21-2-000

- 5 -

enhancement or expansion of transmission facilities to meet New Jersey’s offshore wind

goals.8 The New Jersey Board explained that this type of collaborative approach to

transmission planning will help ensure that the high-voltage transmission system

accommodates state clean energy policies and represents a type of state-federal

collaboration consistent with Commission rules and regulations.9

To the extent that states or public utility transmission providers believe there are

barriers to Voluntary Agreements in Commission-jurisdictional tariffs or other

agreements, we encourage them to identify those barriers and, as necessary, consider

making filings before this Commission to address those barriers. Commission staff is

available to consult on these issues as states, public utility transmission providers, and

other stakeholders consider addressing such barriers and the topic of Voluntary

Agreements more generally. We encourage relevant parties to contact Commission staff

regarding all potential Voluntary Agreements.

I

er

making filings before this Commission to address those barriers. Commission staff is

available to consult on these issues as states, public utility transmission providers, and

other stakeholders consider addressing such barriers and the topic of Voluntary

Agreements more generally. We encourage relevant parties to contact Commission staff

regarding all potential Voluntary Agreements.

I.

Document Availability

In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the

Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the

contents of this document via the Internet through the Commission’s Home Page

(https://www.ferc.gov). At this time, the Commission has suspended access to the

Commission’s Public Reference Room, due to the proclamation declaring a National

8 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 174 FERC ¶ 61,090 (2021).

9 Id. P 10.

Docket No. PL21-2-000

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Emergency concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), issued by the

President on March 13, 2020.

From the Commission’s Home Page on the Internet, this information is available

on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on eLibrary in PDF and

Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To access this

document in eLibrary, type the docket number excluding the last three digits of this

document in the docket number field.

User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission’s website during

normal business hours from the Commission’s Online Support at (202) 502-6652

(toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public

Reference Room at (202) 502-8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference

Room at public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

By direction of the Commission. Commissioner Chatterjee is not participating.

Commissioner Danly is concurring with a separate

statement attached

ion’s Online Support at (202) 502-6652

(toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public

Reference Room at (202) 502-8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference

Room at public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

By direction of the Commission. Commissioner Chatterjee is not participating.

Commissioner Danly is concurring with a separate

statement attached.

Commissioner Christie is concurring with a separate

statement attached.

(SEAL)

Debbie-Anne A. Reese,

Deputy Secretary.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for

Transmission Facilities

PL21-2-000

(Issued June 17, 2021)

DANLY, Commissioner, concurring:

I concur in the issuance of this policy statement on state voluntary agreements to

plan and pay for transmission facilities. I do not know what it accomplishes, but we are

not “categorically precluded” from issuing it, and if there is a chance that it can help

critical transmission infrastructure to be built, then I see no reason to oppose it.

The policy states that “[W]e are concerned that confusion regarding the

relationship between Voluntary Agreements and Commission rules and regulations may

be deterring [Voluntary] agreements.”1 We do not cite any examples of such confusion,

but—who knows—it may well exist.

To attempt to dispel this possible confusion, we “clarify that Voluntary

Agreements are not categorically precluded by the Federal Power Act (FPA)2 or the

Commission’s existing rules and regulations.”3 This amounts to a declaration that the

FPA and existing rules and regulations do not obviously prohibit all Voluntary

Agreements—I have no quarrel with that. But I do believe it necessary to remind

everyone that each Voluntary Agreement must still individually pass muster under our

statute and regulations

by the Federal Power Act (FPA)2 or the

Commission’s existing rules and regulations.”3 This amounts to a declaration that the

FPA and existing rules and regulations do not obviously prohibit all Voluntary

Agreements—I have no quarrel with that. But I do believe it necessary to remind

everyone that each Voluntary Agreement must still individually pass muster under our

statute and regulations.

The actual policy in our statement is an invitation:

To the extent that states or public utility transmission providers believe

there are barriers to Voluntary Agreements in Commission-jurisdictional

tariffs or other agreements, we encourage them to identify those barriers

1 State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for Transmission Facilities, 175

FERC ¶ 61,225, at P 3 (2021) (Policy Statement).

2 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.

3 Policy Statement, 175 FERC ¶ 61,225 at P 1.

Docket No. PL21-2-000

- 2 -

and, as necessary, consider making filings before this Commission to

address those barriers.4

We do not need a policy statement to invite filings. But there is no harm in it. I

also invite and welcome filings before the Commission so that we can ensure that critical

transmission, and critical natural gas pipelines, and other critical infrastructure, can

obtain the approvals and regulatory certainty they require in order to be built.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

________________________

James P. Danly

Commissioner

4 Id. P 6.

no harm in it. I

also invite and welcome filings before the Commission so that we can ensure that critical

transmission, and critical natural gas pipelines, and other critical infrastructure, can

obtain the approvals and regulatory certainty they require in order to be built.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

________________________

James P. Danly

Commissioner

4 Id. P 6.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for

Transmission Facilities

Docket No.

PL21-2-000

(Issued June 17, 2021)

CHRISTIE, Commissioner, concurring:

I concur and write separately to add the following.

Today’s Policy Statement1 reaffirms that voluntary agreements among states to

promote transmission development to meet state public policies are not categorically

precluded by Commission rules and regulations. Order No. 1000 made clear that states

voluntarily could negotiate alternative cost sharing arrangements that are distinct from

the relevant regional cost allocation method2 and that order highlighted a vehicle for

multiple states to cooperate, interstate compacts.3 As the Policy Statement notes, the

Commission has accepted certain alternative cost sharing arrangements in the context of

Order No. 1000 compliance filings.4 I would note that voluntary agreements are open to

all states without regard to whether they participate in Regional Transmission

Organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs)5 and they need not be

limited in purpose to transmission only. Relevant history illustrates.

1 State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for Transmission Facilities, 175

FERC ¶ 61,225 (2021) (Policy Statement).

2 See Policy Statement at PP 3-4, nn.4-5.

3 See id. at n.4. Interstate compacts among states must be approved by

Congress. U.S. Const. art.1, §10, cl. 3

System Operators (ISOs)5 and they need not be

limited in purpose to transmission only. Relevant history illustrates.

1 State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for Transmission Facilities, 175

FERC ¶ 61,225 (2021) (Policy Statement).

2 See Policy Statement at PP 3-4, nn.4-5.

3 See id. at n.4. Interstate compacts among states must be approved by

Congress. U.S. Const. art.1, §10, cl. 3.

4 Policy Statement at n.5 (citing PJM’s State Agreement Approach as an example

of a vehicle by which a state or states may voluntarily pursue transmission projects to

fulfill their own individual public policies and bear the costs of such policy-driven

projects themselves.).

5 Technically speaking, state-regulated utilities participate in RTOs/ISOs, subject

to state law.

Docket No. PL21-2-000

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RTOs/ISOs6 were established more than two decades ago during the

“restructuring” era that saw about half the states initially adopt some version of policies

requiring their vertically-integrated utilities to divest or at least “functionally separate”

their generating assets, which were then supposed to compete on price in RTO/ISO

markets with independent power producers (“IPPs,” sometimes called “NUGS” for non-

utility generators – the acronyms float like confetti in this business).7

Importantly, the states which chose to participate in RTO/ISO markets during the

restructuring era shared a general consensus that the purpose of RTOs/ISOs was to plan

the regional transmission necessary to promote reliability at the least-cost to consumers

and to operate energy and capacity markets to provide consumers with least-cost power

on a non-discriminatory basis, i.e., without regard to the source of the electrons

(sometimes called “economic dispatch”). Federal regulation reflected this consensus

about the purpose of RTOs/ISOs.8

That consensus no longer exists at either the state or federal levels

ility at the least-cost to consumers

and to operate energy and capacity markets to provide consumers with least-cost power

on a non-discriminatory basis, i.e., without regard to the source of the electrons

(sometimes called “economic dispatch”). Federal regulation reflected this consensus

about the purpose of RTOs/ISOs.8

That consensus no longer exists at either the state or federal levels. The past

several years have seen an increasing divergence of public policies in states that are

6 See Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs.

¶ 31,089 (1999) (cross-referenced at 89 FERC ¶ 61,285), order on reh’g, Order No.

2000-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092 (2000) (cross-referenced at 90 FERC ¶ 61,201),

aff’d sub nom. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir.

2001). Order No. 2000 was issued in 1999 and established criteria for RTOs/ISOs.

7 The restructuring era was short-lived. Several states subsequently reversed their

earlier decisions and returned to some form of vertical integration. See Tyson Slocum,

The Failure of Electricity Deregulation: History, Status and Needed Reforms, Public

Citizen’s Energy Program, March 2007, at 5; see, e.g., Ch. 933, 2007 Va. Acts of

Assembly (April 4, 2007). Restructuring was sometimes inaccurately called

“deregulation,” which implied a move from highly structured cost-of-service regulation

to true free markets in power supply, but it was typically more a swap of one complicated

regulatory construct for another one just as vulnerable to rent-seeking. See, e.g., Severin

Borenstein and James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of

Restructuring, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2015, at Abstract (“We

argue that the greatest political motivation for restructuring was rent shifting, not

efficiency improvements, and that this explanation is supported by observed waxing and

waning of political enthusiasm for electricity reform.”); see also id. at 1

d James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of

Restructuring, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2015, at Abstract (“We

argue that the greatest political motivation for restructuring was rent shifting, not

efficiency improvements, and that this explanation is supported by observed waxing and

waning of political enthusiasm for electricity reform.”); see also id. at 1.

8 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided a definition of economic dispatch: as

“the operation of generation facilities to produce energy at the lowest cost to reliably

serve consumers, recognizing any operational limits of generation and transmission

facilities.” Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), Pub L. No. 109-58, § 1234(b), 119

Stat. 594, 960 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16432(b)) (emphasis added).

Docket No. PL21-2-000

- 3 -

members of multi-state RTOs/ISOs, over such fundamental issues as mandated resource

mixes, compensation in capacity markets, transmission planning criteria and cost

allocation, and carbon taxes.9 The disappearance of the original consensus about the

purpose of RTO/ISO markets has serious implications across a range of issues, but the

adoption of this Policy Statement by the Commission offers a good time to emphasize

that states that wish to cooperate with other states which share similar public-policy goals

– whether environmental, reliability or economic – have options for achieving regional

benefits outside the context of RTO/ISO participation.

In particular, I would point out that while this Policy Statement emphasizes the

potential availability of voluntary agreements among states to promote interstate

transmission development, voluntary state agreements may also be available for other

purposes

er environmental, reliability or economic – have options for achieving regional

benefits outside the context of RTO/ISO participation.

In particular, I would point out that while this Policy Statement emphasizes the

potential availability of voluntary agreements among states to promote interstate

transmission development, voluntary state agreements may also be available for other

purposes. Before the restructuring era, many state-regulated utilities participated in

multi-state power pools10 designed to support reliability by wheeling power from state to

state when needed to avoid load shedding, as well as facilitating bilateral sales of excess

power.11 These sales would benefit customers of the selling utility, when booked as a

customer credit for off-system sales, and benefit customers of the purchasing utility when

booked in the “fuel factor” at cost, with no return on equity (ROE) applied.

Options such as these are still available. Through the use of interstate compacts,

enabling legislation12 could create multi-state entities that can plan transmission projects

9 This divergence did not happen yesterday, but has been building. One

commentator wrote ten years ago that “. . . state legislation and regulatory choices

continue to push the electricity industries of the various states along vastly different

paths.” Ari Peskoe, A Challenge for Federalism: Achieving National Goals in the

Electricity Industry, 18 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 209, 211 (2011) (“Peskoe”)

(emphasis added).

10 For over half a century, PJM was a power pool. See https://pjm.com/about-

pjm/who-we-are/pjm-history .

11 See generally Peskoe at 223-24. Any application to this Commission to

establish a power pool or other similar arrangement will, of course, come with its own

specific evidentiary record and will be considered individually under applicable laws at

the time.

12 Power pools were generally regulated by the Federal Power Commission, and

later by FERC. See, e.g., id

jm/who-we-are/pjm-history .

11 See generally Peskoe at 223-24. Any application to this Commission to

establish a power pool or other similar arrangement will, of course, come with its own

specific evidentiary record and will be considered individually under applicable laws at

the time.

12 Power pools were generally regulated by the Federal Power Commission, and

later by FERC. See, e.g., id. Congress could, however, through enabling legislation,

grant various regulatory powers to the requesting states which seek to participate in a

power pool arrangement. For example, Congress could include in such grant of authority

an explicit power to apply a carbon tax to wholesale transactions in a power pool if such

power was requested by the member states, avoiding the many questions attendant to

Docket No. PL21-2-000

- 4 -

– as this Policy Statement encourages – but such entities also could be designed to

function as modern, innovative versions of power pools aligned with the member states’

public policies as to resource adequacy and preferences. The enabling legislation could

also ensure a sufficient state role in the governance to ensure that the authority was used

only in accordance with member-state policies.13

States sharing similar public policies which desire to collaborate with each other to

obtain the benefits of regional cooperation have innovative options to explore and

consider whether they participate in an RTO/ISO or do not. The adoption of this Policy

Statement is a good time to emphasize that opportunity.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

______________________________

Mark C. Christie

Commissioner

whether RTOs/ISOs themselves have such power

the benefits of regional cooperation have innovative options to explore and

consider whether they participate in an RTO/ISO or do not. The adoption of this Policy

Statement is a good time to emphasize that opportunity.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

______________________________

Mark C. Christie

Commissioner

whether RTOs/ISOs themselves have such power. See Carbon Pricing in Organized

Wholesale Electricity Markets, 175 FERC ¶ 61,036 (2021) (Christie, Comm’r concurring

in part and dissenting in part at PP 12-14, 17-24 (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-

events/news/item-e-2-commissioner-mark-c-christie-concurring-part-and-dissenting-

part)).

13 For an example of such a broad grant of power to the states, Congress in the

Energy Policy Act of 2005 allowed three or more contiguous states to enter into a

compact, subject to the approval by Congress, to form their own regional transmission

siting entities that would have siting authority for those states. EPAct 2005, Pub L. No.

109-58, § 1221(i), 119 Stat. 594, 950 (2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i)).