Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Amend the Rule Requiring Resolution Submissions by Covered Insured Depository Institutions

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Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 30, 2026 / Proposed Rules

1 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b).

2 As used in this notice of proposed rulemaking,

the term ‘‘bank’’ is synonymous with the term

‘‘insured depository institution’’ as it is used in

section 3(c)(2) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(2).

As used in this notice, the term ‘‘small bank’’ is

synonymous with the term ‘‘small institution,’’ as

defined in 12 CFR 327.8(e), or using the proposed

revised definition. Additionally, as used in this

notice, the terms ‘‘large bank’’ and ‘‘highly complex

institution’’ refer to an insured depository

institution that meets the definition of a large

institution or highly complex institution as defined

in 12 CFR 327.8(f) and (g), or using the proposed

revised definitions of those terms.

3 12 CFR part 327.

4 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)(C).

5 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)(D).

6 See 12 CFR 327.16(a) and (b).

7 See 12 CFR 327.3(b)(1).

8 See 12 CFR 327.5(a).

9 See 12 CFR 327.16.

10 Banks that elect to use the community bank

leverage ratio framework are also considered small

institutions, even if those banks would otherwise

meet the definition of a large institution. See 12

CFR 327.8(e)(3). An insured branch of a foreign

bank is not considered a large institution. See 12

CFR 327.8(f).

A small institution is reclassified as a large

institution beginning in the fourth consecutive

quarter that it reports assets of $10 billion or more

on the Call Report. Similarly, a large institution is

reclassified as a small institution beginning in the

fourth consecutive quarter that it reports assets of

less than $10 billion on the Call Report.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE

CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 327

RIN 3064–AG27

Assessments Thresholds, Rate

Schedules, and Adjustments

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

milarly, a large institution is

reclassified as a small institution beginning in the

fourth consecutive quarter that it reports assets of

less than $10 billion on the Call Report.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE

CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 327

RIN 3064–AG27

Assessments Thresholds, Rate

Schedules, and Adjustments

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (FDIC) invites

public comment on a proposed rule that

would amend the assessment

regulations in 12 CFR part 327 to:

update the $10 billion asset threshold in

the definitions of small and large

institutions to $30 billion and adjust the

threshold every four years to reflect

inflation, pursuant to a pre-determined

indexing methodology; decrease initial

base deposit insurance assessment rate

schedules by 2 basis points for small

institutions and by 1 basis point for

large and highly complex institutions;

provide a downward resolution

readiness adjustment to assessment

rates for large and highly complex

institutions, including 0.5 basis points

for passing virtual data room testing and

0.5 basis points for providing prescribed

data access; and remove obsolete

provisions.

DATES: Comments must be received no

later than August 31, 2026.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments

on the notice of proposed rulemaking,

identified by RIN 3064–AG27 using any

of the following methods:

• FDIC website: https://www.fdic.gov/

federal-register-publications. Follow the

instructions for submitting comments

on the agency website.

• Email: Comments@fdic.gov. Include

RIN 3064–AG27 on the subject line of

the message.

• Mail: Jennifer M. Jones, Deputy

Executive Secretary, Attention:

Comments—RIN 3064–AG27, Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th

Street NW, Washington, DC 20429

website: https://www.fdic.gov/

federal-register-publications. Follow the

instructions for submitting comments

on the agency website.

• Email: Comments@fdic.gov. Include

RIN 3064–AG27 on the subject line of

the message.

• Mail: Jennifer M. Jones, Deputy

Executive Secretary, Attention:

Comments—RIN 3064–AG27, Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th

Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.

• Hand Delivery to FDIC: Comments

may be hand-delivered to the guard

station at the rear of the 550 17th Street

NW building (located on F Street NW)

on business days between 7 a.m. and 5

p.m.

• Public Inspection: Comments

received, including any personal

information provided, may be posted

without change to https://www.fdic.gov/

federal-register-publications.

Commenters should submit only

information that the commenter wishes

to make available publicly. The FDIC

may review, redact, or refrain from

posting all or any portion of any

comment that it may deem to be

inappropriate for publication, such as

irrelevant or obscene material. The FDIC

may post only a single representative

example of identical or substantially

identical comments, and in such cases

will generally identify the number of

identical or substantially identical

comments represented by the posted

example. All comments that have been

redacted, as well as those that have not

been posted, that contain comments on

the merits of the proposed rule will be

retained in the public comment file and

will be considered as required under all

applicable laws. All comments may be

accessible under the Freedom of

Information Act.

This proposal, all comments received,

and a summary of not more than 100

words of the proposed rule pursuant to

the Providing Accountability Through

Transparency Act of 2023 are available

at https://www.fdic.gov/federal-register-

publications

ic comment file and

will be considered as required under all

applicable laws. All comments may be

accessible under the Freedom of

Information Act.

This proposal, all comments received,

and a summary of not more than 100

words of the proposed rule pursuant to

the Providing Accountability Through

Transparency Act of 2023 are available

at https://www.fdic.gov/federal-register-

publications.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Division of Insurance and Research:

Daniel Hoople, Associate Director,

Financial Risk Management Branch,

202–898–3835, dhoople@fdic.gov;

Division of Complex Institution

Supervision and Resolution: Ryan

Tetrick, Deputy Director, Resolution

Readiness Branch, 202–898–7028,

rtetrick@fdic.gov; Sean Healey, Acting

Associate Director, Policy Analysis,

Systemic Risk Branch, 202–898–7049,

seahealey@fdic.gov; Patrick Bittner,

Senior Policy Specialist, Policy

Analysis, Systemic Risk Branch, 202–

898–3550, pabittner@fdic.gov; Division

of Resolutions and Receiverships:

Shivali Nangia, Deputy Director,

Receivership Operations, 972–761–

2945, snangia@fdic.gov; Catherine

Linhart, Assistant Director, Closing

Operations and Data, 571–242–5368,

clinhart@fdic.gov; Legal Division: Ryan

McCarthy, Counsel, 202–898–7301,

rymccarthy@fdic.gov; Jacques Schillaci,

Counsel, 202–898–7298, jschillaci@

fdic.gov; Dena Kessler, Counsel, 202–

898–3833, dkessler@fdic.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A

ship Operations, 972–761–

2945, snangia@fdic.gov; Catherine

Linhart, Assistant Director, Closing

Operations and Data, 571–242–5368,

clinhart@fdic.gov; Legal Division: Ryan

McCarthy, Counsel, 202–898–7301,

rymccarthy@fdic.gov; Jacques Schillaci,

Counsel, 202–898–7298, jschillaci@

fdic.gov; Dena Kessler, Counsel, 202–

898–3833, dkessler@fdic.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Legal Framework

Pursuant to section 7 of the Federal

Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act,1 the FDIC

has established a risk-based assessment

system for calculating and charging all

insured depository institutions (IDIs) 2 a

quarterly assessment for deposit

insurance.3 The FDI Act defines a risk-

based assessment system as a system for

calculating a depository institution’s

assessment based on: (1) the probability

that the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF)

will incur a loss with respect to the

institution; (2) the likely amount of any

such loss; and (3) the revenue needs of

the DIF.4 The FDIC has established

separate risk-based assessment systems 5

and calculates a bank’s assessment rate

using different methods for small, large,

and highly-complex institutions.6

Under the assessment regulations, the

amount of an IDI’s deposit insurance

assessment is equal to its assessment

base multiplied by its risk-based

assessment rate.7 Generally, an IDI’s

assessment base equals its average

consolidated total assets minus its

average tangible equity.8 An IDI’s risk-

based assessment rate is determined

each quarter based on supervisory

ratings and information collected on the

Consolidated Reports of Condition and

Income (Call Report) or the Report of

Assets and Liabilities of U.S

plied by its risk-based

assessment rate.7 Generally, an IDI’s

assessment base equals its average

consolidated total assets minus its

average tangible equity.8 An IDI’s risk-

based assessment rate is determined

each quarter based on supervisory

ratings and information collected on the

Consolidated Reports of Condition and

Income (Call Report) or the Report of

Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches

and Agencies of Foreign Banks (FFIEC

002), as appropriate.9

The assessment regulations generally

define a small institution as an IDI with

total assets of less than $10 billion, as

reported on the Call Report.10

Assessment rates for established small

banks (i.e., small banks that have been

federally insured for at least five years)

are calculated based on seven financial

ratios and a weighted average of

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39795

Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 30, 2026 / Proposed Rules

11 Bank examiners review and evaluate an

institution’s condition using the Uniform Financial

Institutions Rating System, also known as CAMELS

(Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings,

Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk). CAMELS

ratings are scored on a scale of ‘‘1’’ (best) to ‘‘5’’

(worst). Examiners assign a rating for each CAMELS

component and an overall Composite rating.

12 See 12 CFR 327.16(a); see also 81 FR 32180

(May 20, 2016).

13 See 12 CFR 327.8(f).

14 See 12 CFR 327.8(g).

15 See 12 CFR 327.16(b)(1) and (2); see also 76 FR

10672 (Feb. 25, 2011) and 77 FR 66000 (Oct. 31,

2012).

16 See 12 CFR 327.16(e).

17 Id. See also 74 FR 9525 (Mar. 4, 2009) and 76

FR 10672, 10680 (Feb. 25, 2011). The unsecured

debt adjustment applies to all institutions except

new institutions and insured branches of foreign

banks.

18 See 12 CFR 327.16(e)(3)

(f).

14 See 12 CFR 327.8(g).

15 See 12 CFR 327.16(b)(1) and (2); see also 76 FR

10672 (Feb. 25, 2011) and 77 FR 66000 (Oct. 31,

2012).

16 See 12 CFR 327.16(e).

17 Id. See also 74 FR 9525 (Mar. 4, 2009) and 76

FR 10672, 10680 (Feb. 25, 2011). The unsecured

debt adjustment applies to all institutions except

new institutions and insured branches of foreign

banks.

18 See 12 CFR 327.16(e)(3).

19 See 12 CFR 327.16(b)(3); see also Assessment

Rate Adjustment Guidelines for Large and Highly

Complex Institutions, 76 FR 57992 (Sept. 19, 2011).

20 See 12 U.S.C. 1817 and 1819 (Tenth).

21 See 12 CFR 327.8(e) and (f).

22 See Adjusting and Indexing Certain Regulatory

Thresholds, 90 FR 55789 (Dec. 4, 2025). Any

references to inflation in this proposal refer to

inflation as measured under the consumer price

index for urban wage earners and clerical workers

(CPI–W), unless specifically noted otherwise.

23 Progressively lower assessment rate schedules

will take effect when the reserve ratio exceeds 2

percent and 2.5 percent, and the FDIC did not

modify those schedules when increasing rates in

2023. See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d). See also 87 FR

64314 (Oct. 24, 2022).

supervisory CAMELS 11 components

that are statistically significant in

predicting the probability of an

institution’s failure over a three-year

horizon.12 The CAMELS composite

rating is used to determine the

minimum and maximum assessment

rate for a small institution

modify those schedules when increasing rates in

2023. See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d). See also 87 FR

64314 (Oct. 24, 2022).

supervisory CAMELS 11 components

that are statistically significant in

predicting the probability of an

institution’s failure over a three-year

horizon.12 The CAMELS composite

rating is used to determine the

minimum and maximum assessment

rate for a small institution.

For purposes of deposit insurance

assessments, a large institution is

generally defined as an IDI that reports

assets of $10 billion or more on its Call

Report for four consecutive quarters that

does not meet the definition of a highly

complex institution.13 A highly

complex institution is generally defined

as an institution that has $50 billion or

more in total assets and is controlled by

a parent holding company that has $500

billion or more in total assets, or is a

processing bank or trust company.14

Assessment rates for large banks and

highly complex institutions are

calculated using a scorecard approach

based on CAMELS component ratings

and certain forward-looking financial

measures to assess the risk that the

institution poses to the DIF. One version

of the scorecard applies to most large

banks and another to highly complex

institutions.15

As part of the risk-based assessment

system, institutions are subject to

certain adjustments to their assessment

rates for factors that can increase or

reduce loss to the DIF in the event the

bank fails.16 For example, the unsecured

debt adjustment is a downward

adjustment intended to better account

for certain liabilities that can reduce the

loss to the DIF in the event of failure.17

The brokered deposit adjustment is an

upward adjustment.18 In addition, the

FDIC may adjust a large or highly

complex institution’s total score, which

is used in the calculation of its

assessment rate, to consider

idiosyncratic or other relevant risk

factors not reflected in the appropriate

scorecard.19

B

certain liabilities that can reduce the

loss to the DIF in the event of failure.17

The brokered deposit adjustment is an

upward adjustment.18 In addition, the

FDIC may adjust a large or highly

complex institution’s total score, which

is used in the calculation of its

assessment rate, to consider

idiosyncratic or other relevant risk

factors not reflected in the appropriate

scorecard.19

B. Overview of the Proposal and Policy

Objectives

The FDIC, under its general

rulemaking authority in section 9 of the

FDI Act, and its specific authority under

section 7 of the FDI Act to set

assessments and establish a risk-based

assessment system,20 is proposing to

make several revisions to the deposit

insurance assessment regulations (the

proposal), including to: (1) update the

$10 billion asset threshold in the

definitions of small and large

institutions to $30 billion and adjust the

threshold every four years to reflect

inflation, pursuant to a pre-determined

indexing methodology; (2) decrease

initial base assessment rate schedules by

2 basis points for all small institutions,

including new small institutions and

insured branches of foreign banks, and

by 1 basis point for large and highly

complex institutions; and (3) provide a

downward resolution readiness

adjustment (RRA) to assessment rates

for large and highly complex

institutions electing to participate,

including 0.5 basis points for passing

voluntary virtual data room (VDR)

testing and 0.5 basis points for

providing prescribed data access. In

addition, the FDIC is proposing to make

certain technical amendments to the

assessment regulations to remove

obsolete provisions.

The FDIC continues to explore

opportunities for updating the

assessment regulations, including

adjusting other thresholds and possible

updates and improvements to the

scorecard methodology applied to

calculate assessments for large banks

and highly complex institutions

the FDIC is proposing to make

certain technical amendments to the

assessment regulations to remove

obsolete provisions.

The FDIC continues to explore

opportunities for updating the

assessment regulations, including

adjusting other thresholds and possible

updates and improvements to the

scorecard methodology applied to

calculate assessments for large banks

and highly complex institutions. Any

future updates would be made through

a separate notice and comment

rulemaking.

1. Proposed Updates to Small and Large

Institution Definitions

The FDIC is proposing to update the

definitions of small and large

institutions that determine which risk-

based deposit insurance assessment

methodology is applied to calculate an

institution’s deposit insurance

assessment rate.21 Specifically, the FDIC

is proposing to update the asset-based

threshold (the assessment methodology

threshold) used to define small and

large institutions from $10 billion to $30

billion and to adjust the threshold every

four years to reflect inflation, pursuant

to a pre-determined indexing

methodology which would generally

align with the methodology used to

adjust certain other thresholds within

FDIC regulations.22

The primary objective of the proposed

update and future indexing is to provide

for a more durable deposit insurance

assessment framework by preserving, in

real terms, the assessment methodology

threshold used to define small and large

institutions. The inflation adjustment

would also preserve the FDIC’s ability to

apply different assessment

methodologies based on size that are

more appropriate to banks’ risk profiles

and risk exposure to the DIF.

2. Proposed Revisions to Assessment

Rates

The FDIC is also proposing revisions

to deposit insurance assessment rate

schedules

ology

threshold used to define small and large

institutions. The inflation adjustment

would also preserve the FDIC’s ability to

apply different assessment

methodologies based on size that are

more appropriate to banks’ risk profiles

and risk exposure to the DIF.

2. Proposed Revisions to Assessment

Rates

The FDIC is also proposing revisions

to deposit insurance assessment rate

schedules. First, the proposal would

decrease initial base deposit insurance

assessment rate schedules uniformly by

2 basis points for IDIs that meet the

proposed definition of a small

institution, and by 1 basis point for IDIs

that meet the proposed definition of a

large institution or that are highly

complex institutions. The proposed

reductions would only apply to initial

base assessment rate schedules

applicable while the reserve ratio is less

than 2 percent.23

3. The Resolution Readiness Adjustment

The proposed rule would amend the

risk-based assessment system to include

a downward adjustment, the RRA, of up

to 1 basis point to initial base

assessment rates if a large or highly

complex institution elects to (1) submit

to testing of the institution’s ability to

populate a VDR with information that

could be used to market a bank in the

event of its failure; and/or (2) provide

the FDIC access to an institution’s

service provider(s) and/or internal

systems to obtain detailed bank data

needed to manage and market the bank

in receivership. The RRA would be

applied to a large or highly complex

institution’s assessment rate in

recognition of the expected reduction in

losses to the DIF in the event of the

failure of a bank that successfully

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market the bank

in receivership. The RRA would be

applied to a large or highly complex

institution’s assessment rate in

recognition of the expected reduction in

losses to the DIF in the event of the

failure of a bank that successfully

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Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 30, 2026 / Proposed Rules

24 The FDI Act requires the FDIC to establish a

risk-based assessment system for calculating an

IDI’s assessment based on the probability that the

DIF will incur a loss with respect to that IDI and

the likely amount of any such loss, among other

factors. See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)(C).

25 See supra fn 23.

26 See 12 CFR 327.8(e), (f), and (g).

27 Generally, an established institution is one that

has been federally insured for at least five years. See

12 CFR 327.8(k).

28 See supra fn 10.

29 See 71 FR 69270, 69281 (Nov. 30, 2006).

30 See 76 FR 57992 (Sept. 19, 2011).

completes the VDR testing exercise and/

or provides the prescribed data access.24

The RRA would be applied to a bank’s

initial base assessment rate prior to

application of any other applicable

adjustments to initial base assessment

rates. Under the current regulations, the

minimum initial base assessment rate

applied to large and highly complex

institutions becomes progressively

lower when the reserve ratio reaches 2

percent and 2.5 percent. Under the

proposal, the minimum initial base

assessment rates applied to large and

highly complex institutions would still

become progressively lower, but the

decrease would be smaller in order to

incorporate the RRA

minimum initial base assessment rate

applied to large and highly complex

institutions becomes progressively

lower when the reserve ratio reaches 2

percent and 2.5 percent. Under the

proposal, the minimum initial base

assessment rates applied to large and

highly complex institutions would still

become progressively lower, but the

decrease would be smaller in order to

incorporate the RRA.

Under the revised schedules, a large

or highly complex institution at the

minimum initial base assessment rate

that also earns the full 1 basis point

RRA would be eligible to receive the

same maximum unsecured debt

adjustment as it would under the rate

schedules applied in the current

regulation after the reserve ratio reaches

2 percent. In addition, under the

proposed rate schedules, the minimum

assessment rate after application of all

adjustments would be the same for large

and highly complex institutions and for

small banks, which is equal to the

minimum assessment rates applied

prior to the increase implemented in

2023.25

4. Technical Amendments To Remove

Obsolete Content

The FDIC is also proposing technical

amendments to its regulations governing

deposit insurance assessments to

remove obsolete provisions that are no

longer applicable and have not been

applicable to any IDI for at least three

years.

II. Updating Definitions of Small and

Large Institutions

A. Background

The FDIC is proposing to amend the

definitions of small and large

institutions in the assessment

regulations. Under the assessment

regulations, the definitions of small,

large, and highly complex institutions

determine which risk-based deposit

insurance assessments methodology is

applied when calculating an

institution’s deposit insurance

assessment rate.26

The current definitions of small and

large institutions, first adopted in 2006,

use certain static, dollar-based

thresholds, which have not been

updated in twenty years

ons, the definitions of small,

large, and highly complex institutions

determine which risk-based deposit

insurance assessments methodology is

applied when calculating an

institution’s deposit insurance

assessment rate.26

The current definitions of small and

large institutions, first adopted in 2006,

use certain static, dollar-based

thresholds, which have not been

updated in twenty years. Adjusting

these thresholds on a consistent

schedule would mitigate the risk that

the deposit insurance assessment

system becomes less effective at

differentiating risk and more

burdensome on smaller institutions due

solely to inflation rather than

meaningful changes in an institution’s

size, risk profile, or level of complexity.

Under the proposal, the dollar-based

asset threshold used to define small and

large institutions would be updated and

adjusted in the future to reflect

inflation, pursuant to a pre-determined

indexing methodology. The primary

objective of this component of the

proposal is to provide for a more

durable deposit insurance assessment

framework by preserving, in real terms,

the threshold used to define small and

large institutions. The inflation

adjustment, in combination with the

proposed threshold and definition

updates, also would preserve the FDIC’s

ability to apply different assessment

methodologies based on size and

engagement in certain activities that are

more appropriate to banks’ risk profiles

and risk exposure to the DIF.

In the absence of these ongoing

threshold adjustments, institutions

would also become subject to additional

assessment-related reporting

requirements as they grow above the

threshold. This additional reporting

burden may be justified in cases where

asset growth reflects changes to actual

size, risk profile, and complexity but

would be less appropriate to the extent

that growth instead reflects inflation

f these ongoing

threshold adjustments, institutions

would also become subject to additional

assessment-related reporting

requirements as they grow above the

threshold. This additional reporting

burden may be justified in cases where

asset growth reflects changes to actual

size, risk profile, and complexity but

would be less appropriate to the extent

that growth instead reflects inflation.

Adjusting regulatory thresholds over

time helps preserve the intended use

and application, in real terms, of

additional reporting requirements and

helps ensure that IDIs are assessed

appropriately, commensurate with the

risk they pose to the DIF.

B. Current Definitions of Small and

Large Institutions

For established institutions that are

not insured branches of foreign banks,

asset size, as measured by total assets

reported on the Call Report, is the sole

factor used by the FDIC to determine

whether an institution’s assessment rate

is calculated using the pricing

methodology for small institutions or

large institutions.27 The FDIC’s

assessment regulations generally define

a small institution as an IDI with total

assets of less than $10 billion, as

reported on the Call Report, while a

large institution is defined as an IDI that

reports total assets of $10 billion or

more on its Call Report for four

consecutive quarters and that does not

meet the definition of a highly complex

institution.28 The $10 billion asset size

threshold has been in place since the

FDIC first established separate risk-

based pricing methods for large and

small banks in 2006.29

C

Report, while a

large institution is defined as an IDI that

reports total assets of $10 billion or

more on its Call Report for four

consecutive quarters and that does not

meet the definition of a highly complex

institution.28 The $10 billion asset size

threshold has been in place since the

FDIC first established separate risk-

based pricing methods for large and

small banks in 2006.29

C. Proposed Increase in the Asset

Threshold in the Definitions of Small

and Large Institutions

The FDIC is proposing to update the

asset-based threshold in the assessment

regulations used to define small and

large institutions for deposit insurance

assessments purposes and to determine

whether assessment rates are calculated

using the small bank pricing

methodology or the large bank scorecard

approach from $10 billion in total assets

to $30 billion in total assets. In future

years, the proposed assessment

methodology threshold of $30 billion

would be adjusted on a consistent basis

as later described in section II.F. of this

Supplementary Information.

An institution that is priced as a large

institution immediately prior to the

effective date of any final rule but that

reports less than $30 billion in total

assets would be classified as a small

institution as of the effective date of any

final rule. Such a bank would not need

to report less than $30 billion in total

assets for four consecutive quarters

before being reclassified as small.

Thereafter, a small institution would be

reclassified as a large institution only if

it reports total assets of $30 billion (or

such threshold adjusted in the future for

inflation) or more for four consecutive

quarters. Similarly, a large institution

would be reclassified as a small

institution only if it reports total assets

under $30 billion (or such threshold

adjusted in the future for inflation) for

four consecutive quarters

reclassified as a large institution only if

it reports total assets of $30 billion (or

such threshold adjusted in the future for

inflation) or more for four consecutive

quarters. Similarly, a large institution

would be reclassified as a small

institution only if it reports total assets

under $30 billion (or such threshold

adjusted in the future for inflation) for

four consecutive quarters.

For large and highly complex

institutions, the FDIC can adjust the

total score based on relevant risk or risk-

mitigating factors that are not

adequately reflected in the scorecards.30

The proposed increase in the

assessment methodology threshold from

$10 billion to $30 billion has the effect

that institutions with total assets under

$30 billion that are not priced as large

banks would not be considered for these

potential score adjustments, though the

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31 See FDIC Chairman Travis Hill, ‘‘Oversight of

Prudential Regulators,’’ Testimony, Committee on

Financial Services, United States House of

Representatives, December 2, 2025, available at:

https://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/2025/

oversight-prudential-regulators. A revised

assessment methodology threshold of $30 billion in

total assets is also consistent with recent actions

taken by the Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency (OCC) to tailor its regulatory and

supervisory frameworks to minimize burden for its

regulated institutions and promote economic

growth. See OCC News Release, ‘‘OCC Announces

Actions to Reduce Regulatory Burden for

Community Banks,’’ October 6, 2025, available at:

https://occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2025/

nr-occ-2025-95.html

taken by the Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency (OCC) to tailor its regulatory and

supervisory frameworks to minimize burden for its

regulated institutions and promote economic

growth. See OCC News Release, ‘‘OCC Announces

Actions to Reduce Regulatory Burden for

Community Banks,’’ October 6, 2025, available at:

https://occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2025/

nr-occ-2025-95.html.

32 Analysis is based on data from the Call Report

and FFIEC 002 for the reporting period that ended

December 31, 2025, reported as of February 16,

2026.

33 The regulatory and reporting requirements for

institutions with total assets under $1 billion

generally differ from that of those with over $1

billion. See, e.g., 12 CFR 363.1(a).

adjustment guidelines would be

retained and would be unchanged for an

institution that would meet the

proposed definition of a large institution

or that is defined as a highly complex

institution.

The proposed assessment

methodology threshold of $30 billion in

total assets is consistent with the recent

update to the FDIC’s continuous

examination process. The FDIC has

historically supervised banks under

either a point-in-time examination

process or a continuous examination

process. Prior to recent changes, nearly

all FDIC-supervised banks with $10

billion or more in total assets were

subject to the continuous examination

process, as were a small handful below

$10 billion in total assets based on

certain risk considerations. The FDIC

recently raised the threshold for

presumptive inclusion in the

continuous examination process from

$10 billion to $30 billion in total assets,

while retaining the ability to include a

bank below $30 billion in total assets if

warranted.31

1

ject to the continuous examination

process, as were a small handful below

$10 billion in total assets based on

certain risk considerations. The FDIC

recently raised the threshold for

presumptive inclusion in the

continuous examination process from

$10 billion to $30 billion in total assets,

while retaining the ability to include a

bank below $30 billion in total assets if

warranted.31

1. Analysis

The FDIC anticipates that increasing

the assessment methodology threshold

to $30 billion in total assets would shift

the share of industry assets held by

banks priced using the scorecard

methodology to more closely align with

the share held by such institutions in

2011, when the current large bank and

highly complex scorecard methodology

was first implemented. At that time,

institutions priced as large or highly

complex institutions made up 78.9

percent of industry assets. As of

December 31, 2025, that share has

increased to 85.0 percent. Under the

proposed $30 billion assessment

methodology threshold, large and highly

complex institutions would make up

79.5 percent of industry assets based on

data as of December 31, 2025.

The FDIC anticipates that increasing

the assessment methodology threshold

to $30 billion in total assets would

result in 76 institutions shifting from

the large bank pricing scorecard

methodology to the small bank pricing

methodology based on data as of

December 31, 2025.

The FDIC estimates that among the 76

institutions that would shift from the

large bank pricing scorecard

methodology to the small bank pricing

methodology as a result of the proposal,

almost all would pay less in

assessments, particularly after applying

the proposed 2 basis point reduction in

initial base assessment rate schedules

applicable to small banks detailed

below

ember 31, 2025.

The FDIC estimates that among the 76

institutions that would shift from the

large bank pricing scorecard

methodology to the small bank pricing

methodology as a result of the proposal,

almost all would pay less in

assessments, particularly after applying

the proposed 2 basis point reduction in

initial base assessment rate schedules

applicable to small banks detailed

below. However, to mitigate possible

effects on some institutions, the FDIC is

proposing to provide for a one-time

election for reclassified institutions to

be temporarily priced using the large

bank scorecard methodology to mitigate

any impact and allow for a transition, as

described below.

The overall impact to institutions’

assessments from the proposed change

in definitions would vary by institution,

based on differences in the pricing

methodologies for small and large banks

and the institution’s specific financial

data and supervisory ratings. Therefore,

the shift in pricing methodology is

expected to result in varied financial

outcomes for the affected IDIs, which

will further vary over time and through

banking and economic cycles. For

example, a given bank likely would

have paid a lower rate when priced as

large in 2020 due to the influx of

deposits in response to the pandemic

and related relief efforts which

improved liquidity and core deposits

measures applicable to large banks,

whereas the small bank pricing

methodology directly prices for rapid

asset growth.

Generally, possible impacts could

include, but would not be limited to,

banks with significant concentrations in

higher-risk assets or elevated funding

stress paying lower assessments, and

banks with greater concentrations in

core deposits or larger government

guaranteed loan portfolios paying higher

assessments under the small bank

pricing methodology relative to the

current large bank scorecard

methodology

pacts could

include, but would not be limited to,

banks with significant concentrations in

higher-risk assets or elevated funding

stress paying lower assessments, and

banks with greater concentrations in

core deposits or larger government

guaranteed loan portfolios paying higher

assessments under the small bank

pricing methodology relative to the

current large bank scorecard

methodology. Institutions with higher

leverage ratios could also pay lower

assessments if shifted to the small bank

pricing methodology. These potential

effects arise because the small bank

pricing methodology uses a different set

of financial measures and weights based

on how the measures corresponded with

the probability of failure for small

banks.

In aggregate and disregarding the

other proposed changes to the

assessment regulations in this proposal,

the proposed increase in the assessment

methodology threshold is estimated to

result in an approximate net decrease of

$129 million in annual assessments

based on data as of December 31,

2025.32 This component of the proposal,

if adopted, is therefore expected to

reduce the banking industry’s aggregate

assessment cost, with varied impacts on

individual affected institutions

depending on how their specific risk

profiles at a specific point in time are

priced under the small bank pricing

methodology.

The FDIC analyzed the similarity

between institutions with total assets

between $1 billion and $10 billion and

the 76 institutions with assets between

$10 billion and $30 billion that would

be reclassified as small institutions

under the proposal. As reflected in

Table 1, on average, both groups

reported approximately similar shares of

deposit and loan types and leverage

ratios as of December 31, 2025.33

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llion that would

be reclassified as small institutions

under the proposal. As reflected in

Table 1, on average, both groups

reported approximately similar shares of

deposit and loan types and leverage

ratios as of December 31, 2025.33

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Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 30, 2026 / Proposed Rules

Institutions that would shift from the

large bank scorecard methodology to the

small bank pricing methodology would

also benefit from a reduction in

reporting burden, as large institutions

must report granular data on higher-risk

asset exposures and specific liability

concentrations under the scorecard

approach. These reporting burden

reductions would be expected to create

operational savings for the reclassified

IDIs.

2. Alternatives Considered

In developing the proposal, the FDIC

considered alternatives to the proposed

$30 billion assessment methodology

threshold, including maintaining the

$10 billion threshold or increasing the

assessment methodology threshold to

$20 billion, $25 billion, or $50 billion.

The FDIC believes that maintaining

the current $10 billion assessment

methodology threshold would not be

appropriate because institutions

between $10 billion and $30 billion in

total assets are more appropriately

priced using the small bank pricing

methodology than the large bank

scorecard. Increasing the asset-based

threshold in the definitions of small and

large banks in the assessments

regulations to $30 billion would more

closely align the share of industry assets

held by banks priced using the

scorecard methodology under the

proposal with the share held by such

institutions when the current large bank

and highly complex scorecard

methodology was first implemented in

2011. At that time, institutions priced as

large or highly complex institutions

made up 78.9 percent of industry assets

0 billion would more

closely align the share of industry assets

held by banks priced using the

scorecard methodology under the

proposal with the share held by such

institutions when the current large bank

and highly complex scorecard

methodology was first implemented in

2011. At that time, institutions priced as

large or highly complex institutions

made up 78.9 percent of industry assets.

As of December 31, 2025, that share has

increased to 85.0 percent. Under the

proposed $30 billion assessment

methodology threshold, large and highly

complex institutions would make up

79.5 percent of industry assets based on

data as of December 31, 2025.

Further, institutions that would shift

from the large bank scorecard

methodology to the small bank pricing

methodology under the proposal

demonstrate certain similarities with

other small institutions. For example,

and as described above, small

institutions with total assets between $1

billion and $10 billion report

approximately similar shares of foreign

deposits, uninsured deposits, and real

estate loans as those of the 76

institutions that would shift from the

large bank pricing scorecard

methodology to the small bank pricing

methodology under the proposal.

The FDIC considered several

alternative thresholds. In general,

relative to the alternatives considered,

the FDIC believes that the proposed

threshold of $30 billion best preserves

its intended purpose as it most closely

aligns with the shares of industry assets

held by small and large institutions in

2011, when the current large bank

pricing methodology was implemented,

but seeks comments on alternatives

d several

alternative thresholds. In general,

relative to the alternatives considered,

the FDIC believes that the proposed

threshold of $30 billion best preserves

its intended purpose as it most closely

aligns with the shares of industry assets

held by small and large institutions in

2011, when the current large bank

pricing methodology was implemented,

but seeks comments on alternatives.

Question 1: What are the advantages

and disadvantages of updating the

threshold for defining an institution as

small or large for deposit insurance

assessments purposes from $10 billion

in total assets to $30 billion in total

assets, as described above? Should the

FDIC consider other asset thresholds for

defining an institution as small or large

for deposit assessment purposes? Are

there any other factors the FDIC should

consider?

Question 2: What are the potential

unintended consequences, if any, of

establishing a higher threshold for

deposit insurance assessments

purposes?

D. Removing the Option for a Small

Institution To Request That the FDIC

Determine Its Assessment Rates as a

Large Institution

The FDIC’s assessment regulations

currently permit a small institution with

assets between $5 billion and $10

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34 12 CFR 327.16(f)(1).

35 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes

the CPI–W on a monthly basis. The CPI–W is used

to annually adjust benefits paid to Social Security

beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income

recipients. See U.S. Social Security Administration,

CPI for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers,

available at: www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/cpiw.html

, 2026 / Proposed Rules

34 12 CFR 327.16(f)(1).

35 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes

the CPI–W on a monthly basis. The CPI–W is used

to annually adjust benefits paid to Social Security

beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income

recipients. See U.S. Social Security Administration,

CPI for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers,

available at: www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/cpiw.html.

36 The use of CPI–W to index thresholds is

consistent with other bank regulations, such as

those relating to the Community Reinvestment Act

and the March 2026 proposed updates to the

regulatory capital rules. The indexing methodology

would also generally align with the methodology

used to adjust certain thresholds within FDIC

regulations. See, e.g., Community Reinvestment Act

Regulations Asset-Size Thresholds, 89 FR 106480,

106481 (Dec. 30, 2024); Regulatory Capital Rule:

Category I and II Banking Organizations, Banking

Organizations With Significant Trading Activity,

and Optional Adoption for Other Banking

Organizations, 91 FR 14952, 14960 (Mar. 27, 2026);

and Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital

and Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted

Assets, 91 FR 15332, 15364 (Mar. 27, 2026). See

also 12 CFR 229.11.

billion to request that the FDIC

determine its assessment rate as a large

institution.34 Approved requests

become effective within one year of the

date of the request. If an institution

whose request has been granted

subsequently reports total assets of less

than $5 billion in its Call Report for four

consecutive quarters, the institution

shall be deemed a small institution for

assessment purposes. If the FDIC

approves an institution’s request to be

treated as a large institution, the

institution is not eligible to request to be

assessed as a small institution for a

period of three years from the first

quarter its approval became effective

s

than $5 billion in its Call Report for four

consecutive quarters, the institution

shall be deemed a small institution for

assessment purposes. If the FDIC

approves an institution’s request to be

treated as a large institution, the

institution is not eligible to request to be

assessed as a small institution for a

period of three years from the first

quarter its approval became effective.

Small institutions that have exercised

this option generally have paid lower

assessments under the large bank

scorecard approach relative to the small

bank pricing methodology. However,

several additional reasons for requesting

this option have been cited, including

anticipated growth above the $10 billion

threshold and having an affiliated large

bank with which the small bank shares

the same reporting and risk framework.

The FDIC is proposing to remove this

option to promote fairness, simplicity,

and accuracy in risk-based deposit

insurance assessments. Additionally, if

the assessment methodology threshold

is consistently adjusted in the future to

reflect inflation, banks will be less likely

to naturally grow above the threshold.

The FDIC expects the impact of

removing this provision to be minimal

given that only nine requests were

received in the last ten years.

Question 3: What are the advantages

and disadvantages of eliminating the

option for a small institution to request

treatment as a large institution for

purposes of the assessment regulations,

as described above?

Question 4: What are the potential

unintended consequences, if any, of

eliminating this option?

E. One-Time Election for Reclassified

Institutions To Be Temporarily Priced

Using the Large Bank Scorecard Pricing

Methodology

Under the proposal, an institution

priced as a large institution immediately

prior to the effective date of any final

rule that reports total assets below the

updated threshold of $30 billion would

be priced as a small institution as of the

effective date of any final rule

e Election for Reclassified

Institutions To Be Temporarily Priced

Using the Large Bank Scorecard Pricing

Methodology

Under the proposal, an institution

priced as a large institution immediately

prior to the effective date of any final

rule that reports total assets below the

updated threshold of $30 billion would

be priced as a small institution as of the

effective date of any final rule. To

mitigate possible effects on some

institutions, including the potential

‘‘cliff effect’’ of immediately switching

pricing frameworks, the FDIC is

proposing to provide any bank classified

as a large institution immediately prior

to the effective date of any final rule that

report total assets below $30 billion a

one-time option to temporarily continue

to be priced as a large institution. Under

the proposal, a bank that exercises this

option would be ineligible for the RRA

unless and until the bank meets the

proposed definition of a large institution

by reporting total assets of $30 billion

(or such threshold adjusted in the future

for inflation) or more for four

consecutive quarters and elects to

submit to VDR testing or provides the

prescribed data access.

An institution electing this option

would continue to be priced as a large

institution for eight consecutive quarters

(inclusive of the first quarter) after the

effective date of any final rule. If an

institution that elects to be priced as a

large institution and has not reported

total assets of $30 billion or more for at

least four consecutive quarters reports

total assets of less than $30 billion at the

end of the eight-quarter transition

period, it will be classified as a small

institution beginning on the first day of

the subsequent quarter

effective date of any final rule. If an

institution that elects to be priced as a

large institution and has not reported

total assets of $30 billion or more for at

least four consecutive quarters reports

total assets of less than $30 billion at the

end of the eight-quarter transition

period, it will be classified as a small

institution beginning on the first day of

the subsequent quarter. If an institution

that elects to be priced as a large

institution reports total assets of $30

billion or more for four consecutive

quarters during the eight-quarter

transition period, it would be classified

as a large institution unless and until it

subsequently reports total assets below

the proposed threshold of $30 billion for

four consecutive quarters.

To elect this option, an eligible

institution would be required to provide

notice to the FDIC indicating its one-

time election for the FDIC to determine

its assessment rate as a large institution

for a period of time not to exceed the

eight-quarter transition period, as

defined under the proposal. The FDIC

anticipates posting on its website a form

letter that an eligible institution can

submit as notice. The FDIC must receive

such correspondence by mail or email

prior to the end of the quarter in which

any final rule becomes effective.

1. Alternatives Considered

An alternative to the proposed

approach would be to allow banks

reporting total assets between $10

billion and $30 billion a one-time

election to remain a large institution for

a longer period—for example, until the

next indexing adjustment. Another

alternative would be to reclassify banks

as small or large based on their asset

size as of the effective date of any final

rule without allowing any transition

period

sed

approach would be to allow banks

reporting total assets between $10

billion and $30 billion a one-time

election to remain a large institution for

a longer period—for example, until the

next indexing adjustment. Another

alternative would be to reclassify banks

as small or large based on their asset

size as of the effective date of any final

rule without allowing any transition

period.

The FDIC believes that providing for

a transition period would mitigate

possible effects on some institutions,

including the potential ‘‘cliff effect’’ of

immediately switching pricing

frameworks and invites comment,

including the appropriate length of any

transition.

Question 5: What are the advantages

and disadvantages of providing an

institution that is reclassified as a small

institution as a result of the proposed

update to the assessment methodology

threshold a one-time option to continue

to be priced as large for eight

consecutive quarters following the

effective date of any final rule?

Question 6: Should the FDIC consider

a shorter or longer transition period for

institutions reclassified as small

institutions as a result of the proposal?

Please explain.

Question 7: Should the FDIC permit

an institution that exercises the election

to be treated as a large institution to be

eligible for all or some of the RRA

during the time period it is priced as a

large institution?

F. Indexing of Threshold Used To

Define Small and Large Institutions

Under the proposal, the dollar-based

threshold included in the proposed

definitions of a small and large

institution would be updated and

adjusted every four years to reflect

inflation, pursuant to a pre-determined

indexing methodology. Specifically, the

proposed indexing methodology would

adjust the threshold based on the

consumer price index for urban wage

earners and clerical workers (CPI–W)

published by the U.S

r-based

threshold included in the proposed

definitions of a small and large

institution would be updated and

adjusted every four years to reflect

inflation, pursuant to a pre-determined

indexing methodology. Specifically, the

proposed indexing methodology would

adjust the threshold based on the

consumer price index for urban wage

earners and clerical workers (CPI–W)

published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor

Statistics.35 The use of CPI–W to index

thresholds is consistent with the

indexing methodology in other bank

regulations.36 Further, the indexing

methodology included under the

proposal would generally align with the

methodology used to adjust certain

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37 See supra fn 22.

38 See 91 FR 14952, 14960 (Mar. 27, 2026) and 91

FR 15332, 15364 (Mar. 27, 2026). See also 90 FR

55789 (Dec. 4, 2025).

39 Any periods of deflation would be reflected in

future threshold increases, as threshold adjustments

in the future would be based on the positive net

cumulative change in CPI–W.

40 For example, a threshold that would otherwise

be calculated as $30.964 billion would be rounded

to $31 billion.

41 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes

the CPI–W on a monthly basis.

42 Deposit insurance assessments are collected

quarterly in arrears. For example, for deposit

insurance coverage in the first quarter of each year

(i.e. from January 1 through March 31), institutions

are invoiced and payment is due in June of each

year. Accordingly, if an institution is reclassified as

a small institution with an effective date of January

1, for example, payment for the institution’s first

quarterly assessment calculated pursuant to the

small bank pricing methodology would not be

invoiced and due until June. See 12 CFR

327.3(b)(2).

43 See supra fn 22

31), institutions

are invoiced and payment is due in June of each

year. Accordingly, if an institution is reclassified as

a small institution with an effective date of January

1, for example, payment for the institution’s first

quarterly assessment calculated pursuant to the

small bank pricing methodology would not be

invoiced and due until June. See 12 CFR

327.3(b)(2).

43 See supra fn 22.

44 See 90 FR 35449, 35458 (Jul. 28, 2025). See also

90 FR 55789, 55791 (Dec. 4, 2025).

45 See supra fn 22.

other thresholds within FDIC

regulations.37

Under the proposal the asset-based

threshold defining small and large

institutions for purposes of deposit

insurance assessments would be

adjusted at the end of every consecutive

four-year period based on the

cumulative percent change of the non-

seasonally adjusted CPI–W since the

effective date of any final rule. This

four-year period is intended to provide

an appropriate cadence for capturing

meaningful changes in inflation on a

timely basis while minimizing the

burden of adjustment. The proposed

four-year cadence differs from the two-

year cadence proposed in the March

2026 proposed updates to the regulatory

capital rules and adopted in other FDIC

regulations in consideration of the

requirement that an institution exceed

the dollar-based asset threshold in the

definitions of small and large

institutions in the assessment

regulations for at least four consecutive

quarters before a definition becomes

applicable.38

The proposal would not lower the

threshold in the event of deflation.39 In

contrast to the indexing methodology

included in the March 2026 proposed

updates to the regulatory capital rules,

the threshold defining small and large

institutions in the assessment

regulations would not be adjusted

during any intervening calendar year to

address the possibility of periods of

unusual inflation

The proposal would not lower the

threshold in the event of deflation.39 In

contrast to the indexing methodology

included in the March 2026 proposed

updates to the regulatory capital rules,

the threshold defining small and large

institutions in the assessment

regulations would not be adjusted

during any intervening calendar year to

address the possibility of periods of

unusual inflation. The FDIC believes

this difference is appropriate given the

requirement that an institution must

generally report dollar amounts above or

below the asset threshold defining small

and large institutions in the assessment

regulations for four consecutive quarters

in order to meet the criteria for

applicability of the definitions and the

regular cadence of threshold

adjustments would instill consistency

and transparency in quarterly

assessment payments for IDIs.

Additionally, the threshold adjusted

under the proposed indexing

methodology would be rounded based

on the size of the threshold (e.g.,

billions, millions, thousands), generally,

to the nearest two significant digits, as

appropriate.40

To effectuate future threshold

adjustments under the proposal, the

FDIC would announce the thresholds

adjusted in accordance with the

indexing methodology by issuing a final

rule in the Federal Register to announce

the updated threshold without notice

and comment. Although the FDIC

would be required to publish a final rule

in the Federal Register, the adjustment

would occur even in the absence of

publication in the Federal Register

der the proposal, the

FDIC would announce the thresholds

adjusted in accordance with the

indexing methodology by issuing a final

rule in the Federal Register to announce

the updated threshold without notice

and comment. Although the FDIC

would be required to publish a final rule

in the Federal Register, the adjustment

would occur even in the absence of

publication in the Federal Register.

Threshold adjustments would be

calculated based on cumulative CPI–W

data through August of the year in

which the adjustment is made, relative

to the same initial baseline and would

be effective for the assessment period

beginning on October 1 of the year

during which an adjustment is made.41

An institution priced as a large bank

immediately prior to the effective date

of any final rule announcing a threshold

update that reports total assets below

the updated threshold, would be priced

as a small bank as of the effective date

of any final rule.42

1. Alternatives Considered

In developing this proposal and in

proposing and finalizing the first phase

of adjustments to certain thresholds

within FDIC regulations,43 the FDIC

considered other factors that could be

used to adjust certain thresholds in the

assessment regulations to preserve the

threshold levels in real terms over

time.44 For example, the indexing

methodology could rely on an

alternative index or measure of inflation

(e.g., core versus non-core measures).

Additionally, the FDIC considered using

changes in economic growth, such as

gross domestic product (GDP), or

banking industry assets as well as

alternative approaches using a less or

more frequent cadence or a process that

is less automated (e.g., requiring Board

approval or public notice and

comment).

Properly constructed, periodic

adjustments can avoid unintended and

undesirable outcomes

itionally, the FDIC considered using

changes in economic growth, such as

gross domestic product (GDP), or

banking industry assets as well as

alternative approaches using a less or

more frequent cadence or a process that

is less automated (e.g., requiring Board

approval or public notice and

comment).

Properly constructed, periodic

adjustments can avoid unintended and

undesirable outcomes. For example,

frequent adjustments in the absence of

meaningful change can result in

inefficiencies, as institutions realign

their reporting and balance sheet

management practices to reflect

adjusted thresholds. Conversely,

infrequent adjustments increase the risk

that the intended purpose of the

threshold is not preserved consistently

over time.

A threshold may be periodically

updated through ad-hoc review or

consistent adjustments. An ad-hoc

approach that does not pre-determine

future adjustments may better preserve

the threshold’s intended application by

allowing consideration of relevant

contextual factors at each future

adjustment. Such an approach may also

be less predictable and introduce

inefficiencies. Conversely, periodic

adjustments using a pre-determined

indexing methodology based on one or

more specified factors, such as inflation,

would increase efficiency and

predictability, but may limit flexibility

in cases where the measure is less

relevant to a future context.

Finally, the threshold used in the

assessment regulations to define an

institution as a small or large institution

and determine which assessment

methodology is applied can influence a

bank’s decision to grow, as a bank’s

deposit insurance assessment rate may

increase or decrease depending on

whether it is defined as a small, large,

or highly complex institution.

Moreover, while all banks are required

to report certain items on the Call

Report, as noted above, large and highly

complex institutions have additional

reporting requirements related to

assessments

fluence a

bank’s decision to grow, as a bank’s

deposit insurance assessment rate may

increase or decrease depending on

whether it is defined as a small, large,

or highly complex institution.

Moreover, while all banks are required

to report certain items on the Call

Report, as noted above, large and highly

complex institutions have additional

reporting requirements related to

assessments.

In general, properly structured and

appropriately sequenced threshold

adjustments promote consistent

application of regulatory requirements

over time and contribute to a more

durable regulatory framework that

enhances the overall efficacy of the risk-

based assessment system. In addition,

such adjustments can enhance

transparency and certainty and therefore

allow for more enhanced balance sheet

management practices for IDIs.

As noted in the FDIC’s 2025 final rule

on adjusting and indexing certain

regulatory thresholds, many

commenters supported the proposed

indexing methodology and related

process for automatic threshold

adjustments.45 The FDIC is proposing

substantively the same indexing

methodology as the 2025 final rule, with

the exception of the four-year cadence

and disallowing adjustments in

intervening years for periods of unusual

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tic threshold

adjustments.45 The FDIC is proposing

substantively the same indexing

methodology as the 2025 final rule, with

the exception of the four-year cadence

and disallowing adjustments in

intervening years for periods of unusual

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46 See supra fn 1.

47 See supra fn 7.

48 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(2)(A).

49 The risk factors referred to in factor (iv) include

the probability that the DIF will incur a loss with

respect to the institution, the likely amount of any

such loss, and the revenue needs of the DIF. See

section 7(b)(1)(C) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C.

1817(b)(1)(C).

50 See section 7(b)(2)(B) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C.

1817(b)(2)(B).

51 See 12 CFR 327.10(f)(3). In no case may any

such rate adjustments result in total base

assessment rates that are negative. See 12 CFR

327.10(f)(1).

52 See 87 FR 39388 (Jul. 1, 2022) and 87 FR 64314

(Oct. 24, 2022). The FDI Act requires the Board to

adopt a restoration plan when the DIF reserve ratio

falls below the statutory minimum of 1.35 percent

or is expected to within 6 months, to restore the DIF

to at least 1.35 percent within eight years, absent

extraordinary circumstances. See 12 U.S.C.

1817(b)(3)(B) and (E). The reserve ratio is calculated

as the ratio of the net worth of the DIF to the value

of the aggregate estimated insured deposits at the

end of a given quarter. See 12 U.S.C. 1813(y)(3).

53 See 12 CFR 327.10(b).

54 See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d).

55 The DRR is expressed as a percentage of

estimated insured deposits. The FDI Act requires

that the Board designate the DRR for the DIF and

publish the DRR before the beginning of each

calendar year

et worth of the DIF to the value

of the aggregate estimated insured deposits at the

end of a given quarter. See 12 U.S.C. 1813(y)(3).

53 See 12 CFR 327.10(b).

54 See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d).

55 The DRR is expressed as a percentage of

estimated insured deposits. The FDI Act requires

that the Board designate the DRR for the DIF and

publish the DRR before the beginning of each

calendar year. The Board must set the DRR in

accordance with its analysis of certain statutory

factors: risk of losses to the DIF; economic

conditions generally affecting IDIs; preventing

sharp swings in assessment rates; and any other

factors that the Board determines to be appropriate.

In December 2010, the Board set the DRR at 2

percent based on a comprehensive, long-range

management plan for the DIF and has voted

annually since then to maintain the 2 percent DRR,

most recently in November 2025. See 90 FR 54688

(Nov. 28, 2025).

56 See supra fn 16.

57 See 12 CFR 327.10(b)(2). An established

insured depository institution is a bank or savings

association that has been federally insured for at

least five years as of the last day of any quarter for

which it is being assessed. See 12 CFR 327.8(k).

inflation, in lieu of alternatives, to

reflect that general support.

Comments on the 2025 final rule on

adjusting and indexing certain

regulatory thresholds were mixed as to

whether to use CPI–W as the reference

index under the proposed indexing

methodology. A few commenters

supported the FDIC applying the same

methodology when updating and

adjusting thresholds across its

regulations. Others suggested

alternatives to CPI–W, including

nominal GDP, banking industry assets,

or an approach that would tailor the

reference index by threshold type—for

example, using CPI–W for consumer-

facing monetary thresholds, and

nominal GDP for asset-based thresholds

mmenters

supported the FDIC applying the same

methodology when updating and

adjusting thresholds across its

regulations. Others suggested

alternatives to CPI–W, including

nominal GDP, banking industry assets,

or an approach that would tailor the

reference index by threshold type—for

example, using CPI–W for consumer-

facing monetary thresholds, and

nominal GDP for asset-based thresholds.

In general, the FDIC is proposing to

update the assessment methodology

threshold using CPI–W rather than

using one or more other potential

measures to promote consistency and

reduce complexity across regulatory

thresholds.

The FDIC considered these

alternatives and comments in

developing the proposal for adjusting

thresholds in the assessment

regulations. The FDIC requests

additional feedback on all alternative

approaches discussed and any other

alternative approaches that should be

considered.

The FDIC continues to evaluate other

dollar-based thresholds in the

assessment regulations and may

consider soliciting comment on

updating and adjusting additional

thresholds through a subsequent

proposal to amend the assessment

regulations.

Question 8: What are the advantages

and disadvantages of the proposed

approach for indexing the threshold

used for defining large and small

institutions for purposes of deposit

insurance assessments? What

alternatives should the FDIC consider

and why?

Question 9: What are the advantages

and disadvantages of using a different

index for adjusting the threshold, such

as banking industry assets, nominal

GDP, or the GDP deflator, instead of

CPI–W?

Question 10: Should the FDIC

consider a shorter or longer interval

than four years for automatic threshold

adjustments, and if so, why?

Question 11: What are the advantages

and disadvantages of discretionary off-

year adjustments for periods of unusual

inflation? Should the FDIC consider a

framework for adjustment in off years,

and if so, why?

III. Proposed Revisions to Assessment

Rates

A

stion 10: Should the FDIC

consider a shorter or longer interval

than four years for automatic threshold

adjustments, and if so, why?

Question 11: What are the advantages

and disadvantages of discretionary off-

year adjustments for periods of unusual

inflation? Should the FDIC consider a

framework for adjustment in off years,

and if so, why?

III. Proposed Revisions to Assessment

Rates

A. Background

1. Deposit Insurance Assessment Rates

Pursuant to section 7 of the FDI Act,

the FDIC has established a risk-based

assessment system through which it

charges all IDIs an assessment amount

for deposit insurance.46 Under the

FDIC’s assessment regulations, an IDI’s

assessment amount is equal to its

assessment base multiplied by its risk-

based assessment rate.47 The FDIC is

authorized to set assessments for IDIs in

such amounts as the FDIC may

determine to be necessary or

appropriate.48 In setting assessment

rates, the FDIC is required by statute to

consider the following factors:

(i) The estimated operating expenses

of the DIF.

(ii) The estimated case resolution

expenses and income of the DIF.

(iii) The projected effects of the

payment of assessments on the capital

and earnings of IDIs.

(iv) The risk factors and other factors

taken into account pursuant to section

7(b)(1) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.

1817(b)(1)) under the risk-based

assessment system, including the

requirement under such section to

maintain a risk-based system.49

case resolution

expenses and income of the DIF.

(iii) The projected effects of the

payment of assessments on the capital

and earnings of IDIs.

(iv) The risk factors and other factors

taken into account pursuant to section

7(b)(1) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.

1817(b)(1)) under the risk-based

assessment system, including the

requirement under such section to

maintain a risk-based system.49

(v) Other factors the FDIC has

determined to be appropriate.50

In addition, the FDIC Board of

Directors (Board) is authorized to

uniformly increase or decrease the total

base rate assessment schedule up to a

maximum of 2 basis points or a fraction

thereof, as the Board deems necessary,

without further rulemaking.51

2. Current Assessment Rate Schedules

and the Reserve Ratio

Effective January 1, 2023, the FDIC

adopted an increase in initial base

deposit insurance assessment rate

schedules of 2 basis points as part of the

statutorily-required Restoration Plan.52

Those rate schedules are currently in

effect and are detailed below.53

Progressively lower assessment rate

schedules will take effect when the

reserve ratio exceeds 2 percent and 2.5

percent, and the FDIC did not modify

those schedules when increasing rates

in 2023.54

As of June 30, 2025, the reserve ratio

increased to 1.36 percent, above the

statutory minimum of 1.35 percent.

Therefore, the FDIC is no longer

operating under a Restoration Plan. The

reserve ratio was 1.43 percent as of

March 31, 2026, and has continued to

progress toward the FDIC’s long-term

goal of a 2 percent designated reserve

ratio (DRR).55

a. Current Assessment Rate Schedules

for Established Small Institutions and

Large and Highly Complex Institutions

Assessment rates for established small

institutions and large and highly

complex institutions currently in effect

while the reserve ratio is less than 2

percent are set forth in Table 2 below

ss toward the FDIC’s long-term

goal of a 2 percent designated reserve

ratio (DRR).55

a. Current Assessment Rate Schedules

for Established Small Institutions and

Large and Highly Complex Institutions

Assessment rates for established small

institutions and large and highly

complex institutions currently in effect

while the reserve ratio is less than 2

percent are set forth in Table 2 below.

An institution’s total base assessment

rate may vary from the institution’s

initial base assessment rate as a result of

possible adjustments for certain

liabilities that can increase or reduce

loss to the DIF in the event the

institution fails.56 After applying all

possible adjustments, the current

minimum and maximum total base

assessment rates for established small

institutions and large and highly

complex institutions are set forth in

Table 2 below.57

BILLING CODE 6714–01–P

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58 In lieu of dividends, and pursuant to the FDIC’s

authority to set assessments, the progressively

lower initial base and total base assessment rates set

forth in 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d) will come into

effect without further action by the Board when the

fund reserve ratio at the end of the prior assessment

period reaches 2 percent and 2.5 percent,

respectively.

The assessment rates currently

applicable to established small

institutions and large and highly

complex institutions in Table 2 above

remain in effect unless and until the

reserve ratio meets or exceeds 2

percent.58

Table 3 below applies if the reserve

ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior

assessment period is equal to or greater

than 2 percent and less than 2.5 percent

ectively.

The assessment rates currently

applicable to established small

institutions and large and highly

complex institutions in Table 2 above

remain in effect unless and until the

reserve ratio meets or exceeds 2

percent.58

Table 3 below applies if the reserve

ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior

assessment period is equal to or greater

than 2 percent and less than 2.5 percent.

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Under the current regulations, Table 4

below applies to established small

institutions and large and highly

complex institutions if the reserve ratio

of the DIF as of the end of the prior

assessment period is greater than 2.5

percent.

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59 See 12 CFR 327.10(e)(1)(iv)(B). Subject to

exceptions, a new depository institution is a bank

or savings association that has been federally

insured for less than five years as of the last day

of any quarter for which it is being assessed. See

also 12 CFR 327.8(j).

60 See 12 CFR 327.10(e)(1)(iv)(B).

61 See 75 FR 66272, 66283 (Oct. 27, 2010) and 76

FR 10672, 10686 (Feb. 25, 2011).

b

es

59 See 12 CFR 327.10(e)(1)(iv)(B). Subject to

exceptions, a new depository institution is a bank

or savings association that has been federally

insured for less than five years as of the last day

of any quarter for which it is being assessed. See

also 12 CFR 327.8(j).

60 See 12 CFR 327.10(e)(1)(iv)(B).

61 See 75 FR 66272, 66283 (Oct. 27, 2010) and 76

FR 10672, 10686 (Feb. 25, 2011).

b. Current Assessment Rate Schedules

for New Small Institutions

Current assessment rates applicable to

new small institutions are set forth in

Table 5 below.59 New small institutions

remain subject to the assessment

schedules in Table 5 when the reserve

ratio reaches 2 percent or 2.5 percent.60

As stated in the 2010 notice of proposed

rulemaking describing the FDIC’s

comprehensive, long-term fund

management plan, and adopted in a

2011 Final Rule, the lower assessment

rate schedules applicable when the

reserve ratio reaches 2 percent and 2.5

percent do not apply to any new

depository institutions; these

institutions will remain subject to the

assessment rates shown below, until

they no longer are new depository

institutions.61

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62 See 12 CFR 327.10(e)(2)(ii).

63 In lieu of dividends, and pursuant to the FDIC’s

authority to set assessments, the progressively

lower initial base and total base assessment rates set

forth in 12 CFR 327.10(e)(2)(iii) and (iv) will come

into effect without further action by the FDIC Board

when the fund reserve ratio at the end of the prior

assessment period reaches 2 percent and 2.5

percent, respectively.

c

)(2)(ii).

63 In lieu of dividends, and pursuant to the FDIC’s

authority to set assessments, the progressively

lower initial base and total base assessment rates set

forth in 12 CFR 327.10(e)(2)(iii) and (iv) will come

into effect without further action by the FDIC Board

when the fund reserve ratio at the end of the prior

assessment period reaches 2 percent and 2.5

percent, respectively.

c. Current Assessment Rate Schedule for

Insured Branches of Foreign Banks

Current assessment rates applicable to

insured branches of foreign banks are

set forth in Table 6 below.62 The rates

in Table 6 remain in effect unless and

until the reserve ratio meets or exceeds

2 percent.63 Progressively lower

assessment rate schedules for insured

branches of foreign banks will become

effective when the reserve ratio exceeds

2 percent and 2.5 percent.

BILLING CODE 6714–01–C

B. Proposed Updates to Assessment

Rate Schedules

The FDIC is proposing several

updates to deposit insurance assessment

rate schedules after considering the

statutory factors and the current status

of the DIF, as discussed below in section

VII. of this Supplementary Information.

As noted, the DIF is no longer operating

under a Restoration Plan, and the

reserve ratio is steadily progressing

toward the 2 percent DRR.

1. Proposed 2 Basis Point Reduction in

Initial Base Assessment Rate Schedules

Applied to Small Institutions

The FDIC is proposing to decrease

certain initial base deposit insurance

assessment rate schedules by 2 basis

points, beginning upon the effective

date of any final rule. Specifically, the

proposed 2 basis point decrease in

initial base assessment rate schedules

would apply to small institutions as

defined under this proposal and would

be applicable to established small

institutions, new small institutions, and

insured branches of foreign banks

osit insurance

assessment rate schedules by 2 basis

points, beginning upon the effective

date of any final rule. Specifically, the

proposed 2 basis point decrease in

initial base assessment rate schedules

would apply to small institutions as

defined under this proposal and would

be applicable to established small

institutions, new small institutions, and

insured branches of foreign banks.

As earlier described, the FDIC is

proposing to update the asset-based

threshold in the assessment regulations

used to define a small institution from

$10 billion in total assets to $30 billion

in total assets. Based on Call Report data

as of December 31, 2025, raising the

threshold from $10 billion to $30 billion

would result in approximately 76 IDIs

shifting from the large institution

definition to the small institution

definition for which the small

institution pricing methodology and the

proposed 2 basis point decrease in

initial base assessment rate schedules

would apply.

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64 See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d).

65 The FDI Act requires the FDIC to establish a

risk-based assessment system for calculating an

IDI’s assessment based on the probability that the

DIF will incur a loss with respect to that IDI and

the likely amount of any such loss, among other

factors. See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)(C).

66 If a large or highly complex institution is

affiliated with other IDIs, only an affiliate that is

itself a large or highly complex institution would

be eligible to seek a resolution readiness assessment

adjustment.

67 See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d).

68 See supra fn 16.

The proposed initial base assessment

rate schedules would remain in effect

unless and until the reserve ratio meets

or exceeds 2 percent

highly complex institution is

affiliated with other IDIs, only an affiliate that is

itself a large or highly complex institution would

be eligible to seek a resolution readiness assessment

adjustment.

67 See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d).

68 See supra fn 16.

The proposed initial base assessment

rate schedules would remain in effect

unless and until the reserve ratio meets

or exceeds 2 percent. In lieu of

dividends, the progressively lower

initial base assessment rate schedules

currently in the regulation would

remain unchanged for small institutions

and would come into effect without

further action by the Board when the

DIF reserve ratio at the end of the prior

assessment period reaches 2 percent and

2.5 percent, respectively.64

a. Analysis

Based on data as of December 31,

2025, a 2 basis point reduction in initial

base assessment rate schedules

applicable to banks that would meet the

proposed definition of a small

institution (generally, those under $30

billion in total assets) is estimated to

result in a decline in annual

assessments of approximately $917

million, or 7.5 percent of total annual

assessments.

2. Proposed Updates to Assessment Rate

Schedules Applied to Large and Highly

Complex Institutions

a. Proposed Reduction in Initial Base

Assessment Rates

The FDIC is also proposing to

decrease initial base deposit insurance

assessment rate schedules applicable to

large and highly complex institutions by

1 basis point, beginning upon the

effective date of any final rule.

b

assessments.

2. Proposed Updates to Assessment Rate

Schedules Applied to Large and Highly

Complex Institutions

a. Proposed Reduction in Initial Base

Assessment Rates

The FDIC is also proposing to

decrease initial base deposit insurance

assessment rate schedules applicable to

large and highly complex institutions by

1 basis point, beginning upon the

effective date of any final rule.

b. Proposed Resolution Readiness

Adjustment

The proposal would also establish a

new downward assessment rate

adjustment, the RRA, available to IDIs

that meet the proposed definition of a

large institution or that are highly

complex institutions, and that elect to

submit to testing of the institution’s

ability to populate a VDR with

information that could be used to

market a bank in the event of failure,

and/or provide the FDIC prescribed data

access, including access to an

institution’s service provider(s) and/or

internal systems, to support readiness

for the resolution of rapid failures.

In recognition of the expected

reduction in losses to the DIF in the

event of failure,65 the FDIC is proposing

to apply a downward adjustment of up

to 1 basis point to assessment rates,

available to large and highly complex

institutions that elect to participate,

including 0.5 basis points for passing

the VDR testing exercise and 0.5 basis

points for providing prescribed data

access, as described in section IV. of this

Supplementary Information.66

c

the

event of failure,65 the FDIC is proposing

to apply a downward adjustment of up

to 1 basis point to assessment rates,

available to large and highly complex

institutions that elect to participate,

including 0.5 basis points for passing

the VDR testing exercise and 0.5 basis

points for providing prescribed data

access, as described in section IV. of this

Supplementary Information.66

c. Proposed Revisions to Initial Base

Assessment Rates When the Reserve

Ratio Reaches 2 Percent and 2.5 Percent

Under the current regulation,

progressively lower initial base

assessment rate schedules applicable to

large and highly complex institutions

will come into effect when the reserve

ratio reaches 2 percent and 2.5 percent,

with minimum initial base assessment

rates declining from 5 basis points to 2

basis points and 1 basis point,

respectively.67 Under the proposal, the

minimum initial base assessment rates

applied to large and highly complex

institutions would still become

progressively lower, declining from 4

basis points to 3 basis points and to 2

basis points when the reserve ratio

reaches 2 percent and 2.5 percent,

respectively, in order to incorporate the

RRA into the assessment rate schedules.

This proposed revision to the initial

base assessment rate schedules

combined with the proposed allocation

of adjustments described below have the

result that a large or highly complex

institution at the minimum initial base

assessment rate could effectively

achieve the maximum proposed RRA.

This proposal would also maintain the

same minimum total base assessment

rates applicable to large and highly

complex institutions as the rates in the

current schedules that come into effect

when the reserve ratio reaches 2 percent

and 2.5 percent applicable to small

banks.

d

lex

institution at the minimum initial base

assessment rate could effectively

achieve the maximum proposed RRA.

This proposal would also maintain the

same minimum total base assessment

rates applicable to large and highly

complex institutions as the rates in the

current schedules that come into effect

when the reserve ratio reaches 2 percent

and 2.5 percent applicable to small

banks.

d. Proposed Allocation of Assessment

Rate Adjustments Applicable to Large

and Highly Complex Institutions

Assessment Rates

Under the current assessment

regulations, adjustments to the initial

base assessment rates of institutions are

made in the following order: (1) the

unsecured debt adjustment can reduce

an institution’s assessment rate by the

lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent of

the institution’s initial base assessment

rate; (2) the depository institution debt

adjustment can increase an institution’s

assessment rate based on unsecured

debt held by the institution that is

issued by another depository institution;

and finally (3), the brokered deposit

adjustment can increase an institution’s

assessment rate by up to 10 basis

points.68

The FDIC is proposing that the RRA

would be applied to a large or highly

complex institution’s initial base

assessment rate first, prior to the

application of the other adjustments,

and the unsecured debt adjustment

would be limited to the lesser of 5 basis

points or 50 percent of a large or highly

complex institution’s initial base

assessment rate less any applicable

RRA. Under the proposal, the allocation

of, and limitations on, a small bank’s

rate adjustments would remain

unchanged

al base

assessment rate first, prior to the

application of the other adjustments,

and the unsecured debt adjustment

would be limited to the lesser of 5 basis

points or 50 percent of a large or highly

complex institution’s initial base

assessment rate less any applicable

RRA. Under the proposal, the allocation

of, and limitations on, a small bank’s

rate adjustments would remain

unchanged.

The proposed allocation of

adjustments—specifically, allowing for

an institution’s initial base assessment

rate to be reduced by up to the

maximum RRA of 1 basis point before

applying the unsecured debt

adjustment—would have the result that

a large or highly complex institution

that is assigned an assessment rate that

is the least risky, or the minimum initial

base assessment rate, would be able to

apply an unsecured debt adjustment of

up to 1.5 basis points when the reserve

ratio is less than 2 percent, as shown in

Table 7. This maximum unsecured debt

adjustment of 1.5 basis points would be

equal to the maximum unsecured debt

adjustment that could apply to a small

institution assigned the minimum initial

base assessment rate, and would also be

equal to the maximum unsecured debt

adjustment available prior to the 2023

increase in the rate schedules applied

while the reserve ratio is less than 2

percent.

Similarly, when the reserve ratio

exceeds 2 percent, allocating the RRA

before the unsecured debt adjustment

would result in a large or highly

complex institution that is assigned the

minimum initial base assessment rate

being able to apply up to a 1 basis point

unsecured debt adjustment, also shown

in Table 7, and on par with a small

institution assigned the minimum initial

base assessment rate.

When the reserve ratio exceeds 2.5

percent, the proposed allocation would

result in a large or highly complex

institution that is assigned the

minimum initial base assessment rate

being able to apply up to a 0.5 basis

point unsecured debt adjustment

nt

unsecured debt adjustment, also shown

in Table 7, and on par with a small

institution assigned the minimum initial

base assessment rate.

When the reserve ratio exceeds 2.5

percent, the proposed allocation would

result in a large or highly complex

institution that is assigned the

minimum initial base assessment rate

being able to apply up to a 0.5 basis

point unsecured debt adjustment. As

proposed, the 1 basis point RRA is equal

to or exceeds the maximum unsecured

debt adjustments of 1 basis point and

0.5 basis points available to large and

highly complex institutions with the

minimum initial base assessment rate in

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the schedules applied when the reserve

ratio is between 2 percent and 2.5

percent, and 2.5 percent or greater.

In absence of these revisions, the

maximum unsecured debt adjustment

that a bank at the minimum initial base

assessment rate could receive would

decrease because the adjustment is

limited to the lesser of 5 basis points or

50 percent of the bank’s initial base

assessment rate (or, in the case of the

proposal, 50 percent of the bank’s initial

base assessment rate less any applicable

RRA). For example, when the reserve

ratio is equal to or greater than 2 percent

but less than 2.5 percent, the minimum

initial base assessment rate for large and

highly complex institutions is 2 basis

points. Under the current assessments

regulations, a bank receiving the

minimum initial base assessment rate of

2 basis points would have a maximum

unsecured debt adjustment of 1 basis

point. If the same bank under the

proposal also received the full RRA of

1 basis point, its maximum unsecured

debt adjustment would decline to 0.5

basis points

e and

highly complex institutions is 2 basis

points. Under the current assessments

regulations, a bank receiving the

minimum initial base assessment rate of

2 basis points would have a maximum

unsecured debt adjustment of 1 basis

point. If the same bank under the

proposal also received the full RRA of

1 basis point, its maximum unsecured

debt adjustment would decline to 0.5

basis points.

Recognizing the significant benefit

that the issuance of unsecured debt may

have on potential losses to the DIF in

the event of a bank failure, the proposed

rate schedules would result in no

change to the maximum unsecured debt

adjustment for banks receiving the

minimum initial base assessment rate in

the rate schedules applied when the

reserve ratio exceeds 2 percent. In the

preceding example, the minimum initial

base assessment rate for large and highly

complex institutions would be 3 basis

points and the maximum unsecured

debt adjustment for a bank receiving the

minimum would remain 1 basis point.

In addition, under the proposed rate

schedules, the minimum assessment

rate after all adjustments are applied

would be the same for large and highly

complex institutions and for small

banks.

e. Timing of the Application of the

Resolution Readiness Adjustment

As further described below in section

IV. of this Supplementary Information,

to be eligible for the RRA, a large or

highly complex institution that wishes

to opt into the RRA would submit a

notice of election to the FDIC to

participate in testing of the institution’s

ability to populate a VDR and/or to

provide access to an institution’s service

provider(s) and/or internal systems to

obtain detailed bank data needed to

manage and market the bank in

receivership.

f. Timing of the Component of the RRA

for Data Access Engagement

The FDIC anticipates that the initial

round of data access engagement would

take approximately four years to

complete for large or highly complex

institutions that elect to participate

nstitution’s service

provider(s) and/or internal systems to

obtain detailed bank data needed to

manage and market the bank in

receivership.

f. Timing of the Component of the RRA

for Data Access Engagement

The FDIC anticipates that the initial

round of data access engagement would

take approximately four years to

complete for large or highly complex

institutions that elect to participate.

Under this proposal, the first 0.5 basis

points of the RRA for providing the

FDIC access to an institution’s service

provider(s) and/or internal systems to

obtain detailed bank data needed to

manage and market the bank in

receivership would be applied at the

beginning of the first full quarterly

assessment period after the date on

which the institution elects to

participate. For instance, if an

institution elected to participate on May

15, it would first be entitled to a 0.5

basis point adjustment for providing

data access in the quarterly assessment

period beginning on July 1, for which

payment would be invoiced and due in

December.

If an institution fails to follow through

on providing prescribed data access or

does not provide information or access

to personnel that the FDIC needs to

assess the data, documents, and other

materials that must be provided, the

FDIC would cease application of the 0.5

basis point adjustment beginning the

following quarterly assessment period.

If this occurs in the initial data access

engagement, the institution would be

liable to reimburse the FDIC for an

amount equal to the total amount of the

0.5 basis point component of the

adjustment for data access the

institution already received.

g. Timing of the Component of the RRA

for VDR Testing

If the institution satisfies the

requirements of the rule with respect to

the VDR test, the FDIC would generally

apply the 0.5 basis point component of

the RRA beginning in the first quarterly

assessment period after the institution

passes the VDR test

oint component of the

adjustment for data access the

institution already received.

g. Timing of the Component of the RRA

for VDR Testing

If the institution satisfies the

requirements of the rule with respect to

the VDR test, the FDIC would generally

apply the 0.5 basis point component of

the RRA beginning in the first quarterly

assessment period after the institution

passes the VDR test. However, as

described further below, the FDIC will

not initially apply the downward

adjustment until all banks have

completed the initial round of testing, to

ensure that institutions who are tested

sooner do not unfairly benefit from the

timing of the tests.

h. Retesting and Follow-Up Data Access

Engagements

Participating institutions would be

subject to periodic retesting and follow-

up data access engagements, as

described in section IV. of this

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Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 30, 2026 / Proposed Rules

Supplementary Information. If an

institution receives an RRA, the

institution would generally continue to

receive the adjustment for each

quarterly assessment period unless and

until the institution does not

successfully complete a future VDR test

or declines to participate in subsequent

data access engagement, at which point

the institution’s downward adjustment

for the applicable component would

cease to apply in the next quarterly

assessment period.

i. Analysis

While the reserve ratio is less than 2

percent, the minimum total base

assessment rate for large and highly

complex institutions that receive the

maximum proposed RRA would be 1.5

basis points, the same minimum that

would apply to small institutions

he institution’s downward adjustment

for the applicable component would

cease to apply in the next quarterly

assessment period.

i. Analysis

While the reserve ratio is less than 2

percent, the minimum total base

assessment rate for large and highly

complex institutions that receive the

maximum proposed RRA would be 1.5

basis points, the same minimum that

would apply to small institutions. The

proposed minimum total base

assessment rate of 1.5 basis points is 1

basis point lower than in the current

schedule and is the same as the

minimum total base assessment rate that

was applicable prior to the 2023

increase in the assessment rate schedule

in place while the reserve ratio is less

than 2 percent.

The minimum total base assessment

rates when the reserve ratio is equal to

or greater than 2 percent are the same

for small, large, and highly complex

institutions and are unchanged from the

current schedules, which were not

raised in 2023. The proposed revisions

to the assessment rate schedules are

illustrated in the tables below.

If all IDIs that meet the proposed

definition of a large institution or that

are highly complex institutions

successfully participate in and pass the

VDR exercise and provide the

prescribed data access to achieve the

maximum RRA of 1 basis point, the

RRA combined with the proposed 1

basis point reduction in initial base

assessment rates is generally estimated

to result in a decline in annual

assessments of approximately $3.4

billion, or approximately 27.8 percent of

total annual assessments, based on data

as of December 31, 2025

the

VDR exercise and provide the

prescribed data access to achieve the

maximum RRA of 1 basis point, the

RRA combined with the proposed 1

basis point reduction in initial base

assessment rates is generally estimated

to result in a decline in annual

assessments of approximately $3.4

billion, or approximately 27.8 percent of

total annual assessments, based on data

as of December 31, 2025.

While the proposed reduction in the

initial base assessment rates would be

applied beginning with the effective

date of any final rule, and the

component of the RRA associated with

data access engagement would be

applied the quarterly assessment period

following the institution’s election, the

effects of the component of the RRA

associated with the initial VDR testing

would not be applied until all

institutions who initially elect to

participate have completed testing,

which under the proposal the FDIC

would complete within one year from

the effective date of any final rule. In

addition to the staggered timing for

completion of the first cycle and

application of the adjustment, the

aggregate effect of the RRA is also

contingent on the number of large and

highly complex institutions that elect to

participate in and successfully pass the

VDR testing and provide the prescribed

data access.

Expanded analysis of the aggregate

expected effects of the proposal,

evaluation of the costs and benefits, and

consideration of the statutory factors are

included below in sections VII. and VIII.

of this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.

C. Proposed Assessment Rate Schedules

1. Proposed Assessment Rate Schedules

for Established Small Institutions and

Large and Highly Complex Institutions

Pursuant to the FDIC’s authority to set

assessments, the FDIC is proposing the

following initial base assessment rates,

adjustments, and total base assessment

rates applicable to established small

institutions and large and highly

complex institutions set forth in Table

8 below

Proposed Assessment Rate Schedules

for Established Small Institutions and

Large and Highly Complex Institutions

Pursuant to the FDIC’s authority to set

assessments, the FDIC is proposing the

following initial base assessment rates,

adjustments, and total base assessment

rates applicable to established small

institutions and large and highly

complex institutions set forth in Table

8 below.

BILLING CODE 6714–01–P

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69 In lieu of dividends, and pursuant to the FDIC’s

authority to set assessments, the progressively

lower initial base and total base assessment rates set

forth in 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d) will come into

effect without further action by the Board when the

fund reserve ratio at the end of the prior assessment

period reaches 2 percent and 2.5 percent,

respectively.

The proposed assessment rate

schedules applicable to established

small institutions and large and highly

complex institutions in Table 8 above

would remain in effect unless and until

the reserve ratio meets or exceeds 2

percent.69

The proposed initial base assessment

rates, adjustments, and total base

assessment rates in Table 9 below

would be in effect if the reserve ratio of

the DIF as of the end of the prior

assessment period is equal to or greater

than 2 percent and less than 2.5 percent.

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ments, and total base

assessment rates in Table 9 below

would be in effect if the reserve ratio of

the DIF as of the end of the prior

assessment period is equal to or greater

than 2 percent and less than 2.5 percent.

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Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 30, 2026 / Proposed Rules

The proposed initial base assessment

rates, adjustments, and total base

assessment rates in Table 10 below

would be in effect if the reserve ratio of

the DIF as of the end of the prior

assessment period is equal to or greater

than 2.5 percent.

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2. Proposed Assessment Rates for New

Small Institutions

Pursuant to the FDIC’s authority to set

assessments, the proposed initial and

total base assessment rates applicable to

new small institutions set forth in Table

11 below would take effect beginning

upon the effective date of any final rule.

New small institutions would remain

subject to the assessment schedules in

Table 11, even when the reserve ratio

reaches 2 percent or 2.5 percent, until

they no longer were new depository

institutions, consistent with current

assessment regulations.

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n

subject to the assessment schedules in

Table 11, even when the reserve ratio

reaches 2 percent or 2.5 percent, until

they no longer were new depository

institutions, consistent with current

assessment regulations.

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3. Insured Branches of Foreign Banks

Pursuant to the FDIC’s authority to set

assessments, the proposed initial and

total base assessment rates applicable to

insured branches of foreign banks set

forth in Table 12 below would take

effect beginning upon the effective date

of any final rule.

BILLING CODE 6714–01–C

a. Alternatives Considered

In proposing the updates to

assessment rate schedules, the FDIC

considered a number of potential

alternatives, including maintaining the

current schedule of initial base

assessment rates, applying higher or

lower reductions to initial base

assessment rates, applying higher or

lower VDR and data access adjustments,

and modifying the assessment rate

schedules that apply when the reserve

ratio exceeds 2 percent and 2.5 percent.

The FDIC also considered how the

unsecured debt adjustment would

interact with the RRA and the impact on

the maximum unsecured debt

adjustment applicable to large and

highly complex institutions at the

minimum initial base assessment rates

and at higher rates. The unsecured debt

adjustment was adopted in recognition

that, all else equal, greater amounts of

long-term unsecured debt can reduce

the potential loss to the DIF in the event

of an IDI’s failure

teract with the RRA and the impact on

the maximum unsecured debt

adjustment applicable to large and

highly complex institutions at the

minimum initial base assessment rates

and at higher rates. The unsecured debt

adjustment was adopted in recognition

that, all else equal, greater amounts of

long-term unsecured debt can reduce

the potential loss to the DIF in the event

of an IDI’s failure. The FDIC is

proposing to adopt the RRA in

recognition that a large or highly

complex institution’s ability to both

populate a VDR with information that

could be used to market the bank in the

event of its failure and provide the FDIC

access to detailed bank data needed to

manage and market the bank in

receivership can improve resolution

efficiencies and result in a reduction in

losses to the DIF in the event of the

institution’s failure. The FDIC

recognizes that the proposed structure

creates a potential asymmetry in which

the unsecured debt adjustment can be

significantly greater than the RRA for

institutions with higher initial base

assessment rates, while the RRA would

be equal to or greater than the

unsecured debt adjustment for

institutions with the minimum initial

base assessment rate when the reserve

ratio exceeds 2 percent, and seeks

comment on this proposed structure.

Question 12: The FDIC invites

comment on the proposal to revise

deposit insurance assessment rates,

beginning with the effective date of any

final rule. How does the approach in the

proposed rule support or not support

the objectives of the FDIC’s

comprehensive, long-range management

plan for the DIF? What are the

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effective date of any

final rule. How does the approach in the

proposed rule support or not support

the objectives of the FDIC’s

comprehensive, long-range management

plan for the DIF? What are the

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70 If a large or highly complex institution is

affiliated with other IDIs, only an affiliate that is

itself a large or highly complex institution would

be eligible to seek a resolution readiness assessment

adjustment.

advantages and disadvantages of the

proposed reductions in assessment

rates? Are there alternatives the FDIC

should consider, and if so, why?

Question 13:The FDIC invites

comment on the proposed RRA. What

are the advantages and disadvantages of

implementing such an adjustment? Is

the calibration appropriate, and if not,

why?

Question 14: The FDIC additionally

invites comment on the proposed

allocation of the RRA and incorporation

into the assessment rate schedules. Are

there alternative approaches for

allocation or incorporation into the

assessment rate schedules the FDIC

should consider?

Question 15: Under the proposal, the

unsecured debt adjustment would be

limited to the lesser of 5 basis points or

half of an institution’s initial base

assessment rate less any applicable

RRA. As proposed, the 1 basis point

RRA equals or exceeds the maximum

unsecured debt adjustments of 1 basis

point and 0.5 basis points available to

large and highly complex institutions

with the minimum initial base

assessment rate in the schedules

applied when the reserve ratio is

between 2 percent and 2.5 percent, and

2.5 percent or greater. The FDIC invites

comment on the relative allocation of

these adjustments. Are there are

alternative allocations or limitations the

FDIC should consider?

IV

t and 0.5 basis points available to

large and highly complex institutions

with the minimum initial base

assessment rate in the schedules

applied when the reserve ratio is

between 2 percent and 2.5 percent, and

2.5 percent or greater. The FDIC invites

comment on the relative allocation of

these adjustments. Are there are

alternative allocations or limitations the

FDIC should consider?

IV. Resolution Readiness Adjustment

Under the proposed rule, the FDIC

would apply a downward resolution

readiness adjustment to the assessment

rate of a large or highly complex

institution that elects to (1) submit to

testing of the institution’s ability to

populate a VDR (VDR test) with

information that could be used to

market the bank in the event of its

failure (VDR component) and/or (2)

provide the FDIC access to an

institution’s service provider(s) and/or

internal systems if the institution

maintains its own proprietary data

systems, to obtain detailed bank data

needed to manage and market the bank

in receivership (data access

component).70 The proposed RRA

would be comprised of a 0.5 basis point

adjustment for successfully passing a

VDR test (VDR adjustment) and a 0.5

basis point adjustment for completing

the data access component (data access

adjustment) in recognition of the

expected reduction in losses to the DIF

in the event of the failure of an

institution that participates and

completes both components.

A. Background

A large or highly complex

institution’s ability to quickly populate

a VDR with complete, timely, and

accurate information can be key to

ensuring that the FDIC receives high

quality bids in the event of the

institution’s failure, which would

reduce the likely amount of loss to the

DIF. From a marketing standpoint, an

institution’s ability to quickly populate

a VDR is critical to ensuring necessary

information on unique business lines

can be supplied in a timely manner for

bidders to evaluate the institution’s

franchise

o

ensuring that the FDIC receives high

quality bids in the event of the

institution’s failure, which would

reduce the likely amount of loss to the

DIF. From a marketing standpoint, an

institution’s ability to quickly populate

a VDR is critical to ensuring necessary

information on unique business lines

can be supplied in a timely manner for

bidders to evaluate the institution’s

franchise. Better information for bidders

when marketing a franchise increases

bid quality which, in turn, increases the

likelihood that a failed bank will be

acquired over the course of the weekend

immediately following its entry into

receivership. This also decreases the

likelihood of needing to operate the

bank as a bridge depository institution,

which can further erode franchise value

and increase costs to the DIF.

While having the ability to quickly

populate a VDR is important for the

rapid marketing and sale of a failed

institution, directly accessing data from

the institution’s systems and/or its

service provider(s), as applicable, would

allow the FDIC to build out internal

FDIC infrastructure to enable the FDIC

to receive and process necessary data in

the event of an institution’s rapid

failure. Additionally, the data would

further enhance the quality and

robustness of the information provided

to potential bidders and enable the FDIC

to more effectively operate an eventual

receivership or, if needed, a bridge

depository institution.

B. Election Process

Under the proposed rule, a large or

highly complex institution that wishes

to opt into the RRA would submit a

notice of its election or elections to the

FDIC. An institution’s election would

include certain information needed by

the FDIC for the elected component or

components. To support the VDR

component, the institution’s notice of

election would provide the FDIC with

the contact information of the

institution’s personnel with whom the

FDIC should engage prior to the VDR

test

would submit a

notice of its election or elections to the

FDIC. An institution’s election would

include certain information needed by

the FDIC for the elected component or

components. To support the VDR

component, the institution’s notice of

election would provide the FDIC with

the contact information of the

institution’s personnel with whom the

FDIC should engage prior to the VDR

test. To support the data access

component, the institution’s notice of

election would provide the FDIC a

complete list of all systems and

applications maintained by itself and/or

third-party vendor(s) that serve as core

data processors for deposit and loan

data and the institution’s general ledger,

and a list of key personnel (including

personnel of third-party vendors)

needed to support and operate such

systems and applications. The

institution would also authorize the

FDIC to communicate with, and request

data from, its third-party vendors and

acknowledge that any costs required to

obtain any necessary data would be

borne by the institution. The institution

would be able to opt in to one of or both

components of the RRA as part of its

election, whether it be one election

submission or two.

An institution that is a large or highly

complex institution as of the effective

date of any final rule would submit a

notice of election to the FDIC within 30

days of the effective date of the rule.

Such an institution would be eligible to

receive a data access adjustment

beginning in the assessment period

following the institution’s election, and

would be eligible to receive a VDR

adjustment beginning in the assessment

period one year after the effective date

of the final rule if the institution passes

the VDR test.

Following the end of this 30-day

period, institutions would still be able

to make an election at any time

receive a data access adjustment

beginning in the assessment period

following the institution’s election, and

would be eligible to receive a VDR

adjustment beginning in the assessment

period one year after the effective date

of the final rule if the institution passes

the VDR test.

Following the end of this 30-day

period, institutions would still be able

to make an election at any time.

However, the FDIC would not conduct

a VDR test of such an institution until

after all institutions who initially opted

in completed VDR tests, and the

institution’s VDR adjustment would not

be available until after completing the

VDR test. Additionally, an institution

that is a large or highly complex

institution on the effective date of the

final rule that does not opt in to the data

access component during the initial 30

days, but does opt in to the data access

component within the initial four year

period subsequent to the expiration of

the initial 30 day period, will not

receive the adjustment until two

quarters after the end of the quarter in

which the election is made, to

discourage institutions from delaying

making an election.

An institution that becomes a large or

highly complex institution after the

effective date of any final rule would be

eligible to submit a resolution readiness

adjustment election notice to the FDIC

upon becoming a large or highly

complex institution. Such an institution

would be eligible to receive a data

access adjustment beginning in the

quarterly assessment period following

the institution’s election, and would be

eligible to receive a VDR adjustment

beginning in the quarterly assessment

period after the institution passes the

VDR test. Such an institution would not,

however, receive the VDR adjustment

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the institution’s election, and would be

eligible to receive a VDR adjustment

beginning in the quarterly assessment

period after the institution passes the

VDR test. Such an institution would not,

however, receive the VDR adjustment

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71 The FDIC would generally delete data shortly

after concluding the test.

until the initial round of VDR testing is

complete.

If an institution’s notice of election for

the data access component contains

materially inaccurate information or the

institution does not provide required

information in its notice of election, the

FDIC may notify the institution that it

is no longer eligible for the data access

adjustment. In that case, the data access

adjustment would be removed

beginning the next quarterly assessment

period, and the institution would be

liable to reimburse the FDIC for an

amount equal to the amount of data

access adjustment the institution

received. The institution could seek to

resume eligibility for the data access

adjustment by submitting another notice

of election.

C. VDR Test

In order to demonstrate its ability to

adequately populate a VDR, a large or

highly complex institution must be able

to provide information under the below

categories in a VDR set up by the FDIC

within 48 hours of a request.71 These

categories of information reflect the data

and information that potential bidders

have identified as most useful for

conducting due diligence, especially

when there is a short runway to an

institution’s failure:

1. Key financial information,

including balance sheets, income

statements, general ledgers (both

consolidated and unconsolidated), and

other relevant financial information;

2

e

categories of information reflect the data

and information that potential bidders

have identified as most useful for

conducting due diligence, especially

when there is a short runway to an

institution’s failure:

1. Key financial information,

including balance sheets, income

statements, general ledgers (both

consolidated and unconsolidated), and

other relevant financial information;

2. Deposit data and information,

including deposit tapes and data

dictionary, and a report regarding key

depositors (including key depositors by

name and business segment, the amount

of each key depositor’s deposits, and a

list of other services provided to such

key depositors), though existing

management reports are acceptable;

3. Loan and lending data and

information, including loan tapes and

data dictionary, and a report regarding

key loan relationships (including key

loan relationships by name and business

segment, the amount of each

outstanding loan of each key loan

relationship, and a list of other services

provided to such key loan

relationships), though existing

management reports are acceptable;

4. A sample of imaged loan files

sufficient for a potential bidder to

conduct due diligence to inform a

potential bid;

5. Securities and investment portfolio

information, including securities tapes

and data dictionary;

6. A corporate organizational chart

showing all financially or operationally

significant entities, as well as a

description of each of these entity’s

operations and role within the

institution’s operations, and licensing

and regulatory information for each

entity;

7. A list of key personnel identified by

title, function, physical location,

employing legal entity, and business

line or business segment the individual

supports, and if an individual is ‘‘dual

hatted’’ at the institution and at one or

more of its affiliates;

8. A list of material third-party

contracts and a description of what

services or business lines each contract

supports;

9

ity;

7. A list of key personnel identified by

title, function, physical location,

employing legal entity, and business

line or business segment the individual

supports, and if an individual is ‘‘dual

hatted’’ at the institution and at one or

more of its affiliates;

8. A list of material third-party

contracts and a description of what

services or business lines each contract

supports;

9. Recent key internal risk

management reports, such as

assessments concerning credit, capital,

liquidity, risk governance risks; and

10. Other information the institution

believes is necessary to facilitate a rapid

and effective due diligence process for

the sale of the institution, as well as

data or information requested by the

FDIC in its notice concerning the timing

of the institution’s VDR test that is not

covered by other items listed above.

FDIC resolution experience has

shown that VDRs that can be quickly

and accurately populated with key

financial data and operational

information are necessary for bidder due

diligence and results in more and

higher-quality bids.

1. Initial Timing of VDR Test

The FDIC anticipates that the initial

round of VDR tests for institutions that

are large or highly complex as of the

effective date of the final rule would

take up to one year from the effective

date of the final rule. The FDIC would

notify an institution not less than four

weeks in advance of when it would

conduct the VDR test, and on the date

of the test, the institution would have 48

hours to populate the VDR.

2

initial

round of VDR tests for institutions that

are large or highly complex as of the

effective date of the final rule would

take up to one year from the effective

date of the final rule. The FDIC would

notify an institution not less than four

weeks in advance of when it would

conduct the VDR test, and on the date

of the test, the institution would have 48

hours to populate the VDR.

2. Satisfaction of VDR Test

The institution would be considered

to have satisfied the VDR test if (1) all

of the required documents, data and

information are uploaded to the virtual

data room within 48 hours after the test

begins, (2) the FDIC determines that the

information and data uploaded is

sufficient for a potential bidder to

conduct adequate due diligence to

inform a potential bid, including that

the financial information provided is

consistent with the general ledger, and

(3) the institution provides the FDIC

such information and access to such

personnel of the institution as the FDIC

in its discretion determines is relevant

to properly evaluate the documents and

information uploaded to the VDR.

3. Results of VDR Test and Application

of VDR Adjustment

The FDIC will notify the institution in

writing concerning the results of its test.

If the institution has satisfied the

requirements of the rule with respect to

the VDR test, it will be entitled to a VDR

adjustment. The FDIC would retest an

institution’s capabilities with respect to

the VDR test once every three years. In

certain circumstances, such as when the

FDIC determines that it can access

certain important information in a

timely manner in connection with data

access engagement, the FDIC may waive

aspects of future VDR tests. The FDIC

would provide an institution with not

less than four weeks’ notice if it plans

to retest an institution’s VDR population

capabilities. The FDIC may extend the

timeline to more than three years at its

discretion

determines that it can access

certain important information in a

timely manner in connection with data

access engagement, the FDIC may waive

aspects of future VDR tests. The FDIC

would provide an institution with not

less than four weeks’ notice if it plans

to retest an institution’s VDR population

capabilities. The FDIC may extend the

timeline to more than three years at its

discretion. The FDIC may do so if, for

example, there is an increase in bank

failures resulting in increased resources

devoted to resolution activity. If an

institution has experienced material

changes with respect to its ability to

populate a data room, such as

undergoing a merger, the FDIC may

conduct a retest in less than three years

at its discretion. If the institution does

not satisfy the requirements of the VDR

test, the FDIC may offer the institution

an opportunity to retake the test not less

than one month after the initial test.

If the institution receives a 0.5 basis

point adjustment for successfully

completing the VDR test, the institution

will continue to receive the adjustment

for each quarterly assessment period

unless and until the institution does not

successfully complete a future VDR test,

at which point the institution’s

downward adjustment would cease to

apply in the next quarterly assessment

period.

Under the proposal, because the VDR

component is intended to incentivize

banks to maintain the ability to produce

robust information within a 48-hour

timeframe, an institution would not be

able to receive partial credit if it is able

to produce the required data in a period

longer than 48 hours, or if the

institution is able to produce some but

not all of the content required. The FDIC

is seeking comment on whether partial

credit should be offered.

D

ntivize

banks to maintain the ability to produce

robust information within a 48-hour

timeframe, an institution would not be

able to receive partial credit if it is able

to produce the required data in a period

longer than 48 hours, or if the

institution is able to produce some but

not all of the content required. The FDIC

is seeking comment on whether partial

credit should be offered.

D. Data Access

As discussed above, a large or highly

complex institution will be entitled to

the data access adjustment beginning in

the first full assessment period after the

date on which the institution submits its

notice of election.

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72 The FDIC would generally delete data shortly

after concluding the engagement.

1. Initial Timing of Data Access

Engagement

The FDIC anticipates that the initial

round of engagement with respect to the

data access component for electing

institutions that are large or highly

complex as of the effective date of the

final rule would take four years from

this date and therefore believes it

appropriate to grant the data access

adjustment upon submission of a notice

of election rather than require

institutions to wait until every

institution has completed the process

before applying adjustments.

Furthermore, the FDIC believes it is

generally unlikely an institution that

elects to participate in the data access

component will fail to ultimately

qualify for the data access adjustment.

An institution that elects to

participate in the data access

component would be required to

facilitate the FDIC’s access to its data

service provider(s) and/or any internal

data systems

adjustments.

Furthermore, the FDIC believes it is

generally unlikely an institution that

elects to participate in the data access

component will fail to ultimately

qualify for the data access adjustment.

An institution that elects to

participate in the data access

component would be required to

facilitate the FDIC’s access to its data

service provider(s) and/or any internal

data systems. As noted above, the

purpose of data access engagement by

the FDIC would be to allow the FDIC to

engage with service provider(s) and/or

institution personnel to build out

internal FDIC infrastructure to enable

the FDIC to receive and process

necessary data in the event of an

institution’s rapid failure. Specifically,

the FDIC would seek access to such data

service provider(s) and/or internal data

systems in order to access and process

the following data:72

1. The institution’s consolidated and

unconsolidated ledger;

2. Core data regarding the institution’s

deposit portfolio, including:

a. Depositor and beneficiary

information;

b. Deposit account title;

c. Deposit account type;

d. Deposit account balances,

including principal and accrued

interest;

e. Deposit account status;

f. Deposit account rate terms; and

g. Any other information about

material characteristics of deposits;

3. Core data concerning the

institution’s loan portfolio, including:

a. Borrower, co-borrower, and

guarantor information;

b. Loan balances, including charge

offs;

c. Participation information;

d. Loan status;

e. Loan terms;

f. Loan type;

g. Collateral associated with each

loan; and

h. Any other information about

material characteristics of loans;

4. A list of key personnel (including

those employed by third-party vendors)

needed to support and operate each

system and application used to produce

data, information, and other materials

listed above identified by name, title,

employer, telephone number, and email

address

;

g. Collateral associated with each

loan; and

h. Any other information about

material characteristics of loans;

4. A list of key personnel (including

those employed by third-party vendors)

needed to support and operate each

system and application used to produce

data, information, and other materials

listed above identified by name, title,

employer, telephone number, and email

address.

If an institution fails to follow through

on providing prescribed data access or

does not provide information or access

to personnel that the FDIC needs to

assess the data, documents, and other

materials that must be provided, the

FDIC would cease application of the

adjustment beginning the following

quarterly assessment period. If this

occurs during the initial data access

engagement, the institution would be

liable to reimburse the FDIC for an

amount equal to the amount of data

access adjustment the institution

received.

After the initial engagement, the

institution must notify the FDIC within

30 days of any material changes to its

internal data systems or data service

providers that made the FDIC’s prior

engagement with respect to data access

no longer relevant, such as when an

institution engages a new data service

provider with respect to the data that

the FDIC would seek to collect in the

event of the institution’s failure. The

FDIC anticipates that such notices

would be rare. Failure to provide notice

of material change may result in the

data access adjustment being removed

in the following assessment period and,

potentially, liability for repayment if

discovered after multiple assessment

periods.

The FDIC will conduct follow-up

engagements every seven years, except

that the FDIC may (1) extend the

timeline at its discretion or (2) conduct

a follow-up engagement sooner than

seven years in the event of a material

change to an internal data system or

data service provider

ng assessment period and,

potentially, liability for repayment if

discovered after multiple assessment

periods.

The FDIC will conduct follow-up

engagements every seven years, except

that the FDIC may (1) extend the

timeline at its discretion or (2) conduct

a follow-up engagement sooner than

seven years in the event of a material

change to an internal data system or

data service provider. The FDIC would

provide an institution with not less than

four weeks’ notice if it chooses to

conduct a new engagement concerning

an institution’s data access capabilities.

If the institution qualifies for the data

access adjustment after the first

engagement, and then declines to

participate in subsequent engagement,

the data access adjustment will be

removed in the assessment period

following receipt of notice that it

declines to participate, and the

institution would not be liable to

reimburse the FDIC.

Question 16: Please describe and

quantify the costs that large and highly

complex institutions would expect to

incur in seeking the RRA? If possible,

please delineate costs by VDR test and

data access engagement.

Question 17: Do commenters believe

that the amount of the RRA is

appropriately calibrated to recognize

the potential reduction in losses to the

DIF in the event of a large or highly

complex institution’s failure? If not,

what would be a more appropriate

calibration and why?

Question 18: Do commenters believe

that the proposed rule asks for large and

highly complex institutions to provide

the correct set of data for a VDR test?

What, if any, alternative data and

information would potential bidders

want access to in connection with the

marketing of a failed bank and why?

What other information in the

possession of a large or highly complex

institution would help facilitate

competitive, high-quality bids? Should

any of the data or information items

requested under the proposal for

purposes of the VDR test be removed

under any final rule and, if so, why?

Would this set

ntial bidders

want access to in connection with the

marketing of a failed bank and why?

What other information in the

possession of a large or highly complex

institution would help facilitate

competitive, high-quality bids? Should

any of the data or information items

requested under the proposal for

purposes of the VDR test be removed

under any final rule and, if so, why?

Would this set of data benefit from more

or less prescription in the rule and why?

Question 19: What, if any, other data

would be useful to potential bidders,

help improve the marketing process for

a failed institution, or be useful to

operate the institution if the FDIC is

unable to solicit adequate bids over

resolution weekend? Would this set of

data benefit from more or less

prescription in the rule and why?

Question 20: Does the information

that must be populated in a VDR and

to which access would be provided

under the proposed rule overlap with

information that is otherwise provided

by large and highly complex institutions

to the FDIC or information that is

otherwise publicly available?

Question 21: Is the information that

would be required to be submitted with

respect to the election notice

appropriate and sufficient to provide

the FDIC an understanding of the

institution’s information technology

systems in order to aid the FDIC in

conducting testing under the proposed

rule? What, if any, other information

should a large or highly complex

institution provide when seeking an

adjustment?

Question 22: Are the timelines for the

initial VDR test and data access

engagement appropriate and, if not,

why? What alternative timeframe, if any,

would be more appropriate to ensure

sufficient time for the FDIC to conduct

testing under the proposed rule?

Question 23: To what extent would an

appeals process be beneficial for

situations in which the FDIC denies all

or part of the resolution readiness

adjustment?

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lternative timeframe, if any,

would be more appropriate to ensure

sufficient time for the FDIC to conduct

testing under the proposed rule?

Question 23: To what extent would an

appeals process be beneficial for

situations in which the FDIC denies all

or part of the resolution readiness

adjustment?

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73 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(e)(3). See also 71 FR 61374

(Oct. 18, 2006).

74 90 FR 55240 (Dec. 1, 2025).

75 See supra fn 45.

76 See supra fn 50.

77 See supra fn 23.

Question 24: Should an institution be

liable to reimburse the FDIC for an

amount equal to the amount of the data

access component of the RRA in the

event that the institution elects to opt in

but is subsequently notified that it failed

to provide the prescribed data access?

Should the application of the 0.5 basis

point component of the RRA for

satisfying the requirements of the data

access engagement be applied after the

engagement is completed and the

institution is notified of their eligibility?

If so, how would that be implemented?

Question 25: Should the proposal

provide a partial adjustment for

institutions that satisfy some, but not

all, of the requirements of the VDR test?

If so, how should the FDIC calibrate any

partial adjustment? Should the FDIC

consider partial credit of the VDR

adjustment to be divided between a

timeliness and information

subcomponent? If so, what is an

appropriate scoring for partial credit in

each category?

Question 26: Do commenters believe

that the categories of information

requested with respect to the VDR test

are sufficiently clear? Do institutions

have existing internal management

reports that could be used to populate

a VDR, even on a partial basis, without

having to generate additional reports

and, if so, which types of existing

internal

scoring for partial credit in

each category?

Question 26: Do commenters believe

that the categories of information

requested with respect to the VDR test

are sufficiently clear? Do institutions

have existing internal management

reports that could be used to populate

a VDR, even on a partial basis, without

having to generate additional reports

and, if so, which types of existing

internal management reports could be

leveraged by institutions?

V. Other Proposed Amendments to Part

327

A. Conforming Amendments to the

Assessment Regulations

The FDIC also is proposing

conforming amendments to sections

327.8, 327.10, and 327.16 of the

assessment regulations to effectuate the

modifications described above. These

conforming amendments would ensure

that the proposed updates to the

definitions, thresholds, and assessment

rate schedules are properly incorporated

into the assessments regulation

provisions governing the calculations of

an IDI’s quarterly deposit insurance

assessment. The FDIC is proposing

revisions to section 327.10 to reflect the

assessment rate schedules that would be

applicable before and after the effective

date of any final rule.

The FDIC is also proposing to revise

the uniform amounts for small banks

and insured branches of foreign banks

in sections 327.16(a) and (d),

respectively, to reflect the proposed 2

basis point decrease in initial base

assessment rate schedules applicable to

these institutions.

B. Technical Amendments to the

Assessment Regulations To Remove

Obsolete Provisions

The FDIC is proposing other technical

amendments to its regulations governing

deposit insurance assessments to

remove obsolete provisions. Removal of

these provisions, described below, will

neither affect deposit insurance

assessments nor result in new

requirements for IDIs.

1

le to

these institutions.

B. Technical Amendments to the

Assessment Regulations To Remove

Obsolete Provisions

The FDIC is proposing other technical

amendments to its regulations governing

deposit insurance assessments to

remove obsolete provisions. Removal of

these provisions, described below, will

neither affect deposit insurance

assessments nor result in new

requirements for IDIs.

1. Surcharges and Assessments

Required To Raise the Reserve Ratio of

the DIF to 1.35 Percent in Section

327.11

As a technical change, the FDIC is

proposing to rescind in its entirety 12

CFR 327.11 which includes provisions

relating to surcharges and assessments

required to raise the reserve ratio of the

DIF to 1.35 percent that are no longer

applicable.

2. Prepayment of Quarterly Risk-Based

Assessments in 12 CFR 327.12

As a technical change, the FDIC is

rescinding in its entirety 12 CFR 327.12,

which includes provisions relating to

the prepayment of quarterly risk-based

assessments that are no longer

applicable.

3. Implementation of One-Time

Assessment Credit in 12 CFR part 327

Subpart B

As a technical change, the FDIC is

proposing to rescind in its entirety 12

CFR 327 Subpart B which implemented

a one-time assessment credit required

by section 7(e)(3) of the FDI Act.73

VI. Reporting

In December 2025, the FDIC, the

Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency, and the Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System (the

agencies), issued a Request for

Information on Streamlining the Call

Report.74 The request offered the

opportunity for interested stakeholders

to identify ways that the agencies could

streamline the Call Report forms and

instructions while still meeting the

purposes of the collection.

The agencies received several

comments in response to the request

addressing the collection of data on

Schedule RC–O—Other Data for Deposit

Insurance Assessments

g the Call

Report.74 The request offered the

opportunity for interested stakeholders

to identify ways that the agencies could

streamline the Call Report forms and

instructions while still meeting the

purposes of the collection.

The agencies received several

comments in response to the request

addressing the collection of data on

Schedule RC–O—Other Data for Deposit

Insurance Assessments. Many of the

comments on Schedule RC–O addressed

line items that are used in the

calculation of deposit insurance

assessments for small, large, and highly

complex institutions. Revisions to such

line items would generally require

changes to the risk-based pricing

methodologies in the assessment

regulations. The FDIC continues to

consider the comments received

addressing line items on Schedule RC–

O and is considering addressing those

comments through a potential future

proposal to amend risk-based deposit

insurance pricing methodologies in the

assessment regulations.

VII. Statutory Considerations and

Expected Effects

A. Background

In setting assessment rates, the FDIC

is required by statute to consider the

following factors:

(i) The estimated operating expenses

of the DIF.

(ii) The estimated case resolution

expenses and income of the DIF.

(iii) The projected effects of the

payment of assessments on the capital

and earnings of IDIs.

(iv) The risk factors and other factors

taken into account pursuant to section

7(b)(1) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.

1817(b)(1)) under the risk-based

assessment system, including the

requirement under such section to

maintain a risk-based system.75

case resolution

expenses and income of the DIF.

(iii) The projected effects of the

payment of assessments on the capital

and earnings of IDIs.

(iv) The risk factors and other factors

taken into account pursuant to section

7(b)(1) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C.

1817(b)(1)) under the risk-based

assessment system, including the

requirement under such section to

maintain a risk-based system.75

(v) Other factors the FDIC has

determined to be appropriate.76

For purposes of statutory

considerations and expected effects, the

FDIC based its analysis on data as of

December 31, 2025, including data from

the Call Report and FFIEC 002 for the

reporting period that ended December

31, 2025, reported as of February 16,

2026.

B. Deposit Insurance Fund Expenses

and Income

As of December 31, 2025, the DIF

balance totaled $153.9 billion, an

increase of $16.8 billion from the

previous year. Since second quarter

2023, the DIF balance has steadily

increased, primarily from assessments

earned. Assessments earned totaled $13

billion for 2025. The weighted average

assessment rate was approximately 5.6

basis points as of December 31, 2025, up

1.8 basis points from the weighted

average assessment rate of 3.8 basis

points for the assessment period ending

June 30, 2022, just prior to the adoption

of the 2022 final rule implementing a

uniform increase in initial base deposit

insurance assessment rate schedules of

2 basis points.77 Net investment income

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ts for the assessment period ending

June 30, 2022, just prior to the adoption

of the 2022 final rule implementing a

uniform increase in initial base deposit

insurance assessment rate schedules of

2 basis points.77 Net investment income

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78 Estimated losses do not include amounts

associated with the special assessment to recover

estimated losses attributable to protecting

uninsured depositors pursuant to the systemic risk

determination announced following the failures of

Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in March

2023. The FDIC is required by statute to recover

such losses through a special assessment. See 12

U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii). See also 88 FR 83329 (Nov.

29, 2023) and 90 FR 59369 (Dec. 19, 2025).

79 Loss estimates for failures that occurred

between 2023 through 2026 as of March 31, 2026.

FDIC BankFind Suite: Bank Failures & Assistance

Data, available at: https://banks.data.fdic.gov/

bankfind-suite/failures. See also ‘‘Anchor Bank

Assumes Insured Deposits of Community Bank and

Trust—West Georgia, LeGrange, Georgia,’’ May 1,

2026, available at: https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-

releases/2026/anchor-bank-assumes-insured-

deposits-community-bank-and-trust-west-georgia.

80 ‘‘Problem’’ institutions are institutions with a

CAMELS composite rating of ‘‘4’’ or ‘‘5’’ due to

financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses

that threaten their continued financial viability.

further added to the DIF balance,

totaling $4.8 billion for 2025.

Operating expenses partially offset

increases in the DIF balance, ranging

between $497 million and $666 million

on a quarterly basis for the past three

years. Full-year operating expenses were

$2.4 billion for 2025, unchanged from

2024

operational, or managerial weaknesses

that threaten their continued financial viability.

further added to the DIF balance,

totaling $4.8 billion for 2025.

Operating expenses partially offset

increases in the DIF balance, ranging

between $497 million and $666 million

on a quarterly basis for the past three

years. Full-year operating expenses were

$2.4 billion for 2025, unchanged from

2024.

Losses from bank failures, or case

resolution expenses, represent the

largest potential expenses of the DIF.

Except for 2023, the DIF has

experienced low losses since 2016.

Between 2016 and 2022, three banks per

year failed, at an average annual cost to

the DIF of about $177 million. In 2023,

five banks failed with estimated losses

to the DIF of $18.0 billion, excluding

losses that are being recovered through

the special assessment.78 Since 2023, six

institutions have failed as of May 2026,

with an estimated cost to the DIF of

$928 million.79

The total number of institutions on

the FDIC’s Problem Bank List was 60 at

the end of the fourth quarter of 2025, up

by a net of three institutions from the

previous quarter.80 The number of

problem banks represented 1.4 percent

of total banks in the fourth quarter of

2025, which is in the normal range of

1 to 2 percent for non-crisis periods.

While future losses to the DIF are

highly uncertain, FDIC-insured

institutions reported strong earnings in

2025. Loan growth accelerated in 2025,

as did domestic deposit growth. Asset

quality metrics remained favorable

overall despite continued weakness in

certain portfolios. Unrealized losses

reported by banks continued to decline

from the second quarter 2022 peak but

remained elevated relative to historical

conditions. The banking industry

continued to have strong capital and

liquidity levels, which support lending

and protect against potential losses

growth. Asset

quality metrics remained favorable

overall despite continued weakness in

certain portfolios. Unrealized losses

reported by banks continued to decline

from the second quarter 2022 peak but

remained elevated relative to historical

conditions. The banking industry

continued to have strong capital and

liquidity levels, which support lending

and protect against potential losses.

As shown in Table 13 below, the DIF

balance has risen steadily since fourth

quarter 2022, just prior to the 2 basis

point increase in assessment rate

schedules. Over the period from the

fourth quarter 2022 to fourth quarter

2025, growth in the DIF balance

outpaced growth in estimated insured

deposits, resulting in continued growth

in the reserve ratio—DIF balance as a

percentage of estimated insured

deposits. As previously noted, the

reserve ratio further increased to 1.43

percent on March 31, 2026, up 15 basis

points from the year-end 2024 and 28

basis points from year-end 2023.

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C. Projections for DIF Balance, Insured

Deposits, and Reserve Ratio

In developing the proposal, the FDIC

projected how changes to the threshold

used to define small and large

institutions and to rate schedules would

affect assessment revenue and therefore

growth in the DIF balance and reserve

ratio, including when the reserve ratio

would reach 2 percent. These

projections assume the continuation of

current trends, including low to

moderate losses from bank failures, and

do not contemplate a significant

downturn in banking or economic

conditions. Projections also assume no

change in bank behavior

ld

affect assessment revenue and therefore

growth in the DIF balance and reserve

ratio, including when the reserve ratio

would reach 2 percent. These

projections assume the continuation of

current trends, including low to

moderate losses from bank failures, and

do not contemplate a significant

downturn in banking or economic

conditions. Projections also assume no

change in bank behavior. For example,

changes to assessment rates and pricing

methodologies because of the proposal

may motivate banks to adjust their risk

profiles or practices, including changes

to borrowing rates, deposits rates, or

service fees. Any potential adjustments

to bank behavior are unknown and

therefore not incorporated into

projections.

The projections generally assume that

changes to the definitions of small and

large institutions and decreases to

assessment rate schedules take effect at

the beginning of 2027. Projections

further assume that 75 percent of large

and highly complex institutions elect to

participate and receive assessment rate

adjustments of 0.5 basis points for the

data access component of the RRA and

0.5 basis points for the VDR testing

component of the RRA beginning in

2027 and 2028, respectively. The FDIC

believes these are reasonable

assumptions given the expected cost of

initial and continued participation in

the proposed engagement relative to the

proposed assessment benefit.

In total, the FDIC projects a decline in

assessment revenue of $3.7 billion in

2027 and $22.6 billion, cumulatively,

through 2031, as shown in Chart 1. By

2031, the DIF balance would be reduced

by about $24.6 billion under the

proposal, which includes reduced

investment income resulting from the

decrease in assessment revenue.

As a result of the reduced DIF balance

relative to the baseline, the reserve ratio

would rise under the proposal but at a

slower pace than the baseline. Under

the baseline, the reserve ratio is

projected to reach the current DRR by

the end of 2031, as shown in Chart 2

6 billion under the

proposal, which includes reduced

investment income resulting from the

decrease in assessment revenue.

As a result of the reduced DIF balance

relative to the baseline, the reserve ratio

would rise under the proposal but at a

slower pace than the baseline. Under

the baseline, the reserve ratio is

projected to reach the current DRR by

the end of 2031, as shown in Chart 2.

Under the proposal, the reserve ratio is

projected to be 1.85 percent at the end

of 2031 and would reach the 2 percent

DRR in 2035.

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81 Equity capital is defined as capital (stock and/

or surplus earnings) that is free of debt, calculated

as assets less liabilities.

82 Annual income is assumed to equal income

from January 1, 2025, through December 31, 2025,

adjusted for mergers.

83 Profitable institutions are defined as those

having positive merger-adjusted income before

taxes for the 12 months ending December 31, 2025.

Analysis excludes nine insured branches of foreign

banks and three institutions that reported an

assessment base of zero as of December 31, 2025,

as their estimated annual change in assessments as

a percentage of income would be zero. Of the

remaining 4,333 IDIs, 230 were unprofitable based

Continued

D. Projected Effects on Capital and

Earnings

Consistent with section 7(b)(2)(B) of

the FDI Act, the analysis that follows

estimates the annual effect on equity

capital and earnings of IDIs from the

proposal

o as of December 31, 2025,

as their estimated annual change in assessments as

a percentage of income would be zero. Of the

remaining 4,333 IDIs, 230 were unprofitable based

Continued

D. Projected Effects on Capital and

Earnings

Consistent with section 7(b)(2)(B) of

the FDI Act, the analysis that follows

estimates the annual effect on equity

capital and earnings of IDIs from the

proposal. Specifically, the analysis

considers the effects from raising the

threshold defining a small institution

and a large institution from $10 billion

to $30 billion, decreasing initial base

assessment rate schedules by 2 basis

points for small institutions and by 1

basis point for large and highly complex

institutions, and implementing the

proposed RRA applicable to large and

highly complex institutions.81

Data as of December 31, 2025, are

used to calculate each bank’s

assessment base and risk-based

assessment rate, absent the proposed

changes. In 2025, the industry reported

full-year net income of $295.6 billion,

up $27.5 billion from full-year 2024.

The industry’s ROA increased to 1.20

percent from 1.12 percent the year prior.

The increase was driven by higher net

interest and noninterest income, which

offset higher noninterest expense.

For institutions that would experience

a change in assessment rates under the

proposal, the immediate financial

impact would be either (1) a decrease in

assessment expense and a

corresponding increase in pre-tax

income; or (2) an increase in assessment

expense and a corresponding decrease

in pre-tax income. To avoid the

possibility of underestimating effects on

bank earnings or capital, the analysis

also assumes that the effects of the

proposal are not transferred to

customers in the form of changes in

borrowing rates, deposit rates, or service

fees.

A banking organization’s earnings

retention and dividend policies

influence the extent to which changes in

assessments affect equity levels

. To avoid the

possibility of underestimating effects on

bank earnings or capital, the analysis

also assumes that the effects of the

proposal are not transferred to

customers in the form of changes in

borrowing rates, deposit rates, or service

fees.

A banking organization’s earnings

retention and dividend policies

influence the extent to which changes in

assessments affect equity levels. If an

IDI maintains the same dollar amount of

dividends when it recognizes the

assessment expense, equity (retained

earnings) will be

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