Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Simplification of Deposit Insurance Rules for Trust and Mortgage Servicing Accounts
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FDIC Financial Institution Letters › Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Simplification of Deposit Insurance Rules for Trust and Mortgage Servicing Accounts
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41766
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 146 / Tuesday, August 3, 2021 / Proposed Rules
will make its own determination about
the confidential status of the
information and treat it according to its
determination.
It is DOE’s policy that all comments
may be included in the public docket,
without change and as received,
including any personal information
provided in the comments (except
information deemed to be exempt from
public disclosure).
VI. Approval of the Office of the
Secretary
The Secretary of Energy has approved
publication of this supplemental notice
of proposed rulemaking.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 430
Administrative practice and
procedure, Confidential business
information, Energy conservation,
Household appliances, Imports,
Incorporation by reference,
Intergovernmental relations, Small
businesses.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of
Energy was signed on July 22, 2021, by
Kelly Speakes-Backman, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary and Acting
Assistant Secretary for Energy Efficiency
and Renewable Energy, pursuant to
delegated authority from the Secretary
of Energy. That document with the
original signature and date is
maintained by DOE. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DOE Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
the Department of Energy. This
administrative process in no way alters
the legal effect of this document upon
publication in the Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on July 23,
2021.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S.
Department of Energy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DOE is proposing to amend
part 430 of Chapter II of Title 10, Code
of Federal Regulations as set forth
below:
PART 430—ENERGY CONSERVATION
PROGRAM FOR CONSUMER
PRODUCTS
■1
ocument upon
publication in the Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on July 23,
2021.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S.
Department of Energy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DOE is proposing to amend
part 430 of Chapter II of Title 10, Code
of Federal Regulations as set forth
below:
PART 430—ENERGY CONSERVATION
PROGRAM FOR CONSUMER
PRODUCTS
■1. The authority citation for part 430
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 6291–6309; 28 U.S.C.
2461 note.
■2. Appendix I to subpart B of part 430
is amended by:
■a. Adding an introductory note; and
■b. Revising section 2.1.1;
The addition and revision read as
follows:
Appendix I to Subpart B of Part 430—
Uniform Test Method for Measuring the
Energy Consumption of Cooking
Products
Note: Prior to [Date 180 days after
publication of a final rule], representations
with respect to the energy use or efficiency
of a microwave oven, including compliance
certifications, must be based on testing
conducted in accordance with either this
appendix as it now appears or appendix I as
it appeared at 10 CFR part 430, subpart B
revised as of January 1, 2021. Beginning on
[Date 180 days after publication of a final
rule] representations with respect to energy
use or efficiency of a microwave oven,
including compliance certifications, must be
based on testing conducted in accordance
with this appendix.
*
*
*
*
*
2.1.1
Microwave ovens, excluding any
microwave oven component of a combined
cooking product. Install the microwave oven
in accordance with the manufacturer’s
instructions and connect to an electrical
supply circuit with voltage as specified in
section 2.2.1 of this appendix. Install the
microwave oven in accordance with section
5, paragraph 5.2 of IEC 62301 (Second
Edition) (incorporated by reference; see
§ 430.3), disregarding the provisions
regarding batteries and the determination,
classification, and testing of relevant modes
anufacturer’s
instructions and connect to an electrical
supply circuit with voltage as specified in
section 2.2.1 of this appendix. Install the
microwave oven in accordance with section
5, paragraph 5.2 of IEC 62301 (Second
Edition) (incorporated by reference; see
§ 430.3), disregarding the provisions
regarding batteries and the determination,
classification, and testing of relevant modes.
If the microwave oven can communicate
through a network (e.g., Bluetooth® or
internet connection), disable the network
function, by means provided in the
manufacturer’s user manual, for the duration
of testing. If the manufacturer’s user manual
does not provide a means for disabling the
network function, test the microwave oven
with the network function in the factory
default setting or in the as-shipped condition
as instructed in Section 5, Paragraph 5.2 of
IEC 62301 (Second Edition). The clock
display must be on, regardless of
manufacturer’s instructions or default setting
or supplied setting. The clock display must
remain on during testing, unless the clock
display powers down automatically with no
option for the consumer to override this
function. Install a watt meter in the circuit
that meets the requirements of section 2.6.1.1
of this appendix.
*
*
*
*
*
[FR Doc. 2021–16023 Filed 8–2–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 330
RIN 3064–AF27
Simplification of Deposit Insurance
Rules
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation is seeking
comment on proposed amendments to
its regulations governing deposit
insurance coverage
8–2–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 330
RIN 3064–AF27
Simplification of Deposit Insurance
Rules
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation is seeking
comment on proposed amendments to
its regulations governing deposit
insurance coverage. The proposed rule
would simplify the deposit insurance
regulations by establishing a ‘‘trust
accounts’’ category that would provide
for coverage of deposits of both
revocable trusts and irrevocable trusts,
and provide consistent deposit
insurance treatment for all mortgage
servicing account balances held to
satisfy principal and interest obligations
to a lender.
DATES: Comments will be accepted until
October 4, 2021.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
on the notice of proposed rulemaking
using any of the following methods:
• Agency Website: https://
www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/
federal-register-publications/. Follow
the instructions for submitting
comments on the agency website.
• Email: comments@fdic.gov. Include
RIN 3064–AF27 on the subject line of
the message.
• Mail: James P. Sheesley, Assistant
Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments-RIN 3064–AF27, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery: Comments may be
hand delivered to the guard station at
the rear of the 550 17th Street NW
building (located on F Street) on
business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• Public Inspection: All comments
received, including any personal
information provided, will be posted
generally without change to https://
www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/
federal-register-publications/.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Watts, Counsel, Legal Division,
(202) 898–6678, jwatts@fdic.gov;
Kathryn Marks, Counsel, Legal Division,
siness days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• Public Inspection: All comments
received, including any personal
information provided, will be posted
generally without change to https://
www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/
federal-register-publications/.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Watts, Counsel, Legal Division,
(202) 898–6678, jwatts@fdic.gov;
Kathryn Marks, Counsel, Legal Division,
(202) 898–3896, kmarks@fdic.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Simplification of Deposit Insurance Trust
Rules
A. Policy Objectives
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1 Trusts include informal revocable trusts
(commonly referred to as payable-on-death
accounts, in-trust-for accounts, or Totten trusts),
formal revocable trusts, and irrevocable trusts.
2 See 73 FR 56706 (Sep. 30, 2008).
3 In 2008, the FDIC adopted an insurance
calculation for revocable trusts that have five or
fewer beneficiaries. Under this rule, 12 CFR
330.10(a), each trust grantor is insured up to
$250,000 per beneficiary.
B. Background
1. Deposit Insurance and the FDIC’s
Statutory and Regulatory Authority
2. Evolution of Insurance Coverage of Trust
Deposits
3. Current Rules for Coverage of Trust
Deposits
4. Part 370 and Recordkeeping at the
Largest IDIs
5. Need for Further Rulemaking
C. Description of Proposed Rule
D. Examples Demonstrating Coverage
Under Current and Proposed Rules
E. Alternatives Considered
F. Request for Comment
II. Amendments to Mortgage Servicing
Account Rule
A. Policy Objectives
B. Background and Need for Rulemaking
C. Proposed Rule
D. Request for Comment
III. Regulatory Analysis
A. Expected Effects
1. Simplification of Trust Rules
2. Amendments to Mortgage Servicing
Account Rule
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
1. Simplification of Trust Rules
2
ternatives Considered
F. Request for Comment
II. Amendments to Mortgage Servicing
Account Rule
A. Policy Objectives
B. Background and Need for Rulemaking
C. Proposed Rule
D. Request for Comment
III. Regulatory Analysis
A. Expected Effects
1. Simplification of Trust Rules
2. Amendments to Mortgage Servicing
Account Rule
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
1. Simplification of Trust Rules
2. Amendments to Mortgage Servicing
Account Rule
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
D. Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act
E. Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1999—Assessment
of Federal Regulations and Policies on
Families
F. Plain Language
I. Simplification of Deposit Insurance
Trust Rules
A. Policy Objectives
The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) is seeking comment
on proposed amendments to its
regulations governing deposit insurance
coverage for deposits held in connection
with trusts.1 The proposed amendments
are intended to (1) provide depositors
and bankers with a rule for trust account
coverage that is easy to understand and
(2) to facilitate the prompt payment of
deposit insurance in accordance with
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI
Act), among other objectives.
Accomplishing these objectives also
would further the FDIC’s mission in
other respects, as discussed in greater
detail below.
Clarifying Insurance Coverage for Trust
Deposits
The proposed amendments would
clarify for depositors, bankers, and other
interested parties the insurance rules
and limits for trust accounts. The
proposal both reduces the number of
rules governing coverage for trust
accounts and establishes a
straightforward calculation to determine
coverage. The deposit insurance trust
rules have evolved over time and can be
difficult to apply in some
circumstances. The proposed
amendments are intended to alleviate
some of the confusion that depositors
and bankers may experience with
respect to insurance coverage and
limits
r of
rules governing coverage for trust
accounts and establishes a
straightforward calculation to determine
coverage. The deposit insurance trust
rules have evolved over time and can be
difficult to apply in some
circumstances. The proposed
amendments are intended to alleviate
some of the confusion that depositors
and bankers may experience with
respect to insurance coverage and
limits. Under the current regulations,
there are distinct and separate sets of
rules applicable to deposits of revocable
trusts and irrevocable trusts. Each set of
rules has its own criteria for coverage
and methods by which coverage is
calculated. Despite the FDIC’s efforts to
simplify the revocable trust rules in
2008,2 over the last 13 years FDIC
deposit insurance specialists have
responded to approximately 20,000
complex insurance inquiries per year on
average. More than 50 percent of
inquiries pertain to deposit insurance
coverage for trust accounts (revocable or
irrevocable). The consistently high
volume of complex inquiries about trust
accounts over an extended period of
time suggests continued confusion
about insurance limits. To help clarify
insurance limits, the proposed
amendments would further simplify
insurance coverage of trust accounts
(revocable and irrevocable) by
harmonizing the coverage criteria for
certain types of trust accounts and by
establishing a simplified formula for
calculating coverage that would apply to
these deposits. The FDIC proposes using
the calculation that the FDIC first
adopted in 2008 for revocable trust
accounts with five or fewer
beneficiaries. This formula is
straightforward and is already generally
familiar to bankers and depositors.3
Prompt Payment of Deposit Insurance
The FDI Act requires the FDIC to pay
depositors ‘‘as soon as possible’’ after a
bank failure
ld apply to
these deposits. The FDIC proposes using
the calculation that the FDIC first
adopted in 2008 for revocable trust
accounts with five or fewer
beneficiaries. This formula is
straightforward and is already generally
familiar to bankers and depositors.3
Prompt Payment of Deposit Insurance
The FDI Act requires the FDIC to pay
depositors ‘‘as soon as possible’’ after a
bank failure. However, the insurance
determination and subsequent payment
for many trust deposits can be delayed
when FDIC staff must review complex
trust agreements and apply various rules
for determining deposit insurance
coverage. The proposed amendments
are intended to facilitate more timely
deposit insurance determinations for
trust accounts by reducing the amount
of time needed to review trust
agreements and determine coverage.
These amendments should promote the
FDIC’s ability to pay insurance to
depositors promptly following the
failure of an insured depository
institution (IDI), enabling depositors to
meet their financial needs and
obligations.
Facilitating Resolutions
The proposed changes will also
facilitate the resolution of failed IDIs.
The FDIC is routinely required to make
deposit insurance determinations in
connection with IDI failures. In many of
these instances, however, deposit
insurance coverage for trust deposits is
based upon information that is not
maintained in the failed IDI’s deposit
account records. As a result, FDIC staff
work with depositors, trustees, and
other parties to obtain trust
documentation following an IDI’s failure
in order to complete deposit insurance
determinations. The difficulties
associated with completing such a
determination are exacerbated by the
substantial growth in the use of formal
trusts in recent decades
tained in the failed IDI’s deposit
account records. As a result, FDIC staff
work with depositors, trustees, and
other parties to obtain trust
documentation following an IDI’s failure
in order to complete deposit insurance
determinations. The difficulties
associated with completing such a
determination are exacerbated by the
substantial growth in the use of formal
trusts in recent decades. The proposed
amendments could reduce the time
spent reviewing such information and
provide greater flexibility to automate
deposit insurance determinations,
thereby reducing potential delays in the
completion of deposit insurance
determinations and payments. Timely
payment of deposit insurance also helps
to avoid reductions in the franchise
value of failed IDIs, expanding
resolution options and mitigating losses.
Effects on the Deposit Insurance Fund
The FDIC is also mindful of the effect
that the proposed changes to the deposit
insurance regulations could have on
deposit insurance coverage and
generally on the Deposit Insurance Fund
(DIF), which is used to pay deposit
insurance in the event of an IDI’s
failure. The FDIC manages the DIF
according to parameters established by
Congress and continually evaluates the
adequacy of the DIF to protect insured
depositors. The FDIC’s general intent is
that proposed amendments to the trust
rules be neutral with respect to the DIF.
B. Background
1. Deposit Insurance and the FDIC’s
Statutory and Regulatory Authority
The FDIC is an independent agency
that maintains stability and public
confidence in the nation’s financial
system by: Insuring deposits; examining
and supervising IDIs for safety and
soundness and compliance with
consumer financial protection laws; and
resolving IDIs, including large and
complex financial institutions, and
managing receiverships
FDIC’s
Statutory and Regulatory Authority
The FDIC is an independent agency
that maintains stability and public
confidence in the nation’s financial
system by: Insuring deposits; examining
and supervising IDIs for safety and
soundness and compliance with
consumer financial protection laws; and
resolving IDIs, including large and
complex financial institutions, and
managing receiverships. The FDIC has
helped to maintain public confidence in
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4 See 12 U.S.C. 1821(a)(1)(E).
5 See 12 U.S.C. 1821(a)(1)(C) (deposits
‘‘maintained by a depositor in the same capacity
and the same right’’ at the same IDI are aggregated
for purposes of the deposit insurance limit).
6 12 U.S.C. 1821(a)(2).
7 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(i), 1821(a).
8 See 12 CFR 330.10, 330.13.
9 See 1934 FDIC Annual Report at 143.
10 See Banking Act of 1935, Public Law 74–305
(Aug. 23, 1935), section 101 (‘‘Trust funds held by
an insured bank in a fiduciary capacity whether
held in its trust or deposited in any other
department or in another bank shall be insured in
an amount not to exceed $5,000 for each trust
estate, and when deposited by the fiduciary bank
in another insured bank such trust funds shall be
similarly insured to the fiduciary bank according to
the trust estates represented.’’).
11 The name ‘‘Totten trust’’ is derived from an
early New York court decision recognizing this
form of trust, Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112 (N.Y.
1904). Many other states have recognized similar
types of accounts, commonly known as ‘‘payable-
on-death’’ accounts or tentative trust accounts.
12 Separate Insurability of ‘‘Totten Trust’’
Accounts (June 1, 1955), Federal Banking Law
Reporter ¶ 92,583.
13 32 FR 10408 (July 14, 1967).
14 55 FR 20111 (May 15, 1990).
15 54 FR 52399, 52408 (Dec
of trust, Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112 (N.Y.
1904). Many other states have recognized similar
types of accounts, commonly known as ‘‘payable-
on-death’’ accounts or tentative trust accounts.
12 Separate Insurability of ‘‘Totten Trust’’
Accounts (June 1, 1955), Federal Banking Law
Reporter ¶ 92,583.
13 32 FR 10408 (July 14, 1967).
14 55 FR 20111 (May 15, 1990).
15 54 FR 52399, 52408 (Dec. 21, 1989) (notice of
proposed rulemaking).
16 55 FR 20126 (May 15, 1990).
times of financial turmoil, including the
period from 2008 to 2013, when the
United States experienced a severe
financial crisis, and more recently in
2020 during the financial stress
associated with the COVID–19
pandemic. During the more than 88
years since the FDIC was established, no
depositor has lost a penny of FDIC-
insured funds.
The FDI Act establishes the key
parameters of deposit insurance
coverage, including the standard
maximum deposit insurance amount
(SMDIA), currently $250,000.4 In
addition to providing deposit insurance
coverage up to the SMDIA at each IDI
where a depositor maintains deposits,
the FDI Act also provides separate
insurance coverage for deposits that a
depositor maintains in different rights
and capacities (also known as insurance
categories) at the same IDI.5 For
example, deposits in the single
ownership category are separately
insured from deposits in the joint
ownership category at the same IDI.
The FDIC’s deposit insurance
categories have been defined through
both statute and regulation. Certain
categories, such as the government
deposit category, have been expressly
defined by Congress.6 Other categories,
such as joint deposits and corporate
deposits, have been based on statutory
interpretation and recognized through
regulations issued in 12 CFR part 330
pursuant to the FDIC’s rulemaking
authority
urance
categories have been defined through
both statute and regulation. Certain
categories, such as the government
deposit category, have been expressly
defined by Congress.6 Other categories,
such as joint deposits and corporate
deposits, have been based on statutory
interpretation and recognized through
regulations issued in 12 CFR part 330
pursuant to the FDIC’s rulemaking
authority. In addition to defining the
insurance categories, the deposit
insurance regulations in part 330
provide the criteria used to determine
insurance coverage for deposits in each
category.
2. Evolution of Insurance Coverage of
Trust Deposits
Over the years, deposit insurance
coverage has evolved to reflect both the
FDIC’s experience and changes in the
banking industry. The FDI Act includes
provisions defining the coverage for
certain trust deposits,7 while coverage
for other trust deposits has been defined
by regulation.8 The following review of
historical coverage for trust deposits
provides context for the FDIC’s
proposed amendments to the trust rules.
In the FDIC’s earliest years, deposit
insurance coverage for trust deposits
depended upon whether the
beneficiaries of the trust were named in
the bank’s records. If the beneficiaries
were named in the bank’s records, the
trust deposit was insured according to
the beneficiaries’ respective interests
because the deposit was held in trust for
the beneficiaries
mendments to the trust rules.
In the FDIC’s earliest years, deposit
insurance coverage for trust deposits
depended upon whether the
beneficiaries of the trust were named in
the bank’s records. If the beneficiaries
were named in the bank’s records, the
trust deposit was insured according to
the beneficiaries’ respective interests
because the deposit was held in trust for
the beneficiaries. If beneficiaries were
not named in the bank’s records, the
grantor trustee was treated as the
depositor instead and insured to the
applicable limit (then $5,000); however,
the trust deposit was insured separately
from the trustee’s other deposits, if any,
at the same bank.9 If the bank itself was
designated as trustee of the trust,
deposits of the trust were insured up to
the $5,000 limit for each trust estate
pursuant to statute.10
Over time, some states began
recognizing the existence of a trust
based on a designation in the bank’s
records that a deposit was held in trust
for another person—even in the absence
of a written trust agreement. In 1955, the
FDIC’s then-General Counsel concluded
that if relevant state law recognized
these ‘‘Totten trusts’’ 11 and the
depositor complied with the law in
establishing the trust, the FDIC would
insure these deposits separately from
the depositor’s other deposit accounts.12
This was the first time the FDIC insured
informal trusts as trust deposits.
The FDIC further clarified insurance
coverage for trust deposits in 1967 when
it issued rules defining the deposit
insurance categories that the FDIC had
recognized.13 These rules defined a
‘‘testamentary accounts’’ category that
included revocable trust accounts,
tentative or Totten trust accounts, and
payable-on-death accounts and similar
accounts evidencing an intention that
the funds shall belong to another person
upon the depositor’s death
posits in 1967 when
it issued rules defining the deposit
insurance categories that the FDIC had
recognized.13 These rules defined a
‘‘testamentary accounts’’ category that
included revocable trust accounts,
tentative or Totten trust accounts, and
payable-on-death accounts and similar
accounts evidencing an intention that
the funds shall belong to another person
upon the depositor’s death.
Testamentary deposits were insured up
to the applicable limit (which Congress
had raised to $15,000) for each named
beneficiary who was the depositor’s
spouse, child, or grandchild. If the
named beneficiary did not satisfy this
kinship requirement, the deposit was
aggregated with the depositor’s
individual accounts for purposes of
deposit insurance coverage. The rules
also included a separate ‘‘trust
accounts’’ category for irrevocable trusts
with coverage of up to $15,000 for each
beneficiary’s trust interests in deposit
accounts established by the same
grantor pursuant to a trust agreement.
Irrevocable trust accounts were insured
separately from other deposit accounts
of the trustee, grantor, or beneficiary,
including testamentary accounts.
In 1989, Congress transferred
responsibility for insuring deposits of
savings associations from the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) to the FDIC. As part of this
transition, the FDIC issued uniform
deposit insurance rules for the deposits
of banks and savings associations,
reconciling the differences between the
FDIC and FSLIC insurance rules.14
These uniform rules redesignated the
‘‘testamentary accounts’’ category as
‘‘revocable trust accounts,’’ and
continued to require beneficiaries for
revocable trust deposits to be named,
but added the requirement that these
beneficiaries be named in the failed
IDI’s deposit account records in order
for per-beneficiary coverage to apply
erences between the
FDIC and FSLIC insurance rules.14
These uniform rules redesignated the
‘‘testamentary accounts’’ category as
‘‘revocable trust accounts,’’ and
continued to require beneficiaries for
revocable trust deposits to be named,
but added the requirement that these
beneficiaries be named in the failed
IDI’s deposit account records in order
for per-beneficiary coverage to apply. In
the notice of proposed rulemaking
discussing this change, the FDIC
explained that the change was expected
to simplify the deposit insurance
determination process for revocable
trust deposits and expedite the payment
of deposit insurance.15 These rules also
redesignated the ‘‘trust accounts’’
category as ‘‘irrevocable trust accounts’’
and introduced a distinction between
contingent interests and non-contingent
interests in irrevocable trusts that would
affect deposit insurance coverage. Non-
contingent interests were each insured
up to the applicable limit (then
$100,000), while contingent interests
were aggregated and insured up to
$100,000 in total.16
As revocable trusts increased in
popularity during the late 1980s and
early 1990s as an estate planning tool,
the FDIC began receiving more inquiries
about the revocable trust rules. Many of
these inquiries were prompted by
complex trust agreements that included
numerous conditions prescribing
whether, when, or how a named
beneficiary would receive trust assets.
FDIC staff generally interpreted the
revocable trust rules to require
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inquiries were prompted by
complex trust agreements that included
numerous conditions prescribing
whether, when, or how a named
beneficiary would receive trust assets.
FDIC staff generally interpreted the
revocable trust rules to require
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17 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 94–32, Guidelines
for Insurance Coverage of Revocable Trust Accounts
(Including ‘‘Living Trust’’ Accounts), (May 18,
1994). While the vested interest requirement
applied to both formal and informal trusts, interests
in informal trusts were generally considered to be
vested because they automatically passed to the
designated beneficiaries upon the death of the last
grantor.
18 61 FR 25596 (May 22, 1996).
19 63 FR 25750 (May 11, 1998).
20 64 FR 15653 (Apr. 1, 1999).
21 68 FR 38645 (June 30, 2003).
22 69 FR 2825 (Jan. 21, 2004).
23 69 FR 2825, 2828 (Jan. 21, 2004).
24 73 FR 56706 (Sep. 30, 2008).
25 12 CFR 330.10(a).
26 12 CFR 330.10(c).
27 12 CFR 330.10(d).
28 12 CFR 330.10(b)(1).
beneficiaries’ interests in formal and
informal revocable trusts to be vested in
order to qualify for separate insurance
coverage, meaning that, after a grantor’s
death, there was no condition attached
to the beneficiary’s interest that would
make the interest contingent (referred to
as a ‘‘defeating contingency’’).17 Staff
reasoned that only a vested trust interest
could establish a reasonable expectation
that the revocable trust deposit ‘‘shall
belong to’’ the beneficiary, as the
regulation required
ance
coverage, meaning that, after a grantor’s
death, there was no condition attached
to the beneficiary’s interest that would
make the interest contingent (referred to
as a ‘‘defeating contingency’’).17 Staff
reasoned that only a vested trust interest
could establish a reasonable expectation
that the revocable trust deposit ‘‘shall
belong to’’ the beneficiary, as the
regulation required.
In 1996, the FDIC sought public
comment on potential simplification of
the deposit insurance rules, noting that
its experience with bank and savings
association failures and a steady volume
of inquiries on deposit insurance
coverage suggested that simplification
could be beneficial.18 Among other
changes, the FDIC proposed specific
amendments to the rules for revocable
trust deposits. Certain of these changes
were finalized in 1998, when a
provision was added to the rules
defining the conditions that would
constitute a defeating contingency.19
Soon afterward, the FDIC expanded the
list of beneficiaries that would qualify
for per-beneficiary coverage to include
siblings and parents, noting that some
depositors had lost money in bank
failures because they had named non-
qualifying beneficiaries.20
In 2003, the FDIC proposed amending
the revocable trust rules, pointing to
continued confusion about the coverage
for revocable trust deposits.21
Specifically, the FDIC proposed to
eliminate the defeating contingency
provisions of the rules, with the result
that coverage would be based on the
interests of qualifying beneficiaries,
irrespective of any defeating
contingencies in the trust agreement.
The FDIC subsequently adopted this
change, noting that it more closely
aligned coverage for living trust
accounts with payable-on-death
accounts.22 Defeating contingency
provisions were not eliminated for
irrevocable trusts
rules, with the result
that coverage would be based on the
interests of qualifying beneficiaries,
irrespective of any defeating
contingencies in the trust agreement.
The FDIC subsequently adopted this
change, noting that it more closely
aligned coverage for living trust
accounts with payable-on-death
accounts.22 Defeating contingency
provisions were not eliminated for
irrevocable trusts. At the same time, the
FDIC also eliminated the requirement to
name the beneficiaries of a formal
revocable trust in the IDI’s deposit
account records.23 Because the FDIC
had to obtain and review trust
agreements from depositors following
an IDI’s failure to determine the
eligibility of the beneficiaries and
allocation of funds to each beneficiary,
eliminating this requirement was based
on the conclusion that also requiring
IDIs to maintain records of trust
beneficiaries, or requiring grantors to
inform IDIs of changes in their trust
agreements, was unnecessary and
burdensome. Though the additional
information might expedite deposit
insurance payments, the FDIC
determined that removing this
recordkeeping requirement would
support ongoing efforts under the
Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act to eliminate
unnecessary regulatory requirements.
The FDIC’s experience with making
deposit insurance determinations
during the early stages of the most
recent financial crisis suggested that
further changes to the trust rules were
necessary. In 2008, the FDIC simplified
the rules in several respects.24 First, it
eliminated the kinship requirement for
revocable trust beneficiaries, instead
allowing any natural person, charitable
organization, or non-profit, to qualify for
per-beneficiary coverage. Second, a
simplified calculation was established if
a revocable trust named five or fewer
beneficiaries; coverage would be
determined without regard to the
allocation of interests among the
beneficiaries
liminated the kinship requirement for
revocable trust beneficiaries, instead
allowing any natural person, charitable
organization, or non-profit, to qualify for
per-beneficiary coverage. Second, a
simplified calculation was established if
a revocable trust named five or fewer
beneficiaries; coverage would be
determined without regard to the
allocation of interests among the
beneficiaries. This eliminated the need
to discern and consider beneficial
interests in many cases.
A different insurance calculation
applied to revocable trusts with more
than five beneficiaries. Specifically, at
that time, the SMDIA was $100,000 and
thus if more than five beneficiaries were
named in a revocable trust, coverage
would be the greater of: (1) $500,000; or
(2) the aggregate amount of all
beneficiaries’ interests in the trust(s),
limited to $100,000 per beneficiary.
When the SMDIA was increased to
$250,000, a similar adjustment was
made from $100,000 to $250,000 for the
calculation of per beneficiary coverage.
3. Current Rules for Coverage of Trust
Deposits
The FDIC currently recognizes three
different insurance categories for
deposits held in connection with trusts:
(1) Revocable trusts; (2) irrevocable
trusts; and (3) irrevocable trusts with an
IDI as trustee. The current rules for
determining insurance coverage for
deposits in each of these categories are
described below.
Revocable Trust Deposits
The revocable trust category applies
to deposits for which the depositor has
evidenced an intention that the deposit
shall belong to one or more beneficiaries
upon his or her death. This category
includes deposits held in connection
with formal revocable trusts—that is,
revocable trusts established through a
written trust agreement. It also includes
deposits that are not subject to a formal
trust agreement, where the IDI makes
payment to the beneficiaries identified
in the IDI’s records upon the depositor’s
death based on account titling and
applicable state law
th. This category
includes deposits held in connection
with formal revocable trusts—that is,
revocable trusts established through a
written trust agreement. It also includes
deposits that are not subject to a formal
trust agreement, where the IDI makes
payment to the beneficiaries identified
in the IDI’s records upon the depositor’s
death based on account titling and
applicable state law. The FDIC refers to
these types of deposits, including Totten
trust accounts, payable-on-death
accounts, and similar accounts, as
‘‘informal revocable trusts.’’ Deposits
associated with formal and informal
revocable trusts are aggregated for
purposes of the deposit insurance rules;
thus, deposits that will pass from the
same grantor to beneficiaries are
aggregated and insured up to the
SMDIA, currently $250,000, per
beneficiary, regardless of whether the
transfer would be accomplished through
a written revocable trust or an informal
revocable trust.25
Under the current revocable trust
rules, beneficiaries include natural
persons, charitable organizations, and
non-profit entities recognized as such
under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.26 If a named beneficiary does not
satisfy this requirement, funds held in
trust for that beneficiary are treated as
single ownership funds of the grantor
and aggregated with any other single
ownership accounts that the grantor
maintains at the same IDI.27
Certain requirements also must be
satisfied for a deposit to be insured in
the revocable trust category. The
required intention that the funds shall
belong to the beneficiaries upon the
depositor’s death must be manifested in
the ‘‘title’’ of the account using
commonly accepted terms such as ‘‘in
trust for,’’ ‘‘as trustee for,’’ ‘‘payable-on-
death to,’’ or any acronym for these
terms. For purposes of this requirement,
‘‘title’’ includes the IDI’s electronic
deposit account records
ategory. The
required intention that the funds shall
belong to the beneficiaries upon the
depositor’s death must be manifested in
the ‘‘title’’ of the account using
commonly accepted terms such as ‘‘in
trust for,’’ ‘‘as trustee for,’’ ‘‘payable-on-
death to,’’ or any acronym for these
terms. For purposes of this requirement,
‘‘title’’ includes the IDI’s electronic
deposit account records. For example,
an IDI’s electronic deposit account
records could identify the account as a
revocable trust account through coding
or a similar mechanism.28 In addition,
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29 12 CFR 330.10(b)(2).
30 12 CFR 330.10(a).
31 12 CFR 330.10(e).
32 12 CFR 330.10(g). For example, if a revocable
trust provides a life estate for the depositor’s spouse
and remainder interests for six other beneficiaries,
the spouse’s life estate interest would be valued at
$250,000 for purposes of the deposit insurance
calculation.
33 12 CFR 330.10(f)(1).
34 12 CFR 330.10(f)(2).
35 12 CFR 330.10(h).
36 The revocable trust rules tend to provide
greater coverage than the irrevocable trust rules
because contingencies are not considered for
revocable trusts. In addition, where five or fewer
beneficiaries are named by a revocable trust,
specific allocations to beneficiaries also are not
considered.
37 12 CFR 330.1(m). For example, a life estate
interest is generally non-contingent, as it may be
valued using the life expectancy tables. However,
where a trustee has discretion to divert funds from
one beneficiary to another to provide for the second
beneficiary’s medical needs, the first beneficiary’s
interest is contingent upon the trustee’s discretion.
38 12 CFR 330.13(a).
39 12 CFR 330.13(b)
R 330.1(m). For example, a life estate
interest is generally non-contingent, as it may be
valued using the life expectancy tables. However,
where a trustee has discretion to divert funds from
one beneficiary to another to provide for the second
beneficiary’s medical needs, the first beneficiary’s
interest is contingent upon the trustee’s discretion.
38 12 CFR 330.13(a).
39 12 CFR 330.13(b).
40 See 12 CFR 330.1(r) (definition of ‘‘trust
interest’’ does not include any interest retained by
the settlor).
41 12 U.S.C. 1817(i).
42 Part 330 defines ‘‘trust funds’’ as ‘‘funds held
by an insured depository institution as trustee
pursuant to any irrevocable trust established
pursuant to any statute or written trust agreement.’’
12 CFR 330.1(q).
43 12 CFR 330.12(a).
44 81 FR 87734 (Dec. 5, 2016).
the beneficiaries of informal trusts (i.e.,
payable-on-death accounts) must be
named in the IDI’s deposit account
records.29 Since 2004, the requirement
to name beneficiaries in the IDI’s
deposit account records has not applied
to formal revocable trusts; the FDIC
generally obtains information on
beneficiaries of such trusts from
depositors following an IDI’s failure.
Therefore, if a formal revocable trust
deposit exceeds $250,000 and the
depositor’s IDI were to fail, this will
likely result in a hold being placed on
the deposit until the FDIC can review
the trust agreement and verify that the
beneficiary rules are satisfied, thereby
delaying insurance determinations and
payments to insured depositors.
The calculation of deposit insurance
coverage for revocable trust deposits
depends upon the number of unique
beneficiaries named by a depositor
o fail, this will
likely result in a hold being placed on
the deposit until the FDIC can review
the trust agreement and verify that the
beneficiary rules are satisfied, thereby
delaying insurance determinations and
payments to insured depositors.
The calculation of deposit insurance
coverage for revocable trust deposits
depends upon the number of unique
beneficiaries named by a depositor. If
five or fewer beneficiaries have been
named, the depositor is insured in an
amount up to the total number of named
beneficiaries multiplied by the SMDIA,
and the specific allocation of interests
among the beneficiaries is not
considered.30 If more than five
beneficiaries have been named, the
depositor is insured up to the greater of:
(1) Five times the SMDIA; or (2) the
total of the interests of each beneficiary,
with each such interest limited to the
SMDIA.31 For purposes of this
calculation, a life estate interest is
valued at the SMDIA.32
Where a revocable trust deposit is
jointly owned by multiple co-owners,
the interests of each account owner are
separately insured up to the SMDIA per
beneficiary.33 However, if the co-owners
are the only beneficiaries of the trust,
the account is instead insured under the
FDIC’s joint account rule.34
The current revocable trust rule also
contains a provision that was intended
to reduce confusion and the potential
for a decrease in deposit insurance
coverage in the case of the death of a
grantor
separately insured up to the SMDIA per
beneficiary.33 However, if the co-owners
are the only beneficiaries of the trust,
the account is instead insured under the
FDIC’s joint account rule.34
The current revocable trust rule also
contains a provision that was intended
to reduce confusion and the potential
for a decrease in deposit insurance
coverage in the case of the death of a
grantor. Specifically, if a revocable trust
becomes irrevocable due to the death of
the grantor, the trust’s deposit may
continue to be insured under the
revocable trust rules.35 Absent this
provision, the irrevocable trust rules
would apply following the grantor’s
death, as the revocable trust becomes
irrevocable at that time, which could
result in a reduction in coverage.36
Irrevocable Trust Deposits
Deposits held by an irrevocable trust
that has been established either by
written agreement or by statute are
insured in the irrevocable trust deposit
insurance category. Calculating coverage
for deposits insured in this category
requires a determination of whether
beneficiaries’ interests in the trust are
contingent or non-contingent. Non-
contingent interests are interests that
may be determined without evaluation
of any contingencies, except for those
covered by the present worth and life
expectancy tables and the rules for their
use set forth in the IRS Federal Estate
Tax Regulations.37 Funds held for non-
contingent trust interests are insured up
to the SMDIA for each such
beneficiary.38 Funds held for contingent
trust interests are aggregated and
insured up to the SMDIA in total.39
The irrevocable trust rules do not
apply to deposits held for a grantor’s
retained interest in an irrevocable
trust.40 Such deposits are aggregated
with the grantor’s other single
ownership deposits for purposes of
applying the deposit insurance limit
to the SMDIA for each such
beneficiary.38 Funds held for contingent
trust interests are aggregated and
insured up to the SMDIA in total.39
The irrevocable trust rules do not
apply to deposits held for a grantor’s
retained interest in an irrevocable
trust.40 Such deposits are aggregated
with the grantor’s other single
ownership deposits for purposes of
applying the deposit insurance limit.
Deposits Held by an IDI as Trustee of an
Irrevocable Trust
For deposits held by an IDI in its
capacity as trustee of an irrevocable
trust, deposit insurance coverage is
governed by section 7(i) of the FDI Act,
a provision rooted in the Banking Act of
1935. Section 7(i) provides that ‘‘trust
funds held on deposit by an insured
depository institution in a fiduciary
capacity as trustee pursuant to any
irrevocable trust established pursuant to
any statute or written trust agreement
shall be insured in an amount not to
exceed the standard maximum deposit
insurance amount . . . for each trust
estate.’’ 41
The FDIC’s regulations governing
coverage for deposits held by an IDI in
its capacity as trustee of an irrevocable
trust are found in § 330.12. The rule
provides that ‘‘trust funds’’ held by an
IDI in its capacity as trustee of an
irrevocable trust, whether held in the
IDI’s trust department or another
department, or deposited by the
fiduciary institution in another IDI, are
insured up to the SMDIA for each owner
or beneficiary represented.42 This
coverage is separate from the coverage
provided for other deposits of the
owners or the beneficiaries,43 and
deposits held for a grantor’s retained
interest are not aggregated with the
grantor’s single ownership deposits.
Given the statutory basis for coverage,
the FDIC is not proposing any changes
to § 330.12.
4
insured up to the SMDIA for each owner
or beneficiary represented.42 This
coverage is separate from the coverage
provided for other deposits of the
owners or the beneficiaries,43 and
deposits held for a grantor’s retained
interest are not aggregated with the
grantor’s single ownership deposits.
Given the statutory basis for coverage,
the FDIC is not proposing any changes
to § 330.12.
4. Part 370 and Recordkeeping at the
Largest IDIs
Simplification of the deposit
insurance rules would make deposit
insurance coverage easier to understand
and improve the FDIC’s ability to
resolve insurance claims in a timely
manner, broadly benefiting the public
and IDIs, and it would have particular
significance for the large IDIs that are
subject to part 370 of the FDIC’s
regulations. Part 370 was adopted in
2016 to promote the timely payment of
deposit insurance in the event of the
failure of a large IDI.44 Its development
was prompted by the FDIC’s goal of
ensuring a timely insurance
determination in the event a large IDI
with a high volume of deposit accounts
fails. Part 370 requires ‘‘covered
institutions,’’ which generally include
IDIs with two million or more deposit
accounts, to maintain complete and
accurate depositor information and to
configure their information technology
systems so as to permit the FDIC to
calculate deposit insurance coverage
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nerally include
IDIs with two million or more deposit
accounts, to maintain complete and
accurate depositor information and to
configure their information technology
systems so as to permit the FDIC to
calculate deposit insurance coverage
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45 See Crisis and Response: An FDIC History,
2008–2013 at 197, FN 48, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation 2017.
promptly in the event of the IDI’s
failure. To implement part 370, covered
institutions are updating their deposit
account records and developing systems
capable of applying the deposit
insurance rules in an automated
manner.
In addition to broadly benefiting the
public and all IDIs, simplification of the
deposit insurance rules complements
part 370 in that it would further
promote the timely payment of deposit
insurance for depositors of the largest
IDIs. For instance, neither part 370 nor
any other rule requires covered
institutions to maintain certain records
necessary to make an insurance
determination for formal trust deposits,
meaning that the FDIC would need to
obtain and review revocable and
irrevocable trust agreements following a
covered institution’s failure. Analysis of
data from part 370 covered institutions
suggest the number of revocable trusts is
significant and, if a covered institution
were to fail, processing of deposit
insurance for formal revocable trusts
would likely extend well beyond
normal FDIC payment timeframes.
Simplification of the deposit insurance
rules would streamline insurance
determinations for trust accounts. The
FDIC expects that capabilities
developed in accordance with part 370
will be helpful in addressing many of
the challenges involved in making
deposit insurance determinations in
connection with a very large IDI’s
failure
likely extend well beyond
normal FDIC payment timeframes.
Simplification of the deposit insurance
rules would streamline insurance
determinations for trust accounts. The
FDIC expects that capabilities
developed in accordance with part 370
will be helpful in addressing many of
the challenges involved in making
deposit insurance determinations in
connection with a very large IDI’s
failure. Simplification of the deposit
insurance rules would provide
additional benefits by reducing the
amount of time needed to collect and
process trust information after failure in
order to make use of a covered
institution’s part 370 deposit insurance
calculation capabilities. With less time
needed to calculate insurance coverage,
the FDIC would be able to make more
timely insurance payments to insured
depositors.
5. Need for Further Rulemaking
The rules governing deposit insurance
coverage for trust deposits have been
simplified on several occasions, but are
still frequently misunderstood, and can
present some implementation
challenges. For example, the current
trust rules often require detailed, time-
consuming, and resource-intensive
review of trust documentation to obtain
the information that is necessary to
calculate deposit insurance coverage.
This information is often not found in
an IDI’s records and must be obtained
from depositors after an IDI’s failure.
For example, the FDIC’s deposit
insurance determinations for depositors
of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (IndyMac)
following its failure in 2008 were
challenging in part because IndyMac
had a large number of trust accounts for
which deposit insurance coverage was
governed by complex deposit insurance
rules.45 FDIC claims personnel
contacted more than 10,500 IndyMac
depositors to obtain the trust
documentation necessary to complete
deposit insurance determinations for
their revocable trust and irrevocable
trust deposits. In some cases, this
process took several months
c
had a large number of trust accounts for
which deposit insurance coverage was
governed by complex deposit insurance
rules.45 FDIC claims personnel
contacted more than 10,500 IndyMac
depositors to obtain the trust
documentation necessary to complete
deposit insurance determinations for
their revocable trust and irrevocable
trust deposits. In some cases, this
process took several months. Revision of
the deposit insurance coverage rules for
trust deposits along the lines proposed
would reduce the amount of
information that must be provided by
trust depositors, as well as the
complexity of the FDIC’s review. This
revision should enable the FDIC to
complete deposit insurance
determinations more rapidly if another
IDI with a large number of trust
accounts were to fail in the future.
Delays in the payment of deposit
insurance can be consequential, as
revocable trust deposits in particular are
often used by depositors to satisfy their
daily financial obligations, and the
proposal would help to mitigate those
delays.
Several factors contribute to the
challenges of making insurance
determinations for trust deposits. First,
there are three different sets of rules
governing deposit insurance coverage
for trust deposits. Understanding the
coverage for a particular deposit
requires a threshold inquiry to
determine which set of rules to apply—
the revocable trust rules, the irrevocable
trust rules, or the rules for deposits held
by an IDI as trustee of an irrevocable
trust. This requires review of the trust
agreement to determine the type of trust
(revocable or irrevocable), and the
inquiry may be complicated by
innovations in state trust law that are
intended to increase the flexibility and
utility of trusts. In some cases, this
threshold inquiry is also complicated by
the provision of the revocable trust rules
that allows for continued coverage
under those rules where a trust becomes
irrevocable upon the grantor’s death
of trust
(revocable or irrevocable), and the
inquiry may be complicated by
innovations in state trust law that are
intended to increase the flexibility and
utility of trusts. In some cases, this
threshold inquiry is also complicated by
the provision of the revocable trust rules
that allows for continued coverage
under those rules where a trust becomes
irrevocable upon the grantor’s death.
The result of an irrevocable trust deposit
being insured under the revocable trust
rules has proven confusing for both
depositors and bankers.
Second, even after determining which
set of rules applies to a particular
deposit, it may be challenging to apply
the rules. For example, the revocable
trust rules include unique titling
requirements and beneficiary
requirements. These rules also provide
for two separate calculations to
determine insurance coverage,
depending in part upon whether there
are five or fewer trust beneficiaries or at
least six beneficiaries. In addition, for
revocable trusts that provide benefits to
multiple generations of potential
beneficiaries, the FDIC needs to evaluate
the trust agreement to determine
whether a beneficiary is a primary
beneficiary (immediately entitled to
funds when a grantor dies), contingent
beneficiary, or remainder beneficiary.
Only ‘‘eligible’’ primary beneficiaries
and remainder beneficiaries are
considered in calculating FDIC deposit
insurance coverage. The irrevocable
trust rules may require detailed review
of trust agreements to determine
whether beneficiaries’ interests are
contingent and may also require
actuarial or present value calculations.
These types of requirements complicate
the determination of insurance coverage
for trust deposits, have proven
confusing for depositors, and extend the
amount of time needed to complete a
deposit insurance determination and
insurance payment.
Third, the complexity and variety of
depositors’ trust arrangements adds to
the difficulty of determining deposit
insurance coverage
calculations.
These types of requirements complicate
the determination of insurance coverage
for trust deposits, have proven
confusing for depositors, and extend the
amount of time needed to complete a
deposit insurance determination and
insurance payment.
Third, the complexity and variety of
depositors’ trust arrangements adds to
the difficulty of determining deposit
insurance coverage. For example, trust
interests are sometimes defined through
numerous conditions and formulas, and
a careful analysis of these provisions
may be necessary in order to calculate
deposit insurance coverage under the
current rules. Arrangements involving
multiple trusts where the same
beneficiaries are named by the same
grantor(s) in different trusts add to the
difficulty of applying the trust rules.
The FDIC believes that simplification
of the deposit insurance rules also
presents an opportunity to more closely
align the coverage provided for different
types of trust deposits. For example, the
revocable trust rules generally provide
for a greater amount of coverage than
the irrevocable trust rules. This outcome
occurs because contingent interests for
irrevocable trusts are aggregated and
insured up to the SMDIA rather than
being insured up to the SMDIA per
beneficiary, while contingencies are not
considered and therefore do not limit
coverage in the same manner for
revocable trusts.
C. Description of Proposed Rule
The FDIC is proposing to amend the
rules governing deposit insurance
coverage for trust deposits. Generally,
the proposed amendments would:
Merge the revocable and irrevocable
trust categories into one category; apply
a simpler, common calculation method
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osing to amend the
rules governing deposit insurance
coverage for trust deposits. Generally,
the proposed amendments would:
Merge the revocable and irrevocable
trust categories into one category; apply
a simpler, common calculation method
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46 For example, the FDIC currently aggregates
deposits in payable-on-death accounts and deposits
of written revocable trusts for purposes of deposit
insurance coverage, despite their separate and
distinct legal mechanisms. Also, where the co-
owners of a revocable trust are also that trust’s sole
beneficiaries, the FDIC instead insures the trust’s
deposits as joint deposits, reflecting the
arrangement’s substance rather than its legal form.
47 As noted above, if a revocable trust becomes
irrevocable due to the death of the grantor, the
trust’s deposit continues to be insured under the
revocable trust rules. 12 CFR 330.10(h).
48 The death of an account owner can affect
deposit insurance coverage, often reducing the
amount of coverage that applies to a family’s
accounts. To ensure that families dealing with the
death of a family member have adequate time to
review and restructure accounts if necessary, the
FDIC insures a deceased owner’s accounts as if he
or she were still alive for a period of six months
after his or her death. 12 CFR 330.3(j).
49 For example, two co-grantors that designate
five beneficiaries are insured for up to $2,500,000
(2 × 5 × $250,000).
to determine insurance coverage for
deposits held by revocable and
irrevocable trusts; and eliminate certain
requirements found in the current rules
for revocable and irrevocable trusts
e were still alive for a period of six months
after his or her death. 12 CFR 330.3(j).
49 For example, two co-grantors that designate
five beneficiaries are insured for up to $2,500,000
(2 × 5 × $250,000).
to determine insurance coverage for
deposits held by revocable and
irrevocable trusts; and eliminate certain
requirements found in the current rules
for revocable and irrevocable trusts.
Merger of Revocable and Irrevocable
Trust Categories
As discussed above, the FDIC
historically has insured revocable trust
deposits and irrevocable trust deposits
under two separate insurance categories.
Staff’s experience has been that this
bifurcation often confuses depositors
and bankers, as it requires a threshold
inquiry to determine which set of rules
to apply to a trust deposit. Moreover,
each trust deposit must be categorized
before the aggregation of trust deposits
within each category can be completed.
The FDIC believes that trust deposits
held in connection with revocable and
irrevocable trusts are sufficiently
similar, for purposes of deposit
insurance coverage, to warrant the
merger of these two categories into one
category. Under the FDIC’s current
rules, deposit insurance coverage is
provided because the trustee maintains
the deposit for the benefit of the
beneficiaries. This is true regardless of
whether the trust is revocable or
irrevocable. Merger of the revocable and
irrevocable trust categories would better
conform deposit insurance coverage to
the substance—rather than the legal
form—of the trust arrangement. This
underlying principle of the deposit
insurance rules is particularly important
in the context of trusts, as state law
often provides flexibility to structure
arrangements in different ways to
accomplish a given purpose.46
Depositors may have a variety of reasons
for selecting a particular legal
arrangement, but that decision should
not significantly affect deposit
insurance coverage
This
underlying principle of the deposit
insurance rules is particularly important
in the context of trusts, as state law
often provides flexibility to structure
arrangements in different ways to
accomplish a given purpose.46
Depositors may have a variety of reasons
for selecting a particular legal
arrangement, but that decision should
not significantly affect deposit
insurance coverage. Importantly, the
proposed merger of the revocable trust
and irrevocable trust categories into one
category for deposit insurance purposes
would not affect the application or
operation of state trust law; this only
would affect the determination of
deposit insurance coverage for these
types of trust deposits in the event of an
IDI’s failure.
Accordingly, the FDIC is proposing to
amend § 330.10 of its regulations, which
currently applies only to revocable trust
deposits, to establish a new ‘‘trust
accounts’’ category that would include
both revocable and irrevocable trust
deposits. The proposed rule defines the
deposits that would be included in this
category: (1) Informal revocable trust
deposits, such as payable-on-death
accounts, in-trust-for accounts, and
Totten trust accounts; (2) formal
revocable trust deposits, defined to
mean deposits held pursuant to a
written revocable trust agreement under
which a deposit passes to one or more
beneficiaries upon the grantor’s death;
and (3) irrevocable trust deposits,
meaning deposits held pursuant to an
irrevocable trust established by written
agreement or by statute. Section 330.10
would not apply to deposits maintained
by an IDI in its capacity as trustee of an
irrevocable trust; these deposits would
continue to be insured separately
pursuant to section 7(i) of the FDI Act
and § 330.12 of the deposit insurance
regulations
rrevocable trust deposits,
meaning deposits held pursuant to an
irrevocable trust established by written
agreement or by statute. Section 330.10
would not apply to deposits maintained
by an IDI in its capacity as trustee of an
irrevocable trust; these deposits would
continue to be insured separately
pursuant to section 7(i) of the FDI Act
and § 330.12 of the deposit insurance
regulations.
In addition, the merger of the
revocable trust and irrevocable trust
categories eliminates the need for
§ 330.10(h)–(i) of the current revocable
trust rules, which provides that the
revocable trust rules may continue to
apply to a deposit where a revocable
trust becomes irrevocable due to the
death of one or more of the trust’s
grantors. These provisions were
intended to benefit depositors, who
sometimes were unaware that a trust
owner’s death could also trigger a
significant decrease in insurance
coverage as a revocable trust becomes
irrevocable. However, in the FDIC’s
experience, this rule has proven
complex in part because it results in
some irrevocable trusts being insured
per the revocable trust rules, while other
irrevocable trusts are insured under the
irrevocable trust rules.47 As a result, a
depositor could know a trust was
irrevocable but not know which deposit
insurance rules to apply. The proposed
rule would insure deposits of revocable
trusts and irrevocable trusts according
to a common set of rules, eliminating
the need for these provisions
(§ 330.10(h)–(i)) and simplifying
coverage for depositors. Accordingly,
the death of a revocable trust owner
would not result in a decrease in
deposit insurance coverage for the trust
know which deposit
insurance rules to apply. The proposed
rule would insure deposits of revocable
trusts and irrevocable trusts according
to a common set of rules, eliminating
the need for these provisions
(§ 330.10(h)–(i)) and simplifying
coverage for depositors. Accordingly,
the death of a revocable trust owner
would not result in a decrease in
deposit insurance coverage for the trust.
Coverage for irrevocable and revocable
trusts would fall under the same
category and deposit insurance coverage
would remain the same, even after the
expiration of the six-month grace period
following the death of a deposit
owner.48
Calculation of Coverage
The FDIC is proposing to use one
streamlined calculation to determine the
amount of deposit insurance coverage
for deposits of revocable and irrevocable
trusts. This method is already utilized
by the FDIC to calculate coverage for
revocable trusts that have five or fewer
beneficiaries and it is an aspect of the
rules that is generally well-understood
by bankers and trust depositors.
The proposed rule would provide that
a grantor’s trust deposits are insured in
an amount up to the SMDIA (currently
$250,000) multiplied by the number of
trust beneficiaries, not to exceed five
beneficiaries. The FDIC would presume
that, for deposit insurance purposes, the
trust provides for equal treatment of
beneficiaries such that specific
allocation of the funds to the respective
beneficiaries will not be relevant,
consistent with the FDIC’s current
treatment of revocable trusts with five or
fewer beneficiaries. This would, in
effect, limit coverage for a grantor’s trust
deposits at each IDI to a total of
$1,250,000; in other words, maximum
coverage would be equivalent to
$250,000 per beneficiary up to five
beneficiaries
allocation of the funds to the respective
beneficiaries will not be relevant,
consistent with the FDIC’s current
treatment of revocable trusts with five or
fewer beneficiaries. This would, in
effect, limit coverage for a grantor’s trust
deposits at each IDI to a total of
$1,250,000; in other words, maximum
coverage would be equivalent to
$250,000 per beneficiary up to five
beneficiaries. In determining deposit
insurance coverage, the FDIC would
continue to only consider beneficiaries
that are expected to receive the deposit
held by the trust in the IDI; the FDIC
would not consider beneficiaries who
are expected to receive only non-deposit
assets of the trust.
The FDIC is proposing to calculate
coverage in this manner based on its
experience with the revocable trust
rules after the most recent modifications
to these rules in 2008. The FDIC has
found that the deposit insurance
calculation method for revocable trusts
with five or fewer beneficiaries has been
the most straightforward and is easy for
bankers and the public to understand.
This calculation provides for insurance
in an amount up to the total number of
unique grantor-beneficiary trust
relationships (i.e., the number of
grantors, multiplied by the total number
of beneficiaries, multiplied by the
SMDIA).49 In addition to being simpler,
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for insurance
in an amount up to the total number of
unique grantor-beneficiary trust
relationships (i.e., the number of
grantors, multiplied by the total number
of beneficiaries, multiplied by the
SMDIA).49 In addition to being simpler,
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50 Data from 2,550,001 depositors, including
249,257 trust account depositors, at 246 failed
banks from September 17, 2010–April 3, 2020. A
total of 212 out of 249,257 (.085 percent) trust
account depositors had more than $1.25 million in
deposits across all of their trust accounts. Of these
depositors, only 24 had more than five beneficiaries
named in the bank’s records. However, not all trust
accounts in the sample maintained beneficiary
records at the bank, so this likely underestimates
the number of affected depositors.
51 See 12 CFR 330.10(a) (‘‘all funds that a
depositor holds in both living trust accounts and
payable-on-death accounts, at the same FDIC-
insured institution and naming the same
beneficiaries, are aggregated for insurance
purposes’’).
52 For example, if a grantor maintained both an
informal revocable trust account with three
beneficiaries and a formal revocable trust account
with three separate and unique beneficiaries, the
two accounts would be aggregated and the
maximum deposit insurance available would be
$1.25 million (1 grantor × SMDIA × number of
unique beneficiaries, limited to 5). However, if the
same three people were the beneficiaries of both
accounts, the maximum deposit insurance available
would be $750,000 (1 grantor × SMDIA × 3 unique
beneficiaries).
53 12 CFR 330.10(c)
nique beneficiaries, the
two accounts would be aggregated and the
maximum deposit insurance available would be
$1.25 million (1 grantor × SMDIA × number of
unique beneficiaries, limited to 5). However, if the
same three people were the beneficiaries of both
accounts, the maximum deposit insurance available
would be $750,000 (1 grantor × SMDIA × 3 unique
beneficiaries).
53 12 CFR 330.10(c).
54 See FDIC Financial Institution Employee’s
Guide to Deposit Insurance at 51 (‘‘Sometimes the
trust agreement will provide that if a primary
beneficiary predeceases the owner, the deceased
beneficiary’s share will pass to an alternative or
contingent beneficiary. Regardless of such language,
if the primary beneficiary is alive at the time of an
IDI’s failure, only the primary beneficiary, and not
the alternative or contingent beneficiary, is taken
into account in calculating deposit insurance
coverage.’’). Including only unique beneficiaries
means that when an owner names the same
beneficiary on multiple trust accounts, the
beneficiary will only be counted once in calculating
trust coverage. For example, if a grantor has two
trust deposit accounts and names the same
beneficiary in both trust documents, the total
deposit insurance coverage associated with that
beneficiary is limited to $250,000 in total.
this calculation has proven beneficial in
resolutions, as it leads to more prompt
deposit insurance determinations and
quicker access to insured deposits for
depositors. Accordingly, the FDIC
proposes to calculate deposit insurance
coverage for trust deposits based on the
simpler calculation currently used for
revocable trusts with five or fewer
beneficiaries.
The streamlined calculation that
would be used to determine coverage for
revocable trust deposits and irrevocable
trust deposits includes a limit on the
total amount of deposit insurance
coverage for all of a depositor’s funds in
the trust category at the same IDI
age for trust deposits based on the
simpler calculation currently used for
revocable trusts with five or fewer
beneficiaries.
The streamlined calculation that
would be used to determine coverage for
revocable trust deposits and irrevocable
trust deposits includes a limit on the
total amount of deposit insurance
coverage for all of a depositor’s funds in
the trust category at the same IDI. The
proposed rule would provide coverage
for trust deposits at each IDI up to a total
of $1,250,000 per grantor; in other
words, each grantor’s insurance limit
would be $250,000 per beneficiary up to
a maximum of five beneficiaries. The
level of five beneficiaries is an
important threshold in the current
revocable trust rules, as it defines
whether a grantor’s coverage is
determined using the simpler
calculation of the number of
beneficiaries multiplied by the SMDIA,
rather than the more complex
calculation involving the consideration
of the amount of each beneficiary’s
specific interest (which applies when
there are six or more beneficiaries). The
trust rules currently limit coverage by
tying coverage to the specific interests of
each beneficiary of an irrevocable trust
or of each beneficiary of a revocable
trust with more than five beneficiaries.
The proposed rule’s $1,250,000 per-
grantor, per-IDI limit is more
straightforward and balances the
objectives of simplifying the trust rules,
promoting timely payment of deposit
insurance, facilitating resolutions,
ensuring consistency with the FDI Act,
and limiting risk to the DIF.
The FDIC anticipates that limiting
coverage to $1,250,000 per grantor, per
IDI, for trust deposits would affect very
few depositors, as most trust deposits in
past IDI failures have had balances well
below this level
of simplifying the trust rules,
promoting timely payment of deposit
insurance, facilitating resolutions,
ensuring consistency with the FDI Act,
and limiting risk to the DIF.
The FDIC anticipates that limiting
coverage to $1,250,000 per grantor, per
IDI, for trust deposits would affect very
few depositors, as most trust deposits in
past IDI failures have had balances well
below this level. For example, data
obtained from a sample of IDI failures
from 2010–2020 suggests that only
about 0.085 percent of depositors
maintaining trust deposits might be
affected by the proposed $1,250,000
limit.50 The FDIC does not possess
sufficient information, however, to
enable it to project the effects of the
proposed limit on current depositors,
and requests that commenters provide
information that might be helpful in this
regard.
Under the proposed rule, to determine
the level of insurance coverage that
would apply to trust deposits,
depositors would still need to identify
the grantors and the eligible
beneficiaries of the trust. The level of
coverage that applies to trust deposits
would no longer be affected by the
specific allocation of trust funds to each
of the beneficiaries of the trust or by
contingencies outlined in the trust
agreement. Instead, the proposed rule
would provide that a grantor’s trust
deposits are insured up to a total of
$1,250,000 per grantor, or an amount up
to the SMDIA multiplied by the number
of eligible beneficiaries, with a limit of
no more than five beneficiaries.
Aggregation
The proposed rule also provides for
the aggregation of revocable and
irrevocable trust deposits for purposes
of applying the deposit insurance limit.
Under the current rules, deposits of
informal revocable trusts and formal
revocable trusts are aggregated for this
purpose.51 The proposed rule would
aggregate a grantor’s informal and
formal revocable trust deposits, as well
as irrevocable trust deposits
le also provides for
the aggregation of revocable and
irrevocable trust deposits for purposes
of applying the deposit insurance limit.
Under the current rules, deposits of
informal revocable trusts and formal
revocable trusts are aggregated for this
purpose.51 The proposed rule would
aggregate a grantor’s informal and
formal revocable trust deposits, as well
as irrevocable trust deposits. For
example, all informal revocable trusts,
formal revocable trusts and irrevocable
trusts held for the same grantor, at the
same IDI would be aggregated and the
grantor’s insurance limit would be
determined by how many eligible and
unique beneficiaries were identified
between all of their trust accounts.52
The deposit insurance coverage
provided in the ‘‘trust accounts’’
category would continue to remain
separate from the coverage provided for
other deposits held in a different right
and capacity at the same IDI. However,
a small number of depositors that
currently maintain both revocable trust
and irrevocable trust deposits at the
same IDI may have deposits in excess of
the insurance limit if these separate
categories are combined. The FDIC does
not have data on depositors’ trust
arrangements that would allow it to
estimate the number of depositors that
might be affected in this manner, and
requests that commenters provide
information that might be helpful in this
regard.
Eligible Beneficiaries
Currently, the revocable trust rules
provide that beneficiaries include
natural persons, charitable
organizations, and non-profit entities
recognized as such under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986,53 while the
irrevocable trust rules do not establish
criteria for beneficiaries. The FDIC
believes that a single definition should
be used to determine whether an entity
is an ‘‘eligible’’ beneficiary for all trust
deposits, and proposes to use the
current revocable trust rule’s definition
organizations, and non-profit entities
recognized as such under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986,53 while the
irrevocable trust rules do not establish
criteria for beneficiaries. The FDIC
believes that a single definition should
be used to determine whether an entity
is an ‘‘eligible’’ beneficiary for all trust
deposits, and proposes to use the
current revocable trust rule’s definition.
The FDIC believes that this will result
in a change in deposit insurance
coverage only in very rare cases.
The proposed rule also would exclude
from the calculation of deposit
insurance coverage beneficiaries that
only would obtain an interest in a trust
if one or more named beneficiaries are
deceased (often referred to as contingent
beneficiaries). In this respect, the
proposed rule would codify existing
practice to include only primary, unique
beneficiaries in the deposit insurance
calculation.54 This would not represent
a substantive change in coverage.
Consistent with treatment under the
current trust rules, naming a chain of
contingent beneficiaries that would
obtain trust interests only in event of a
beneficiary’s death would not increase
deposit insurance coverage.
Finally, the proposed rule would
codify a longstanding interpretation of
the trust rules where an informal
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neficiaries that would
obtain trust interests only in event of a
beneficiary’s death would not increase
deposit insurance coverage.
Finally, the proposed rule would
codify a longstanding interpretation of
the trust rules where an informal
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55 See FDIC Financial Institution Employee’s
Guide to Deposit Insurance at 71.
56 See 12 CFR 330.1(r); see also FDIC Financial
Institution Employee’s Guide to Deposit Insurance
at 87.
57 12 CFR 330.10(d).
58 In the unlikely event a trust does not name any
eligible beneficiaries, the FDIC would treat the
trust’s deposits as single ownership deposits. Such
deposits would be aggregated with any other single
ownership deposits that the grantor maintains at the
same IDI and insured up to the SMDIA of $250,000.
59 See FDIC Financial Institution Employee’s
Guide to Deposit Insurance at 74.
60 See 12 CFR 330.10(b)(2).
61 See 12 CFR 330.10(f).
revocable trust designates the
depositor’s formal trust as its
beneficiary. A formal trust generally
does not meet the definition of an
eligible beneficiary for deposit
insurance purposes, but the FDIC has
treated such accounts as revocable trust
accounts under the trust rules, insuring
the account as if it were titled in the
name of the formal trust.55
Retained Interests and Ineligible
Beneficiaries’ Interests
The current trust rules provide that in
some instances, funds corresponding to
specific beneficiaries are aggregated
with a grantor’s single ownership
deposits at the same IDI for purposes of
the deposit insurance calculation
ounts under the trust rules, insuring
the account as if it were titled in the
name of the formal trust.55
Retained Interests and Ineligible
Beneficiaries’ Interests
The current trust rules provide that in
some instances, funds corresponding to
specific beneficiaries are aggregated
with a grantor’s single ownership
deposits at the same IDI for purposes of
the deposit insurance calculation. These
instances include a grantor’s retained
interest in an irrevocable trust 56 and
interests of beneficiaries that do not
satisfy the definition of ‘‘beneficiary.’’ 57
This adds complexity to the deposit
insurance calculation, as detailed
review of a trust agreement may be
required to value such interests in order
to aggregate them with a grantor’s other
funds. In order to implement the
streamlined calculation for trust
deposits, the FDIC is proposing to
eliminate these provisions. Under the
proposed rules, the grantor and other
beneficiaries that do not satisfy the
definition of ‘‘eligible beneficiary’’
would not be included for purposes of
the deposit insurance calculation.58
Importantly, this would not in any way
limit a grantor’s ability to establish such
trust interests under State law. These
interests simply would not factor into
the calculation of deposit insurance
coverage.
Future Trusts Named as Beneficiaries
Trusts often contain provisions for the
establishment of one or more new trusts
upon the grantor’s death, and the
proposed rule also would clarify deposit
insurance coverage in these situations.
Specifically, if a trust agreement
provides that trust funds will pass into
one or more new trusts upon the death
of the grantor (or grantors), the future
trust (or trusts) would not be treated as
beneficiaries for purposes of the
calculation
shment of one or more new trusts
upon the grantor’s death, and the
proposed rule also would clarify deposit
insurance coverage in these situations.
Specifically, if a trust agreement
provides that trust funds will pass into
one or more new trusts upon the death
of the grantor (or grantors), the future
trust (or trusts) would not be treated as
beneficiaries for purposes of the
calculation. The future trust(s) instead
would be considered mechanisms for
distributing trust funds, and the natural
persons or organizations that receive the
trust funds through the future trusts
would be considered the beneficiaries
for purposes of the deposit insurance
calculation. This clarification is
consistent with published guidance and
would not represent a substantive
change in deposit insurance coverage.59
Naming of Beneficiaries in Deposit
Account Records
Consistent with the current revocable
trust rules, the proposed rule would
continue to require the beneficiaries of
an informal revocable trust to be
specifically named in the deposit
account records of the IDI.60 The FDIC
does not believe this requirement
imposes a burden on IDIs, as informal
revocable trusts by their nature require
the IDI to be able to identify the
individuals or entities to which a
deposit would be paid upon the
depositor’s death.
Presumption of Ownership
The proposed rule also would state
that, unless otherwise specified in an
IDI’s deposit account records, a deposit
of a trust established by multiple
grantors is presumed to be owned in
equal shares. This presumption is
consistent with the current revocable
trust rules.61
Bankruptcy Trustee Deposits
The proposed rule would continue
the current treatment of deposits placed
at an IDI by a bankruptcy trustee. If
funds of multiple bankruptcy estates
were commingled in a single account at
the IDI, each estate would be separately
insured up to the SMDIA
esumed to be owned in
equal shares. This presumption is
consistent with the current revocable
trust rules.61
Bankruptcy Trustee Deposits
The proposed rule would continue
the current treatment of deposits placed
at an IDI by a bankruptcy trustee. If
funds of multiple bankruptcy estates
were commingled in a single account at
the IDI, each estate would be separately
insured up to the SMDIA.
Deposits Covered Under Other Rules
The proposed rule would exclude
from coverage under § 330.10 certain
trust deposits that are covered by other
sections of the deposit insurance
regulations. For example, employee
benefit plan deposits are insured
pursuant to § 330.14, and investment
company deposits are insured as
corporate deposits pursuant to § 330.11.
Deposits held by an insured depository
institution in its capacity as trustee of
an irrevocable trust are insured
pursuant to § 330.12. In addition, if the
co-owners of an informal or formal
revocable trust are the trust’s sole
beneficiaries, deposits held in
connection with the trust would be
treated as joint deposits under § 330.9.
In each of these cases, the FDIC is not
proposing to change the current rule.
Conforming Changes
The proposed simplification of the
calculation for insurance coverage for
trust deposits also would permit the
elimination of certain definitions from
§ 330.1 of the regulations. Specifically,
§ 330.1 defines ‘‘trust interest’’ and
‘‘non-contingent trust interest,’’ terms
that are used in connection with the
current irrevocable trust rules. Because
the proposed rule would eliminate the
evaluation of contingencies in
determining coverage for trust deposits,
the FDIC is proposing to remove these
definitions from the regulation.
Enhancements to Claims Processes
The FDIC is also considering
enhancements to its claims processes to
further promote prompt insurance
determinations for trust deposits
current irrevocable trust rules. Because
the proposed rule would eliminate the
evaluation of contingencies in
determining coverage for trust deposits,
the FDIC is proposing to remove these
definitions from the regulation.
Enhancements to Claims Processes
The FDIC is also considering
enhancements to its claims processes to
further promote prompt insurance
determinations for trust deposits. For
example, the FDIC may be able to
establish enhanced processes and
systems for reaching out to depositors
and obtaining trust documentation
following an IDI’s failure. The claims
process enhancements adopted by the
FDIC will likely depend upon the
amendments to the deposit insurance
rules, if any, that are adopted through
this rulemaking.
D. Examples Demonstrating Coverage
Under Current and Proposed Rules
To assist commenters, the FDIC is
providing examples demonstrating how
the proposed rule would apply to
determine deposit insurance coverage
for trust deposits. These examples are
not intended to be all-inclusive; they
merely address a few possible scenarios
involving trust deposits. The FDIC
expects that for the vast majority of
depositors, insurance coverage would
not change under the proposed rule.
The examples here specifically highlight
a few instances where coverage could be
reduced to ensure that commenters are
aware of them. In addition, in any
instances where a trust is established,
the examples assume that the trustee is
not an IDI.
Example 1: Payable-on-Death Account
Depositor A establishes a payable-on-
death account at an FDIC-insured bank.
A has designated three beneficiaries for
this deposit—B, C, and D—who will
receive the funds upon her death, and
listed all three on a form provided to the
bank. The only other deposit account
that A maintains at the same bank is a
checking account with no designated
beneficiaries
ple 1: Payable-on-Death Account
Depositor A establishes a payable-on-
death account at an FDIC-insured bank.
A has designated three beneficiaries for
this deposit—B, C, and D—who will
receive the funds upon her death, and
listed all three on a form provided to the
bank. The only other deposit account
that A maintains at the same bank is a
checking account with no designated
beneficiaries. What is the maximum
amount of deposit insurance coverage
for A’s deposits at the bank?
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Under the proposed rule, Depositor
A’s payable-on-death account represents
an informal revocable trust and would
be insured in the trust accounts
category. The maximum coverage for
this deposit would be equal to the
SMDIA (currently $250,000) multiplied
by the number of grantors (in this case,
one because A established the account
herself) multiplied by the number of
beneficiaries, up to a maximum of five
(here three, the number of beneficiaries,
is less than five). A’s payable-on-death
account would be insured for up to:
($250,000) × (1) × (3) = $750,000.
The coverage for A’s payable-on-death
account is separate from the coverage
provided for A’s checking account,
which would be insured in the single
ownership category because she has not
named any beneficiaries for that
account. The single ownership checking
account would be insured up to the
SMDIA, $250,000. A’s total insurance
coverage for her deposits at the bank
would be: $750,000 + $250,000 =
$1,000,000. Notably, this level of
coverage is the same as that provided by
the current deposit insurance rules.
Example 2: Formal Revocable Trust and
Informal Revocable Trust
Depositors E and F jointly establish a
payable-on-death account at an FDIC-
insured bank
insured up to the
SMDIA, $250,000. A’s total insurance
coverage for her deposits at the bank
would be: $750,000 + $250,000 =
$1,000,000. Notably, this level of
coverage is the same as that provided by
the current deposit insurance rules.
Example 2: Formal Revocable Trust and
Informal Revocable Trust
Depositors E and F jointly establish a
payable-on-death account at an FDIC-
insured bank. E and F have designated
three beneficiaries for this deposit—G,
H and I—who will receive the funds
after both E and F are deceased. They
list these beneficiaries on a form
provided to the bank. E and F also
jointly establish an account titled in the
name of the ‘‘E and F Living Trust’’ at
the same bank. E and F are the grantors
of the living trust, a formal revocable
trust that includes the same three
beneficiaries, G, H, and I. The grantors,
E and F, do not maintain any other
deposit accounts at this same bank.
What is the maximum amount of
deposit insurance coverage for E and F’s
deposits?
Under the proposed rule, E and F’s
payable-on-death account represents an
informal revocable trust and would be
insured in the trust accounts category. E
and F’s living trust account constitutes
a formal revocable trust and also would
be insured in the trust accounts
category. To the extent these deposits
would pass from the same grantor (E or
F) to beneficiaries (G, H, and I), they
would be aggregated for purposes of
applying the deposit insurance limit. As
under the current rules, it would be
irrelevant that the grantors’ deposits are
divided between the payable-on-death
account and the living trust account.
The maximum coverage for E and F’s
deposits would be equal to the SMDIA
($250,000) multiplied by the number of
grantors (two, because E and F are the
grantors with respect to both deposits)
multiplied by the number of unique
beneficiaries, up to a maximum of five
(here three, the number of beneficiaries,
is less than five)
etween the payable-on-death
account and the living trust account.
The maximum coverage for E and F’s
deposits would be equal to the SMDIA
($250,000) multiplied by the number of
grantors (two, because E and F are the
grantors with respect to both deposits)
multiplied by the number of unique
beneficiaries, up to a maximum of five
(here three, the number of beneficiaries,
is less than five). Therefore, the
coverage for E and F’s trust deposits
would be: ($250,000) × (2) × (3) =
$1,500,000. This level of coverage is the
same as that provided by the current
deposit insurance rules.
Example 3: Two-Owner Trust and a
One-Owner Trust
Depositors J and K jointly establish a
payable-on-death account at an FDIC-
insured bank. J and K have designated
three beneficiaries for this deposit—L,
M and N—who will receive the funds
after both J and K are deceased. They
list these beneficiaries on a form
provided to the bank. At the same FDIC-
insured bank, J establishes a payable-on-
death account and designates K as the
beneficiary upon J’s death. What is the
maximum amount of coverage for J and
K’s deposits?
Under the proposed rule, both
accounts would be insured under the
trust account category. To the extent
these deposits would pass from the
same grantor (J or K) to beneficiaries
(such as L, M, and N), they would be
aggregated for purposes of applying the
deposit insurance limit. For example, K
identified three beneficiaries (L, M and
N), and therefore, K’s insurance limit is
$750,000 (or 1 × 3 × SMDIA). K would
be fully insured as long as one-half
interest of the co-owned trust account
was $750,000 or less, which is the same
level of coverage provided under
current rules.
In this example, J’s situation differs
from K because J has a second trust
account, but the insurance calculation
remains the same. Specifically, J has
two trust accounts and identified four
unique beneficiaries (L, M, N, and K);
therefore, J’s insurance limit is
$1,000,000 (or 1 × 4 × SMDIA)
account
was $750,000 or less, which is the same
level of coverage provided under
current rules.
In this example, J’s situation differs
from K because J has a second trust
account, but the insurance calculation
remains the same. Specifically, J has
two trust accounts and identified four
unique beneficiaries (L, M, N, and K);
therefore, J’s insurance limit is
$1,000,000 (or 1 × 4 × SMDIA). J would
remain fully insured as long as J’s trust
deposits—equal to one-half of the co-
owned trust account plus J’s personal
trust account—total no more than
$1,000,000. This methodology and level
of coverage is the same as that provided
by the current deposit insurance rules.
Example 4: Revocable and Irrevocable
Trusts
Depositor O establishes a deposit
account at an FDIC-insured bank titled
the ‘‘O Living Trust’’. O is the grantor
of this living trust, a formal revocable
trust that includes three beneficiaries—
P, Q, and R. The grantor, O, also
establishes an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of the same three beneficiaries.
The trustee of the irrevocable trust
maintains a deposit account at the same
bank as the living trust account, titled
in the name of the irrevocable trust.
Neither O nor the trustee maintains
other deposit accounts at the same bank.
What is the insurance coverage for these
deposits?
Under the proposed rule, the living
trust account is a deposit of a formal
revocable trust and would be insured in
the trust accounts category. The deposit
of the irrevocable trust also would be
insured in the trust accounts category.
To the extent these deposits would pass
from the same grantor (O) to
beneficiaries (P, Q, or R), they would be
aggregated for purposes of applying the
deposit insurance limit. It would be
irrelevant that the deposits are divided
between the living trust account and the
irrevocable trust account
ry. The deposit
of the irrevocable trust also would be
insured in the trust accounts category.
To the extent these deposits would pass
from the same grantor (O) to
beneficiaries (P, Q, or R), they would be
aggregated for purposes of applying the
deposit insurance limit. It would be
irrelevant that the deposits are divided
between the living trust account and the
irrevocable trust account. The maximum
coverage for these deposits would be
equal to the SMDIA ($250,000)
multiplied by the number of grantors
(one, because O is the grantor with
respect to both deposits) multiplied by
the number of beneficiaries, up to a
maximum of five (here three, the
number of beneficiaries, is less than
five). Therefore, the maximum coverage
for the trust deposits would be:
($250,000) × (1) × (3) = $750,000.
This is one of the isolated instances
where the proposed rule may provide a
reduced amount of coverage as a result
of the aggregation of revocable and
irrevocable trust deposits, depending on
the structure of the trust agreement.
Under the current rules, O would be
insured for up to $750,000 for revocable
trust deposits and separately insured for
up to $750,000 for irrevocable trust
deposits (assuming non-contingent
beneficial interests), resulting in
$1,500,000 in total coverage. If that were
the case, current coverage would exceed
that provided by the proposed rule.
However, the terms of irrevocable trusts
sometimes lead to less coverage than
depositors might expect. FDIC staff’s
experience is that irrevocable trust
deposits are often insured only up to
$250,000 under the current rules due to
contingencies in the trust agreement,
but determining this with certainty
often requires careful consideration of
the trust agreement’s contingency
provisions. Under the current rule, if
contingencies existed, current coverage
would exceed that provided by the
proposed rule, as O would be insured
up to $1,000,000; $750,000 for his
revocable trust and $250,000 for his
irrevocable trust
o
contingencies in the trust agreement,
but determining this with certainty
often requires careful consideration of
the trust agreement’s contingency
provisions. Under the current rule, if
contingencies existed, current coverage
would exceed that provided by the
proposed rule, as O would be insured
up to $1,000,000; $750,000 for his
revocable trust and $250,000 for his
irrevocable trust. In the FDIC’s view,
one of the key benefits of the proposed
rule versus the current rule would be
greater clarity and predictability in
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62 For example, if all of the beneficiaries’ interests
were equal, coverage would be: $250,000 × (7
beneficiaries) = $1,750,000. This is the maximum
coverage possible under the current rule.
Conversely, if a few beneficiaries had a large
interest in the trust, the total of all beneficiaries’
interests (limited to the SMDIA per beneficiary)
could be less than $1,250,000, in which case the
current rule would provide a minimum of
$1,250,000 in coverage. Depending upon the precise
allocation of interests, the amount of coverage
provided would fall somewhere within this range.
deposit insurance coverage because
whether contingencies exist would no
longer be a factor that could affect
deposit insurance.
Example 5: Many Beneficiaries Named
Depositor S establishes a deposit
account at an FDIC-insured bank titled
in the name of the ‘‘S Living Trust’’.
This trust is a revocable trust naming
seven beneficiaries—T, U, V, W, X, Y,
and Z. The grantor, S, does not maintain
any other deposits at the same bank.
What is the coverage for this deposit?
Under the proposed rule, the living
trust account is a deposit of a formal
revocable trust and would be insured in
the trust accounts category
ed bank titled
in the name of the ‘‘S Living Trust’’.
This trust is a revocable trust naming
seven beneficiaries—T, U, V, W, X, Y,
and Z. The grantor, S, does not maintain
any other deposits at the same bank.
What is the coverage for this deposit?
Under the proposed rule, the living
trust account is a deposit of a formal
revocable trust and would be insured in
the trust accounts category. The
maximum coverage for this deposit
would be equal to the SMDIA
($250,000) multiplied by the number of
grantors (one, because S is the sole
grantor) multiplied by the number of
beneficiaries, up to a maximum of five.
Here the number of named beneficiaries
(seven) exceeds the maximum (five) so
insurance is calculated using the
maximum (five). Coverage for the
deposit would be: ($250,000) × (1) × (5)
= $1,250,000.
This is another limited instance
where the proposed rule may provide
for less coverage than the current rule.
Under the current rule, because more
than five beneficiaries are named, the
deposit is insured up to the greater of:
(1) Five times the SMDIA; or (2) the
total of the interests of each beneficiary,
with each such interest limited to the
SMDIA. Determining coverage requires
review of the trust agreement to
ascertain each beneficiary’s interest.
Each such insurable interest is limited
to the SMDIA, and the total of all of
these interests is compared with
$1,250,000 (five times the SMDIA). The
current rule provides coverage in the
greater of these two amounts. The result
would fall into a range from $1,250,000
to $1,750,000, depending on the precise
allocation of trust interests among the
beneficiaries.62 In the FDIC’s view, one
of the key benefits of the proposed rule
versus the current rule would be greater
clarity and predictability in deposit
insurance coverage because a single
formula would be used to determine
maximum coverage, and this formula
would not depend upon the specific
allocation of funds among beneficiaries.
E
cise
allocation of trust interests among the
beneficiaries.62 In the FDIC’s view, one
of the key benefits of the proposed rule
versus the current rule would be greater
clarity and predictability in deposit
insurance coverage because a single
formula would be used to determine
maximum coverage, and this formula
would not depend upon the specific
allocation of funds among beneficiaries.
E. Alternatives Considered
The FDIC has considered a number of
alternatives to the proposed rule that
could meet its objectives in this
rulemaking. Some of these alternatives
are described below.
Insuring Revocable Trust Deposits up to
$250,000 per Grantor and Irrevocable
Trust Deposits up to $250,000 per Trust
The FDIC considered limiting the
total amount of deposit insurance
coverage for revocable trust deposits to
the SMDIA (currently $250,000) for each
grantor and irrevocable trust deposits up
to $250,000 per trust. This would
dramatically simplify the trust rules
because the determination of coverage
would no longer require the review of
trust agreements or the consideration of
beneficiaries’ interests. This alternative
would therefore provide significant
benefits in terms of supporting the
timely payment of deposit insurance.
However, this would substantially
reduce deposit insurance coverage for
many trust deposits that currently
exceed $250,000. The FDIC therefore
declined to pursue this proposal.
Provide Per-Beneficiary Coverage Where
Beneficiary Information Is Maintained at
the IDI
The FDIC considered changing the
trust rules to provide coverage of
$250,000 per beneficiary for trust
deposits only where the trust
documentation necessary to determine
insurance coverage is maintained in an
IDI’s deposit account records. This
would promote the timely payment of
deposit insurance and simplify
insurance determinations, as the
information required to calculate
coverage would be immediately
available to the FDIC following the
failure of an IDI
000 per beneficiary for trust
deposits only where the trust
documentation necessary to determine
insurance coverage is maintained in an
IDI’s deposit account records. This
would promote the timely payment of
deposit insurance and simplify
insurance determinations, as the
information required to calculate
coverage would be immediately
available to the FDIC following the
failure of an IDI. However, such a
requirement could prove burdensome
and difficult to comply with for IDIs and
depositors. Furthermore, even if
depositors were to provide the
necessary documentation to IDIs, they
could be unaware as to whether the IDIs
are maintaining that information in their
records. Accordingly, the FDIC believes
that this alternative may not promote
depositor confidence in the level of
coverage for their deposits.
Retain Separate Trust Categories,
Harmonize Rules
The FDIC also considered
harmonizing the rules for calculating
coverage for revocable and irrevocable
trusts while maintaining these two
categories as separate for deposit
insurance purposes. The use of common
rules would reduce complexity to some
extent. However, so long as these
categories remain separate, determining
the level of coverage for a trust deposit
would require the threshold inquiry as
to whether the trust is revocable or
irrevocable. This is because the deposits
in each category would still be
aggregated within each deposit
insurance category for purposes of
applying the insurance limit. The FDIC
believes that the proposed rule provides
greater benefits than this alternative.
Status Quo
The FDIC is proposing amendments to
the trust rules to advance the objectives
discussed above, including making the
rules more understandable for the
public and depositors, promoting the
timely payment of deposit insurance,
and facilitating the administration of
resolutions. The FDIC considered the
status quo alternative to not amend the
existing trust rules and not propose the
amendments
he FDIC is proposing amendments to
the trust rules to advance the objectives
discussed above, including making the
rules more understandable for the
public and depositors, promoting the
timely payment of deposit insurance,
and facilitating the administration of
resolutions. The FDIC considered the
status quo alternative to not amend the
existing trust rules and not propose the
amendments. However, for reasons
previously stated in Section I.B entitled
‘‘Background,’’ the FDIC considers the
proposed rule to be a more appropriate
alternative.
F. Request for Comment
The FDIC is requesting comment on
all aspects of the proposed rule,
including the alternatives presented.
Comment is specifically invited with
respect to the following questions:
• Would the proposed amendments
to the deposit insurance rules make
insurance coverage for trust deposits
easier to understand for bankers and the
public?
• The FDIC believes that depositors
generally would have the information
necessary to readily calculate deposit
insurance coverage for their trust
deposits under the proposed rule,
allowing them to better understand
insurance coverage for their trust
deposits. Are there instances where a
depositor would not likely have the
necessary information?
• Are there any other types of trusts
not described in this proposal whose
deposits would be affected by the
proposed rule if adopted? What types of
trusts are those and how would they be
impacted?
• While the FDIC has substantial
experience regarding trust
arrangements, the FDIC does not possess
sufficiently detailed information on
depositors’ existing trust arrangements
to allow the FDIC to project the
proposed rule’s effects on current
depositors. Are there any other sources
of empirical information that the FDIC
should consider that may be helpful in
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depositors’ existing trust arrangements
to allow the FDIC to project the
proposed rule’s effects on current
depositors. Are there any other sources
of empirical information that the FDIC
should consider that may be helpful in
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63 See 73 FR 61658, 61658–59 (Oct. 17, 2008).
64 In order to fulfill their contractual obligations
with investors, covered institutions maintain
mortgage principal and interest balances at a pool
level and remittances, advances, advance
reimbursement and excess funds applications that
affect pool-level balances are not allocated back to
individual borrowers.
understanding the effects of the
proposed rule? The FDIC also
encourages commenters to provide such
information, if possible.
• Grandfathering of the deposit
insurance rules would result in
significantly greater complexity for the
period of time during which two sets of
rules could apply to deposits—
especially in conducting resolutions.
Therefore, the FDIC is not inclined to
consider allowing grandfathering, but
rather rely on a delayed implementation
date to allow stakeholders to make
necessary adjustments as a result of the
new rules. However, the FDIC
recognizes there are instances, such as
trusts holding time deposits or other
deposit relationships, which may not be
easily restructured without adverse
consequences to the depositor
FDIC is not inclined to
consider allowing grandfathering, but
rather rely on a delayed implementation
date to allow stakeholders to make
necessary adjustments as a result of the
new rules. However, the FDIC
recognizes there are instances, such as
trusts holding time deposits or other
deposit relationships, which may not be
easily restructured without adverse
consequences to the depositor. Are there
fact patterns where grandfathering the
current rules may be appropriate?
Would grandfathering be appropriate
with respect to the proposed rule’s
coverage limit of $1,250,000 per IDI for
a depositor’s trust deposits?
• Are the examples provided clear
and understandable? Are there other
common trust deposit scenarios that
would benefit from an example being
provided?
• Would any of the alternatives
described above better meet the FDIC’s
objectives in connection with this
rulemaking? Are there any other
alternatives that would better meet
those objectives? Are there any other
amendments to the deposit insurance
rules applicable to trusts that the FDIC
should consider?
• For the covered institutions subject
to part 370, what cost and time frame
might be required to update information
technology systems and deposit account
records to be capable of calculating
insurance coverage under the proposed
rule? The FDIC also seeks any
supporting information that commenters
might be able to provide on this topic.
II. Amendments to Mortgage Servicing
Account Rule
A. Policy Objectives
The FDIC’s regulations governing
deposit insurance coverage include
specific rules on deposits maintained at
IDIs by mortgage servicers. These rules
are intended to be easy to understand
and apply in determining the amount of
deposit insurance coverage for a
mortgage servicer’s deposits. The FDIC
also seeks to avoid uncertainty
concerning the extent of deposit
insurance coverage for such deposits, as
deposits in mortgage servicing accounts
(MSAs) provide a source of funding for
IDIs
ntained at
IDIs by mortgage servicers. These rules
are intended to be easy to understand
and apply in determining the amount of
deposit insurance coverage for a
mortgage servicer’s deposits. The FDIC
also seeks to avoid uncertainty
concerning the extent of deposit
insurance coverage for such deposits, as
deposits in mortgage servicing accounts
(MSAs) provide a source of funding for
IDIs.
The FDIC is proposing an amendment
to its rules governing insurance
coverage for deposits maintained at IDIs
by mortgage servicers that consist of
mortgagors’ principal and interest
payments. The proposed rule is
intended to address a servicing
arrangement that is not specifically
addressed in the current rules.
Specifically, some servicing
arrangements may permit or require
servicers to advance their own funds to
the lenders when mortgagors are
delinquent in making principal and
interest payments, and servicers might
commingle such advances in the MSA
with principal and interest payments
collected directly from mortgagors. This
may be required, for example, under
certain mortgage securitizations. The
FDIC believes that the factors that
motivated the FDIC to establish its
current rules for mortgage servicing
accounts, described below, argue for
treating funds advanced by a mortgage
servicer in order to satisfy mortgagors’
principal and interest obligations to the
lender as if such funds were collected
directly from borrowers.
B. Background and Need for
Rulemaking
The FDIC’s rules governing coverage
for mortgage servicing accounts were
adopted in 1990 following the transfer
of responsibility for insuring deposits of
savings associations from the FSLIC to
the FDIC. Under the rules adopted in
1990, funds representing payments of
principal and interest were insured on
a pass-through basis to mortgagees,
investors, or security holders
for
Rulemaking
The FDIC’s rules governing coverage
for mortgage servicing accounts were
adopted in 1990 following the transfer
of responsibility for insuring deposits of
savings associations from the FSLIC to
the FDIC. Under the rules adopted in
1990, funds representing payments of
principal and interest were insured on
a pass-through basis to mortgagees,
investors, or security holders. In
adopting this rule, the FDIC focused on
the fact that principal and interest funds
were generally owned by investors, on
whose behalf the servicer, as agent,
accepted principal and interest
payments. By contrast, payments of
taxes and insurance were insured to the
mortgagors or borrowers on a pass-
through basis because the borrower
owns such funds until tax and
insurance bills are paid by the servicer.
In 2008, however, the FDIC
recognized that securitization methods
and vehicles for mortgages had become
more complex, exacerbating the
difficulty of determining the ownership
of deposits consisting of principal and
interest payments by mortgagors and
extending the time required to make a
deposit insurance determination for
deposits of a mortgage servicer in the
event of an IDI’s failure.63 The FDIC
expressed concern that a lengthy
insurance determination could lead to
continuous withdrawal of deposits of
principal and interest payments from
IDIs and unnecessarily reduce a funding
source for such institutions. The FDIC
therefore amended its rules to provide
coverage to lenders based on each
mortgagor’s payments of principal and
interest into the mortgage servicing
account, up to the SMDIA (currently
$250,000) per mortgagor. The FDIC did
not amend the rule for coverage of tax
and insurance payments, which
continued to be insured to each
mortgagor on a pass-through basis and
aggregated with any other deposits
maintained by each mortgagor at the
same IDI in the same right and capacity
r’s payments of principal and
interest into the mortgage servicing
account, up to the SMDIA (currently
$250,000) per mortgagor. The FDIC did
not amend the rule for coverage of tax
and insurance payments, which
continued to be insured to each
mortgagor on a pass-through basis and
aggregated with any other deposits
maintained by each mortgagor at the
same IDI in the same right and capacity.
The 2008 amendments to the rules for
mortgage servicing accounts did not
provide for the fact that servicers may
be required to advance their own funds
to make payments of principal and
interest on behalf of delinquent
borrowers to the lenders. However, this
is required of mortgage servicers in
some instances. For example, insured
depository institutions covered by 12
CFR part 370, the FDIC’s rule requiring
recordkeeping and information
technology capabilities for deposit
insurance purposes (covered
institutions), identified challenges to
implementing certain recordkeeping
requirements with respect to MSA
deposit balances as a result of the way
in which servicer advances are
administered and accounted.64
The current rule provides coverage for
principal and interest funds only to the
extent ‘‘paid into the account by the
mortgagors’’; it does not provide
coverage for funds paid into the account
from other sources, such as the
servicer’s own operating funds, even if
those funds satisfy mortgagors’ principal
and interest payments. As a result,
advances are not provided the same
level of coverage as other deposits in a
mortgage servicing account consisting of
principal and interest payments directly
from the borrower, which are insured
up to the SMDIA for each borrower.
Instead, the advances are aggregated and
insured to the servicer as corporate
funds for a total of $250,000
agors’ principal
and interest payments. As a result,
advances are not provided the same
level of coverage as other deposits in a
mortgage servicing account consisting of
principal and interest payments directly
from the borrower, which are insured
up to the SMDIA for each borrower.
Instead, the advances are aggregated and
insured to the servicer as corporate
funds for a total of $250,000. The FDIC
is concerned that this inconsistent
treatment of principal and interest
amounts could result in financial
instability during times of stress, and
could further complicate the insurance
determination process, a result that is
inconsistent with the FDIC’s policy
objective.
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65 Servicers’ advances may have been insured
under the rule that applied to mortgage servicing
account deposits prior to 2008. Prior to 2008,
mortgage servicing deposits were insured on a pass-
through basis. Under the pass-through insurance
rules, the identity of the party that pays funds into
a deposit account does not generally factor into
insurance coverage. In this sense, the proposed rule
can be viewed as restoring coverage to the previous
level.
66 The count of institutions includes FDIC-
insured U.S. branches of institutions headquartered
in foreign countries.
67 FDIC Call Report data, March 31, 2021.
68 Data on failed banks comes from the FDIC’s
Claims Administration System, which contains data
on depositors’ funds from every failed IDI since
September 2010.
C
ed rule
can be viewed as restoring coverage to the previous
level.
66 The count of institutions includes FDIC-
insured U.S. branches of institutions headquartered
in foreign countries.
67 FDIC Call Report data, March 31, 2021.
68 Data on failed banks comes from the FDIC’s
Claims Administration System, which contains data
on depositors’ funds from every failed IDI since
September 2010.
C. Proposed Rule
The FDIC is proposing to amend the
rules governing coverage for deposits in
mortgage servicing accounts to provide
consistent deposit insurance treatment
for all MSA deposit balances held to
satisfy principal and interest obligations
to a lender, regardless of whether those
funds are paid into the account by
borrowers, or paid into the account by
another party (such as the servicer) in
order to satisfy a periodic obligation to
remit principal and interest due to the
lender. Under the proposed rule,
accounts maintained by a mortgage
servicer in an agency, custodial, or
fiduciary capacity, which consist of
payments of principal and interest,
would be insured for the cumulative
balance paid into the account in order
to satisfy principal and interest
obligations to the lender, whether paid
directly by the borrower or by another
party, up to the limit of the SMDIA per
mortgagor. Mortgage servicers’ advances
of principal and interest funds on behalf
of delinquent borrowers would therefore
be insured up to the SMDIA per
mortgagor, consistent with the coverage
rules for payments of principal and
interest collected directly from
borrowers.65
The composition of an MSA
attributable to principal and interest
payments would also include
collections by a servicer, such as
foreclosure proceeds, that are used to
satisfy a borrower’s principal and
interest obligation to the lender. In some
cases, foreclosure proceeds may not be
paid directly by a mortgagor
for payments of principal and
interest collected directly from
borrowers.65
The composition of an MSA
attributable to principal and interest
payments would also include
collections by a servicer, such as
foreclosure proceeds, that are used to
satisfy a borrower’s principal and
interest obligation to the lender. In some
cases, foreclosure proceeds may not be
paid directly by a mortgagor. The
current rule does not address whether
foreclosure collections represent
payments of principal and interest by a
mortgagor. Under the proposed rule,
foreclosure proceeds used to satisfy a
borrower’s principal and interest
obligation would be insured up to the
limit of the SMDIA per mortgagor.
The proposed rule would make no
change to the deposit insurance
coverage provided for mortgage
servicing accounts comprised of
payments from mortgagors of taxes and
insurance premiums. Such aggregate
escrow accounts are held separately
from the principal and interest MSAs
and the deposits therein are held in
trust for the mortgagors until such time
as tax and insurance payments are
disbursed by the servicer on the
borrower’s behalf. Under the proposed
rule, such deposits would continue to
be insured based on the ownership
interest of each mortgagor in the
account and aggregated with other
deposits maintained by the mortgagor at
the same IDI in the same capacity and
right.
D. Request for Comment
The FDIC is requesting comment on
all aspects of the proposed rule
re
disbursed by the servicer on the
borrower’s behalf. Under the proposed
rule, such deposits would continue to
be insured based on the ownership
interest of each mortgagor in the
account and aggregated with other
deposits maintained by the mortgagor at
the same IDI in the same capacity and
right.
D. Request for Comment
The FDIC is requesting comment on
all aspects of the proposed rule.
Comment is specifically invited with
respect to the following questions:
• Would the proposed amendments
to the rules governing coverage for
mortgage servicing accounts adequately
address servicers’ practices with respect
to these accounts, as described above?
Are there any other funds representing
principal and interest that are
commingled with borrowers’ payments
that the FDIC should take into account
in the deposit insurance calculation,
consistent with its policy objectives?
• Would deposit insurance coverage
of servicer principal and interest
advances help to promote financial
stability in the financial system? If the
FDIC does not amend the rule as
proposed, how would mortgage
servicers react if their insured
depository institution, or the banking
industry as a whole, appears stressed? If
so, how would funding arrangements or
deposit relationships change?
• Does the proposed rule reduce the
compliance burden for part 370 covered
institutions?
• Are there any alternatives to the
proposed rule that would better achieve
the FDIC’s policy objectives in
connection with this rulemaking? Are
there any other amendments to the
deposit insurance rules applicable to
MSAs that the FDIC should consider?
III. Regulatory Analysis
A. Expected Effects
1
• Does the proposed rule reduce the
compliance burden for part 370 covered
institutions?
• Are there any alternatives to the
proposed rule that would better achieve
the FDIC’s policy objectives in
connection with this rulemaking? Are
there any other amendments to the
deposit insurance rules applicable to
MSAs that the FDIC should consider?
III. Regulatory Analysis
A. Expected Effects
1. Simplification of Trust Rules
Generally, the proposed
simplification of the trust rules is
expected to have benefits including
clarifying depositors’ and bankers’
understanding of the insurance rules,
promoting the timely payment of
deposit insurance following an IDI’s
failure, facilitating the transfer of
deposit relationships to failed bank
acquirers (thereby potentially reducing
the FDIC’s resolution costs), and
addressing differences in the treatment
of revocable trust deposits and
irrevocable trust deposits contained in
the current rules. The proposed
amendments would directly affect the
level of deposit insurance coverage
provided to some depositors with trust
deposits. In some cases, which the FDIC
expects are rare, the proposed
amendments could reduce deposit
insurance coverage; for the vast majority
of depositors, the FDIC expects the
coverage level to be unchanged. The
FDIC has also considered the impact of
any changes in the deposit insurance
rules on the DIF and on the covered
institutions that are subject to part 370.
Finally, the FDIC describes other
potential effects of the proposal, such as
the effects on information technology
(IT) service providers to the institutions
that could be affected by the proposed
rule. These effects are discussed in
greater detail below.
Effects on Deposit Insurance Coverage
The proposed rule would affect
deposit insurance coverage for deposits
held in connection with trusts
ly, the FDIC describes other
potential effects of the proposal, such as
the effects on information technology
(IT) service providers to the institutions
that could be affected by the proposed
rule. These effects are discussed in
greater detail below.
Effects on Deposit Insurance Coverage
The proposed rule would affect
deposit insurance coverage for deposits
held in connection with trusts.
According to the March 31, 2021 Call
Report data, the FDIC insures 4,987
depository institutions 66 that report
holding approximately 641 million
deposit accounts. Additionally, 1,573
IDIs have powers granted by a state or
national regulatory authority to
administer accounts in a fiduciary
capacity (i.e., trust powers) and 1,167
exercise those powers, comprising 31.5
percent and 23.4 percent, respectively,
of all IDIs.67 However, individual
depositors may establish a trust account
at an IDI even if that IDI does not itself
have or exercise trust powers, and in
fact, as discussed below, 99 percent of
a sample of failed banks had trust
accounts. Therefore, the FDIC estimates
that the proposed rule, if adopted, could
affect between 1,167 and 4,987 IDIs.
The FDIC does not have detailed data
on depositors’ trust arrangements that
would allow the FDIC to precisely
estimate the number of trust accounts
that are currently held by FDIC-insured
institutions. However, the FDIC
estimated the number of trust accounts
and trust account depositors utilizing
data from failed banks. Based on data
from 249 failed banks 68 between 2010
and 2020, 335,657 deposit accounts—
owned by 250,139 distinct depositors—
were trust accounts (revocable or
irrevocable), out of a total of 3,013,575
deposit accounts. Thus, about 11.14
percent of the deposit accounts at the
249 failed banks were trust accounts. Of
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ccounts—
owned by 250,139 distinct depositors—
were trust accounts (revocable or
irrevocable), out of a total of 3,013,575
deposit accounts. Thus, about 11.14
percent of the deposit accounts at the
249 failed banks were trust accounts. Of
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69 There were approximately 641 million deposit
accounts reported by FDIC-insured institutions as of
March 31, 2021, based on Call Report data.
Assuming that 11.14 percent of accounts are trust
accounts, then there are an estimated 71.4 million
trust accounts as of March 31, 2021.
70 Using the data from failed banks, 250,139
distinct depositors held 335,657 revocable or
irrevocable trust accounts, or there were 0.745 trust
account depositors per trust account (250,139
divided by 335,657). The estimated number of trust
depositors at FDIC-insured institutions (53.2
million) is obtained by multiplying the estimated
number of trust accounts by the number of trust
account depositors per trust account (71.4 million
multiplied by 0.745).
71 As discussed above, the provisions relating to
contingent interests may not apply when a trust has
become irrevocable due to the death of one or more
grantors. In such instances, the revocable trust rules
continue to apply.
72 As discussed above, deposits maintained by an
IDI as trustee of an irrevocable trust would not be
included in this aggregation, and would remain
separately insured pursuant to section 7(i) of the
FDI Act and 12 CFR 330.12.
73 Data obtained in connection with IDI failures
during the recent financial crisis suggests that
irrevocable trust deposits comprise less than one
percent of trust deposits
iscussed above, deposits maintained by an
IDI as trustee of an irrevocable trust would not be
included in this aggregation, and would remain
separately insured pursuant to section 7(i) of the
FDI Act and 12 CFR 330.12.
73 Data obtained in connection with IDI failures
during the recent financial crisis suggests that
irrevocable trust deposits comprise less than one
percent of trust deposits. However, as discussed
above, the FDIC does not possess sufficient
information to enable it to estimate the effects of the
proposed rule on trust account depositors at all
IDIs.
74 In the data obtained in connection with IDI
failures during the recent financial crisis, only 51
out of 250,139 depositors with trust accounts had
both revocable and irrevocable types. Of these 51
depositors, nine had total trust account balances
greater than $250,000, and only one had a total trust
balance of more than $1.25 million.
75 To estimate the numbers of trust account
depositors and trust accounts affected, the FDIC
performed the following calculation. First, based on
data from 249 failed banks between 2010 and 2020,
the FDIC determined that there were 335,657 trust
accounts out of 3,013,575 deposit accounts (trust
account share). Second, the FDIC determined the
number of trust accounts per trust depositor
(335,657/250,139). The FDIC then estimated the
number of trust accounts by multiplying the trust
account share (335,657/3,013,575) by the number of
deposit accounts across all IDIs (640,918,226)
according to March 31, 2021, Call Report data. This
step yielded an estimate of 71,386,539 trust
accounts. Based on the estimated number of trust
accounts per trust depositor from the failed bank
data, the FDIC estimated the total number of trust
depositors to be 53,198,823. Using failed bank data,
100 out of 250,139 trust depositors had balances in
excess of $1.25 million in their trust accounts
ing to March 31, 2021, Call Report data. This
step yielded an estimate of 71,386,539 trust
accounts. Based on the estimated number of trust
accounts per trust depositor from the failed bank
data, the FDIC estimated the total number of trust
depositors to be 53,198,823. Using failed bank data,
100 out of 250,139 trust depositors had balances in
excess of $1.25 million in their trust accounts.
Thus, the FDIC estimated that, of the approximately
53.2 million trust depositors, (100/250,139) of
them—approximately 21,268—had balances in
excess of $1.25 million in their trust accounts, and
therefore could be directly affected by the proposal.
These estimated 21,268 trust depositors are
associated with an estimated 28,539 trust accounts,
based on the observed number of trust accounts per
trust depositor from the data from 249 failed banks
between 2010 and 2020.
the 249 institutions, 247 (99 percent)
reported having trust accounts at time of
failure. Of the 247 failed banks that
reported trust accounts, 212 reported
not having trust powers as of their last
Call Report. Assuming the percentage of
trust accounts at failed banks is
representative of the percentage of trust
accounts among all FDIC-insured
institutions, the FDIC estimates, for
purposes of this analysis, that there are
approximately 71.4 million trust
accounts in existence at FDIC-insured
institutions.69 Additionally, based on
the observed number of trust account
depositors per trust account in the
population of 249 failed banks, the FDIC
estimates, for purposes of this analysis,
that there are approximately 53.2
million trust depositors.70 These
estimates are subject to considerable
uncertainty, since the percentage of
deposit accounts that are trust accounts
and the number of depositors per trust
account for all FDIC insured institutions
may differ from what was observed at
the 249 failed banks
49 failed banks, the FDIC
estimates, for purposes of this analysis,
that there are approximately 53.2
million trust depositors.70 These
estimates are subject to considerable
uncertainty, since the percentage of
deposit accounts that are trust accounts
and the number of depositors per trust
account for all FDIC insured institutions
may differ from what was observed at
the 249 failed banks. The FDIC does not
have information that would shed light
on whether or how the numbers of trust
accounts and trust depositors at failed
banks differs from the corresponding
numbers for other FDIC-insured
institutions.
The FDIC also does not have detailed
data on depositors’ trust arrangements
that would allow the FDIC to precisely
estimate the quantitative effects of the
proposed rule on deposit insurance
coverage. Thus, the effects of the
proposed changes to the insurance rules
are outlined qualitatively below. The
FDIC expects that most depositors
would experience no change in the
coverage for their deposits under the
proposed rule. However, some
depositors that maintain trust deposits
would experience a change in their
insurance coverage under the proposed
rule.
The FDIC anticipates that deposit
insurance coverage for some irrevocable
trust deposits would increase under the
proposed rule. The FDIC’s experience
suggests that the provisions of the
current irrevocable trust rules that
require the identification and
aggregation of contingent interests often
apply due to the inclusion of
contingencies in such trusts.71 Thus,
even where an irrevocable trust names
multiple beneficiaries, the current trust
rules often provide a total of only
$250,000 in deposit insurance coverage.
The proposed rule would not consider
such contingencies in the calculation of
coverage, and per-beneficiary coverage
would apply.
In limited instances, the proposed
merger of the revocable trust and
irrevocable trust categories may
decrease coverage for depositors
names
multiple beneficiaries, the current trust
rules often provide a total of only
$250,000 in deposit insurance coverage.
The proposed rule would not consider
such contingencies in the calculation of
coverage, and per-beneficiary coverage
would apply.
In limited instances, the proposed
merger of the revocable trust and
irrevocable trust categories may
decrease coverage for depositors.
Deposits of revocable trusts and
deposits of irrevocable trusts are
currently insured separately. The
proposed rule would require aggregation
for purposes of applying the deposit
insurance limit, thereby increasing the
likelihood of the combined trust
account balances exceeding the
insurance limit.72 However, the FDIC’s
experience is that irrevocable trust
deposits comprise a relatively small
share of the average IDI’s deposit base,73
and that it is rare for IDIs to hold
deposits in connection with irrevocable
and revocable trusts established by the
same grantor(s).74 Individual grantors’
trust deposits held for the benefit of up
to five different beneficiaries would
continue to be separately insured.
With respect to revocable and
irrevocable trusts, depositors who have
designated more than five beneficiaries
and structured their trust accounts in a
manner that provides for more than
$1,250,000 in coverage per grantor, per
IDI under the current rules would
experience a reduction in coverage. The
FDIC’s experience suggests that the
$1,250,000 maximum coverage amount
per grantor, per IDI would not affect the
vast majority of trust depositors, as most
trusts have either five or fewer
beneficiaries, less than $1,250,000 per
grantor on deposit at the same IDI, or are
structured in a manner that results in
only $1,250,000 in coverage under the
current rules
reduction in coverage. The
FDIC’s experience suggests that the
$1,250,000 maximum coverage amount
per grantor, per IDI would not affect the
vast majority of trust depositors, as most
trusts have either five or fewer
beneficiaries, less than $1,250,000 per
grantor on deposit at the same IDI, or are
structured in a manner that results in
only $1,250,000 in coverage under the
current rules. The FDIC estimates that
approximately 21,268 trust account
depositors and approximately 28,539
trust accounts could be directly affected
by this aspect of the proposed rule,
representing about 0.04 percent of both
the estimated number of trust account
depositors and the estimated number of
trust accounts.75 The actual number of
trust depositors and trust accounts
impacted will likely differ, as the
estimates rely on data from failed banks,
and failed banks may differ from other
institutions in their percentages of trust
depositors or trust accounts. It is also
possible depositors may restructure
their deposits in response to changes to
the rule, thus mitigating the potential
effects on deposit insurance coverage.
Clarification of Insurance Rules
The proposed merger of certain
revocable and irrevocable trust
categories is intended to clarify deposit
insurance coverage for trust accounts.
Specifically, the merger of these
categories would mostly eliminate the
need to distinguish revocable and
irrevocable trusts currently required to
determine coverage for a particular trust
deposit. The benefit of the common set
of rules would likely be particularly
significant for depositors that have
established arrangements involving
multiple trusts, as they would no longer
need to apply two different sets of rules
to determine the level of deposit
insurance coverage that would apply to
their deposits. For example, the
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tors that have
established arrangements involving
multiple trusts, as they would no longer
need to apply two different sets of rules
to determine the level of deposit
insurance coverage that would apply to
their deposits. For example, the
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76 See 12 CFR 370.10(d).
proposed rule would eliminate the need
to consider the specific allocation of
interests among the beneficiaries of
revocable trusts with six or more
beneficiaries, as well as contingencies
established in irrevocable trusts. The
merger of the categories also would
eliminate the need for current
§ 330.10(h) and (i), which allows for the
continued application of the revocable
trust rules to the account of a revocable
trust that becomes irrevocable due to the
death of the trust’s owner. As previously
discussed, these provisions of the
current trust rules have proven
confusing as illustrated by the
numerous inquiries that are consistently
submitted to the FDIC on these topics.
FDIC-insured depository institutions
will incur some regulatory costs
associated with making necessary
changes to internal processes and
systems and bank personnel training in
order to accommodate the proposed
rule’s definition of ‘‘trust accounts’’ and
attendant deposit insurance coverage
terms, if adopted. There also may be
some initial cost for institutions to
become familiar with the proposed
changes to the trust insurance coverage
rules in order to be able to explain them
to potential trust customers,
counterbalanced to some extent by the
fact that the proposed rules should be
simpler for institutions to understand
and explain going forward
deposit insurance coverage
terms, if adopted. There also may be
some initial cost for institutions to
become familiar with the proposed
changes to the trust insurance coverage
rules in order to be able to explain them
to potential trust customers,
counterbalanced to some extent by the
fact that the proposed rules should be
simpler for institutions to understand
and explain going forward. As the
business impacts and costs associated
with operationalizing the proposed
changes to the trust rules may vary
significantly across IDIs, the FDIC
would welcome industry comments in
this regard.
Prompt Payment of Deposit Insurance
The FDIC also expects that
simplification of the trust rules would
promote the timely payment of deposit
insurance in the event of an IDI’s
failure. The FDIC’s experience has been
that the current trust rules often require
detailed, time-consuming, and resource-
intensive review of trust documentation
to obtain the information that is
necessary to calculate deposit insurance
coverage. This information is often not
found in an IDI’s records and must be
obtained from depositors after the IDI’s
failure. The proposed rule would
ameliorate the operational challenge of
calculating deposit insurance coverage,
which could be particularly acute in the
case of a failure of a large IDI with a
large number of trust accounts. The
proposed rule would streamline the
review of trust documents required to
make a deposit insurance
determination, promoting more prompt
payment of deposit insurance. Timely
payment of deposit insurance also can
help to facilitate the transfer of
depositor relationships to a failed bank’s
acquirer, potentially expand resolution
options, potentially reduce the FDIC’s
resolution costs, and support greater
confidence in the banking system.
Deposit Insurance Fund Impact
As discussed above, the proposed rule
is expected to have mixed effects on the
level of insurance coverage provided for
trust deposits
p to facilitate the transfer of
depositor relationships to a failed bank’s
acquirer, potentially expand resolution
options, potentially reduce the FDIC’s
resolution costs, and support greater
confidence in the banking system.
Deposit Insurance Fund Impact
As discussed above, the proposed rule
is expected to have mixed effects on the
level of insurance coverage provided for
trust deposits. Coverage for some
irrevocable trust deposits would be
expected to increase, but in the FDIC’s
experience, irrevocable trust deposits
are not nearly as common as revocable
trust deposits. The level of coverage for
some trust deposits would be expected
to decrease due to the proposed rule’s
simplified calculation of coverage and
its aggregation of revocable and
irrevocable trust deposits. As noted
above, the FDIC does not have detailed
data on depositors’ trust arrangements
to allow it to precisely project the
quantitative effects of the proposed rule
on deposit insurance coverage.
Indirect Effects
A change in the level of deposit
insurance coverage does not necessarily
result in a direct economic impact, as
deposit insurance is only paid to
depositors in the event of an IDI’s
failure. However, changes in deposit
insurance coverage may prompt
depositors to take actions with respect
to their deposits. In response to changes
in the level of coverage under the
proposed rules, trust depositors could
maximize coverage relative to the
coverage under the current rule by
transferring some of their trust deposits
to other types of accounts that provide
similar or higher amounts of coverage or
by amending the terms of their trusts.
Parties affected could include IDIs,
depositors, and other firms in the
financial services marketplace (e.g.,
deposit brokers)
ed rules, trust depositors could
maximize coverage relative to the
coverage under the current rule by
transferring some of their trust deposits
to other types of accounts that provide
similar or higher amounts of coverage or
by amending the terms of their trusts.
Parties affected could include IDIs,
depositors, and other firms in the
financial services marketplace (e.g.,
deposit brokers). Any costs borne by the
depositor in moving a portion of the
funds to a different IDI to stay under the
insurance limit would be accompanied
by benefits, such as more prompt
deposit insurance determinations, and
quicker access to insured deposits for
depositors during the resolution
process. The FDIC cannot estimate these
effects because it does not have
information on the individual costs of
each action that confronts each
depositor, their ability to amend their
trust structure or move funds, and their
subjective risk preference with respect
to holding insured and uninsured
deposits.
Part 370 Covered Institutions
As discussed previously, institutions
covered by part 370 must maintain
deposit account records and systems
capable of applying the deposit
insurance rules in an automated
manner. The proposed rule would
change certain aspects of how coverage
is determined for trust deposits. This
could require covered institutions to
reprogram certain systems to ensure that
they continue to be capable of applying
the deposit insurance rules as part 370
requires. A covered institution is not
considered to be in violation of part 370
as a result of a change in law that alters
the availability or calculation of deposit
insurance for such period as specified
by the FDIC following the effective date
of such change.76
The FDIC expects that the proposed
rule would make the deposit insurance
status of a trust account generally
clearer
art 370
requires. A covered institution is not
considered to be in violation of part 370
as a result of a change in law that alters
the availability or calculation of deposit
insurance for such period as specified
by the FDIC following the effective date
of such change.76
The FDIC expects that the proposed
rule would make the deposit insurance
status of a trust account generally
clearer. Moreover, since part 370
requires covered institutions to develop
and maintain the capacity to calculate
deposit insurance for its deposits, the
proposed rule could make compliance
with part 370 relatively less
burdensome. This is because the
underlying rules that would be applied
to most trust deposits would be
simplified. In particular, the proposed
rule would require the aggregation of
revocable and irrevocable trust deposits,
categories that are currently separated
for purposes of part 370’s recordkeeping
provisions. The FDIC does not expect
that the proposed rule would require
significant changes with respect to
covered institutions’ treatment of
informal revocable trust deposits.
Moreover, many deposits of formal
revocable trusts and irrevocable trusts
currently fall within the scope of part
370’s alternative recordkeeping
provisions, meaning that covered
institutions are not required to maintain
all of the records necessary to calculate
the maximum amount of deposit
insurance coverage available for these
deposits. These factors may diminish
the impact of the proposed rule on the
part 370 covered institutions, but the
FDIC does not have sufficient
information on covered institutions’
systems and records to quantify this.
Although the FDIC does not have
sufficient information to determine the
time that might be required to
reprogram systems, it believes that a
two-year period of time may be
reasonable
se factors may diminish
the impact of the proposed rule on the
part 370 covered institutions, but the
FDIC does not have sufficient
information on covered institutions’
systems and records to quantify this.
Although the FDIC does not have
sufficient information to determine the
time that might be required to
reprogram systems, it believes that a
two-year period of time may be
reasonable. The FDIC requests comment
on this proposal, including any
information that commenters may be
able to provide to support their views
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77 The count of institutions includes FDIC-
insured U.S. branches of institutions headquartered
in foreign countries.
78 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
79 The SBA defines a small banking organization
as having $600 million or less in assets, where ‘‘a
financial institution’s assets are determined by
averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly
financial statements for the preceding year.’’ See 13
CFR 121.201 (as amended by 84 FR 34261, effective
August 19, 2019). ‘‘SBA counts the receipts,
employees, or other measure of size of the concern
whose size is at issue and all of its domestic and
foreign affiliates.’’ See 13 CFR 121.103. Following
these regulations, the FDIC uses a covered entity’s
affiliated and acquired assets, averaged over the
preceding four quarters, to determine whether the
FDIC-supervised institution is ‘‘small’’ for the
purposes of RFA.
on the time necessary to attain
compliance with part 370 if the
proposed rule is adopted.
Other Potential Effects
Although the FDIC expects that
coverage for most trust depositors
would be unchanged under the
proposal, and that the proposed changes
simplify the FDIC’s insurance rules for
trust accounts, the proposal may have
other potential effects
is ‘‘small’’ for the
purposes of RFA.
on the time necessary to attain
compliance with part 370 if the
proposed rule is adopted.
Other Potential Effects
Although the FDIC expects that
coverage for most trust depositors
would be unchanged under the
proposal, and that the proposed changes
simplify the FDIC’s insurance rules for
trust accounts, the proposal may have
other potential effects. For example, the
institutions affected by the proposal
may rely on third-party IT service
providers to perform insurance coverage
estimates for their trust depositors. The
proposal may lead such IT service
providers to revise their systems to
account for the proposal’s changes.
2. Amendments to Mortgage Servicing
Account Rule
The proposed rule would affect the
deposit insurance coverage for certain
principal and interest payments within
MSA deposits maintained at IDIs by
mortgage servicers. According to the
March 31, 2021 Call Report data, the
FDIC insures 4,987 IDIs.77 Of the 4,987
IDIs, 1,167 IDIs (23.4 percent) report
holding mortgage servicing assets,
which indicates that they service
mortgage loans and could thus be
affected by the proposed rule. In
addition, mortgage servicing accounts
may be maintained at IDIs that do not
themselves service mortgage loans. The
FDIC does not know how many IDIs are
recipients of mortgage servicing account
deposits, but believes that most IDIs are
not. Therefore, the FDIC estimates that
the number of IDIs potentially affected
by the proposed rule, if adopted, would
be greater than 1,167 and substantially
less than 4,987.
The FDIC does not have detailed data
on MSAs that would allow the FDIC to
reliably estimate the number of MSAs
maintained at IDIs that would be
affected by the proposed rule, or any
potential change in the total amount of
insured deposits. Thus, the potential
effects of the proposed amendments
regarding governing deposit insurance
coverage for MSAs are outlined
qualitatively below
,987.
The FDIC does not have detailed data
on MSAs that would allow the FDIC to
reliably estimate the number of MSAs
maintained at IDIs that would be
affected by the proposed rule, or any
potential change in the total amount of
insured deposits. Thus, the potential
effects of the proposed amendments
regarding governing deposit insurance
coverage for MSAs are outlined
qualitatively below.
The proposed rule would directly
affect the level of deposit insurance
coverage provided for some MSAs.
Under the proposed rule, the
composition of an MSA attributable to
mortgage servicers’ advances of
principal and interest funds on behalf of
delinquent borrowers and collections
such as foreclosure proceeds would be
insured up to the SMDIA per mortgagor,
consistent with the coverage for
payments of principal and interest
collected directly from borrowers.
Under the current rules, principal and
interest funds advanced by a servicer to
cover delinquencies, and foreclosure
proceeds collected by servicers, are not
be insured under the rules for MSA
deposits, but instead are insured to the
servicer as corporate funds up to the
SMDIA. Therefore, the proposed rule
would expand deposit insurance
coverage in instances where an account
maintained by a mortgage servicer
contains principal and interest funds
advanced by the servicer in order to
satisfy the obligations of delinquent
borrowers to the lender, or foreclosure
proceeds collected by the servicers; and
where the funds in such instances
exceed the mortgage servicer’s SMDIA.
If enacted, the proposed rule is likely
to benefit a servicer compelled by the
terms of a pooling and servicing
agreement to advance principal and
interest funds to note holders when a
borrower is delinquent, and therefore
the servicer has not received such funds
from the borrower
eeds collected by the servicers; and
where the funds in such instances
exceed the mortgage servicer’s SMDIA.
If enacted, the proposed rule is likely
to benefit a servicer compelled by the
terms of a pooling and servicing
agreement to advance principal and
interest funds to note holders when a
borrower is delinquent, and therefore
the servicer has not received such funds
from the borrower. In the event that the
IDI hosting the MSA for the servicer
fails, the proposal reduces the
likelihood that the funds advanced by
the servicer are uninsured, and thereby
facilitates access to, and helps avoids
losses of, those funds. As previously
discussed, the FDIC does not have
detailed data on MSAs held at IDIs,
pooling and servicing agreements for
outstanding mortgage loans, or servicer
payments into MSAs that would allow
the FDIC to reliably estimate the number
of, and volume of funds within, MSAs
maintained at IDIs that would be
affected by the proposed rule.
Further, the proposed rule is likely to
benefit an IDI who is hosting an MSA
for a servicer that is compelled by the
terms of a pooling and servicing
agreement to advance principal and
interest funds to note holders on behalf
of delinquent borrowers by increasing
the volume of insured funds. In the
event that the IDI enters into a troubled
condition, the proposed rule could
marginally increase the stability of MSA
deposits from such servicers, thereby
increasing the general stability of
funding.
Finally, the FDIC believes that the
proposed rule, if enacted, would pose
general benefits to parties that provide
or utilize financial services related to
mortgage products by amending an
inconsistency in the deposit insurance
treatment for principal and interest
payments made by the borrower and
such payments made by the servicer on
behalf of the borrower
general stability of
funding.
Finally, the FDIC believes that the
proposed rule, if enacted, would pose
general benefits to parties that provide
or utilize financial services related to
mortgage products by amending an
inconsistency in the deposit insurance
treatment for principal and interest
payments made by the borrower and
such payments made by the servicer on
behalf of the borrower.
Effects on Part 370 Covered Institutions
Institutions subject to the enhanced
requirements of part 370 may bear some
costs in recognizing the expanded
coverage for servicer advances and
foreclosure proceeds. However,
institutions subject to the requirements
of part 370 already are responsible for
determining coverage for MSA accounts
based on each borrower’s payments.
Therefore, the FDIC does not believe the
impact of the proposal on part 370
covered IDIs will be significant.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),
requires that, in connection with a
notice of proposed rulemaking, an
agency prepare and make available for
public comment an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis that describes the
impact of the proposed rule on small
entities.78 However, a regulatory
flexibility analysis is not required if the
agency certifies that the rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities
and publishes its certification and a
short explanatory statement in the
Federal Register together with the rule.
The Small Business Administration
(SBA) has defined ‘‘small entities’’ to
include banking organizations with total
assets of less than or equal to $600
million.79 Generally, the FDIC considers
a significant effect to be a quantified
effect in excess of 5 percent of total
annual salaries and benefits per
institution, or 2.5 percent of total
noninterest expenses. The FDIC believes
that effects in excess of these thresholds
typically represent significant effects for
small entities
anizations with total
asse
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