Final Rule to Address the Temporary Deposit Insurance Assessment Effects of the Optional Regulatory Capital Transitions for Implementing the Current Expected Credit Losses (CECL) Methodology

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FDIC Financial Institution Letters › Final Rule to Address the Temporary Deposit Insurance Assessment Effects of the Optional Regulatory Capital Transitions for Implementing the Current Expected Credit Losses (CECL) Methodology

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11391

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

1 12 U.S.C. 1817(b). As used in this final rule, the

term ‘‘insured depository institution’’ has the same

meaning as it is used in section 3(c)(2) of the FDI

Act, 12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(2). Pursuant to this

requirement, the FDIC first adopted a risk-based

deposit insurance assessment system effective in

1993 that applied to all IDIs. See 57 FR 45263 (Oct.

1, 1992). The FDIC implemented this assessment

system with the goals of making the deposit

insurance system fairer to well-run institutions and

encouraging weaker institutions to improve their

condition, and thus, promote the safety and

soundness of IDIs.

2 As used in this final rule, the term ‘‘small bank’’

is synonymous with ‘‘small institution,’’ the term

‘‘large bank’’ is synonymous with ‘‘large

institution,’’ and the term ‘‘highly complex bank’’

is synonymous with ‘‘highly complex institution,’’

as the terms are defined in 12 CFR 327.8. For

assessment purposes, a large bank is generally

defined as an institution with $10 billion or more

in total assets, a small bank is generally defined as

an institution with less than $10 billion in total

assets, and a highly complex bank is generally

defined as an institution that has $50 billion or

more in total assets and is controlled by a parent

holding company that has $500 billion or more in

total assets, or is a processing bank or trust

company. See 12 CFR 327.8(e), (f), and (g)

in total assets, a small bank is generally defined as

an institution with less than $10 billion in total

assets, and a highly complex bank is generally

defined as an institution that has $50 billion or

more in total assets and is controlled by a parent

holding company that has $500 billion or more in

total assets, or is a processing bank or trust

company. See 12 CFR 327.8(e), (f), and (g).

3 Banking organizations subject to the capital rule

include national banks, state member banks, state

nonmember banks, savings associations, and top-

tier bank holding companies and savings and loan

holding companies domiciled in the United States

not subject to the Federal Reserve Board’s Small

Bank Holding Company Policy Statement (12 CFR

part 225, appendix C), but exclude certain savings

and loan holding companies that are substantially

engaged in insurance underwriting or commercial

activities or that are estate trusts, and bank holding

companies and savings and loan holding companies

that are employee stock ownership plans. See 12

CFR part 3 (Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency)); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part

324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019) and

85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020).

4 See 84 FR 4225 (Feb. 14, 2019).

TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (h)

Softwood lumber

(by HTSUS number)

Assessment

$/cubic

meter

Assessment

$/square

meter

4407.11.00 ..................

0.1737

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4407.12.00 ..................

0.1737

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4407.19.05 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4407.19.06 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4407.19.10 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4409.10.05 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4409.10.10 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4409.10.20 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4409.10.90 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4418.99.10 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

*

*

*

*

*

Bruce Summers,

Administrator, Agricultural Marketing

Service.

[FR Doc

......

0.1737

0.004412

4407.19.10 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4409.10.05 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4409.10.10 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4409.10.20 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4409.10.90 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

4418.99.10 ..................

0.1737

0.004412

*

*

*

*

*

Bruce Summers,

Administrator, Agricultural Marketing

Service.

[FR Doc. 2021–03467 Filed 2–24–21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE

CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 327

RIN 3064–AF65

Assessments, Amendments To

Address the Temporary Deposit

Insurance Assessment Effects of the

Optional Regulatory Capital

Transitions for Implementing the

Current Expected Credit Losses

Methodology

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (FDIC).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation is adopting

amendments to the risk-based deposit

insurance assessment system applicable

to all large insured depository

institutions (IDIs), including highly

complex IDIs, to address the temporary

deposit insurance assessment effects

resulting from certain optional

regulatory capital transition provisions

relating to the implementation of the

current expected credit losses (CECL)

methodology. The final rule removes the

double counting of a specified portion

of the CECL transitional amount or the

modified CECL transitional amount, as

applicable (collectively, the CECL

transitional amounts), in certain

financial measures that are calculated

using the sum of Tier 1 capital and

reserves and that are used to determine

assessment rates for large or highly

complex IDIs. The final rule also adjusts

the calculation of the loss severity

measure to remove the double counting

of a specified portion of the CECL

transitional amounts for a large or

highly complex IDI

ansitional amounts), in certain

financial measures that are calculated

using the sum of Tier 1 capital and

reserves and that are used to determine

assessment rates for large or highly

complex IDIs. The final rule also adjusts

the calculation of the loss severity

measure to remove the double counting

of a specified portion of the CECL

transitional amounts for a large or

highly complex IDI. This final rule does

not affect regulatory capital or the

regulatory capital relief provided in the

form of transition provisions that allow

banking organizations to phase in the

effects of CECL on their regulatory

capital ratios.

DATES: The final rule is effective April

1, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Scott Ciardi, Chief, Large Bank Pricing,

(202) 898–7079 or sciardi@fdic.gov;

Ashley Mihalik, Chief, Banking and

Regulatory Policy, (202) 898–3793 or

amihalik@fdic.gov; Nefretete Smith,

Counsel, (202) 898–6851 or nefsmith@

fdic.gov; Sydney Mayer, Senior

Attorney, (202) 898–3669 or smayer@

fdic.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Policy Objectives and Overview of

Final Rule

The Federal Deposit Insurance Act

(FDI Act) requires that the FDIC

establish a risk-based deposit insurance

assessment system for insured

depository institutions (IDIs).1

Consistent with this statutory

requirement, the FDIC’s objective in

finalizing this rule is to ensure that IDIs

are assessed in a manner that is fair and

accurate

ATION:

I. Policy Objectives and Overview of

Final Rule

The Federal Deposit Insurance Act

(FDI Act) requires that the FDIC

establish a risk-based deposit insurance

assessment system for insured

depository institutions (IDIs).1

Consistent with this statutory

requirement, the FDIC’s objective in

finalizing this rule is to ensure that IDIs

are assessed in a manner that is fair and

accurate. In particular, the primary

objective of this final rule is to remove

a double counting issue in several

financial measures used to determine

deposit insurance assessment rates for

large or highly complex banks, which

could result in a deposit insurance

assessment rate for a large or highly

complex bank that does not accurately

reflect the bank’s risk to the deposit

insurance fund (DIF), all else equal.2

The final rule amends the assessment

regulations to remove the double

counting of a portion of the CECL

transitional amounts, in certain

financial measures used to determine

deposit insurance assessment rates for

large or highly complex banks. In

particular, certain financial measures

are calculated by summing Tier 1

capital, which includes the CECL

transitional amounts, and reserves,

which already reflects the

implementation of CECL. As a result, a

portion of the CECL transitional

amounts is being double counted in

these measures, which in turn affects

assessment rates for large or highly

complex banks. The final rule also

adjusts the calculation of the loss

severity measure to remove the double

counting of a portion of the CECL

transitional amounts for large or highly

complex banks

lects the

implementation of CECL. As a result, a

portion of the CECL transitional

amounts is being double counted in

these measures, which in turn affects

assessment rates for large or highly

complex banks. The final rule also

adjusts the calculation of the loss

severity measure to remove the double

counting of a portion of the CECL

transitional amounts for large or highly

complex banks.

This final rule amends the deposit

insurance system applicable to large

banks and highly complex banks only,

and it does not affect regulatory capital

or the regulatory capital relief provided

in the form of transition provisions that

allow banking organizations to phase in

the effects of CECL on their regulatory

capital ratios.3 Specifically, in

calculating another measure used to

determine assessment rates for all IDIs,

the Tier 1 leverage ratio, the FDIC will

continue to apply the CECL regulatory

capital transition provisions, consistent

with the regulatory capital relief

provided to address concerns that

despite adequate capital planning,

unexpected economic conditions at the

time of CECL adoption could result in

higher-than-anticipated increases in

allowances.4

The FDIC did not receive any

comment letters in response to the

proposal and is adopting the proposed

rule as final without change. Under this

final rule, amendments to the deposit

insurance assessment system and

changes to regulatory reporting

requirements will be applicable only

while the regulatory capital relief

described above, or any potential future

amendment that may affect the

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nal without change. Under this

final rule, amendments to the deposit

insurance assessment system and

changes to regulatory reporting

requirements will be applicable only

while the regulatory capital relief

described above, or any potential future

amendment that may affect the

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11392

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

5 12 CFR part 327.

6 See 71 FR 69282 (Nov. 30, 2006).

7 See 76 FR 10672 (Feb. 25, 2011).

8 See 12 CFR 327.3(b)(1).

9 See 12 CFR 327.5.

10 See 12 CFR 327.16(a) and (b).

11 See 12 CFR 327.16(b); see also 76 FR 10672

(Feb. 25, 2011) and 77 FR 66000 (Oct. 31, 2012).

12 See 76 FR 10688. The FDIC uses a different

scorecard for highly complex IDIs because those

institutions are structurally and operationally

complex, or pose unique challenges and risks in

case of failure. 76 FR 10695.

13 ASU 2016–13 covers measurement of credit

losses on financial instruments and includes three

subtopics within Topic 326: (i) Subtopic 326–10

Financial Instruments—Credit Losses—Overall; (ii)

Subtopic 326–20: Financial Instruments—Credit

Losses—Measured at Amortized Cost; and (iii)

Subtopic 326–30: Financial Instruments—Credit

Losses—Available-for-Sale Debt Securities.

14 ‘‘Other extensions of credit’’ includes trade and

reinsurance receivables, and receivables that relate

to repurchase agreements and securities lending

agreements. ‘‘Off-balance sheet credit exposures’’

includes off-balance sheet credit exposures not

accounted for as insurance, such as loan

commitments, standby letters of credit, and

financial guarantees. The FDIC notes that credit

losses for off-balance sheet credit exposures that are

unconditionally cancellable by the issuer are not

recognized under CECL.

15 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board);

12 CFR part 324 (FDIC).

16 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)

sheet credit exposures not

accounted for as insurance, such as loan

commitments, standby letters of credit, and

financial guarantees. The FDIC notes that credit

losses for off-balance sheet credit exposures that are

unconditionally cancellable by the issuer are not

recognized under CECL.

15 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board);

12 CFR part 324 (FDIC).

16 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019).

calculation of CECL transitional

amounts and the double counting of

these amounts for deposit insurance

assessment purposes, is reflected in the

regulatory reports of banks.

II. Background

A. Deposit Insurance Assessments

Pursuant to Section 7 of the FDI Act,

the FDIC has established a risk-based

assessment system in Part 327 of its

Rules and Regulations.5 In 2006, the

FDIC adopted a final rule that created

different risk-based assessment systems

for large IDIs and small IDIs that

combined supervisory ratings with other

risk measures to differentiate risk and

determine assessment rates.6 In 2011,

the FDIC amended the risk-based

assessment system applicable to large

IDIs to, among other things, better

capture risk at the time the institution

assumes the risk, to better differentiate

risk among large IDIs during periods of

good economic and banking conditions

based on how they would fare during

periods of stress or economic

downturns, and to better take into

account the losses that the FDIC may

incur if a large IDI fails.7

The FDIC charges all IDIs an

assessment amount for deposit

insurance equal to the IDI’s deposit

insurance assessment base multiplied

by its risk-based assessment rate.8 An

IDI’s assessment base and assessment

rate are determined each quarter based

on supervisory ratings and information

collected in the Consolidated Reports of

Condition and Income (Call Report) or

the Report of Assets and Liabilities of

U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign

Banks (FFIEC 002), as appropriate

deposit

insurance assessment base multiplied

by its risk-based assessment rate.8 An

IDI’s assessment base and assessment

rate are determined each quarter based

on supervisory ratings and information

collected in the Consolidated Reports of

Condition and Income (Call Report) or

the Report of Assets and Liabilities of

U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign

Banks (FFIEC 002), as appropriate.

Generally, an IDI’s assessment base

equals its average consolidated total

assets minus its average tangible

equity.9

An IDI’s assessment rate is calculated

using different methods based on

whether the IDI is a small, large, or

highly complex bank.10 A large or

highly complex bank is assessed using

a scorecard approach that combines

CAMELS ratings and certain forward-

looking financial measures to assess the

risk that the bank poses to the DIF.11

The score that each large or highly

complex bank receives is used to

determine its deposit insurance

assessment rate. One scorecard applies

to most large IDIs and another applies

to highly complex banks. Both

scorecards use quantitative financial

measures that are useful in predicting a

large or highly complex bank’s long-

term performance.12

As described in more detail below,

the FDIC is finalizing amendments to

the assessment regulations to remove

the double counting of a specified

portion of the CECL transitional

amounts in the calculation of the loss

severity measure and certain other

financial measures that are calculated

by summing Tier 1 capital and reserves,

which are used to determine assessment

rates for large or highly complex banks.

B. The Current Expected Credit Losses

Methodology

In 2016, the Financial Accounting

Standards Board (FASB) issued

Accounting Standards Update (ASU)

No. 2016–13, Financial Instruments—

Credit Losses, Topic 326, Measurement

of Credit Losses on Financial

Instruments.13 The ASU resulted in

significant changes to credit loss

accounting under U.S. generally

accepted accounting principles (GAAP)

The Current Expected Credit Losses

Methodology

In 2016, the Financial Accounting

Standards Board (FASB) issued

Accounting Standards Update (ASU)

No. 2016–13, Financial Instruments—

Credit Losses, Topic 326, Measurement

of Credit Losses on Financial

Instruments.13 The ASU resulted in

significant changes to credit loss

accounting under U.S. generally

accepted accounting principles (GAAP).

The revisions to credit loss accounting

under GAAP included the introduction

of CECL, which replaces the incurred

loss methodology for financial assets

measured at amortized cost. For these

assets, CECL requires banking

organizations to recognize lifetime

expected credit losses and to

incorporate reasonable and supportable

forecasts in developing the estimate of

lifetime expected credit losses, while

also maintaining the current

requirement that banking organizations

consider past events and current

conditions.

CECL allowances cover a broader

range of financial assets than the

allowance for loan and lease losses

(ALLL) under the incurred loss

methodology. Under the incurred loss

methodology, the ALLL generally covers

credit losses on loans held for

investment and lease financing

receivables, with additional allowances

for certain other extensions of credit and

allowances for credit losses on certain

off-balance sheet credit exposures (with

the latter allowances presented as

liabilities).14 These exposures will be

within the scope of CECL. In addition,

CECL applies to credit losses on held-

to-maturity (HTM) debt securities. ASU

2016–13 also introduces new

requirements for available-for-sale (AFS)

debt securities. The new accounting

standard requires that a banking

organization recognize credit losses on

individual AFS debt securities through

credit loss allowances, rather than

through direct write-downs, as is

currently required under U.S. GAAP

es to credit losses on held-

to-maturity (HTM) debt securities. ASU

2016–13 also introduces new

requirements for available-for-sale (AFS)

debt securities. The new accounting

standard requires that a banking

organization recognize credit losses on

individual AFS debt securities through

credit loss allowances, rather than

through direct write-downs, as is

currently required under U.S. GAAP.

The credit loss allowances attributable

to debt securities are separate from the

credit loss allowances attributable to

loans and leases.

C. The 2019 CECL Rule

Upon adoption of CECL, a banking

organization will record a one-time

adjustment to its credit loss allowances

as of the beginning of its fiscal year of

adoption equal to the difference, if any,

between the amount of credit loss

allowances required under the incurred

loss methodology and the amount of

credit loss allowances required under

CECL. A banking organization’s

implementation of CECL will affect its

retained earnings, deferred tax assets

(DTAs), allowances, and, as a result, its

regulatory capital ratios.

In recognition of the potential for the

implementation of CECL to affect

regulatory capital ratios, on February 14,

2019, the FDIC, the Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and

the Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System (Board) (collectively,

the agencies) issued a final rule that

revised certain regulations, including

the agencies’ regulatory capital

regulations (capital rule),15 to account

for the aforementioned changes to credit

loss accounting under GAAP, including

CECL (2019 CECL rule).16 The 2019

CECL rule includes a transition

provision that allows banking

organizations to phase in over a three-

year period the day-one adverse effects

of CECL on their regulatory capital

ratios.

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changes to credit

loss accounting under GAAP, including

CECL (2019 CECL rule).16 The 2019

CECL rule includes a transition

provision that allows banking

organizations to phase in over a three-

year period the day-one adverse effects

of CECL on their regulatory capital

ratios.

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11393

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

17 85 FR 17723 (Mar. 31, 2020).

18 See 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020).

19 A banking organization that is required to

adopt CECL under GAAP in the 2020 calendar year,

but chooses to delay use of CECL for regulatory

reporting in accordance with section 4014 of the

Coronavirus Aid Relief, and Economic Security Act

(CARES Act), is also eligible for the 2020 CECL

transition provision. The CARES Act (Pub. L. 116–

136, 4014, 134 Stat. 281 (March 27, 2020)) provides

banking organizations optional temporary relief

from complying with CECL ending on the earlier of

(1) the termination date of the current national

emergency, declared by the President on March 13,

2020 under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.

1601 et seq.) concerning COVID–19; or (2)

December 31, 2020. If a banking organization

chooses to revert to the incurred loss methodology

pursuant to the CARES Act in any quarter in 2020,

the banking organization would not apply any

transitional amounts in that quarter but would be

allowed to apply the transitional amounts in

subsequent quarters when the banking organization

resumes use of CECL. The Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2021 (Pub. L. 116–260 (Dec

ing organization

chooses to revert to the incurred loss methodology

pursuant to the CARES Act in any quarter in 2020,

the banking organization would not apply any

transitional amounts in that quarter but would be

allowed to apply the transitional amounts in

subsequent quarters when the banking organization

resumes use of CECL. The Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2021 (Pub. L. 116–260 (Dec. 27,

2020)) extended the optional temporary relief from

complying with CECL afforded under the CARES

Act, with an end date on the earlier of (1) the first

day of the fiscal year of the IDI, bank holding

company, or any affiliate thereof that begins after

the date on which the national emergency

concerning the COVID–19 outbreak declared by the

President on March 13, 2020 under the National

Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) terminates;

or (2) January 1, 2022.

20 See 85 FR 61578 (Sept. 30, 2020).

21 The 2019 CECL rule defined a new term for

regulatory capital purposes, adjusted allowances for

credit losses (AACL). The meaning of the term

AACL for regulatory capital purposes is different

from the meaning of the term allowances of credit

losses (ACL) used in applicable accounting

standards. The term allowance for credit losses as

used by the FASB in ASU 2016–13 applies to both

financial assets measured at amortized cost and

AFS debt securities. In contrast, the AACL

definition includes only those allowances that have

been established through a charge against earnings

or retained earnings. Under the 2019 CECL rule, the

term AACL, rather than ALLL, applies to a banking

organization that has adopted CECL.

22 See 85 FR 61580 (Sept. 30, 2020)

2016–13 applies to both

financial assets measured at amortized cost and

AFS debt securities. In contrast, the AACL

definition includes only those allowances that have

been established through a charge against earnings

or retained earnings. Under the 2019 CECL rule, the

term AACL, rather than ALLL, applies to a banking

organization that has adopted CECL.

22 See 85 FR 61580 (Sept. 30, 2020).

23 Thus, when calculating regulatory capital, a

bank electing the 2019 CECL rule transition

provision would increase the retained earnings

reported on its balance sheet by the applicable

portion of its CECL transitional amount, i.e., 75

percent of its CECL transitional amount during the

first year of the transition period, 50 percent of its

CECL transitional amount during the second year of

the transition period, and 25 percent of its CECL

transitional amount during the third year of the

transition period. A bank electing the 2020 CECL

rule transition provision would increase the

retained earnings reported on its balance sheet by

the applicable portion of its modified CECL

transitional amount, i.e., 100 percent of its modified

CECL transitional amount during the first and

second years of the transition period, 75 percent of

its CECL modified transitional amount during the

third year of the transition period, 50 percent of its

modified CECL transitional amount during the

fourth year of the transition period, and 25 percent

of its CECL transitional amount during the fifth year

of the transition period.

D

modified

CECL transitional amount during the first and

second years of the transition period, 75 percent of

its CECL modified transitional amount during the

third year of the transition period, 50 percent of its

modified CECL transitional amount during the

fourth year of the transition period, and 25 percent

of its CECL transitional amount during the fifth year

of the transition period.

D. The 2020 CECL Rule

As part of the efforts to address the

disruption of economic activity in the

United States caused by the spread of

coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19),

on March 31, 2020, the agencies

adopted a second CECL transition

provision through an interim final

rule.17 The agencies subsequently

adopted a final rule (2020 CECL rule) on

September 30, 2020, that is consistent

with the interim final rule, with some

clarifications and adjustments related to

the calculation of the transition and the

eligibility criteria for using the 2020

CECL transition provision.18 The 2020

CECL rule provides banking

organizations that adopt CECL for

purposes of GAAP (as in effect January

1, 2020), for a fiscal year that begins

during the 2020 calendar year, the

option to delay for up to two years an

estimate of CECL’s effect on regulatory

capital, followed by a three-year

transition period (i.e., a five-year

transition period in total).19 The 2020

CECL rule does not replace the three-

year transition provision in the 2019

CECL rule, which remains available to

any banking organization at the time

that it adopts CECL.20

E. Double Counting of a Portion of the

CECL Transitional Amounts in Certain

Financial Measures Used To Determine

Assessments for Large or Highly

Complex Banks

An increase in a banking

organization’s allowances, including

those estimated under CECL, generally

will reduce the banking organization’s

earnings or retained earnings, and

therefore, its Tier 1 capital

me

that it adopts CECL.20

E. Double Counting of a Portion of the

CECL Transitional Amounts in Certain

Financial Measures Used To Determine

Assessments for Large or Highly

Complex Banks

An increase in a banking

organization’s allowances, including

those estimated under CECL, generally

will reduce the banking organization’s

earnings or retained earnings, and

therefore, its Tier 1 capital. For banks

electing the 2019 CECL rule, the CECL

transitional amount is the difference

between the closing balance sheet

amount of retained earnings for the

fiscal year-end immediately prior to the

bank’s adoption of CECL (pre-CECL

amount) and the bank’s balance sheet

amount of retained earnings as of the

beginning of the fiscal year in which it

adopts CECL (post-CECL amount). For

banks electing the 2020 CECL rule

transition provision, retained earnings

are increased for regulatory capital

calculation purposes by a modified

CECL transitional amount that is

adjusted to reflect changes in retained

earnings due to CECL that occur during

the first two years of the five-year

transition period. Under the 2020 CECL

rule, the change in retained earnings

due to CECL is calculated by taking the

change in reported adjusted allowances

for credit losses (AACL) 21 relative to the

first day of the fiscal year in which

CECL was adopted and applying a

scaling multiplier of 25 percent during

the first two years of the transition

period. The resulting amount is added

to the CECL transitional amount

described above. Hence, the modified

CECL transitional amount for banks

electing the 2020 CECL rule is

calculated on a quarterly basis during

the first two years of the transition

period

e fiscal year in which

CECL was adopted and applying a

scaling multiplier of 25 percent during

the first two years of the transition

period. The resulting amount is added

to the CECL transitional amount

described above. Hence, the modified

CECL transitional amount for banks

electing the 2020 CECL rule is

calculated on a quarterly basis during

the first two years of the transition

period. The bank reflects that modified

CECL transitional amount, which

includes 100 percent of the day-one

impact of CECL on retained earnings

plus a portion of the difference between

AACL reported in the most recent

regulatory report and AACL as of the

beginning of the fiscal year that the

banking organization adopts CECL, in

the transitional amount applied to

retained earnings in regulatory capital

calculations.22

For banks electing the 2020 CECL rule

transition provision that enter the third

year of their transition period and for

banks electing the three-year 2019 CECL

rule transition provision, banks must

calculate the transitional amount to

phase into their retained earnings for

purposes of their regulatory capital

calculations over a three-year period.

For banks electing the 2019 CECL rule,

the CECL transitional amount is the

difference between the pre-CECL

amount of retained earnings and the

post-CECL amount of retained earnings.

For banks electing the 2020 CECL rule

that enter the third year of their

transition, the modified CECL

transitional amount is the difference

between the bank’s AACL at the end of

the second year of the transition period

and its AACL as of the beginning of the

fiscal year of CECL adoption multiplied

by 25 percent plus the CECL transitional

amount described above

ount of retained earnings.

For banks electing the 2020 CECL rule

that enter the third year of their

transition, the modified CECL

transitional amount is the difference

between the bank’s AACL at the end of

the second year of the transition period

and its AACL as of the beginning of the

fiscal year of CECL adoption multiplied

by 25 percent plus the CECL transitional

amount described above. The CECL

transitional amount or, at the end of the

second year of the transition period for

banks electing the 2020 CECL rule, the

modified CECL transitional amount, is

fixed and must be phased in over the

three-year transition period or the last

three years of the transition period,

respectively, on a straight-line basis, 25

percent in the first year (or third year for

banks electing the 2020 CECL rule), and

an additional 25 percent of the

transitional amount over each of the

next two years.23 At the beginning of the

sixth year for banks electing the 2020

CECL rule, or the beginning of the

fourth year for banks electing the 2019

CECL rule, the electing bank would

have completely reflected in regulatory

capital the day-one effects of CECL

(plus, for banks electing the 2020 CECL

rule, an estimate of CECL’s effect on

regulatory capital, relative to the

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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

24 See 84 FR 4228 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR

61580 (Sept. 30, 2020).

25 The allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment also is reported in item

7, column A, of Call Report Schedule RI–B, Part II,

Changes in Allowances for Credit Losses.

26 85 FR 78794 (Dec. 7, 2020)

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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

24 See 84 FR 4228 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR

61580 (Sept. 30, 2020).

25 The allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment also is reported in item

7, column A, of Call Report Schedule RI–B, Part II,

Changes in Allowances for Credit Losses.

26 85 FR 78794 (Dec. 7, 2020).

incurred loss methodology’s effect on

regulatory capital, during the first two

years of CECL adoption).24

Certain financial measures that are

used in the scorecard to determine

assessment rates for large or highly

complex banks are calculated using both

Tier 1 capital and reserves. Tier 1

capital is reported in Call Report

Schedule RC–R, Part I, item 26, and for

banks that elect either the three-year

transition provision contained in the

2019 CECL rule or the five-year

transition provision contained in the

2020 CECL rule, Tier 1 capital includes

(due to adjustments to the amount of

retained earnings reported on the

balance sheet) the applicable portion of

the CECL transitional amount (or

modified CECL transitional amount).

For deposit insurance assessment

purposes, reserves are calculated using

the amount reported in Call Report

Schedule RC, item 4.c, ‘‘Allowance for

loan and lease losses.’’ For all banks that

have adopted CECL, this Schedule RC

line item reflects the allowance for

credit losses on loans and leases.25

The issue of double counting arises in

certain financial measures used to

determine assessment rates for large or

highly complex banks that are

calculated using both Tier 1 capital and

reserves because the allowance for

credit losses on loans and leases is

included during the transition period in

both reserves and, as a portion of the

CECL or modified CECL transitional

amount, Tier 1 capital

issue of double counting arises in

certain financial measures used to

determine assessment rates for large or

highly complex banks that are

calculated using both Tier 1 capital and

reserves because the allowance for

credit losses on loans and leases is

included during the transition period in

both reserves and, as a portion of the

CECL or modified CECL transitional

amount, Tier 1 capital. For banks that

elect either the three-year transition

provision contained in the 2019 CECL

rule or the five-year transition provision

contained in the 2020 CECL rule, the

CECL transitional amounts, as defined

in section 301 of the regulatory capital

rules, additionally include the effect on

retained earnings, net of tax effect, of

establishing allowances for credit losses

in accordance with the CECL

methodology on HTM debt securities,

other financial assets measured at

amortized cost, and off-balance sheet

credit exposures as of the beginning of

the fiscal year of adoption (plus, for

banks electing the 2020 CECL rule, the

change during the first two years of the

transition period in reported AACLs for

HTM debt securities, other financial

assets measured at amortized cost, and

off-balance sheet credit exposures

relative to the balances of these AACLs

as of the beginning of the fiscal year of

CECL adoption multiplied by 25

percent). The applicable portions of the

CECL transitional amounts attributable

to allowances for credit losses on HTM

debt securities, other financial assets

measured at amortized cost, and off-

balance sheet credit exposures are

included in Tier 1 capital only and are

not double counted with reserves for

deposit insurance assessment purposes.

The CECL effective dates assigned by

ASU 2016–13 as most recently amended

by ASU No

CECL transitional amounts attributable

to allowances for credit losses on HTM

debt securities, other financial assets

measured at amortized cost, and off-

balance sheet credit exposures are

included in Tier 1 capital only and are

not double counted with reserves for

deposit insurance assessment purposes.

The CECL effective dates assigned by

ASU 2016–13 as most recently amended

by ASU No. 2019–10, the optional

temporary relief from complying with

CECL afforded by the CARES Act and as

extended by the Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2021, and the

transitions provided for under the 2019

CECL rule and 2020 CECL rule, provide

that all banks will have completely

reflected in regulatory capital the day-

one effects of CECL (plus, if applicable,

an estimate of CECL’s effect on

regulatory capital, relative to the

incurred loss methodology’s effect on

regulatory capital, during the first two

years of CECL adoption) by December

31, 2026. As a result, and as discussed

below, the amendments to the deposit

insurance assessment system and

changes to reporting requirements

pursuant to this final rule will be

applicable only while the temporary

regulatory capital relief described above,

or any potential future amendment that

may affect the calculation of CECL

transitional amounts and the double

counting of these amounts for deposit

insurance assessment purposes, is

reflected in the regulatory reports of

banks.

F. The Proposed Rule

On December 7, 2020, the FDIC

published in the Federal Register a

notice of proposed rulemaking (the

proposed rule, or proposal) 26 that

would amend the risk-based deposit

insurance assessment system applicable

to all large IDIs, including highly

complex IDIs, to address the temporary

deposit insurance assessment effects

resulting from certain optional

regulatory capital transition provisions

relating to the implementation of the

CECL methodology

er a

notice of proposed rulemaking (the

proposed rule, or proposal) 26 that

would amend the risk-based deposit

insurance assessment system applicable

to all large IDIs, including highly

complex IDIs, to address the temporary

deposit insurance assessment effects

resulting from certain optional

regulatory capital transition provisions

relating to the implementation of the

CECL methodology. To address these

temporary deposit insurance assessment

effects, in calculating certain measures

used in the scorecard for determining

deposit insurance assessment rates for

large or highly complex banks, the FDIC

proposed to remove the applicable

portions of the CECL transitional

amounts added to retained earnings for

regulatory capital purposes and

attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases held for

investment under the transitions

provided for under the 2019 and 2020

CECL rules. Specifically, in certain

scorecard measures which are

calculated using the sum of Tier 1

capital and reserves, the FDIC proposed

to remove a specified portion of the

CECL transitional amount (or modified

CECL transitional amount) that is added

to retained earnings for regulatory

capital purposes when determining

deposit insurance assessment rates. The

FDIC also proposed to adjust the

calculation of the loss severity measure

to remove the double counting of a

specified portion of the CECL

transitional amounts for a large or

highly complex bank.

The FDIC did not receive any

comment letters in response to the

proposal and is adopting the proposed

rule as final without change.

III. The Final Rule

A. Summary

As proposed, in certain scorecard

measures which are calculated using the

sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves, the

FDIC will remove a specified portion of

the CECL transitional amounts that is

added to retained earnings for

regulatory capital purposes when

determining deposit insurance

assessment rates

is adopting the proposed

rule as final without change.

III. The Final Rule

A. Summary

As proposed, in certain scorecard

measures which are calculated using the

sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves, the

FDIC will remove a specified portion of

the CECL transitional amounts that is

added to retained earnings for

regulatory capital purposes when

determining deposit insurance

assessment rates. The FDIC also will

adjust the calculation of the loss

severity measure to remove the double

counting of a specified portion of the

CECL transitional amounts for a large or

highly complex bank.

Absent the adjustments to the

calculation of certain financial measures

in the large or highly complex bank

scorecards under this final rule, the

inclusion of the applicable portions of

the CECL transitional amounts added to

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes and attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment in regulatory

capital and the implementation of CECL

in calculating reserves would result in

temporary double counting of a portion

of the CECL transitional amounts in

select financial measures used to

determine assessment rates for large or

highly complex banks. For example, in

the denominator of the higher-risk

assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves

ratio, the applicable portions of the

CECL transitional amounts added to

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes and attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment would be

included in Tier 1 capital, and these

portions also would be reflected in the

calculation of reserves using the

allowance amount reported in Call

Report Schedule RC, item 4.c. If left

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ibutable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment would be

included in Tier 1 capital, and these

portions also would be reflected in the

calculation of reserves using the

allowance amount reported in Call

Report Schedule RC, item 4.c. If left

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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

27 This stylized example is included to illustrate

the effect of the final rule and omits the effects of

deferred tax assets on regulatory capital

calculations, which are addressed in the agencies’

capital rule, the 2019 CECL rule, and the 2020 CECL

rule. The example reflects the first-quarter 2020

application by a hypothetical large bank (with no

purchased credit-deteriorated assets) that has

adopted the five-year CECL transition under the

2020 CECL rule and assumes that the full amount

of the CECL transitional amount is attributable to

the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases.

The example does not reflect any changes over the

course of the first quarterly reporting period in year

1 (i.e., no changes in the amounts reported on the

bank’s balance sheet between January 1 and March

31, 2020, the end of the reporting period for the first

quarter). As a consequence, the example bank’s

modified CECL transitional amount as of March 31,

2020 equals its CECL transitional amount. See 12

CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR

part 324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)

and 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020)

n the

bank’s balance sheet between January 1 and March

31, 2020, the end of the reporting period for the first

quarter). As a consequence, the example bank’s

modified CECL transitional amount as of March 31,

2020 equals its CECL transitional amount. See 12

CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR

part 324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)

and 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020).

28 While the CECL transitional amount is

calculated using the difference between the closing

balance sheet amount of retained earnings for the

fiscal year-end immediately prior to a bank’s

adoption of CECL and the balance sheet amount of

retained earnings as of the beginning of the fiscal

year in which the bank adopts CECL, the FDIC

calculates financial measures used to determine

deposit insurance assessment rates using data

reported as of each quarter end.

29 Under the 2019 CECL rule, when calculating

regulatory capital ratios during the first year of an

electing bank’s CECL adoption date, the bank must

phase in 25 percent of the transitional amounts. The

bank would phase in an additional 25 percent of

the transitional amounts over each of the next two

years so that the bank would have phased in 75

percent of the day-one adverse effects of adopting

CECL during year three. At the beginning of the

fourth year, the bank would have completely

reflected in regulatory capital the day-one effects of

CECL. Under the 2020 CECL rule, the modified

CECL transitional amount is calculated on a

quarterly basis during the first two years of the

transition period. See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR

part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC). See also

84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR 61577 (Sept.

30, 2020).

30 In this stylized example, the entirety of the

CECL transitional amount is attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and leases and

it equals the modified CECL transitional amount

during the first quarter of the transition period

. See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR

part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC). See also

84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR 61577 (Sept.

30, 2020).

30 In this stylized example, the entirety of the

CECL transitional amount is attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and leases and

it equals the modified CECL transitional amount

during the first quarter of the transition period. The

applicable portion of the CECL transitional amounts

is the amount that is double counted in certain

financial measures used to determine deposit

insurance assessment rates and that the FDIC will

remove from those financial measures. However,

CECL transitional amounts may also include

amounts attributable to allowances for credit losses

under CECL on HTM debt securities, other financial

assets measured at amortized cost, and off-balance

sheet credit exposures. Under the final rule, in

determining a large or highly complex bank’s

deposit insurance assessment rate, the FDIC will

continue to include in Tier 1 capital the applicable

portion of any CECL transitional amounts

attributable to allowances for credit losses on items

other than loans and leases held for investment.

uncorrected, this temporary double

counting could result in a deposit

insurance assessment rate for a large or

highly complex bank that does not

accurately reflect the bank’s risk to the

DIF, all else equal.

In the following simplified, stylized

example, illustrated in Table 1 below,

consider a hypothetical large bank that

has a CECL effective date of January 1,

2020, and elects a five-year transition.27

On the closing balance sheet date

immediately prior to adopting CECL

(i.e., December 31, 2019), the electing

bank has $1 million of ALLL and $10

million of Tier 1 capital

IF, all else equal.

In the following simplified, stylized

example, illustrated in Table 1 below,

consider a hypothetical large bank that

has a CECL effective date of January 1,

2020, and elects a five-year transition.27

On the closing balance sheet date

immediately prior to adopting CECL

(i.e., December 31, 2019), the electing

bank has $1 million of ALLL and $10

million of Tier 1 capital. On the opening

balance sheet date immediately after

adopting CECL (i.e., January 1, 2020),

the electing bank has $1.2 million of

allowances for credit losses, of which

the entire $1.2 million qualifies as

AACL for regulatory capital purposes

and is attributable to the allowance for

credit losses on loans and leases held

for investment.28 The bank would

recognize the adoption of CECL as of

January 1, 2020, by recording an

increase in its allowances for credit

losses, and in its AACL for regulatory

capital purposes, of $200,000, with a

reduction in beginning retained

earnings of $200,000, which flows

through and results in Tier 1 capital of

$9.8 million. For each of the quarterly

reporting periods in year 1 of the five-

year transition period (i.e., 2020), the

electing bank would increase the

retained earnings reported on its

balance sheet by $200,000 for purposes

of calculating its regulatory capital

ratios, resulting in an increase in its Tier

1 capital of $200,000 to $10 million, all

else equal.29

In this example, in determining the

hypothetical large bank’s deposit

insurance assessment rate, the bank’s

Tier 1 capital of $10 million would

include the $200,000 addition to the

bank’s reported retained earnings due to

the CECL transition (entirely

attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases), and its

reserves would equal $1.2 million, the

entire amount of which is attributable to

the allowance for credit losses on loans

and leases held for investment

ate, the bank’s

Tier 1 capital of $10 million would

include the $200,000 addition to the

bank’s reported retained earnings due to

the CECL transition (entirely

attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases), and its

reserves would equal $1.2 million, the

entire amount of which is attributable to

the allowance for credit losses on loans

and leases held for investment. Its

combined Tier 1 capital and reserves

would equal $11.2 million ($10 million

plus $1.2 million), reflecting double

counting of the $200,000 applicable

portion of the bank’s CECL transitional

amount attributable to the allowance for

credit losses on loans and leases.30

Under the final rule, for purposes of

calculating assessments for large or

highly complex banks, the FDIC would

subtract $200,000 from the denominator

of financial measures that sum Tier 1

capital and reserves, since the amount

of $200,000 is incorporated in both Tier

1 capital (as the applicable portion of

the CECL transitional amount in year

one of the five-year transition period)

and reserves in the denominator. The

bank’s adjusted Tier 1 capital and

reserves would equal $11 million. The

FDIC also would adjust the calculation

of the loss severity measure by

$200,000, as described below.

TABLE 1—STYLIZED EXAMPLE 1 OF FIRST-QUARTER APPLICATION OF A FIVE-YEAR CECL TRANSITION IN CALCULATING

TIER 1 CAPITAL AND RESERVES FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE ASSESSMENT PURPOSES

In thousands

Dec. 31, 2019

Jan. 1, 2020

Reserves .................................................................................................................

$1,000 (ALLL) ........................................

$1,200 (AACL).

Tier 1 Capital ..........................................................................................................

$10,000 ..................................................

$10,000.

Tier 1 Capital and Reserves (absent final rule) .....................................................

....................................

$1,000 (ALLL) ........................................

$1,200 (AACL).

Tier 1 Capital ..........................................................................................................

$10,000 ..................................................

$10,000.

Tier 1 Capital and Reserves (absent final rule) ......................................................

$11,000 ..................................................

$11,200.

Applicable Portion of the CECL Transitional Amount .............................................

................................................................

$200.

Tier 1 Capital and Reserves (under final rule) .......................................................

................................................................

$11,000.

1 This stylized example reflects the first-quarter application of a hypothetical bank that has adopted a five-year CECL transition under the 2020

CECL rule and assumes that the full amount of the CECL transitional amount is attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases. The example does not reflect any changes over the course of the first quarter of 2020 (i.e., no changes in the amounts reported on the

bank’s balance sheet between January 1 and March 31, 2020, the end of the reporting period for the first quarter). As a consequence, the bank’s

modified CECL transitional amount as of March 31, 2020, equals its CECL transitional amount. This stylized example omits the effects of de-

ferred tax assets, which are addressed in the agencies’ capital rule, the 2019 CECL rule, and the 2020 CECL rule.

The final rule amends the deposit

insurance system applicable to large

banks and highly complex banks only,

and does not affect regulatory capital or

the regulatory capital relief provided

under the 2019 CECL rule or 2020 CECL

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rule, the 2019 CECL rule, and the 2020 CECL rule.

The final rule amends the deposit

insurance system applicable to large

banks and highly complex banks only,

and does not affect regulatory capital or

the regulatory capital relief provided

under the 2019 CECL rule or 2020 CECL

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31 See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217

(Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR

4222 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30,

2020).

32 As discussed in the section on the Paperwork

Reduction Act below, the agencies published a joint

notice and request for comment (85 FR 82580 (Dec.

18, 2020)) requesting one additional temporary item

on the Call Report (FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041 only)

to make the adjustments described below.

33 See 12 CFR 327.16(b)(ii)(A)(2)(iv).

34 See Appendix A to subpart A of 23 CFR 327.

35 Appendix D to subpart A of 12 CFR part 327

describes the calculation of the loss severity

measure.

36 The loss severity measure is an average loss

severity ratio for the three most recent quarters of

data available. It is anticipated that the temporary

reporting changes proposed pursuant to this final

rule would be implemented no earlier than the first

applicable reporting period following the

anticipated effective date of this final rule. As such,

the FDIC will adjust the calculation of the loss

severity measure to remove the double counting of

the specified portion of the CECL transitional

amounts for one of the three quarters averaged in

the first reporting period following the effective

date, for two of the three quarters averaged in the

second reporting period following the effective

date, and for all three quarters averaged in all

subsequent reporting periods, as applicable

s

severity measure to remove the double counting of

the specified portion of the CECL transitional

amounts for one of the three quarters averaged in

the first reporting period following the effective

date, for two of the three quarters averaged in the

second reporting period following the effective

date, and for all three quarters averaged in all

subsequent reporting periods, as applicable.

rule.31 The FDIC will continue the

application of the transition provisions

provided for under the 2019 and 2020

CECL rules to the Tier 1 leverage ratio

used in determining deposit insurance

assessment rates for all IDIs.

Temporary changes to the Call Report

forms and instructions are required to

implement the amendments to the

assessment system to remove the double

counting under the final rule. These

changes are being effectuated in

coordination with the other member

entities of the Federal Financial

Institutions Examination Council

(FFIEC).32 Changes to regulatory

reporting requirements pursuant to this

final rule will be required only while

the regulatory capital relief is reflected

in the regulatory reports of banks.

B. Adjustments to Certain Measures

Used in the Scorecard Approach for

Determining Assessment Rates for Large

or Highly Complex Banks

Under the final rule, the FDIC will

adjust the calculations of certain

financial measures used to determine

deposit insurance assessment rates for

large or highly complex banks to remove

the applicable portions of the CECL

transitional amounts added to retained

earnings that is attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment. The FDIC is

removing this part of the CECL

transitional amounts because, for large

or highly complex banks that have

adopted CECL, the measure of reserves

used in the scorecard is the allowance

for credit losses on loans and leases

reported in Call Report Schedule RC,

item 4.c

ained

earnings that is attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment. The FDIC is

removing this part of the CECL

transitional amounts because, for large

or highly complex banks that have

adopted CECL, the measure of reserves

used in the scorecard is the allowance

for credit losses on loans and leases

reported in Call Report Schedule RC,

item 4.c.

This amount, which will be reported

in a new line item in Schedule RC–O

only on the FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041

versions of the Call Report, will be

removed from scorecard measures that

are calculated using the sum of Tier 1

capital and reserves, as described in

more detail below. The FDIC also will

adjust the calculation of the loss

severity measure to remove the double

counting by removing the applicable

portions of the CECL transitional

amounts added to retained earnings for

regulatory capital purposes and

attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases held for

investment for large or highly complex

banks.

While the FDIC recognizes that by the

April 1, 2021, effective date for this final

rule, numerous large or highly complex

banks will have implemented CECL and

many will have elected the transition

provided under either the 2019 CECL

rule or 2020 CECL rule, the FDIC is not

making adjustments to prior quarterly

assessments.

1. Credit Quality Measure

The score for the credit quality

measure, applicable to both large banks

and highly complex banks, is the greater

of (1) the ratio of criticized and

classified items to Tier 1 capital and

reserves score or (2) the ratio of

underperforming assets to Tier 1 capital

and reserves score.33 The double

counting results in lower ratios and a

credit quality measure that reflects less

risk than a bank actually poses to the

DIF

y

measure, applicable to both large banks

and highly complex banks, is the greater

of (1) the ratio of criticized and

classified items to Tier 1 capital and

reserves score or (2) the ratio of

underperforming assets to Tier 1 capital

and reserves score.33 The double

counting results in lower ratios and a

credit quality measure that reflects less

risk than a bank actually poses to the

DIF. Under the final rule, the FDIC is

adjusting the denominator, Tier 1

capital and reserves, used in both ratios

by removing the applicable portions of

the CECL transitional amounts added to

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes and attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment.

2. Concentration Measure

For large banks, the concentration

measure is the higher of (1) the ratio of

higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and

reserves or (2) the growth-adjusted

portfolio concentration measure. The

growth-adjusted portfolio concentration

measure includes the ratio of

concentration levels for several loan

portfolios to Tier 1 capital and reserves.

For highly complex banks, the

concentration measure is the highest of

three measures: (1) The ratio of higher-

risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves,

(2) the ratio of top 20 counterparty

exposures to Tier 1 capital and reserves,

or (3) the ratio of the largest

counterparty exposure to Tier 1 capital

and reserves.34

The double counting results in lower

ratios and a concentration measure that

reflects less risk than a bank actually

poses to the DIF. Under the final rule,

the FDIC is adjusting the denominator,

Tier 1 capital and reserves, used in each

of these ratios by removing the

applicable portions of the CECL

transitional amounts added to retained

earnings for regulatory capital purposes

and attributable to the allowance for

credit losses on loans and leases held

for investment.

3

ess risk than a bank actually

poses to the DIF. Under the final rule,

the FDIC is adjusting the denominator,

Tier 1 capital and reserves, used in each

of these ratios by removing the

applicable portions of the CECL

transitional amounts added to retained

earnings for regulatory capital purposes

and attributable to the allowance for

credit losses on loans and leases held

for investment.

3. Loss Severity Measure

The loss severity measure estimates

the relative magnitude of potential

losses to the DIF in the event of an IDI’s

failure.35 In calculating this measure,

the FDIC applies a standardized set of

assumptions based on historical failures

regarding liability runoffs and the

recovery value of asset categories to

simulate possible losses to the FDIC,

reducing capital and assets until the

Tier 1 leverage ratio declines to 2

percent. The double counting results in

a greater reduction of assets during the

capital reduction phase and therefore a

lower resolution value of assets at the

time of failure, which in turn results in

a higher loss severity measure that

reflects more risk than a bank actually

poses to the DIF. Under the final rule,

the FDIC is adjusting the calculation of

the capital adjustment in the loss

severity measure to remove the double

counting of the applicable portion of the

CECL transitional amounts added to

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes and attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment for both large

banks and highly complex banks.36

C. Other Conforming Amendments to

the Assessment Regulations

Under the final rule, the FDIC is

making conforming amendments to the

FDIC’s assessment regulations to

effectuate the adjustments described

above and consistent with the proposed

rule. These conforming amendments

ensure that the adjustments to the

financial measures used to calculate a

large or highly complex bank’s

assessment rate are properly

incorporated into the assessment

regulations.

D

the final rule, the FDIC is

making conforming amendments to the

FDIC’s assessment regulations to

effectuate the adjustments described

above and consistent with the proposed

rule. These conforming amendments

ensure that the adjustments to the

financial measures used to calculate a

large or highly complex bank’s

assessment rate are properly

incorporated into the assessment

regulations.

D. Regulatory Reporting Changes

A bank electing a transition under

either the 2019 CECL rule or the 2020

CECL rule must indicate its election to

use the 3-year 2019 or the 5-year 2020

CECL transition provision in Call Report

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37 See 84 FR 4227 and 85 FR 17726.

38 85 FR 82580 (Dec. 18, 2020).

Schedule RC–R, Part I, item 2.a. In

addition, such an electing bank must

report the applicable portions of the

transitional amounts under the 2019

CECL rule or the 2020 CECL rule in the

affected Call Report items during the

transition period. For example, an

electing bank would add the applicable

portion of the CECL transitional amount

(or the modified CECL transitional

amount) when calculating the amount of

retained earnings it would report in

Schedule RC–R, Part I, item 2, of the

Call Report.37

In calculating certain measures used

in the scorecard approach for

determining deposit insurance

assessments for large or highly complex

banks, under the final rule the FDIC will

remove a specified portion of the CECL

transitional amounts added to retained

earnings under the transitions provided

for under the 2020 and 2019 CECL rules

Schedule RC–R, Part I, item 2, of the

Call Report.37

In calculating certain measures used

in the scorecard approach for

determining deposit insurance

assessments for large or highly complex

banks, under the final rule the FDIC will

remove a specified portion of the CECL

transitional amounts added to retained

earnings under the transitions provided

for under the 2020 and 2019 CECL rules.

Specifically, in certain measures used in

the scorecard approach for determining

assessments for large or highly complex

banks, the FDIC will remove the

applicable portion of the CECL

transitional amount (or modified CECL

transitional amount) added to retained

earnings for regulatory capital purposes

(Call Report Schedule RC–R, Part I, Item

2), attributable to the allowance for

credits losses on loans and leases held

for investment and included in the

amount reported on the Call Report

balance sheet in Schedule RC, item 4.c.

However, large or highly complex

banks that have elected a CECL

transition provision do not currently

report these specific portions of the

CECL transitional amounts in the Call

Report. Thus, implementing the

finalized amendments to the risk-based

deposit insurance assessment system

applicable to large or highly complex

banks requires temporary changes to the

reporting requirements applicable to the

Call Report and its related instructions.

These reporting changes have been

proposed and are being effectuated in

coordination with the other member

entities of the FFIEC.38 As previously

described, changes to reporting

requirements for large or highly

complex banks pursuant to this final

rule will be required only while the

temporary relief is reflected in banks’

regulatory reports.

E

Call Report and its related instructions.

These reporting changes have been

proposed and are being effectuated in

coordination with the other member

entities of the FFIEC.38 As previously

described, changes to reporting

requirements for large or highly

complex banks pursuant to this final

rule will be required only while the

temporary relief is reflected in banks’

regulatory reports.

E. Expected Effects

The final rule removes the applicable

portions of the CECL transitional

amounts added to retained earnings for

regulatory capital purposes and

attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases held for

investment from certain financial

measures used in the scorecards that

determine deposit insurance assessment

rates for large or highly complex banks.

Absent the final rule, this amount

would be temporarily double counted

and could result in a deposit insurance

assessment rate for a large or highly

complex bank that does not accurately

reflect the bank’s risk to the DIF, all else

equal. Furthermore, the double counting

could result in inequitable deposit

insurance assessments, as a large or

highly complex bank that has not yet

implemented CECL or that does not

utilize a transition provision could pay

a higher or lower assessment rate than

a bank that has implemented CECL and

utilizes a transition provision, even if

both banks pose equal risk to the DIF.

The FDIC estimates that the majority of

large or highly complex banks affected

by the double counting are currently

paying a lower rate than they would

absent the final rule. However, the FDIC

also estimates that a few banks are

currently paying a higher rate than they

otherwise would pay if the issue of

double counting is corrected

ovision, even if

both banks pose equal risk to the DIF.

The FDIC estimates that the majority of

large or highly complex banks affected

by the double counting are currently

paying a lower rate than they would

absent the final rule. However, the FDIC

also estimates that a few banks are

currently paying a higher rate than they

otherwise would pay if the issue of

double counting is corrected. The FDIC

estimates that the rate these latter banks

are paying is higher by only a de

minimis amount, and occurs where the

double counting on the loss severity

measure more than offsets the effect of

double counting on the other scorecard

measures that are calculated using the

sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.

Based on FDIC data as of September

30, 2020, the FDIC estimates that this

double counting could result in

approximately $55 million in annual

foregone assessment revenue, or 0.047

percent of the DIF balance as of that

date. This estimate includes the

majority of large or highly complex

banks that are paying a lower rate due

to the double counting and the few

banks that are paying a higher rate

absent correction of double counting.

The FDIC expects that absent this final

rule, the estimated amount of foregone

assessment revenue would increase as

additional large or highly complex

banks adopt CECL, to the extent those

large or highly complex banks elect to

apply a transition. Absent the final rule,

the FDIC expects that this amount of

foregone assessment revenue also may

increase as large or highly complex

banks electing the 2020 CECL rule

include in their modified CECL

transitional amounts an estimate of

CECL’s effect on regulatory capital,

relative to the incurred loss

methodology’s effect on regulatory

capital, during the first two years of

CECL adoption. As of September 30,

2020, the FDIC estimates that 109 of 139

large or highly complex banks had

implemented CECL, and that 94 had

elected a transition provided under

either the 2019 CECL rule or the 2020

CECL rule

ounts an estimate of

CECL’s effect on regulatory capital,

relative to the incurred loss

methodology’s effect on regulatory

capital, during the first two years of

CECL adoption. As of September 30,

2020, the FDIC estimates that 109 of 139

large or highly complex banks had

implemented CECL, and that 94 had

elected a transition provided under

either the 2019 CECL rule or the 2020

CECL rule. As banks phase out the

transitional amounts over time, the

assessment effect also will decline. As

described previously, the optional

temporary relief from CECL afforded by

the CARES Act and as extended by the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,

and the transitions provided for under

the 2019 CECL rule and 2020 CECL rule,

provide that all banks will have

completely reflected in regulatory

capital the day-one effects of CECL

(plus, if applicable, an estimate of

CECL’s effect on regulatory capital,

relative to the incurred loss

methodology’s effect on regulatory

capital, during the first two years of

CECL adoption) by December 31, 2026,

thereby eliminating the double counting

effects from the scorecard for large or

highly complex banks. These above

estimates are subject to uncertainty

given differing CECL implementation

dates and the option for large or highly

complex banks to choose between the

transitions offered under the 2019 CECL

rule or the 2020 CECL rule, or to

recognize the full impact of CECL on

regulatory capital upon implementation.

The final rule could pose some

additional regulatory costs for large or

highly complex banks that elect a

transition under either the 2019 CECL

rule or the 2020 CECL rule associated

with changes to internal systems or

processes, or changes to reporting

requirements

he 2019 CECL

rule or the 2020 CECL rule, or to

recognize the full impact of CECL on

regulatory capital upon implementation.

The final rule could pose some

additional regulatory costs for large or

highly complex banks that elect a

transition under either the 2019 CECL

rule or the 2020 CECL rule associated

with changes to internal systems or

processes, or changes to reporting

requirements. It is the FDIC’s

understanding that banks already

calculate, for internal purposes, the

portion of the CECL transitional amount

(or modified CECL transitional amount)

added to retained earnings for

regulatory capital purposes that is

attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases held for

investment. As such, the FDIC

anticipates that the addition of this

temporary item to the Call Report would

not impose significant additional

burden and any additional costs are

likely to be de minimis.

IV. Effective Date of the Final Rule

The FDIC is issuing this final rule

with an effective date of April 1, 2021,

and applicable to the second quarterly

assessment period of 2021 (i.e., April 1–

June 30, 2021). Based on this effective

date, the temporary effects of the double

counting of the applicable portions of

the CECL transitional amounts in select

financial measures used in the scorecard

approach for determining assessments

for large or highly complex banks will

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June 30, 2021). Based on this effective

date, the temporary effects of the double

counting of the applicable portions of

the CECL transitional amounts in select

financial measures used in the scorecard

approach for determining assessments

for large or highly complex banks will

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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

39 5 U.S.C. 553.

40 5 U.S.C. 553(d).

41 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

42 The SBA defines a small banking organization

as having $600 million or less in assets, where an

organization’s ‘‘assets are determined by averaging

the assets reported on its four quarterly financial

statements for the preceding year.’’ See 13 CFR

121.201 (as amended, effective August 19, 2019). In

its determination, the SBA ‘‘counts the receipts,

employees, or other measure of size of the concern

whose size is at issue and all of its domestic and

foreign affiliates.’’ 13 CFR 121.103. Following these

regulations, the FDIC uses a covered entity’s

affiliated and acquired assets, averaged over the

preceding four quarters, to determine whether the

covered entity is ‘‘small’’ for the purposes of RFA.

43 5 U.S.C. 601.

44 FDIC Call Report data, September 30, 2020.

45 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).

45 U.S.C. 553(d).

45 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

45 U.S.C. 801 et seq.

45 U.S.C. 801(a)(3).

45 U.S.C. 804(2).

45 U.S.C. 808(2).

45 12 U.S.C. 4802(a).

45 12 U.S.C. 4802(b).

46 4 U.S.C. 3501–3521.

47 85 FR 82580 (Dec. 18, 2020).

48 12 U.S.C. 4809.

be corrected beginning with the second

quarterly assessment period of 2021.

V. Administrative Law Matters

A

tember 30, 2020.

45 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).

45 U.S.C. 553(d).

45 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

45 U.S.C. 801 et seq.

45 U.S.C. 801(a)(3).

45 U.S.C. 804(2).

45 U.S.C. 808(2).

45 12 U.S.C. 4802(a).

45 12 U.S.C. 4802(b).

46 4 U.S.C. 3501–3521.

47 85 FR 82580 (Dec. 18, 2020).

48 12 U.S.C. 4809.

be corrected beginning with the second

quarterly assessment period of 2021.

V. Administrative Law Matters

A. Administrative Procedure Act

Under the Administrative Procedure

Act (APA),39 ‘‘[t]he required publication

or service of a substantive rule shall be

made not less than 30 days before its

effective date, except as otherwise

provided by the agency for good cause

found and published with the rule.’’ 40

An effective date of April 1, 2021

would mean that the temporary effects

of the double counting of the applicable

portions of the CECL transitional

amounts in select financial measures

used in the scorecard approach for

determining assessments for large or

highly complex banks are corrected,

beginning with the second quarterly

assessment period of 2021 (i.e., April 1–

June 30, 2021), with a payment due date

of September 30, 2021.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),

5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., generally requires

an agency, in connection with a final

rule, to prepare and make available for

public comment a final regulatory

flexibility analysis that describes the

impact of a final rule on small entities.41

However, a regulatory flexibility

analysis is not required if the agency

certifies that the rule will not have a

significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.

The U.S

s

an agency, in connection with a final

rule, to prepare and make available for

public comment a final regulatory

flexibility analysis that describes the

impact of a final rule on small entities.41

However, a regulatory flexibility

analysis is not required if the agency

certifies that the rule will not have a

significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.

The U.S. Small Business Administration

(SBA) has defined ‘‘small entities’’ to

include banking organizations with total

assets of less than or equal to $600

million.42 Certain types of rules, such as

rules of particular applicability relating

to rates, corporate or financial

structures, or practices relating to such

rates or structures, are expressly

excluded from the definition of ‘‘rule’’

for purposes of the RFA.43 Because the

final rule relates directly to the rates

imposed on IDIs for deposit insurance

and to the deposit insurance assessment

system that measures risk and

determines each bank’s assessment rate,

the final rule is not subject to the RFA.

Nonetheless, the FDIC is voluntarily

presenting information in this RFA

section.

Based on Call Report data as of

September 30, 2020, the FDIC insures

5,042 depository institutions, of which

3,585 are defined as small entities by

the terms of the RFA.44 The final rule,

however, only applies to institutions

with $10 billion or greater in total

assets. Consequently, small entities for

purposes of the RFA will experience no

economic impact as a result of the

implementation of this final rule.

C

as of

September 30, 2020, the FDIC insures

5,042 depository institutions, of which

3,585 are defined as small entities by

the terms of the RFA.44 The final rule,

however, only applies to institutions

with $10 billion or greater in total

assets. Consequently, small entities for

purposes of the RFA will experience no

economic impact as a result of the

implementation of this final rule.

C. Riegle Community Development and

Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994

Section 302(a) of the Riegle

Community Development and

Regulatory Improvement Act (RCDRIA)

requires that the Federal banking

agencies, including the FDIC, in

determining the effective date and

administrative compliance requirements

of new regulations that impose

additional reporting, disclosure, or other

requirements on IDIs, consider,

consistent with principles of safety and

soundness and the public interest, any

administrative burdens that such

regulations would place on depository

institutions, including small depository

institutions, and customers of

depository institutions, as well as the

benefits of such regulations. In addition,

section 302(b) of RCDRIA requires new

regulations and amendments to

regulations that impose additional

reporting, disclosures, or other new

requirements on IDIs generally to take

effect on the first day of a calendar

quarter that begins on or after the date

on which the regulations are published

in final form, with certain exceptions,

including for good cause.45

The amendments to the FDIC’s

deposit insurance assessment

regulations under this final rule do

impose additional reporting,

disclosures, or other new requirements.

As discussed above, the FDIC is making

temporary changes to the FFIEC 031 and

FFIEC 041 Call Report forms and

instructions to implement the

amendments to the assessment system

to remove the double counting under

the final rule. These changes are being

effectuated in coordination with the

other member entities of the FFIEC

pose additional reporting,

disclosures, or other new requirements.

As discussed above, the FDIC is making

temporary changes to the FFIEC 031 and

FFIEC 041 Call Report forms and

instructions to implement the

amendments to the assessment system

to remove the double counting under

the final rule. These changes are being

effectuated in coordination with the

other member entities of the FFIEC. As

such, the FDIC considered the

requirements of the RCDRIA and are

finalizing this rule with an effective date

of April 1, 2021. The FDIC invited

comments regarding the application of

RCDRIA to the final rule, but did not

receive comments on this topic.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

(PRA) states that no agency may

conduct or sponsor, nor is the

respondent required to respond to, an

information collection unless it displays

a currently valid Office of Management

and Budget (OMB) control number.46

The FDIC’s OMB control numbers for its

assessment regulations are 3064–0057,

3064–0151, and 3064–0179. The final

rule does not revise any of these existing

assessment information collections

pursuant to the PRA and consequently,

no submissions in connection with

these OMB control numbers will be

made to the OMB for review. However,

the final rule affects the agencies’

current information collections for the

Call Report (FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041,

but not FFIEC 051). The agencies’ OMB

control numbers for the Call Reports are:

OCC OMB No. 1557–0081; Board OMB

No. 7100–0036; and FDIC OMB No.

3064–0052. The changes to the Call

Report forms and instructions have been

addressed in a separate Federal Register

notice or notices.47

E. Plain Language

Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-

Bliley Act 48 requires the Federal

banking agencies to use plain language

in all proposed and final rulemakings

published in the Federal Register after

January 1, 2000. The FDIC invited

comment regarding the use of plain

language, but did not receive any

comments on this topic.

E

essed in a separate Federal Register

notice or notices.47

E. Plain Language

Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-

Bliley Act 48 requires the Federal

banking agencies to use plain language

in all proposed and final rulemakings

published in the Federal Register after

January 1, 2000. The FDIC invited

comment regarding the use of plain

language, but did not receive any

comments on this topic.

E. The Congressional Review Act

For purposes of Congressional Review

Act, the OMB makes a determination as

to whether a final rule constitutes a

‘‘major’’ rule. The OMB has determined

that the final rule is not a major rule for

purposes of the Congressional Review

Act.

If a rule is deemed a ‘‘major rule’’ by

the OMB, the Congressional Review Act

generally provides that the rule may not

take effect until at least 60 days

following its publication. The

Congressional Review Act defines a

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‘‘major rule’’ as any rule that the

Administrator of the Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs of

the OMB finds has resulted in or is

likely to result in—(A) an annual effect

on the economy of $100,000,000 or

more; (B) a major increase in costs or

prices for consumers, individual

industries, Federal, State, or Local

government agencies or geographic

regions, or (C) significant adverse effects

on competition, employment,

investment, productivity, innovation, or

on the ability of United States-based

enterprises to compete with foreign-

based enterprises in domestic and

export markets. As required by the

Congressional Review Act, the FDIC

will submit the final rule and other

appropriate reports to Congress and the

Government Accountability Office for

review.

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 327

Bank deposit insurance, Banks,

Banking, Savings associations

bility of United States-based

enterprises to compete with foreign-

based enterprises in domestic and

export markets. As required by the

Congressional Review Act, the FDIC

will submit the final rule and other

appropriate reports to Congress and the

Government Accountability Office for

review.

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 327

Bank deposit insurance, Banks,

Banking, Savings associations.

Authority and Issuance

For the reasons stated in the

preamble, the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation amends 12 CFR part 327 as

follows:

PART 327—ASSESSMENTS

■1. The authority citation for part 327

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1813, 1815, 1817–19,

1821.

■2. In Appendix A to Subpart A, revise

the table under the heading, ‘‘VI.

Description of Scorecard Measures’’ to

read as follows:

Appendix A to Subpart A of Part 327—

Method To Derive Pricing Multipliers

and Uniform Amount

*

*

*

*

*

VI. Description of Scorecard Measures

Scorecard

measures 1

Description

Leverage Ratio .....................

Tier 1 capital for Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) divided by adjusted average assets based on the definition for

prompt corrective action.

Concentration Measure for

Large Insured depository

institutions (excluding

Highly Complex Institu-

tions).

The concentration score for large institutions is the higher of the following two scores:

(1) Higher-Risk Assets/

Tier 1 Capital and Re-

serves 2.

Sum of construction and land development (C&D) loans (funded and unfunded), higher-risk C&I loans (funded

and unfunded), nontraditional mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk securitizations divided by

Tier 1 capital and reserves. See Appendix C for the detailed description of the ratio.

(2) Growth-Adjusted

Portfolio Concentra-

tions 2.

The measure is calculated in the following steps:

nstruction and land development (C&D) loans (funded and unfunded), higher-risk C&I loans (funded

and unfunded), nontraditional mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk securitizations divided by

Tier 1 capital and reserves. See Appendix C for the detailed description of the ratio.

(2) Growth-Adjusted

Portfolio Concentra-

tions 2.

The measure is calculated in the following steps:

(1) Concentration levels (as a ratio to Tier 1 capital and reserves) are calculated for each broad portfolio cat-

egory:

• C&D,

• Other commercial real estate loans,

• First lien residential mortgages (including non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities),

• Closed-end junior liens and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs),

• Commercial and industrial loans,

• Credit card loans, and

• Other consumer loans.

(2) Risk weights are assigned to each loan category based on historical loss rates.

(3) Concentration levels are multiplied by risk weights and squared to produce a risk-adjusted concentration

ratio for each portfolio.

(4) Three-year merger-adjusted portfolio growth rates are then scaled to a growth factor of 1 to 1.2 where a

3-year cumulative growth rate of 20 percent or less equals a factor of 1 and a growth rate of 80 percent or

greater equals a factor of 1.2. If three years of data are not available, a growth factor of 1 will be assigned.

(5) The risk-adjusted concentration ratio for each portfolio is multiplied by the growth factor and resulting val-

ues are summed.

See Appendix C for the detailed description of the measure.

Concentration Measure for

Highly Complex Institu-

tions.

Concentration score for highly complex institutions is the highest of the following three scores:

available, a growth factor of 1 will be assigned.

(5) The risk-adjusted concentration ratio for each portfolio is multiplied by the growth factor and resulting val-

ues are summed.

See Appendix C for the detailed description of the measure.

Concentration Measure for

Highly Complex Institu-

tions.

Concentration score for highly complex institutions is the highest of the following three scores:

(1) Higher-Risk Assets/

Tier 1 Capital and Re-

serves 2.

Sum of C&D loans (funded and unfunded), higher-risk C&I loans (funded and unfunded), nontraditional mort-

gages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk securitizations divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. See

Appendix C for the detailed description of the measure.

(2) Top 20 Counterparty

Exposure/Tier 1 Cap-

ital and Reserves 2.

Sum of the 20 largest total exposure amounts to counterparties divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. The total

exposure amount is equal to the sum of the institution’s exposure amounts to one counterparty (or borrower)

for derivatives, securities financing transactions (SFTs), and cleared transactions, and its gross lending expo-

sure (including all unfunded commitments) to that counterparty (or borrower). A counterparty includes an enti-

ty’s own affiliates. Exposures to entities that are affiliates of each other are treated as exposures to one

counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure excludes all counterparty exposure to the U.S. Government

and departments or agencies of the U.S. Government that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full faith and

credit of the United States. The exposure amount for derivatives, including OTC derivatives, cleared trans-

actions that are derivative contracts, and netting sets of derivative contracts, must be calculated using the

methodology set forth in 12 CFR 324.34(b), but without any reduction for collateral other than cash collateral

that is all or part of variation margin and that satisfies the requirements of 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii) and

for derivatives, including OTC derivatives, cleared trans-

actions that are derivative contracts, and netting sets of derivative contracts, must be calculated using the

methodology set forth in 12 CFR 324.34(b), but without any reduction for collateral other than cash collateral

that is all or part of variation margin and that satisfies the requirements of 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii) and

(iii) and 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7). The exposure amount associated with SFTs, including cleared trans-

actions that are SFTs, must be calculated using the standardized approach set forth in 12 CFR 324.37(b) or

(c). For both derivatives and SFT exposures, the exposure amount to central counterparties must also include

the default fund contribution.3

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Scorecard

measures 1

Description

(3) Largest Counterparty

Exposure/Tier 1 Cap-

ital and Reserves 2.

The largest total exposure amount to one counterparty divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. The total exposure

amount is equal to the sum of the institution’s exposure amounts to one counterparty (or borrower) for deriva-

tives, SFTs, and cleared transactions, and its gross lending exposure (including all unfunded commitments) to

that counterparty (or borrower). A counterparty includes an entity’s own affiliates. Exposures to entities that are

affiliates of each other are treated as exposures to one counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure ex-

cludes all counterparty exposure to the U.S. Government and departments or agencies of the U.S. Government

that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States

r borrower). A counterparty includes an entity’s own affiliates. Exposures to entities that are

affiliates of each other are treated as exposures to one counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure ex-

cludes all counterparty exposure to the U.S. Government and departments or agencies of the U.S. Government

that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States. The exposure amount for de-

rivatives, including OTC derivatives, cleared transactions that are derivative contracts, and netting sets of deriv-

ative contracts, must be calculated using the methodology set forth in 12 CFR 324.34(b), but without any re-

duction for collateral other than cash collateral that is all or part of variation margin and that satisfies the re-

quirements of 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii) and (iii) and 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7). The exposure

amount associated with SFTs, including cleared transactions that are SFTs, must be calculated using the

standardized approach set forth in 12 CFR 324.37(b) or (c). For both derivatives and SFT exposures, the expo-

sure amount to central counterparties must also include the default fund contribution.3

Core Earnings/Average

Quarter-End Total Assets.

Core earnings are defined as net income less extraordinary items and tax-adjusted realized gains and losses on

available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity (HTM) securities, adjusted for mergers. The ratio takes a four-

quarter sum of merger-adjusted core earnings and divides it by an average of five quarter-end total assets

(most recent and four prior quarters). If four quarters of data on core earnings are not available, data for quar-

ters that are available will be added and annualized. If five quarters of data on total assets are not available,

data for quarters that are available will be averaged.

Credit Quality Measure ........

The credit quality score is the higher of the following two scores:

total assets

(most recent and four prior quarters). If four quarters of data on core earnings are not available, data for quar-

ters that are available will be added and annualized. If five quarters of data on total assets are not available,

data for quarters that are available will be averaged.

Credit Quality Measure ........

The credit quality score is the higher of the following two scores:

(1) Criticized and Classi-

fied Items/Tier 1 Cap-

ital and Reserves 2.

Sum of criticized and classified items divided by the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves. Criticized and classified

items include items an institution or its primary federal regulator have graded ‘‘Special Mention’’ or worse and

include retail items under Uniform Retail Classification Guidelines, securities, funded and unfunded loans, other

real estate owned (ORE), other assets, and marked-to-market counterparty positions, less credit valuation ad-

justments.4 Criticized and classified items exclude loans and securities in trading books, and the amount recov-

erable from the U.S. government, its agencies, or government-sponsored enterprises, under guarantee or in-

surance provisions.

(2) Underperforming As-

sets/Tier 1 Capital

and Reserves 2.

Sum of loans that are 30 days or more past due and still accruing interest, nonaccrual loans, restructured loans

(including restructured 1–4 family loans), and ORE, excluding the maximum amount recoverable from the U.S.

government, its agencies, or government-sponsored enterprises, under guarantee or insurance provisions, di-

vided by a sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.

Core Deposits/Total Liabil-

ities.

Total domestic deposits excluding brokered deposits and uninsured non-brokered time deposits divided by total li-

abilities.

Balance Sheet Liquidity

Ratio

luding the maximum amount recoverable from the U.S.

government, its agencies, or government-sponsored enterprises, under guarantee or insurance provisions, di-

vided by a sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.

Core Deposits/Total Liabil-

ities.

Total domestic deposits excluding brokered deposits and uninsured non-brokered time deposits divided by total li-

abilities.

Balance Sheet Liquidity

Ratio.

Sum of cash and balances due from depository institutions, federal funds sold and securities purchased under

agreements to resell, and the market value of available for sale and held to maturity agency securities (ex-

cludes agency mortgage-backed securities but includes all other agency securities issued by the U.S. Treasury,

U.S. government agencies, and U.S. government-sponsored enterprises) divided by the sum of federal funds

purchased and repurchase agreements, other borrowings (including FHLB) with a remaining maturity of one

year or less, 5 percent of insured domestic deposits, and 10 percent of uninsured domestic and foreign depos-

its.5

Potential Losses/Total Do-

mestic Deposits (Loss Se-

verity Measure) 6.

Potential losses to the DIF in the event of failure divided by total domestic deposits. Appendix D describes the

calculation of the loss severity measure in detail.

Market Risk Measure for

Highly Complex Institu-

tions.

The market risk score is a weighted average of the following three scores:

(1) Trading Revenue

Volatility/Tier 1 Capital.

Trailing 4-quarter standard deviation of quarterly trading revenue (merger-adjusted) divided by Tier 1 capital.

(2) Market Risk Capital/

Tier 1 Capital.

Market risk capital divided by Tier 1 capital.7

sure in detail.

Market Risk Measure for

Highly Complex Institu-

tions.

The market risk score is a weighted average of the following three scores:

(1) Trading Revenue

Volatility/Tier 1 Capital.

Trailing 4-quarter standard deviation of quarterly trading revenue (merger-adjusted) divided by Tier 1 capital.

(2) Market Risk Capital/

Tier 1 Capital.

Market risk capital divided by Tier 1 capital.7

(3) Level 3 Trading As-

sets/Tier 1 Capital.

Level 3 trading assets divided by Tier 1 capital.

Average Short-term Funding/

Average Total Assets.

Quarterly average of federal funds purchased and repurchase agreements divided by the quarterly average of

total assets as reported on Schedule RC–K of the Call Reports.

1 The FDIC retains the flexibility, as part of the risk-based assessment system, without the necessity of additional notice-and-comment rule-

making, to update the minimum and maximum cutoff values for all measures used in the scorecard. The FDIC may update the minimum and

maximum cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio in order to maintain an approximately similar distribution of

higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio scores as reported prior to April 1, 2013, or to avoid changing the overall amount of as-

sessment revenue collected. 76 FR 10672, 10700 (February 25, 2011). The FDIC will review changes in the distribution of the higher-risk assets

to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio scores and the resulting effect on total assessments and risk differentiation between banks when determining

changes to the cutoffs. The FDIC may update the cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio more frequently than

annually. The FDIC will provide banks with a minimum one quarter advance notice of changes in the cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to

Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio with their quarterly deposit insurance invoice

ween banks when determining

changes to the cutoffs. The FDIC may update the cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio more frequently than

annually. The FDIC will provide banks with a minimum one quarter advance notice of changes in the cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to

Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio with their quarterly deposit insurance invoice.

2 The applicable portions of the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital

regulations, as they may be amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and

84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.

3 SFTs include repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, security lending and borrowing, and margin lending transactions,

where the value of the transactions depends on market valuations and the transactions are often subject to margin agreements. The default fund

contribution is the funds contributed or commitments made by a clearing member to a central counterparty’s mutualized loss sharing arrange-

ment. The other terms used in this description are as defined in 12 CFR part 324, subparts A and D, unless defined otherwise in 12 CFR part

327.

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ntribution is the funds contributed or commitments made by a clearing member to a central counterparty’s mutualized loss sharing arrange-

ment. The other terms used in this description are as defined in 12 CFR part 324, subparts A and D, unless defined otherwise in 12 CFR part

327.

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4 A marked-to-market counterparty position is equal to the sum of the net marked-to-market derivative exposures for each counterparty. The

net marked-to-market derivative exposure equals the sum of all positive marked-to-market exposures net of legally enforceable netting provisions

and net of all collateral held under a legally enforceable CSA plus any exposure where excess collateral has been posted to the counterparty.

For purposes of the Criticized and Classified Items/Tier 1 Capital and Reserves definition a marked-to-market counterparty position less any

credit valuation adjustment can never be less than zero.

5 Deposit runoff rates for the balance sheet liquidity ratio reflect changes issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its Decem-

ber 2010 document, ‘‘Basel III: International Framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards, and monitoring,’’ http://www.bis.org/publ/

bcbs188.pdf.

6 The applicable portions of the CECL transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for invest-

ment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes will be removed from the calculation of the loss severity measure.

7 Market risk is defined in 12 CFR 324.202.

*

*

*

*

*

■3. Amend Appendix C to Subpart A

by:

■a. Redesignating footnotes 2 through

16 as footnotes 3 through 17; and

■b. Revising the paragraph under the

heading, ‘‘I

es on loans and leases held for invest-

ment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes will be removed from the calculation of the loss severity measure.

7 Market risk is defined in 12 CFR 324.202.

*

*

*

*

*

■3. Amend Appendix C to Subpart A

by:

■a. Redesignating footnotes 2 through

16 as footnotes 3 through 17; and

■b. Revising the paragraph under the

heading, ‘‘I. Concentration Measures,’’

to read as follows:

Appendix C to Subpart A of Part 327—

Description of Concentration Measures

I. Concentration Measures

The concentration score for large banks is

the higher of the higher-risk assets to Tier 1

capital and reserves score or the growth-

adjusted portfolio concentrations score.1 The

concentration score for highly complex

institutions is the highest of the higher-risk

assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves score, the

Top 20 counterparty exposure to Tier 1

capital and reserves score, or the largest

counterparty to Tier 1 capital and reserves

score.2 The higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital

and reserves ratio and the growth-adjusted

portfolio concentration measure are

described herein.

1 For the purposes of this Appendix, the

term ‘‘bank’’ means insured depository

institution.

2 As described in Appendix A to this

subpart, the applicable portions of the

current expected credit loss methodology

(CECL) transitional amounts attributable to

the allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment and added to

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital

regulations, as they may be amended from

time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217,

12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30,

2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb

credit loss methodology

(CECL) transitional amounts attributable to

the allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment and added to

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital

regulations, as they may be amended from

time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217,

12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30,

2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will

be removed from the sum of Tier 1 capital

and reserves throughout the large bank and

highly complex bank scorecards, including in

the ratio of Higher-Risk Assets to Tier 1

Capital and Reserves, the Growth-Adjusted

Portfolio Concentrations Measure, the ratio of

Top 20 Counterparty Exposure to Tier 1

Capital and Reserves, and the Ratio of Largest

Counterparty Exposure to Tier 1 Capital and

Reserves.

*

*

*

*

*

■4. In Appendix D to Subpart A, revise

the introductory text to read as follows:

Appendix D to Subpart A of Part 327—

Description of the Loss Severity

Measure

The loss severity measure applies a

standardized set of assumptions to an

institution’s balance sheet to measure

possible losses to the FDIC in the event of an

institution’s failure. To determine an

institution’s loss severity rate, the FDIC first

applies assumptions about uninsured deposit

and other unsecured liability runoff, and

growth in insured deposits, to adjust the size

and composition of the institution’s

liabilities. Assets are then reduced to match

any reduction in liabilities.1 The institution’s

asset values are then further reduced so that

the Leverage ratio reaches 2 percent.2 3 In

both cases, assets are adjusted pro rata to

preserve the institution’s asset composition.

Assumptions regarding loss rates at failure

for a given asset category and the extent of

secured liabilities are then applied to

estimated assets and liabilities at failure to

determine whether the institution has

enough unencumbered assets to cover

domestic deposits

ge ratio reaches 2 percent.2 3 In

both cases, assets are adjusted pro rata to

preserve the institution’s asset composition.

Assumptions regarding loss rates at failure

for a given asset category and the extent of

secured liabilities are then applied to

estimated assets and liabilities at failure to

determine whether the institution has

enough unencumbered assets to cover

domestic deposits. Any projected shortfall is

divided by current domestic deposits to

obtain an end-of-period loss severity ratio.

The loss severity measure is an average loss

severity ratio for the three most recent

quarters of data available.

1 In most cases, the model would yield

reductions in liabilities and assets prior to

failure. Exceptions may occur for institutions

primarily funded through insured deposits

which the model assumes to grow prior to

failure.

2 Of course, in reality, runoff and capital

declines occur more or less simultaneously

as an institution approaches failure. The loss

severity measure assumptions simplify this

process for ease of modeling.

3 The applicable portions of the current

expected credit loss methodology (CECL)

transitional amounts attributable to the

allowance for credit losses on loans and

leases held for investment and added to

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital

regulations, as they may be amended from

time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217,

12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30,

2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will

be removed from the calculation of the loss

severity measure.

*

*

*

*

*

■5. In Appendix E to subpart A, under

the heading ‘‘II

o

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital

regulations, as they may be amended from

time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217,

12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30,

2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will

be removed from the calculation of the loss

severity measure.

*

*

*

*

*

■5. In Appendix E to subpart A, under

the heading ‘‘II. Mitigating the

Assessment Effects of Paycheck

Protection Program Loans for Large or

Highly Complex Institutions’’, revise

Table E.2 and paragraph (a) to read as

follows:

TABLE E.2—EXCLUSIONS FROM CERTAIN RISK MEASURES USED TO CALCULATE THE ASSESSMENT RATE FOR LARGE OR

HIGHLY COMPLEX INSTITUTIONS

Scorecard

measures 1

Description

Exclusions

Leverage Ratio ......................

Tier 1 capital for Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) divided by adjusted average as-

sets based on the definition for prompt corrective action.

No Exclusion.

Concentration Measure for

Large Insured depository

institutions (excluding High-

ly Complex Institutions).

The concentration score for large institutions is the higher of the following two

scores:

(1) Higher-Risk Assets/

Tier 1 Capital and Re-

serves.

Sum of construction and land development (C&D) loans (funded and unfunded),

higher-risk commercial and industrial (C&I) loans (funded and unfunded), non-

traditional mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk securitizations

divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. See Appendix C for the detailed descrip-

tion of the ratio.

No Exclusion.

(2) Growth-Adjusted Port-

folio Concentrations.

The measure is calculated in the following steps:

(funded and unfunded),

higher-risk commercial and industrial (C&I) loans (funded and unfunded), non-

traditional mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk securitizations

divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. See Appendix C for the detailed descrip-

tion of the ratio.

No Exclusion.

(2) Growth-Adjusted Port-

folio Concentrations.

The measure is calculated in the following steps:

(1) Concentration levels (as a ratio to Tier 1 capital and reserves) are cal-

culated for each broad portfolio category:

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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

TABLE E.2—EXCLUSIONS FROM CERTAIN RISK MEASURES USED TO CALCULATE THE ASSESSMENT RATE FOR LARGE OR

HIGHLY COMPLEX INSTITUTIONS—Continued

Scorecard

measures 1

Description

Exclusions

• Constructions and land development (C&D),

• Other commercial real estate loans,

• First lien residential mortgages (including non-agency residential mort-

gage-backed securities),

• Closed-end junior liens and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs),

• Commercial and industrial loans (C&I),

• Credit card loans, and

• Other consumer loans.

(2) Risk weights are assigned to each loan category based on historical loss

rates.

(3) Concentration levels are multiplied by risk weights and squared to produce

a risk-adjusted concentration ratio for each portfolio.

(4) Three-year merger-adjusted portfolio growth rates are then scaled to a growth

factor of 1 to 1.2 where a 3-year cumulative growth rate of 20 percent or less

equals a factor of 1 and a growth rate of 80 percent or greater equals a factor

of 1.2. If three years of data are not available, a growth factor of 1 will be as-

signed.

Exclude from C&I loan

growth rate the out-

standing amount of loans

provided under the Pay-

check Protection Pro-

gram.

then scaled to a growth

factor of 1 to 1.2 where a 3-year cumulative growth rate of 20 percent or less

equals a factor of 1 and a growth rate of 80 percent or greater equals a factor

of 1.2. If three years of data are not available, a growth factor of 1 will be as-

signed.

Exclude from C&I loan

growth rate the out-

standing amount of loans

provided under the Pay-

check Protection Pro-

gram.

(5) The risk-adjusted concentration ratio for each portfolio is multiplied by the

growth factor and resulting values are summed.

See Appendix C for the detailed description of the measure.

Concentration Measure for

Highly Complex Institutions.

Concentration score for highly complex institutions is the highest of the following

three scores:

(1) Higher-Risk Assets/

Tier 1 Capital and Re-

serves.

Sum of C&D loans (funded and unfunded), higher-risk C&I loans (funded and un-

funded), nontraditional mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk

securitizations divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. See Appendix C for the

detailed description of the measure.

No Exclusion.

(2) Top 20 Counterparty

Exposure/Tier 1 Cap-

ital and Reserves.

Sum of the 20 largest total exposure amounts to counterparties divided by Tier 1

capital and reserves. The total exposure amount is equal to the sum of the insti-

tution’s exposure amounts to one counterparty (or borrower) for derivatives, se-

curities financing transactions (SFTs), and cleared transactions, and its gross

lending exposure (including all unfunded commitments) to that counterparty (or

borrower). A counterparty includes an entity’s own affiliates. Exposures to enti-

ties that are affiliates of each other are treated as exposures to one

counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure excludes all counterparty ex-

posure to the U.S. Government and departments or agencies of the U.S. Gov-

ernment that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the

United States

rrower). A counterparty includes an entity’s own affiliates. Exposures to enti-

ties that are affiliates of each other are treated as exposures to one

counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure excludes all counterparty ex-

posure to the U.S. Government and departments or agencies of the U.S. Gov-

ernment that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the

United States. The exposure amount for derivatives, including OTC derivatives,

cleared transactions that are derivative contracts, and netting sets of derivative

contracts, must be calculated using the methodology set forth in 12 CFR

324.34(b), but without any reduction for collateral other than cash collateral that

is all or part of variation margin and that satisfies the requirements of 12 CFR

324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii) and (iii) and 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7). The expo-

sure amount associated with SFTs, including cleared transactions that are

SFTs, must be calculated using the standardized approach set forth in 12 CFR

324.37(b) or (c). For both derivatives and SFT exposures, the exposure amount

to central counterparties must also include the default fund contribution.

No Exclusion.

(3) Largest Counterparty

Exposure/Tier 1 Cap-

ital and Reserves.

The largest total exposure amount to one counterparty divided by Tier 1 capital

and reserves. The total exposure amount is equal to the sum of the institution’s

exposure amounts to one counterparty (or borrower) for derivatives, SFTs, and

cleared transactions, and its gross lending exposure (including all unfunded

commitments) to that counterparty (or borrower). A counterparty includes an en-

tity’s own affiliates. Exposures to entities that are affiliates of each other are

treated as exposures to one counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure

excludes all counterparty exposure to the U.S. Government and departments or

agencies of the U.S. Government that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full

faith and credit of the United States

borrower). A counterparty includes an en-

tity’s own affiliates. Exposures to entities that are affiliates of each other are

treated as exposures to one counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure

excludes all counterparty exposure to the U.S. Government and departments or

agencies of the U.S. Government that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full

faith and credit of the United States. The exposure amount for derivatives, in-

cluding OTC derivatives, cleared transactions that are derivative contracts, and

netting sets of derivative contracts, must be calculated using the methodology

set forth in 12 CFR 324.34(b), but without any reduction for collateral other than

cash collateral that is all or part of variation margin and that satisfies the re-

quirements of 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii) and (iii) and 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3)

through (7). The exposure amount associated with SFTs, including cleared

transactions that are SFTs, must be calculated using the standardized approach

set forth in 12 CFR 324.37(b) or (c). For both derivatives and SFT exposures,

the exposure amount to central counterparties must also include the default

fund contribution.

No Exclusion.

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TABLE E.2—EXCLUSIONS FROM CERTAIN RISK MEASURES USED TO CALCULATE THE ASSESSMENT RATE FOR LARGE OR

HIGHLY COMPLEX INSTITUTIONS—Continued

Scorecard

measures 1

Description

Exclusions

Core Earnings/Average Quar-

ter-End Total Assets.

Core earnings are defined as net income less extraordinary items and tax-ad-

justed realized gains and losses on available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity

(HTM) securities, adjusted for mergers. The ratio takes a four-quarter sum of

merger-adjusted core earnings and divides it by an average of five quarter-end

total assets (most recent and four prior quarters)

ge Quar-

ter-End Total Assets.

Core earnings are defined as net income less extraordinary items and tax-ad-

justed realized gains and losses on available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity

(HTM) securities, adjusted for mergers. The ratio takes a four-quarter sum of

merger-adjusted core earnings and divides it by an average of five quarter-end

total assets (most recent and four prior quarters). If four quarters of data on

core earnings are not available, data for quarters that are available will be

added and annualized. If five quarters of data on total assets are not available,

data for quarters that are available will be averaged.

Prior to averaging, exclude

from total assets for the

applicable quarter-end

periods the outstanding

balance of loans provided

under the Paycheck Pro-

tection Program.

Credit Quality Measure. 2

The credit quality score is the higher of the following two scores:

(1) Criticized and Classi-

fied Items/Tier 1 Cap-

ital and Reserves.

Sum of criticized and classified items divided by the sum of Tier 1 capital and re-

serves. Criticized and classified items include items an institution or its primary

federal regulator have graded ‘‘Special Mention’’ or worse and include retail

items under Uniform Retail Classification Guidelines, securities, funded and un-

funded loans, other real estate owned (ORE), other assets, and marked-to-mar-

ket counterparty positions, less credit valuation adjustments. Criticized and clas-

sified items exclude loans and securities in trading books, and the amount re-

coverable from the U.S. government, its agencies, or government-sponsored

enterprises, under guarantee or insurance provisions.

No Exclusion.

funded and un-

funded loans, other real estate owned (ORE), other assets, and marked-to-mar-

ket counterparty positions, less credit valuation adjustments. Criticized and clas-

sified items exclude loans and securities in trading books, and the amount re-

coverable from the U.S. government, its agencies, or government-sponsored

enterprises, under guarantee or insurance provisions.

No Exclusion.

(2) Underperforming As-

sets/Tier 1 Capital and

Reserves.

Sum of loans that are 30 days or more past due and still accruing interest, non-

accrual loans, restructured loans (including restructured 1–4 family loans), and

ORE, excluding the maximum amount recoverable from the U.S. government,

its agencies, or government-sponsored enterprises, under guarantee or insur-

ance provisions, divided by a sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.

No Exclusion.

Core Deposits/Total Liabilities

Total domestic deposits excluding brokered deposits and uninsured non-brokered

time deposits divided by total liabilities.

Exclude from total liabilities

outstanding borrowings

from Federal Reserve

Banks under the Pay-

check Protection Pro-

gram Liquidity Facility

with a maturity of one

year or less and out-

standing borrowings from

the Federal Reserve

Banks under the Pay-

check Protection Pro-

gram Liquidity Facility

with a maturity of greater

than one year.

Balance Sheet Liquidity Ratio

Sum of cash and balances due from depository institutions, federal funds sold and

securities purchased under agreements to resell, and the market value of avail-

able for sale and held to maturity agency securities (excludes agency mortgage-

backed securities but includes all other agency securities issued by the U.S.

Treasury, U.S. government agencies, and U.S

.

Balance Sheet Liquidity Ratio

Sum of cash and balances due from depository institutions, federal funds sold and

securities purchased under agreements to resell, and the market value of avail-

able for sale and held to maturity agency securities (excludes agency mortgage-

backed securities but includes all other agency securities issued by the U.S.

Treasury, U.S. government agencies, and U.S. government sponsored enter-

prises) divided by the sum of federal funds purchased and repurchase agree-

ments, other borrowings (including FHLB) with a remaining maturity of one year

or less, 5 percent of insured domestic deposits, and 10 percent of uninsured do-

mestic and foreign deposits.

Include in highly liquid as-

sets the outstanding bal-

ance of PPP loans that

exceed borrowings from

the Federal Reserve

Banks under the PPPLF,

until September 30,

2020, or if extended by

the Board of Governors

of the Federal Reserve

System and the Sec-

retary of the Treasury,

until such date of exten-

sion.

Exclude from other bor-

rowings with a remaining

maturity of one year or

less the balance of out-

standing borrowings from

the Federal Reserve

Banks under the Pay-

check Protection Pro-

gram Liquidity Facility

with a remaining maturity

of one year or less.

Potential Losses/Total Do-

mestic Deposits (Loss Se-

verity Measure).

Potential losses to the DIF in the event of failure divided by total domestic depos-

its. Paragraph (a) of this section describes the calculation of the loss severity

measure in detail.

Exclusions are described in

paragraph (a) of this sec-

tion.

Market Risk Measure for

Highly Complex Institu-

tions 2.

The market risk score is a weighted average of the following three scores:

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(a) of this section describes the calculation of the loss severity

measure in detail.

Exclusions are described in

paragraph (a) of this sec-

tion.

Market Risk Measure for

Highly Complex Institu-

tions 2.

The market risk score is a weighted average of the following three scores:

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11404

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 36 / Thursday, February 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

TABLE E.2—EXCLUSIONS FROM CERTAIN RISK MEASURES USED TO CALCULATE THE ASSESSMENT RATE FOR LARGE OR

HIGHLY COMPLEX INSTITUTIONS—Continued

Scorecard

measures 1

Description

Exclusions

(1) Trading Revenue Vol-

atility/Tier 1 Capital.

Trailing 4-quarter standard deviation of quarterly trading revenue (merger-ad-

justed) divided by Tier 1 capital.

No Exclusion.

(2) Market Risk Capital/

Tier 1 Capital.

Market risk capital divided by Tier 1 capital ..............................................................

No Exclusion.

(3) Level 3 Trading As-

sets/Tier 1 Capital.

Level 3 trading assets divided by Tier 1 capital ........................................................

No Exclusion.

Average Short-term Funding/

Average Total Assets.

Quarterly average of federal funds purchased and repurchase agreements divided

by the quarterly average of total assets as reported on Schedule RC–K of the

Call Reports.

Exclude from the quarterly

average of total assets

the outstanding balance

of loans provided under

the Paycheck Protection

Program.

1 The applicable portions of the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital

regulations, as they may be amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and

84 FR 4222 (Feb

ected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit

losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital

regulations, as they may be amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and

84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves throughout the large bank and highly complex bank

scorecards, including in the ratio of Higher-Risk Assets to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, the Growth-Adjusted Portfolio Concentrations Measure,

the ratio of Top 20 Counterparty Exposure to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, the Ratio of Largest Counterparty Exposure to Tier 1 Capital and Re-

serves, the ratio of Criticized and Classified Items to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, and the ratio of Underperforming Assets to Tier 1 Capital and

Reserves. All of these ratios are described in appendix A of this subpart.

2 The credit quality score is the greater of the criticized and classified items to Tier 1 capital and reserves score or the underperforming assets

to Tier 1 capital and reserves score. The market risk score is the weighted average of three scores—the trading revenue volatility to Tier 1 cap-

ital score, the market risk capital to Tier 1 capital score, and the level 3 trading assets to Tier 1 capital score. All of these ratios are described in

appendix A of this subpart and the method of calculating the scores is described in appendix B of this subpart. Each score is multiplied by its re-

spective weight, and the resulting weighted score is summed to compute the score for the market risk measure. An overall weight of 35 percent

is allocated between the scores for the credit quality measure and market risk measure

tios are described in

appendix A of this subpart and the method of calculating the scores is described in appendix B of this subpart. Each score is multiplied by its re-

spective weight, and the resulting weighted score is summed to compute the score for the market risk measure. An overall weight of 35 percent

is allocated between the scores for the credit quality measure and market risk measure. The allocation depends on the ratio of average trading

assets to the sum of average securities, loans and trading assets (trading asset ratio) as follows: (1) Weight for credit quality score = 35 percent

* (1—trading asset ratio); and, (2) Weight for market risk score = 35 percent * trading asset ratio. In calculating the trading asset ratio, exclude

from the balance of loans the outstanding balance of loans provided under the Paycheck Protection Program.

(a) Description of the loss severity

measure. The loss severity measure

applies a standardized set of

assumptions to an institution’s balance

sheet to measure possible losses to the

FDIC in the event of an institution’s

failure. To determine an institution’s

loss severity rate, the FDIC first applies

assumptions about uninsured deposit

and other liability runoff, and growth in

insured deposits, to adjust the size and

composition of the institution’s

liabilities. Exclude total outstanding

borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks

under the Paycheck Protection Program

Liquidity Facility from short-and long-

term secured borrowings, as

appropriate. Assets are then reduced to

match any reduction in liabilities.

Exclude from an institution’s balance of

commercial and industrial loans the

outstanding balance of loans provided

under the Paycheck Protection Program

total outstanding

borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks

under the Paycheck Protection Program

Liquidity Facility from short-and long-

term secured borrowings, as

appropriate. Assets are then reduced to

match any reduction in liabilities.

Exclude from an institution’s balance of

commercial and industrial loans the

outstanding balance of loans provided

under the Paycheck Protection Program.

In the event that the outstanding

balance of loans provided under the

Paycheck Protection Program exceeds

the balance of commercial and

industrial loans, exclude any remaining

balance of loans provided under the

Paycheck Protection Program first from

the balance of all other loans, up to the

total amount of all other loans, followed

by the balance of agricultural loans, up

to the total amount of agricultural loans.

Increase cash balances by outstanding

loans provided under the Paycheck

Protection Program that exceed total

outstanding borrowings from Federal

Reserve Banks under the Paycheck

Protection Program Liquidity Facility, if

any. The institution’s asset values are

then further reduced so that the

Leverage Ratio reaches 2 percent. In

both cases, assets are adjusted pro rata

to preserve the institution’s asset

composition. Assumptions regarding

loss rates at failure for a given asset

category and the extent of secured

liabilities are then applied to estimated

assets and liabilities at failure to

determine whether the institution has

enough unencumbered assets to cover

domestic deposits. Any projected

shortfall is divided by current domestic

deposits to obtain an end-of-period loss

severity ratio. The loss severity measure

is an average loss severity ratio for the

three most recent quarters of data

available

ities are then applied to estimated

assets and liabilities at failure to

determine whether the institution has

enough unencumbered assets to cover

domestic deposits. Any projected

shortfall is divided by current domestic

deposits to obtain an end-of-period loss

severity ratio. The loss severity measure

is an average loss severity ratio for the

three most recent quarters of data

available. The applicable portions of the

current expected credit loss

methodology (CECL) transitional

amounts attributable to the allowance

for credit losses on loans and leases

held for investment and added to

retained earnings for regulatory capital

purposes pursuant to the regulatory

capital regulations, as they may be

amended from time to time (12 CFR part

3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85

FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and 84 FR

4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed

from the calculation of the loss severity

measure.

*

*

*

*

*

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

By order of the Board of Directors.

Dated at Washington, DC, on February 16,

2021.

James P. Sheesley,

Assistant Executive Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2021–03456 Filed 2–23–21; 11:15 am]

BILLING CODE 6714–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2020–0503; Product

Identifier 2018–SW–006–AD; Amendment

39–21386; AD 2021–02–03]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Leonardo

S.p.a. Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain

Leonardo S.p.a. (Leonardo) Model

AW189 helicopters. This AD requires

various repetitive inspections of the

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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