SECURITY STANDARDS FOR CUSTOMER INFORMATION

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FDIC Financial Institution Letters › SECURITY STANDARDS FOR CUSTOMER INFORMATION

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[Federal Register: February 1, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 22)]

[Rules and Regulations]

[Page 8615-8641]

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:fr01fe01-9]

[[Page 8615]]

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Part II

Department of the Treasury

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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Office of Thrift Supervision

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Federal Reserve System

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

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12 CFR Part 30, et al.

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Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer

Information and Rescission of Year 2000 Standards for Safety and

Soundness; Final Rule

[[Page 8616]]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 30

[Docket No. 00-35]

RIN 1557-AB84

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Parts 208, 211, 225, and 263

[Docket No. R-1073]

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Parts 308 and 364

RIN 3064-AC39

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of Thrift Supervision

12 CFR Parts 568 and 570

[Docket No. 2000-112]

RIN 1550-AB36

Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding

Customer Information and Rescission of Year 2000 Standards for Safety

and Soundness

AGENCIES: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),

Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board);

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and Office of Thrift

Supervision (OTS), Treasury.

ACTION: Joint final rule

eragency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding

Customer Information and Rescission of Year 2000 Standards for Safety

and Soundness

AGENCIES: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),

Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board);

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and Office of Thrift

Supervision (OTS), Treasury.

ACTION: Joint final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance

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Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision (collectively, the

Agencies) are publishing final Guidelines establishing standards for

safeguarding customer information that implement sections 501 and

505(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (the G-L-B Act or Act).

Section 501 of the G-L-B Act requires the Agencies to establish

appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to their

respective jurisdictions relating to administrative, technical, and

physical safeguards for customer records and information. As described

in the Act, these safeguards are to: insure the security and

confidentiality of customer records and information; protect against

any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such

records; and protect against unauthorized access to or use of such

records or information that could result in substantial harm or

inconvenience to any customer. The Agencies are to implement these

standards in the same manner, to the extent practicable, as standards

prescribed pursuant to section 39(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance

Act (FDI Act). These final Guidelines implement the requirements

described above

inst unauthorized access to or use of such

records or information that could result in substantial harm or

inconvenience to any customer. The Agencies are to implement these

standards in the same manner, to the extent practicable, as standards

prescribed pursuant to section 39(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance

Act (FDI Act). These final Guidelines implement the requirements

described above.

The Agencies previously issued guidelines establishing Year 2000

safety and soundness standards for insured depository institutions

pursuant to section 39 of the FDI Act. Since the events for which these

guidelines were issued have passed, the Agencies have concluded that

the guidelines are no longer necessary and are rescinding these

guidelines.

Effective Date: The joint final rule is effective July 1, 2001.

Applicability date: The Year 2000 Standards for Safety and

Soundness are no longer applicable as of March 5, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

OCC

John Carlson, Deputy Director for Bank Technology, (202) 874-5013;

or Deborah Katz, Senior Attorney, Legislative and Regulatory Activities

Division, (202) 874-5090.

Board

Heidi Richards, Assistant Director, Division of Banking Supervision

and Regulation, (202) 452-2598; Stephanie Martin, Managing Senior

Counsel, Legal Division, (202) 452-3198; or Thomas E. Scanlon, Senior

Attorney, Legal Division, (202) 452-3594. For the hearing impaired

only, contact Janice Simms, Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD)

tory Activities

Division, (202) 874-5090.

Board

Heidi Richards, Assistant Director, Division of Banking Supervision

and Regulation, (202) 452-2598; Stephanie Martin, Managing Senior

Counsel, Legal Division, (202) 452-3198; or Thomas E. Scanlon, Senior

Attorney, Legal Division, (202) 452-3594. For the hearing impaired

only, contact Janice Simms, Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD)

(202) 452-3544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th

and C Streets, NW, Washington, DC 20551.

FDIC

Thomas J. Tuzinski, Review Examiner, Division of Supervision, (202)

898-6748; Jeffrey M. Kopchik, Senior Policy Analyst, Division of

Supervision, (202) 898-3872; or Robert A. Patrick, Counsel, Legal

Division, (202) 898-3757.

OTS

Jennifer Dickerson, Manager, Information Technology, Examination

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Policy, (202) 906-5631; or Christine Harrington, Counsel, Banking and

Finance, Regulations and Legislation Division, (202) 906-7957.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The contents of this preamble are listed in

the following outline:

I. Background

II. Overview of Comments Received

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

IV. Regulatory Analysis

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. Executive Order 12866

D. Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995

I. Background

On November 12, 1999, President Clinton signed the G-L-B Act (Pub.

L. 106-102) into law. Section 501, titled ``Protection of Nonpublic

Personal Information'', requires the Agencies, the National Credit

Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the

Federal Trade Commission to establish appropriate standards for the

financial institutions subject to their respective jurisdictions

relating to the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for

customer records and information

tection of Nonpublic

Personal Information'', requires the Agencies, the National Credit

Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the

Federal Trade Commission to establish appropriate standards for the

financial institutions subject to their respective jurisdictions

relating to the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for

customer records and information. As stated in section 501, these

safeguards are to: (1) Insure the security and confidentiality of

customer records and information; (2) protect against any anticipated

threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such records; and

(3) protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or

information that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience to

any customer.

Section 505(b) of the G-L-B Act provides that these standards are

to be implemented by the Agencies in the same manner, to the extent

practicable, as standards prescribed pursuant to section 39(a) of the

FDI Act.\1\ Section 39(a) of the FDI Act authorizes the Agencies to

establish operational and managerial standards for insured depository

institutions relative to, among other things, internal controls,

information systems, and internal audit systems, as well as such other

operational and managerial standards as the Agencies determine to be

appropriate.\2\

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\1\ Section 39 applies only to insure depository institutions,

including insured branches of foreign banks. The Guidelines,

however, will also apply to certain uninsured institutions, such as

bank holding companies, certain nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding

companies and insured depository institutions, and uninsured

branches and agencies of foreign banks. See sections 501 and 505(b)

of the G-L-B Act.

\2\ OTS has placed its information security guidelines in

appendix B to 12 CFR part 570, with the provisions implementing

section 39 of the FDI Act

ured institutions, such as

bank holding companies, certain nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding

companies and insured depository institutions, and uninsured

branches and agencies of foreign banks. See sections 501 and 505(b)

of the G-L-B Act.

\2\ OTS has placed its information security guidelines in

appendix B to 12 CFR part 570, with the provisions implementing

section 39 of the FDI Act. At the same time, OTS has adopted a

regulatory requirement that the institutions OTS regulates comply

with the proposed Guidelines. Because information security

guidelines are similar to physical security procedures, OTS has

included a provision in 12 CFR part 568, which covers primarily

physical security procedures, requiring compliance with the

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Guidelines in appendix B to part 570.

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II. Overview of Comments Received

On June 26, 2000, the Agencies published for comment the proposed

Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer

Information and Rescission of Year 2000 Standards for Safety and

Soundness in the Federal Register (65 FR 39472). The public comment

period closed August 25, 2000. The Agencies collectively received a

total of 206 comments in response to the proposal, although many

commenters sent copies of the same letter to each of the Agencies.

Those combined comments included 49 from banks, 7 from savings

associations, 60 from financial institution holding companies; 50 from

financial institution trade associations; 33 from other business

entities; and four from state regulators. The Federal Reserve also

received comments from three Federal Reserve Banks.

The Agencies invited comment on all aspects of the proposed

Guidelines, including whether the rules should be issued as guidelines

or as regulations

, 60 from financial institution holding companies; 50 from

financial institution trade associations; 33 from other business

entities; and four from state regulators. The Federal Reserve also

received comments from three Federal Reserve Banks.

The Agencies invited comment on all aspects of the proposed

Guidelines, including whether the rules should be issued as guidelines

or as regulations. Commenters overwhelmingly supported the adoption of

guidelines, with many commenters offering suggestions for ways to

improve the proposed Guidelines as discussed below. Many commenters

cited the benefits of flexibility and the drawbacks of prescriptive

requirements that could become rapidly outdated as a result of changes

in technology.

The Agencies also requested comments on the impact of the proposal

on community banks, recognizing that community banks operate with more

limited resources than larger institutions and may present a different

risk profile. In general, community banks urged the Agencies to issue

guidelines that are not prescriptive, that do not require detailed

policies or reporting by banks that share little or no information

outside the bank, and that provide flexibility in the design of an

information security program. Some community banks indicated that the

Guidelines are unnecessary because they already have information

security programs in place. Others requested clarification of the

impact of the Guidelines on banks that do not share any information in

the absence of a customer's consent.

In light of the comments received, the Agencies have decided to

adopt the Guidelines, with several changes as discussed below to

respond to the commenters' suggestions. The respective texts of the

Agencies' Guidelines are substantively identical

Others requested clarification of the

impact of the Guidelines on banks that do not share any information in

the absence of a customer's consent.

In light of the comments received, the Agencies have decided to

adopt the Guidelines, with several changes as discussed below to

respond to the commenters' suggestions. The respective texts of the

Agencies' Guidelines are substantively identical. In directing the

Agencies to issue standards for the protection of customer records and

information, Congress provided that the standards apply to all

financial institutions, regardless of the extent to which they may

disclose information to affiliated or nonaffiliated third parties,

electronically transfer data with customers or third parties, or record

data electronically. Because the requirements of the Act apply to a

broad range of financial institutions, the Agencies believe that the

Guidelines must establish appropriate standards that allow each

institution the discretion to design an information security program

that suits its particular size and complexity and the nature and scope

of its activities. In many instances, financial institutions already

will have information security programs that are consistent with these

Guidelines, because key components of the Guidelines were derived from

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security-related supervisory guidance previously issued by the Agencies

and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). In

such situations, little or no modification to an institution's program

will be required.

Below is a section-by-section analysis of the final Guidelines.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

The discussion that follows applies to each Agency's Guidelines.

I. Introduction

Paragraph I

e previously issued by the Agencies

and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). In

such situations, little or no modification to an institution's program

will be required.

Below is a section-by-section analysis of the final Guidelines.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

The discussion that follows applies to each Agency's Guidelines.

I. Introduction

Paragraph I. of the proposal set forth the general purpose of the

Guidelines, which is to provide guidance to each financial institution

in establishing and implementing administrative, technical, and

physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and

integrity of customer information. This paragraph also set forth the

statutory authority for the Guidelines, including section 39(a) of the

FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1831p-1) and sections 501 and 505(b) of the G-L-B

Act (15 U.S.C. 6801 and 6805(b) ). The Agencies received no comments on

this paragraph, and have adopted it as proposed.

I.A. Scope

Paragraph I.A. of the proposal described the scope of the

Guidelines. Each Agency defined specifically those entities within its

particular scope of coverage in this paragraph of the Guidelines.

The Agencies received no comments on the issue of which entities

are covered by the Guidelines, and have adopted paragraph I.A. as

proposed.

I.B. Preservation of Existing Authority

Paragraph I.B. of the proposal made clear that in issuing these

Guidelines none of the Agencies is, in any way, limiting its authority

to address any unsafe or unsound practice, violation of law, unsafe or

unsound condition, or other practice, including any condition or

practice related to safeguarding customer information. As noted in the

preamble to the proposal, any action taken by any Agency under section

39(a) of the FDI Act and these Guidelines may be taken independently

of, in conjunction with, or in addition to any other enforcement action

available to the Agency

tion of law, unsafe or

unsound condition, or other practice, including any condition or

practice related to safeguarding customer information. As noted in the

preamble to the proposal, any action taken by any Agency under section

39(a) of the FDI Act and these Guidelines may be taken independently

of, in conjunction with, or in addition to any other enforcement action

available to the Agency. The Agencies received no comments on this

paragraph, and have adopted paragraph I.B. as proposed.

I.C.1. Definitions

Paragraph I.C. set forth the definitions of various terms for

purposes of the Guidelines.\3\ It also stated that terms used in the

Guidelines have the same meanings as set forth in sections 3 and 39 of

the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1813 and 1831p-1).

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\3\ In addition to the definitions discussed below, the Board's

Guidelines in 12 CFR parts 208 and 225 contain a definition of

``subsidiary'', which described the state member bank and bank

holding company subsidiaries that are subject to the Guidelines.

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The Agencies received several comments on the proposed definitions,

and have made certain changes as discussed below. The Agencies also

have reordered proposed paragraph I.C. so that the statement concerning

the reliance on sections 3 and 39(a) of the FDI Act is now in paragraph

I.C.1., with the definitions appearing in paragraphs I.C.2.a.-e. The

defined terms have been placed in alphabetical order in the final

Guidelines.

I.C.2.a. Board of Directors

The proposal defined ``board of directors'' to mean, in the case of

a branch or agency of a foreign bank, the managing official in charge

of the branch or agency.\4\ The Agencies received no comments on this

proposed definition, and have adopted it without change

raphs I.C.2.a.-e. The

defined terms have been placed in alphabetical order in the final

Guidelines.

I.C.2.a. Board of Directors

The proposal defined ``board of directors'' to mean, in the case of

a branch or agency of a foreign bank, the managing official in charge

of the branch or agency.\4\ The Agencies received no comments on this

proposed definition, and have adopted it without change.

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\4\ The OTS version of the Guidelines does not include this

definition because OTS does not regulate foreign institutions.

Paragraph I of the OTS Guidelines has been renumbered accordingly.

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I.C.2.b. Customer

The proposal defined ``customer'' in the same way as that term is

defined in section __.3(h) of the Agencies' rule captioned ``Privacy of

Consumer Financial Information'' (Privacy Rule).\5\

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The Agencies proposed to use this definition in the Guidelines because

section 501(b) refers to safeguarding the security and confidentiality

of ``customer'' information. Given that Congress used the same term for

both the 501(b) standards and for the sections concerning financial

privacy, the Agencies have concluded that it is appropriate to use the

same definition in the Guidelines that was adopted in the Privacy Rule.

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\6\ See 65 FR 35162 (June 1, 2000). Citations to the interagency

Privacy Rule in this preamble are to sections only, leaving blank

the citations to the part numbers used by each agency.

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Under the Privacy Rule, a customer is a consumer who has

established a continuing relationship with an institution under which

the institution provides one or more financial products or services to

the consumer to be used primarily for personal, family or household

purposes

to the part numbers used by each agency.

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Under the Privacy Rule, a customer is a consumer who has

established a continuing relationship with an institution under which

the institution provides one or more financial products or services to

the consumer to be used primarily for personal, family or household

purposes. ``Customer'' does not include a business, nor does it include

a consumer who has not established an ongoing relationship with a

financial institution (e.g., an individual who merely uses an

institution's ATM or applies for a loan). See sections__.3(h) and (i)

of the Privacy Rule. The Agencies solicited comment on whether the

definition of ``customer'' should be broadened to provide a common

information security program for all types of records under the control

of a financial institution.

The Agencies received many comments on this definition, almost all

of which agreed with the proposed definition. Although a few commenters

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indicated they would apply the same security program to both business

and consumer records, the vast majority of commenters supported the use

of the same definition of ``customer'' in the Guidelines as is used in

the Privacy Rule. They observed that the use of the term ``customer''

in section 501 of the G-L-B Act, when read in the context of the

definitions of ``consumer'' and ``customer relationship'' in section

509, reflects the Congressional intent to distinguish between certain

kinds of consumers for the information security standards and the other

privacy provisions established under subtitle A of Title V.

The Agencies have concluded that the definition of ``customer''

used in the Guidelines should be consistent with the definition

established in section__.3(h) of the Privacy Rule

in section

509, reflects the Congressional intent to distinguish between certain

kinds of consumers for the information security standards and the other

privacy provisions established under subtitle A of Title V.

The Agencies have concluded that the definition of ``customer''

used in the Guidelines should be consistent with the definition

established in section__.3(h) of the Privacy Rule. The Agencies

believe, therefore, that the most reasonable interpretation of the

applicable provisions of subtitle A of Title V of the Act is that a

financial institution is obligated to protect the security and

confidentiality of the nonpublic personal information of its consumers

with whom it has a customer relationship. As a practical manner, a

financial institution may also design or implement its information

security program in a manner that encompasses the records and

information of its other consumers and its business clients.\6\

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\6\ The Agencies recognize that ``customer'' is defined more

broadly under Subtitle B of Title V of the Act, which, in general,

makes it unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain

customer information of a financial institution by making false,

fictitious, or fraudulent statements. For the purpose of that

subtitle, the term ``customer'' means ``any person (or authorized

representative of a person) to whom the financial institution

provides a product or service, including that of acting as a

fiduciary.'' (See section 527(1) of the Act.) In light of the

statutory mandate to ``prescribe such revisions to such regulations

and guidelines as may be necessary to ensure that such financial

institutions have policies, procedures, and controls in place to

prevent the unauthorized disclosure of customer financial

information'' (section 525), the Agencies considered modifying these

Guidelines to cover other customers, namely, business entities and

individuals who obtain financial produc

revisions to such regulations

and guidelines as may be necessary to ensure that such financial

institutions have policies, procedures, and controls in place to

prevent the unauthorized disclosure of customer financial

information'' (section 525), the Agencies considered modifying these

Guidelines to cover other customers, namely, business entities and

individuals who obtain financial products and services for purposes

other than personal, family, or household purposes. The Agencies

have concluded, however, that defining ``customer'' to accommodate

the range of objectives set forth in Title V of the Act is

unnecessary. Instead, the Agencies have included a new paragraph

III.C.1.a, described below, and plan to issue guidance and other

revisions to the applicable regulations, as may be necessary, to

satisfy the requirements of section 525 of the Act.

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I.C.2.c. Customer Information

The proposal defined ``customer information'' as any records

containing nonpublic personal information, as defined in section__.3(n)

of the Privacy Rule, about a customer. This included records, data,

files, or other information in paper, electronic, or other form that

are maintained by any service provider on behalf of an institution.

Although section 501(b) of the G-L-B Act refers to the protection of

both customer ``records'' and ``information'', for the sake of

simplicity, the proposed Guidelines used the term ``customer

the Privacy Rule, about a customer. This included records, data,

files, or other information in paper, electronic, or other form that

are maintained by any service provider on behalf of an institution.

Although section 501(b) of the G-L-B Act refers to the protection of

both customer ``records'' and ``information'', for the sake of

simplicity, the proposed Guidelines used the term ``customer

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information'' to encompass both information and records.

The Agencies received several comments on this definition. The

commenters suggested that the proposed definition was too broad because

it included files ``containing'' nonpublic personal information. The

Agencies believe, however, that a financial institution's security

program must apply to files that contain nonpublic personal information

in order to adequately protect the customer's information. In deciding

what level of protection is appropriate, a financial institution may

consider the fact that a given file contains very little nonpublic

personal information, but that fact would not render the file entirely

beyond the scope of the Guidelines. Accordingly, the Agencies have

adopted a definition of ``customer record'' that is substantively the

same as the proposed definition. The Agencies have, however, deleted

the reference to ``data, files, or other information'' from the final

Guidelines, since each is included in the term ``records'' and also is

covered by the reference to ``paper, electronic, or other form''.

I.C.2.d. Customer Information System

The proposal defined ``customer information system'' to be

electronic or physical methods used to access, collect, store, use,

transmit, or protect customer information. The Agencies received a few

comments on this definition, mostly from commenters who stated that it

is too broad

lso is

covered by the reference to ``paper, electronic, or other form''.

I.C.2.d. Customer Information System

The proposal defined ``customer information system'' to be

electronic or physical methods used to access, collect, store, use,

transmit, or protect customer information. The Agencies received a few

comments on this definition, mostly from commenters who stated that it

is too broad. The Agencies believe that the definition needs to be

sufficiently broad to protect all customer information, wherever the

information is located within a financial institution and however it is

used. Nevertheless, the broad scope of the definition of ``customer

information system'' should not result in an undue burden because, in

other important respects, the Guidelines allow a high degree of

flexibility for each institution to design a security program that

suits its circumstances.

For these reasons, the Agencies have adopted the definition of

``customer information system'' largely as proposed. However, the

phrase ``electronic or physical'' in the proposal has been deleted

because each is included in the term ``any methods''. The Agencies also

have added a specific reference to records disposal in the definition

of ``customer information system.'' This is consistent with the

proposal's inclusion of access controls in the list of items a

financial institution is to consider when establishing security

policies and procedures (see discussion of paragraph III.C.1.a.,

below), given that inadequate disposal of records may result in

identity theft or other misuse of customer information. Under the final

Guidelines, a financial institution's responsibility to safeguard

customer information continues through the disposal process.

I.C.2.e

ncial institution is to consider when establishing security

policies and procedures (see discussion of paragraph III.C.1.a.,

below), given that inadequate disposal of records may result in

identity theft or other misuse of customer information. Under the final

Guidelines, a financial institution's responsibility to safeguard

customer information continues through the disposal process.

I.C.2.e. Service Provider

The proposal defined a ``service provider'' as any person or entity

that maintains or processes customer information for a financial

institution, or is otherwise granted access to customer information

through its provision of services to an institution. One commenter

urged the Agencies to modify this definition so that it would not

include a financial institution's attorneys, accountants, and

appraisers. Others suggested deleting the phrase ``or

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is otherwise granted access to customer information through its

provision of services to an institution''.

The Agencies believe that the Act requires each financial

institution to adopt a comprehensive information security program that

is designed to protect against unauthorized access to or use of

customers' nonpublic personal information. Disclosing information to a

person or entity that provides services to a financial institution

creates additional risks to the security and confidentiality of the

information disclosed. In order to protect against these risks, a

financial institution must take appropriate steps to protect

information that it provides to a service provider, regardless of who

the service provider is or how the service provider obtains access. The

fact that an entity obtains access to customer information through, for

instance, providing professional services does not obviate the need for

the financial institution to take appropriate steps to protect the

information

appropriate steps to protect

information that it provides to a service provider, regardless of who

the service provider is or how the service provider obtains access. The

fact that an entity obtains access to customer information through, for

instance, providing professional services does not obviate the need for

the financial institution to take appropriate steps to protect the

information. Accordingly, the Agencies have determined that, in

general, the term ``service provider'' should be broadly defined to

encompass a variety of individuals or companies that provide services

to the institution.

This does not mean, however, that a financial institution's methods

for overseeing its service provider arrangements will be the same for

every provider. As explained in the discussion of paragraph III.D., a

financial institution's oversight responsibilities will be shaped by

the institution's analysis of the risks posed by a given service

provider. If a service provider is subject to a code of conduct that

imposes a duty to protect customer information consistent with the

objectives of these Guidelines, a financial institution may take that

duty into account when deciding what level of oversight it should

provide.

Moreover, a financial institution will be responsible under the

final Guidelines for overseeing its service provider arrangements only

when the service is provided directly to the financial institution. The

Agencies clarified this point by amending the definition of ``service

provider'' in the final Guidelines to state that it applies only to a

person or entity that maintains, processes, or otherwise is permitted

access to customer information through its provision of services

directly to the financial institution. Thus, for instance, a payment

intermediary involved in the collection of a check but that has no

correspondent relationship with a financial institution would not be

considered a service provider of that financial institution under this

rule

maintains, processes, or otherwise is permitted

access to customer information through its provision of services

directly to the financial institution. Thus, for instance, a payment

intermediary involved in the collection of a check but that has no

correspondent relationship with a financial institution would not be

considered a service provider of that financial institution under this

rule. By contrast, a financial institution's correspondent bank would

be considered its service provider. Nevertheless, the financial

institution may take into account the fact that the correspondent bank

is itself a financial institution that is subject to security standards

under section 501(b) when it determines the appropriate level of

oversight for that service provider.\7\

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\7\ Similarly, in the case of a service provider that is not

subject to these Guidelines but is subject to standards adopted by

its primary regulator under section 501(b) of the G-L-B Act, a

financial institution may take that fact into consideration when

deciding what level of oversight is appropriate for that service

provider.

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In situations where a service provider hires a subservicer,\8\ the

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subservicer would not be a ``service provider'' under the final

Guidelines. The Agencies recognize that it would be inappropriate to

impose obligations on a financial institution to select and monitor

subservicers in situations where the financial institution has no

contractual relationship with that person or entity

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subservicer would not be a ``service provider'' under the final

Guidelines. The Agencies recognize that it would be inappropriate to

impose obligations on a financial institution to select and monitor

subservicers in situations where the financial institution has no

contractual relationship with that person or entity. When conducting

due diligence in selecting its service providers (see discussion of

paragraph III.D., below), however, a financial institution must

determine that the service provider has adequate controls to ensure

that the subservicer will protect the customer information in a way

that meets the objectives of these Guidelines.

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\8\ The term ``subservicer'' means any person who has access to

an institution's customer information through its provision of

services to the service provider and is not limited to mortgage

subservicers.

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II. Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information

II.A. Information Security Program

The proposed Guidelines described the Agencies' expectations for

the creation, implementation, and maintenance of a comprehensive

information security program. As noted in the proposal, this program

must include administrative, technical, and physical safeguards

appropriate to the size and complexity of the institution and the

nature and scope of its activities.

Several commenters representing large and complex organizations

were concerned that the term ``comprehensive information security

program'' required a single and uniform document that must apply to all

component parts of the organization. In response, the Agencies note

that a program that includes administrative, technical, and physical

safeguards will, in many instances, be composed of more than one

document

representing large and complex organizations

were concerned that the term ``comprehensive information security

program'' required a single and uniform document that must apply to all

component parts of the organization. In response, the Agencies note

that a program that includes administrative, technical, and physical

safeguards will, in many instances, be composed of more than one

document. Moreover, use of this term does not require that all parts of

an organization implement a uniform program. However, the Agencies will

expect an institution to coordinate all the elements of its information

security program. Where the elements of the program are dispersed

throughout the institution, management should be aware of these

elements and their locations. If they are not maintained on a

consolidated basis, management should have an ability to retrieve the

current documents from those responsible for the overall coordination

and ongoing evaluation of the program.

The Board received comment on its proposal to revise the appendix

to Regulation Y regarding the provision that would require a bank

holding company to ensure that each of its subsidiaries is subject to a

comprehensive information security program.\9\ This comment urged the

Board to eliminate that provision and argued, in part, that the

requirement assumes that a bank holding company has the power to impose

such controls upon its subsidiary companies. These commenters

recommended, instead, that the standards should be limited to customer

information in the possession or control of the bank holding company.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ The appendix provided that the proposed Guidelines would be

applicable to customer information maintained by or on behalf of

bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries or affiliates

that the standards should be limited to customer

information in the possession or control of the bank holding company.

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\9\ The appendix provided that the proposed Guidelines would be

applicable to customer information maintained by or on behalf of

bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries or affiliates

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(except brokers, dealers, persons providing insurance, investment

companies, and investment advisors) for which the Board has

supervisory authority. See 65 FR 39484 (June 26, 2000).

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Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and the Board's

Regulation Y, a subsidiary is presumed to be controlled directly or

indirectly by the holding company. 12 U.S.C. 1841(d); 12 CFR 225.2(o).

Moreover, the Board believes that a bank holding company is ultimately

responsible for ensuring that its subsidiaries comply with the

standards set forth under these Guidelines. The Board recognizes,

however, that a bank holding company may satisfy its obligations under

section 501 of the GLB Act through a variety of measures, such as by

including a subsidiary within the scope of its information security

program or by causing the subsidiary to implement a separate

information security program in accordance with these Guidelines.

II.B. Objectives

Paragraph II.B. of the proposed Guidelines described the objectives

that each financial institution's information security program should

be designed to achieve. These objectives tracked the objectives as

stated in section 501(b)(1)-(3), adding only that the security

[[Page 8620]]

program is to protect against unauthorized access that could risk the

safety and soundness of the institution

Paragraph II.B. of the proposed Guidelines described the objectives

that each financial institution's information security program should

be designed to achieve. These objectives tracked the objectives as

stated in section 501(b)(1)-(3), adding only that the security

[[Page 8620]]

program is to protect against unauthorized access that could risk the

safety and soundness of the institution. The Agencies requested comment

on whether there are additional or alternative objectives that should

be included in the Guidelines.

The Agencies received several comments on this proposed paragraph,

most of which objected to language that, in the commenters' view,

required compliance with objectives that were impossible to meet. Many

commenters stated, for instance, that no information security program

can ensure that there will be no problems with the security or

confidentiality of customer information. Others criticized the

objective that required protection against any anticipated threat or

hazard. A few commenters questioned the objective of protecting against

unauthorized access that could result in inconvenience to a customer,

while others objected to the addition of the safety and soundness

standard noted above.

The Agencies do not believe the statute mandates a standard of

absolute liability for a financial institution that experiences a

security breach. Thus, the Agencies have clarified these objectives by

stating that each security program is to be designed to accomplish the

objectives stated. With the one exception discussed below, the Agencies

have otherwise left unchanged the statement of the objectives, given

that these objectives are identical to those set out in the statute.

In response to comments that objected to the addition of the safety

and soundness standard, the Agencies have deleted that reference in

order to make the statement of objectives identical to the objectives

identified in the statute

d below, the Agencies

have otherwise left unchanged the statement of the objectives, given

that these objectives are identical to those set out in the statute.

In response to comments that objected to the addition of the safety

and soundness standard, the Agencies have deleted that reference in

order to make the statement of objectives identical to the objectives

identified in the statute. The Agencies believe that risks to the

safety and soundness of a financial institution may be addressed

through other supervisory or regulatory means, making it unnecessary to

expand the statement of objectives in this rulemaking.

Some commenters asked for clarification of a financial

institution's responsibilities when a customer authorizes a third party

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to access that customer's information. For purposes of the Guidelines,

access to or use of customer information is not ``unauthorized'' access

if it is done with the customer's consent. When a customer gives

consent to a third party to access or use that customer's information,

such as by providing the third party with an account number, PIN, or

password, the Guidelines do not require the financial institution to

prevent such access or monitor the use or redisclosure of the

customer's information by the third party. Finally, unauthorized access

does not mean disclosure pursuant to one of the exceptions in the

Privacy Rule.

III. Develop and Implement Information Security Program

III.A. Involve the Board of Directors

Paragraph III.A. of the proposal described the involvement of the

board and management in the development and implementation of an

information security program

formation by the third party. Finally, unauthorized access

does not mean disclosure pursuant to one of the exceptions in the

Privacy Rule.

III. Develop and Implement Information Security Program

III.A. Involve the Board of Directors

Paragraph III.A. of the proposal described the involvement of the

board and management in the development and implementation of an

information security program. As explained in the proposal, the board's

responsibilities are to: (1) Approve the institution's written

information security policy and program; and (2) oversee efforts to

develop, implement, and maintain an effective information security

program, including reviewing reports from management. The proposal also

laid out management's responsibilities for developing, implementing,

and maintaining the security program.

The Agencies received a number of comments regarding the

requirement of board approval of the information security program. Some

commenters stated that each financial institution should be allowed to

decide for itself whether to obtain board approval of its program.

Others suggested that approval by either a board committee or at the

holding company level might be appropriate. Still others suggested

modifying the Guidelines to require only that the board approve the

initial information security program and delegate subsequent review and

approval of the program to either a committee or an individual.

The Agencies believe that a financial institution's overall

information security program is critical to the safety and soundness of

the institution. Therefore, the final Guidelines continue to place

responsibility on an institution's board to approve and exercise

general oversight over the program. However, the Guidelines allow the

entire board of a financial institution, or an appropriate committee of

the board to approve the institution's written security program

curity program is critical to the safety and soundness of

the institution. Therefore, the final Guidelines continue to place

responsibility on an institution's board to approve and exercise

general oversight over the program. However, the Guidelines allow the

entire board of a financial institution, or an appropriate committee of

the board to approve the institution's written security program. In

addition, the Guidelines permit the board to assign specific

implementation responsibilities to a committee or an individual.

One commenter suggested that the Guidelines be revised to provide

that if a holding company develops, approves, and oversees the

information security program that applies to its bank and nonbank

subsidiaries, there should be no separate requirement for each

subsidiary to do the same thing, as long as those subsidiaries agree to

abide by the holding company's security program. The Agencies agree

that subsidiaries within a holding company can use the security program

developed at the holding company level. However, if subsidiary

institutions choose to use a security program developed at the holding

company level, the board of directors or an appropriate committee at

each subsidiary institution must conduct an independent review to

ensure that the program is suitable and complies with the requirements

prescribed by the subsidiary's primary regulator. See 12 U.S.C. 505.

Once the subsidiary institution's board, or a committee thereof, has

approved the security program, it must oversee the institution's

the board of directors or an appropriate committee at

each subsidiary institution must conduct an independent review to

ensure that the program is suitable and complies with the requirements

prescribed by the subsidiary's primary regulator. See 12 U.S.C. 505.

Once the subsidiary institution's board, or a committee thereof, has

approved the security program, it must oversee the institution's

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efforts to implement and maintain an effective program.

The Agencies also received comments suggesting that use of the term

``oversee'' conveyed the notion that a board is expected to be involved

in day-to-day monitoring of the development, implementation, and

maintenance of an information security program. The Agencies' use of

the term ``oversee'' is meant to convey a board's conventional

supervisory responsibilities. Day-to-day monitoring of any aspect of an

information security program is a management responsibility. The final

Guidelines reflect this by providing that the board must oversee the

institution's information security program but may assign specific

responsibility for its implementation.

The Agencies invited comment on whether the Guidelines should

require that the board designate a Corporate Information Security

Officer or other responsible individual who would have the authority,

subject to the board's approval, to develop and administer the

institution's information security program. The Agencies received a

number of comments suggesting that the Agencies should not require the

creation of a new position for this purpose. Some financial

institutions also stated that hiring one or more additional staff for

this purpose would impose a significant burden

the authority,

subject to the board's approval, to develop and administer the

institution's information security program. The Agencies received a

number of comments suggesting that the Agencies should not require the

creation of a new position for this purpose. Some financial

institutions also stated that hiring one or more additional staff for

this purpose would impose a significant burden. The Agencies believe

that a financial institution will not need to create a new position

with a specific title for this purpose, as long as the institution has

adequate staff in light of the risks to its customer information.

Regardless of whether new staff are added, the lines of authority and

responsibility for development, implementation, and administration of a

financial institution's information security program need to be well

defined and clearly articulated.\10\

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\10\ The Agencies note that other regulations already require a

financial institution to designate a security officer for different

purposes. See 12 CFR 21.2; 12 CFR 208.61(b).

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[[Page 8621]]

The proposal identified three responsibilities of management in the

development of an information security program. They were to: (1)

Evaluate the impact on a financial institution's security program of

changing business arrangements and changes to customer information

systems; (2) document compliance with these Guidelines; and (3) keep

the board informed of the overall status of the institution's

information security program. A few commenters objected to the Agencies

assigning specific tasks to management. These commenters did not object

to the tasks per se, but suggested that the Agencies allow an

institution's board and management to decide who within the institution

is to carry out the tasks

ese Guidelines; and (3) keep

the board informed of the overall status of the institution's

information security program. A few commenters objected to the Agencies

assigning specific tasks to management. These commenters did not object

to the tasks per se, but suggested that the Agencies allow an

institution's board and management to decide who within the institution

is to carry out the tasks.

The Agencies agree that a financial institution is in the best

position to determine who should be assigned specific roles in

implementing the institution's security program. Accordingly, the

Agencies have deleted the separate provision assigning specific roles

to management. The responsibilities that were contained in this

provision are now included in other paragraphs of the Guidelines.

III.B. Assess Risk

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Paragraph III.B. of the proposal described the risk assessment

process to be used in the development of the information security

program. Under the proposal, a financial institution was to identify

and assess the risks to customer information. As part of that

assessment, the institution was to determine the sensitivity of the

information and the threats to the institution's systems. The

institution also was to assess the sufficiency of its policies,

procedures, systems, and other arrangements in place to control risk.

Finally, the institution was to monitor, evaluate, and adjust its risk

assessment in light of changes in areas identified in the proposal.

The Agencies received several comments on these provisions, most of

which focused on the requirement that financial institutions do a

sensitivity analysis. One commenter noted that ``customer information''

is defined to mean ``nonpublic personal information'' as defined in the

G-L-B Act, and that the G-L-B Act provides the same level of coverage

for all nonpublic personal information

sal.

The Agencies received several comments on these provisions, most of

which focused on the requirement that financial institutions do a

sensitivity analysis. One commenter noted that ``customer information''

is defined to mean ``nonpublic personal information'' as defined in the

G-L-B Act, and that the G-L-B Act provides the same level of coverage

for all nonpublic personal information. The commenter stated that it is

therefore unclear how the level of sensitivity would affect an

institution's obligations with respect to the security of this

information.

While the Agencies agree that all customer information requires

protection, the Agencies believe that requiring all institutions to

afford the same degree of protection to all customer information may be

unnecessarily burdensome in many cases. Accordingly, the final

Guidelines continue to state that institutions should take into

consideration the sensitivity of customer information. Disclosure of

certain information (such as account numbers or access codes) might be

particularly harmful to customers if the disclosure is not authorized.

Individuals who try to breach the institution's security systems may be

likely to target this type of information. When such information is

housed on systems that are accessible through public telecommunications

networks, it may require more and different protections, such as

encryption, than if it were located in a locked file drawer. To provide

flexibility to respond to these different security needs in the way

most appropriate, the Guidelines confer upon institutions the

discretion to determine the levels of protection necessary for

different categories of information. Institutions may treat all

customer information the same, provided that the level of protection is

adequate for all the information.

Other commenters suggested that the risk assessment requirement be

tied to reasonably foreseeable risks

propriate, the Guidelines confer upon institutions the

discretion to determine the levels of protection necessary for

different categories of information. Institutions may treat all

customer information the same, provided that the level of protection is

adequate for all the information.

Other commenters suggested that the risk assessment requirement be

tied to reasonably foreseeable risks. The Agencies agree that the

security program should be focused on reasonably foreseeable risks and

have amended the final Guidelines accordingly.

The final Guidelines make several other changes to this paragraph

to improve the order of the Guidelines and to eliminate provisions that

were redundant in light of responsibilities outlined elsewhere. For

instance, while the proposal stated that the risk assessment function

included the need to monitor for relevant changes to technology,

sensitivity of customer information, and threats to information

security and make adjustments as needed, that function has been

incorporated into the discussion of managing and controlling risk in

paragraphs III.C.3. and III.E.

Thus, under the Guidelines as adopted, a financial institution

should identify the reasonably foreseeable internal and external

threats that could result in unauthorized disclosure, misuse,

alteration, or destruction of customer information or customer

information systems. Next, the risk assessment should consider the

potential damage that a compromise of customer information from an

.E.

Thus, under the Guidelines as adopted, a financial institution

should identify the reasonably foreseeable internal and external

threats that could result in unauthorized disclosure, misuse,

alteration, or destruction of customer information or customer

information systems. Next, the risk assessment should consider the

potential damage that a compromise of customer information from an

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identified threat would have on the customer information, taking into

consideration the sensitivity of the information to be protected in

assessing the potential damage. Finally, a financial institution should

conduct an assessment of the sufficiency of existing policies,

procedures, customer information systems, and other arrangements

intended to control the risks it has identified.

III.C. Manage and Control Risk

Paragraph III.C. describes the steps an institution should take to

manage and the control risks identified in paragraph III.B.

Establish policies and procedures (III.C.1.). Paragraph III.C.1 of

the proposal described the elements of a comprehensive risk management

plan designed to control identified risks and to achieve the overall

objective of ensuring the security and confidentiality of customer

information. It identified eleven factors an institution should

consider in evaluating the adequacy of its policies and procedures to

effectively manage these risks.

The Agencies received a large number of comments on this paragraph.

Most of the comments were based on a perception that every institution

would have to adopt every security measure listed in proposed

III.C.1.a.-k. as part of the institution's policies and procedures. In

particular, a number of commenters were concerned that the proposed

Guidelines would require the encryption of all customer data.

The Agencies did not intend for the security measures listed in

paragraph III.C.1

e based on a perception that every institution

would have to adopt every security measure listed in proposed

III.C.1.a.-k. as part of the institution's policies and procedures. In

particular, a number of commenters were concerned that the proposed

Guidelines would require the encryption of all customer data.

The Agencies did not intend for the security measures listed in

paragraph III.C.1. to be seen as mandatory for all financial

institutions and for all data. Rather, the Agencies intended only that

an institution would consider whether the protections listed were

appropriate for the institution's particular circumstances, and, if so,

adopt those identified as appropriate. The Agencies continue to believe

that these elements may be adapted by institutions of varying sizes,

scope of operations, and risk management structures. Consistent with

that approach, the manner of implementing a particular element may vary

from institution to institution. For example, while a financial

institution that offers Internet-based transaction accounts may

conclude that encryption is appropriate, a different institution that

processes all data internally and does not have a transactional web

site may consider other kinds of access restrictions that are adequate

to maintain the confidentiality of customer information. To underscore

this point, the final Guidelines have been amended to state that each

financial institution must consider whether the security elements

discussed in paragraphs III.C.1.a.-h. are appropriate for the

institution and, if so, adopt those

[[Page 8622]]

elements an institution concludes are appropriate.

The Agencies invited comment on the degree of detail that should be

included in the Guidelines regarding the risk management program,

including which elements should be specified in the Guidelines, and any

other components of a risk management program that should be listed

propriate for the

institution and, if so, adopt those

[[Page 8622]]

elements an institution concludes are appropriate.

The Agencies invited comment on the degree of detail that should be

included in the Guidelines regarding the risk management program,

including which elements should be specified in the Guidelines, and any

other components of a risk management program that should be listed.

With the exception of those commenters who thought some or all of the

elements of the risk management program were intended to be mandatory

for all financial institutions, the comments supported the level of

detail conveyed in the proposed Guidelines. The Agencies have adopted

the provision regarding management and control of risks with the

changes discussed below. Comments addressing proposed security measures

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that have been adopted without change also are discussed below.

Access rights. The Agencies received a number of comments

suggesting that the reference to ``access rights to customer

information'' in paragraph III.C.1.a. of the proposal could be

interpreted to mean providing customers with a right of access to

financial information. The reference was intended to refer to

limitations on employee access to customer financial information, not

to customer access to financial information. However, this element has

been deleted since limitations on employee access are covered

adequately in other parts of paragraph III.C.1. (See discussion of

``access controls'' in paragraph III.C.1.a. of the final Guidelines,

below.)

Access controls. Paragraph III.C.1.b. of the proposed Guidelines

required a financial institution to consider appropriate access

controls when establishing its information security policies and

procedures. These controls were intended to address unauthorized access

to an institution's customer information by anyone, whether or not

employed by the institution

the final Guidelines,

below.)

Access controls. Paragraph III.C.1.b. of the proposed Guidelines

required a financial institution to consider appropriate access

controls when establishing its information security policies and

procedures. These controls were intended to address unauthorized access

to an institution's customer information by anyone, whether or not

employed by the institution.

The Agencies believe that this element sufficiently addresses the

concept of unauthorized access, regardless of who is attempting to

obtain access. This would cover, for instance, attempts through pretext

calling to gather information about a financial institution's

customers.\11\ The Agencies have amended the final Guidelines to refer

specifically to pretext calling in new III.C.1.a. The Agencies do not

intend for the final Guidelines to require a financial institution to

provide its customers with access to information the institution has

gathered. Instead, the provision in the final Guidelines addressing

access is limited solely to the issue of preventing unauthorized access

to customer information.

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\11\ Pretext calling is a fraudulent means of obtaining an

individual's personal information by persons posing as bank

customers.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Agencies have deleted the reference in the proposed paragraph

III.C.1.b. to providing access to authorized companies. This change was

made partly in response to commenters who objected to what they

perceived to be an inappropriate expansion of the scope of the

Guidelines to include company records and partly in recognition of the

fact that access to records would be obtained, in any case, only

through requests by individuals

e in the proposed paragraph

III.C.1.b. to providing access to authorized companies. This change was

made partly in response to commenters who objected to what they

perceived to be an inappropriate expansion of the scope of the

Guidelines to include company records and partly in recognition of the

fact that access to records would be obtained, in any case, only

through requests by individuals. The final Guidelines require an

institution to consider the need for access controls in light of the

institution's various customer information systems and adopt such

controls as appropriate.

Dual control procedures. Paragraph III.C.1.f. of the proposed

Guidelines stated that financial institutions should consider dual

control procedures, segregation of duties, and employee background

checks for employees with responsibility for, or access to, customer

information. Most of the comments on this paragraph focused on dual

control procedures, which refers to a security technique that uses two

or more separate persons, operating together to protect sensitive

information. Both persons are equally responsible for protecting the

information and neither can access the information alone.

According to one commenter, dual controls are part of normal audit

procedures and did not need to be restated. Other commenters suggested

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that dual control procedures are not always necessary, implying that

these procedures are not the norm. The Agencies recognize that dual-

control procedures are not necessary for all activities, but might be

appropriate for higher-risk activities. Given that the Guidelines state

only that dual control procedures should be considered by a financial

institution and adopted only if appropriate for the institution, the

Agencies have retained a reference to dual control procedures in the

items to be considered (paragraph III.C.1.e).

Oversight of servicers

necessary for all activities, but might be

appropriate for higher-risk activities. Given that the Guidelines state

only that dual control procedures should be considered by a financial

institution and adopted only if appropriate for the institution, the

Agencies have retained a reference to dual control procedures in the

items to be considered (paragraph III.C.1.e).

Oversight of servicers. Paragraph III.C.1.g. of the proposal was

deleted. Instead, the final Guidelines consolidate the provisions

related to service providers in paragraph III.D.

Physical hazards and technical failures. The paragraphs of the

proposed Guidelines addressing protection against destruction due to

physical hazards and technological failures (paragraphs III.C.1.j. and

k., respectively, of the proposal) have been consolidated in paragraph

III.C.1.h. of the final Guidelines. The Agencies believe that this

change improves clarity and recognizes that disaster recovery from

environmental and technological failures often involve the same

considerations.

Training (III.C.2.). Paragraph III.C.2. of the proposed Guidelines

provided that an institution's information security program should

include a training component designed to train employees to recognize,

respond to, and report unauthorized attempts to obtain customer

information. The Agencies received several comments suggesting that

this provision directed staff of financial institutions to report

suspected attempts to obtain customer information to law enforcement

agencies rather than to the management of the financial institution.

The Agencies did not intend that result, and note that nothing in the

Guidelines alters other applicable requirements and procedures for

reporting suspicious activities

ments suggesting that

this provision directed staff of financial institutions to report

suspected attempts to obtain customer information to law enforcement

agencies rather than to the management of the financial institution.

The Agencies did not intend that result, and note that nothing in the

Guidelines alters other applicable requirements and procedures for

reporting suspicious activities. For purposes of these Guidelines, the

Agencies believe that, as part of a training program, staff should be

made aware both of federal reporting requirements and an institution's

procedures for reporting suspicious activities, including attempts to

obtain access to customer information without proper authority.

The final Guidelines amend the provision governing training to

state that a financial institution's information security program

should include a training component designed to implement the

institution's information security policies and procedures. The

Agencies believe that the appropriate focus for the training should be

on compliance with the institution's security program generally and not

just on the limited aspects identified in proposed III.C.2. The

provisions governing reporting have been moved to paragraph III.C.1.g.,

which addresses response programs in general.

Testing (III.C.3.). Paragraph III.C.3. of the proposed Guidelines

provided that an information security program should include regular

testing of key controls, systems, and procedures. The proposal provided

that the frequency and nature of the testing should be determined by

the risk assessment and adjusted as necessary to reflect changes in

both internal and external conditions. The proposal also provided that

the tests are to be conducted, where appropriate, by independent third

parties or staff independent of those that develop or maintain the

security program. Finally, the proposal stated that test results are to

be reviewed by independent third parties or staff independent of those

that

[[Page 8623]]

y to reflect changes in

both internal and external conditions. The proposal also provided that

the tests are to be conducted, where appropriate, by independent third

parties or staff independent of those that develop or maintain the

security program. Finally, the proposal stated that test results are to

be reviewed by independent third parties or staff independent of those

that

[[Page 8623]]

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conducted the test. The Agencies requested comment on whether specific

types of security tests, such as penetration tests or intrusion

detection tests, should be required.

The most frequent comment regarding testing of key controls was

that the Agencies should not require specific tests. Commenters noted

that because technology changes rapidly, the tests specified in the

Guidelines will become obsolete and other tests will become the

standard. Consequently, according to these commenters, the Guidelines

should identify areas where testing may be appropriate without

requiring a financial institution to implement a specific test or

testing procedure. Several commenters noted that periodic testing of

information security controls is a sound idea and is an appropriate

standard for inclusion in these Guidelines.

The Agencies believe that a variety of tests may be used to ensure

the controls, systems, and procedures of the information security

program work properly and also recognize that such tests will

progressively change over time. The Agencies believe that the

particular tests that may be applied should be left to the discretion

of management rather than specified in advance in these Guidelines.

Accordingly, the final Guidelines do not require a financial

institution to apply specific tests to evaluate the key control systems

of its information security program

nize that such tests will

progressively change over time. The Agencies believe that the

particular tests that may be applied should be left to the discretion

of management rather than specified in advance in these Guidelines.

Accordingly, the final Guidelines do not require a financial

institution to apply specific tests to evaluate the key control systems

of its information security program.

The Agencies also invited comment regarding the appropriate degree

of independence that should be specified in the Guidelines in

connection with the testing of information security systems and the

review of test results. The proposal asked whether the tests or reviews

of tests be conducted by persons who are not employees of the financial

institution. The proposal also asked whether employees may conduct the

testing or may review test results, and what measures, if any, are

appropriate to assure their independence.

Some commenters interpreted the proposal as requiring three

separate teams of people to provide sufficient independence to control

testing: one team to operate the system; a second team to test the

system; and a third team to review test results. This approach, they

argued, would be too burdensome and expensive to implement. The

Agencies believe that the critical need for independence is between

those who operate the systems and those who either test them or review

the test results. Therefore, the final Guidelines now require that

tests should be conducted or reviewed by persons who are independent of

those who operate the systems, including the management of those

systems.

Whether a financial institution should use third parties to either

conduct tests or review their results depends upon a number of factors.

Some financial institutions may have the capability to thoroughly test

certain systems in-house and review the test results but will need the

assistance of third party testers to assess other systems

systems, including the management of those

systems.

Whether a financial institution should use third parties to either

conduct tests or review their results depends upon a number of factors.

Some financial institutions may have the capability to thoroughly test

certain systems in-house and review the test results but will need the

assistance of third party testers to assess other systems. For example,

an institution's internal audit department may be sufficiently trained

and independent for the purposes of testing certain key controls and

providing test results to decision makers independent of system

managers. Some testing may be conducted by third parties in connection

with the actual installation or modification of a particular program.

In each instance, management needs to weigh the benefits of testing and

test review by third parties against its own resources in this area,

both in terms of expense and reliability.

Ongoing adjustment of program. Paragraph III.C.4. of the proposal

required an institution to monitor, evaluate and adjust, as

appropriate, the information security program in light of any relevant

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changes in technology, the sensitivity of its customer information, and

internal or external threats to information security. This provision

was previously located in the paragraph titled ``Manage and Control

Risk''. While there were no comments on this provision, the Agencies

wanted to highlight this concept and clarify that this provision is

applicable to an institutions' entire information security program.

Therefore, this provision is now separately identified as new paragraph

III.E. of the final Guidelines, discussed below.

III.D. Oversee Service Provider Arrangements

The Agencies' proposal addressed service providers in two

provisions

vision, the Agencies

wanted to highlight this concept and clarify that this provision is

applicable to an institutions' entire information security program.

Therefore, this provision is now separately identified as new paragraph

III.E. of the final Guidelines, discussed below.

III.D. Oversee Service Provider Arrangements

The Agencies' proposal addressed service providers in two

provisions. The Agencies provided that an institution should consider

contract provisions and oversight mechanisms to protect the security of

customer information maintained or processed by service providers as

one of the proposed elements to be considered in establishing risk

management policies and procedures (proposed paragraph III.C.1.g.).

Additionally, proposed paragraph III.D. provided that, when an

institution uses an outsourcing arrangement, the institution would

continue to be responsible for safeguarding customer information that

it gives to the service provider. That proposed paragraph also provided

that the institution must use due diligence in managing and monitoring

the outsourcing arrangement to confirm that its service providers would

protect customer information consistent with the Guidelines.

The Agencies requested comment on the appropriate treatment of

outsourcing arrangements, such as whether industry best practices are

available regarding effective monitoring of service provider security

precautions, whether service providers accommodate requests for

specific contract provisions regarding information security, and, to

the extent that service providers do not accommodate these requests,

whether financial institutions implement effective information security

programs. The Agencies also requested comment on whether institutions

would find it helpful if the Guidelines contained specific contract

provisions requiring service provider performance standards in

connection with the security of customer information

the extent that service providers do not accommodate these requests,

whether financial institutions implement effective information security

programs. The Agencies also requested comment on whether institutions

would find it helpful if the Guidelines contained specific contract

provisions requiring service provider performance standards in

connection with the security of customer information.

The Agencies received one example of best practices, but the

commenter did not recommend that they be included in the Guidelines.

While some commenters suggested that the Guidelines include best

practices, other commenters stated that, given the various types of

financial institutions, there could be a variety of best industry

practices. Another commenter stated that best practices could become

minimum requirements that result in inappropriate burdens. The Agencies

recognize that information security practices are likely to evolve

rapidly, and thus believe that it is inappropriate to include best

practices in the final Guidelines.

Commenters were mixed as to whether service providers are receptive

to contract modifications to protect customer information. Commenters

were uniform, however, in stating that an institution's obligation to

monitor service providers should not include on-site audits by the

institution or its agent. The commenters stated that, in addition to

the expense for financial institutions, the procedure would place an

inordinate burden on many service providers that process customer

information for multiple institutions. Several commenters noted that

the service providers often contract for audits of their systems and

that institutions should be able to rely upon those testing procedures.

Some commenters recommended that an institution's responsibility for

information given to service providers require only that the

burden on many service providers that process customer

information for multiple institutions. Several commenters noted that

the service providers often contract for audits of their systems and

that institutions should be able to rely upon those testing procedures.

Some commenters recommended that an institution's responsibility for

information given to service providers require only that the

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institution enter into appropriate contractual arrangements. However,

commenters also indicated that requiring specific

[[Page 8624]]

contract provisions would not be consistent with the development of

flexible Guidelines and recommended against the inclusion of specific

provisions.

The Agencies believe that financial institutions should enter into

appropriate contracts, but also believe that these contracts, alone,

are not sufficient. Therefore, the final Guidelines, in paragraph

III.D., include provisions relating to selecting, contracting with, and

monitoring service providers.

The final Guidelines require that an institution exercise

appropriate due diligence in the selection of service providers. Due

diligence should include a review of the measures taken by a service

provider to protect customer information. As previously noted in the

discussion of ``service provider'', it also should include a review of

the controls the service provider has in place to ensure that any

subservicer used by the service provider will be able to meet the

objectives of these Guidelines.

The final Guidelines also require that a financial institution have

a contract with each of its service providers that requires each

provider to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the

objectives of these Guidelines (as stated in paragraph II.B.). This

provision does not require a service provider to have a security

program in place that complies with each paragraph of these Guidelines

inal Guidelines also require that a financial institution have

a contract with each of its service providers that requires each

provider to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the

objectives of these Guidelines (as stated in paragraph II.B.). This

provision does not require a service provider to have a security

program in place that complies with each paragraph of these Guidelines.

Instead, by stating that a service provider's security measures need

only achieve the objectives of these Guidelines, the Guidelines provide

flexibility for a service provider's information security measures to

differ from the program that a financial institution implements. The

Agencies have provided a two-year transition period during which

institutions may bring their outsourcing contracts into compliance.

(See discussion of paragraph III.F.) The Agencies have not included

model contract language, given our belief that the precise terms of

service contracts are best left to the parties involved.

Each financial institution must also exercise an appropriate level

of oversight over each of its service providers to confirm that the

service provider is implementing the provider's security measures. The

Agencies have amended the Guidelines as proposed to include greater

flexibility with regard to the monitoring of service providers. A

financial institution need only monitor its outsourcing arrangements if

such oversight is indicated by an institution's own risk assessment.

The Agencies recognize that not all outsourcing arrangements will need

to be monitored or monitored in the same fashion. Some service

providers will be financial institutions that are directly subject to

these Guidelines or other standards promulgated by their primary

regulator under section 501(b). Other service providers may already be

subject to legal and professional standards that require them to

safeguard the institution's customer information

s will need

to be monitored or monitored in the same fashion. Some service

providers will be financial institutions that are directly subject to

these Guidelines or other standards promulgated by their primary

regulator under section 501(b). Other service providers may already be

subject to legal and professional standards that require them to

safeguard the institution's customer information. Therefore, the final

Guidelines permit an institution to do a risk assessment taking these

factors into account and determine for themselves which service

providers will need to be monitored.

Even where monitoring is warranted, the Guidelines do not require

on-site inspections. Instead, the Guidelines state that this monitoring

can be accomplished, for example, through the periodic review of the

service provider's associated audits, summaries of test results, or

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equivalent measures of the service provider. The Agencies expect that

institutions will arrange, when appropriate, through contracts or

otherwise, to receive copies of audits and test result information

sufficient to assure the institution that the service provider

implements information security measures that are consistent with its

contract provisions regarding the security of customer information. The

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Statement of

Auditing Standards No. 70, captioned ``Reports on the Processing of

Transactions by Service Organizations'' (SAS 70 report), is one

commonly used external audit tool for service providers. Information

contained in an SAS 70 report may enable an institution to assess

whether its service provider has information security measures that are

consistent with representations made to the institution during the

service provider selection process.

III.E. Adjust the Program

Paragraphs III.B.3 and III.C.4

(SAS 70 report), is one

commonly used external audit tool for service providers. Information

contained in an SAS 70 report may enable an institution to assess

whether its service provider has information security measures that are

consistent with representations made to the institution during the

service provider selection process.

III.E. Adjust the Program

Paragraphs III.B.3 and III.C.4. of the proposed Guidelines both

addressed a financial institution's obligations when circumstances

change. Both paragraph III.B.3. (which set forth management's

responsibilities with respect to its risk assessment) and paragraph

III.C.4. (which focused on the adequacy of an institution's information

security program) identified the possible need for changes to an

institution's program in light of relevant changes to technology, the

sensitivity of customer information, and internal or external threats

to the information security.

The Agencies received no comments objecting to the statements in

these paragraphs of the need to adjust a financial institution's

program as circumstances change. While the Agencies have not changed

the substance of these provisions in the final Guidelines, we have,

however, made a stylistic change to simplify the Guidelines. The final

Guidelines combine, in paragraph III.E., the provisions previously

stated separately. Consistent with the proposal, this paragraph

provides that each financial institution must monitor, evaluate, and

adjust its information security program in light of relevant changes in

technology, the sensitivity of its customer information, internal or

external threats to information, and the institution's own changing

business arrangements

.E., the provisions previously

stated separately. Consistent with the proposal, this paragraph

provides that each financial institution must monitor, evaluate, and

adjust its information security program in light of relevant changes in

technology, the sensitivity of its customer information, internal or

external threats to information, and the institution's own changing

business arrangements. This would include an analysis of risks to

customer information posed by new technology (and any needed program

adjustments) before a financial institution adopts the technology in

order to determine whether a security program remains adequate in light

of the new risks presented.\12\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ For additional information concerning how a financial

institution should identify, measure, monitor, and control risks

associated with the use of technology, see OCC Bulletin 98-3

concerning technology risk management, which may be obtained on the

Internet at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/98-3.txt.; Federal

Reserve SR Letter 98-9 on Assessment of Information Technology in

the Risk-Focused Frameworks for the Supervision of Community Banks

and Large Complex Banking Organizations, April 20, 1998, http://

www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/1998/SR9809.HTM; FDIC FIL

99-68 concerning risk assessment tools and practices for information

security systems at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/

fil9968.html.; OTS's CEO Letter 70, Statement on Retail On-Line

Personal Computer Banking, (June 23, 1997), available at http://

and Large Complex Banking Organizations, April 20, 1998, http://

www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/1998/SR9809.HTM; FDIC FIL

99-68 concerning risk assessment tools and practices for information

security systems at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/

fil9968.html.; OTS's CEO Letter 70, Statement on Retail On-Line

Personal Computer Banking, (June 23, 1997), available at http://

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www.ots.treas.gov/docs/25070.pdf.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III.F. Report to the Board

Paragraph III.A.2.c. of the proposal set out management's

responsibilities for reporting to its board of directors. As previously

discussed, the final Guidelines have removed specific requirements for

management, but instead allow a financial institution to determine who

within the organization should carry out a given responsibility. The

board reporting requirement thus has been amended to require that a

financial institution report to its board, and that this report be at

least annual. Paragraph III.F. of the final Guidelines sets out this

requirement.

The Agencies invited comment regarding the appropriate frequency of

reports to the board, including whether reports should be monthly,

quarterly, or annually. The Agencies received a number of comments

recommending that no specific frequency be mandated by the Guidelines

and that each financial institution be permitted to establish its own

reporting period.

[[Page 8625]]

Several commenters stated that if a reporting period is required, then

it should be not less than annually unless some material event triggers

the need for an interim report.

The Agencies expect that in all cases, management will provide its

board (or the appropriate board committee) a written report on the

information security program consistent with the Guidelines at least

annually

25]]

Several commenters stated that if a reporting period is required, then

it should be not less than annually unless some material event triggers

the need for an interim report.

The Agencies expect that in all cases, management will provide its

board (or the appropriate board committee) a written report on the

information security program consistent with the Guidelines at least

annually. Management of financial institutions with more complex

information systems may find it necessary to provide information to the

board (or a committee) on a more frequent basis. Similarly, more

frequent reporting will be appropriate whenever a material event

affecting the system occurs or a material modification is made to the

system. The Agencies expect that the content of these reports will vary

for each financial institution, depending upon the nature and scope of

its activities as well as the different circumstances that it will

confront as it implements and maintains its program.

III.G. Implement the Standards

Paragraph III.E. of the proposal described the timing requirements

for the implementation of these standards. It provided that each

financial institution is to take appropriate steps to fully implement

an information security program pursuant to these Guidelines by July 1,

2001.

The Agencies received several comments suggesting that the proposed

effective date be extended for a period of 12 to 18 months because

financial institutions are currently involved in efforts to meet the

requirements of the final Privacy Rule by the compliance deadline, July

1, 2001. The Agencies believe that the dates for full compliance with

these Guidelines and the Privacy Rule should coincide. Financial

institutions are required, as part of their initial privacy notices, to

disclose their policies and practices with respect to protecting the

confidentiality and security of nonpublic personal information. See

Sec. __.6(a)(8)

e by the compliance deadline, July

1, 2001. The Agencies believe that the dates for full compliance with

these Guidelines and the Privacy Rule should coincide. Financial

institutions are required, as part of their initial privacy notices, to

disclose their policies and practices with respect to protecting the

confidentiality and security of nonpublic personal information. See

Sec. __.6(a)(8). Each Agency has provided in the appendix to its

Privacy Rule that a financial institution may satisfy this disclosure

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requirement by advising its customers that the institution maintains

physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards that comply with

federal standards to guard customers' nonpublic personal information.

See appendix A-7. The Agencies believe that this disclosure will be

meaningful only if the final Guidelines are effective when the

disclosure is made. If the effective date of these Guidelines is

extended beyond July 1, 2001, then a financial institution may be

placed in the position of providing an initial notice regarding

confidentiality and security and thereafter amending the privacy policy

to accurately refer to the federal standards once they became

effective. For these reasons, the Agencies have retained July 1, 2001,

as the effective date for these Guidelines.

However, the Agencies have included a transition rule for contracts

with service providers. The transition rule, which parallels a similar

provision in the Privacy Rule, provides a two-year period for

grandfathering existing contracts. Thus a contract entered into on or

before the date that is 30 days after publication of the final

Guidelines in the Federal Register satisfies the provisions of this

part until July 1, 2003, even if the contract does not include

provisions delineating the servicer's duties and responsibilities to

protect customer information described in paragraph III.D

for

grandfathering existing contracts. Thus a contract entered into on or

before the date that is 30 days after publication of the final

Guidelines in the Federal Register satisfies the provisions of this

part until July 1, 2003, even if the contract does not include

provisions delineating the servicer's duties and responsibilities to

protect customer information described in paragraph III.D.

Location of Guidelines: These guidelines have been published as an

appendix to each Agency's Standards for Safety and Soundness. For the

OCC, those regulations appear at 12 CFR part 30; for the Board, at 12

CFR part 208; for the FDIC, at 12 CFR part 364; and for the OTS, at 12

CFR part 570. The Board also is amending 12 CFR parts 211 and 225 to

apply the Guidelines to other institutions that it supervises.

The Agencies will apply the rules already in place to require the

submission of a compliance plan in appropriate circumstances. For the

OCC, those regulations appear at 12 CFR part 30; for the Board at 12

CFR part 263; for the FDIC at 12 CFR part 308, subpart R; and for the

OTS at 12 CFR part 570. The final rules make conforming changes to the

regulatory text of these parts.

Rescission of Year 2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness: The

Agencies previously issued guidelines establishing Year 2000 safety and

soundness standards for insured depository institutions pursuant to

section 39 of the FDI Act. Because the events for which these standards

were issued have passed, the Agencies have concluded that the

guidelines are no longer necessary and proposed to rescind the

standards as part of this rulemaking. The Agencies requested comment on

whether rescission of these standards is appropriate. Those commenters

responding to this request were unanimous in recommending the

rescission of the Year 2000 Standards, and the Agencies have rescinded

these standards

d, the Agencies have concluded that the

guidelines are no longer necessary and proposed to rescind the

standards as part of this rulemaking. The Agencies requested comment on

whether rescission of these standards is appropriate. Those commenters

responding to this request were unanimous in recommending the

rescission of the Year 2000 Standards, and the Agencies have rescinded

these standards. These standards appeared for the OCC at 12 CFR part

30, appendix B and C; for the Board at 12 CFR part 208, appendix D-2;

for the FDIC at 12 CFR part 364, appendix B; and for the OTS at 12 CFR

part 570, appendix B. Accordingly, the Agencies hereby rescind the Year

2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness, effective thirty (30) days

after the publication date of this notice of the joint final rule.

IV. Regulatory Analysis

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Agencies have determined that this rule does not involve a

collection of information pursuant to the provisions of the Paperwork

Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

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B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

OCC: Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), the OCC must

either provide a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) with

these final Guidelines or certify that the final Guidelines ``will not,

if promulgated'', have a significant economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities.\13\ The OCC has evaluated the effects of

these Guidelines on small entities and is providing the following FRFA.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\13\ The RFA defines the term ``small entity'' in 5 U.S.C. 601

by reference to a definition published by the Small Business

Administration (SBA). The SBA has defined a ``small entity'' for

banking purposes as a national or commercial bank, or savings

institution with less than $100 million in assets. See 13 CFR

121.201

----------------------------------------------------------------------

\13\ The RFA defines the term ``small entity'' in 5 U.S.C. 601

by reference to a definition published by the Small Business

Administration (SBA). The SBA has defined a ``small entity'' for

banking purposes as a national or commercial bank, or savings

institution with less than $100 million in assets. See 13 CFR

121.201.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Although the OCC specifically sought comment on the costs to small

entities of establishing and operating information security programs,

no commenters provided specific cost information. Instead, commenters

confirmed the OCC's conclusion that most if not all institutions

already have information security programs in place, because the

standards reflect good business practices and existing OCC and FFIEC

guidance. Some comments indicated, however, that institutions will have

to formalize or enhance their information security programs.

Accordingly, the OCC considered certifying, under section 605(b) of the

RFA, that these Guidelines will not have a significant economic impact

on a substantial number of small entities. However, given that the

guidance previously issued by the OCC and the FFIEC is not completely

identical to the Guidelines being adopted in this rulemaking, the

Guidelines are likely to have some impact on all affected institutions.

While the OCC believes that this impact will not be substantial in the

case of most small entities, we nevertheless have prepared the

following FRFA.

[[Page 8626]]

1. Reasons for Final Action

The OCC is issuing these Guidelines under section 501(b) of the G-

L-B Act

the Guidelines being adopted in this rulemaking, the

Guidelines are likely to have some impact on all affected institutions.

While the OCC believes that this impact will not be substantial in the

case of most small entities, we nevertheless have prepared the

following FRFA.

[[Page 8626]]

1. Reasons for Final Action

The OCC is issuing these Guidelines under section 501(b) of the G-

L-B Act. Section 501(b) requires the OCC to publish standards for

financial institutions subject to its jurisdiction relating to

administrative, technical and physical standards to: (1) insure the

security and confidentiality of customer records and information; (2)

protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or

integrity of such records; and (3) protect against unauthorized access

to or use of such records or information which could result in

substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.

2. Objectives of and Legal Basis for Final Action

The objectives of the Guidelines are described in the Supplementary

Information section above. The legal bases for the Guidelines are: 12

U.S.C. 93a, 1818, 1831p-1, and 3102(b) and 15 USC 6801 and 6805(b)(1).

3. Small Entities to Which the Rule Will Apply

The OCC's final Guidelines will apply to approximately 2300

institutions, including national banks, federal branches and federal

agencies of foreign banks, and certain subsidiaries of such entities.

tary

Information section above. The legal bases for the Guidelines are: 12

U.S.C. 93a, 1818, 1831p-1, and 3102(b) and 15 USC 6801 and 6805(b)(1).

3. Small Entities to Which the Rule Will Apply

The OCC's final Guidelines will apply to approximately 2300

institutions, including national banks, federal branches and federal

agencies of foreign banks, and certain subsidiaries of such entities.

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The OCC estimates that approximately 1125 of these institutions are

small institutions with assets less than $100 million.

4. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance

Requirements; Skills Required

The Guidelines do not require any reports to the OCC, however, they

require all covered institutions to develop and implement a written

information security program comprised of several elements.

Institutions must assess the risks to their customer information and

adopt appropriate measures to control those risks. Institutions must

then test these security measures and adjust their information security

programs in light of any relevant changes. In addition, institutions

must use appropriate due diligence in selecting service providers, and

require service providers, by contract, to implement appropriate

security measures. The Guidelines also require institutions to monitor

their service providers, where appropriate, to confirm they have met

their contractual obligations. Finally, the Guidelines require the

board of directors or an appropriate committee of the board of each

institution to approve the institution's information security program

and to oversee its implementation. To facilitate board oversight, the

institution must provide to the board or to the board committee a

report, at least annually, describing the overall status of the

institution's information security program and the institution's

compliance with the Guidelines

mmittee of the board of each

institution to approve the institution's information security program

and to oversee its implementation. To facilitate board oversight, the

institution must provide to the board or to the board committee a

report, at least annually, describing the overall status of the

institution's information security program and the institution's

compliance with the Guidelines.

Because the information security program described above reflects

existing supervisory guidance, the OCC believes that most institutions

already have the expertise to develop, implement, and maintain the

program. However, if they have not already done so, institutions will

have to retain the services of someone capable of assessing threats to

the institution's customer information. Institutions that lack an

adequate information security program also will have to have personnel

capable of developing, implementing and testing security measures to

address these threats. Institutions that use service providers may

require legal skills to draft appropriate language for contracts with

service providers.

5. Public Comment and Significant Alternatives

The OCC did not receive any public comment on its initial

regulatory flexibility analysis, although it did receive comments on

the proposed Guidelines, and on the impact of the Guidelines on small

entities in particular. The comments received by the OCC and the other

Agencies are discussed at length in the supplementary information

above. While some commenters suggested that the OCC exempt small

institutions altogether, the OCC has no authority under the statute to

do so. The discussion below reviews the changes adopted in the final

Guidelines that will minimize the economic impact of the Guidelines on

all businesses

nts received by the OCC and the other

Agencies are discussed at length in the supplementary information

above. While some commenters suggested that the OCC exempt small

institutions altogether, the OCC has no authority under the statute to

do so. The discussion below reviews the changes adopted in the final

Guidelines that will minimize the economic impact of the Guidelines on

all businesses.

The OCC carefully considered comments from small entities that

encouraged the Agencies to issue guidelines that are not overly

prescriptive, that provide flexibility in the design of an information

security program, but that still provide small entities with some

guidance. After considering these comments, the OCC determined that it

is appropriate to issue the standards as Guidelines that allow each

institution the discretion to design an information security program

that suits its particular size and complexity and the nature and scope

of its activities. The OCC considered issuing broader Guidelines that

would only identify objectives to be achieved while leaving it up to

each institution to decide what steps it should take to ensure that it

meets these objectives. However, the OCC concluded that such broad

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guidance ultimately would be less helpful than would be guidelines that

combine the flexibility sought by commenters with meaningful guidance

on factors that an institution should consider and steps that the

institution should take. The OCC also considered the utility of more

prescriptive guidelines, but rejected that approach out of concern that

it likely would be more burdensome, could interfere with innovation,

and could impose requirements that would be inappropriate in a given

situation

by commenters with meaningful guidance

on factors that an institution should consider and steps that the

institution should take. The OCC also considered the utility of more

prescriptive guidelines, but rejected that approach out of concern that

it likely would be more burdensome, could interfere with innovation,

and could impose requirements that would be inappropriate in a given

situation. While the Guidelines are not overly detailed, they provide

guidance by establishing the process an institution will need to follow

in order to protect its customer information and by identifying

security measures that are likely to have the greatest applicability to

national banks in general.

Most commenters supported the use of the more narrow definition of

``customer'' in the Guidelines as is used in the Privacy Rule rather

than a broad definition that would apply to all records under the

control of a financial institution. Commenters maintained that two

different definitions would be confusing and also inconsistent with the

use of the term ``customer'' in section 501 of the G-L-B Act. The OCC

considered using the broader definition, but determined that

information security could be addressed more broadly through other

vehicles. For the sake of consistency, the final Guidelines adopt the

narrower definition and apply only to records of consumers who have

established a continuing relationship with an institution under which

the institution provides one or more financial products or services to

the consumer to be used primarily for personal, family or household

purposes, the definition used in the Privacy Rule.

Many commenters criticized the list of proposed objectives for each

financial institution's information security program which generally

reflected the statutory objectives in section 501(b). According to

these comments, the objectives were stated in a manner that made them

absolute, unachievable, and therefore burdensome

mily or household

purposes, the definition used in the Privacy Rule.

Many commenters criticized the list of proposed objectives for each

financial institution's information security program which generally

reflected the statutory objectives in section 501(b). According to

these comments, the objectives were stated in a manner that made them

absolute, unachievable, and therefore burdensome. The final Guidelines

have been drafted to clarify these objectives by stating that each

security program is to be ``designed'' to accomplish the objectives

stated.

Commenters wanted board involvement in the development and

implementation of an information security program left to the

discretion of the financial institution. Commenters also asked the OCC

to clarify that the board may delegate to a committee responsibility

for involvement in the

[[Page 8627]]

institution's security program. While the final Guidelines as drafted

continue to place responsibility on an institution's board to approve

and exercise general oversight over the program, they now clarify that

a committee of the board may approve the institution's written security

program. In addition, the Guidelines permit the board to assign

specific implementation responsibilities to a committee or an

individual.

The OCC considered requiring an institution to designate a

Corporate Security Officer. However, the agency agreed with commenters

that a financial institution is in the best position to determine who

should be assigned specific roles in implementing the institution's

security program. Therefore, the Guidelines do not include this

requirement.

The proposal identifying various security measures that an

institution should consider in evaluating the adequacy of its policies

r. However, the agency agreed with commenters

that a financial institution is in the best position to determine who

should be assigned specific roles in implementing the institution's

security program. Therefore, the Guidelines do not include this

requirement.

The proposal identifying various security measures that an

institution should consider in evaluating the adequacy of its policies

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and procedures was criticized by many commenters. These commenters

misinterpreted the list of measures and believed each measure to be

mandatory. Small entities commented that these measures were overly

comprehensive and burdensome. As discussed previously in the preamble,

the OCC did not intend to suggest that every institution must adopt

every one of the measures. To highlight the OCC's intention that an

institution must determine for itself which measures will be

appropriate for its own risk profile, the final Guidelines now clearly

state that each financial institution must consider whether the

security elements listed are appropriate for the institution and, if

so, adopt those elements an institution concludes are appropriate.

Commenters noted that testing could be burdensome and costly,

especially for small entities. The OCC considered mandating specific

tests, but determined that with changes in technology, such tests could

become obsolete. Therefore, the final Guidelines permit management to

exercise its discretion to determine the frequency and types of tests

that need to be conducted. The OCC considered required testing or the

review of tests to be conducted by outside auditors. The OCC determined

that these duties could be performed effectively by an institution's

own staff, if staff selected is sufficiently independent

ete. Therefore, the final Guidelines permit management to

exercise its discretion to determine the frequency and types of tests

that need to be conducted. The OCC considered required testing or the

review of tests to be conducted by outside auditors. The OCC determined

that these duties could be performed effectively by an institution's

own staff, if staff selected is sufficiently independent. Therefore,

the Guidelines permit financial institutions to determine for

themselves whether to use third parties to either conduct tests or

review their results or to use staff independent of those that develop

or maintain the institution's security program.

Many commenters objected to provisions in the proposal requiring

institutions to monitor their service providers. Commenters asserted

that it would be burdensome to require them to monitor the activities

of their service providers and that information security of service

providers should be handled through contractual arrangements. The final

Guidelines include greater flexibility with regard to the monitoring of

service providers than was provided in the proposal. The final

Guidelines recognize that some service providers will be financial

institutions that are directly subject to these Guidelines or other

standards promulgated under section 501(b) and that other service

providers may already be subject to legal and professional standards

that require them to safeguard the institution's customer information.

Therefore, the final Guidelines permit an institution to do a risk

assessment taking these factors into account and to determine for

themselves which service providers will need to be monitored. Where

monitoring is warranted, the Guidelines now specify that monitoring can

be accomplished, for example, through the periodic review of the

service provider's associated audits, summaries of test results, or

equivalent measures of the service provider

o do a risk

assessment taking these factors into account and to determine for

themselves which service providers will need to be monitored. Where

monitoring is warranted, the Guidelines now specify that monitoring can

be accomplished, for example, through the periodic review of the

service provider's associated audits, summaries of test results, or

equivalent measures of the service provider.

In addition, after considering the comments about contracts with

service providers and the effective date of the Guidelines, the OCC

also adopted a transition rule, similar to a provision in the Privacy

Rule, that grandfathers existing contracts for a two-year period.

One commenter requested that smaller community banks be given

additional time to comply with the Guidelines because having to comply

with the new Privacy Rule and these Guidelines will put a strain on the

resources of smaller banks. The OCC considered this request but did not

change the effective date of the Guidelines given the importance of

safeguarding customer information. In addition, most institutions

already have information security programs in place, and the OCC has

addressed this concern by adding flexibility to the final Guidelines in

a variety of other areas as described above.

Board: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 604) requires an

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agency to publish a final regulatory flexibility analysis when

promulgating a final rule that was subject to notice and comment.

Need for and objectives of Guidelines: As discussed above, these

Guidelines implement section 501 of the GLB Act. The objective of the

Guidelines is to establish standards for financial institutions that

are subject to the Board's jurisdiction to protect the security and

confidentiality of their customers' information

when

promulgating a final rule that was subject to notice and comment.

Need for and objectives of Guidelines: As discussed above, these

Guidelines implement section 501 of the GLB Act. The objective of the

Guidelines is to establish standards for financial institutions that

are subject to the Board's jurisdiction to protect the security and

confidentiality of their customers' information. In particular, the

Guidelines require those financial institutions to implement a

comprehensive written information security program that includes:

(1) Assessing the reasonably foreseeable internal and external

threats that could result in unauthorized disclosure, misuse,

alteration, or destruction of customer information;

(2) Adopting security measures that the financial institution

concludes are appropriate for it; and

(3) Overseeing its arrangements with its service provider(s).

Comments on the initial regulatory flexibility analysis: Although

few commenters addressed the initial regulatory flexibility analysis

specifically, many commenters addressed the regulatory burdens that

were discussed in that analysis. Several commenters noted that certain

aspects of the proposal may tax the comparatively limited resources of

small institutions, yet few commenters quantified the potential costs

of compliance. The comments received by the Board and the other

Agencies were discussed in the supplementary information above. Those

comments that are closely related to regulatory burden are highlighted

below:

The Board requested comment on the scope of the term ``customer''

for purposes of the Guidelines. Many commenters opposed expanding the

proposed scope of the Guidelines to apply to information about business

customers and consumers who have not established continuing

relationships with the financial institution

comments that are closely related to regulatory burden are highlighted

below:

The Board requested comment on the scope of the term ``customer''

for purposes of the Guidelines. Many commenters opposed expanding the

proposed scope of the Guidelines to apply to information about business

customers and consumers who have not established continuing

relationships with the financial institution. The commenters stated

that an expanded scope would impose higher costs of developing an

information security program and would be inconsistent with the use of

the term ``customer'' in section 501 of the GLB Act and the Agencies'

Privacy Rule. As explained in the supplementary information above, the

Board has defined ``customer'' in the final Guidelines in the same way

as that term is defined in section __.3(h) of the Agencies' Privacy

Rule.

Many commenters urged the Board to reduce the level of detail about

the kinds of measures that would be required to implement an

information security program under the proposed Guidelines. Commenters

argued, for instance, that requiring particular testing procedures of

security systems would make the standards too onerous for those

institutions for which other kinds of tests and audits would be more

suitable. In a similar vein, some commenters proposed that the Board

[[Page 8628]]

should issue examples that would illustrate the kinds of security

measures that, if adopted, would constitute compliance with the

Guidelines.

The Board believes that many commenters may have misinterpreted the

intent of the original proposal regarding the particular safeguards

that would be expected. The provision that requires each financial

institution to consider a variety of security measures has been

redrafted in an effort to clarify that the institution must determine

for itself which measures will be appropriate to its own risk profile.

Although an institution is required to consider each of the security

original proposal regarding the particular safeguards

that would be expected. The provision that requires each financial

institution to consider a variety of security measures has been

redrafted in an effort to clarify that the institution must determine

for itself which measures will be appropriate to its own risk profile.

Although an institution is required to consider each of the security

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measures listed in paragraph III.C.1., it is not obligated to

incorporate any particular security measures or particular testing

procedures into its information security program. Rather, the

institution may adopt those measures and use those tests that it

concludes are appropriate. The Board is mindful that institutions'

operations will vary in their complexity and scope of activities and

present different risk profiles to their customer information.

Accordingly, the Board has not established definitive security measures

that, if adopted, would constitute compliance with the Guidelines.

The Board asked for comments on several issues related to the

appropriate security standards pertaining to an institution's

arrangements with its service providers. As discussed above, many

comments addressed these issues and, notably, objected to a provision

that would require an institution to monitor its service providers

through on-site audits. Several commenters noted that the service

providers often contract for audits of their systems and argued that an

institution should be able to rely upon those testing procedures.

Commenters also recommended that an institution's responsibility for

information given to service providers require only that the

institution enter into appropriate contractual arrangements. The Board

has modified the Guidelines to clarify an institution's

responsibilities with respect to service providers

s and argued that an

institution should be able to rely upon those testing procedures.

Commenters also recommended that an institution's responsibility for

information given to service providers require only that the

institution enter into appropriate contractual arrangements. The Board

has modified the Guidelines to clarify an institution's

responsibilities with respect to service providers. The Board has not

designed a standard that would require a financial institution to

conduct an on-site audit of its service provider's security program.

Instead, the Board adopted a standard that requires an institution to

monitor its service provider to confirm that it has satisfied its

contractual obligations, depending upon the institution's risk

assessment. In the course of conducting its risk assessment and

determining which service providers will need to be monitored, an

institution may take into account the fact that some of its service

providers may be financial institutions that are directly subject to

these Guidelines or other standards promulgated by their primary

regulator under section 501(b). Furthermore, after considering the

comments about contracts with service providers and the effective date

of the Guidelines, the Board also adopted a transition rule, which

parallels a similar provision in the Privacy Rule, that provides a two-

year period for grandfathering existing contracts.

Many commenters addressed the burdens that would be imposed by the

proposal due to the effective date and urged the Board to extend the

proposed July 1, 2001, effective date for period ranging from one to

two years. Most of these commenters argued that complying with the

proposed Guidelines by July 1, 2001, would place a considerable burden

on their businesses, particularly because the Guidelines would mandate

changes to computer software, employee training, and compliance

systems

ctive date and urged the Board to extend the

proposed July 1, 2001, effective date for period ranging from one to

two years. Most of these commenters argued that complying with the

proposed Guidelines by July 1, 2001, would place a considerable burden

on their businesses, particularly because the Guidelines would mandate

changes to computer software, employee training, and compliance

systems. As discussed above, the Board believes that the dates for full

compliance with these Guidelines and the Privacy Rule should coincide.

Financial institutions are required, as part of their initial privacy

notices, to describe their policies and practices with respect to

protecting the confidentiality and security of nonpublic personal

information (12 CFR 216.6). The Board believes that if the effective

date of these Guidelines is extended beyond July 1, 2001, then a

financial institution may be placed in the position of providing an

initial notice regarding confidentiality and security and thereafter

amending the privacy policy to accurately refer to the federal

standards once they became effective. Accordingly, the Board has

adopted the proposed effective date of July 1, 2001.

Institutions covered. The Board's final Guidelines will apply to

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approximately 9,500 institutions, including state member banks, bank

holding companies and certain of their nonbank subsidiaries or

affiliates, state uninsured branches and agencies of foreign banks,

commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and

Edge and Agreement corporations. The Board estimates that over 4,500 of

the institutions are small institutions with assets less than $100

million.

New compliance requirements. The final Guidelines contain new

compliance requirements for all covered institutions, many of which are

contained in existing supervisory guidance and examination procedures

ned or controlled by foreign banks, and

Edge and Agreement corporations. The Board estimates that over 4,500 of

the institutions are small institutions with assets less than $100

million.

New compliance requirements. The final Guidelines contain new

compliance requirements for all covered institutions, many of which are

contained in existing supervisory guidance and examination procedures.

Nonetheless, each must develop and implement a written information

security program. As part of that program, institutions will be

required to assess the reasonably foreseeable risks, taking into

account the sensitivity of customer information, and assess the

sufficiency of policies and procedures in place to control those risks.

Institutions that use third party service providers to process customer

information must exercise appropriate due diligence in selecting them,

require them by contract to implement appropriate measures designed to

meet the objectives of these Guidelines, and depending upon the

institution's risk assessment, monitor them to confirm that they have

satisfied their contractual obligations. As part of its compliance

measures, an institution may need to train its employees or hire

individuals with professional skills suitable to implementing the

policies and procedures of its information security program, such as

those skills necessary to test or review tests of its security

measures. Some institutions may already have programs that meet these

requirements, but others may not.

Minimizing impact on small institutions. The Board believes the

requirements of the Act and these Guidelines may create additional

burden for some small institutions. The Guidelines apply to all covered

institutions, regardless of size. The Act does not provide the Board

with the authority to exempt a small institution from the requirement

of implementing administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to

protect the security and confidentiality of customer information

he Act and these Guidelines may create additional

burden for some small institutions. The Guidelines apply to all covered

institutions, regardless of size. The Act does not provide the Board

with the authority to exempt a small institution from the requirement

of implementing administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to

protect the security and confidentiality of customer information.

Although the Board could develop different guidelines depending on the

size and complexity of a financial institution, the Board believes that

differing treatment would not be appropriate, given that one of the

stated purposes of the Act is to protect the confidentiality and

security of customers' nonpublic personal information.

The Board believes that the compliance burden is minimized for

small institutions because the Guidelines expressly allow institutions

to develop security measures that are ``appropriate to the size and

complexity of the [institution]''. The Guidelines do not mandate any

particular policies, procedures, or security measures for any

institution other than general requirements, such as to ``train staff''

or ``monitor its service providers to confirm that they have satisfied

their [contractual] obligations''. The Board believes that the final

Guidelines vest a small institution with a broad degree of discretion

to design and implement an

[[Page 8629]]

information security program that suits its own organizational

structure and risk profile.

FDIC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (RFA)

requires, subject to certain exceptions, that federal agencies prepare

an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) with a proposed rule

t a small institution with a broad degree of discretion

to design and implement an

[[Page 8629]]

information security program that suits its own organizational

structure and risk profile.

FDIC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (RFA)

requires, subject to certain exceptions, that federal agencies prepare

an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) with a proposed rule

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and a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) with a final rule,

unless the agency certifies that the rule will not have a significant

economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.\14\ At the

time of issuance of the proposed Guidelines, the FDIC could not make

such a determination for certification. Therefore, the FDIC issued an

IRFA pursuant to section 603 of the RFA. After reviewing the comments

submitted in response to the proposed Guidelines, the FDIC believes

that it does not have sufficient information to determine whether the

final Guidelines would have a significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities. Hence, pursuant to section 604 of

the RFA, the FDIC provides the following FRFA.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ The RFA defines the term ``small entity'' in 5 U.S.C. 601

by reference to definitions published by the Small Business

Administration (SBA). The SBA has defined a ``small entity'' for

banking purposes as a national or commercial bank, or savings

institution with less than $100 million in assets. See 13 CFR

121.201

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ The RFA defines the term ``small entity'' in 5 U.S.C. 601

by reference to definitions published by the Small Business

Administration (SBA). The SBA has defined a ``small entity'' for

banking purposes as a national or commercial bank, or savings

institution with less than $100 million in assets. See 13 CFR

121.201.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This FRFA incorporates the FDIC's initial findings, as set forth in

the IRFA; addresses the comments submitted in response to the IRFA; and

describes the steps the FDIC has taken in the final rule to minimize

the impact on small entities, consistent with the objectives of the

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (G-L-B Act). Also, in accordance with section

212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

(Public Law 104-121), in the near future the FDIC will issue a

compliance guide to assist small entities in complying with these

Guidelines.

Small Entities to Which the Guidelines Will Apply

The final Guidelines will apply to all FDIC-insured state-nonmember

banks, regardless of size, including those with assets of under $100

million. As of September 2000, there were 3,331 small banks out of a

total of 5,130 FDIC-insured state-nonmember banks with assets of under

$100 million. Title V, Subtitle A, of the GLBA does not provide either

an exception for small banks or statutory authority upon which the FDIC

could provide such an exception in the Guidelines.

Statement of the Need and Objectives of the Rule

The final Guidelines implement the provisions of Title V, Subtitle

A, Section 501 of the GLBA addressing standards for safeguarding

customer information. Section 501 requires the Agencies to publish

standards for financial institutions relating to administrative,

technical, and physical standards to:

Insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and

information

the Rule

The final Guidelines implement the provisions of Title V, Subtitle

A, Section 501 of the GLBA addressing standards for safeguarding

customer information. Section 501 requires the Agencies to publish

standards for financial institutions relating to administrative,

technical, and physical standards to:

Insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and

information.

Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the

security or integrity of such records.

Protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or

information, which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience

to any customer.

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The final Guidelines do not represent any change in the policies of

the FDIC; rather they implement the G-L-B Act requirement to provide

appropriate standards relating to the security and confidentiality of

customer records.

Summary of Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments;

Description of Steps the Agency Has Taken in Response to the Comments

to Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities.

In the IRFA, the FDIC specifically requested information on whether

small entities would be required to amend their operations in order to

comply with the final Guidelines and the costs for such compliance. The

FDIC also requested comment or information on the costs of establishing

information security programs. The FDIC also sought comment on any

significant alternatives, consistent with the G-L-B Act that would

minimize the impact on small entities. The FDIC received a total of 63

comment letters. However, none of the comment letters specifically

addressed the initial regulatory flexibility act section of the

proposed Guidelines. Instead, many commenters, representing banks of

various sizes, addressed the regulatory burdens in connection with

their discussion of specific Guideline provisions

would

minimize the impact on small entities. The FDIC received a total of 63

comment letters. However, none of the comment letters specifically

addressed the initial regulatory flexibility act section of the

proposed Guidelines. Instead, many commenters, representing banks of

various sizes, addressed the regulatory burdens in connection with

their discussion of specific Guideline provisions.

The FDIC has sought to minimize the burden on all businesses,

including small entities, in promulgating this final Guidelines. The

statute does not authorize the FDIC to create exemptions from the G-L-B

Act based on an institution's asset size. However, the FDIC carefully

considered comments regarding alternatives designed to minimize the

economic and overall burden of complying with the final Guidelines. The

discussion below reviews some of the significant changes adopted in the

final Guidelines to accomplish this purpose.

1. Issue the Rule as Guidelines or Regulations. The FDIC sought

comment on whether to issue the rule as Guidelines or as regulations.

All the comment letters stated that the rule should be issued in the

form of Guidelines. Some community banks stated that the Guidelines

were unnecessary because they already have information security

programs in place but would prefer Guidelines to regulations. The

commentary supported the use of Guidelines because guidelines typically

provide more flexibility than regulations. Since technology changes

rapidly, Guidelines would allow institutions to adapt to a changing

environment more quickly than regulations, which may become outdated.

The FDIC has issued these standards as Guidelines. The final Guidelines

establish standards that will allow each institution the flexibility to

design an information security program to accommodate its particular

level of complexity and scope of activities.

2. Definition of Customer. In the proposed Guidelines, the FDIC

defined ``customer'' in the same manner as in the Privacy Rule

dated.

The FDIC has issued these standards as Guidelines. The final Guidelines

establish standards that will allow each institution the flexibility to

design an information security program to accommodate its particular

level of complexity and scope of activities.

2. Definition of Customer. In the proposed Guidelines, the FDIC

defined ``customer'' in the same manner as in the Privacy Rule. A

``customer'' is defined as a consumer who has established a continuing

relationship with an institution under which the institution provides

one or more financial products or services to the consumer to be used

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. This definition

does not include a business or a consumer who does not have an ongoing

relationship with a financial institution. Almost all of the comments

received by the FDIC agreed with the proposed definition and agreed

that the definition should not be expanded to provide a common

information security program for all types of records under the control

of a financial institution. The Guidelines will apply only to consumer

records as defined by the Privacy Rule, not business records. This will

allow for a consistent interpretation of the term ``customer'' between

the Guidelines and the Privacy Rule.

3. Involvement of the Bank's Board of Directors. The FDIC sought

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comment on how frequently management should report to the board of

directors concerning the bank's information security program. Most of

the comment letters stated that the final Guidelines should not dictate

how frequently the bank reports to the board of directors and that the

bank should have discretion in this regard. The comment letters clearly

conveyed a preference to not have a reporting requirement. However, if

there was to be one, commenters suggested that it be annual

the bank's information security program. Most of

the comment letters stated that the final Guidelines should not dictate

how frequently the bank reports to the board of directors and that the

bank should have discretion in this regard. The comment letters clearly

conveyed a preference to not have a reporting requirement. However, if

there was to be one, commenters suggested that it be annual.

[[Page 8630]]

The Agencies have amended the Guidelines to require that a bank report

at least annually to its board of directors. However, more frequent

reporting will be necessary if a material event affecting the

information security system occurs or if material modifications are

made to the system.

4. Designation of Corporate Information Security Officer. The

Agencies considered whether the Guidelines should require that the

bank's board of directors designate a ``Corporate Information Security

Officer'' with the responsibility to develop and administer the bank's

information security program. Most of the comment letters requested

that this requirement not be adopted because adding a new personnel

position would be financially burdensome. The FDIC agrees that a new

position with a specific title is not necessary. The final Guidelines

do, however, require that the authority for the development,

implementation, and administration of the bank's information security

program be clearly expressed although not assigned to a particular

individual.

5. Managing and Controlling Risk. Many comments focused on the

eleven factors in the proposed Guidelines that banks should consider

when evaluating the adequacy of their information security programs.

The Agencies did not intend to mandate the security measures listed in

section III.C. of the proposed Guidelines for all banks and all data.

Instead the Agencies believe the security measures should be followed

as appropriate for each bank's particular circumstances

ctors in the proposed Guidelines that banks should consider

when evaluating the adequacy of their information security programs.

The Agencies did not intend to mandate the security measures listed in

section III.C. of the proposed Guidelines for all banks and all data.

Instead the Agencies believe the security measures should be followed

as appropriate for each bank's particular circumstances. Some concern

was expressed that the proposed Guidelines required encryption of all

customer information. The FDIC believes that a bank that has Internet-

based transaction accounts or a transactional Web site may decide that

encryption is appropriate, but a bank that processes all data

internally may need different access restrictions. While a bank is to

consider each element in section III.C. in the design of its

information security program, this is less burdensome than a

requirement to include each element listed that section.

The proposed Guidelines provided that institutions train employees

to recognize, respond to, and report suspicious attempts to obtain

customer information directly to law enforcement agencies and

regulatory agencies. Some comment letters stated that suspicious

activity should be reported to management, not directly to law

enforcement agencies and regulatory agencies. The FDIC believes

employees should be made aware of federal reporting requirements and an

institution's procedures for reporting suspicious activity. However,

the Guidelines have been amended to allow financial institutions to

decide who is to file a report to law enforcement agencies, consistent

with other applicable regulations.

A significant number of comments stated that the FDIC should not

require specific tests to ensure the security and confidentiality of

customer information. Some comments stated that periodic testing is

appropriate. The final Guidelines do not specify particular tests but

titutions to

decide who is to file a report to law enforcement agencies, consistent

with other applicable regulations.

A significant number of comments stated that the FDIC should not

require specific tests to ensure the security and confidentiality of

customer information. Some comments stated that periodic testing is

appropriate. The final Guidelines do not specify particular tests but

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provide that management should decide on the appropriate testing. Also,

the final Guidelines require tests to be conducted or reviewed by

people independent of those who operate the systems. Further, banks

must review their service provider's security program to determine that

it is consistent with the Guidelines. However, the final Guidelines do

not require on-site inspections.

6. Effective Date. The effective date for the final Guidelines is

July 1, 2001. As discussed in the section-by-section analysis, many of

the comment letters urged the FDIC to extend the effective date of the

Guidelines, particularly since this is the effective date for complying

with the Privacy Rule. Several of the comments suggested the proposed

effective date be extended for 12 to 18 months. However, the FDIC

believes that the effective date for the Guidelines and the Privacy

Rule should coincide. The Privacy Rule requires a financial institution

to disclose to its customers that the bank maintains physical,

electronic, and procedural safeguards to protect customers' nonpublic

personal information. Appendix A of the Privacy Rule provides that this

disclosure may refer to these federal guidelines. This is only

meaningful if the final Guidelines for safeguarding customer

information are effective when the disclosure is made. The Guidelines

do provide a transition rule for contracts with service providers--

essentially allowing a two-year compliance period for service provider

contracts

n. Appendix A of the Privacy Rule provides that this

disclosure may refer to these federal guidelines. This is only

meaningful if the final Guidelines for safeguarding customer

information are effective when the disclosure is made. The Guidelines

do provide a transition rule for contracts with service providers--

essentially allowing a two-year compliance period for service provider

contracts. A contract entered into on or before March 5, 2001,

satisfies the provisions of this part until July 1, 2003, even if the

contract does not include provisions delineating the servicer's duties

and responsibilities to protect customer information described in

section III.D. This additional time will allow financial institutions

to make all necessary changes to service provider contracts and to

comply with this segment of the Guidelines.

Summary of the Agency Assessment of Issues Raised in Public

Comments

Most of the comment letters did not discuss actual compliance costs

for implementing the provisions of the Guidelines. Some commenters

stated that their bank has an established information security program

and that information security is a customary business practice. The new

compliance and reporting requirements will create additional costs for

some institutions. These costs include: (1) Training staff; (2)

monitoring outsourcing agreements; (3) performing due diligence before

contracting with a service provider; (4) testing security systems; and

s an established information security program

and that information security is a customary business practice. The new

compliance and reporting requirements will create additional costs for

some institutions. These costs include: (1) Training staff; (2)

monitoring outsourcing agreements; (3) performing due diligence before

contracting with a service provider; (4) testing security systems; and

(5) adjusting security programs due to technology changes. The comments

did not provide data from which the FDIC could quantify the cost of

implementing the requirements of the GLBA. The compliance costs will

vary among institutions.

Description/Estimate of Small Entities To Which the Guidelines Will

Apply

The Guidelines will apply to approximately 3,300 FDIC insured State

nonmember banks that are small entities (assets less than $100 million)

as defined in the RFA.

Description of Projected Reporting, Record-Keeping, and Other

Compliance Requirements

The final Guidelines contain standards for the protection of

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customer records and information that apply to all FDIC-insured state-

nonmember banks. Institutions will be required to report annually to

the bank's board of directors concerning the bank's information

security program. Institutions will need to develop a training program

that is designed to implement the institution's information security

policies and procedures. An institution's information security system

will be tested to ensure the controls and procedures of the program

work properly. However, the final Guidelines do not specify what

particular tests the bank should undertake. The final Guidelines state

that the tests are to be conducted or reviewed by persons who are

independent of those who operate the systems

security

policies and procedures. An institution's information security system

will be tested to ensure the controls and procedures of the program

work properly. However, the final Guidelines do not specify what

particular tests the bank should undertake. The final Guidelines state

that the tests are to be conducted or reviewed by persons who are

independent of those who operate the systems. Institutions will have to

exercise due diligence in the selection of service providers to ensure

that the bank's customer information will be protected consistent with

these Guidelines. And institutions will have to monitor these service

provider arrangements to confirm that the institution's customer

information is protected, which may be accomplished by reviewing

service provider audits

[[Page 8631]]

and summaries of test results. Also, institutions will need to adjust

their security program as technology changes.

The types of professional skills within the institution necessary

to prepare the report to the board would include an understanding of

the institution's information security program, a level of technical

knowledge of the hardware and software systems to evaluate test results

recommending substantial modifications; and the ability to evaluate and

report on the institution's steps to oversee service provider

arrangements.

OTS: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),\15\ requires OTS to

prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis with these final

Guidelines unless the agency certifies that the rule will not have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

OTS has evaluated the effects these Guidelines will have on small

entities. In issuing proposed Guidelines, OTS specifically sought

comment on the costs of establishing and operating information security

programs, but no commenters provided specific cost information

unless the agency certifies that the rule will not have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

OTS has evaluated the effects these Guidelines will have on small

entities. In issuing proposed Guidelines, OTS specifically sought

comment on the costs of establishing and operating information security

programs, but no commenters provided specific cost information.

Institutions cannot yet know how they will implement their information

security programs and therefore have difficulty quantifying the

associated costs. The Director of OTS considered certifying, under

section 605(b) of the RFA, that these guidelines will not have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

However, because OTS cannot quantify the impact the Guidelines will

have on small entities, and in the interests of thoroughness, OTS does

not certify that the Guidelines will not have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small entities. Instead, OTS has

prepared the following final regulatory flexibility analysis.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\15\ U.S.C. 604(a).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Reasons for Final Action

OTS issues these Guidelines pursuant to section 501 of the G-L-B

Act. As described in this preamble and in the notice of proposed

action, section 501 requires OTS to publish standards for the thrift

------------------------------------------------------------------

\15\ U.S.C. 604(a).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Reasons for Final Action

OTS issues these Guidelines pursuant to section 501 of the G-L-B

Act. As described in this preamble and in the notice of proposed

action, section 501 requires OTS to publish standards for the thrift

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industry relating to administrative, technical, and physical safeguards

to: (1) Insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and

information; (2) protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to

the security or integrity of such records, and (3) protect against

unauthorized access to or use of such records or information which

could result in the substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.

B. Objectives of and Legal Basis for Final Action

The objectives of the Guidelines are described in the Supplementary

Information section above. The legal bases for the final action are:

section 501 of the G-L-B Act; section 39 of the FDI Act; and sections

2, 4, and 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. 1462, 1463, and

1464).

C. Description of Entities To Which Final Action Will Apply

These Guidelines will apply to all savings associations whose

deposits are FDIC insured, and subsidiaries of such savings

associations, except subsidiaries that are brokers, dealers, persons

providing insurance, investment companies, and investment advisers.\16\

D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance

Requirements; Skills Required

The Guidelines do not require any reports to OTS. As discussed more

fully above, they do require institutions to have a written information

security program, and to make an appropriate report to the board of

directors, or a board committee, at least annually

ent companies, and investment advisers.\16\

D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance

Requirements; Skills Required

The Guidelines do not require any reports to OTS. As discussed more

fully above, they do require institutions to have a written information

security program, and to make an appropriate report to the board of

directors, or a board committee, at least annually. The Guidelines

require institutions to establish an information security program, if

they do not already have one. The Guidelines require institutions to

assess the risks to their customer security and to adopt appropriate

measures to control those risks. Institutions must also test the key

controls, commensurate with the risks. Institutions must use

appropriate due diligence in selecting outside service providers, and

require service providers, by contract, to implement appropriate

security measures. Finally, where appropriate, the Guidelines require

institutions to monitor their service providers.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\16\ For purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, a small

savings association is one with less than $100 million in assets. 13

CFR 121.201 (Division H). There are approximately 487 such small

savings associations, approximately 97 of which have subsidiaries.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Professional skills, such as skills of computer hardware and

software, will be necessary to assess information security needs, and

to design and implement an information security program. The particular

skills needed will be commensurate with the nature of each

institution's system, i.e. more skills will be needed in institutions

with sophisticated and extensive computerization. As a result, small

entities with less extensive computerization are likely to have less

burdensome compliance needs than large entities

ds, and

to design and implement an information security program. The particular

skills needed will be commensurate with the nature of each

institution's system, i.e. more skills will be needed in institutions

with sophisticated and extensive computerization. As a result, small

entities with less extensive computerization are likely to have less

burdensome compliance needs than large entities. Institutions that use

outside service providers may require legal skills to draft appropriate

language for contracts with service providers.

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