Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits

[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 65 (Monday, April 7, 2025)]

[Presidential Documents]

[Pages 15041-15109]

From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[FR Doc No: 2025-06063]

[[Page 15039]]

Vol. 90

Monday,

No. 65

April 7, 2025

Part II

The President

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Executive Order 14257--Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To

Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual

United States Goods Trade Deficits

Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 90 , No. 65 / Monday, April 7, 2025 /

Presidential Documents

___________________________________________________________________

Title 3--

The President

[[Page 15041]]

Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025

Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To

Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and

Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits

By the authority vested in me as President by the

Constitution and the laws of the United States of

America, including the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the

National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA),

section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19

U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States

Code,

of the United States of

America, including the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the

National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA),

section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19

U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States

Code,

I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of

America, find that underlying conditions, including a

lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade

relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff

barriers, and U.S. trading partners' economic policies

that suppress domestic wages and consumption, as

indicated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods

trade deficits, constitute an unusual and extraordinary

threat to the national security and economy of the

United States. That threat has its source in whole or

substantial part outside the United States in the

domestic economic policies of key trading partners and

structural imbalances in the global trading system. I

hereby declare a national emergency with respect to

this threat.

On January 20, 2025, I signed the America First Trade

Policy Presidential Memorandum directing my

Administration to investigate the causes of our

country's large and persistent annual trade deficits in

goods, including the economic and national security

implications and risks resulting from such deficits,

and to undertake a review of, and identify, any unfair

trade practices by other countries

Administration to investigate the causes of our

country's large and persistent annual trade deficits in

goods, including the economic and national security

implications and risks resulting from such deficits,

and to undertake a review of, and identify, any unfair

trade practices by other countries. On February 13,

2025, I signed a Presidential Memorandum entitled

``Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs,'' that directed further

review of our trading partners' non-reciprocal trading

practices, and noted the relationship between non-

reciprocal practices and the trade deficit. On April 1,

2025, I received the final results of those

investigations, and I am taking action today based on

those results.

Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits

have led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing

base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced domestic

manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply

chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base

dependent on foreign adversaries. Large and persistent

annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in

substantial part by a lack of reciprocity in our

bilateral trade relationships. This situation is

evidenced by disparate tariff rates and non-tariff

barriers that make it harder for U.S. manufacturers to

sell their products in foreign markets. It is also

evidenced by the economic policies of key U.S. trading

partners insofar as they suppress domestic wages and

consumption, and thereby demand for U.S

evidenced by disparate tariff rates and non-tariff

barriers that make it harder for U.S. manufacturers to

sell their products in foreign markets. It is also

evidenced by the economic policies of key U.S. trading

partners insofar as they suppress domestic wages and

consumption, and thereby demand for U.S. exports, while

artificially increasing the competitiveness of their

goods in global markets. These conditions have given

rise to the national emergency that this order is

intended to abate and resolve.

For decades starting in 1934, U.S. trade policy has

been organized around the principle of reciprocity. The

Congress directed the President to secure reduced

reciprocal tariff rates from key trading partners first

through bilateral trade agreements and later under the

auspices of the global trading system. Between 1934 and

1945, the executive branch negotiated and signed 32

bilateral reciprocal trade agreements designed to lower

tariff rates on a

[[Page 15042]]

reciprocal basis. After 1947 through 1994,

participating countries engaged in eight rounds of

negotiation, which resulted in the General Agreements

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven subsequent tariff

reduction rounds.

iprocal trade agreements designed to lower

tariff rates on a

[[Page 15042]]

reciprocal basis. After 1947 through 1994,

participating countries engaged in eight rounds of

negotiation, which resulted in the General Agreements

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven subsequent tariff

reduction rounds.

However, despite a commitment to the principle of

reciprocity, the trading relationship between the

United States and its trading partners has become

highly unbalanced, particularly in recent years. The

post-war international economic system was based upon

three incorrect assumptions: first, that if the United

States led the world in liberalizing tariff and non-

tariff barriers the rest of the world would follow;

second, that such liberalization would ultimately

result in more economic convergence and increased

domestic consumption among U.S. trading partners

converging towards the share in the United States; and

third, that as a result, the United States would not

accrue large and persistent goods trade deficits.

This framework set in motion events, agreements, and

commitments that did not result in reciprocity or

generally increase domestic consumption in foreign

economies relative to domestic consumption in the

United States. Those events, in turn, created large and

persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits as a

feature of the global trading system.

and

commitments that did not result in reciprocity or

generally increase domestic consumption in foreign

economies relative to domestic consumption in the

United States. Those events, in turn, created large and

persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits as a

feature of the global trading system.

Put simply, while World Trade Organization (WTO)

Members agreed to bind their tariff rates on a most-

favored-nation (MFN) basis, and thereby provide their

best tariff rates to all WTO Members, they did not

agree to bind their tariff rates at similarly low

levels or to apply tariff rates on a reciprocal basis.

Consequently, according to the WTO, the United States

has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in

the world at 3.3 percent, while many of our key trading

partners like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5

percent), the European Union (EU) (5 percent), India

(17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4 percent) have simple

average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher.

Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates conceal much

larger discrepancies across economies in tariff rates

applied to particular products. For example, the United

States imposes a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger

vehicle imports (with internal combustion engines),

while the European Union (10 percent), India (70

percent), and China (15 percent) impose much higher

duties on the same product. For network switches and

routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff,

but for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a

higher rate

al combustion engines),

while the European Union (10 percent), India (70

percent), and China (15 percent) impose much higher

duties on the same product. For network switches and

routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff,

but for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a

higher rate. Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30

percent) impose a higher tariff on ethanol than does

the United States (2.5 percent). For rice in the husk,

the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent (ad valorem

equivalent), while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40

percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) impose

higher rates. Apples enter the United States duty-free,

but not so in Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50

percent).

Similarly, non-tariff barriers also deprive U.S.

manufacturers of reciprocal access to markets around

the world. The 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on

Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) details a great number of

non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports around the world on

a trading-partner by trading-partner basis. These

barriers include import barriers and licensing

restrictions; customs barriers and shortcomings in

trade facilitation; technical barriers to trade (e.g.,

unnecessarily trade restrictive standards, conformity

assessment procedures, or technical regulations);

sanitary and phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily

restrict trade without furthering safety objectives;

inadequate patent, copyright, trade secret, and

trademark regimes and inadequate enforcement of

intellectual property rights; discriminatory

assessment procedures, or technical regulations);

sanitary and phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily

restrict trade without furthering safety objectives;

inadequate patent, copyright, trade secret, and

trademark regimes and inadequate enforcement of

intellectual property rights; discriminatory licensing

requirements or regulatory standards; barriers to

cross-border data flows and discriminatory practices

affecting trade in digital products; investment

barriers; subsidies; anticompetitive practices;

discrimination in favor of domestic state-owned

enterprises, and failures by governments in protecting

labor and environment standards; bribery; and

corruption.

Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic

economic policies and practices of our trading

partners, including currency practices and value-added

taxes, and their associated market distortions, that

suppress domestic

[[Page 15043]]

consumption and boost exports to the United States.

This lack of reciprocity is apparent in the fact that

the share of consumption to Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) in the United States is about 68 percent, but it

is much lower in others like Ireland (27 percent),

Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South Korea

(49 percent), and Germany (50 percent).

This lack of reciprocity is apparent in the fact that

the share of consumption to Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) in the United States is about 68 percent, but it

is much lower in others like Ireland (27 percent),

Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South Korea

(49 percent), and Germany (50 percent).

At the same time, efforts by the United States to

address these imbalances have stalled. Trading partners

have repeatedly blocked multilateral and plurilateral

solutions, including in the context of new rounds of

tariff negotiations and efforts to discipline non-

tariff barriers. At the same time, with the U.S.

economy disproportionately open to imports, U.S.

trading partners have had few incentives to provide

reciprocal treatment to U.S. exports in the context of

bilateral trade negotiations.

These structural asymmetries have driven the large and

persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficit. Even for

countries with which the United States may enjoy an

occasional bilateral trade surplus, the accumulation of

tariff and non-tariff barriers on U.S. exports may make

that surplus smaller than it would have been without

such barriers. Permitting these asymmetries to continue

is not sustainable in today's economic and geopolitical

environment because of the effect they have on U.S.

domestic production. A nation's ability to produce

domestically is the bedrock of its national and

economic security.

ave been without

such barriers. Permitting these asymmetries to continue

is not sustainable in today's economic and geopolitical

environment because of the effect they have on U.S.

domestic production. A nation's ability to produce

domestically is the bedrock of its national and

economic security.

Both my first Administration in 2017, and the Biden

Administration in 2022, recognized that increasing

domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S. national

security. According to 2023 United Nations data, U.S.

manufacturing output as a share of global manufacturing

output was 17.4 percent, down from a peak in 2001 of

28.4 percent.

Over time, the persistent decline in U.S. manufacturing

output has reduced U.S. manufacturing capacity. The

need to maintain robust and resilient domestic

manufacturing capacity is particularly acute in certain

advanced industrial sectors like automobiles,

shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, technology products,

machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals, because

once competitors gain sufficient global market share in

these sectors, U.S. production could be permanently

weakened. It is also critical to scale manufacturing

capacity in the defense-industrial sector so that we

can manufacture the defense materiel and equipment

necessary to protect American interests at home and

abroad.

icient global market share in

these sectors, U.S. production could be permanently

weakened. It is also critical to scale manufacturing

capacity in the defense-industrial sector so that we

can manufacture the defense materiel and equipment

necessary to protect American interests at home and

abroad.

In fact, because the United States has supplied so much

military equipment to other countries, U.S. stockpiles

of military goods are too low to be compatible with

U.S. national defense interests. Furthermore, U.S.

defense companies must develop new, advanced

manufacturing technologies across a range of critical

sectors including bio-manufacturing, batteries, and

microelectronics. If the United States wishes to

maintain an effective security umbrella to defend its

citizens and homeland, as well as for its allies and

partners, it needs to have a large upstream

manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem to

manufacture these products without undue reliance on

imports for key inputs.

Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods also

has compromised U.S. economic security by rendering

U.S. supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical

disruption and supply shocks. In recent years, the

vulnerability of the U.S. economy in this respect was

exposed both during the COVID-19 pandemic, when

Americans had difficulty accessing essential products,

as well as when the Houthi rebels later began attacking

cargo ships in the Middle East.

al

disruption and supply shocks. In recent years, the

vulnerability of the U.S. economy in this respect was

exposed both during the COVID-19 pandemic, when

Americans had difficulty accessing essential products,

as well as when the Houthi rebels later began attacking

cargo ships in the Middle East.

The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threatens

the U.S. economy in other ways, including through the

loss of manufacturing jobs. From 1997 to 2024, the

United States lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs

and experienced one of the largest drops in

manufacturing employment in history. Furthermore, many

manufacturing job losses were concentrated in specific

geographical areas. In these areas, the loss of

manufacturing jobs contributed

[[Page 15044]]

to the decline in rates of family formation and to the

rise of other social trends, like the abuse of opioids,

that have imposed profound costs on the U.S. economy.

The future of American competitiveness depends on

reversing these trends. Today, manufacturing represents

just 11 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, yet it

accounts for 35 percent of American productivity growth

and 60 percent of our exports. Importantly, U.S.

manufacturing is the main engine of innovation in the

United States, responsible for 55 percent of all

patents and 70 percent of all research and development

(R&D) spending. The fact that R&D expenditures by U.S

ccounts for 35 percent of American productivity growth

and 60 percent of our exports. Importantly, U.S.

manufacturing is the main engine of innovation in the

United States, responsible for 55 percent of all

patents and 70 percent of all research and development

(R&D) spending. The fact that R&D expenditures by U.S.

multinational enterprises in China grew at an average

rate of 13.6 percent a year between 2003 and 2017,

while their R&D expenditures in the United States grew

by an average of just 5 percent per year during the

same time period, is evidence of the strong link

between manufacturing and innovation. Furthermore,

every manufacturing job spurs 7 to 12 new jobs in other

related industries, helping to build and sustain our

economy.

Just as a nation that does not produce manufactured

products cannot maintain the industrial base it needs

for national security, neither can a nation long

survive if it cannot produce its own food. Presidential

Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical

Infrastructure Security and Resilience), designates

food and agriculture as a ``critical infrastructure

sector'' because it is one of the sectors considered

``so vital to the United States that [its] incapacity

or destruction . . . would have a debilitating impact

on security, national economic security, national

public health or safety, or any combination of those

matters.'' Furthermore, when I left office, the United

States had a trade surplus in agricultural products,

but today, that surplus has vanished

or destruction . . . would have a debilitating impact

on security, national economic security, national

public health or safety, or any combination of those

matters.'' Furthermore, when I left office, the United

States had a trade surplus in agricultural products,

but today, that surplus has vanished. Eviscerated by a

slew of new non-tariff barriers imposed by our trading

partners, it has been replaced by a projected $49

billion annual agricultural trade deficit.

For these reasons, I hereby declare and order:

Section 1. National Emergency. As President of the

United States, my highest duty is ensuring the national

and economic security of the country and its citizens.

I have declared a national emergency arising from

conditions reflected in large and persistent annual

U.S. goods trade deficits, which have grown by over 40

percent in the past 5 years alone, reaching $1.2

trillion in 2024. This trade deficit reflects

asymmetries in trade relationships that have

contributed to the atrophy of domestic production

capacity, especially that of the U.S. manufacturing and

defense-industrial base. These asymmetries also impact

U.S. producers' ability to export and, consequentially,

their incentive to produce.

reflects

asymmetries in trade relationships that have

contributed to the atrophy of domestic production

capacity, especially that of the U.S. manufacturing and

defense-industrial base. These asymmetries also impact

U.S. producers' ability to export and, consequentially,

their incentive to produce.

Specifically, such asymmetry includes not only non-

reciprocal differences in tariff rates among foreign

trading partners, but also extensive use of non-tariff

barriers by foreign trading partners, which reduce the

competitiveness of U.S. exports while artificially

enhancing the competitiveness of their own goods. These

non-tariff barriers include technical barriers to

trade; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary rules;

inadequate intellectual property protections;

suppressed domestic consumption (e.g., wage

suppression); weak labor, environmental, and other

regulatory standards and protections; and corruption.

These non-tariff barriers give rise to significant

imbalances even when the United States and a trading

partner have comparable tariff rates.

The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the

transfer of resources from domestic producers to

foreign firms, reducing opportunities for domestic

manufacturers to expand and, in turn, leading to lost

manufacturing jobs, diminished manufacturing capacity,

and an atrophied industrial base, including in the

defense-industrial sector. At the same time, foreign

firms are better positioned to scale production,

reinvest in innovation, and compete

[[Page 15045]]

manufacturers to expand and, in turn, leading to lost

manufacturing jobs, diminished manufacturing capacity,

and an atrophied industrial base, including in the

defense-industrial sector. At the same time, foreign

firms are better positioned to scale production,

reinvest in innovation, and compete

[[Page 15045]]

in the global economy, to the detriment of U.S.

economic and national security.

The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing

capacity in certain critical and advanced industrial

sectors--another outcome of the large and persistent

annual U.S. goods trade deficits--also compromises U.S.

economic and national security by rendering the U.S.

economy less resilient to supply chain disruption.

Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade

deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial

capacity, have compromised military readiness; this

vulnerability can only be redressed through swift

corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into

the United States. Such impact upon military readiness

and our national security posture is especially acute

with the recent rise in armed conflicts abroad. I call

upon the public and private sector to make the efforts

necessary to strengthen the international economic

position of the United States.

the United States. Such impact upon military readiness

and our national security posture is especially acute

with the recent rise in armed conflicts abroad. I call

upon the public and private sector to make the efforts

necessary to strengthen the international economic

position of the United States.

Sec. 2. Reciprocal Tariff Policy. It is the policy of

the United States to rebalance global trade flows by

imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports

from all trading partners except as otherwise provided

herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports

from all trading partners shall start at 10 percent and

shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty

shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex

I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to

this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall

apply until such time as I determine that the

underlying conditions described above are satisfied,

resolved, or mitigated.

Sec. 3. Implementation. (a) Except as otherwise

provided in this order, all articles imported into the

customs territory of the United States shall be,

consistent with law, subject to an additional ad

valorem rate of duty of 10 percent. Such rates of duty

shall apply with respect to goods entered for

consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for

consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight

time on April 5, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a

vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the

final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m

of duty

shall apply with respect to goods entered for

consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for

consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight

time on April 5, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a

vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the

final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern

daylight time on April 5, 2025, and entered for

consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption

after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5,

2025, shall not be subject to such additional duty.

Furthermore, except as otherwise provided in this

order, at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9,

2025, all articles from trading partners enumerated in

Annex I to this order imported into the customs

territory of the United States shall be, consistent

with law, subject to the country-specific ad valorem

rates of duty specified in Annex I to this order. Such

rates of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered

for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for

consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight

time on April 9, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a

vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the

final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern

daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for

consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption

after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9,

2025, shall not be subject to these country-specific ad

valorem rates of duty set forth in Annex I to this

order

nsit before 12:01 a.m. eastern

daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for

consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption

after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9,

2025, shall not be subject to these country-specific ad

valorem rates of duty set forth in Annex I to this

order. These country-specific ad valorem rates of duty

shall apply to all articles imported pursuant to the

terms of all existing U.S. trade agreements, except as

provided below.

(b) The following goods as set forth in Annex II to

this order, consistent with law, shall not be subject

to the ad valorem rates of duty under this order: (i)

all articles that are encompassed by 50 U.S.C. 1702(b);

(ii) all articles and derivatives of steel and aluminum

subject to the duties imposed pursuant to section 232

of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and proclaimed in

Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports

of Aluminum Into the United States), as amended,

Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports

of Steel Into the United States), as amended, and

Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020 (Adjusting

Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative

Steel Articles Into the United States), as amended,

Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting

Imports of Aluminum

[[Page 15046]]

ports

of Steel Into the United States), as amended, and

Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020 (Adjusting

Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative

Steel Articles Into the United States), as amended,

Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting

Imports of Aluminum

[[Page 15046]]

Into the United States), and Proclamation 10896 of

February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Steel into the

United States); (iii) all automobiles and automotive

parts subject to the additional duties imposed pursuant

to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as

amended, and proclaimed in Proclamation 10908 of March

26, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and

Automobile Parts Into the United States); (iv) other

products enumerated in Annex II to this order,

including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors,

lumber articles, certain critical minerals, and energy

and energy products; (v) all articles from a trading

partner subject to the rates set forth in Column 2 of

the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States

(HTSUS); and (vi) all articles that may become subject

to duties pursuant to future actions under section 232

of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

(c) The rates of duty established by this order are

in addition to any other duties, fees, taxes,

exactions, or charges applicable to such imported

articles, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e)

of this section below.

future actions under section 232

of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

(c) The rates of duty established by this order are

in addition to any other duties, fees, taxes,

exactions, or charges applicable to such imported

articles, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e)

of this section below.

(d) With respect to articles from Canada, I have

imposed additional duties on certain goods to address a

national emergency resulting from the flow of illicit

drugs across our northern border pursuant to Executive

Order 14193 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To

Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern

Border), as amended by Executive Order 14197 of

February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our

Northern Border), and Executive Order 14231 of March 2,

2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of

Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border). With respect

to articles from Mexico, I have imposed additional

duties on certain goods to address a national emergency

resulting from the flow of illicit drugs and illegal

migration across our southern border pursuant to

Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing

Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern

Border), as amended by Executive Order 14198 of

February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our

Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of March 2,

2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Situation at

Our Southern Border)

ry 1, 2025 (Imposing

Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern

Border), as amended by Executive Order 14198 of

February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our

Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of March 2,

2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Situation at

Our Southern Border). As a result of these border

emergency tariff actions, all goods of Canada or Mexico

under the terms of general note 11 to the HTSUS,

including any treatment set forth in subchapter XXIII

of chapter 98 and subchapter XXII of chapter 99 of the

HTSUS, as related to the Agreement between the United

States of America, United Mexican States, and Canada

(USMCA), continue to be eligible to enter the U.S.

market under these preferential terms. However, all

goods of Canada or Mexico that do not qualify as

originating under USMCA are presently subject to

additional ad valorem duties of 25 percent, with energy

or energy resources and potash imported from Canada and

not qualifying as originating under USMCA presently

subject to the lower additional ad valorem duty of 10

percent.

that do not qualify as

originating under USMCA are presently subject to

additional ad valorem duties of 25 percent, with energy

or energy resources and potash imported from Canada and

not qualifying as originating under USMCA presently

subject to the lower additional ad valorem duty of 10

percent.

(e) Any ad valorem rate of duty on articles

imported from Canada or Mexico under the terms of this

order shall not apply in addition to the ad valorem

rate of duty specified by the existing orders described

in subsection (d) of this section. If such orders

identified in subsection (d) of this section are

terminated or suspended, all items of Canada and Mexico

that qualify as originating under USMCA shall not be

subject to an additional ad valorem rate of duty, while

articles not qualifying as originating under USMCA

shall be subject to an ad valorem rate of duty of 12

percent. However, these ad valorem rates of duty on

articles imported from Canada and Mexico shall not

apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to

an article eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA

that is a part or component of an article substantially

finished in the United States.

percent. However, these ad valorem rates of duty on

articles imported from Canada and Mexico shall not

apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to

an article eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA

that is a part or component of an article substantially

finished in the United States.

(f) More generally, the ad valorem rates of duty

set forth in this order shall apply only to the non-

U.S. content of a subject article, provided at least 20

percent of the value of the subject article is U.S.

originating. For the purposes of this subsection,

``U.S. content'' refers to the value of an article

attributable to the components produced entirely, or

substantially transformed in, the United States. U.S.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP),

[[Page 15047]]

to the extent permitted by law, is authorized to

require the collection of such information and

documentation regarding an imported article, including

with the entry filing, as is necessary to enable CBP to

ascertain and verify the value of the U.S. content of

the article, as well as to ascertain and verify whether

an article is substantially finished in the United

States.

ch information and

documentation regarding an imported article, including

with the entry filing, as is necessary to enable CBP to

ascertain and verify the value of the U.S. content of

the article, as well as to ascertain and verify whether

an article is substantially finished in the United

States.

(g) Subject articles, except those eligible for

admission under ``domestic status'' as defined in 19

CFR 146.43, which are subject to the duty specified in

section 2 of this order and are admitted into a foreign

trade zone on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time

on April 9, 2025, must be admitted as ``privileged

foreign status'' as defined in 19 CFR 146.41.

(h) Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C.

1321(a)(2)(A)-(B) shall remain available for the

articles described in subsection (a) of this section.

Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C.

1321(a)(2)(C) shall remain available for the articles

described in subsection (a) of this section until

notification by the Secretary of Commerce to the

President that adequate systems are in place to fully

and expeditiously process and collect duty revenue

applicable pursuant to this subsection for articles

otherwise eligible for de minimis treatment. After such

notification, duty-free de minimis treatment under 19

U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall not be available for the

articles described in subsection (a) of this section.

expeditiously process and collect duty revenue

applicable pursuant to this subsection for articles

otherwise eligible for de minimis treatment. After such

notification, duty-free de minimis treatment under 19

U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall not be available for the

articles described in subsection (a) of this section.

(i) The Executive Order of April 2, 2025 (Further

Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid

Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China as

Applied to Low-Value Imports), regarding low-value

imports from China is not affected by this order, and

all duties and fees with respect to covered articles

shall be collected as required and detailed therein.

(j) To reduce the risk of transshipment and

evasion, all ad valorem rates of duty imposed by this

order or any successor orders with respect to articles

of China shall apply equally to articles of both the

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau

Special Administrative Region.

(k) In order to establish the duty rates described

in this order, the HTSUS is modified as set forth in

the Annexes to this order. These modifications shall

enter into effect on the dates set forth in the Annexes

to this order.

Administrative Region and the Macau

Special Administrative Region.

(k) In order to establish the duty rates described

in this order, the HTSUS is modified as set forth in

the Annexes to this order. These modifications shall

enter into effect on the dates set forth in the Annexes

to this order.

(l) Unless specifically noted herein, any prior

Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other

Presidential directive or guidance related to trade

with foreign trading partners that is inconsistent with

the direction in this order is hereby terminated,

suspended, or modified to the extent necessary to give

full effect to this order.

Sec. 4. Modification Authority. (a) The Secretary of

Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in

consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary

of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security,

the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the

Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the

Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, shall recommend to me additional action, if

necessary, if this action is not effective in resolving

the emergency conditions described above, including the

increase in the overall trade deficit or the recent

expansion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S.

trading partners in a manner that threatens the

economic and national security interests of the United

States.

t effective in resolving

the emergency conditions described above, including the

increase in the overall trade deficit or the recent

expansion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S.

trading partners in a manner that threatens the

economic and national security interests of the United

States.

(b) Should any trading partner retaliate against

the United States in response to this action through

import duties on U.S. exports or other measures, I may

further modify the HTSUS to increase or expand in scope

the duties imposed under this order to ensure the

efficacy of this action.

(c) Should any trading partner take significant

steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and

align sufficiently with the United States on economic

and national security matters, I may further modify the

HTSUS to decrease or limit in scope the duties imposed

under this order.

(d) Should U.S. manufacturing capacity and output

continue to worsen, I may further modify the HTSUS to

increase duties under this order.

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Sec. 5. Implementation Authority

y matters, I may further modify the

HTSUS to decrease or limit in scope the duties imposed

under this order.

(d) Should U.S. manufacturing capacity and output

continue to worsen, I may further modify the HTSUS to

increase duties under this order.

[[Page 15048]]

Sec. 5. Implementation Authority. The Secretary of

Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in

consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary

of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security,

the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the

Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, the

Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, and the Chair of the International Trade

Commission are hereby authorized to employ all powers

granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary

to implement this order. Each executive department and

agency shall take all appropriate measures within its

authority to implement this order.

Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements. The United States Trade

Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of

State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of

Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the

Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the

Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the

Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and

final reports to the Congress on the national emergency

declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c)

of the NEA (50 U.S.C

licy, the

Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the

Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and

final reports to the Congress on the national emergency

declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c)

of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of

IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order

shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the

head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with

applicable law and subject to the availability of

appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not,

create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,

enforceable at law or in equity by any party against

the United States, its departments, agencies, or

entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any

other person.

(Presidential Sig.)

THE WHITE HOUSE,

April 2, 2025.

Billing code 3395-F4-P

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[FR Doc. 2025-06063

Filed 4-4-25; 11:15 am]

Billing code 7020-02-C