Combating Emerging Firearms Threats and Improving School-Based Active-Shooter Drills

[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 191 (Wednesday, October 2, 2024)]

[Presidential Documents]

[Pages 80345-80350]

From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[FR Doc No: 2024-22938]

[[Page 80343]]

Vol. 89

Wednesday,

No. 191

October 2, 2024

Part III

The President

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Executive Order 14127--Combating Emerging Firearms Threats and

Improving School-Based Active-Shooter Drills

Proclamation 10817--Amending Proclamation 10773

Proclamation 10818--Gold Star Mother's and Family's Day, 2024

Proclamation 10819--National Hunting and Fishing Day, 2024

Proclamation 10820--National Public Lands Day, 2024

Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 191 / Wednesday, October 2, 2024 /

Presidential Documents

___________________________________________________________________

Title 3--

The President

[[Page 80345]]

Executive Order 14127 of September 26, 2024

Combating Emerging Firearms Threats and Improving

School-Based Active-Shooter Drills

By the authority vested in me as President by the

Constitution and the laws of the United States of

America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. During 2020, the last year of the

prior administration, homicides in the Nation increased

nearly 30 percent over the previous year--the largest

1-year increase in murders ever recorded. After that,

the Vice President and I took action to reduce gun

crime and other forms of violent crime. By the middle

of 2022, we had already taken more executive action to

reduce gun violence than any other administration at

that point in time

-the largest

1-year increase in murders ever recorded. After that,

the Vice President and I took action to reduce gun

crime and other forms of violent crime. By the middle

of 2022, we had already taken more executive action to

reduce gun violence than any other administration at

that point in time. On June 25, 2022, I signed into law

the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (Public Law 117-

159)--the most significant new gun violence prevention

law in nearly 30 years. Rates of homicide in the United

States are falling at one of the fastest rates ever

recorded. Year-over-year comparison shows that 2023 had

one of the largest declines in the homicide rate in

recent history. This life-saving progress has continued

in 2024. While we have made great progress, much more

work remains to be done to reduce gun violence and save

lives.

It is the policy of my Administration to coordinate

across executive departments and agencies (agencies) to

reduce gun violence and save lives. This order directs

enhanced coordination for two key challenges: combating

emerging firearms threats and understanding and

improving school-based active-shooter drills.

It is the policy of my Administration to coordinate

across executive departments and agencies (agencies) to

reduce gun violence and save lives. This order directs

enhanced coordination for two key challenges: combating

emerging firearms threats and understanding and

improving school-based active-shooter drills.

One way to continue the progress on reducing gun

violence is to stay ahead of emerging violent crime

threats involving firearms. My Administration has

always taken these threats seriously. In April 2021,

one of my Administration's first executive actions to

reduce gun violence was directed at stopping the

proliferation of firearms without serial numbers, often

referred to as ``ghost guns.'' To expand these efforts,

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and

Explosives (ATF) of the Department of Justice

established an Emerging Threats Center, which focuses

ATF's resources on identifying developments in illicit

firearm marketplaces, including the use of new

technologies to make and unlawfully distribute

undetectable firearms and devices that convert

semiautomatic firearms into illegal machineguns. The

Vice President and I strongly disagreed with the

Supreme Court's decision to strike down an important

gun safety regulation on bump stocks--the device used

in the shooting at a crowded music festival in Las

Vegas--and called on the Congress to clarify that this

dangerous accessory is a machinegun.

Vice President and I strongly disagreed with the

Supreme Court's decision to strike down an important

gun safety regulation on bump stocks--the device used

in the shooting at a crowded music festival in Las

Vegas--and called on the Congress to clarify that this

dangerous accessory is a machinegun.

The Court's decision addressing bump stocks did not

alter the statutory prohibition on machinegun

conversion devices, which are prohibited for non-

governmental possession even when not installed on a

firearm. The threat posed by the continued

proliferation of these devices is particularly acute.

These devices enable semiautomatic firearms, including

easily concealable handguns, to match or exceed the

rate of fire of many military machineguns with a single

engagement of the trigger--up to 20 bullets in one

second and 1,200 rounds in one minute. From 2017

through 2021, ATF recovered 5,454 of these devices--a

570 percent increase over the previous 5-year period.

These devices are often illegally imported or illegally

made on a 3D printer.

[[Page 80346]]

Unserialized, 3D printed firearms--which can be used

for illicit purposes such as gun trafficking,

possession by people convicted of felonies or subject

to domestic violence restraining orders, or unlawful

engagement in the business of manufacturing or selling

firearms--are another emerging threat

Unserialized, 3D printed firearms--which can be used

for illicit purposes such as gun trafficking,

possession by people convicted of felonies or subject

to domestic violence restraining orders, or unlawful

engagement in the business of manufacturing or selling

firearms--are another emerging threat. These firearms

can be 3D printed from computer code downloaded from

the internet and produced without serial numbers, which

law enforcement uses to trace firearms recovered in

criminal investigations. Some 3D printed firearms can

be rendered undetectable by magnetometers used to

secure airports, courthouses, and certain events. 3D

printing technology is developing quickly, which can

cause the safety threat of 3D printed firearms to

suddenly increase.

In addition to the threat of domestic crime, these

emerging firearms threats pose a significant risk to

the national security and foreign policy interests of

the United States. Many foreign countries have heavily

regulated automatic weapons and 3D printed and

undetectable firearms. The wide availability of these

emerging firearms threats would undermine other

nations' gun laws and the safety and security of our

allies. Technical data and software for 3D printed

firearms and machinegun conversion devices can be used

by international gangs, criminals, and terrorists in a

manner contrary to United States national security and

foreign policy interests.

her

nations' gun laws and the safety and security of our

allies. Technical data and software for 3D printed

firearms and machinegun conversion devices can be used

by international gangs, criminals, and terrorists in a

manner contrary to United States national security and

foreign policy interests.

Multiple agencies have the authority to help stop the

proliferation of these emerging threats, and it is the

policy of the United States to work collectively across

agencies to identify threats, engage in information

sharing, and work together to develop and implement

effective strategies to combat these threats.

Authorities that can address emerging firearms threats

extend beyond the Gun Control Act (Public Law 90-618)

and the National Firearms Act (Public Law 73-474).

Focused and enhanced coordination is needed to ensure a

unified and robust strategy for enforcing existing

legal authorities and using every available tool and

resource. This interagency effort will build on the

life-saving work that has occurred to date to stop the

proliferation of machinegun conversion devices,

including the ongoing efforts at the Department of

Justice and ATF.

for enforcing existing

legal authorities and using every available tool and

resource. This interagency effort will build on the

life-saving work that has occurred to date to stop the

proliferation of machinegun conversion devices,

including the ongoing efforts at the Department of

Justice and ATF.

My Administration also has invested significant

resources in school safety and has taken steps to keeps

firearms out of schools. These steps have focused on

preventing unauthorized access to firearms for youth

and individuals in crisis; supporting schools that are

implementing evidence-based safety and gun-violence

prevention and intervention solutions; and addressing

the mental health needs of students, particularly those

impacted by gun violence.

Keeping students and educators, including teachers and

other school personnel, safe from gun violence in their

schools is a top priority for my Administration, but

there is more to do to make our schools safer. Since

the mass shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado

in 1999, according to one analysis, there have been

more than 400 school shootings that exposed more than

375,000 students to gun violence. Exposure to school

shootings takes a terrible toll on students and

educators. A nationally representative study found that

51 percent of 14- to 17-year-olds in the United States

worry about school shootings.

en

more than 400 school shootings that exposed more than

375,000 students to gun violence. Exposure to school

shootings takes a terrible toll on students and

educators. A nationally representative study found that

51 percent of 14- to 17-year-olds in the United States

worry about school shootings.

The majority of States require schools to conduct

active-shooter drills for students and educators. About

95 percent of K-12 public schools in the United States

conduct lockdown drills, which include drills to

prepare for an active-shooter situation. These drills

vary widely in their approach, and many parents,

students, and educators have expressed concerns over

the effectiveness of and trauma caused by some

approaches to these drills.

Despite their ubiquity, there is very limited research

on how to design and deploy these drills to maximize

their effectiveness and minimize any collateral harms

they might cause. While additional research is ongoing,

it is difficult to conclusively determine which

specific practices are most effective in preparing

schools for active-shooter incidents, preventing

injuries

[[Page 80347]]

lls to maximize

their effectiveness and minimize any collateral harms

they might cause. While additional research is ongoing,

it is difficult to conclusively determine which

specific practices are most effective in preparing

schools for active-shooter incidents, preventing

injuries

[[Page 80347]]

and fatalities, and minimizing any associated

psychological impacts or traumas. The Department of

Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services,

the Department of Education, and the Department of

Homeland Security continue to work together on a range

of school safety issues, including the beginnings of

research into these important questions. It is time for

these agencies to extend their efforts to help schools

better design and conduct effective and age- and

developmentally appropriate active-shooter drills.

Sec. 2. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

(a) The term ``machinegun'' has the meaning given

by 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(24) and 26 U.S.C. 5845(b), and

includes a ``machinegun conversion device,'' which is

any part designed and intended solely and exclusively,

or combination of parts designed and intended, for use

in converting a weapon into a machinegun.

(b) The term ``undetectable firearm'' means a

firearm as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 922(p).

includes a ``machinegun conversion device,'' which is

any part designed and intended solely and exclusively,

or combination of parts designed and intended, for use

in converting a weapon into a machinegun.

(b) The term ``undetectable firearm'' means a

firearm as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 922(p).

(c) The term ``3D printing'' refers to the additive

manufacturing process, during which producers transmit

digital designs to 3D printers. The computerized design

guides the fabrication of products, building them up

layer by layer rather than cutting away from a large

block of existing material as in most traditional

manufacturing. This term includes additive

manufacturing technology used to produce a firearm,

firearm frame or receiver, or machinegun conversion

device.

Sec. 3. Combating Emerging Firearms Threats. (a) There

is hereby established an interagency Emerging Firearms

Threats Task Force (Task Force). The Task Force shall

be chaired by the Director of the Office of Gun

Violence Prevention. In addition to the Chair, the Task

Force shall consist of the following members:

(i) the Secretary of State;

(ii) the Attorney General;

(iii) the Secretary of Commerce;

(iv) the Secretary of Homeland Security;

(v) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;

(vi) the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy;

(vii) the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor;

(viii) the Counsel to the President;

(ix) the Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy

Council;

General;

(iii) the Secretary of Commerce;

(iv) the Secretary of Homeland Security;

(v) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;

(vi) the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy;

(vii) the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor;

(viii) the Counsel to the President;

(ix) the Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy

Council;

(x) the Deputy Assistant to the President and Domestic Policy Advisor to

the Vice President; and

(xi) the heads of such other agencies and offices as the Chair may from

time to time invite to participate.

(b) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the

Task Force shall submit to the President, through the

Director of the Office of Gun Violence Prevention, a

report containing a risk assessment and strategy to

stop the proliferation of machinegun conversion

devices, with a particular emphasis on the devices used

to convert a standard, semiautomatic firearm to a

machinegun. The risk assessment and strategy shall

include:

(i) information regarding the use, recovery, origins, and distribution

channels of machinegun conversion devices, including:

(A) the software or technology used for 3D printing machinegun conversion

devices; and

(B) the origins of machinegun conversion devices that are seized at ports

of entry, illegally imported into the United States, or otherwise recovered

by law enforcement agencies in the United States;

[[Page 80348]]

(ii) an assessment of existing applicable legal authorities of the agencies

represented on the Task Force and other agencies identified at the

direction of the Chair to regulate software or technology used to make

machinegun conversion devices, which shall include a review of export and

import laws;

tes, or otherwise recovered

by law enforcement agencies in the United States;

[[Page 80348]]

(ii) an assessment of existing applicable legal authorities of the agencies

represented on the Task Force and other agencies identified at the

direction of the Chair to regulate software or technology used to make

machinegun conversion devices, which shall include a review of export and

import laws;

(iii) an assessment of the technological and legal feasibility of 3D

printing companies designing 3D printers that block the functional

capacities of software that can 3D print machinegun conversion devices;

(iv) an assessment of the operational capabilities and legal authorities of

agencies to detect, intercept, and seize machinegun conversion devices that

are illegally imported or illegally produced domestically, including

through 3D printing;

(v) an interagency plan for expanding U.S. Customs and Border Protection

initiatives with Federal, State, Tribal, and local law enforcement to stop

the flow into the United States of machinegun conversion devices;

(vi) an interagency plan for seizing as criminal instrumentalities 3D

printers that are acquired for the purpose of illegally making machinegun

conversion devices and recommendations for additional administrative

actions necessary to facilitate such seizure;

(vii) an interagency plan for expanding partnerships with State, Tribal,

and local law enforcement for Federal training on identifying machinegun

conversion devices, tracing the firearms to which they were attached, and

submitting seizure data to ATF;

(viii) an interagency plan--with input from 3D data providers, technology

companies, and civil society--for voluntary, regulatory, and international

mechanisms to limit the availability on the internet of files used for the

purpose of unlawfully producing machinegun conversion devices;

n

conversion devices, tracing the firearms to which they were attached, and

submitting seizure data to ATF;

(viii) an interagency plan--with input from 3D data providers, technology

companies, and civil society--for voluntary, regulatory, and international

mechanisms to limit the availability on the internet of files used for the

purpose of unlawfully producing machinegun conversion devices;

(ix) an interagency plan for effective coordination to limit the illegal

export and import of software or technology on the internet that can be

readily used to 3D print machinegun conversion devices; and

(x) recommendations for any additional authorities or funding agencies need

from the Congress to more effectively address the proliferation of

machinegun conversion devices.

(c) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the

Task Force shall submit to the President, through the

Director of the Office of Gun Violence Prevention, a

report containing a risk assessment and strategy to

address the emerging threat related to 3D printed

firearms, including unserialized or undetectable 3D

printed firearms. The risk assessment and strategy

shall include:

(i) information regarding the usage, recovery, origins, and distribution

channels of 3D printed unserialized firearms and 3D printed undetectable

firearms, including the software or technology used for 3D printing

unserialized firearms or undetectable firearms;

(ii) an assessment of how 3D printing of firearms can facilitate violation

of the Undetectable Firearms Act (18 U.S.C. 922(p));

(iii) an assessment of existing authorities, including export and import

laws, that regulate software or technology used for 3D printing firearms,

including undetectable firearms;

are or technology used for 3D printing

unserialized firearms or undetectable firearms;

(ii) an assessment of how 3D printing of firearms can facilitate violation

of the Undetectable Firearms Act (18 U.S.C. 922(p));

(iii) an assessment of existing authorities, including export and import

laws, that regulate software or technology used for 3D printing firearms,

including undetectable firearms;

(iv) an assessment of the technological feasibility of 3D printers

proactively blocking the functional capacities of software used to 3D print

undetectable firearms;

(v) an interagency plan for seizing as criminal instrumentalities 3D

printers acquired for the purpose of illegally producing or dealing in

firearms, including unserialized or undetectable firearms, or for the

purpose of producing firearms for criminal purposes, and recommendations

for additional administrative actions that may be necessary to facilitate

such seizures;

[[Page 80349]]

(vi) an interagency plan for effective coordination between the Department

of Justice and the Department of Commerce to limit the illegal export or

import of software or technology on the internet that can be readily used

to illegally 3D print firearms, including unserialized or undetectable

firearms;

(vii) an interagency plan for expanding partnerships with Federal, State,

Tribal, and local law enforcement to train them on identifying undetectable

or unserialized firearms made with 3D printing software or technology and

reporting recoveries of such firearms to ATF; and

(viii) recommendations for any additional authorities or funding the

agencies need from the Congress to more effectively address the problem of

3D printed firearms, including unserialized or undetectable firearms.

law enforcement to train them on identifying undetectable

or unserialized firearms made with 3D printing software or technology and

reporting recoveries of such firearms to ATF; and

(viii) recommendations for any additional authorities or funding the

agencies need from the Congress to more effectively address the problem of

3D printed firearms, including unserialized or undetectable firearms.

(d) The Task Force shall be responsible for

interagency coordination necessary to facilitate

agencies' implementation of the recommendations and

strategies in the reports described in subsections (b)

and (c) of this section.

(e) At the direction of the Chair, the Task Force

may coordinate interagency efforts to address

additional emerging firearms threats.

Sec. 4. Understanding and Improving School-Based

Active-Shooter Drills. (a) Within 110 days of the date

of this order, the Secretary of Education and the

Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with

the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human

Services, and the Surgeon General, shall develop and

publish information about school-based active-shooter

drills for schools, including institutions of higher

education, and for State, Tribal, and local educational

agencies. Such information shall include:

the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human

Services, and the Surgeon General, shall develop and

publish information about school-based active-shooter

drills for schools, including institutions of higher

education, and for State, Tribal, and local educational

agencies. Such information shall include:

(i) a summary of existing research and recommendations on active-shooter

drills, including information on:

(A) how educators can collaborate within schools--as well as with

families; communities; State, Tribal, and local law enforcement; and other

emergency response officials--to implement drills that effectively prepare

a response to school-based active-shooter situations, including by

accounting for the particular needs of educators and students with

disabilities; sharing evidence-informed age- and developmentally

appropriate practices, such as those that prevent or limit trauma and

psychological harm to those participating in drills; and facilitating

effective and timely communication with students, educators, first

responders, family members, and other relevant stakeholders; and

(B) how schools must comply with Federal civil rights laws prohibiting

discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and

disability when creating, implementing, and evaluating active-shooter

drills, including by effectively serving educators and students with

disabilities as well as ensuring that communications with educators and

students consider their language-related needs (e.g., communicating in a

manner and language that educators and students are able to understand);

and

color, national origin, sex, and

disability when creating, implementing, and evaluating active-shooter

drills, including by effectively serving educators and students with

disabilities as well as ensuring that communications with educators and

students consider their language-related needs (e.g., communicating in a

manner and language that educators and students are able to understand);

and

(ii) resources on school-based active-shooter drills, including information

on:

(A) the types of drills that may be appropriate to prepare students and

educators for school-based active-shooter situations; and

(B) how to create, implement, and evaluate evidence-informed, effective,

and age- and developmentally appropriate school-based drills, including:

(1) how best to engage with students, family members, educators, law

enforcement, and other relevant stakeholders on the process for creating,

implementing, and evaluating these drills;

(2) how best to communicate with students, family members, educators, and

other relevant stakeholders before, during, and after the drill, including

through the use of notification plans for students, educators, parents, and

other parties;

[[Page 80350]]

(3) how to prevent or limit trauma or psychological distress associated

with active-shooter drills and support students and educators who may

experience such trauma or psychological distress; and

(4) how best to serve people with disabilities and those with unique

language-related needs.

hrough the use of notification plans for students, educators, parents, and

other parties;

[[Page 80350]]

(3) how to prevent or limit trauma or psychological distress associated

with active-shooter drills and support students and educators who may

experience such trauma or psychological distress; and

(4) how best to serve people with disabilities and those with unique

language-related needs.

(b) Within 110 days of the date of this order, the

Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Homeland

Security, in coordination with the Attorney General,

the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the

Surgeon General, shall develop and publish information

on recommended areas for future research that can help

inform policymakers, educators, students, parents, and

other relevant stakeholders about different types of

school-based active-shooter drills, the appropriate

frequency of such drills, and the effects of such

drills on students and educators. This information

shall include potential funding sources that could help

advance research on, and inform improvements to,

active-shooter drills.

Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order

shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or

the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with

applicable law and subject to the availability of

appropriations.

uthority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or

the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with

applicable law and subject to the availability of

appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not,

create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,

enforceable at law or in equity by any party against

the United States, its departments, agencies, or

entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any

other person.

(Presidential Sig.)

THE WHITE HOUSE,

September 26, 2024.

[FR Doc. 2024-22938

Filed 10-1-24; 11:15 am]

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