Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities

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Presidential Documents › Executive Order › 2022-22531

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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 198 (Friday, October 14, 2022)]

[Presidential Documents]

[Pages 62283-62297]

From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[FR Doc No: 2022-22531]

Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 198 / Friday, October 14, 2022 /

Presidential Documents

___________________________________________________________________

Title 3--

The President

[[Page 62283]]

Executive Order 14086 of October 7, 2022

Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals

Intelligence Activities

By the authority vested in me as President by the

Constitution and the laws of the United States of

America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. The United States collects signals

intelligence so that its national security

decisionmakers have access to the timely, accurate, and

insightful information necessary to advance the

national security interests of the United States and to

protect its citizens and the citizens of its allies and

partners from harm. Signals intelligence capabilities

are a major reason we have been able to adapt to a

dynamic and challenging security environment, and the

United States must preserve and continue to develop

robust and technologically advanced signals

intelligence capabilities to protect our security and

that of our allies and partners

apabilities

are a major reason we have been able to adapt to a

dynamic and challenging security environment, and the

United States must preserve and continue to develop

robust and technologically advanced signals

intelligence capabilities to protect our security and

that of our allies and partners. At the same time, the

United States recognizes that signals intelligence

activities must take into account that all persons

should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless

of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and

that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in

the handling of their personal information. Therefore,

this order establishes safeguards for such signals

intelligence activities.

Sec. 2. Signals Intelligence Activities.

(a) Principles. Signals intelligence activities

shall be authorized and conducted consistent with the

following principles:

(i) Signals intelligence activities shall be authorized by statute or by

Executive Order, proclamation, or other Presidential directive and

undertaken in accordance with the Constitution and with applicable statutes

and Executive Orders, proclamations, and other Presidential directives.

shall be authorized and conducted consistent with the

following principles:

(i) Signals intelligence activities shall be authorized by statute or by

Executive Order, proclamation, or other Presidential directive and

undertaken in accordance with the Constitution and with applicable statutes

and Executive Orders, proclamations, and other Presidential directives.

(ii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subject to appropriate

safeguards, which shall ensure that privacy and civil liberties are

integral considerations in the planning and implementation of such

activities so that:

(A) signals intelligence activities shall be conducted only following a

determination, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors,

that the activities are necessary to advance a validated intelligence

priority, although signals intelligence does not have to be the sole means

available or used for advancing aspects of the validated intelligence

priority; and

(B) signals intelligence activities shall be conducted only to the extent

and in a manner that is proportionate to the validated intelligence

priority for which they have been authorized, with the aim of achieving a

proper balance between the importance of the validated intelligence

priority being advanced and the impact on the privacy and civil liberties

of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might

reside.

(iii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subjected to rigorous

oversight in order to ensure that they comport with the principles

identified above.

(b) Objectives. Signals intelligence collection

activities shall be conducted in pursuit of legitimate

objectives.

persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might

reside.

(iii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subjected to rigorous

oversight in order to ensure that they comport with the principles

identified above.

(b) Objectives. Signals intelligence collection

activities shall be conducted in pursuit of legitimate

objectives.

(i) Legitimate objectives.

(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall be conducted only in

pursuit of one or more of the following objectives:

[[Page 62284]]

(1) understanding or assessing the capabilities, intentions, or activities

of a foreign government, a foreign military, a faction of a foreign nation,

a foreign-based political organization, or an entity acting on behalf of or

controlled by any such foreign government, military, faction, or political

organization, in order to protect the national security of the United

States and of its allies and partners;

(2) understanding or assessing the capabilities, intentions, or activities

of foreign organizations, including international terrorist organizations,

that pose a current or potential threat to the national security of the

United States or of its allies or partners;

(3) understanding or assessing transnational threats that impact global

security, including climate and other ecological change, public health

risks, humanitarian threats, political instability, and geographic rivalry;

(4) protecting against foreign military capabilities and activities;

(5) protecting against terrorism, the taking of hostages, and the holding

of individuals captive (including the identification, location, and rescue

of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(6) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other

intelligence activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance

of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

ividuals captive (including the identification, location, and rescue

of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(6) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other

intelligence activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance

of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(7) protecting against threats from the development, possession, or

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies and

threats conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(8) protecting against cybersecurity threats created or exploited by, or

malicious cyber activities conducted by or on behalf of, a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(9) protecting against threats to the personnel of the United States or of

its allies or partners;

(10) protecting against transnational criminal threats, including illicit

finance and sanctions evasion related to one or more of the other

objectives identified in subsection (b)(i) of this section;

(11) protecting the integrity of elections and political processes,

government property, and United States infrastructure (both physical and

electronic) from activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the

assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign

person; and

evasion related to one or more of the other

objectives identified in subsection (b)(i) of this section;

(11) protecting the integrity of elections and political processes,

government property, and United States infrastructure (both physical and

electronic) from activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the

assistance of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign

person; and

(12) advancing collection or operational capabilities or activities in

order to further a legitimate objective identified in subsection (b)(i) of

this section.

(B) The President may authorize updates to the list of objectives in

light of new national security imperatives, such as new or heightened

threats to the national security of the United States, for which the

President determines that signals intelligence collection activities may be

used. The Director of National Intelligence (Director) shall publicly

release any updates to the list of objectives authorized by the President,

unless the President determines that doing so would pose a risk to the

national security of the United States.

(ii) Prohibited objectives.

(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall not be conducted for

the purpose of:

(1) suppressing or burdening criticism, dissent, or the free expression of

ideas or political opinions by individuals or the press;

(2) suppressing or restricting legitimate privacy interests;

(3) suppressing or restricting a right to legal counsel; or

f the United States.

(ii) Prohibited objectives.

(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall not be conducted for

the purpose of:

(1) suppressing or burdening criticism, dissent, or the free expression of

ideas or political opinions by individuals or the press;

(2) suppressing or restricting legitimate privacy interests;

(3) suppressing or restricting a right to legal counsel; or

(4) disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, gender

identity, sexual orientation, or religion.

(B) It is not a legitimate objective to collect foreign private

commercial information or trade secrets to afford a competitive advantage

to United States companies and United States business sectors commercially.

The

[[Page 62285]]

collection of such information is authorized only to protect the national

security of the United States or of its allies or partners.

(iii) Validation of signals intelligence collection priorities.

(A) Under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended

(50 U.S.C. 3024), the Director must establish priorities for the

Intelligence Community to ensure the timely and effective collection of

national intelligence, including national intelligence collected through

signals intelligence. The Director does this through the National

Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which the Director maintains and

presents to the President, through the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs, on a regular basis

igence Community to ensure the timely and effective collection of

national intelligence, including national intelligence collected through

signals intelligence. The Director does this through the National

Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which the Director maintains and

presents to the President, through the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs, on a regular basis. In order to ensure that

signals intelligence collection activities are undertaken to advance

legitimate objectives, before presenting the NIPF or any successor

framework that identifies intelligence priorities to the President, the

Director shall obtain from the Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (CLPO) an assessment as to

whether, with regard to anticipated signals intelligence collection

activities, each of the intelligence priorities identified in the NIPF or

successor framework:

(1) advances one or more of the legitimate objectives set forth in

subsection (b)(i) of this section;

(2) neither was designed nor is anticipated to result in signals

intelligence collection in contravention of the prohibited objectives set

forth in subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and

(3) was established after appropriate consideration for the privacy and

civil liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever

they might reside.

(B) If the Director disagrees with any aspect of the CLPO's assessment

with respect to any of the intelligence priorities identified in the NIPF

or successor framework, the Director shall include the CLPO's assessment

and the Director's views when presenting the NIPF to the President.

following safeguards shall fulfill the principles

contained in subsections (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) of this

section.

s identified in the NIPF

or successor framework, the Director shall include the CLPO's assessment

and the Director's views when presenting the NIPF to the President.

following safeguards shall fulfill the principles

contained in subsections (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) of this

section.

(i) Collection of signals intelligence.

(A) The United States shall conduct signals intelligence collection

activities only following a determination that a specific signals

intelligence collection activity, based on a reasonable assessment of all

relevant factors, is necessary to advance a validated intelligence

priority, although signals intelligence does not have to be the sole means

available or used for advancing aspects of the validated intelligence

priority; it could be used, for example, to ensure alternative pathways for

validation or for maintaining reliable access to the same information. In

determining whether to collect signals intelligence consistent with this

principle, the United States--through an element of the Intelligence

Community or through an interagency committee consisting in whole or in

part of the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, the heads of

departments containing such elements, or their designees--shall consider

the availability, feasibility, and appropriateness of other less intrusive

sources and methods for collecting the information necessary to advance a

validated intelligence priority, including from diplomatic and public

sources, and shall prioritize such available, feasible, and appropriate

alternatives to signals intelligence.

ments containing such elements, or their designees--shall consider

the availability, feasibility, and appropriateness of other less intrusive

sources and methods for collecting the information necessary to advance a

validated intelligence priority, including from diplomatic and public

sources, and shall prioritize such available, feasible, and appropriate

alternatives to signals intelligence.

(B) Signals intelligence collection activities shall be as tailored as

feasible to advance a validated intelligence priority and, taking due

account of relevant factors, not disproportionately impact privacy and

civil liberties. Such factors may include, depending on the circumstances,

the nature of the pursued objective; the feasible steps taken to limit the

scope of the collection to the authorized purpose; the intrusiveness of the

collection activity, including its duration; the probable contribution of

the collection to the objective pursued; the reasonably foreseeable

consequences to individuals, including unintended third parties; the nature

and sensitivity

[[Page 62286]]

of the data to be collected; and the safeguards afforded to the information

collected.

specific signals intelligence collection activity may include, for example,

a specific line of effort or target, as appropriate.

(ii) Bulk collection of signals intelligence.

d third parties; the nature

and sensitivity

[[Page 62286]]

of the data to be collected; and the safeguards afforded to the information

collected.

specific signals intelligence collection activity may include, for example,

a specific line of effort or target, as appropriate.

(ii) Bulk collection of signals intelligence.

(A) Targeted collection shall be prioritized. The bulk collection of

signals intelligence shall be authorized only based on a determination--by

an element of the Intelligence Community or through an interagency

committee consisting in whole or in part of the heads of elements of the

Intelligence Community, the heads of departments containing such elements,

or their designees--that the information necessary to advance a validated

intelligence priority cannot reasonably be obtained by targeted collection.

When it is determined to be necessary to engage in bulk collection in order

to advance a validated intelligence priority, the element of the

Intelligence Community shall apply reasonable methods and technical

measures in order to limit the data collected to only what is necessary to

advance a validated intelligence priority, while minimizing the collection

of non-pertinent information.

(B) Each element of the Intelligence Community that collects signals

intelligence through bulk collection shall use such information only in

pursuit of one or more of the following objectives:

(1) protecting against terrorism, the taking of hostages, and the holding

of individuals captive (including the identification, location, and rescue

of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(2) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other

intelligence activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance

of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

ividuals captive (including the identification, location, and rescue

of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(2) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other

intelligence activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance

of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(3) protecting against threats from the development, possession, or

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies and

threats conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(4) protecting against cybersecurity threats created or exploited by, or

malicious cyber activities conducted by or on behalf of, a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(5) protecting against threats to the personnel of the United States or of

its allies or partners; and

(6) protecting against transnational criminal threats, including illicit

finance and sanctions evasion related to one or more of the other

objectives identified in subsection (c)(ii) of this section.

light of new national security imperatives, such as new or heightened

threats to the national security of the United States, for which the

President determines that bulk collection may be used. The Director shall

publicly release any updates to the list of objectives authorized by the

President, unless the President determines that doing so would pose a risk

to the national security of the United States.

(D) In order to minimize any impact on privacy and civil liberties, a

targeted signals intelligence collection activity that temporarily uses

data acquired without discriminants (for example, without specific

identifiers or selection terms) shall be subject to the safeguards

described in this subsection, unless such data is:

would pose a risk

to the national security of the United States.

(D) In order to minimize any impact on privacy and civil liberties, a

targeted signals intelligence collection activity that temporarily uses

data acquired without discriminants (for example, without specific

identifiers or selection terms) shall be subject to the safeguards

described in this subsection, unless such data is:

(1) used only to support the initial technical phase of the targeted

signals intelligence collection activity;

(2) retained for only the short period of time required to complete this

phase; and

(3) thereafter deleted.

(iii) Handling of personal information collected through signals

intelligence.

[[Page 62287]]

(A) Minimization. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles

personal information collected through signals intelligence shall establish

and apply policies and procedures designed to minimize the dissemination

and retention of personal information collected through signals

intelligence.

(1) Dissemination. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles

personal information collected through signals intelligence:

(a) shall disseminate non-United States persons'

personal information collected through signals

intelligence only if it involves one or more of the

comparable types of information that section 2.3 of

Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981 (United

States Intelligence Activities), as amended, states

may be disseminated in the case of information

concerning United States persons;

(b) shall not disseminate personal information

collected through signals intelligence solely

because of a person's nationality or country of

residence;

lligence Activities), as amended, states

may be disseminated in the case of information

concerning United States persons;

(b) shall not disseminate personal information

collected through signals intelligence solely

because of a person's nationality or country of

residence;

Government personal information collected through

signals intelligence only if an authorized and

appropriately trained individual has a reasonable

belief that the personal information will be

appropriately protected and that the recipient has

a need to know the information;

(d) shall take due account of the purpose of the

dissemination, the nature and extent of the

personal information being disseminated, and the

potential for harmful impact on the person or

persons concerned before disseminating personal

information collected through signals intelligence

to recipients outside the United States Government,

including to a foreign government or international

organization; and

(e) shall not disseminate personal information

collected through signals intelligence for the

purpose of circumventing the provisions of this

order.

(2) Retention. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles

personal information collected through signals intelligence:

organization; and

(e) shall not disseminate personal information

collected through signals intelligence for the

purpose of circumventing the provisions of this

order.

(2) Retention. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles

personal information collected through signals intelligence:

(a) shall retain non-United States persons'

personal information collected through signals

intelligence only if the retention of comparable

information concerning United States persons would

be permitted under applicable law and shall subject

such information to the same retention periods that

would apply to comparable information concerning

United States persons;

(b) shall subject non-United States persons'

personal information collected through signals

intelligence for which no final retention

determination has been made to the same temporary

retention periods that would apply to comparable

information concerning United States persons; and

personal information collected through signals

intelligence that may no longer be retained in the

same manner that comparable information concerning

United States persons would be deleted.

(B) Data security and access. Each element of the Intelligence Community

that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:

rsonal information collected through signals

intelligence that may no longer be retained in the

same manner that comparable information concerning

United States persons would be deleted.

(B) Data security and access. Each element of the Intelligence Community

that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:

(1) shall process and store personal information collected through signals

intelligence under conditions that provide appropriate protection and

prevent access by unauthorized persons, consistent with the applicable

safeguards for sensitive information contained in relevant Executive

Orders, proclamations, other Presidential directives, Intelligence

Community directives, and associated policies;

(2) shall limit access to such personal information to authorized personnel

who have a need to know the information to perform their mission and have

received appropriate training on the requirements of applicable United

States law, as described in policies and procedures issued under subsection

(c)(iv) of this section; and

[[Page 62288]]

(3) shall ensure that personal information collected through signals

intelligence for which no final retention determination has been made is

accessed only in order to make or support such a determination or to

conduct authorized administrative, testing, development, security, or

oversight functions.

personal information collected through signals intelligence shall include

such personal information in intelligence products only as consistent with

applicable Intelligence Community standards for accuracy and objectivity,

with a focus on applying standards relating to the quality and reliability

of the information, consideration of alternative sources of information and

interpretations of data, and objectivity in performing analysis.

als intelligence shall include

such personal information in intelligence products only as consistent with

applicable Intelligence Community standards for accuracy and objectivity,

with a focus on applying standards relating to the quality and reliability

of the information, consideration of alternative sources of information and

interpretations of data, and objectivity in performing analysis.

(D) Queries of bulk collection. Each element of the Intelligence

Community that conducts queries of unminimized signals intelligence

obtained by bulk collection shall do so consistent with the permissible

uses of signals intelligence obtained by bulk collection identified in

subsection (c)(ii)(B) of this section and according to policies and

procedures issued under subsection (c)(iv) of this section, which shall

appropriately take into account the impact on the privacy and civil

liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever they

might reside.

(E) Documentation. In order to facilitate the oversight processes set

forth in subsection (d) of this section and the redress mechanism set forth

in section 3 of this order, each element of the Intelligence Community that

engages in signals intelligence collection activities shall maintain

documentation to the extent reasonable in light of the nature and type of

collection at issue and the context in which it is collected. The content

of any such documentation may vary based on the circumstances but shall, to

the extent reasonable, provide the factual basis pursuant to which the

element of the Intelligence Community, based on a reasonable assessment of

all relevant factors, assesses that the signals intelligence collection

activity is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority.

hich it is collected. The content

of any such documentation may vary based on the circumstances but shall, to

the extent reasonable, provide the factual basis pursuant to which the

element of the Intelligence Community, based on a reasonable assessment of

all relevant factors, assesses that the signals intelligence collection

activity is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority.

(iv) Update and publication of policies and procedures. The head of each

element of the Intelligence Community:

(A) shall continue to use the policies and procedures issued pursuant to

Presidential Policy Directive 28 of January 17, 2014 (Signals Intelligence

Activities) (PPD-28), until they are updated pursuant to subsection

(c)(iv)(B) of this section;

(B) shall, within 1 year of the date of this order, in consultation with

the Attorney General, the CLPO, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties

Oversight Board (PCLOB), update those policies and procedures as necessary

to implement the privacy and civil liberties safeguards in this order; and

policies and procedures publicly to the maximum extent possible, consistent

with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, in order to

enhance the public's understanding of, and to promote public trust in, the

safeguards pursuant to which the United States conducts signals

intelligence activities.

n this order; and

policies and procedures publicly to the maximum extent possible, consistent

with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, in order to

enhance the public's understanding of, and to promote public trust in, the

safeguards pursuant to which the United States conducts signals

intelligence activities.

(v) Review by the PCLOB.

(A) Nature of review. Consistent with applicable law, the PCLOB is

encouraged to conduct a review of the updated policies and procedures

described in subsection (c)(iv)(B) of this section once they have been

issued to ensure that they are consistent with the enhanced safeguards

contained in this order.

(B) Consideration of review. Within 180 days of completion of any review

by the PCLOB described in subsection (c)(v)(A) of this section, the head of

each element of the Intelligence Community shall carefully consider and

shall implement or otherwise address all recommendations contained in such

review, consistent with applicable law.

[[Page 62289]]

(d) Subjecting signals intelligence activities to

rigorous oversight. The actions directed in this

subsection are designed to build on the oversight

mechanisms that elements of the Intelligence Community

already have in place, in order to further ensure that

signals intelligence activities are subjected to

rigorous oversight.

igence activities to

rigorous oversight. The actions directed in this

subsection are designed to build on the oversight

mechanisms that elements of the Intelligence Community

already have in place, in order to further ensure that

signals intelligence activities are subjected to

rigorous oversight.

(i) Legal, oversight, and compliance officials. Each element of the

Intelligence Community that collects signals intelligence:

(A) shall have in place senior-level legal, oversight, and compliance

officials who conduct periodic oversight of signals intelligence

activities, including an Inspector General, a Privacy and Civil Liberties

Officer, and an officer or officers in a designated compliance role with

the authority to conduct oversight of and ensure compliance with applicable

United States law;

(B) shall provide such legal, oversight, and compliance officials access

to all information pertinent to carrying out their oversight

responsibilities under this subsection, consistent with the protection of

intelligence sources or methods, including their oversight responsibilities

to ensure that any appropriate actions are taken to remediate an incident

of non-compliance with applicable United States law; and

such legal, oversight, and compliance officials in carrying out their

oversight responsibilities under this subsection.

(ii) Training. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall maintain

appropriate training requirements to ensure that all employees with access

to signals intelligence know and understand the requirements of this order

and the policies and procedures for reporting and remediating incidents of

non-compliance with applicable United States law.

ersight responsibilities under this subsection.

(ii) Training. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall maintain

appropriate training requirements to ensure that all employees with access

to signals intelligence know and understand the requirements of this order

and the policies and procedures for reporting and remediating incidents of

non-compliance with applicable United States law.

(iii) Significant incidents of non-compliance.

(A) Each element of the Intelligence Community shall ensure that, if a

legal, oversight, or compliance official, as described in subsection (d)(i)

of this section, or any other employee, identifies a significant incident

of non-compliance with applicable United States law, the incident is

reported promptly to the head of the element of the Intelligence Community,

the head of the executive department or agency (agency) containing the

element of the Intelligence Community (to the extent relevant), and the

Director.

(B) Upon receipt of such report, the head of the element of the

Intelligence Community, the head of the agency containing the element of

the Intelligence Community (to the extent relevant), and the Director shall

ensure that any necessary actions are taken to remediate and prevent the

recurrence of the significant incident of non-compliance.

(e) Savings clause. Provided the signals

intelligence collection is conducted consistent with

and in the manner prescribed by this section of this

order, this order does not limit any signals

intelligence collection technique authorized under the

National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C.

3001 et seq.), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Act of 1978, as amended (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)

(FISA), Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law

or Presidential directive.

ignals

intelligence collection technique authorized under the

National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C.

3001 et seq.), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Act of 1978, as amended (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)

(FISA), Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law

or Presidential directive.

Sec. 3. Signals Intelligence Redress Mechanism.

(a) Purpose. This section establishes a redress

mechanism to review qualifying complaints transmitted

by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying

state concerning United States signals intelligence

activities for any covered violation of United States

law and, if necessary, appropriate remediation.

(b) Process for submission of qualifying

complaints. Within 60 days of the date of this order,

the Director, in consultation with the Attorney General

and the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community

that collect or

[[Page 62290]]

handle personal information collected through signals

intelligence, shall establish a process for the

submission of qualifying complaints transmitted by the

appropriate public authority in a qualifying state.

by the CLPO.

ect or

[[Page 62290]]

handle personal information collected through signals

intelligence, shall establish a process for the

submission of qualifying complaints transmitted by the

appropriate public authority in a qualifying state.

by the CLPO.

(i) Establishment. The Director, in consultation with the Attorney General,

shall establish a process that authorizes the CLPO to investigate, review,

and, as necessary, order appropriate remediation for qualifying complaints.

This process shall govern how the CLPO will review qualifying complaints in

a manner that protects classified or otherwise privileged or protected

information and shall ensure, at a minimum, that for each qualifying

complaint the CLPO shall:

(A) review information necessary to investigate the qualifying complaint;

(B) exercise its statutory and delegated authority to determine whether

there was a covered violation by:

(i) taking into account both relevant national security interests and

applicable privacy protections;

(ii) giving appropriate deference to any relevant determinations made by

national security officials; and

(iii) applying the law impartially;

(D) provide a classified report on information indicating a violation of

any authority subject to the oversight of the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court (FISC) to the Assistant Attorney General for National

Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its

rules of procedure;

(E) after the review is completed, inform the complainant, through the

appropriate public authority in a qualifying state and without confirming

or denying that the complainant was subject to United States signals

intelligence activities, that:

(FISC) to the Assistant Attorney General for National

Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its

rules of procedure;

(E) after the review is completed, inform the complainant, through the

appropriate public authority in a qualifying state and without confirming

or denying that the complainant was subject to United States signals

intelligence activities, that:

(1) ``the review either did not identify any covered violations or the

Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence issued a determination requiring appropriate

remediation'';

(2) the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community may, as

prescribed in the regulations issued by the Attorney General pursuant to

section 3(d)(i) of this order, apply for review of the CLPO's

determinations by the Data Protection Review Court described in subsection

(d) of this section; and

(3) if either the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community

applies for review by the Data Protection Review Court, a special advocate

will be selected by the Data Protection Review Court to advocate regarding

the complainant's interest in the matter;

(F) maintain appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying

complaint and produce a classified decision explaining the basis for its

factual findings, determination with respect to whether a covered violation

occurred, and determination of the appropriate remediation in the event

there was such a violation, consistent with its statutory and delegated

authority;

(G) prepare a classified ex parte record of review, which shall consist

of the appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying complaint

and the classified decision described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of this

section; and

(H) provide any necessary support to the Data Protection Review Court.

event

there was such a violation, consistent with its statutory and delegated

authority;

(G) prepare a classified ex parte record of review, which shall consist

of the appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying complaint

and the classified decision described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of this

section; and

(H) provide any necessary support to the Data Protection Review Court.

(ii) Binding effect. Each element of the Intelligence Community, and each

agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, shall comply

with any determination by the CLPO to undertake appropriate remediation

[[Page 62291]]

pursuant to subsection (c)(i)(C) of this section, subject to any contrary

determination by the Data Protection Review Court.

(iii) Assistance. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall provide

the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the reviews

described in subsection (c)(i) of this section, consistent with the

protection of intelligence sources and methods, and shall not take any

actions designed to impede or improperly influence the CLPO's reviews.

Privacy and civil liberties officials within elements of the Intelligence

Community shall also support the CLPO as it performs the reviews described

in subsection (c)(i) of this section.

(iv) Independence. The Director shall not interfere with a review by the

CLPO of a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section; nor

shall the Director remove the CLPO for any actions taken pursuant to this

order, except for instances of misconduct, malfeasance, breach of security,

neglect of duty, or incapacity.

(d) Data Protection Review Court.

section.

(iv) Independence. The Director shall not interfere with a review by the

CLPO of a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section; nor

shall the Director remove the CLPO for any actions taken pursuant to this

order, except for instances of misconduct, malfeasance, breach of security,

neglect of duty, or incapacity.

(d) Data Protection Review Court.

(i) Establishment. The Attorney General is authorized to and shall

establish a process to review determinations made by the CLPO under

subsection (c)(i) of this section. In exercising that authority, the

Attorney General shall, within 60 days of the date of this order,

promulgate regulations establishing a Data Protection Review Court to

exercise the Attorney General's authority to review such determinations.

These regulations shall, at a minimum, provide that:

(A) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce,

the Director, and the PCLOB, shall appoint individuals to serve as judges

on the Data Protection Review Court, who shall be legal practitioners with

appropriate experience in the fields of data privacy and national security

law, giving weight to individuals with prior judicial experience, and who

shall not be, at the time of their initial appointment, employees of the

United States Government. During their term of appointment on the Data

Protection Review Court, such judges shall not have any official duties or

employment within the United States Government other than their official

duties and employment as judges on the Data Protection Review Court.

prior judicial experience, and who

shall not be, at the time of their initial appointment, employees of the

United States Government. During their term of appointment on the Data

Protection Review Court, such judges shall not have any official duties or

employment within the United States Government other than their official

duties and employment as judges on the Data Protection Review Court.

(B) Upon receipt of an application for review filed by the complainant or

an element of the Intelligence Community of a determination made by the

CLPO under subsection (c) of this section, a three-judge panel of the Data

Protection Review Court shall be convened to review the application.

Service on the Data Protection Review Court panel shall require that the

judge hold the requisite security clearances to access classified national

security information.

select a special advocate through procedures prescribed in the Attorney

General's regulations. The special advocate shall assist the panel in its

consideration of the application for review, including by advocating

regarding the complainant's interest in the matter and ensuring that the

Data Protection Review Court panel is well informed of the issues and the

law with respect to the matter. Service as a special advocate shall require

that the special advocate hold the requisite security clearances to access

classified national security information and to adhere to restrictions

prescribed in the Attorney General's regulations on communications with the

complainant to ensure the protection of classified or otherwise privileged

or protected information.

with respect to the matter. Service as a special advocate shall require

that the special advocate hold the requisite security clearances to access

classified national security information and to adhere to restrictions

prescribed in the Attorney General's regulations on communications with the

complainant to ensure the protection of classified or otherwise privileged

or protected information.

(D) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall impartially review the

determinations made by the CLPO with respect to whether a covered violation

occurred and the appropriate remediation in the event there was such a

violation. The review shall be based at a minimum on the classified ex

parte record of review described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of this section

and information or submissions provided by the complainant,

[[Page 62292]]

the special advocate, or an element of the Intelligence Community. In

reviewing determinations made by the CLPO, the Data Protection Review Court

panel shall be guided by relevant decisions of the United States Supreme

Court in the same way as are courts established under Article III of the

United States Constitution, including those decisions regarding appropriate

deference to relevant determinations of national security officials.

(E) In the event that the Data Protection Review Court panel disagrees

with any of the CLPO's determinations with respect to whether a covered

violation occurred or the appropriate remediation in the event there was

such a violation, the panel shall issue its own determinations.

(F) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall provide a classified

report on information indicating a violation of any authority subject to

the oversight of the FISC to the Assistant Attorney General for National

Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its

rules of procedure.

the event there was

such a violation, the panel shall issue its own determinations.

(F) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall provide a classified

report on information indicating a violation of any authority subject to

the oversight of the FISC to the Assistant Attorney General for National

Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its

rules of procedure.

(G) After the review is completed, the CLPO shall be informed of the Data

Protection Review Court panel's determinations through procedures

prescribed by the Attorney General's regulations.

(H) After a review is completed in response to a complainant's

application for review, the Data Protection Review Court, through

procedures prescribed by the Attorney General's regulations, shall inform

the complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying

state and without confirming or denying that the complainant was subject to

United States signals intelligence activities, that ``the review either did

not identify any covered violations or the Data Protection Review Court

issued a determination requiring appropriate remediation.''

(ii) Binding effect. Each element of the Intelligence Community, and each

agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, shall comply

with any determination by a Data Protection Review Court panel to undertake

appropriate remediation.

(iii) Assistance. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall provide

the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the review

described in subsection (d)(i) of this section, consistent with the

protection of intelligence sources and methods, that a Data Protection

Review Court panel requests from the CLPO and shall not take any actions

for the purpose of impeding or improperly influencing a panel's review.

of the Intelligence Community shall provide

the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the review

described in subsection (d)(i) of this section, consistent with the

protection of intelligence sources and methods, that a Data Protection

Review Court panel requests from the CLPO and shall not take any actions

for the purpose of impeding or improperly influencing a panel's review.

(iv) Independence. The Attorney General shall not interfere with a review

by a Data Protection Review Court panel of a determination the CLPO made

regarding a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section;

nor shall the Attorney General remove any judges appointed as provided in

subsection (d)(i)(A) of this section, or remove any judge from service on a

Data Protection Review Court panel, except for instances of misconduct,

malfeasance, breach of security, neglect of duty, or incapacity, after

taking due account of the standards in the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and

Judicial-Disability Proceedings promulgated by the Judicial Conference of

the United States pursuant to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act (28

U.S.C. 351 et seq.).

(v) Record of determinations. For each qualifying complaint transmitted by

the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state, the Secretary of

Commerce shall:

(A) maintain a record of the complainant who submitted such complaint;

(B) not later than 5 years after the date of this order and no less than

every 5 years thereafter, contact the relevant element or elements of the

Intelligence Community regarding whether information pertaining to the

review of such complaint by the CLPO has been declassified and whether

information pertaining to the review of any application for review

submitted to the Data Protection Review Court has been declassified,

[[Page 62293]]

including whether an element of the Intelligence Community filed an

application for review with the Data Protection Review Court; and

whether information pertaining to the

review of such complaint by the CLPO has been declassified and whether

information pertaining to the review of any application for review

submitted to the Data Protection Review Court has been declassified,

[[Page 62293]]

including whether an element of the Intelligence Community filed an

application for review with the Data Protection Review Court; and

complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying

state, that information pertaining to the review of their complaint by the

CLPO or to the review of any application for review submitted to the Data

Protection Review Court may be available under applicable law.

(e) Annual review by PCLOB of redress process.

(i) Nature of review. Consistent with applicable law, the PCLOB is

encouraged to conduct an annual review of the processing of qualifying

complaints by the redress mechanism established by section 3 of this order,

including whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court processed

qualifying complaints in a timely manner; whether the CLPO and the Data

Protection Review Court are obtaining full access to necessary information;

whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court are operating

consistent with this order; whether the safeguards established by section 2

of this order are properly considered in the processes of the CLPO and the

Data Protection Review Court; and whether the elements of the Intelligence

Community have fully complied with determinations made by the CLPO and the

Data Protection Review Court.

(ii) Assistance. The Attorney General, the CLPO, and the elements of the

Intelligence Community shall provide the PCLOB with access to information

necessary to conduct the review described in subsection (e)(i) of this

section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

methods.

nity have fully complied with determinations made by the CLPO and the

Data Protection Review Court.

(ii) Assistance. The Attorney General, the CLPO, and the elements of the

Intelligence Community shall provide the PCLOB with access to information

necessary to conduct the review described in subsection (e)(i) of this

section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

methods.

(iii) Report and certification. Within 30 days of completing any review

described in subsection (e)(i) of this section, the PCLOB is encouraged to:

(A) provide the President, the Attorney General, the Director, the heads

of elements of the Intelligence Community, the CLPO, and the congressional

intelligence committees with a classified report detailing the results of

its review;

(B) release to the public an unclassified version of the report; and

mechanism established pursuant to section 3 of this order is processing

complaints consistent with this order.

(iv) Consideration of review. Within 180 days of receipt of any report by

the PCLOB described in subsection (e)(iii)(A) of this section, the Attorney

General, the Director, the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community,

and the CLPO shall carefully consider and shall implement or otherwise

address all recommendations contained in such report, consistent with

applicable law.

(f) Designation of qualifying state.

of receipt of any report by

the PCLOB described in subsection (e)(iii)(A) of this section, the Attorney

General, the Director, the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community,

and the CLPO shall carefully consider and shall implement or otherwise

address all recommendations contained in such report, consistent with

applicable law.

(f) Designation of qualifying state.

(i) To implement the redress mechanism established by section 3 of this

order, the Attorney General is authorized to designate a country or

regional economic integration organization as a qualifying state for

purposes of the redress mechanism established pursuant to section 3 of this

order, effective immediately or on a date specified by the Attorney

General, if the Attorney General determines, in consultation with the

Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, that:

(A) the laws of the country, the regional economic integration

organization, or the regional economic integration organization's member

countries require appropriate safeguards in the conduct of signals

intelligence activities for United States persons' personal information

that is transferred from the United States to the territory of the country

or a member country of the regional economic integration organization;

[[Page 62294]]

(B) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the

regional economic integration organization's member countries of the

regional economic integration organization permit, or are anticipated to

permit, the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes

between the territory of that country or those member countries and the

territory of the United States; and

States.

al economic integration organization's member countries of the

regional economic integration organization permit, or are anticipated to

permit, the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes

between the territory of that country or those member countries and the

territory of the United States; and

States.

(ii) The Attorney General may revoke or amend such a designation, effective

immediately or on a date specified by the Attorney General, if the Attorney

General determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the

Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, that:

(A) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the

regional economic integration organization's member countries do not

provide appropriate safeguards in the conduct of signals intelligence

activities for United States persons' personal information that is

transferred from the United States to the territory of the country or to a

member country of the regional economic integration organization;

(B) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the

regional economic integration organization's member countries do not permit

the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes between the

territory of that country or those member countries and the territory of

the United States; or

States.

Sec. 4. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

regional economic integration organization's member countries do not permit

the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes between the

territory of that country or those member countries and the territory of

the United States; or

States.

Sec. 4. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

(a) ``Appropriate remediation'' means lawful measures

designed to fully redress an identified covered

violation regarding a specific complainant and limited

to measures designed to address that specific

complainant's complaint, taking into account the ways

that a violation of the kind identified have

customarily been addressed. Such measures may include,

depending on the specific covered violation at issue,

curing through administrative measures violations found

to have been procedural or technical errors relating to

otherwise lawful access to or handling of data,

terminating acquisition of data where collection is not

lawfully authorized, deleting data that had been

acquired without lawful authorization, deleting the

results of inappropriately conducted queries of

otherwise lawfully collected data, restricting access

to lawfully collected data to those appropriately

trained, or recalling intelligence reports containing

data acquired without lawful authorization or that were

otherwise disseminated in a manner inconsistent with

United States law

ed queries of

otherwise lawfully collected data, restricting access

to lawfully collected data to those appropriately

trained, or recalling intelligence reports containing

data acquired without lawful authorization or that were

otherwise disseminated in a manner inconsistent with

United States law. Appropriate remediation shall be

narrowly tailored to redress the covered violation and

to minimize adverse impacts on the operations of the

Intelligence Community and the national security of the

United States.

(b) ``Bulk collection'' means the authorized

collection of large quantities of signals intelligence

data that, due to technical or operational

considerations, is acquired without the use of

discriminants (for example, without the use of specific

identifiers or selection terms).

meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.

(d) ``Covered violation'' means a violation that:

(i) arises from signals intelligence activities conducted after the date of

this order regarding data transferred to the United States from a

qualifying state after the effective date of the Attorney General's

designation for such state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;

(ii) adversely affects the complainant's individual privacy and civil

liberties interests; and

violation that:

(i) arises from signals intelligence activities conducted after the date of

this order regarding data transferred to the United States from a

qualifying state after the effective date of the Attorney General's

designation for such state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;

(ii) adversely affects the complainant's individual privacy and civil

liberties interests; and

(iii) violates one or more of the following:

(A) the United States Constitution;

[[Page 62295]]

(B) the applicable sections of FISA or any applicable FISC-approved

procedures;

Executive Order 12333;

(D) this order or any applicable agency policies and procedures issued or

updated pursuant to this order (or the policies and procedures identified

in section 2(c)(iv)(A) of this order before they are updated pursuant to

section 2(c)(iv)(B) of this order);

(E) any successor statute, order, policies, or procedures to those

identified in section 4(d)(iii)(B)-(D) of this order; or

(F) any other statute, order, policies, or procedures adopted after the

date of this order that provides privacy and civil liberties safeguards

with respect to United States signals intelligence activities within the

scope of this order, as identified in a list published and updated by the

Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National

Intelligence.

(e) ``Foreign intelligence'' shall have the same

meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.

(f) ``Intelligence'' shall have the same meaning as

it has in Executive Order 12333.

(g) ``Intelligence Community'' and ``elements of

the Intelligence Community'' shall have the same

meaning as they have in Executive Order 12333.

hall have the same

meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.

(f) ``Intelligence'' shall have the same meaning as

it has in Executive Order 12333.

(g) ``Intelligence Community'' and ``elements of

the Intelligence Community'' shall have the same

meaning as they have in Executive Order 12333.

(h) ``National security'' shall have the same

meaning as it has in Executive Order 13526 of December

29, 2009 (Classified National Security Information).

(i) ``Non-United States person'' means a person who

is not a United States person.

(j) ``Personnel of the United States or of its

allies or partners'' means any current or former member

of the Armed Forces of the United States, any current

or former official of the United States Government, and

any other person currently or formerly employed by or

working on behalf of the United States Government, as

well as any current or former member of the military,

current or former official, or other person currently

or formerly employed by or working on behalf of an ally

or partner.

(k) ``Qualifying complaint'' means a complaint,

submitted in writing, that:

behalf of the United States Government, as

well as any current or former member of the military,

current or former official, or other person currently

or formerly employed by or working on behalf of an ally

or partner.

(k) ``Qualifying complaint'' means a complaint,

submitted in writing, that:

(i) alleges a covered violation has occurred that pertains to personal

information of or about the complainant, a natural person, reasonably

believed to have been transferred to the United States from a qualifying

state after the effective date of the Attorney General's designation for

such state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;

(ii) includes the following basic information to enable a review:

information that forms the basis for alleging that a covered violation has

occurred, which need not demonstrate that the complainant's data has in

fact been subject to United States signals intelligence activities; the

nature of the relief sought; the specific means by which personal

information of or about the complainant was believed to have been

transmitted to the United States; the identities of the United States

Government entities believed to be involved in the alleged violation (if

known); and any other measures the complainant pursued to obtain the relief

requested and the response received through those other measures;

(iii) is not frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith;

(iv) is brought on behalf of the complainant, acting on that person's own

behalf, and not as a representative of a governmental, nongovernmental, or

intergovernmental organization; and

(v) is transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying

state, after it has verified the identity of the complainant and that the

complaint satisfies the conditions of section 5(k)(i)-(iv) of this order.

[[Page 62296]]

f of the complainant, acting on that person's own

behalf, and not as a representative of a governmental, nongovernmental, or

intergovernmental organization; and

(v) is transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying

state, after it has verified the identity of the complainant and that the

complaint satisfies the conditions of section 5(k)(i)-(iv) of this order.

[[Page 62296]]

(l) ``Significant incident of non-compliance''

shall mean a systemic or intentional failure to comply

with a principle, policy, or procedure of applicable

United States law that could impugn the reputation or

integrity of an element of the Intelligence Community

or otherwise call into question the propriety of an

Intelligence Community activity, including in light of

any significant impact on the privacy and civil

liberties interests of the person or persons concerned.

(m) ``United States person'' shall have the same

meaning as it has in Executive Order 12333.

(n) ``Validated intelligence priority'' shall mean,

for most United States signals intelligence collection

activities, a priority validated under the process

described in section 2(b)(iii) of this order; or, in

narrow circumstances (for example, when such process

cannot be carried out because of a need to address a

new or evolving intelligence requirement), shall mean a

priority set by the President or the head of an element

of the Intelligence Community in accordance with the

criteria described in section 2(b)(iii)(A)(1)-(3) of

this order to the extent feasible.

cannot be carried out because of a need to address a

new or evolving intelligence requirement), shall mean a

priority set by the President or the head of an element

of the Intelligence Community in accordance with the

criteria described in section 2(b)(iii)(A)(1)-(3) of

this order to the extent feasible.

(o) ``Weapons of mass destruction'' shall have the

same meaning as it has in Executive Order 13526.

Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order

shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the

head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with

applicable law, including orders of and procedures

approved by the FISC, and subject to the availability

of appropriations.

of more privacy-protective safeguards for United States

signals intelligence activities that would apply in the

absence of this order. In the case of any conflict

between this order and other applicable law, the more

privacy-protective safeguards shall govern the conduct

of signals intelligence activities, to the maximum

extent allowed by law.

d States

signals intelligence activities that would apply in the

absence of this order. In the case of any conflict

between this order and other applicable law, the more

privacy-protective safeguards shall govern the conduct

of signals intelligence activities, to the maximum

extent allowed by law.

(d) Nothing in this order prohibits elements of the

Intelligence Community from disseminating information

relating to a crime for law enforcement purposes;

disseminating warnings of threats of killing, serious

bodily injury, or kidnapping; disseminating cyber

threat, incident, or intrusion response information;

notifying victims or warning potential victims of

crime; or complying with dissemination obligations

required by statute, treaty, or court order, including

orders of and procedures approved by the FISC or other

court orders.

(e) The collection, retention, and dissemination of

information concerning United States persons is

governed by multiple legal and policy requirements,

such as those required by FISA and Executive Order

12333. This order is not intended to alter the rules

applicable to United States persons adopted pursuant to

FISA, Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law.

information concerning United States persons is

governed by multiple legal and policy requirements,

such as those required by FISA and Executive Order

12333. This order is not intended to alter the rules

applicable to United States persons adopted pursuant to

FISA, Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law.

(f) This order shall apply to signals intelligence

activities consistent with the scope of PPD-28's

application to such activities prior to PPD-28's

partial revocation by the national security memorandum

issued concurrently with this order. To implement this

subsection, the head of each agency containing an

element of the Intelligence Community, in consultation

with the Attorney General and the Director, is hereby

delegated the authority to issue guidance, which may be

classified, as appropriate, as to the scope of

application of this order with respect to the element

or elements of the Intelligence Community within their

agency. The CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court,

in carrying out the functions assigned to it under this

order, shall treat such guidance as authoritative and

binding.

[[Page 62297]]

application of this order with respect to the element

or elements of the Intelligence Community within their

agency. The CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court,

in carrying out the functions assigned to it under this

order, shall treat such guidance as authoritative and

binding.

[[Page 62297]]

(g) Nothing in this order confers authority to

declassify or disclose classified national security

information except as authorized pursuant to Executive

Order 13526 or any successor order. Consistent with the

requirements of Executive Order 13526, the CLPO, the

Data Protection Review Court, and the special advocates

shall not have authority to declassify classified

national security information, nor shall they disclose

any classified or otherwise privileged or protected

information except to authorized and appropriately

cleared individuals who have a need to know the

information.

(h) This order creates an entitlement to submit

qualifying complaints to the CLPO and to obtain review

of the CLPO's decisions by the Data Protection Review

Court in accordance with the redress mechanism

established in section 3 of this order. This order is

not intended to, and does not, create any other

entitlement, right, or benefit, substantive or

procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any

party against the United States, its departments,

agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or

agents, or any other person

is order. This order is

not intended to, and does not, create any other

entitlement, right, or benefit, substantive or

procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any

party against the United States, its departments,

agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or

agents, or any other person. This order is not intended

to, and does not, modify the availability or scope of

any judicial review of the decisions rendered through

the redress mechanism, which is governed by existing

law.

(Presidential Sig.)

THE WHITE HOUSE,

October 7, 2022.

[FR Doc. 2022-22531

Filed 10-13-22; 8:45 am]

Billing code 3395-F3-P

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.