IN THE PASCUA YAQUI COURT OF APPEALS

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) Case No.: CA-05-006

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE

Petitioner/Appellant

)

v. OPINION

)

A JUVENILE,

Respondent/Appellee

Appeal from a decision of the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court, Docket Number CR-05-277,

the Honorable Melvin R. Stoof, Tribal Court Judge presiding.

Micah Schmit, Esq., Office of the Prosecutor, Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Tucson, Arizona, for

the Appellant.

Nicholas A. Fontana, Esq., Office of the Public Defender, Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Tucson,

Arizona, for the Appellee.

Per curiam.

Appellee was charged in the Pascua Yaqui Tribe Juvenile Court with battery, 1

PYTC § 3.8, and three counts of theft, 1 PYTC § 3.64, after allegedly assaulting another

male at a party, taking his keys, driving away in his car, and removing the stereo. The car

was allegedly found abandoned in the desert with the stereo missing. Appellee allegedly

committed these offenses when he was seventeen years old. The petition charging

Appellee with the offenses was filed in Juvenile Court on September 6, 2005; five days

after Appellee turned eighteen years old. The Tribe moved to dismiss its petition in

Juvenile Court so it could file criminal charges against Appellee in the Pascua Yaqui

Tribal Court when it discovered that he had turned eighteen years old. The Juvenile

Court dismissed the complaint.

On September 14, 2006, criminal charges were brought against Appellee in the

Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court. The Tribal Court, however, dismissed the complaint for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tribal Court ruled that Appellee’s case belonged in

Juvenile Court because he had committed the alleged crimes when he “was a minor.”

Order of Dismissal (Sept. 20, 2005). According to the Tribal Court’s ruling, a person

under eighteen years of age is a juvenile and the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over

offenses committed by a juvenile, regardless of the fact that at the time of the juvenile

proceeding, that person may have turned eighteen. /d. On September 22, 2005, the Tribe

appealed and assigned error to the Tribal Court’s ruling that the defendant’s age at the

time he allegedly committed the criminal offense determines whether the complaint

should be filed in Juvenile Court or Tribal Court.

The Tribe asserts that the controlling law is the definition of “juvenile” in the

definitions section of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe Juvenile Code. The Juvenile Code defines

“Juvenile” as:

1. A person under eighteen (18) years of age.

2. A person under eighteen (18) years of age or older concerning whom

proceedings are commenced in Juvenile Court prior to his eighteenth

birthday.

2 PYTC Definitions, p. 4. The Tribe argues that it filed the complaint in Tribal Court

because, at the time of filing, Appellee did not meet either provision 1 or 2 of the

definition of juvenile; i.e., although Appellee was not over eighteen years of age at the

time he was alleged to have committed the offenses, proceedings were not started against

him in Juvenile Court before his eighteenth birthday. Thus, the Tribe argues, he must be

tried in the Tribal Court.

The Juvenile Court jurisdiction statute gives the Juvenile Court exclusive

jurisdiction in cases where a person under eighteen years of age commits a criminal

offense. “The Juvenile Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction ... [iJn all matters

where a minor has been alleged to be a juvenile offender ...... 2 PYTC § 2.1(A)(2).

Appellee was a minor at the time he was alleged to have been a juvenile offender.

Therefore, the Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses committed

while he was a minor.

This interpretation of the code is consistent with 2 PYTC § 2.1(A)(2) and 2 PYTC

§ 1.2(A), both of which authorize transfers of juvenile cases to Tribal Court. Juveniles

who turn eighteen years of age while involved in proceedings before the Juvenile Court

are not considered adults for purposes of prosecution unless the case is transferred to

adult court pursuant to Sections 2.1(A)(2) and 1.2(A).

The Tribe agrees that Appellee was a juvenile when he allegedly committed the

offenses cited in the charging complaint. The Juvenile Code defines a juvenile offense as

“[a]n act which if committed by an adult is designated a crime under the Pascua Yaqui

Trial [sic] Law and Order Code.” 2 PYTC Definitions, p.4. Thus, the Juvenile Court has

exclusive jurisdiction where the person committing the offense is a juvenile offender. In

other words, a person who is under eighteen years of age who commits a crime listed in

the Pascua Yaqui Tribe Criminal Code has committed a juvenile offense and is classified

as a juvenile offender. In this case, Appellee allegedly committed a juvenile offense;

therefore, he meets the definition of juvenile offender. We conclude that the Juvenile

Court had exclusive jurisdiction over Appellee and not the Tribal Court.

We reiterate that the Tribe, under the Juvenile Code, can refile the complaint for

the offenses charged against Appellee in Juvenile Court, and then pursue the statutory

remedies to transfer the case to Tribal Court. The Tribal Court judge correctly directed

the Tribe to Sections 2.1(A)(2) and 1.2(A), which authorize the Tribe to request a transfer

of the case from Juvenile Court to the Tribal Court. Order of Dismissal.

Accordingly, we hold that the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court correctly ruled that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We affirm the Tribal Court’s order

dismissing the criminal complaint against Appellee.

Filed this 2S" day of Awaust , 2006.

C MM juke J

Chief Justice

(Lewy ( Ww

(JAssoplate Justice

Associate Justi

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

7474 S. Camino de Oeste

Tucson, AZ 85757

I DOS OO€

(520) 879-6251 TNOCE DR: 004

GEY

Micah Schmit,

Chief Prosecutor

IN THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE COURT OF APPEALS

IN AND FOR THE PASCUA YAQUI INDIAN RESERVATION

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE, ) App. Case No. CA-05-006

Appellant/Plaintiff, )

) Trial Case No. CR-05-277

vs. )

) TRIBE’S SUPPLEMENTAL CITATION

Arturo FLORES, ) OF LEGAL AUTHORITY

Defendant/Appellee. )

)

The Tribe supplements its Brief on Appeal with the following additional courtesy legal

authority only: ,

McBeth vs. C. Kimball Rose (real party in interest)

111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156 (1975)

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28" day of June, 2006.

MICAH SCHMIT

CHIEF a Of _

—~.

ghh AK

Chief Prosecutor, PYT

Original and 5 copies delivered to:

Clerk, Pascua Yaqui Tribe Court of Appeals

Copy mailed/delivered to:

PYT clerk of the Tribal Court

Pascua Yaqui Public Defender, Attorneys for Defendant

On June 28, 2006 by: ]

/ [ —

Westlaw.

531 P.2d 156

[11 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156

(Cite as: 111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156)

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Mary Louise McBETH, Petitioner,

Honorable C. kimball ROSE, Judge of the Superior

Court, Maricopa County,

Division 27--E, Real Party in Interest, Respondent.

Carole Jean TATELY and Daniel P. Monohan,

Petitioners,

Vv.

JUSTICE COURT OF the NORTHEAST PHOENIX

PRECINCT, MARICOPA COUNTY, Justice of

the Peace Harold Lee, and Moise Berger, County

Attorney, Maricopa County,

Respondents.

Nos. 11542, 11552.

Jan. 24, 1975.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1975.

Proceeding on petition for special actions to prohibit

criminal prosecution from proceeding against

petitioners who raised substantially the same issues.

The petitions were consolidated. The Supreme Court,

Holohan, J., held that where minors committed the

offenses a few days before their eighteenth birthday

and juvenile petitions were filed, such persons after

reaching 18 years of age could be prosecuted as

adults on felony complaints charging identical

offenses without a transfer of proceedings from

juvenile court which dismissed the petitions.

Relief denied.

Cameron, C.J., and Struckmeyer, V.C.J., did not

participate, and Haire, C.J., and Eubank, J., of the

Court of Appeals, Division |, sat in their stead.

West Headnotes

[1] Infants 68.1

211k68.1 Most Cited Cases

(Formerly 211k68)

Juvenile provisions concern the treatment and not the

capacity of the offender and provide a special method

of treatment for minors under the age of 18 who have

violated the criminal law, and even with such

children the application of juvenile or criminal code

is left to the discretion of the trial court. A.R.S.Const.

art. 6.§ 15.

Page |

[2] Infants <=68.1

211k68.1 Most Cited Cases

(Formerly 211k68)

Where infants were under 18 at the time of

commission of offenses and juvenile petitions

concerning them were filed and then dismissed

without adjudication on motion of county attorney

after infants became 18, such disposition of the

petitions did not prevent their later prosecutions as

adults on felony complaints based on identical

charges contained in the juvenile _ petitions.

A.R.S.Const. art. 6, § 15; A.R.S.§ § 8-202 [D], 8-

246 [Al].

[3] Infants <=" 152

211k152 Most Cited Cases

(Formerly 211k16.4)

Retention of jurisdiction by juvenile court as

permitted by statute with respect to persons over the

age of 18 is limited to those whom juvenile court has

adjudicated as delinquent or dependent prior to their

reaching their eighteenth birthday. A.R.S. § § 8-202

ID], 8-246 [A].

[4] Infants <68.7(3)

211k68.7(3) Most Cited Cases

(Formerly 211k68)

No person under 18 years of age may be prosecuted

criminally unless, after hearing, juvenile court

transfers matter to adult side of the law for criminal

prosecution. A.R.S.Const. art. 6, § 15; A.R.S. § §

8-202 [D], 8-246 [A].

[5] Infants ©=68.5

211k68.5 Most Cited Cases

(Formerly 211k68)

Once persons, who were a few days short of their

eighteenth birthdays at the time they committed

offenses, reached the age of 18, they were subject to

criminal prosecution as adults and the juvenile court

had no jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 8-233.

[6] Infants ©7191

211kI91 Most Cited Cases

(Formerly 211k16.6)

Decision to file juvenile petition was a matter

exclusively for the prosecutor. A.R.S. § 8-233.

*399 **156 Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public

Defender by Oral W. Tucker, Jr., Deputy Public

Defender, Phoenix, Lawrence W. Katz, Certified

Third-Year Law Student Arizona State University,

531 P.2d 156

I11 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156

(Cite as: 111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156)

for petitioner McBeth.

Treon, Warnicke & Dann by B. Michael Dann and

Richard T. Treon, Phoenix, for petitioner Tately.

*400 **157 Trew & Woodford by C. Brad

Woodford, Phoenix, for petitioner monohan.

Moise Berger, Maricopa County Attorney by Alan

Johnson and J. P. Shaw, Deputy County Attys.,

Phoenix, for respondents.

HOLOHAN, Justice.

Petitions for special action were filed by petitioners

to prohibit criminal prosecution from proceeding

against them. Since the petitions both raise

substantially the same issues, we ordered them

consolidated.

Petitioner Mary Louise McBeth (No. 11542) was

arrested November 26, 1973 on two charges of

assault with a deadly weapon. At the time of arrest

she was seventeen years of age and would not

become eighteen until January 15, 1974. She was

booked into the county jail on the aforementioned

charges, but upon learning of petitioner's age, she

was referred to juvenile court. A hearing was

scheduled in juvenile court for January 8, 1974, but

on the day of the hearing the county attorney moved

to dismiss the juvenile petition. The judge of the

juvenile court granted the state's motion and

dismissed the juvenile petition.

On January 18, 1974, three days after petitioner

became eighteen, the state filed a felony complaint

against petitioner accusing her of two counts of

assault with a deadly weapon which were alleged to

have occurred on November 26, 1973. It is conceded

by the state that these are the identical charges

previously contained in the juvenile petition which

was dismissed in juvenile court.

Over objection of defense counsel, petitioner was

held to answer in superior court on the charges. An

information was filed in superior court on February

21, 1974. On March 20, 1974, at the omnibus

hearing, the motion of the defense to dismiss was

denied, and petitioner was ordered to stand trial on

May 15, 1974.

This Court accepted jurisdiction of the special action

filed by petitioner to prohibit the superior court from

proceeding further with the criminal case.

Page 2

Petitioners Carole Jean Tately and Daniel P.

Monohan (No. 11552) were arrested on December 2,

1973 for illegal possession of marijuana. The matter

was referred to juvenile court as each of the

petitioners was seventeen at the time.

Petitions were filed in juvenile court, their case

consolidated for an adjudication hearing which was

set for March 14, 1974. Prior to the hearing, each of

the petitioners became eighteen. On the day before

the adjudication hearing, the deputy county attorney

in charge of the case moved ex parte to dismiss the

juvenile petitions pending against petitioners. The

juvenile court judge granted the motions, dismissed

the petitions, and vacated and adjudication hearing

date.

On April 9, 1974 a complaint was filed by the state

in justice court charging that the petitioners on

December 2, 1973 illegally possessed marijuana.

Petitioners filed a special action in this Court seeking

to restrain further action in the criminal case until

there was a lawful transfer of the case by juvenile

court to adult prosecution.

The argument of the several petitioners is essentially

that, once the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction of a

case involving a juvenile, there can be no criminal

prosecution of that case in adult court unless the

Juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court for

prosecution. They argue that the procedure of simply

dismissing the juvenile petition after or shortly before

the juvenile turns eighteen and then commencing an

adult prosecution violates the provisions of the

Arizona Constitution, the Juvenile Code, and the

Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.

The Arizona Constitution, in Article 6, Section 15,

provides:

‘The superior court shall have exclusive original

jurisdiction in all proceedings and matters affecting

dependent, neglected, incorrigible or delinquent

children, or children accused of crime under *401

**158 the age of eighteen years. The judges shall

hold examinations in chambers for all such

children concerning whom _ proceedings are

brought, in advance of any criminal prosecution of

such children, and may, in their discretion, suspend

criminal prosecution of such children. The powers

of the judges to control such children shall be as

provided by law.’

The Juvenile Code provides in A.R.S. s 8--202(D):

‘Jurisdiction of a child obtained by the juvenile

court in a proceeding under this chapter shall be

531 P.2d 156

111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156

(Cite as: 111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156)

retained by it, for the purposes of implementing the

orders made and filed in that proceeding, until the

child becomes twenty-one years of age, unless

terminated by order of the court prior thereto."

It is further provided in A.R.S. s 8--246(A):

‘When jurisdiction has been acquired by the

juvenile court of a child, the child shall continue

under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court until

such child becomes twenty-one years of age, unless

sooner discharged pursuant to law. From the time

of commitment to the department of corrections, a

child shall be subject to the control of the

department of corrections until such child's

absolute discharge.’

Counsel for petitioners point out that the Rules of

Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 17A A.R.S.,

especially Rules 12, 13 and 14, set forth the

procedure to be followed if a juvenile case is to be

transferred for adult prosecution. Our attention is

directed to the requirements of Rule 14(b) which

provides:

'The court may transfer the action for criminal

prosecution to the appropriate court having

jurisdiction of the offense if the court finds

probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe

that:

‘d) The child is not amenable to treatment or

rehabilitation as a delinquent child through

available facilities; and

(2) The child is not commitable to an institution

for mentally deficient, mentally defective or

mentally ill persons; and

(3) The safety or interest of the public requires that

the child be transferred for criminal prosecution.'

and Rule 14(c) which requires that:

‘Upon such transfer the juvenile court shall state

the reasons therefor by minute entry or written

order and the child shall thereupon be transferred

to the custody of an appropriate law enforcement

officer, released on bail, if the offense is bailable,

or released upon his own recognizance.’

Although the issue presented by these cases is a

matter of first impression in this Court, it has been

decided in several other jurisdictions. In at least two

jurisdictions the decision has been that an accused,

who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the

offense and who had a juvenile proceeding

commenced but later dismissed before adjudication,

could be charged and tried as an adult for such

offense. Locke v. Commonwealth, Ky.. 503 S.W.2d

729 (1973); State _v. Kramer, 72 Wash.2d 904, 435

P.2d 970 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833, 89 S.Ct.

103, 21 L.Ed.2d 103 (1968).

In Friedman vy. Juvenile Court, 20 Ariz.App. 31, 509

P.2d 1068 (1973) Division Two of the Court of

Appeals held that a juvenile cause pending and not

heard on its merits prior to the time the juvenile

reached eighteen results in loss of jurisdiction over

the cause in the juvenile court. This Court, in Caruso

v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463

(1966), stated that jurisdiction in the juvenile court

does not attach until there has been an adjudication

based upon evidence that the child is dependent,

neglected, incorrigible or delinquent. Both Friedman

and Caruso dealt with dependency matters rather than

delinquency.

In Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029

who had reached the age of eighteen, charged by

information for a crime committed before his

eighteenth birthday was nevertheless subject to

prosecution, trial, and sentence as an adult. For cases

from other jurisdictions see 89 A.L.R.2d 506 et seq.

[1] The statute concerning juvenile jurisdiction under

which Burrows was decided was substantially carried

forward into the Arizona Constitution by amendment

in 1960 and is now Section 15 of Article 6. We

believe the rationale in the Burrows case is equally

applicable to Section 15. The purpose of the juvenile

provisions in Arizona concerns the treatment, not the

capacity, of the offender, or as the Court stated in

Burrows:

'... the purpose of the Arizona juvenile law is not

to attempt to establish an arbitrary age below

which the child is presumed to be ignorant of the

consequences of his acts, but rather to provide a

special method of treatment for minors under the

age of eighteen who have violated the criminal law,

and, even with such children, leaving the

application of the juvenile or criminal code to the

discretion of the trial court.’ 38 Ariz. at 111.

[2] In effect, Burrows held that a juvenile could

commit a crime, and his age made it no less a crime,

but the law provided a special method of dealing with

such a person by reason of his age. This age factor

was to be determined as of the time of prosecution.

If the age factor was not present at the time of

prosecution the accused was to be tried as an adult.

Petitioners argue that Burrows is not applicable

because in these cases, unlike Burrows, proceedings

had been commenced in juvenile court. They

contend that the only way the matters could have

531 P.2d 156

111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156

(Cite as: 111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156)

been made subject to adult jurisdiction was after

hearing. Miller _v. Quatsoe, 348 F.Supp. 764

(E.D.Wis.1972). Petitioners contend that the state

may not avoid a transfer hearing by the simple device

of dismissing the juvenile petition.

The state argues that the petitioners are not all in the

same status so far as a transfer hearing being

required. The state contends that Monohan and

Tately (No. 11552) both reached their eighteenth

birthday before the juvenile court had made any

adjudication or held any hearing on the merits of the

case, and no transfer hearing was necessary because

the juvenile court had no jurisdiction. We agree with

this contention.

The authorities from other states generally hold that

a juvenile who has reached his eighteenth birthday

before being tried as a juvenile or before an

adjudication of delinquency cannot validly be tried in

juvenile court. Our cases, Caruso v. Superior Court,

Supra, and Friedman v. Juvenile Court, Supra, are

analogous in holding that juvenile court is without

jurisdiction to adjudicate a person dependent who is

over the age of eighteen.

Our state's constitution gives the superior court, as

the juvenile court, exclusive jurisdiction over

children accused of crime under the age of eighteen.

Ariz.Const.Art. 6, s 15. When such a person is no

longer a child under the age of eighteen the juvenile

court has no jurisdiction to try him.

[3] Nor do the statutes A.R.S. s 8--202(D) or A.R.S.

s 8--246(A) grant jurisdiction to try a person over the

age of eighteen in juvenile court. The retention of

jurisdiction referred to in the cited statutes is limited

to those persons whom the juvenile court has

adjudicated as delinquent or dependent prior to their

reaching their eighteenth birthday.

Unlike Monohan and Tately, the other petitioner,

Mary Louise McBeth (No. 11542) was within seven

days of her eighteenth birthday when the dismissal

was granted. The juvenile court had full jurisdiction

of the matter. Conceivably she could have been

adjudicated a delinquent, if the evidence warranted,

and a disposition made which would have prevented

any action in the criminal courts resulting in a

criminal record. It is equally possible that she #403

**160 could have been transferred to adult criminal

prosecution as she is now. Petitioner urges that the

important aspect in her case is that she never had a

hearing in juvenile court, and the practice of

dismissing a case to avoid a transfer hearing to await

an age change for adult prosecution should be

stopped.

[4][S|[6] Petitioner McBeth further argues that she

has a right to a transfer hearing before being

prosecuted criminally, and indeed she does as long as

she is under the age of eighteen. Neither she nor any

person under the age of eighteen may be prosecuted

criminally unless, after hearing, the juvenile court

transfers the matter to the adult side of the law for

criminal prosecution. Once the petitioner reached the

age of eighteen, she was subject to criminal

prosecution and the juvenile court had no

jurisdiction. The decision to file a petition was a

matter exclusively for the prosecutor. A.R.S. s 2--

233. The dismissal of the juvenile petition and case

was approved by the court. This left nothing pending

in the juvenile court and freed petitioner from any

further control of juvenile court.

The transfer procedure required by the juvenile rules

assumes a pending juvenile petition. If the petition

has been dismissed there is nothing for the court to

hear. The dismissal of the petition removes any

control which the juvenile court had on the juvenile

by reason of the petition. The juvenile, if detained,

must be released, and he is free to follow his own

pursuits. There has been no jeopardy because there

has been no hearing on the merits.

There is nothing in the constitution or statutes which

prevents the court from dismissing a juvenile action

on motion of the state. We find nothing which

prevents the state from later refiling the charges.

Therefore, we can find no sufficient reason to

invalidate the procedure used in the McBeth case.

The relief sought in both petitions is denied.

LOCKWOOD and HAYS, JJ., HAIRE, Court of

Appeals, Chief Judge, and EUBANK, Court of

Appeals, Judge, concur.

Note: CAMERON, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER,

V.C.J., and not participate in the determination of this

matter. HAIRE, C.J., Court of Appeals, Chief Judge,

Division One, and EUBANK, J., Court of Appeals,

Judge, Division One, sat in their stated.

111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156

END OF DOCUMENT

Westlaw.

Date of Printing: JUN 20,2006

KEYCITE

CMcBeth v. Rose, 111 Ariz. 399, 531 P.2d 156 (Ariz., Jan 24, 1975) (NO. 11542, 11552)

Citing References

Positive Cases (U.S.A.)

*IX Discussed

P 1 Matter of Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-81405-S, 594 P.2d 533, 537+, 122 Ariz. 279,

_ 283+ (Ariz.App. Div. | Feb 07, 1978) (NO. 1 CA-JUV 56) HN: 2,6 (P.2d)

2 ** Cited

ee | . 2 /Matter of Pima County Juvenile Action No. J-70107-2, 716 P.2d 404, 407, 149 Ariz. 35, 38 (Ariz.

_ Mar 17, 1986) (NO. 18524-PR) HN: 5 (P.2d)

Cc 3. Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-94518, 674 P.2d 841, 844, 138 Ariz.

_ 287, 290 (Ariz. Dec 02, 1983) (NO. 17047-PR) HN: 4 (P.2d)

H 4 Matter of Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-81405-S, 594 P.2d 506, 509, 122 Ariz. 252, 255

_ (Ariz. Mar 29, 1979) (NO. 13624-PR) HN: 6 (P.2d)

Cc 5 Matter of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-05401, 845 P.2d 1129, 1135, 173 Ariz. 634,

_ 640 (Ariz.App. Div. 1 Jan 26, 1993) (NO. 1 CA-JV 92-0010) HN: 3 (P.2d)

| 6 Matter of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-122733, 838 P.2d 1303, 1306, 172 Ariz. 542,

_ 545 (Ariz.App. Div. 1 Feb 04, 1992) (NO. | CA-JV 91-014, 1 CA-CR 91-1166)

P 7 State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 823 P.2d 1347, 1350, 170

_ Ariz. 339, 342 (Ariz.App. Div. | Sep 24, 1991) (NO. | CA-SA 90-255) ‘” HN: 4,5 (P.2d)

8 Matter of Pima County Juvenile Delinquency Action No. 89248-01, 764 P.2d 752, 754, 159 Ariz.

17, 19 (Ariz.App. Div. 2 Jul 07, 1988) (NO. 2 CA-JV 88-0016)

Cc 9 Matter of Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JV-110565, 763 P.2d 268, 270, 158 Ariz. 448, 450

_ (Ariz.App. Div. | Jun 21, 1988) (NO. | CA-JV 88-003) HN: 3 (P.2d)

Cc lO Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-93117, 654 P.2d 39, 424, 134 Ariz.

_ 105, 108+ (Ariz.App. Div. | Oct 21, 1982) (NO. | CA-JUV 174) “” HN: 4,5 (P.2d)

Cc it Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-86843, 608 P.2d 804, 806, 125 Ariz.

_ 227, 229 (Ariz.App. Div. | Mar 18, 1980) (NO. 1 CA-JUV 110) HN: 3 (P.2d)

Cc 12 L.H. v. Jamieson, 643 F.2d 1351, 1355 (9th Cir.(Ariz.) May 01, 1981) (NO. 78-3091) *” HN: 1

(P.2d)

Cc 13 State ex rel. Elliot v. District Court of Sixth Judicial Dist., In and For Sweet Grass County, 684 P.2d

_ 481,483, 211 Mont. 1,5 (Mont. Jun 20, 1984) (NO. 83-469) HN: 1 (P.2d)

Cc 14 State v. Manns, 329 S.E.2d 865, 869, 174 W.Va. 793, 796 (W.Va. Apr 18, 1985) (NO. 16358) HN:

_ 5 (P.2d)

* Mentioned

| 15 = McCutcheon v. Superior Court of State In and For Pima County, 723 P.2d 661, 664, 150 Ariz. 312,

_ 315 (Ariz. Jul 18, 1986) (NO. CV 86-0055-SA) HN: 4,5 (P.2d)

Cc 16 State v. Myers, 569 P.2d 1351, 1352, 116 Ariz. 453, 454 (Ariz. Sep 20, 1977) (NO. 3890) HN: 4,5

_ (P.2d)

Other Administrative Materials (U.S.A.)

17 1982 Ariz. Op. Atty. Gen. 81, Ms. Suzanne Laursen (1982) ** HN: 1 (P.2d)

Secondary Sources (U.S.A.)

Cc 18 Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time of legal proceedings, as criterion

of jurisdiction of juvenile court, 89 A.L.R.2d 506, § 506+ (1963) HN: 1,4 (P.2d)

19 Wharton's Criminal Law s 98, s 98. Infancy and youth -- Jurisdiction of juvenile court (2006) HN:

3 (P.2d)

Cc 20 CJS Infants s 27, s 27. Jurisdiction of courts to try or prosecute offenders -- Age at time of

_ commission of offense (2006) HN: 5 (P.2d)

Court Documents

Appellate Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Appellate Briefs

21 T.M.""Jim"" PARHAM, et al., Appellants, v. J. L. and J. R., et al., Appellees., 1977 WL 189791,

*189791 (Appellate Brief) (U.S. Oct Term 1977) Brief of the Child Welfare League of America

as ... (NO. 75-1690) ™

IN THE PASCUA YAQUI COURT OF APPEALS

) Case No.: No. CA-05-006

)

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE, )

)

Appellant, )

Vv ) ORDER

ARTURO FLORES )

)

Appellee )

)

Micah Schmit, Esq., Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Office of the Prosecutor, Tucson, Arizona for

the Appellant.

Nicholas Fontana, Esq., Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Office of the Public Defender, Tucson,

Arizona, for the Appellee.

Upon review of the record, this Court requests an appellate hearing be held in this

case. Oral arguments have been scheduled for June 30", 2006 at 2:40 PM. Arguments

will be held in the courtroom at the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court. Appellant and appellee

will each have 15 minutes to present.

So ORDERED this S ay of June, Di

ih WY,

Chief Justice L

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

7474 S. Camino de Oeste

Tucson, Arizona 85757

(520) 879-6251

Micah Schmit, SB# 014887

Chief Prosecutor

IN THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE COURT OF APPEALS

IN AND FOR THE PASCUA YAQUI RESERVATION, ARIZONA

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE,

Appellant, NO. CA-05-006

(Tribal Court No. CR-05-277)

Vs.

Arturo M. FLORES

Appellee.

Appellant’s Opening Brief

ee eee lees ae

COMES NOW The Pascua Yaqui Tribe, by and through counsel

undersigned, and hereby files its Brief on Appeal within the time

limits specified and the manner prescribed by the Court of Appeals

Procedures Act of 2000 (hereinafter, CAPA).

A. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Tribe has appealed a September 20, 2005 trial court Order

which dismissed a Complaint filed by the Tribe under cause number

CR-05-277, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. The Tribe

timely filed its Notice of Appeal, September, 22™°, 2005 - within

the requisite 14 days, Exhibit B. Under CAPA, Section 1.12, this

Court “shall have jurisdiction to hear all appeals from any Order

of the Trial Court.” Lastly, Appellant’s opening brief is due

October 13, 2005 - 21 days after filing of said notice.

B. PERTINENT FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 1, 2005, in an earlier juvenile case (JD-05-

085) Appellee, Arturo Flores, was sentenced for an unrelated

incident. Defendant, however, had turned 18 years of age on that

very sentencing date, his birthday being September 1, 1987.

Appropriately, he was ordered to serve his short incarceration

time in an adult detention facility, though these proceedings

remained in Juvenile Court.

Unbeknownst to both the Trial Court and the Prosecutor’s

Office at that time, just days earlier, on August 27, 2005,

Defendant had also assaulted an individual and stolen his vehicle

(and ultimately, the stereo from that vehicle). It is this

incident that is the direct subject of this appeal. The

immediately preceding events are nonetheless relevant to lay the

background for why/what had occurred subsequently and to bolster

the discussion on statutory intent (and practice) regarding the

lower court’s Juvenile Court jurisdiction.

Returning to the August 27 incident, the victim’s vehicle

was later recovered, abandoned and in a desert area. The victim

was interviewed and wished to pursue charges against Mr. Flores

for the car-jacking. When the officer’s Affidavit (the avowed

report upon which charges may be based) arrived at the

prosecutor’s office, it was approved, and a Complaint (the

“charging document” used in Tribal Courts) was filed on September

6, 2005 (the Tuesday after Labor Day).1

1 Incidentally, the Complaint that was filed also comported with the

‘“within-1l0-days” requirement for filing juvenile, in-custody Complaints,

per Sec. 3.9 of the Juvenile Code.

Unfortunately, however, the Tribal Complaint was filed in

Juvenile Court, under JD-05-121, by the prosecutor that handled

Mr. Flores’s sentencing on September 1, 2005 - the error

understandably borne of repetition in dealing with Arturo as a

juvenile in a previous matter.

When the undersigned Chief Prosecutor later saw the

Complaint, he noticed that it had been filed in Juvenile Court

rather than Tribal Court.2 He filed a dismissal of that juvenile

Complaint, due to lack of jurisdiction (Exhibit C) and re-filed

the case in Tribal Court under the above-captioned cause-number,

CR-05-277 (Exhibit A).

In simultaneous Orders dated September 20°", 2005, Judge

Melvin Stoof granted the dismissal requested on the Juvenile

Court complaint, but then disallowed the filing of the subsequent

(adult) complaint in Tribal Court. See Minute Entry entitled:

“Order of Dismissal Due To Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction”

(Exhibit D). The lower court decided that jurisdiction in Mr.

Flores’s new case lay exclusively with the Juvenile Court,

essentially, because the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over any

“juvenile offense.” Id. And, since the offense “occurred” while

Arturo was under 18 y.o., the case belonged in Juvenile Court.

Id., Emphasis Added. As the following discussion will reveal,

this reasoning is contrary to both public policy and to the plain

language of further provisions within the PYT Juvenile Code.

2 Among the definitions in the Juvenile Code is the term “Tribal Court”

which is specifically defined as “the adult court” for the Pascua Yaqui Tribe.

Cc. PUBLIC POLICY AND PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

CORROBORATE CHARGING 18 Y.O.’s IN ADULT COURT.

As a matter of policy, juvenile courts are set up with the

idea of treating minors in criminal court proceedings differently

from adults. This proved valid until one got to the serious

juvenile offender. Then mixing serious juvenile offenders with the

other youths, became nonsensical. Indeed, in the mid-late 1990s,

when the Arizona County Juvenile Courts were wrestling with

legislative modifications to the triggers for transfer, the primary

argument in favor of automatically transferring certain 15, 16 and

17 year-olds directly to Superior Court was that these offenders

were getting neither the appropriate deterrent penalties nor

rehabilitative treatment, prior to turning eighteen. The crimes or

histories were too serious and the available jurisdictional time

was Simply too brief. The automatic transfer legislation passed.

Independent of this automatic case-transfer mechanism,

coexists a well recognized practice of charging juveniles directly

as adults once they have turned eighteen. This is a long-standing

and unchallenged practice that has occurred in surrounding courts

for decades.

Once an offender reaches eighteen, he may be charged in adult

court immediately, even if the offense occurred when he was only

17-1/2 years old. This makes sense because, to hold otherwise

would allow juveniles the absurd license to offend recklessly and

deliberately just before they turned eighteen (hypothetically going

on crime binges just days before), in hopes of frustrating the

investigative process which cannot be completed in such short a

time frame.

Indeed, in other jurisdictions, be it Pima County, around

the state, or around the country, agencies routinely wait fora

juvenile (who is closing in on 18) to actually turn eighteen

before charging that individual (in felony situations) so that he

may be charged in adult court via traditional grand jury (GJ) and

also proceed through the criminal justice process with likeadults (as Mr. Flores now is), rather than true, small, and

vulnerable youngsters that occupy the bulk of juvenile court

systems. As the following analysis will further show, the Trial

Court erred by not following existing code definitions when

holding that the Tribe could not file against Mr. Flores in

Tribal Court.

D. THE ACT OF CHARGING AN 18 Y.O. ADULT UNDER THE

YAQUI CODE VESTS JURISDICTION IN TRIBAL COURT,

REGARDLESS OF WHEN THAT OFFENSE CHRONOLOGICALLY

OCCURRED .

The Tribe asserts that when the Code employs the terms

“juvenile” and “jurisdiction,” it very intentionally grants

jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court only when both:

(1) court proceedings have begun,

(2) involving a person under 18 years of age.3

1. The Code’s Definition of “Juvenile”

To determine when/where jurisdiction begins for a juvenile,

3 Curiously, however, this requisite is neither cited, nor addressed, in

the lower court’s September 20° minute entry, despite it being specifically

cited as the reason for the Tribe’s motion to dismiss and re-file in (adult)

Tribal Court. See Exhibit C, page 2.

one must first look to the Code’s definitions. Under Title 2 (The

Juvenile Code) “Juvenile” is defined specifically as:

1s A person under eighteen (18) years of age; [or]

2. A person under eighteen (18) years of age or older

concerning whom proceedings are commenced in Juvenile

Court prior to his eighteenth (18) birthday.

Critical, is the wording in number two, as there the

determinative intent is laid forth. This important condition can

be broken down in to three key necessary parts:

(a) commencement of;

(b) proceedings in Juvenile Court;

All three of these are prerequisites to any viability in Juvenile

Court. By its very declaration, if any of these components is

absent, there cannot be jurisdiction with the Juvenile Court. And,

notably, no where is the “date of the juvenile offense” identified

in this section as influential in anything.

In Appellee’s case, when the Complaint was filed, the

defendant had neither requisite number one (a person under

eighteen) nor requisite number two (a person over eighteen, but

whom proceedings had already commenced in Juvenile Court prior to

that).4 Indeed, the charging document (Complaint) wasn’t even

filed until September 6, 2005.

Moreover, having the filing of the Complaint determine

4 It is truly puzzling how the lower court, normally analytical and

attentive to definitions, omitted discussion of this provision and,

especially, Sec. 2.1, infra.

jurisdiction is entirely harmonious with the rather unambiguous

language of the rest of the Juvenile Code (Sec 2.1, Infra). This

is not a coincidence, but rather a demonstration of consistent

intent.

2. The Code’s Definition of “Jurisdiction”

In a subsequent section, Sec. 2.1 (entitled “Jurisdiction”)

the Juvenile Code reiterates that Juvenile Court jurisdiction

cannot lie where the defendant has already turned 18. In this

provision, the Juvenile Code says there is no jurisdiction unless

the case was pendent while the defendant was, at least at its

inception, a juvenile:

B. Jurisdiction is obtained by Juvenile Court [and

retained] until terminated by...

(1) The juvenile becoming an adult,

except where a juvenile becomes an adult

during the pendency of proceedings in Juvenile

Court.

Id. (emphasis added).

Flipped over for illustration, we see that jurisdiction of an

adult in Juvenile Court is never appropriate except where the

transition to adulthood occurred during the pendency of preexisting

proceedings in Juvenile Court. We have here a circumstance where a

legal precept is framed in two different parts of the PYT Code and

they are mutually supporting. Applying the definitional and

jurisdictional language of these two parts of the Code leads only

to the conclusion that Mr. Flores had to be charged in “Tribal

Court” and no other.

Finally, it cannot be disputed that it is by the filing of the

Complaint that any case necessarily generates its first “court

proceeding.” There is no court proceeding initiated or calendared

or even in existence when an “offense” merely has “occurred.”

Indeed, these words lie nowhere in the definition of Juvenile, nor

in the definition of Jurisdiction.5

Fate had Mr. Flores’s birthday occur only days prior to the

possibility of filing the Complaint. As a result, Mr. Flores’s

car-jacking Complaint with affidavit could only reasonably have

been filed after he had already turned eighteen. Since he was

already eighteen, it had to be filed in (adult) Tribal Court.

The earliest possible moment that any lower court could have

conducted any kind of “proceeding” would have been after the

Appellee was an adult. In fact, the Complaint filing is precisely

what alerts a trial court to create a file and generate

“proceedings” under a real case number. There aren’t even any

“parties” which a court could entertain jurisdiction over until the

Complaint is lodged by the Tribe in a lower court.

Here, the Complaint was filed, at its earliest, on September

6, 2005.6 Consequently, there could not have been appropriate

Juvenile Court jurisdiction ever. And there could never be since

Appellee Flores was, at no point during any court pendency of any

fragment of this case, “under eighteen years of age.”

5 Typical of most jurisdictions, 1/3 or more alleged offenses never rise

to formal Complaints (or indictments). To follow the lower court’s logic,

however, they could, nonetheless have jurisdiction over all of these parties

as jurisdiction begins from the offense date, not the court-proceedings date.

6 Remember, assuming only arguendo that such filing can even be deemed

“valid,” since it is the Tribe’s position that Mr. Flores’s Complaint

could/should never have been filed in Juvenile Court to begin with.

CONCLUSION

The Tribe respectfully asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion by dismissing the September 14‘, 2005 re-filing of the

Complaint in (adult) Tribal Court. The inertial moment at which

“Juvenile” status is determined is the moment at which “court

proceedings” begin in that case. When proceedings began here,

Appellee Flores was eighteen. The lower court was therefore in

error when it construed clear Code language to suggest that the

“offense date” triggers determination of jurisdiction. Here,

however, proceedings never initiated with any lower court, Juvenile

or Tribal, until after Appellee had already turned eighteen.

To uphold the September 20 minute entry from the lower court,

would not only frustrate the plain reading of the terms “juvenile”

and “proceedings” but would create an illogical loop-hole for young

offenders to exploit, non-existent in any other known jurisdiction.

For all of these reasons, The Tribe prays this Court grant it

relief by reversing the lower court’s September 20 Order

dismissing jurisdiction of Mr. Flores’s case in Tribal Court.

Since Mr. Flores was an adult when first court-proceedings began,

Jurisdiction appropriately vested with Tribal Court.

Respectfully submitted this 13th day of October, 2005.

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE

Hah Hot

Micah Schmit

Chief Prosecutor

Original and four copies of the foregoing delivered/mailed

This date to:

Clerk of the Court, Pascua Yaqui Tribe Court of Appeals

Copy delivered/mailed this date to:

Nick Fontana c/o

PYT Public Defenders Ofc

Attorney for Appellee

PYT Attorney General’s Office

Tucson, Arizona 85757

Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court

By: as

Exhibit A

IN AND FOR THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL GOuB LAM 10: 50

IN AND FOR THE PASCUA YAQUI INDIAN RESERVATION

OCKE , Say

Case No. CR-05-3 77" 2 wo y)

CLERK

Pascua Yaqui Tribe,

Plaintiff, CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

Vs.

FLORES, Arturo Martin

Defendant.

The PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE, hereby complains and alleges, upon information

and belief, that the above named defendant, an Indian, while on the Pascua Yaqui

Reservation, did commit the following offense(s): o # sag, 0)

COUNT 1: BATTERY: 1 PYTC § 3.8

On or about August 27, 2005 at approximately 6:00 a.m., at or near 7851 Maala Mecha

Voo’o, willfully struck Giovanni Valencia in the face.

COUNT 2: THEFT: 1 PYTC § 3.64

On or about August 27, 2005 at approximately 6:00 a.m., at or near 7851 Maala Mecha

Voo’o, took property of Giovanni Valencia without his consent, to wit: car keys.

COUNT 3: THEFT: 1 PYTC § 3.64

On or about August 27, 2005 at approximately 6:00 a.m., at or near 7851 Maala Mecha

Voo’o, took property of Giovanni Valencia without his consent, to wit: vehicle.

COUNT 4: THEFT: 1 PYTC § 3.64

On or about August 27, 2005 at approximately 6:00 a.m., at or near 7851 Maala Mecha

Voo’o, took property of Giovanni Valencia without his consent, to wit: stereo system.

And such violations, upon conviction, are punishable under the Pascua Yaqui Tribal__

Codes. opSCug 2b

a, "?

DATED this 13" day of September 2005. Sh, ea §

“ 6

The undersigned hereby swears and affirms that this complaint is based upon

information and belief, and the attached Affidavit and Verification.

A at, O~_

Complainant/Deputy Prosecutor

DEFENDANT: Arturo Flores

ADDRESS: 7831 Camino Tetaviecti, Tucson, Arizona 85757

DOB: 09/01/87 SSN: 601-42-5268 ORIGIN: Pascua Yaqui #2694U06320

SEX: Male HT: WT: EYES: HAIR:

Note: Accused persons may obtain disclosure information about their case ten days after arraignment by

contacting the Prosecutor’s Office at 4725 West Tetakusim Bldg C, Tucson AZ 85746. [PYTC Title 10

Rule 5.1]

e-*

c e

IN THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL COURT#5

IN AND FOR THE PASCUA YAQUI INDIAN RESERV AFION, 2

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

ARTURO FLORES,

Defendant COURT USE ONLY

; Case Number: |

050827-3554

PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT

AFFIDAVIT

1. 1, CHET BABCOCK, being a duly authorized law enforcement officer of the Pascua Yaqui Indian

Tribe and for the Pascua Yaqui Indian Reservation, do hereby swear and affirm as follows:

A. C] | am the arresting officer in this case; OR

XxX] | am a law enforcement officer and make this statement on information

and belief.

2. SUSPECTED PARTY (Defendant)

Name: ARTURO FLORES

Driver’s license number:

PY Enrollment number:

Date of Birth: 09-01-87

ARTURO FLORES [is [is not an enrolled member of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe.

3. The defendant was arrested without a warrant on _at [] A.M. [J] P.M.

4. | have probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the following offerise(s) at

7851 MALLA MECHA VOOD (address) which is within the exterior boundaries of the Pascua

Yaqui Indian Reservation:

XI PYC/LJARS, Title , Chapter 3, Section 3.6, ASSAULT

R PYC/L]ARS, Title , Chapter 3, Section 3.64, THEFT

LIPYC/LJARS, Title , Chapter , Section” ,

LIPYC/LJARS, Title , Chapter , Section

PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT Pascua Yaqui Law Enforcement Form

| RECORDS DIVISION

LIPYC/LJARS,Title ,Chapter , Section ,

L]PYC/(L]ARS, Title ,Chapter , Section ;

LJPYC/LJARS,Title ,Chapter , Section ,

L]PYC/CLJARS,Title ,Chapter , Section ,

5. 1 believe that the defendant committed the above-listed offense(s) because: (Summarize facts to

support probable cause claim)

At the above-stated date and time and at the above-referenced location within the exterior boundaries

of the Pascua Yaqui Indian Reservation | did witness the following:

ON 08-27-05 AT 1043 HOURS, OFFICERS RESPONDED TO A REPORT OF A STOLEN

VEHICLE. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE,GIOVANNI

VALENCIA, HAD BEEN DRINKING AT A PARTY WHEN ARTURO FLORES PUNCHED HIM IN THE

FACE,RENDERING HIM PARTIALLY CONCIOUS. FLORES REMOVED THE KEYS TO VALENCIA

VEHICLE FROM VALENCIA'S PANTS POCKET. FLORES LEFT WITH THE VEHICLE,WHICH WAS

LATER RECOVERED ABANDONED IN THE DESERT. THE VEHICLE'S STEREO, SYSTEM HAD BEEN

REMOVED.

The information contained herein is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

6. Irequest that the Court make a probable cause determination hat the defendant may be continued in

custody pending further proceedings.

\. =:

Signauad cRORICH

Z -2EOS™

Date

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME ON CLuguat ZV 2OOS”

_ Slee th Leiulir My Commission expires: HWA) 27 1007

otary Signature .

OFFICIAL SEAL

wesea®) |ISABELLE M. QUINTERO

ay G/NOTARY PUBLIC-ARIZONA

oy PIMA COUNTY

My omm. EXP. March 27, 2007

PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT Pascua Yaqui Law Enforcement Form

Exhibit B

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE :

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR O5 SEP 22 py 4.

7474 S. Camino de Oeste P22 PH 3: 22

Tucson, Arizona 85746 5

(520) 879-6251 u

‘a's

Gui

G. Allen Osburn

Deputy Prosecutor

IN THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE COURT OF APPEALS

IN AND FOR THE PASCUA YAQUI RESERVATION, ARIZONA

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE,

Appellant, NO.

( Tribal Court No. CR-05-277)

Vs.

FLORES, Arturo NOTICE OF APPEAL

Oral argument requested

Defendant.

Notice is hereby given that the Pascua Yaqui Tribe appeals to

the Appellate Court of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe from the judgment

entered in this action by the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court on

September 20, 2005. The Pascua Yaqui Tribe requests oral argument .

Respectfully submitted this 22° day of September, 2005.

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE

A Ah. te-€

G. Allen Osburn

Deputy Prosecutor

Original delivered/mailed

This date to:

Clerk of the Court, Pascua Yaqui Tribe Court of Appeals CUA Za

te ‘on

Copy delivered/mailed to: a Received

Public Defender SEP 26 2005

Attorney for Appellee

Pascua Yaqui Tribal Cour

By: ee

Exhibit C

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.