IN THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION SUPREME COURT FILED

SUPREME COURT

IN THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION SUPREME COURT FILED

CITIZENSHIP BOARD OF THE

MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION,

Appellant,

vs.

RHONDA K. GRAYSON and

JEFFREY D. KENNEDY,

Respondents.

MAR 0 9 2026

Case No: SC-2023-10

(District Court Case No.: CV-2020-34)

ee ee

CONNIE DEARMAN

MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION

COURT CLERK

Respondents’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

Damario Solomon-Simmons, MCN # 354

SOLOMONSIMMONSLAW, PLLC

601 S. Boulder Ave., Ste. 602

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119

918-551-8999 — Phone/9 118-558-8039 — Facsimile

dss@solomonsimmons.com

Jana L. Knott, MCN #1320

BASS LAW

252 NW 70" St.

Oklahoma City, OK 73116

(405) 262-4040 — Phone/(405) 262-4058 — Facsimile

jana@basslaw.net

M. David Riggs, MCN # 1239

RIGGS, ABNEY, NEAL, TURPEN ORBISON & LEWIS, P.C.

502 West 6th Street

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119

(918) 587-3161 — Phone/(918) 587-9708 — Facsimile

driggs@riggsabney.com

Attorneys for Respondents

Lm

INTRODUCTION

On May 30, 2026, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation will hold a special election on amending

the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Constitution (“May Special Election”). To register to vote in this

election and others, Muscogee (Creek) citizens must show citizenship cards. See Muscogee

(Creek) Nation Code Annotated (“M(C)NCA”) Title 19 § 4—108 (requiring Tribal enrollment

number to register to vote). Through their continued failure to issue Respondents Rhonda Grayson

and Jeffrey Kennedy citizenship cards, Principal Chief David Hill and the Citizenship Board have

deliberately obfuscated this Court’s July 23, 2025 Order and Opinion, thereby denying

Respondents’ court-ordered citizenship, and with it, their fundamental right to vote. See

Citizenship Bd. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Rhonda K. Grayson & Jeffrey D. Kennedy, SC-

2023-10 (Sup. Ct. Muscogee (Creek) Nation July 23, 2025) (“July Opinion”). With their lack of

citizenship cards posing an administrative roadblock to their ability to register to vote, the May

Special Election will mark the second election where Chief Hill and the Citizenship Board have

denied Ms. Grayson and Mr. Kennedy their right to vote under the Muscogee (Creek) Nation

Constitution.

To safeguard Respondents’ fundamental right to vote as citizens, the Court should

intervene and issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction halting the May

Special Election and postponing the voter registration deadline until Respondents—and all other

Muscogee (Creek) Freedman with pending applications—are rightfully granted their citizenship

cards, permitting them to register and take part in the election. Alternatively, this Court should

permit all Creek Freedmen with pending applications to cast a provisional ballot in the upcoming

election, or at the very least, permit Respondents to cast a provisiona! vote.

The standard for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requires a

showing of the following: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the

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movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of

equities tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest.” RoDa

Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Mdewakanton Sioux Indians

of Minnesota v. Zinke, 255 F. Supp .3d 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2017); Martin v. Crittenden, 347 F. Supp.

3d 1302, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (“The standard for obtaining a temporary restraining order (‘TRO’)

is identical to that of obtaining a preliminary injunction.”) (citing Windsor v. United States, 379 F.

App’x 912, 916-17 (11th Cir. 2010)). This Court follows the Tenth Circuit standard for injunctive

relief. See Ellis v. Bristow Muscogee Indian Cmty., No. CV 2009-33, 2009 WL 10270097, at *3

(Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. Apr. 21, 2009) (adopting federal preliminary injunction standard).

Importantly, this Court has jurisdiction over this motion and the power to grant

Respondents relief. Under Rule 18 A(5) of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s Procedures and Rules,

this Court may “require such other action or further proceedings as may be appropriate to each

individual action.” M(C)NCA Title 27, App’x 2, Rule 18 A(5). Further action is required because

the Citizenship Board has failed to issue Respondents’ citizenship cards despite this Court ordering

Respondents’ citizenship eight months ago. Since then, Respondents have filed three motions for

contempt against the Citizenship Board and Chief Hill. Without further intervention from this

court,' Respondents will yet again be denied their fundamental right to vote.

Respondents have met the preliminary injunction standard. First, Respondents can

demonstrate there is a strong likelihood that they will succeed on the merits. The Muscogee (Creek)

Nation Constitution and Code grant the right to vote to all citizens who are over the age of eighteen

and registered to vote. Although this Court made clear that Creek Freedman are citizens, and

consequently, hold the constitutionally protected right to vote, Respondents are still unable to

' Without tribal court intervention, Respondents are faced with no other option but to bring this motion in federal

court.

register to vote because the Citizenship Board and Chief Hill continue to deny them their

citizenship cards.

Second, if this Court does not grant injunctive relief, Respondents will suffer an irreparable

harm. Being denied the right to vote in an election is a harm that cannot be undone—once the

election takes place, a Court cannot retroactively grant Respondents the ability to exercise their

fundamental right. Therefore, the Court should preserve such a right and halt the election.

Third, other interested parties, particularly other members of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation,

will not suffer substantial harm if injunctive relief is granted. Enjoining the election, or simply

postponing the registration deadline, are simply administrative burdens faced by government

agencies. Such administrative burdens pale in comparison to the fundamental right Respondents—

and all other Muscogee (Creek) Freedman—will lose if injunctive relief is not granted.

Fourth and finally, public interest favors granting injunctive relief. This Court’s July

Opinion qualified thousands of Creek Freedman to vote in this election. But such newlyrecognized citizens will be denied the right to vote because of the Citizenship Board’s and Chief

Hill’s obstructive conduct. Because Respondents have met their burden, injunctive relief should

be granted.

This request does not require changing the Code or the Constitution. In fact, it does quite

the opposite—it ensures compliance with the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Constitution and Code

establishing a Muscogee (Creek) citizen’s right to vote. Respondents are citizens. This Court’s

July Opinion made that clear. It is time to let them vote.

L THERE IS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD RESPONDENTS WILL SUCCEED ON

THE MERITS.

First, Respondents have a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Treaties between the

Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the United States are the supreme law of the land. See U.S. Const.

art. VI; Muscogee (Creek) Nation Const. Art. 1, § 2 (the “political jurisdiction of the [M(C)N]...

is based upon those Treaties entered into by the [M(C)N] and the United States of America[.]”);

see also M(C)NCA Title 27, § 1-101; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).? Article II of the

Treaty of 1866 mandates:

The Creeks hereby covenant and agree that henceforth neither slavery nor

involuntary servitude . . . shall ever exist in the nation; inasmuch as there are among

the Creeks many persons of African descent, who have no interest in the soil, it is

stipulated that hereafter these persons lawfully residing in said country, and may

return within one year from the ratification of this treaty, and their descendants and

such others of the same race as may be permitted by the laws of the said nation to

settle within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Creek Nation as citizens [thereof],

shall have and enjoy all the rights and privileges of native citizens, including an

equal interest in the soil and national funds, and the laws of the said nation shall

be equally binding upon and give protection to all such persons, and all others, of

whatsoever race or color, who may be adopted as citizens or members of said tribe.

(emphasis added). On July 23, 2025, this Court recognized Creek Freedmen’s citizenship rights

under the Treaty, holding that “the Treaty of 1866 requires that Creek Freedmen, and their

descendants, shall be granted ‘all the rights and privileges of the native citizens[.]’” July Opinion

at 21 (citing Article II, Treaty of 1866). Specifically, this Court recognized that by striking “by

blood” in Article III, Section 2 of the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution, “citizenship is available to

any ‘Muscogee Creek Indians whose names appear on the final rolls as provided by the Act of

April 26, 1906 .. . and persons who are lineal descendants of those Muscogee (Creek) Indians

whose names appear on the final rolls as provided by the Act of April 26, 1906.” /d. at 22. Because

Respondents are lineal descendants of individuals who appear on the Dawes Rolls, they are citizens

under the Court’s July Opinion. Jd. at 23 (ordering the Citizenship Board to “issue citizenship to

the Respondents”). Of course, the ability to vote in tribal elections is one such right and privilege

enjoyed by citizens of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. See Courtwright v. July, SC-93-01, 1993 WL

2 See Ex. A(Chief Hill’s August 30, 2023 Letter to Governor Kevin Stitt about State of the State Address (Chief Hill

stating the Treaty is “the supreme law of the land.”).

831884, at *5 (Sup. Ct. Muscogee (Creek) June 28, 1993) (“One guarantee granted to all citizens

is the right to elect whom they choose and to pass what laws they want.”).

Chief Hill’s Executive Order violates the Treaty by explicitly treating Creek Freedman

citizenship applicants different from all other citizenship applicants, effectively denying Creek

Freedman equal protection of the laws. See Article II, Treaty of 1866 (“[T]he laws of the said

nation shall be equally binding upon and give protection to all such persons [of African descent].”)

(emphasis added). Yet the Executive Order purports to do exactly that, by directing the Citizenship

Office to “not issue citizenship cards” to Creek Freedman descendant applicants while directing

the Office “to maintain the status quo by continuing to accept, process, and issue determinations

for applications” for all other applicants. Executive Order No. 25-05, J 2.01, 2.02. These

directives treat Creek Freedman as second-class citizens in clear violation of the Treaty. See also

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1 (“[N]Jor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.”). See also, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964)

(“[T]he rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity

and are coextensive.”);Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946) (“Citizenship obtained

through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship.”).

Although this Court’s July Opinion conferred citizenship on Ms. Grayson and Mr.

Kennedy, the Citizenship Board—by way of Chief Hill and his Executive Order—has continually

refused to grant Respondents their citizenship cards, which are required to register to vote. See

M(C)NCA Title 19 § 4-108 (requiring Tribal enrollment number to register to vote). Article IV,

Section 2 of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Constitution confers the right to vote on citizens: “Every

citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, regardless of religion, creed, or sex, shall be eligible to

vote in the tribal elections provided that (a) they are registered voters for elections; (b) they are at

least eighteen (18) years of age at the date of election, with the registrant providing sufficient proof

of age to the Election Board; and (c) they hold citizenship.” See also M(C)NCA Title 19 § 4-101

(establishing substantially the same requirements) (emphasis added).

Respondents satisfy the last two requirements but are prevented from establishing the first.

As discussed above, this Court interpreted the Treaty of 1866 to presently confer citizenship on

Respondents. See July Opinion at 23. Moreover, Respondents are both above the age of eighteen.

However, through no choice of their own, Respondents cannot register to vote. To become a

registered voter, an individual must complete a registration form and provide the “[v]oter’s full

name and sex, date of birth, place of residence and mailing address; the voter’s Tribal enrollment

number; the voter’s social security number, an oath of the voter’s eligibility to become a registered

voter; and such other information as may be deemed necessary by the Election Board to identify

said voter and to ascertain his or her eligibility.” M(C)NCA Title 19 § 4-108; see also M(C)NCA

Title 19 § 9-104 (“Special elections shall be conducted under the provisions of this Title applicable

to primary and general elections.”). Due to Chief Hill’s Executive Order halting any processing of

citizenship cards, Respondents cannot obtain a Tribal enrollment number, and thus cannot register

to vote and enjoy the “rights and privileges of native citizens” as guaranteed by the Treaty of 1866.

This cannot be. See, e.g., Anderson yv. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (quoting Williams v.

Rhodes, 398 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)) (“[T]he right of qualified voters, regardless of their political

39 66.

persuasion, to cast their votes effectively” “rank[s] among our most precious freedoms.”).

Moreover, the requested alternative relief of provisional voting has historical precedent. In

2011, the Cherokee Nation stripped Cherokee Freedman of their citizenship, and consequently,

their right to vote, seeking to prevent them from voting in a special election. Ex. B at 2 (Freedman

P1.’s Mem. in Supp. of their Mot. fora Prelim. Inj., Vann et al. v. Norton et al., No. 1:03-cv-01711

(D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2011) (ECF No. 146-1)). The Freedmen sued and sought a preliminary injunction

against the Cherokee Nation to prevent the denial of their fundamental right to vote. Jd. at 3, 23.

Specifically, the Freedman asked the court to “enjoin the Cherokee Nation, Defendants from

denying Plaintiffs and the other Freedmen their full citizenship rights and from holding any

election as to which Plaintiffs and other Freedmen are denied the right to vote solely upon their

status as Cherokee Freedmen.” /d. at 23. The court granted the preliminary injunction, recognizing

Cherokee Freedmen citizenship pending litigation and allowing all Cherokee Freedman who were

enrolled as citizens to vote and have their votes counted. Ex. C (Order, Vann et al. v. Norton et al.,

No. 1:03-cv-01711 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2011) (ECF No. 153)). The Court reasoned that because

“{[t]hey are citizens of the Cherokee Nation, ...” they are “entitled to vote in the upcoming Principal

Chief election and to have their vote counted in the same manner as all other Cherokee citizens.”

Id. at 2.

This situation is analogous—this Court has decided all “applicant[s] who [are] able to

establish a lineal descendant on the Creek by Blood Dawes Roll, or the Creek Freedman Dawes

Roll” are citizens. July Opinion at 23. Therefore, any individual who has applied for citizenship

since this Court’s July opinion should be able to vote in the May Special Election. This Court

should order that Creek Freedmen be granted a provisional ballot to be cast in accordance with the

deadlines set for the election. And once the Citizenship Board, and other proper parties, have

determined that the individual is eligible, then the vote should be counted “in the same manner as

all other [Muscogee (Creek)] citizens.” Ex. C at 2.

There is also strong support in United States constitutional and election law for allowing

provisional voting for Creek Freedman whose citizenship applications are still pending. Under

federal law and the U.S. Constitution, it has long been accepted that all citizens have a strong and

equal interest in exercising their “fundamental political right” to vote. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.

330, 336 (1972) (“[Each] citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections

on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”).

When there are questions about a voter’s eligibility to vote in a U.S. election, federal law

requires that the voter be allowed to cast a provisional ballot, to be counted after their eligibility

has been established. 52 U.S.C. § 21082. The entitlement to a provisional ballot derives from

federal law but operates against the backdrop of well-established constitutional principles

recognizing voting as a fundamental right. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964)

(explaining the U.S. Constitution protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote and the right to

vote cannot be denied outright). The availability of provisional ballots serves as an important

safeguard that helps protect the fundamental right to vote even when questions of eligibility arise.

See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197-98 (2008) (explaining the right to

cast a provisional ballot adequately protects the constitutional rights of voters missing certain

documentation).

Pursuant to the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), voters are entitled to cast a provisional

ballot when their qualifications are still being considered. 52 U.S.C. § 21082. In enacting the Help

America Vote Act, Congress recognized that the right to vote is fundamental and eligible voters

should not be disenfranchised by mere administrative barriers. Accordingly, HAVA ensures that

all voters are afforded an opportunity to cast a ballot even while their eligibility is in question, and

that voters and election officials may then confirm eligibility after the provisional ballot has been

cast but before it is counted, including during the period following an election. See, e.g., Sandusky

Cnty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2004) (“HAVA is

quintessentially about being able to cast a provisional ballot. No one should be ‘turned away’ from

the polls, but ... if the voter is not eligible, the vote will then not be counted.”).

Federal Courts have also found provisional ballots to be critical in ensuring that eligible

voters are not disenfranchised due to administrative failures outside of their control. See Hunter v.

Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 245 (6th Cir. 2011) (expressing constitutional

concerns regarding the disenfranchisement of eligible voters solely on the account of error by a

state actor).

Chief Hill and the Citizenship Board’s continued denial of citizenship cards blatantly

violates this Court’s July Opinion and the Treaty of 1866. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation

Constitution and Code confer the right to vote on any citizen, including Respondents. Issuing

Respondents citizenship cards is nothing more than a simple, administrative task—yet this

administrative task stands between Respondents and the exercise of their fundamental right to vote.

Therefore, Respondents are likely to succeed on the merits.

II. RESPONDENTS WILL SUFFER AN IRREPARABLE HARM IF THE SPECIAL

ELECTION PROCEEDS.

Second, Respondents will suffer irreparable harm absent the requested injunctive relief. An

irreparable harm “is one which is ‘beyond remediation’—and for economic harms ‘[t]he

possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in

the ordinary course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”

Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minnesota, 255 F. Supp. at 52 (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel

Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Here, Respondents can show there

is no remediation, no compensatory relief, and no corrective relief available for the denial of a

fundamental right—the right to vote. See Martin, 347 F. Supp. 3d at 1309 (“[A] violation of the

right to vote cannot be undone through monetary relief and, once the election results are tallied,

10

the rejected electors will have been disenfranchised without a future opportunity to cast their

votes.” (internal quotation omitted)).

The right to vote has been deemed fundamental by many courts, including the United States

Supreme Court. See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding poll

taxes violate the fundamental right to vote); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949),

aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (holding literacy tests intended to disenfranchise Black voters violated

the Fifteenth Amendment). Moreover, “[c]ourts routinely deem restrictions on fundamental voting

rights irreparable injury because once the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress.”

Majority Forward v. Ben Hill Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1348, 1356 (M.D. Ga. 2020)

(quoting Ga. State Conf. NAACP v. Georgia, No. 1:17-cv-1397, 2017 WL 9435558, at *4 (N.D.

Ga. May 4, 2017)). Respondents have already been denied the opportunity to vote in the September

20, 2025 National Council elections. See generally The Muscogee (Creek) National 2025 General

Election Saturday, September 20, 2025 Official Results (last visited Mar. 7, 2025),

https://www.muscogeenation.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/2025-General-Official-

Results.pdf. If Respondents are denied their right to vote, and the May Special Election occurs,

there will be no do-overs and Respondents will once again be left without redress.

Special circumstances exist in this case that warrant an injunction by this Court halting the

election. While courts are reluctant to interfere in special elections or ballot referenda “when only

one outcome of the election would allegedly impair the movants rights,” several amendments

poised for consideration would be patently unconstitutional. Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of

Minnesota, 255 F. Supp. at 53-54; Nev. Rest. Ass'n v. Pest Comm., No. 3:08-CV-00118, 2008 WL

8225546, at *4 (D. Nev. July 15, 2008) (“Insofar as the few federal courts that have entertained

such challenges [to ballot measures pre-election] are concerned, those courts have only done so

where the proposed measures were plainly unconstitutional.”).

On Wednesday, February 19, 2026, the M(C)N Business, Finance, and Justice Committee

passed legislation to send to the full council. Meredith Johnson, BFJ Passes Referendum

Legislation, MVSKOKE Media (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.mvskokemedia.com/bfj-passesreferendum-legislation. If the full council votes to send this legislation to the ballot, this legislation

would be part of the May Special Election: NCA 26-030 (amending Article VII, Section 2 of the

Muscogee (Creek) Nation Constitution to permit Special Justices to be appointed if Supreme Court

Justices recuse themselves to ensure seven justices hear each case); NCA 26-031 (amending

Article IX of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Constitution to read “The Special Election may be

called by the Principal Chief and combined with a General Election if the constitutional

amendment ordinance is enacted at least 90 days prior to a General Election.”); NCA 26-037

(amending Article V, Section 1(a) and (c) of Muscogee (Creek) Nation Constitution to “change

the terms of office for Principal Chief and Second Chief from two consecutive terms (8 years) to

three terms (12 years total, consecutive or non-consecutive).” Id.

Undoubtably, these amendments are aimed at preventing Respondents from being able to

vote anywhere in the near future. This Court already found an illegal court-packing scheme to

prevent the issuance of the July Opinion granting Creek Freedmen citizenship. See Jn re: the

Constitutionality of NCA 24-077, SC-2024-05 (Sup. Ct. Muscogee (Creek) Nation Apr. 22, 2025).

Having been defeated once, the National Council and Chief Hill now look to enshrine their

manipulation of the Supreme Court in this Nation’s Code. Moreover, Chief Hill is seeking to

extend his term to continue interfering with and preventing the Citizenship Board from fully

recognizing Respondents’ citizenship. Should Chief Hill succeed, Respondents may never be able

to enjoy the citizenship this Court ordered. See Otey v. Common Council of City of Milwaukee,

281 F. Supp. 264, 274-76 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (blocking the submission of a “palpably

unconstitutional” resolution to a referendum). Both of these amendments affect Respondents’

rights and clearly violate this Court’s clear and unambiguous July Opinion.

As a result, this Court should not wait for the outcome of the election and seek to

retroactively invalidate the election results.* Instead, this Court should enjoin the May Special

Election to preserve Respondents’ fundamental right to vote. In the alternative, this Court should

order provisional voting for Creek Freedmen. Without the injunction or provisional voting,

Respondents will suffer irreparable harm, meeting the second element.

Il. THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

Third, the harm to Respondents if the injunctive relief is denied outweighs the harm to

other interested parties. “[T]he right to vote is a fundamental right and is preservative of all other

rights. Denying an individual the right to vote works a serious, irreparable injury upon that

individual.” Majority Forward, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1357 (quoting Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups,

406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2005)). “We cannot ignore the irreparable harm of this

denial of the right to vote.” Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 755 (10th Cir. 2016). Given the gravity

of the harm done here, the scales already tip towards Respondents.

Thus, the harm other interested parties may suffer pales in comparison to the harm

Respondents—and other Creek Freedmen overall—will otherwise suffer. See Majority Forward,

509 F. Supp. 3d at 1357 (“While the Court acknowledges that an injunction may burden

3 The deadlines for the May Special Election are rapidly approaching with the Voter Registration deadline on May 19,

2026. See 2026 Special Election Dates & Deadlines (last visited Mar. 7, 2026), https://www.muscogeenation.com/wpcontent/uploads/2026/0 1/Special-Election-Dates-Deadlines-2026.png. Importantly, the deadline to receive an

absentee ballot request form by mail has already passed. Without rapid intervention from this Court, Respondents will

be left with no redress in a matter of months.

Defendants in their role managing the ongoing election, the harm to voters whose right to vote is

wrongfully impeded or denied is far greater.”). The smallest requested relief of allowing two

people to register to vote is a small burden on the Citizenship Board and the Board of Elections,

especially considering that this Court has already recognized their citizenship. See July Opinion at

23. Such administrative burdens cannot overcome the harm of being denied the right to vote. See

Fish, 840 F.3d at 754 (finding balance of equities favored voters where “the administrative burden

of altering the registration status of the roughly 18,000 applicants in question was limited to a

largely automated process that would be neither unduly time consuming or costly”); id. at 755

(“There is no contest between the mass denial of a fundamental constitutional right and the modest

administrative burdens to be borne by Secretary Kobach’s office and other state and local offices

involved in elections.”).

Nor would the administrative burdens of allowing all Creek Freedmen with pending

applications to cast provisional ballots outweigh the gravity of the mass denial of the right to vote.

See Fish, 840 F.3d at 754-55. The Citizenship Board would simply need to transmit information

on who has a pending application to the Board of Elections. As in Fish, adjusting the registration

status of a group of people is a small inconvenience.

Similarly, postponing the registration deadline and enjoining the special election itself is

no match for the denial of the fundamental right to vote. Jd. Moreover, unlike a general election, a

special election is not subject to a regular timeframe and can be rescheduled. That the election is

in the future and not subject to any specific timeline reduces the potential harm to the rest of the

Nation in postponing Thus, the balance of the equities favors postponement in favor of allowing

Respondents to exercise their right to vote.

IV. GRANTING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION IS

IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

The public interest strongly favors granting the request injunctive relief. “{T]he right to

vote is a fundamental right, and securing it is also in the public interest.” Majority Forward, 509

F. Supp. 3d at 1358. In other words, “[i]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of

a party’s constitutional rights.” Colorado v. DeJoy, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1066 (D. Colo. 2020)

(quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1147 (10th Cir. 2013)). The Nation

itself has said that “one guarantee granted to all citizens is the right to elect whom they choose and

to pass what laws they want.” Courtwright, 1993 WL 831884, at *5 .

Not only are Respondents being disenfranchised, but so too are the thousands of Creek

Freedmen whose citizenship is currently being held up by the Executive Order. There are an

estimated 43,500 to 117,300 Creek Freedmen who would qualify for citizenship as of 2022. See

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, Tribal

Programs, Information on Freedmen Descendants of the Five Tribes, GAO-26-107118, at 15

(Dec. 2025). Thus, tens of thousands of people are being disenfranchised by the Executive Order

and the upcoming special election. In fact, thousands of Creek Freedmen have submitted

citizenship applications, which remain in purgatory under the unlawful Executive Order. Though

not parties to the case, these Creek Freedmen have a strong interest in exercising their own right

to vote. Creek Freedman, as a result, are deeply invested in the outcome of this motion, so granting

the requested relief furthers the public interest. See Fish, 840 F.3d at 756.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant Respondents’ motion for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Respectfully submitted,

a |

ye MCN # 354

SOLOMONSIMMONSLAW, PLLC

601 S. Boulder Ave., Ste. 602

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119

918-551-8999 — Phone/9 118-558-8039 —

Facsimile dss@solomonsimmons.com

Jana L. Knott, MCN #1320

BASS LAW

252 NW 70" St.

Oklahoma City, OK 73116

(405) 262-4040 — Phone/(405) 262-4058 —

Facsimile jana@basslaw.net

M. David Riggs, MCN # 1239

RIGGS, ABNEY, NEAL, TURPEN ORBISON & LEWIS, P.C.

502 West 6th Street

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119

(918) 587-3161 — Phone/(918) 587-9708 — Facsimile

driggs@riggsabney.com

Attorneys for Respondents

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the 9" day of March 2026, | caused the foregoing Respondents’

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to be transmitted to the

following counsel of record via email and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:

Rod W. Wiemer Geri Wisner

114 North Grand Clinton A. Wilson

Okmulgee, OK 74447 Jeremy Pittman

Tulsa, OK 74120 THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION

rwattys@sbcglobal.net OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O Box 580

Okmulgee, OK 74447

gwisner@mcnag.com

cwilson@mcnag.com

jpittman@mcnag.com

a

Damario ns ee

EXHIBIT A

Muscogee (CREEK) Nation

Lxecutive Office

August 30, 2023

Office of Governor J. Kevin Stu

2300 N, Lincoln Blvd... Suite 212

Oklahoma City. OK 73108

Governor Kevin Stitt:

Your recent lies and offensive claims made in last week's State of the State address at the

Oklahoma Chamber of Commerce are comments unbecoming of the Office of Governor. Your

remarks represent a new low, even for someone who has developed a pattern of baseless hostility

towards tribes in Oklahoma and require correction for the public record. These lies will perpetuate

hostility that will be felt on individual levels and directed toward tribal citizens. For example, the

reckless comment you made regarding tribal tags-“Every time you sec a tribal tag, just realize the

state is losing about $200 million in revenue annually”- is not only inaccurate, but it could result

in physical confrontations against innocent tribal citizens for no other reason than having a tribal

tag on their vehicle.

You also stated that “Tribal governments disbanded and allotted out all the land in 1907 at

statchoed.” You say this as though it were a fact. However, every agency of the federal

government--which has plenary authority to make laws governing Indian County--and the United

States Supreme Court has repeatedly found otherwise. On this matter, | would encourage you to

listen to informed advisors on both history and the law so as to avoid the embarrassing mistake of

saying such easily disproven things in the future. 1 would also remind you that the Muscogee

(Creek) Nation has entered into numerous treaties with the United States. and, as you should know,

Article VI of the U.S. Constitution clearly upholds these treaties as the supreme law of the land.

and every judge in every state shall be bound thereby.

You also stated that “we are now in a jurisdictional and geographical fight for who has authority

over our slate” and characterized tribal efforts to assert their legal jurisdiction on their reservations

as a“storm of injustice.” There is no such struggle. We have always known the State of Oklahoma

is our neighbor, and our intent has been to be good neighbors. We've demonstrated our patience

and desire to be good neighbors.

Ihe concept of tribal jurisdiction over reservations is not new, nor did it begin with the McGirt

decision. It has always been the law of the land since before Oklahoma statehood. and McGirt

PO. Box 380 Oknudges, OK 74447-0580 1-890-482-1979

simply affirmed that lact. However, politicians of the past chose to ignore those laws and pretend

they didn’t exist-- just as you are attempting to do now.

Had the State of Oklahoma not illegally ignored tribal jurisdiction and instead developed a

collaborative relationship with tribes, as the system is designed to be, neither the state nor the tribes

would be in the place we find ourselves today.

Much of the work that tribes have done since the McGirt decision has been to repair the damage

of those politicians” actions. We’ve made great strides these past few years to continue to

strengthen our tribal systems that were illegally thwarted for decades. The result is more police on

the streets, more courts to try cases, and more public safety on reservations.

Your efforts to ignore the law are just as harmful as those of the politicians of years pone by.

It is clear that state leaders of the past were influenced in their treatment of Indians by the shameful

ignorance of their times. But here in 2023, there can be no excuse for resurrecting such sentiments

and actions. Misrepresenting history, ignoring the law, and spewing false rhetoric is best left in the

past.

Sovereign tribal jurisdiction should be treated as an opportunity, not a zero-sum game. Such a

totalitarian perspective is not supported in this case and is Jacksonian type leadership that is

desizned to only serve an elite pool of people. Many other states work with tribes to the benefit of

their citizens and their economies. That same collaboration and positive sovereign-to-sovercign

cooperation is the only path that every citizen of Oklahoma, tribal or not, deserves.

Your words give the perception that you wish tribes didn’t exist. but we do and will continue to

do so. You may personally wish tribes didn’t have any jurisdiction or authority, but we do and will

continue to do so. So. | encourage you, as the elected leader of our state, to end your political

campaign of baseless and damaging rhetoric, cease using Oklahomans’ hard-earned money to fund

baseless lawsuits, and forge a path to work with tribal leaders for the benefit of all.

As always, my door is open for constructive conversation and sovereign-to-sovereign negotiations.

| hope to hear from you soon.

Sincerely,

s ‘

Qoxd Ww, AX?

David W. Hill, Principal Chief

Muscogee (Creek) Nation

ce Lt Gov. Matt Pinnell, Speaker Charles MeCall, Pro ‘Tem Greg Treat

Attorney General Gentner Drummond

EXHIBIT B

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 1 of 33

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARILYN VANN, RONALD MOON,

DONALD MOON, CHARLENE WHITE,

RALPH THREAT, FAITH RUSSELL,

ANGELA SANDERS, SAMUEL E. FORD,

and THE FREEDMEN BAND OF THE

CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Case No: 1:03cv01711 (HHK)

Judge: Henry H. Kennedy

Docket Type: Civil Rights

(non-employment)

KEN SALAZAR, Secretary of the United

States Department of the Interior;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR;

CHADWICK SMITH, Individually and in His

Official Capacity;

S. JOE CRITTENDEN, Individually and in

His Official Capacity; and

John Does, Individually and in Their Official

Capacity,

Defendants.

[Nee Sere Nome? Nema Nonenee? Nee” Nee” Nee Neer Nee” Ne” Nene” Sree Nee ee Nee” ee” ee ee ee ee ee” ee” ee ee’ ee ee”

FREEDMEN PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

THEIR MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

The Cherokee Nation was one of the few Indian tribes to own slaves and fight with the

Confederacy during the Civil War. After the Civil War ended, the Cherokee Nation agreed, in

connection with restoring its relations with the United States Government in the Treaty of 1866,

to free its slaves and guarantee them and their descendents “all the rights of native Cherokees” —

including full citizenship rights.

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 2 of 33

Certain Freedmen, until recently (and with a couple of exceptions), had been permitted to

exercise their Cherokee citizenship rights. The Cherokee Nation Constitution, in accordance

with the Treaty of 1866, until 2007 granted full Cherokee citizenship rights to the Freedmen. In

March 2007, however, the Cherokee Nation amended its Constitution to strip its Freedmen of

their citizenship rights. On May 14, 2007, the Cherokee Nation District Court issued a

temporary injunction restoring the Freedmens’ citizenship rights. On January 14, 2011, the

Cherokee Nation District Court held that the constitutional amendment was invalid because it

violated the Treaty of 1866. The Cherokee Nation, observing the District Court’s temporary

injunction and later its final ruling, permitted certain Freedmen to exercise their citizenship

rights, including their right to vote in the election for Principal Chief held on June 25, 2011.

Yet the Freedmen’s citizenship rights will now be taken away permanently — unless this

Court acts to preserve them. On August 22, 2011, the Cherokee Supreme Court ruled that the

March 2007 constitutional amendment is valid and that the Cherokee Nation may deny

citizenship rights to the Freedmen. The Cherokee Nation is now stripping the Freedmen of their

citizenship rights. Freedmen who had been registered to vote in Cherokee elections — and who

voted in the election for Principal Chief held on June 25, 2011 — are being removed from the

Cherokee voter rolls and will be prevented from voting in the special election for Principal Chief

to be held on September 24, 2011. In addition, Freedmen will be denied crucial benefits

afforded to all Cherokee citizens, including health care, employment in the Tribe or its many

companies, education assistance, and many other benefits.

The Freedmen now turn to this Court to seek a preliminary injunction against the

Cherokee Nation Defendants and the Federal Defendants to prevent the Cherokee Nation from

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 3 of 33

taking away their most fundamental rights until this Court makes its final ruling on the merits of

the Freedmen’s claims.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Historical Background

Prior to the Civil War, slaves of Cherokees, as well as free intermarried Blacks or

children of mixed racial families, lived in the Cherokee Nation. Complaint (“Compl.”) q 24.' In

1861, the Cherokee Nation entered into a treaty with the Confederate States of America, thereby

severing its relationship with the United States. The Cherokee Nation received seats in the

Confederate House of Representatives and Senate and rank in its military. As part of the

Confederate Army, the Cherokee Nation waged war against the United States in defense of the

institution of slavery. The Cherokee Nation passed legislation enacting slave codes, regulating

slavery within its borders.

In 1863, slavery was abolished through the Emancipation Proclamation, and in 1865 the

Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was ratified. Jd. 25. Following the

Civil War, the United States and the Cherokee Nation entered into the Treaty of 1866, July 19,

1866, 14 Stat. L. 799 (“Treaty of 1866”), which, among other things, granted the freed Cherokee

slaves (the “Freedmen”’) citizenship in the Cherokee Nation. Jd. 426. After the Cherokee

All citations to the Complaint refer to the Freedmen Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint,

filed December 19, 2008. D.C. Action Doc. No. 115. The Freedmen Plaintiffs have filed a

motion for leave to file their Fifth Amended Complaint on March 14, 2009, which is still

awaiting decision. See D.C. Action Doc. No. 127.

In July 2010, the related action The Cherokee Nation v. Nash, Civil Case No. 1:10-cv-1169

(HHK), was transferred to this Court from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Oklahoma. Except where necessary for procedural reasons to distinguish between

the Freedmen Plaintiffs here and the Freedmen Defendants in the transferred action, both

groups will be referred to herein collectively as “the Freedmen.” Both groups are represented

We

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 4 of 33

Nation entered into the Treaty of 1866, the Cherokee National Council amended its constitution,

implementing the Treaty’s requirement that the Cherokee Nation guarantee the Cherokee

Freedmen full rights as citizens.

In 1893, the United States government established the Dawes Commission for the

purpose of creating authoritative membership rolls for all of the Native American tribes in

Oklahoma, including the Cherokees. /d. | 33. Although not required or authorized to do so, the

Dawes Commission created separate categories of Cherokee citizens, including one for

Cherokees “by Blood,” also known as the “Blood Roll,” and the “Freedmen Roll” for the Black

Cherokees. /d. Persons on the Freedman Roll were typically former Cherokee slaves and

descendants of Cherokee slaves, but it also included any other member of the Cherokee Nation

having any Black ancestry, regardless of that individual’s Cherokee ancestry “by Blood.” Id.

Although the quantum of Native American ancestry was recorded for each individual on the

“Blood Roll,” no effort was made to record the percentage of Native American ancestry of those

persons listed on the “Freedmen Roll.” Jd. In 1907, the Dawes Commission completed its rolls

of citizens of the Cherokee Nation. Jd. ] 37.

by the same legal counsel and, as Judge Kern recognized in his Transfer Order, although the

five individual Freedmen named as defendants in the transferred action differ from the named

plaintiffs in this action, “[flor purposes of deciding the questions presented in both lawsuits, it

makes little difference which individual Freedmen are parties. [The] D.C. Individual Plaintiffs

are simply other Freedmen asserting rights contrary to the declaratory relief sought by the

Cherokee Nation in this case, and they could be readily substituted as defendants in this case

without effecting any substantive change in the declaratory action. In addition, the presence of

Freedmen Band as a plaintiff in the D.C. Action renders the parties in the two suits even more

similar because all Freedmen Defendants are members of this political organization...[.]”

Transfer Order at 16-17.

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 5 of 33

Previous Actions by the Federal Defendants To Protect the Citizenship Rights of

the Cherokee Freedmen and the Freedmen of Other Tribes

In 1970, Congress enacted The Principal Chiefs Act, which permitted the Cherokee

Nation and other tribes to elect their principal chiefs but required that the procedures established

for any such election “shall be subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior.” Pub. L. No.

91-495, 84 Stat. 1091 (1970). The Department of the Interior determined immediately that any

such election procedures must permit the Freedmen to vote. See Letter from Harrison Loesch

dated March 29, 1971 (“Voter qualifications of the Choctaw, Seminole, Cherokee and Creek

people must be broad enough to include the enrolled freedmen citizens of the respective

nations.”) (attached as Exhibit 1).

Over ten years ago, the Seminole Nation sought to deny citizenship rights to its

Freedmen. The Federal Defendants, as they were obligated to do under the Thirteenth

Amendment, the Seminole Treaty of 1866 (identical in substance to the Cherokee Treaty of

1866), and the Principal Chiefs Act, acted to protect the citizenship rights of the Seminole

Freedmen. In particular, the Federal Defendants made clear to the Seminole Nation that the

Seminole Freedmen were citizens of the Seminole Nation and were entitled to full citizenship

rights.”

In response, the Seminole Nation sued the Federal Defendants in this Court, but the

Federal Defendants prevailed. Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, No. 00-2384, 2001 WL

3 See Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs to Chief Jerry Haney (dated

September 29, 2000) (stating that the Freedmen became citizens of the Tribe pursuant to the

Treaty of 1866; proposed constitutional amendments to remove the Freedmen from

membership would violate the Treaty and the Indian Civil Rights Act; the Tribe did not submit

the proposed revisions of removing the Freedmen to the United States for approval, as

required; and the amendment to the Constitution removing the Freedmen from membership are

“deemed disapproved and invalid”) (attached as Exhibit 2).

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 6 of 33

36228153 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2001) (memorandum opinion granting summary judgment in part to

the Federal Defendants) (“Seminole P’). In Seminole I, this Court held that the Federal

Defendants had acted properly to protect the citizenship rights of the Seminole Freedmen. In

particular, this Court held that the Seminole Treaty of 1866 has not been abrogated and

“continues to bind the United States and Seminole governments” Id. at *16.

While Seminole J was pending, the Seminole Nation held an election for Principal Chief

and did not permit the Seminole Freedmen to vote. The Federal Defendants again acted to

protect the citizenship rights of the Seminole Freedmen, the Seminole Nation again brought suit

in this Court, and the Federal Defendants again prevailed. Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton,

223 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Seminole IP’). In holding that the Federal Defendants

properly acted to protect the citizenship rights of the Seminole Freedmen, this Court stated as

follows:

The Court acknowledges and appreciates the importance of the Nation’s

right, as a sovereign body, to self-determination and self-government.

However, as a sovereign, the Nation has the duty and the responsibility

to respect the rights of all of its members, including the rights of its

minority members, as guaranteed by the Nation's Constitution. See

Seminole Constitution Art. II (“The membership of this body shall

consist of all Seminole citizens whose names appear on the final rolls of

the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma approved pursuant to section 2 of the

Act of April 26, 1906 ...). And, where the Nation evidences that it does

not intend to respect those rights, the government, as part of “the

distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon [it] in its dealings with

these dependent and sometimes exploited people,” Seminole Nation, 316

U.S. at 296, 62 S. Ct. 1049, (citations omitted), has a duty to ensure that

its minority members are protected against the will of the majority that is

being imposed in violation of its own Constitution. The United States

has itself dealt with many of these same issues, where, if the will of the

majority had prevailed, many minority members of this society would

not have been able to enjoy the same privileges and benefits as other

citizens. Where the Nation will not protect the Constitutional rights of

its minority members, the BIA has the responsibility and indeed, the

duty, to intervene and attempt to protect those rights through appropriate

remedies. Id. at 296-97, 62 S. Ct. 1049.

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 7 of 33

Id. at 146-147.

Initial Actions of the Cherokee Nation to Deny Citizenship Rights to the Cherokee

Freedmen

Nearly ten years ago, the Cherokee Nation, like the Seminole Nation before it, took steps

to deny citizenship rights to its Freedmen. The Cherokee Nation Constitution provided that any

amendment to the Constitution required the approval of the President of the United States or his

authorized representative. The Cherokee Nation proposed amending its Constitution to remove

that approval requirement. The Federal Defendants did not object to the removal of the approval

right, so long as the citizenship rights of the Freedmen were protected:

We have no objection to the referendum as proposed and I am prepared

to approve the amendment deleting the requirement for Federal approval

of future amendments subject to certain understandings. First, all

members of the Cherokee nation, including the Freedmen descendants

who are otherwise qualified, must be provide an equal opportunity to

vote in the election. Second, under the current law, no amendment of the

Nation’s Constitution can eliminate the Freedmen from membership in

the Nation absent Congressional authorization. And lastly,

notwithstanding any amendment of the Nation’s Constitution, the Act of

October 22, 1970 (94 Stat. 1091).until it is repealed or amended will still

require Secretarial approval of the procedures for the election of the

leaders of the Cherokee Nation and the other of the Five Civilized

Tribes.

Letter from Neal McCaleb to Chief Smith (dated March 15, 2002) (attached as Exhibit 3). The

Federal Defendants also made clear to the Cherokee Nation that the Principal Chiefs Act,

requiring that the Secretary of the Interior approve the Cherokee Nations election procedures,

remains in effect. Letter from Dennis Springwater to Chief Smith (dated May 8, 2002) (attached

as Exhibit 4).

On May 24, 2003, the Cherokee Nation held a special election to elect its Principal Chief,

to elect other tribal officials, and to amend its constitution to remove the provision requiring

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 8 of 33

approval by the Federal Defendants of future constitutional amendments. Compl. ] 1. The

Cherokee Nation did not permit the Cherokee Freedmen to vote in this election. On July 26,

2003, the Cherokee Nation held a run-off election for certain tribal officials and an election to

consider further constitutional amendments. The Cherokee Nation did not permit the Cherokee

Freedmen to vote in this election either. Jd. [J 1, 46; Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 744

(D.C. Cir. 2008).

As of the election held on May 24, 2003, and as of the election held on July 26, 2003, the

Federal Defendants had made clear that they would not approve the election procedures or the

election results unless the Cherokee Nation protected the citizenship rights of the Cherokee

Freedmen and permitted them to vote in the elections. However, on August 6, 2003, the Federal

Defendants reversed their position and recognized the election of Chief Smith as Principal Chief

— even though the Cherokee Freedmen had been denied the right to vote in the elections held on

May 24, 2003, and July 26, 2003. Letter from Jeanette Hanna to Chief Smith (dated Aug. 6,

2003) (attached as Exhibit 5). The Federal Defendants stated that they were continuing to review

the amendment to the Cherokee Constitution approved on May 24, 2003, an election in which

the Cherokee Freedmen were not permitted to vote.

The D.C. Action

On August 11, 2003, a group of six individual Cherokee Freedmen filed this action

against Gale Norton, then Secretary of the Interior, and the United States Department of Interior

(the “Federal Defendants”), Civil Case No. 1:03-cv-01711 (HHK) (the “D.C. Action”), seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Federal Defendants to protect the citizenship rights

of the Freedmen. On January 14, 2005, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma filed a Limited

Motion to Intervene for the purpose of moving to dismiss the D.C. Action. D.C. Action Doc.

Case 1:03-cv-01711-TFH Document 146-1 Filed 09/02/11 Page 9 of 33

No. 17. On September 8, 2005, this Court granted the Cherokee Nation’s motion to intervene

and deemed as filed on that date the Cherokee Nation’s Motion to Dismiss. D.C. Action Doc.

Nos. 22 and 23. In response, Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add the Cherokee

Nation and the Cherokee Principal Chief (the “Cherokee Nation Defendants”) as party

defendants. D.C. Action Doc. No. 38.

On December 19, 2006, this Court denied the Cherokee Nation’s motion and granted

Plaintiffs leave to add the Cherokee Nation Defendants as parties. Vann v. Kempthorne, 467 F.

Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Vann I’) (D.C. Action Doc. No. 41). In addition, this Court held

that (1) the Thirteenth Amendment applies to the Cherokee Nation, (2) the Civil Rights Act of

1866 was intended to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment against all persons and entities under

the jurisdiction of the United States, and (3) the Treaty of 1866 (which guarantees Cherokee

citizenship to Cherokee Freedmen) incorporated the principles of the Thirteenth Amendment and

the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and makes adherence to such principles a condition of the Cherokee

Nation’s existence within the United States. Jd. at 67-69. This Court also held that the Federal!

Defendants have a fiduciary obligation to protect the rights of Plaintiffs and other Cherokee

Freedmen and, under the Principal Chiefs Act of 1970, are obligated to review and approve the

procedures by which the Cherokee Nation elects its principal chief. Jd. at 71-72 and n.12.

The 2007 Elections and the Freedmen Plaintiffs’ Previous Motions for

Preliminary Injunction

Following this Court’s decision on December 19, 2006, the Cherokee Nation announced

its intention to hold a special election on March 3, 2007, to decide the following ballot initiative

to amend the Cherokee constitution in order to remove the Cherokee Freedmen from the

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma:

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