WHITE EARTH BAND OF OJIBWE

Case No. AP21-0516

WHITE EARTH BAND OF OJIBWE

IN TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants,

vs.

MANOOMIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Respondents.

APPELLANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

KEITH ELLISON

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

FRANK BIBEAU, #0306460

Tribal Attorney

51124 County Road 118

Deer River, MN 56636

frankbibeau@gmail.com

COLIN P. O’DONOVAN, #0396349

OLIVER J. LARSON, #0392946

Assistant Attorneys General

JOE PLUMER #0164859

Tribal Attorney

9352 North Grace Lake Road

Bemidji, MN 56601

jplummer@paulbunyan.net

445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400

St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2131

(651) 757-1026

(651) 297-4139 (Fax)

colin.odonovan@ag.state.mn.us

oliver.larson@ag.state.mn.us

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS

i

INTRODUCTION

The respondents have moved for reconsideration of this Court’s decision (the

“Decision”) holding that the White Earth Band of Ojibwe’s tribal courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction over the claims pled here against state officials for issuing permits for an offreservation project. The respondents offer nothing that merits this Court reconsidering the

Decision.

LEGAL STANDARD

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored. Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979,

985 (8th Cir. 2006). A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to identify facts or legal

arguments that could have been raised at the time the matter was first pending, but were

not. SPV-LS, LLC v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 1106, 1111–12 (8th Cir. 2019);

Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791 F.3d 915, 923 (8th Cir. 2015).

ARGUMENT

The respondents filed two briefs in support of reconsideration, making essentially

four arguments. First, the respondents argue this Court should ignore the Montana

framework limiting when a tribal court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember, and

instead decide the issue of tribal court jurisdiction based exclusively on a reading of the

Tribal Code of Manoomin. Second, the respondents re-argue their position that the

Montana framework allows tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers for actions occurring

off-reservation if there is an on-reservation impact. Third, the respondents newly argue

that a congressional delegation of authority gives the Band’s courts jurisdiction over DNR

officials for any conduct that impacts Manoomin. Fourth, the respondents argue that newly

discovered evidence supports the Court reconsidering the Decision because the evidence

shows additional potential harms to Manoomin.

There is nothing for this Court to revisit. The respondents have still not cited a

single case in which a court has held that a tribal court can exercise jurisdiction over a

nonmember for off-reservation conduct. The respondents instead continue to cite cases

involving on-reservation conduct – often on tribal or trust lands where a different legal

regime applies – to argue the Band’s courts have off-reservation jurisdiction. The cases

that do address off-reservation conduct plainly hold that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over

nonmembers. The decision is correct, and the motion for reconsideration should be denied.

I.

TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS IS LIMITED BY FEDERAL

LAW.

The respondents argue the Band’s courts have plenary power to exercise jurisdiction

over nonmembers as a matter of inherent sovereignty. (Respondents Supplemental Br. at

4-9.) From this, they argue the Band’s courts do not need to account for federal-law

limitations on jurisdiction over nonmembers. This is plainly inconsistent with a long line

of Supreme Court cases emanating from Montana that hold that tribes generally do not

have inherent jurisdiction over nonmembers, and that federal law cabins tribal exercises of

jurisdiction over nonmembers.

Federal law, not tribal law, establishes the outer limits of when a tribal court may

exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember for conduct beyond tribal or trust lands. (Decision

at 6.) This issue was considered and resolved by the time of the Supreme Court’s decision

in National Farmers Union, if not earlier. In National Farmers Union, the Supreme Court

2

held that tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers is a matter of federal law, permitting

federal courts to determine the jurisdiction of tribal courts over nonmembers. Nat. Farmers

Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985).

Subsequent decisions have reiterated the federal-law limitation on tribal court

jurisdiction over nonmembers in unmistakable language: “whether a tribal court has

adjudicative authority over nonmembers is a federal question.” Plains Com. Bank v. Long

Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008); citing Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852;

see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (holding the argument that tribal courts

are courts of general jurisdiction is “quite wrong”); Atty’s Process & Investigation Servs.,

Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2010).

This is not a new issue in the case. The DNR explicitly briefed the issue – citing

Plains Commerce, Nat’l Farmers, and API – and argued that the limits of tribal court

jurisdiction over nonmembers is controlled by federal law. (See DNR Opening Brief on

Appeal at 12.) This Court extensively analyzed the issue, reaching the same conclusion:

That the Tribe has granted its courts authority to hear certain matters,

however, does not end the courts’ examination of subject matter jurisdiction.

The United State Supreme Court has restricted the authority of tribal courts

to hear certain cases against nonmembers, even if the Tribe would permit its

courts to hear those cases.

(Decision at 6-7.)

In their supplemental briefing, the respondents now argue that tribal courts have

inherent power to exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers for anything that impacts the

3

reservation. (Respondents’ Supplemental Br. at 4-9.) 1 From this, they argue the Band’s

courts can ignore federal law restrictions on tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers.

This is incorrect.

Even on fee lands inside a reservation, tribes and tribal courts lack plenary authority

over nonmembers, and must ground exercises of jurisdiction over nonmembers in a

Montana exception. See, e.g., Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 328. Plains Commerce

affirmed this already well-established principle of law. There, the issue was whether a

tribal court had jurisdiction to hear claims against a nonmember for discrimination and

wrongful foreclosure of fee lands. Id. at 325-26. If the respondents were correct, and tribes

have inherent authority over nonmembers, this would have been an easy decision in favor

of the tribe. It was not – precisely because the Supreme Court has long held that tribes

have no general jurisdiction over nonmembers, even for conduct on fee lands inside a

reservation. Id. at 328 (“Our cases have made clear that once tribal land is converted into

fee simple, the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction over it.”). As a result, the Plains Commerce

Court analyzed the case under the Montana exceptions and found no tribal court

jurisdiction. 2

The respondents offered no argument to the Court on this issue prior to the Decision,

despite this Court’s specific invitation for them to do so with its December 16, 2021 order

inviting written argument on five discrete issues, including: “Does the Tribe’s adoption of

a Judicial Code provision granting the Tribal Court jurisdiction to hear actions based on

alleged treaty violations override federal common law re Tribal Court jurisdiction under

Montana?”

2

In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court similarly considered the sovereign power of tribal

courts in holding that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over nonmembers to try criminal

matters. 495 U.S. 676, 681 (1990). The Duro court held that tribal sovereignty is limited,

(Footnote Continued on Next Page.)

1

4

As this Court observed in its order for supplemental reconsideration briefing, the

respondents had not previously cited any cases holding that tribal courts can ignore federal

law limits on their jurisdiction over nonmembers. With their supplemental briefing, the

respondents have newly cited a set of related cases emanating from the following language

from the Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual: 3 “Tribal authority over the activities of nonIndians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.” (Respondents Br.

at 5.) From this, the respondents argue tribal sovereignty allows tribal courts to ignore

federal law restrictions on jurisdiction. There are several problems with this argument.

First, all but one of the cases predate Plains Commerce. To the extent this line of

cases ever held that tribal courts have inherent sovereign authority over nonmembers free

of federal limits (a dubious reading of the cases), 4 that argument was expressly rejected in

Plains Commerce. Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 328; see also Duro, 495 U.S. at 681.

The one case cited by the respondents that post-dates Plains Commerce – Grand Canyon

– involved conduct on trust lands and is therefore inapposite. 715 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.

2013). The power of tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers for conduct on

tribal or trust lands is greater than on fee lands and is of no relevance to this case involving

off-reservation conduct. Grand Canyon discusses this very distinction in holding that the

and tribal court jurisdiction extends only to its members in the absence of a federal grant

of jurisdiction. Id. at 686.

3

480 U.S. 9, 11 (1985).

4

The issue in Iowa Mutual was whether diversity jurisdiction allowed a nonmember to

challenge tribal court jurisdiction in federal court before exhausting jurisdictional

arguments in tribal court. 480 U.S. at 14. The Court did not resolve the question of whether

the tribal court actually had jurisdiction, only whether it was sufficiently colorable to

require exhaustion. Id. The subsequent cases cite Iowa Mutual only in passing.

5

Montana framework did not apply precisely because the conduct was on trust lands, not

fee lands. Grand Canyon, 715 F.3d at 1205.

Second, even putting aside the trust lands/fee lands distinction, none of the new

cases cited by respondents go that one step further and support authority for tribal court

jurisdiction over off-reservation conduct free from federal limits. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at

11 (auto accident inside a reservation); Grand Canyon, 715 F.3d at 1205 (development

contract on tribal trust lands); Bruce H. Lien Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 93 F.3d 1412,

1414 (8th Cir. 1996) (contract dispute for the construction and operation of a casino on

trust lands); City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 556 (8th Cir.

1993) (regulation of liquor stores inside a reservation)5; Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian

Affs., 867 F.2d 1094, 1095 (8th Cir. 1989) (illegal garbage dumps located inside a

reservation); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 134 (1982) (oil and gas

leases on trust lands inside a reservation). Each of these cases also expressly cabins its

language as limited to on-reservation conduct. See, e.g., Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18 (“Tribal

authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of

tribal sovereignty”) (emphasis added).

In sum, no matter how far the newly cited cases might be stretched, they cannot be

stretched to hold that tribal courts have jurisdiction over nonmembers for off-reservation

conduct without regard to federal limitations. None of the cases hold that tribal courts can

City of Timber Lake also involved a federal statute expressly giving tribes authority to

regulate liquor stores located on fee lands within a reservation. 10 F.3d at 556, 18 U.S.C.

1161.

5

6

ignore the Montana framework when determining tribal court jurisdiction over

nonmembers for conduct beyond tribal or trust lands. Nor could they. The whole point of

Montana was that it established a background rule that tribes generally lack jurisdiction

over nonmembers, from which an exception must be found. Montana v. United States, 450

U.S. 544, 565 (1981). This Court was correct to analyze whether federal law permits

jurisdiction over DNR officials under the Montana framework, and it should not revisit the

issue.

II.

MONTANA DOES NOT CREATE A SOURCE OF TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION

FOR OFF-RESERVATION CONDUCT.

As a result of the respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the parties again return

to an issue already briefed and decided by this Court – does the second Montana exception

allow for tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers for their off-reservation conduct if a

party can allege an on-reservation impact. (Respondents Supplemental Br. at 9-16.) The

answer to this question is no, as the Court correctly determined after an extensive analysis.

(Decision 7-14.)

In its order for supplemental briefing, the Court directed the respondents to focus

their argument on new cases, rather than re-argue the same cases already considered.

Respondents cite four new cases, none of which supports their position.

The respondents newly cite Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210, 1223

(9th Cir. 2000) (“Bugenig I”). The first problem for the respondents on Bugenig I is that it

goes the wrong way, with the Ninth Circuit ruling against tribal court jurisdiction on the

7

Montana issue. Bugenig I, 229 F.3d at 1223. 6 The second problem is that Bugenig I

involved on-reservation conduct – logging activity on fee lands within the boundary of the

reservation near a sacred tribal site. Id. 1219-20. The respondents are thus citing a case

rejecting tribal court jurisdiction over on-reservation conduct to argue in favor of tribal

court jurisdiction for off-reservation conduct. If anything, Bugenig I supports the DNR’s

position.

The respondents newly cite Rincon Mushroom Corporation of America v. Mazzetti,

No. 09CV2330WQH-POR, 2010 WL 3768347 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2010), rev’d sub

nom. Rincon Mushroom Corp. v. Mazzetti, 490 F. App’x 11 (9th Cir. 2012). In Rincon, the

issue was whether a tribe could regulate the land uses of a parcel inside the reservation on

fee lands adjacent to its casino. Id. at *2. As with every other case the respondents have

cited, it involved the application of the second Montana exception to on-reservation

conduct, not off-reservation conduct. Id.

The respondents newly cite MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 391 F. Supp. 2d 895 (D.

Utah 2007). It is another case involving on-reservation rather than off-reservation conduct.

Id. at 918. Moreover, the respondents fail to disclose that the district court decision they

cite was then reversed, with the Tenth Circuit holding the tribal court had no jurisdiction

The Ninth’s Circuit first decision in Bugenig was reversed after an on banc rehearing –

but not on the Montana issue. Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201, 1212 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“Bugenig II”). Bugenig II held that there had been an express delegation of

congressional authority to the tribe that conferred jurisdiction. Id. This issue is discussed

in Section III below.

6

8

over any of the claims brought against nonmembers, on or off-reservation. MacArthur v.

San Juan Cnty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007).

Respondents newly cite City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir.

1996). Like the Wisconsin v. EPA case cited previously by respondents and extensively

analyzed by this Court, City of Albuquerque involves a delegation of authority to a tribe

under the Clean Water Act. 7 Id. at 423-24. As with Wisconsin v. EPA, the respondents

again seek to spin City of Albuquerque as a Montana case. It is not. As the City of

Albuquerque court explained:

Under the statutory and regulatory scheme, tribes are not applying or

enforcing their water quality standards beyond reservation

boundaries. Instead, it is the EPA which is exercising its own authority in

issuing NPDES permits in compliance with downstream state and tribal

water quality standards. In regard to this question, therefore, the 1987

amendment to the Clean Water Act clearly and unambiguously provides

tribes the authority to establish NPDES programs in conjunction with the

EPA. . . . [T]he EPA has the authority to require upstream NPDES

dischargers, such as Albuquerque, to comply with downstream tribal

standards.

Id. at 425. City of Albequerque therefore undercuts the respondents’ argument, and

reinforces this Court’s correct holding that Clean Water Act cases do not support an

The Clean Water Act authorizes the EPA to delegate its national pollutant discharge

eliminations system (NPDES) permitting authority under the Clean Water Act to the

individual states upon application, assurances that the state’s program meets the minimum

qualifications to manage the federal program, and EPA approval. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).

The U.S. Code also authorizes the EPA to treat the tribes as states under the Clean Water

Act and permits the EPA to delegate NPDES permitting authorities to the tribes provided

the tribe applies and meets the applicable requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). The EPA

has not delegated it’s NPDES authority to the White Earth Band.

https://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribes-approved-treatment-state-tas

7

9

argument for off-reservation jurisdiction under Montana. These cases are instead properly

read as an exercise of federal jurisdiction, not tribal jurisdiction.

Beyond these new cases, the respondents offer further argument on cases already

analyzed by the Court – particularly Wisconsin v. EPA, Montana v. EPA, FMC

Corporation, and API – but nothing new. None of these cases holds that tribes can exercise

jurisdiction under Montana over off-reservation activities that have an on-reservation

impact.

The DNR does not re-brief the issues here, relying on its prior briefing and three

cases in particular – Plains Commerce, Hornell Brewing and API. 8 These cases contain

clear and unambiguous holdings from the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit that Montana

and its progeny only permit tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation,

and then only if the other conditions of Montana are met. Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at

338; API, 609 F.3d at 940; Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct., 133 F.3d

1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 1998). This Court correctly decided this issue, and there is no reason

to revisit it.

III.

THE BAND DOES NOT HAVE A CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION OF

AUTHORITY OVER DNR.

In their supplemental briefing, the respondents advance an entirely new argument –

that the Band has a congressional delegation of authority to regulate the conduct of DNR

Because the respondents did not initially brief the Montana issue at all, the most relevant

briefing is in the DNR’s reply brief filed in the Eighth Circuit (where the tribal parties did

brief the issue). The DNR submitted this brief to this Court with its December 20

supplemental submission in response to the Court’s request for additional briefing on this

issue. (See DNR Eighth Circuit Reply at 4-10.)

8

10

officials if that conduct might impact the reservation. (Respondents Supplemental Br. at

17-23.) For this proposition, the respondents rely on Bugenig II – where the Ninth Circuit

held that a congressional act dividing an existing reservation among tribes, and ratifying

one tribe’s constitution and civil laws, gave that tribe the authority to regulate logging on

the reservation. 266 F.3d at 1212. The respondents allege the Band has a similar delegation

of congressional authority that permits civil jurisdiction over DNR officials for off

reservation conduct that impacts the reservation. There are at least two fatal defects in this

argument.

First, congress can only delegate jurisdiction to tribes over nonmembers for conduct

within a reservation. As Bugenig II, itself holds:

The Supreme Court has stated, repeatedly, that Congress can delegate

authority to an Indian tribe to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on nonIndian land that is within a reservation.

Id. at 1210 (emphasis added). Here, the conduct at issue is not occurring on lands within

the reservation, and no inquiry needs to be made into whether there is congressional

delegation of authority over DNR officials because congress would have no authority to

make such a delegation. Id.

Second, the Band has no delegation of congressional authority analogous to that of

the Hoopa Valley Tribe in Bugenig II. In Bugenig II, the court considered the impact of a

settlement act passed by Congress that dealt not just with allotment and compensation

issues, but also partitioned a reservation which had originally been divided among four

tribes with no grant of any particular jurisdiction to any particular tribe. Id. at 1206.

Congress therefore acted to confirm the civil jurisdiction of the Hoopa Valley Tribe in

11

various ways to a portion of the reservation that had been allocated to it. Id. at 1212.

Congress did so by explicitly affirming that the tribe’s governing documents conferring

civil jurisdiction inside the reservation were “ratified and confirmed.” Id.

The respondents argue the same language appears in the White Earth Reservation

Land Settlement Act of 1985 – giving the Band the same delegation. (Respondents

Supplemental Br. at 20.) It does not, and the language of the two settlement acts is not

analogous. The “ratified and confirmed” language of the White Earth Reservation Land

Settlement Act concerns property ownership, not civil jurisdiction. The relevant language

of the two settlement acts is as follows:

12

Language of the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act

Pub. Law 100-580, Sec. 8, 102 Stat. 2924

(emphasis added)

The existing governing documents of the Hoopa Valley Tribe and the

governing body established and elected thereunder, as heretofore

recognized by the Secretary, are hereby ratified and confirmed.

Language of the White Earth Reservation Settlement Act of 1985

Pub. Law 99-264, Sec. 5 (c), (d), 100 Stat. 61

(emphasis added)

(c) As to any allotment which was granted to an allottee who had died prior

to the selection date of the allotment, the granting of such allotment is

hereby ratified and confirmed, and shall be of the same effect as if the

allotment had been selected by the allottee before the allottee’s death:

Provided, That the White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians shall be

compensated for such allotments in the manner provided in sections 6, 7,

and 8.

(d) As to any allotment that was made under the provisions of the Treaty

of March 19, 1867 (16 Stat. 719), and which was reallotted under the

provisions of the Act of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat. 642), such reallotment

is hereby ratified and confirmed.

As a result, there is no congressional delegation of any civil jurisdiction to the Band over

nonmembers in the 1985 settlement act, let alone civil jurisdiction over state officials for

issuing off-reservation permits. Any such delegation would need to be express. Bugenig

II, 266 F.3d at 1211. There is no express delegation here. The delegation would also need

to be lawful, which it would not be if it conferred jurisdiction over nonmembers for offreservation activities. Id. at 1210, 1211. Simply put, there is not and cannot be a

13

congressional delegation of civil jurisdiction to the Band for the off-reservation actions of

state officials.

IV.

THERE IS NO NEW EVIDENCE MERITING RECONSIDERATION

In their original brief in support of their motion for reconsideration, the respondents

assert that new evidence merits reconsideration of the Decision. (Respondents Original

Br. at 9-11.) The evidence concerns aquifer breaches associated with the construction of

Line 3. This evidence does not establish a basis for reconsideration.

First, the aquifer breaches were not allowed or allowable under any DNR permit.

The appropriation permit DNR issued for the Line 3 replacement project was for

construction/trench dewatering. 9 It does not cover or allow breaches of aquifers, which is

why DNR is now taking enforcement actions for the breaches. 10 Simply put, there is no

DNR permit or conduct to challenge with respect to the aquifer breaches.

Second, as with everything else in this case, the new evidence concerns the offreservation actions or inactions of DNR. The respondents’ efforts to muster more evidence

of things happening off-reservation doesn’t strengthen their argument for tribal court

jurisdiction because, as this Court correctly held, the Band’s courts do not have jurisdiction

over off-reservation conduct of nonmembers.

Relatedly, the respondents expend considerable effort in both reconsideration briefs

arguing that this Court ignored their allegations of on-reservation impacts. (Respondents

https://files.dnr.state.mn.us/features/line3/decisions/04june2021-update-trench-wateringdecisions.pdf.

10

https://files.dnr.state.mn.us/features/line3/restoration-order-enbridge-energy-9-1621.pdf

9

14

Opening Br. at 2, 6-9; Respondents Supplemental Br. at 1-2, 7-8, 13-14.) Neither the Court

nor the DNR ignored these allegations. In truth, the respondents did not plead onreservation impacts. As this Court recognized, the complaint instead pled impacts on the

Mississippi watershed and wild rice beds in the ceded territories. (See Compl. ¶¶ 50-51;

Decision at 8-9.) But for purposes of the appeal, the DNR did not argue the case should

be dismissed because the respondents failed to plead on-reservation impacts. DNR argued

that the case should be dismissed because the challenged conduct occurred off-reservation,

and did not confer jurisdiction on the Band’s courts even if there was an on-reservation

impact. The Court clearly understood the issue in the same way, and referenced the

respondents’ submissions in their motion papers and appellate papers of on-reservation

impacts (even if not technically supported by their complaint). (Decision at 8-9.) The

Court then resolved the jurisdictional issue by holding that Montana requires onreservation conduct, not just on-reservation impacts. (Id. at 14.) The new evidence does

not change the pertinent facts of the case.

V.

IF THE COURT REVERSES ITS DECISION ON THE MONTANA ISSUE, IT MUST

THEN TAKE UP THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

As the Court will recall, the DNR made an independent argument for dismissal of

this matter based on sovereign immunity to suit in tribal courts. (Decision at 16.) Having

decided that the Band’s courts lacked jurisdiction under the Montana framework, the Court

declined to decide this issue. (Id.) If the Court were to overturn its holding on Montana,

it would then need to resolve the DNR’s sovereign immunity challenge before it could

remand. DNR relies on its prior briefing on this issue.

15

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should deny respondents’ motion for

reconsideration.

Dated: April 20, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

KEITH ELLISON

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

/s/ Oliver J. Larson

OLIVER J. LARSON (No. 0392946)

COLIN P. O’DONOVAN (No. 0396349)

Assistants Attorney General

445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400

St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2131

(651) 757-1026 (Voice)

(651) 297-4139 (Fax)

oliver.larson@ag.state.mn.us

colin.odonovan@ag.state.mn.us

ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS

16