United States v. AT&T Corp. and Tele-Communications, Inc.; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

Federal RegisterJan 14, 1999

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

United States v. AT&T Corp. and Tele-Communications, Inc.;

Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and

Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16 (b) through (h), that a proposed Final

Judgment, Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed

with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in

United States v. AT&T Corporation and Tele-Communications, Inc., Civil

No. 1:98CV03170.

On December 30, 1998, the United States filed a Complaint alleging

that the proposed acquisition by AT&T Corporation of Tele-

Communications, Inc. would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15

U.S.C. 18. The Complaint alleges that AT&T is the largest provider of

mobile wireless telephone services in the United States, and that Tele-

Communications, Inc. owns a 23.5 percent equity interest in the mobile

wireless telephone business of Sprint Corporation. The Complaint

further alleges that if consummated, the acquisition may substantially

lessen competition in the provision of mobile wireless telephone

services in many geographic areas throughout the United States. The

proposed Final Judgment, filed at the same time as the Complaint,

requires AT&T Corporation to divest its interest in the mobile wireless

telephone business of Sprint Corporation.

Public comment is invited within the statutory 60-day comment

period. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the

Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed

to Donald J. Russell, Chief, Telecommunications Task Force, Antitrust

Division, Department of Justice, 1401 H St., NW, Suite 8000,

Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: (202) 514-5621).

Copies of the Complaint, Stipulation, proposed Final Judgment, and

Competitive Impact Statement are available for inspection in Room 215

of the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 7th

St., NW, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone (202) 514-2841) and at the

Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained upon

request and payment of a copying fee.

Constance K. Robinson,

Director of Operations and Merger Enforcement, Antitrust Division.

Stipulation

It is stipulated by and between the undersigned parties, by their

respective attorneys, that:

A. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this

action and over each of the parties hereto, and venue of this action is

proper in the District for the District of Columbia.

B. The parties to this Stipulation consent that a Final Judgment in

the form attached may be filed and entered by the Court, upon the

motion of any party or the Court's own motion, at any time after

compliance with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and

Penalties Act (15 U.S.C. 16), without further notice to any party or

other proceedings, provided that plaintiff has not withdrawn its

consent, which it may do at any time before entry of the proposed Final

Judgment by serving notice on the defendants and by filing that notice

with the Court.

C. Defendants shall abide by and comply with the provisions of the

proposed Final Judgment pending entry of the Final Judgment, and shall,

from the date of the filing of this Stipulation, comply with all the

terms and provisions of the proposed Final Judgment as though the same

were in full force and effect as an order of the Court.

D. In the event plaintiff withdraws its consent, as provided in

paragraph (B) above, or if the proposed Final Judgment is not entered

pursuant to this Stipulation, this Stipulation shall be of no effect

whatever, and the making of this Stipulation shall be without prejudice

to any party in this or any other proceeding.

For the Plaintiff:

A. Douglas Melamed,

Acting Assistant Attorney General.

Constance K. Robinson,

Director of Operations and Merger Enforcement.

Deborah A. Roy,

Attorney, Telecommunications Task Force.

Donald J. Russell,

Chief, Telecommunications Task Force.

Peter A. Gray,

Attorney, Telecommunications Task Force.

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H Street, NW.,

Suite 8000, Washington, DC 20530, (202) 514-5636.

Dated: December 30, 1998.

[[Page 2507]]

For the Defendants:

Mark C. Rosenblum,

Vice President-Law, AT&T Corp., 295 North Maple Avenue, Room 3244J1,

Basking Ridge, New Jersey 07920.

Dated: December 28, 1998.

Kathy Fenton,

Counsel for Tele-Communications, Inc., Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue,

Suite 700, 1450 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20005.

Dated: December 28, 1998.

Final Judgment

WHEREAS, plaintiff, the United States of America, having filed its

Complaint herein on December 30, 1998, and plaintiff and defendants, by

their respective attorneys, having consented to the entry of this Final

Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law

herein, and without this Final Judgment constituting any evidence

against or an admission by any party with respect to any issue of law

or fact herein;

And whereas, defendants have agreed to be bound by the provisions

of this Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;

And whereas, the essence of this Final Judgment is certain

divestiture of specific assets and the imposition of related injunctive

relief to ensure that competition is not substantially lessened;

And whereas, plaintiff requires Liberty Media Corporation to make

certain divestitures for the purpose of preventing a lessening of

competition alleged in the Complaint;

And whereas, defendants have represented to plaintiff that the

divestiture ordered herein can and will be made and that defendants

will later raise no claims of hardship or difficulty as grounds for

asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture provisions contained

herein;

And, therefore, before the taking of any testimony, and without

trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon

consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and

decreed as follows:

I. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over each of the parties hereto and the

subject matter of this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which

relief may be granted against the defendants under section 7 of the

Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 18).

II. Definitions

As used in this Final Judgment:

A. ``TCI'' means defendant Tele-Communications, Inc., a Delaware

corporation with its headquarters in Englewood, Colorado and includes

its successors and assigns, its subsidiaries, and the directors,

officers, managers, agents and employees acting for or on behalf of

TCI, except for Liberty, its successors and assigns, its subsidiaries,

and the directors, officers, managers, agents and employees acting for

or on behalf of Liberty.

B. ``Liberty'' means Liberty Media Corporation, a Delaware

corporation, as well as the assets, liabilities and businesses

attributed to the Liberty Media Group (as defined in the AT&T/TCI

Merger Agreement) and its successors and assigns, its subsidiaries and

the directors, officers, managers, agents and employees acting for or

on behalf of Liberty.

C. ``Liberty Media Tracking Shares'' means the classes of common

stock to be issued by AT&T, referred to as ``Liberty Media Tracking

Shares'' in the AT&T/TCI Merger Agreement, and any shares of stock

issued in respect of any of the foregoing (including by way of

conversion, redemption, reclassification, distribution, merger,

combination, or other similar event).

D. ``AT&T'' means defendant AT&T Corp., a New York corporation with

its headquarters in New York, New York and includes all of its

successors and assigns, its subsidiaries, and the directors, officers,

managers, agents and employees acting for or on behalf of AT&T, except

for Liberty, its successors and assigns, its subsidiaries, and the

directors, officers, managers, agents and employees acting for or on

behalf of Liberty.

E. ``AT&T/TCI Merger Agreement'' means the Agreement and Plan of

Merger dated as of June 23, 1998, as produced to plaintiff on July 23,

1998, with respect to the AT&T/TCI Merger.

F. ``AT&T/TCI Merger'' means the merger of TCI with a subsidiary of

AT&T, as contemplated by the AT&T/TCI Merger Agreement.

G. ``AT&T Stock'' means all classes of common stock issued by AT&T,

except for Liberty Media Tracking Shares.

H. ``Sprint PCS Tracking Stock'' means, collectively, (i) the PCS

Common Stock, Series 1, (ii) the PCS Common Stock, Series 2, (iii) the

PCS Common Stock, Series 3, (iv) the shares of Sprint PCS Tracking

Stock issuable in respect of Sprint's outstanding shares of Class A

Common Stock, (v) the shares of Sprint PCS Tracking Stock issuable in

respect of any ``inter-group interest'' of the ``Sprint FON Group'' in

the ``Sprint PCS Group,'' (vi) the shares of Sprint's Series 7

Preferred Stock and warrants to purchase shares of Sprint PCS Tracking

Stock issued to TCI, Comcast Corporation (``Comcast'') and Cox

Communications, Inc. (``Cox'') in connection with the Sprint PCS

Restructuring (and the shares of Sprint PCS Tracking Stock issuable

upon any exercise or conversion thereof), (vii) any other options,

warrants or convertible securities exercisable for or convertible into

any shares of Sprint PCS Tracking Stock, and (viii) any shares of

capital stock Sprint issued in respect of any of the foregoing

(including by way of conversion, redemption, reclassification,

distribution, merger, combination, or other similar event).

I. ``Liberty's Sprint Holdings'' means the Sprint PCS Tracking

Stock acquired by TCI Ventures Group LLC and its subsidiaries in the

Sprint PCS Restructuring and in which Liberty will have a beneficial

interest after the closing of the AT&T/TCI Merger.

J. ``Sprint PCS Restructuring'' means that series of transactions

that occurred simultaneously on November 23, 1998 in which Sprint

Corporation (``Sprint'') acquired through a number of mergers all of

the outstanding partnership interests in a number of partnerships

collectively holding all of the assets and businesses known as ``Sprint

PCS'' held by affiliates of TCI, Cox, and Comcast.

K. ``Private sale'' means any sale except for sales made through

the public market.

III. Applicability

The provisions of this Final Judgment apply to each of the

defendants, its successors and assigns, its subsidiaries, directors,

officers, managers, agents, employees and all other persons in active

concert or participation with any of them who shall have received

actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise,

and with respect to Sections IV, V and VI of this Final Judgment, to

the trustee and his or her successors.

IV. Creation of a Trust

A. TCI is hereby ordered and directed, prior to closing of the

AT&T/TCI Merger, to assign and transfer Liberty's Sprint Holdings to a

trustee for the purpose of accomplishing a divestiture of such holdings

in accordance with the terms of this Final Judgment. The trust

agreement shall be in a form approved by the plaintiff, and its terms

shall be consistent with the terms of this Final Judgment. Defendants

shall submit a form of trust agreement to the plaintiff, who shall

communicate to defendants within ten (10) business days its approval or

disapproval of that form. The trustee shall agree to be bound by this

Final Judgment.

[[Page 2508]]

B. Prior to the closing of the AT&T/TCI Merger, TCI shall submit

the name of its nominee for trustee to the plaintiff, who within ten

(10) business days shall (i) approve the nominee as trustee, or (ii)

request additional names until a nominee for trustee proposed by

Liberty is approved by the plaintiff, with plaintiff reaching a

decision on each nominee within ten (10) business days. The trustee

shall not be a director, officer, manager, agent or employee of AT&T or

Liberty. Defendants shall not consummate the Merger until such time as

the trustee and the trust agreement have been approved by plaintiff,

and the Liberty Sprint Holdings have been transferred to the trust.

V. Divestiture of Sprint PCS Interest

A. The trustee is hereby ordered and directed, in accordance with

the terms of this Final Judgment, on or before May 23, 2002, to divest

that portion of Liberty's Sprint Holdings sufficient to cause Liberty

to own no more than 10% of the outstanding shares of Sprint PCS

Tracking Stock. On or before May 23, 2004, the trustee shall divest the

remainder of Liberty's Sprint Holdings. The number of outstanding

shares of Sprint PCS Tracking Stock for such purposes shall be

calculated on a share of Series 1 PCS Stock equivalent basis assuming

the issuance of all shares of Series 1 PCS Stock ultimately issuable in

respect of the applicable Sprint PCS Tracking Stock upon the exercise,

conversion or other issuance thereof in accordance with the terms of

such securities. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, if a

motion to terminate this Final Judgment in which plaintiff has joined

has been filed, and is pending before the Court, the trustee shall not

proceed with the divestitures provided by this paragraph until the

motion to terminate the Final Judgment has been decided by the Court.

B. After Liberty's Sprint Holdings have been transferred to the

trustee, only the trustee shall have the right to sell Liberty's Sprint

Holdings. The trustee shall have the power and authority to accomplish

the divestiture only in a manner reasonably calculated to maximize the

value of Liberty's Sprint Holdings to the holders of the Liberty Media

Tracking Shares, without regard to any costs or benefits to AT&T

(including any costs or benefits of such divestiture to AT&T that may

be directly or indirectly transferred to the holders of the Liberty

Media Tracking Shares.) However, the trustee may in accomplishing the

divestiture, take into account income or gain tax costs or benefits for

AT&T that flow to the holders of the Liberty Media Tracking Shares. The

trustee shall have the powers provided by the trust agreement and such

other powers as the Court shall deem appropriate.

C. All decisions regarding the divestiture, in whole or in part, of

Liberty's Sprint Holdings shall be made by the trustee without

discussion or consultation with AT&T, with any of the Class A Directors

of Liberty, or with any other officer, director or shareholder of

Liberty who individually owns more that 0.10% of the outstanding shares

of AT&T Stock. The trustee shall consult with the Board of Directors of

Liberty, but the Class A Directors of Liberty and any director,

officer, or shareholders of Liberty who owns more than 0.10% of the

outstanding shares of AT&T Stock shall not participate in such

consultation. The decision to divest part or all of the Liberty Sprint

Holdings shall be made by the trustee in his or her sole discretion,

except as provided for in Section V.D. of this Final Judgment. Liberty

shall not take any action to block a sale by the trustee, on any

grounds other than the trustee's malfeasance as defined in the trust

agreement. Where the trustee intends to effect a private sale of part

or all of Liberty's Sprint Holdings, the trustee shall notify Liberty

and plaintiff of that intention. Any objection by Liberty, based on the

trustee's malfeasance, must be made within ten (10) business days of

notice from the trustee of an intention to make a private sale. Subject

to Section V.G. of this Final Judgment, the trustee shall have the

power and authority to hire at the cost and expense of Liberty any

investment bankers, attorneys, or other agents reasonably necessary in

the judgment of the trustee to assist in the divestiture, and such

professionals or agents shall be solely accountable to the trustee.

D. The trustee shall not divest part or all of Liberty's Sprint

Holdings in a private sale without a premerger notification form having

been filed pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act

of 1976 or, if the private sale is not reportable under the Hart-Scott-

Rodina Act, without obtaining the prior written consent of the

plaintiff, which shall be granted or denied within thirty (30) calendar

days of the request for such consent.

E. Defendants shall not provide financing in connection with the

divestiture to the purchaser of any of Liberty's Sprint Holdings

required to be divested by this Final Judgment.

F. Except as provided for in Section V.C. of this Final Judgment,

defendants shall take no action to influence, interfere with or impede

the trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture of Liberty's Sprint

Holdings and Liberty shall, if requested by the trustee, use its best

efforts to assist the trustee in accomplishing the required

divestiture, provided that Liberty is not required to take any action

with respect to any of Liberty's non-Sprint PCS asset or businesses.

Subject to a customary confidentiality agreement, the trustee shall

have full and complete access to the defendants' personnel, books,

records, and facilities related to Liberty's Sprint Holdings. Subject

to a customary confidentiality agreement, the trustee shall permit

prospective purchasers of part or all of Liberty's Sprint Holdings in a

private sale to have access to any and all financial or operational

information to which the trustee has access, as may be relevant to the

divestiture required by this Final Judgment.

G. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of Liberty and

shall account for all monies derived from the sale of the assets sold

by the trustee and all costs and expenses so incurred. The compensation

of the trustee and of any professionals and agents retained by the

trustee shall be reasonable in light of value of the Liberty Sprint

Holdings and based on a fee arrangement set forth in the trust

agreement.

VI. Liberty Governance and Economic Interest

Until the divestitures required by the Final Judgment have been

accomplished:

A. Any economic interest arising in connection with Liberty's

Sprint Holdings, without limitation, and including but not limited to

any interest or dividends earned or net proceeds received upon the

disposition of Liberty's Sprint Holdings, shall be for the sole and

exclusive benefit of the holders of the Liberty Media Tracking Shares.

AT&T shall not engage in any transaction that transfers either directly

or indirectly the benefits of Liberty's Sprint Holdings to any other

class of AT&T shareholders or to AT&T. AT&T shall adhere to the Policy

Statement Regarding Liberty Tracking Stock Matters contained in Exhibit

D to the AT&T/TCI Merger Agreement.

B. TCI shall, on or before the consummation of the merger, (i)

amend and restate the certificate of incorporation and bylaws of

Liberty to be in substantially the form set forth in Schedule 2.1(c)(i)

of the AT&T/TCI Merger Agreement and (ii) appoint all of the Class B

Directors and the Class C Directors (as such terms are defined in

Schedule 2.1(c)(i) to the AT&T/TCI

[[Page 2509]]

Merger Agreement) of Liberty Media Corporation.

C. AT&T shall, on or before the consummation of the AT&T/TCI Merger

or promptly thereafter, form a Capital Stock Committee as described in

the Bylaw Amendment for the Capital Stock Committee set out in Exhibit

D of the AT&T/TCI Merger Agreement and agree to have the Capital Stock

Committee have the responsibilities described in Exhibit D of the AT&T/

TCI Merger Agreement.

D. The trustee shall be instructed not to vote Liberty's Sprint

Holdings for so long as they are held in the trust.

E. Liberty shall not purchase additional shares of Sprint PCS

Tracking Stock (other than in connection with the exercise of warrants

to purchase such shares or the conversion of shares of Series 7

Preferred Stock acquired in the Sprint PCS Restructuring) without the

prior written consent of the plaintiff, which shall act on any request

for such consent within thirty (30) calendar days.

F. Liberty shall not hold or acquire any interest, direct or

indirect, in AT&T's mobile wireless operations without a premerger

notification form having been filed pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino

Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, or if the acquisition is not

reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, without obtaining the prior

written consent of the plaintiff, which shall be granted or denied

within thirty (30) calendar days of the request for such consent. This

paragraph shall not apply to any cumulative holding or acquisition by

Liberty of 1.0% or less of the outstanding shares of AT&T Stock

indirectly through the acquisition of an interest in a third party,

with such percentage to be calculated by multiplying the percentage

interest owned by Liberty in such third party by the third party's

interest in AT&T Stock (and such third party's interest being

determined in the same manner, if also held indirectly).

VII. Compliance Inspection

For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with the

Final Judgment and subject to any legally recognized privilege, from

time to time:

A. Duly authorized representatives of the plaintiff, upon written

request of the Attorney General or of the Assistant Attorney General in

charge of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to

defendants made to their principal offices, shall be permitted:

(1) Access during office hours of defendants to inspect and copy

all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other

records and documents in the possession or under the control of

defendants, who may have counsel present, relating to matters contained

in this Final Judgment; and

(2) Subject to the reasonable convenience of defendants and without

restraint or interference from them, to interview, either informally or

on the record, officers, employers, and agents of defendants, who may

have counsel present, regarding any such matters.

B. Upon the written request of the Attorney General or of the

Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, made to

defendants' principal offices, defendants shall submit such written

reports, under oath if requested, with respect to any matter contained

in this Final Judgment.

C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in

this Section VII shall be divulged by a representative of the plaintiff

to any person other than a duly authorized representative of the

Executive Branch of the United States, except in the course of legal

proceedings to which the United States is a party (including grand jury

proceedings), or for the purpose of securing compliance with this Final

Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.

D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by

defendants to plaintiff, defendants represent and identify in writing

the material in any such information or documents to which a claim of

protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and defendants mark each pertinent page of such

material ``Subject to claim to protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then ten (10) calendar days notice

shall be given by plaintiff to defendants prior to divulging such

material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding).

VIII. Reporting Requirement

Until the divestitures have been accomplished as provided for in

Section V. of this Final Judgment, the trustee shall file a report

every six months with the plaintiff, commencing on November 1, 1999,

setting forth the efforts to accomplish the divestitures required by

this Final Judgment.

IX. Retention of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is retained by this Court for the purpose of enabling

any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any

time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or

appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Final

Judgment, for the modification of any of the provisions hereof, for the

enforcement of compliance herewith, and for the punishment of any

violations hereof.

X. Termination

This Final Judgment will expire upon the tenth anniversary of its

entry.

XI. Public Interest

Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

Dated:-----------------------------------------------------------------

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United States District Judge

Competitive Impact Statement

The United States, pursuant to section 2(b) of the Antitrust

Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h) (``APPA''), files

this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the proposed Final

Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding

The United States filed a civil antitrust complaint on December 30,

1998, alleging that the proposed merger of Tele-Communications Inc.

(``TCI'') with a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T Corporation (``AT&T'')

would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. Among its

other telecommunications businesses, AT&T is the largest provider of

mobile wireless telephone services in the nation. TCI, through a wholly

owned subsidiary, holds a 23.5% equity interest in the mobile wireless

telephone business of Sprint Corporation (``Sprint'') another large

provider of mobile wireless telephone services through its personal

communications services (``PCS'') subsidiary, Sprint PCS.\1\ The

complaint alleges that AT&T's acquisition of this

[[Page 2510]]

interest in one of its principal competitors may substantially lessen

competition in the sale of mobile wireless telephone services. The

prayer for relief seeks a judgment that the proposed acquisition would

violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, a 15 U.S.C. 18, and a preliminary

and permanent injunction preventing AT&T and TCI from carrying out the

proposed merger.

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\1\ When the proposed merger with AT&T was announced, TCI

(through a subsidiary) owned 23.5% of Sprint Spectrum Holdings, Co.,

L.P. as a general partner. This partnership was restructured on

November 23, 1998, through transactions in which TCI and the other

cable partners (Cox Communications, Inc. and Comcast Corporation)

received Series 2 (Sprint) PCS tracking stock in exchange for their

partnership interests. In relinquishing their governance rights as

partners, the cable partners, including TCI, received the right to

liquidate their interests over the next few years. Their Sprint PCS

tracking stock has full voting power on issues relating to changing

the number or nature of the PCS stock, spinoffs or acquisition of

the PCS business. On all other issues TCI's shares (and those of the

other two cable partners) have only one-tenth (\1/10\) the voting

rights that shareholders of other classes of Sprint PCS stock enjoy.

The restructuring contemplates that the Sprint Corporation Board of

Directors will manage Sprint's PCS business, with TCI and the other

cable company owners of the Sprint PCS tracking stock playing a

passive or lesser role, due to their minimal voting powers on

matters relating to those issues. Sprint owns 53% of the voting

power and equity of Sprint PCS.

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Shortly before this complaint was filed, the Department and the

defendants reached agreement on the terms of a proposed consent decree,

which requires the complete divestiture of the interest in Sprint PCS

now owned by TCI. The proposed consent decree also contains provisions,

explained below, designed to minimize any risk of competitive harm that

otherwise might arise pending completion of the divestiture. In light

of this agreement, the Department concluded that there was no

competition-based reason to seek to prohibit AT&T's merger with TCI. A

Stipulation and proposed Final Judgment embodying the settlement were

filed simultaneously with the complaint.

The United States and the defendants have stipulated that the

proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16 (``APPA''). Entry

of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that

the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the

provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations

thereof.

II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation

A. The Defendants and the Proposed Transaction

Defendant AT&T is a New York corporation with headquarters in New

York, New York. AT&T is a provider of a wide range of

telecommunications services internationally and in the United States.

Among other things, it is the largest provider of long distance

telecommunications services in the United States, as well as the

largest provider of mobile wireless telephone services. In 1998, AT&T's

mobile wireless operations reported total revenues of approximately $5

billion.

TCI is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Englewood,

Colorado. TCI is the second largest cable system operator in the

nation. At the time of the proposed merger closing, TCI, through its

wholly owned subsidiary, Liberty Media Corporation, will own a partial

interest in Sprint PCS, one of the principal competitors to AT&T's

mobile wireless telephone business in a large number of markets

throughout the country. In 1998, Sprint`s PCS revenues totaled

approximately $975 million.

On June 24, 1998, AT&T and TCI entered into an agreement pursuant

to which TCI will merge with a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T in a $48

billion transaction. Through this transaction, AT&T will acquire TCI's

cable television operations, TCI's shares of the Internet Service

Provider @Home and of Teleport Communications Group, and assume $11

billion of TCI debt. A variety of other assets now owned by

subsidiaries of TCI, including the Sprint PCS holdings, will be

transferred to Liberty Media Corp. (``Liberty'').\2\ Liberty will be a

wholly-owned subsidiary of AT&T Corp. Although the shares of Liberty

will be entirely owned by AT&T, the Class B and Class C directors of

Liberty, who will hold two-thirds (\2/3\) of the seats on the board of

directors, will be appointed prior to the merger with AT&T by the

current (TCI) Liberty media shareholders. These directors may be

removed only for cause for a defined period of time.\3\ AT&T will issue

a separate class of stock, Liberty Media Tracking Stock, the

performance of which will reflect the assets held and businesses

conducted by Liberty.\4\

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\2\ TCI, at the time of the merger announcement, was organized

into three groups, the TCI Cable Group, the TCI Ventures Group, and

the Liberty Media Group, each group having its own TCI tracking

stock reflecting the assets owned by different sets of TCI

subsidiaries. TCI is reorganizing so that before the merger closes,

all of the TCI Cable Group and some of the TCI Ventures assets will

be in the TCI Cable Group, to be managed post-merger by AT&T's Board

of Directors. The remainder of TCI Ventures, including TCI's

international cable plant holdings, a joint satellite venture with

news Corporation Limited, an educational and training company,

partial ownership of two technology companies, and the shares of

Sprint PCS stock now held by TCI Wireline, Inc., will be merged with

the cable programming assets of Liberty Media, into Liberty Media

Corporation, a Delaware Corporation and subsidiary of TCI. Upon

consummation of the merger, each share of the Liberty Media Group

tracking stock issued by TCI can be exchanged for one share of

Liberty Media Tracking stock to be issued by AT&T.

\3\ See Schedule 2.1(c)(i) of the AT&T/TCI Merger Agreement,

dated June 23, 1998.

\4\ See Exhibit D of the AT&T/TCI Merger Agreement, dated June

23, 1998.

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B. Mobile Wireless Telephone Services

The complaint alleges that the proposed merger may substantially

lessen competition in the provision of mobile wireless telephone

services in a number of cities throughout the United States.

Mobile wireless telephone services permit users to make and receive

telephone calls, using radio transmissions, while traveling by car or

by other means. The mobility afforded by these services is a valuable

feature to consumers. In order to provide this capability, wireless

carriers must deploy an extensive network of switches and radio

transmitters and receivers. Prior to 1995, mobile wireless telephone

services were provided primarily by two licensed cellular carriers in

each geographic area. AT&T owned cellular licenses in a large number of

areas throughout the country. In 1995, the Federal Communications

Commissions (``FCC'') allocated (and subsequently issued licenses for)

additional spectrum for PCS providers, which include mobile wireless

telephone services comparable to those offered by cellular carriers. In

addition, in 1996 Nextel Communications, Inc. (``Nextel'') began to

offer mobile wireless telephone services comparable to that offered by

cellular and PCS carriers, bundled with dispatch services, using

spectrum that had been allocated for the provision of specialized

mobile radio (``SMR'') services.

In most major metropolitan markets today, there are two cellular

license holders, each of which is authorized to use 25 MHZ of spectrum,

up to three PCS licensees each authorized to use 30 MHZ of spectrum, up

to three PCS licensees each authorized to use 10 MHZ of spectrum, and

one carrier, Nextel, that uses SMR spectrum. There is substantial

variation among different geographic areas, however, in terms of the

number of independent firms that are currently offering mobile wireless

telephone services, the time frame in which additional firms are

expected to enter the market using the PCS licenses described above,

and the scope of geographic coverage that the various carriers can

offer, in light of the fact that their networks have not yet been fully

built. Most of the relevant geographic markets have between four and

six carriers providing mobile wireless telephone services for consumers

and business, including the two incumbent cellular providers and

Nextel. The emergence of PCS providers has generally resulted in lower

rates and/or higher quality services in those areas in which they have

constructed their networks. Measured by current subscribers and

revenues, however, the two cellular carriers still control a large

share of the market, with a collective share of 80% or more in many

markets.

There is significant differentiation among the mobile wireless

telephone services offered by different carriers. Carriers use a

variety of different technologies, offer a variety of service and

pricing plans, and offer a variety of product bundles which combine

[[Page 2511]]

wireless telephone service with other services (such as paging and

messaging services) and/or with a variety of wireless telephone

handsets. For a significant segment of customers, the services offered

by AT&T and Sprint PCS appear to be particularly close substitutes. In

contrast to other mobile wireless telephone service providers that

offer services only on a local or regional basis on their own

facilities, both AT&T and Sprint PCS have licenses and facilities in

most large metropolitan areas and in many smaller metropolitan areas

throughout the country. In addition, AT&T and Sprint are two of the

largest providers of long distance telecommunications, as well as a

wide range of other telecommunications services, and therefore have a

high degree of brand recognition. For customers who travel frequently,

and therefore use their mobile phones frequently outside their home

metropolitan areas, the broad geographic coverage provided by AT&T and

Sprint is an important competitive advantage. Customers of other

wireless carriers which have local or regional networks may be able to

place and receive calls outside of their ``home'' areas, but when they

do so, they typically incur significant ``roaming'' charges assessed by

the carrier whose wireless network is being used. Both AT&T and Sprint

have attempted to exploit this advantage by, among other things,

offering a single-rate national plan.\5\

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\5\ ``Single Rate'' refers to plans that involve a flat per

minute usage charge, regardless of the location at which the call

originates or terminates. These plans usually require the purchase

of a minimum number of minutes per month.

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C. Anticompetitive Consequences of the Proposed Merger

The complaint alleges that AT&T's proposed merger with TCI, which

would result in AT&T's acquisition of TCI's interest in Sprint PCS, may

substantially lessen competition in the provision of mobile wireless

telephone services in the metropolitan areas of New York City; Los

Angeles; Dallas-Fort Worth; San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose; Miami-Ft.

Lauderdale; Minneapolis-St. Paul; Seattle; Pittsburgh; Denver;

Portland, OR; Sacramento; Salt Lake City; Las Vegas; and at least 18

other metropolitan markets. In each of these markets, AT&T is one of

two licensed cellular service providers, and Sprint PCS provides mobile

wireless telephone services pursuant to a PCS license. AT&T is the

largest or second largest provider of mobile wireless telephone

services in these markets, which are highly concentrated.\6\

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\6\ The Department of Justice utilizes the Herfindahl-Hirschman

Index (``HHI'') as a measure of market concentration. The HHI is

calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of every firm

in the relevant market. A market with an HHI level greater than

1,800 is considered highly concentrated. Department of Justice

Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines Sec. 1.5

(April 2, 1992, revised April 8, 1997). Here, most if not all of the

relevant markets have pre-merger HHIs well over 2500.

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The proposed merger may affect the incentives that govern AT&T's

competitive behavior (relating to either pricing or service quality) in

these markets. When a firm makes pricing decisions (or decisions on

potential investments to improve service quality) it weighs two effects

that its decision may produce. A higher price (or reduced investment in

service quality) will generate greater revenues from those customers

who continue to purchase services from the firm. But a higher price (or

reduced service quality) also is likely to cause some portion of

current or potential new customers to purchase services from a

competitor, thereby reducing the firm's revenues. Weighing these two

countervailing factors, firms attempt to choose the price (or service

quality) level that will maximize their profits.

A firm that acquires a full or partial equity interest in a

competitor--as AT&T proposes to do here--will face a different

calculation of its profit-maximizing price (or service quality) after

such an acquisition. After the acquisition, some portion of the

customers who would turn to a competitor in response to a price

increase (or decline in service quality) would likely purchase services

from the firm being acquired; thus, the revenue generated by those

customers' purchases will continue to be earned indirectly (through the

competitor that has been acquired) by the firm raising its price (or

lowering its service quality). Thus an acquisition can cause an

individual firm, acting unilaterally, to raise its price more than it

would have otherwise (or invest less in service quality than it would

have otherwise) because its profit-maximizing price will be higher (or

service quality lower) as a result of the acquisition. These adverse

effects are greater to the extent that the service offered by the

acquired firm is a particularly close substitute for the service

offered by the acquiring firm. Under those conditions, a larger share

of the customers who switch service providers as a result of a price

increase (or reduction in quality) will switch to the acquired firm.\7\

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\7\ Another factor that affects the magnitude of the potential

price effects is the size of the equity interest that has been

acquired. If a 100% equity interest has been acquired, the acquiring

firm will recapture 100% of the revenue earned by the acquired firm

from customers who switch as a result of the price increase. If a

20% equity interest has been acquired, only 20% of that revenue

would be recaptured. Thus, all other things equal, acquisition of a

larger equity interest in the acquired firm will generate larger

adverse price effects than would the acquisition of a smaller

interest.

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In light of the high level of concentration in mobile wireless

telephone services markets, and the fact that AT&T and Sprint PCS

services appear to be close substitutes for one another for a

significant segment of customers, the Department was concerned that the

acquisition of a substantial portion of the equity of Sprint PCS by

AT&T could reduce AT&T's incentive to compete aggressively in those

areas in which Sprint PCS is a significant rival and thereby lead to

higher prices or reduced service quality for mobile wireless telephone

services.\8\

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\8\ Acquisitions of shares with significant voting rights may

raise additional competitive concerns, beyond those described here

in connection with acquisitions of equity interests. An acquisition

of voting rights may allow the acquiring firm to exert control or

influence over the competitive behavior of the acquired firm in ways

that reduce competition. These concerns are not present in this

case. Sprint will retain a majority of the voting power (53%) of the

Sprint PCS shares and the voting rights conferred by TCI's Sprint

PCS investment are insignificant. Furthermore, Section VI.D. of the

proposed Final Judgment will prohibit the trustee from even voting

those shares during the pre-divestiture period. The Department also

considered whether the proposed acquisition would distort the

incentives of Sprint PCS to compete in this market and concluded

that this was not a significant risk. The defendants will be under a

court order to divest the Sprint PCS stock. Thus, there is no

prospect that AT&T will ultimately control Sprint PCS and no reason

to believe that Sprint PCS's incentives to compete with AT&T during

the pre-divestiture period will be diminished.

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It appears unlikely that, in the immediate future, entry into the

relevant markets will be sufficient to mitigate this competitive harm.

For at least the next two years, the only potential entrants will be

firms using the spectrum already allocated for PCS by the FCC. While

the FCC may eventually allocate additional spectrum which could be used

to provide mobile wireless telephone services, it is unlikely that such

spectrum could be allocated and licensed, and that licensees could

construct their networks and begin offering service, within the next

two years. Additional entry within the next two years may come from

firms using the spectrum that the FCC has already allocated for PCS.

However, in

[[Page 2512]]

that time frame, it appears unlikely that a firm could acquire a

sufficient number of PCS licenses and construct its networks so as to

be able to offer geographic coverage comparable to AT&T's and Sprint

PCS's nearly nationwide footprint.

For these reasons, the Department concluded that the merger as

proposed may substantially lessen competition, in violation of section

7 of the Clayton Act, in the provision of mobile wireless telephone

services in those markets where AT&T is one of two cellular licensees

and where Sprint PCS also provides mobile wireless telephone

services.\9\

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\9\ AT&T also offers mobile wireless telephone services in other

geographic areas, using PCS licenses. AT&T's market share in those

markets, which it has only recently entered, is considerably smaller

than its share in markets where AT&T has a cellular license. The

Department has reached no judgment as to the competitive effects of

the proposed merger in those markets. To the extent that the merger

might produce anticompetitive effects in those markets, however, the

divestiture requirements in the proposed Final Judgment would

provide an effective remedy.

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III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

The proposed Final Judgment will preserve competition in the sale

of mobile wireless services in the relevant geographic markets by

requiring the defendants to execute a complete divestiture of the

Sprint PCS stock. This divestiture will eliminate the change in market

structure caused by the merger; after this divestiture, AT&T would be

unable to recapture any of the revenues that might be diverted from

AT&T to Sprint PCS as a result of an increase in the price of AT&T's

mobile wireless telephone services.

In merger cases in which the Department seeks a divestitute remedy,

the Department requires completion of the divestiture within the

shortest time period reasonable under the circumstances. In this case,

the proposed Final Judgment requires that Liberty's holdings of Sprint

PCS be reduced to 10% or less of the outstanding Sprint PCS stock by

May 2002, approximately three years from the expected date of entry of

the decree, and that the holding be divested completely by May 2004,

approximately five years from the expected entry of the decree.

These time periods for divestiture are significantly longer than

the Department ordinarily would accept. The Department believes they

are appropriate in this case, however, because of concerns that a more

rapid divestiture might harm competition by adversely affecting

Sprint's ability to raise capital to complete the build out of its

wireless network. Sprint anticipates that it will have near-term needs

for a substantial amount of capital, both debt and equity, in order to

purchase and deploy additional infrastructure for its wireless network.

A complete divestiture in the time period required by the Department in

the typical case (e.g., six months) potentially could adversely affect

the value of new stock that would be issued by Sprint, thereby

increasing its cost of raising additional capital and potentially

delaying or limiting the completion of Sprint's wireless network

construction efforts.\10\

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\10\ Sprint has also expressed concerns that if AT&T were to

control the divestiture of Sprint PCS stock, it could strategically

time the sale of those shares so as to exacerbate, rather than

mitigate, any possible adverse effect on the value of Sprint PCS

stock that might be issued by Sprint. Unlike the usual divestitures

in consent decrees entered into by the Department, the acquiring

firm here (AT&T) will not be permitted a period of time to

accomplish the divestiture; rather, it will go immediately to a

trustee who will effect the sale of the stock.

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Sprint's wireless business has recently been restructured through

transactions in which TCI's former partnership interest in the business

was converted to TCI's current holding of Sprint PCS stock. In

connection with that restructuring, Sprint, TCI, and others negotiated

contractual limitations on the ability of TCI to sell its Sprint PCS

shares during the period in which Sprint would be seeking to raise

capital for its build out. The proposed Final Judgment will not

interfere in any way with TCI's compliance with its contractual

obligations pursuant to the Sprint PCS restructuring.

The terms of the proposed Final Judgment reflect a balancing of the

potential harm to competition that might arise from a divestiture that

proceeds either too slowly or too rapidly. By permitting the

divestiture of the Sprint PCS shares to be accomplished by a trustee

over a period of five years, the proposed Final Judgment should

minimize the risk of any potential adverse effect on Sprint's build out

of its wireless network. The anticompetitive effects that could arise

from the ownership of a substantial interest in Sprint's PCS business

by a subsidiary of AT&T are addressed by the requirement that a major

portion of the Sprint PCS holding be divested within three years, and

that there be a complete divestiture within five years. In addition,

other supplementary provisions in the Final Judgment, described below,

are designed to reduce the risk that AT&T's partial ownership of Sprint

PCS would create anticompetitive incentives during the interim period

before the completion of the required divestitures.

Section VI.A. of the proposed Final Judgment requires all economic

benefits of the Sprint PCS Holding to inure exclusively to the benefit

of the holders of Liberty Media Tracking Shares, and forbids AT&T from

engaging in any transaction that would directly or indirectly transfer

such benefits to AT&T or to any other class of AT&T shareholders. It

also requires AT&T to adhere to the Policy Statement Regarding Liberty

Tracking Stock Matters that is an exhibit to its merger agreement.

Section VI.B. requires TCI to complete the amendment of the Liberty

certificate of incorporation and bylaws, contemplated by its merger

agreement with AT&T, and to appoint the Class B and Class C Directors

of Liberty, prior to the consummation of the merger. Section VI.C.

requires AT&T to form the Capital Stock Committee contemplated by its

merger agreement. The Policy Statement, the amendment of Liberty's

certificate of incorporation and bylaws, and the Capital Stock

Committee are integral parts of the framework establishing the

governance arrangements for Liberty, and controlling certain financial

relationships between and among the various classes of stock issued by

AT&T Corp., including the Liberty Media Tracking Stock. Section VI.F.

of the proposed Final Judgment is also intended to ensure substantial

separation between Liberty's Sprint PCS holding and AT&T's wireless

business, by restricting Liberty's ability to acquire any interest in

AT&T's wireless business.

Collectively, these provisions are meant to promote a ``hold

separate'' relationship between AT&T and its Sprint PCS holdings during

the pre-divestiture period, (i) reducing the risk that Liberty will be

operated for the benefit of holders of other classes at AT&T stock

(including those other shareholders who will collectively own and

control AT&T's wireless business), rather than for the benefit of the

Liberty Tracking Stock shareholders, and (ii) reducing the risk that

AT&T could recapture any of the revenues that might be diverted to

Sprint PCS as a result of an AT&T price increase, because the holders

of the Liberty Media tracking stock, rather than the shareholders of

AT&T's wireless business, would be the beneficiaries to the extent that

AT&T customers switch to Sprint PCS.

As a general matter, the Department does not believe that decree

restrictions dealing with corporate governance arrangements and the

separation of economic interests among different

[[Page 2513]]

components of a single corporate enterprise are an appropriate remedy

for the anticompetitive effects that might arise from mergers and

acquisitions. Such restrictions will have limited efficacy as a long-

term protection against anticompetitive effects, and may require

ongoing oversight of the conduct of a corporation's internal affairs

that neither the Department nor a Court is well-suited to perform on an

ongoing basis. The proposed settlement of this case adopts such

provisions only because of the unique factors that are present here,

and only as an interim measure designated to mitigate any

anticompetitive incentives that could otherwise arise during the

unusually lengthy period permitted for complete divestiture.

Sections IV and V of the proposed Final Judgment set forth the

process and substantive requirements for the complete divestiture of

the Sprint PCS Holding, a divestiture that will cure the potential

anticompetitive effects of the AT&T/TCI merger. Prior to the closing of

the merger, TCI is required to establish a trust, appoint a trustee,

and transfer the Sprint PCS Holding to the trust. TCI must secure the

Department's approval of both the terms of the trust agreement and the

appointment of the trustee nominated by TCI. The trustee will have the

obligation and the sole responsibility for executing the divestiture of

the Sprint PCS Holding.\11\ The trustee is required, by Section V.B.,

to exercise this responsibility in a manner reasonably calculated to

maximize the value of the Sprint PCS Holding to the holders of Liberty

Media Tracking Shares. The trustee is prohibited from considering

possible costs or benefits of a sale to AT&T (Section V.B.), from

consulting with AT&T, with any Liberty director appointed by AT&T, or

with any Liberty director, officer, or shareholder who owns a

substantial interest in AT&T, concerning the sale of the Sprint PCS

stock (Section V.C.). The trustee will, however, consult with the Class

B and Class C directors of Liberty, who will be appointed by TCI prior

to the completion of the merger. The trustee is also prohibited from

voting the Sprint PCS shares.

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\11\ The Sprint PCS shares may be sold either in the public

markets or in a private sale negotiated with an identified buyer.

With respect to a private sale, the proposed Final Judgment requires

prior notice to the Department, so that the Department can ensure

that such a sale would not raise competitive concerns. There is no

such requirement with respect to sales in the public market, where

there is no means of determining in advance who the buyer would be.

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By requiring the trustee to act solely in the interests of the

Liberty Media Tracking Stock shareholders, the proposed Final Judgment

seeks to minimize any possibility that the divestiture would be carried

out in a manner designed to provide anticompetitive benefits to AT&T's

wireless business.

Collectively, these provisions of the proposed Final Judgment are

meant to provide a structural remedy (i.e., complete divestiture) for

the anticompetitive effects that might otherwise result from the

acquisition; to minimize the risk that this strucural remedy might

adversely affect competition by impairing Sprint's ability to raise

capital to complete its wireless build out (by affording a reasonable

period of time in which to complete the divestiture); and to minimize

the possibility of interim competitive harm during the period prior to

completion of the divestiture.

In order to ensure compliance with the Final Judgment, Section VII

authorizes plaintiff to conduct an inspection of the defendant's

records. Plaintiff may copy any records under the control of the

defendant, interview officers, employees and agents of the defendant,

and request that the defendant submit written reports. The inspection

is subject to any legally recognized privilege. All information

obtained by plaintiff under section VII will be held as confidential

except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United States is

a party, or for purposes of securing compliance with the Final

Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.

Section IX of the proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court

will retain jurisdiction over this action, and permits the parties to

apply to the Court for any order necessary or appropriate for the

modification of the Final Judgment. In the Department's view, a

complete legal and economic separation between AT&T's wireless business

and the Sprint PCS Holdings would constitute a material change in

circumstances that would justify termination of the divestiture

obligation. Section IX also provides for the Court's continuing

jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the Final Judgment.

IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any

person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the

antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times

the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable

attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither

impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action.

Under the provisions of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.

16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any

subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against defendants.

V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment

The plaintiff and defendants have stipulated that the proposed

Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the

provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not

withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's

determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public

interest.

The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding

the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any

person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the

proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so

within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive

Impact Statement in the Federal Register. The United States will

evaluate and respond to the comments. All comments will be given due

consideration by the Department of Justice, which remains free to

withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time prior

to entry. The comments and the response of the United States will be

filed with the Court and published in the Federal Register.

Written comments should be submitted to: Donald J. Russell, Chief,

Telecommunications Task Force, Antitrust Division, United States

Department of Justice, 1401 H Street, NW, Suite 8000, Washington, DC

20530.

VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

The plaintiff considered, as an alternative to the proposed Final

Judgment, action to block consummation of the merger. The plaintiff is

satisfied, however, that the divestiture of the Sprint PCS Tracking

Stock and other relief contained in the proposed Final Judgment will

preserve competition in the provision of mobile wireless telephone

services, and that there is no competition-related reason to seek to

block the merger.

VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for Proposed Final Judgment

The APPA requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust

cases brought by the United States be subject to a sixty (60) day

comment period, after

[[Page 2514]]

which the court shall determine whether entry of the proposed Final

Judgment ``is in the public interest.'' In making that determination,

the court may consider--

(1) The competitive impact of such judgment, including

termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and

modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of

alternative remedies actually considered, and any other

considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;

(2) The impact of entry of such judgment upon the public

generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the

violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the

public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the

issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. 16(e) (emphasis added). As the United States Court of Appeals

for the D.C. Circuit recently held, this statute permits a court to

consider, among other things, the relationship between the remedy

secured and the specific allegations set forth in the government's

complaint, whether the decree is sufficiently clear, whether

enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and whether the decree may

positively harm third parties. See United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d

1448, 1461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

In conducting this inquiry, ``[t]he Court is nowhere compelled to

go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the

effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement

through the consent decree process.'' \12\ Rather,

\12\ 119 Cong. Rec. 24598 (1973). See United States v. Gillette

Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975). A ``public interest''

determination can be made properly on the basis of the Competitive

Impact Statement and Response to Comments filed pursuant to the

APPA. Although the APPA authorizes the use of additional procedures,

15 U.S.C. 16(f), those procedures are discretionary. A court need

not invoke any of them unless it believes that the comments have

raised significant issues and that further proceedings would aid the

court in resolving those issues. See H.R. Rep. 93-1463, 93d Cong. 2d

Sess. 8-9 (1974), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6538.

[a]bsent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge

its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should *

* * carefully consider the explanations of the government in the

competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order

to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the

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circumstances.

United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)

para. 61,508, at 71.980 (W.D. Mo. 1977).

Accordingly, with respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by

the decree, a court may not ``engage in an unrestricted evaluation of

what relief would best serve the public.'' United States v. BNS, Inc.,

858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Bechtel

Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083

(1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-62. Precedent requires

that

the balancing of competing social and political interests affected

by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first

instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's

role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the

government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to

the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a

particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but

whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public

interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the

effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.\13\

\13\ Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added); see BNS, 858

F.2d at 463; United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F.

Supp. 1127, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 716.

See also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (whether ``the remedies

(obtained in the decree are) so inconsonant with the allegations

charged as to fall outside of the `reaches of the public interest'

'').

The proposed Final Judgment, therefore, should not be reviewed

under a standard of whether it is certain to eliminate every

anticompetitive effect of a particular practice or whether it mandates

certainty of free competition in the future. Court approval of a final

judgment requires a standard more flexible and less strict than the

standard required for a finding of liability. ``[A] proposed decree

must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would

impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of

acceptability or is `within the reaches of public interest.' '' \14\

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\14\ United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.

131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States,

460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (quoting Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. at 716);

United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D.

Ky. 1985).

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VIII. Determinative Documents

There are no determinative materials or documents within the

meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in

formulating the proposed Final judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

Donald J. Russell,

Chief, Telecommunications Task Force, U.S. Department of Justice,

Antitrust Division, 1401 H Street, NW, Suite 8000, Washington, DC

20530, (202) 514-5621.

Dated: December 30, 1998.

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's

Competitive Impact Statement were served by hand and/or first-class

U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this 30th day of December, 1998 upon

each of the parties listed below:

Betsy Brady, Esq (by hand), Vice President-Federal Government Affairs,

Suite 1000, 1120 20th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036, (Counsel for

AT&T Corp.).

Kathy Fenton (by hand), Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue, Suite 700, 1450 G

Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005, (Counsel for Tele-Communications,

Inc.).

Peter A. Gray,

Counsel for Plaintiff.

[FR Doc. 99-824 Filed 1-13-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-11-M

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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