Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Tennessee Valley Authority

[Docket No. 50-259]

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Issuance of Director's

Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision concerning a Petition

dated April 5, 1998, filed on behalf of the Union of Concerned

Scientists (Petitioner) by Mr. David A. Lochbaum, pursuant to Title 10

of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.206 (10 CFR 2.206). The

Petition requests the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to (1)

revoke the operating license for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1;

(2) require the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to submit either a

decommissioning plan or a lay-up plan for Unit 1; (3) conduct NRC

inspections at Browns Ferry Unit 1 against the decommissioning plan or

the lay-up plan; and (4) hold a hearing in the Washington, DC, area.

The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined

to deny in part and grant in part the Petition, for the reasons stated

in the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-99-06). The

complete text that follows this notice is available for public

inspection and copying in the Commission's Public Document Room, the

Gelman Building, 2210 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local

public document room for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant at the Athens

Public Library, 405 E. South Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.

A copy of this decision has been filed with the Secretary of the

Commission for the Commission's review. As provided for by 10 CFR

2.206(c), the decision will constitute the final action of the

Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the Commission, on its own

motion, institutes a review of the decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of March 1999.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 9

Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 (DD-99-06)

I. Introduction

On April 5, 1998, Mr. David A. Lochbaum filed a petition

1, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR 2.206), on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists

(Petitioner).

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\1\ The petition can be viewed and downloaded from the NRC World

Wide Web page (http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/2206/petitions/g980199/

g980199.html). Copies of the petition also are available for public

inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555-0001, and at the

local public document room located at the Athens Public Library,

South Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.

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Petitioner requested the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to (1)

revoke the operating license for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1;

(2) require the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to submit either a

decommissioning plan or a lay-up plan for Unit 1; (3) conduct NRC

inspections at Browns Ferry Unit 1 against the decommissioning plan or

the lay-up plan; and (4) hold a hearing in the Washington, DC, area.

As the basis for the request, Petitioner asserts that because Unit

1 has been on ``administrative hold'' since June 1, 1985, and has not

operated since then, revoking the operating license and requiring

relicensing if TVA later decides to restart Unit 1 is a better and

safer process than is the current restart process of Inspection Manual

Chapter (IMC) 0350. Further, a decommissioning plan would provide

assurance that the irradiated fuel is stored safely and that Units 2

and 3 are sufficiently independent of Unit 1 for safe operation.

Petitioner notes that while Unit 1 has been in administrative hold

status, the NRC has issued numerous bulletins, generic letters, and

information notices. TVA's typical action in response to these NRC

communications is to delay addressing the issues until prior to

returning the unit to service. Petitioner notes a similar response was

provided by TVA to the NRC's letter of October 9, 1996, which requested

information pertaining to the adequacy, availability, and control of

design-basis information 2, 3. Petitioner

speculates that the configuration management problems and plant

material condition that led to the shutdown in 1985 only could have

worsened since then. Thus, Petitioner believes that requiring

relicensing for Unit 1 if the decision is made to restart would ``wipe

the licensing slate clean and allow TVA, the NRC, and the public to

examine restarting the plant without the burden of unraveling the mess

caused by more than a decade of licensing limbo.'' Petitioner further

asserts that the NRC cannot meaningfully inspect a facility in a

degraded condition and in an uncertain licensing status.

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\2\ NRC letter from James M. Taylor, Executive Director for

Operations, to Craven Crowell, Chairman, TVA Board of Directors,

dated October 9, 1996.

\3\ This letter was sent to TVA on Browns Ferry Units 2 and 3,

Sequyoah Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Units 1 and 2 dockets. It was

not sent on the Browns Ferry Unit 1 docket because that facility was

not operating, and it was known to the NRC that extensive design-

basis reconstitution will be required before the facility may be

restarted.

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On April 29, 1998, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the petition and

informed Petitioner that the petition had been assigned to the Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for response. Petitioner was

informed that the request for a hearing was denied because the petition

did not provide new information that raised the potential for a

significant safety issue and did not allege any violations of NRC

requirements. Petitioner was advised that any new information that

should be considered by the NRC in evaluating the issues raised in the

petition should be provided promptly to the NRC in writing.

On June 5, 1998, Petitioner reiterated the request for a hearing

and cited NRC Bulletin 94-01, ``Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by

Inadequate Maintenance Practices at Dresden Unit

[[Page 16008]]

1,'' as an example of what could involve one or more significant safety

issues. Bulletin 94-01 was sent to (1) all holders of operating

licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors (for

information) and (2) all holders (except Shoreham) of licenses for

nuclear power reactors that are permanently shutdown with spent fuel in

the spent fuel pool (for action). Petitioner argued that Bulletin 94-01

should have been sent to the Unit 1 licensee for action instead of

merely for information because Unit 1 is more nearly like a permanently

shutdown facility than an operating facility and the conditions

described in the bulletin could have existed at Unit 1.

By letter dated August 7, 1998, Petitioner was informed that the

NRC had reconsidered its earlier denial of the request for a hearing

and had decided that holding an informal public hearing would be

appropriate 4, even though such a hearing was not required

under the criteria for such hearings as provided in NRC Management

Directive 8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions.'' The

August 7 letter also addressed the issues surrounding Bulletin 94-01

and its applicability to Browns Ferry Unit 1. The hearing was held on

October 26, 1998, in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Training

Center.5

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\4\ The NRC concluded that the petition raised novel issues with

respect to maintaining an operating license for a facility for which

there are no plans for future operation and that the information

that might be presented during an informal public hearing could

constitute a valuable resource for the NRC in reaching a decision

with regard to the petition.

\5\ The hearing transcript can be obtained from the NRC World

Wide Web page (http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/2206trans.html). Copies

of the transcript are available for public inspection at the

Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L

Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555-0001, and at the local public

document room located at the Athens Public Library, 504 E. South

Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.

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II. Background

TVA is the holder of operating licenses for three nuclear power

units at the Browns Ferry site. In March 1985, TVA voluntarily shut

down Units 1 and 3 because of questions relating to primary containment

isolation testing at Unit 1 and reactor water level instrumentation at

Unit 3. Unit 2 was in a refueling outage, but TVA voluntarily decided

not to restart the unit as scheduled because other questions and

concerns arose about the adequacy of TVA's nuclear program. In

September 1985,6 the NRC requested TVA to submit its plans

for correcting problems and improving performance in its overall

nuclear program and at Browns Ferry. The Commission did not order TVA

to obtain its approval before restarting the plants because of prior

verbal agreement between TVA and NRC to that effect; however, TVA was

required, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), to inform the NRC if TVA

intended to change this commitment. In late 1985, TVA submitted its

corporate nuclear performance plan (CNPP) to address weaknesses in the

TVA corporate nuclear program. The CNPP was followed by the Browns

Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan to address site-specific weaknesses and

to resolve additional concerns raised by the NRC. These plans formed

the regulatory framework for the restart of Unit 2.

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\6\ NRC letter from William J. Dircks, Executive Director for

Operations, to Charles Dean, Chairman,TVA Board of Directors, dated

September 17, 1985.

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In July 1987, the NRC concluded 7 that organizational,

staffing, and programmatic improvements already in place or under way

would resolve the problems at the corporate level. In January 1991, the

NRC concluded 8 that TVA's commitments and corrective action

programs for Unit 2 were acceptable, and in April 1991, the Commission

approved Unit 2 restart. Unit 2 restarted May 24, 1991. TVA submitted

its corrective action plan for returning Units 1 and 3 to service in

1991,9 and generally used the same methods, criteria, and

technical positions for Unit 3 that were approved for the restart of

Unit 2. In February 1992, an NRC Restart Panel was formed in accordance

with NRC IMC 0350. TVA completed the recovery of Browns Ferry Unit 3 in

1995, and the Commission authorized the Regional Administrator to

approve restart of Unit 3 upon completion of certain open issues. The

NRC Administrator for Region II issued restart approval on November 19,

1995. Units 2 and 3 have operated well since their respective restarts,

and this performance is reflected in the NRC systematic assessment of

licensee performance reports issued since the restart of Unit 2.

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\7\ NUREG-1232, Volume 1, ``Safety Evaluation Report on

Tennessee Valley Authority Revised Corporate Nuclear Performance

Plan,`` July 1987.

\8\ NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2, ``Safety Evaluation

Report on Tennessee Valley Authority: Browns Ferry Nuclear

Performance Plan. Browns Ferry Unit 2 Restart,'' January 1991.

\9\ Letter from Mark O. Medford, Vice President, Nuclear

Assurance, Licensing, and Fuels, TVA, dated January 9, 1991.

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In April 1996, TVA requested removal 10 of Browns Ferry

Unit 1 as a Category 3 plant from the NRC's list of problem plants. TVA

stated that no decision had been reached on the long-term operational

status of Unit 1, and the unit is defueled and maintained in lay-up

status. Those shared systems that support operation of Units 2 and 3,

however, will continue to be kept in service. TVA noted that there are

no plans for equipment refurbishing or recovery activities at Unit 1.

TVA committed to inform the NRC immediately of a decision to return

Unit 1 to service, to implement the same programs used for the Unit 3

recovery, and to not restart Unit 1 without prior Commission approval.

Unit 1 was removed from the list of problem plants 11 on

June 21, 1996.

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\10\ Letter from Oliver D. Kingsley, President and Chief Nuclear

Officer, TVA, dated April 16, 1996, to James M. Taylor, NRC

Executive Director for Operations.

\11\ NRC letter from James A. Taylor, Executive Director for

Operations, to Oliver D. Kingsley, President and Chief Nuclear

Officer, TVA, dated June 21, 1996.

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III. Discussion

The hearing provided Petitioner the opportunity to present

information related to issues that have a bearing upon the actions

requested in the petition. Petitioner, represented by Mr. David

Lochbaum, was joined in presenting information to support the petition

by Ms. Ann Harris, a representative of We the People of Tennessee and

spokesperson for the National Nuclear Safety Network. The NRC staff has

reviewed the transcript of the hearing to identify the relevant issues

to be considered in addition to the filing of April 5, 1998. The

following paragraphs discuss the issues raised in the petition and in

the hearing. Related issues have been grouped together and are

addressed in the following paragraphs.

Petitioner Issues

The NRC does not inspect Browns Ferry Unit 1.

The NRC cannot meaningfully inspect Browns Ferry Unit 1

because the NRC does not have an ``Administrative Hold'' category.

The NRC cannot meaningfully inspect Browns Ferry Unit 1

because it is not in compliance with NRC regulations, including the

``Maintenance Rule.''

Petitioner asserts that, contrary to a statement made in a letter

12 to him by

[[Page 16009]]

the NRC Project Manager for Browns Ferry, he has information that shows

that NRC inspectors do not look at Browns Ferry Unit 1 at all.

Petitioner asserted further, that NRC inspectors could not meaningfully

inspect Unit 1 because NRC regulations recognize only two categories of

power plants: operating plants and permanently closed plants.

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\12\ NRC letter from Albert W. De Agazio, Browns Ferry Project

Manager, to David A. Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists, dated

January 23, 1998. This letter also was an attachment to the April 5,

1998, submitted by Mr. Lochbaum.

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Browns Ferry Unit 1 is sometimes referred to as being in an

``Administrative Hold'' 13 status, but this is a TVA

designation and it is irrelevant for regulatory purposes. Browns Ferry

Unit 1 is an operating reactor subject to all the terms and conditions

that are specified in Operating License DPR-3314, the

uncertainty of its return to service notwithstanding. The Unit 1

Technical Specifications (TSs) are maintained, are in force, and must

be complied with. The operating license and associated TSs are amended

periodically, usually in concert with similar changes for Units 2 and

3.

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\13\ ``Administrative Hold'' is a TVA designation that denotes

that while no decision has been made regarding future operation of

the facility, the option for restart at an unspecified future date

is being retained.

\14\ Operating License No. DPR-33 was issued to TVA for the

operation of Browns Ferry Unit 1 on December 20, 1973. The license

expires on midnight October 20, 2013.

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Some Unit 1 systems or components 15 are required to

support the unit in its current defueled condition, or they directly

support the safe operation of Units 2 or 3. These systems and

components are maintained and operated as required under applicable

plant programs or TSs. The remaining systems and components

16 have been placed in lay-up status to protect their

economic value and to preserve the equipment in the event a decision is

made to restart the unit.

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\15\ This includes such systems (or portions thereof) as spent

fuel pool cooling and cleanup, raw water, fire protection, reactor /

refuel zone ventilation, radiation monitoring, residual heat

removal, reactor building closed cooling water, certain electrical

systems, and emergency diesel generators.

\16\ Many of these systems and components have been drained,

deenergized, and disassembled, as appropriate.

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Unit 1 is subject to both routine and reactive NRC inspection, and

the unit is inspected by NRC inspectors. However, the operational

status of the facility is considered when determining the frequency,

type, and scope of inspections, and the amount of inspection effort is

substantially less than for a comparable facility in active service

because much of the equipment and systems serve no safety function

while the unit is shutdown and defueled. Thus, the NRC inspection

effort for Unit 1 is focused mostly upon those areas that have a direct

bearing upon safety. Generally, this includes those structures,

systems, and components (SSCs) that are necessary to ensure the safe

storage of Unit 1 irradiated fuel and to support the safe operation of

Units 2 and 3. The inspection effort includes no or little effort for

SSCs that are not needed to provide a safety function for the current

plant operating status.

Petitioner, in the original petition and during the hearing, relied

upon information compiled by the NRC that led him to conclude that Unit

1 is not inspected at all. The sources of the tables used by

Petitioner, though not fully identified, appear to be taken from

certain NRC documents that were intended primarily for internal

management use, but the information has been released through at least

one Freedom of Information Act request, and similar information has

been presented at several of the annual Regulatory Information

Conferences sponsored by NRR. We acknowledge that the NRC documents are

misleading and could lead a person to that conclusion regarding Unit 1

inspection. Until 1997, NRR compiled quarterly various program and

management information in a ``White Book,'' intended for internal

purposes. The documents included data on inspection efforts expended at

single-, dual-, and triple-unit sites. In those documents, Browns Ferry

was shown as a dual unit site, though it is actually a triple unit

site. Unit 1 was not included because it was not in operational

service. This was done so that the data could be used for comparison

purposes to other dual-unit sites. Although these documents

17 have described incorrectly the Browns Ferry site as a

dual-unit site, the fact remains that Unit 1 is inspected by NRC

inspectors. This inspection activity is adequately demonstrated by the

results of a review of NRC inspection reports for Browns Ferry issued

for the 3-year period 1996 through 1998. Of 32 inspection reports

issued for that period, 10 refer to NRC inspection of Unit 1 issues

(Table I). Table I does not include inspection activities associated

with the systems ``shared'' between the units or inspection of common

buildings; those items are routinely inspected as support for Units 2

and/or 3.

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\17\ Publication of these documents was discontinued at the end

of 1996.

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NRC IMC 0030, ``Policy and Guidance for Development of NRC

Inspection Manual Programs,'' provides guidance for the development of

the NRC inspection program, and the inspection program at Browns Ferry

has been developed in accordance with this guidance. For the 12 month

period from October 1, 1997, through September 30, 1998, the actual NRC

inspection effort expended at Unit 1 was approximately 12 percent of

the effort expended at either of the other units. On a site basis, Unit

1 received approximately 6 percent of the total inspection hours for

the site. Thus, the greater inspection effort at the operating units

allows the NRC to adequately assess the licensee's performance and to

focus its efforts into areas that have the greater safety significance

as opposed to inspecting in areas of Unit 1 that have little on no

safety significance.

Petitioner asserts that Browns Ferry Unit 1 is not in compliance

with NRC regulations. To support this contention, Petitioner states

that usually TVA has deferred taking actions with respect to Browns

Ferry Unit 1 requested by numerous generic communications issued since

1985. TVA typically has committed to completing the actions before

returning the unit to service, if such a decision is made. As

additional support for this contention, Petitioner notes that there is

an outstanding issue regarding Unit 1 compliance with 10 CFR 50.65,

commonly referred to as the maintenance rule.

IMC 0720 provides guidance with regard to NRC generic

communications on nuclear reactor issues. Generic communications

consist of bulletins, generic letters, and information notices.

Bulletins may transmit information to the addressees, request specified

actions, and require a written response. Generic letters request that

analyses be performed or descriptions of proposed corrective actions be

submitted regarding matters of safety, safeguards, or environmental

significance. The addressees may be asked to accomplish the actions and

report their completion by letter. Information relating to these

actions may be requested on a voluntary basis or in accordance with

Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR

50.54(f). Usually, this type of generic letter requests new or revised

licensee commitments or other continuing actions but may not explicitly

or coercively solicit licensee commitments. Information notices provide

information regarding safety, safeguards, or environmental issues.

Information notices normally are used to bring significant, recently

identified safety, security, or environmental information to the

attention of licensees. Addressees are expected to review the

[[Page 16010]]

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions,

as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

IMC 0720 states that the various types of generic communications

are not used to impose regulatory requirements, and they are not to be

used as a substitute for the rule-making process. Thus, the fact that a

licensee merely provides the written response required by the Atomic

Energy Act and/or NRC rules and regulations but does not, or will not,

implement other requested action(s) does not, by itself, constitute

being in non-compliance with a regulatory requirement and does not

constitute a basis for suspension or revocation of the operating

license. In such circumstances, the NRC, may take other action

commensurate with the safety significance of the issues. Such actions

could vary in severity from acceptance by the NRC that the licensee has

a valid basis for not taking the requested actions up to the NRC's

issuing an Order to shut down (or to remain shutdown) until the

particular safety issue is resolved in an acceptable manner. With

regard to Browns Ferry Unit 1, the licensee has either taken the

requested actions in the generic communications when necessary or has

committed to address the issues raised before the unit can be

restarted. Furthermore, although TVA has no announced plans for

restarting the facility, TVA has agreed not to restart it without

specific approval from the Commission. Thus, any Commission action

taken with regard to revoking the Unit 1 operating license merely

because of TVA's deferral of actions requested in generic

communications pending a decision to restart Unit 1 would serve no

useful purpose.

With the possible exception of 10 CFR 50.65, the Commission is not

aware of any non-compliance issues with applicable NRC rules and

regulations at Browns Ferry Unit 1. Furthermore, Petitioner has not

offered any contradictory credible information, either in the original

petition or during the hearing. However, the issue of Unit 1 compliance

with 10 CFR 50.65 is still undergoing review by the NRC staff, and no

final decision has been made.

The issue regarding 10 CFR 50.65 arose from an inspection of the

implementation of 10 CFR 50.65 at the Browns Ferry plant from April 4

through April 8, 1997.18 The inspection team found that the

licensee considered Unit 1 status (shutdown and defueled) for

implementing 10 CFR 50.65. Thus, a number of Unit 1 systems, such as

high pressure coolant injection, which normally would be included

within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 for an operating plant, were not

included, and performance monitoring, data collection, and trending

were not being performed on these systems. However, those Unit 1

systems that support Unit 2 and/or Unit 3 operation, systems that are

common to Unit 2 or Unit 3, or systems required to maintain safe

shutdown of Unit 1, such as spent fuel pool cooling, were properly

scoped under 10 CFR 50.65, and performance monitoring, data collection,

and trending were being performed on these systems.

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\18\ NRC Inspection Report 50-259/97-04, 50-260/97-04, and 50-

296/97-04, issued May 21, 1997.

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At issue is whether scoping Unit 1 SSCs by considering the defueled

and indefinite shutdown condition of Unit 1 satisfies 10 CFR 50.65. The

staff has informed the licensee that the issue can be resolved by one

of three approaches, namely, certify per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) that Unit 1

operations have ceased permanently, submit a request for exemption from

those aspects of 10 CFR 50.65 that currently are not being met, or

revise the scope of the Unit 1 maintenance program to meet the

requirements of the rule. On February 4, 1999, TVA submitted a request

for a temporary partial exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR

50.65. The staff currently is reviewing the proposed exemption request.

Petitioner Issues

TVA would exceed its statutory debt limit if Browns Ferry

Unit 1 is closed prematurely.

TVA may lack the money needed to put Browns Ferry Unit 1

into the operating category, or the permanently closed category.

TVA does not have the necessary funds for decommissioning

funding assurance.

Petitioner has made a number of assertions regarding the ability of

TVA to fund operations and/or decommissioning of Unit 1 but has not

provided any facts in support thereof. The NRC, however, has no

regulatory authority with regard to issues related to TVA's statutory

debt limit or other financial matters and decisions other than

decommissioning funding assurance.

On November 23, 1998, the Commission's amended rules for

``Financial Assurance Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power

Reactors'' became effective.19 The amendments require power

reactor licensees to report periodically on the status of their

decommissioning funds, and on changes in their external trust

agreements and other financial assurance mechanisms, and also allow

licensees to take credit for certain earnings on decommissioning trust

funds. The amendments also added a definition of the term ``Federal

Licensee'' to address the issue of which licensees may use statements

of intent. As now defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a Federal Licensee means any

NRC licensee, the obligations of which are guaranteed by and supported

by the full faith and credit of the United States Government. In the

past, TVA has relied upon statements of intent to have decommissioning

funds available. The purpose of the statement of intent is to obtain a

commitment by another, and superior, governmental entity that the

obligations of the subordinate governmental entity will be paid by the

superior entity if the subordinate entity cannot pay them. Such a

commitment represents support for the obligations by the full faith and

credit of the United States. TVA agrees 20 that the revised

definition excludes TVA from relying upon this funding mechanism and

has informed the NRC that statements of intent will no longer be relied

upon for decommissioning funding assurance. TVA has provided

documentation for three external Master Decommissioning Trusts that

were established in 1996. TVA has stated that the external trusts

arrangements meet the requirements for an external sinking fund (10 CFR

50.75(e)(ii)). The trust arrangements meet the requirement that the

account be segregated from licensee assets and placed outside the

licensee's administrative control. During the hearing on October 26,

1998, a representative of the TVA's Office of the General Counsel

stated that the external trust fund arrangements exceeded several

hundreds of millions of dollars. As required by 10 CFR 50.75(f)(1), TVA

is to report to the NRC by March 31, 1999, and at least once every 2

years thereafter, the status of its decommissioning funding, including

the amount of decommissioning funds estimated to be required, the

amount accumulated to the end of the calendar year preceding the date

of the report, and a schedule of the annual amounts remaining to be

collected. The NRC will review the status of TVA's decommissioning

funding report, and if necessary, appropriate action will be

[[Page 16011]]

taken to ensure compliance with NRC regulations.

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\19\ Final rule changes to 10 CFR Parts 30 and 50 on financial

assurance requirements for the decommissioning of nuclear power

plants were published in the Federal Register on September 22, 1998

(63 FR 50465).

\20\ Letter from Mark J. Burzynski, Manager, Nuclear Licensing,

TVA, dated December 21, 1998, to NRC.

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Petitioner Issue

A decommissioning plan would ensure safe storage of Browns

Ferry Unit 1 irradiated fuel and would ensure sufficient independence

of Units 2 and 3 from Unit 1.

Petitioner contends that Unit 1 irradiated fuel stored in its spent

fuel pool will continue to represent a threat to public health for many

years. The probability of an accident involving stored fuel is

considered to be sufficiently small to make the overall risk to the

public from an accident acceptable; however, Petitioner contends that

the probability is small only because NRC regulations for design

features and administrative controls at both permanently closed plants

and operating plants minimize the chances of an accident. Petitioner

asserts that there are no regulations for plants in Administrative Hold

status, and, thus, there are no regulations that apply to Unit 1.

As previously stated, Administrative Hold is a TVA designation, not

an NRC designation, and, thus, for NRC regulatory purposes, Browns

Ferry Unit 1 is an operating reactor and is subject to all terms and

conditions of the Unit 1 operating license, TSs, and all applicable NRC

regulations, contrary to Petitioner's assertion that Unit 1 is

unregulated.

Each of the reactors at Browns Ferry has its own spent fuel storage

pool, but the pools of Units 1 and 2 are joined by a transfer canal

that allows fuel assemblies to be transferred between the Unit 1 and

Unit 2 fuel storage pools. The fuel storage facilities are shared only

for Units 1 and 2, and the transfer canal is the only shared feature.

The Unit 1 spent fuel storage pool is located on a common refueling

floor with and in the same structure that houses the Units 2 and 3

spent fuel storage pools.

Units 2 and 3 are in active operational status, thus, each unit is

refueled periodically, requiring discharge of recently irradiated fuel

into the storage pools. Compared to Unit 1 fuel that was last

discharged in 1985, recently discharged fuel from Unit 2 or Unit 3 is

substantially more radioactive and produces greater decay heat. Thus,

the consequences of an accident involving recently discharged

irradiated fuel would be more severe than the same accident involving

Unit 1 fuel. It follows that TSs, administrative controls, technical

requirements, and design features that are adequate to ensure the safe

storage of Unit 2 or Unit 3 spent fuel are also adequate to ensure safe

storage of Unit 1 irradiated fuel.

Thus, whether or not Unit 1 was to be declared permanently shut

down, the fuel storage requirements would not be changed. Requiring the

licensee to declare the permanent shutdown of Unit 1 and to submit a

post-shutdown decommissioning activities report, as requested by

Petitioner, would have no effect upon the risk to the public from a

potential fuel-handling accident or from accidental draining of the

fuel storage pool because the existing technical specifications and

administrative controls would not be changed, and existing design

features to preclude draining of the storage pools would be maintained.

Additionally, the SSCs required to ensure safe storage of irradiated

fuel in the Unit 1 storage pool are operated, tested, and maintained to

ensure that they are capable of performing their function.

With regard to Petitioner's assertion that a decommissioning plan

would ensure sufficient independence of Units 2 and 3 from Unit 1, it

is not at all clear which safety issue would be addressed. As currently

licensed, the Browns Ferry units incorporate some sharing of certain

structures and systems to obtain redundancy and improve reliability,

but aside from the shared and common features, each unit is capable of

operating independently of the other units, and each unit's TSs and

technical requirements take into account the shared and common features

that must be operable to support safe operation of that unit. Requiring

the licensee to declare the permanent shutdown of Unit 1 and to submit

a post-shutdown decommissioning activities report would require

retaining those sections of the Unit 1 TSs that are necessary to

support the safe operation of Units 2 and 3.

Continuing Operational Safety of Browns Ferry Unit 1

The Browns Ferry Unit 1 TSs are maintained and amended periodically

as necessary, as is the case with Units 2 and 3, and TVA is required to

operate Unit 1 in conformance with the TSs and technical requirements.

Inasmuch as Unit 1 is shutdown and defueled, a number of safety and

non-safety systems and components are not required to be operational.

These systems and components have been drained, deenergized, and

disassembled, as appropriate, and have been placed in a lay-up

condition to protect and preserve the equipment pending a decision to

resume power operations. The lay-up program is described in plant

procedures and includes periodic monitoring of the condition of the

equipment and lay-up status.

Unit 1 systems and components required to perform a function while

the unit is in its current defueled status or that are required to

support Units 2 and 3 operations are operated, maintained, and

periodically tested in conformance with applicable TSs, and are

included within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65)

program. Design and configuration control is maintained for these

systems, and modifications or temporary alterations are performed under

the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

Certain systems and components not required to perform a function

while Unit 1 is shutdown and defueled may not now conform to the design

basis or may not have been modified to meet the actions requested by

various NRC generic communications issued since the unit shut down.

This, by itself, does not constitute a basis for revoking the license

since the facility is in an operational mode in which the equipment is

not required to be operable. TVA has committed to implementing a Design

Baseline Verification Program for Unit 1 prior to returning Unit 1 to

service.

Units 1 and 2 share a common control room that is staffed

continually by licensed reactor operators, and the Unit 1 control

boards are given regular attention similar to the operating units.

Operators and engineers routinely tour areas of Unit 1 containing the

systems and equipment that the TSs require to be operable to ensure

safe storage of irradiated fuel and to support operation of the other

units.

Relicensing Versus Applying the IMC 0350 Process

Petitioner asserts that revoking the operating license and

requiring relicensing if TVA later decides to restart Unit 1 is a

better and safer process than is the current restart process in IMC

0350. Petitioner believes that this would ``wipe the licensing slate

clean and allow TVA, the NRC, and the public to examine restarting the

plant without the burden of unraveling the mess caused by more than a

decade of licensing limbo.''

NRC IMC 0350 provides staff guidelines for approving restart of

nuclear power plants that have been shut down either voluntarily or

involuntarily because of a significant operating event, complex

equipment problems, or serious licensee management deficiencies. The

guidelines have been used successfully for the restart of Browns Ferry

Unit 3, Crystal River Unit 3, and Millstone Unit 3 and are being used

for the D. C. Cook

[[Page 16012]]

reactors and Millstone Unit 2. In each case, a plant-specific restart

plan is developed using the IMC for guidance. The restart action plan

identifies expected NRC actions to be taken before approving restart

and includes an inspection plan to ensure that an adequate inspection

record is created to support the restart decision. IMC 0350 specifies

that the NRC Commissioners are to be adequately informed of staff

restart actions on a continuing basis through Commission papers or

through the Executive Director for Operations, and as necessary, the

staff will brief the Commissioners. IMC 0350 provides the opportunity

for public participation through public meetings. Through such

meetings, the public may hear and comment on the licensee's restart

plans and the results of NRC reviews of the restart activities. Public

comments and concerns are considered by the NRC and may be factored

into the restart review, as appropriate.

During the hearing on October 26, 1998, Petitioner was questioned

by an NRC representative regarding why it is believed that the

processes used by TVA and NRC to recover Units 2 and 3 would not work

for recovery of Unit 1. Petitioner indicated that the process is ``not

very objective and it's basically up to the whims of the restart team

as to what is safe, where the lines are drawn.'' However, when asked if

there would be an issue if the process is applied correctly with

openness and public involvement, Petitioner responded by referencing

the use of the process at Millstone and indicating that it [IMC 0350]

is a good process, but that it wasn't followed [at Millstone]. Thus,

Petitioner's issue does not appear to be the process but its

implementation. Petitioner conceded that the IMC 0350 process is

working very well in the case of the D.C. Cook plant, and that if it

were used at Browns Ferry Unit 1 as it is being used at D. C. Cook,

there would be reasonable expectation that a good product would be

realized.

IV. Summary and Conclusions

The NRC has determined that--

Petitioner has not identified any credible safety concern

that has been created by the current ``Administrative Hold'' status of

the unit that would not otherwise exist if the operating license were

to be revoked. Absent a credible safety concern, there is no regulatory

basis for suspending or revoking an operating license merely because

the licensee chooses not to operate the unit.

The licensee is required to comply with and is, with one

possible exception to the staff's knowledge, in compliance with all

current applicable regulations for operating reactors and is required

to comply with Unit 1 TSs and other technical requirements for the

current operational mode of the unit. The issue of compliance of Unit 1

with 10 CFR 50.65 is the subject of an ongoing review, and resolution

is expected soon.

Unit 1 is inspected by NRC inspectors, but at a reduced

scope that is appropriate for the status of the unit.

Decommissioning Unit 1 would not provide any greater

degree of safety for the Unit 1 irradiated fuel, for radiation control,

or for Units 2 and 3 than is currently provided by the requirements of

the operating license, TSs, and the Technical Requirements Manual.

There is no demonstrated credible basis for the assertion

that facility restart based upon IMC 0350 is a less reliable process

for resolving the safety concerns of a problem plant than the

relicensing process. The IMC 0350 process has been demonstrated by a

number of restart efforts, including those for Browns Ferry Unit 3.

For the reasons stated herein Petitioner's requests for the NRC to

revoke the Browns Ferry Unit 1 operating license and to require TVA to

submit a decommissioning plan or a lay-up plan for Unit 1, and for the

NRC to conduct inspections against the decommissioning plan are denied.

As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this decision will be

filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.

This decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25

days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion,

institutes review of the Decision at that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of March 1999.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Attachment to Director's Decision 99-06

Table 1.--Browns Ferry Unit 1 Inspection Activities

[1996 through 1998]

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Inspection report Date Inspection activity

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

50-259/96-01............................................... 02/29/96 Radioactive material postings.

50-259/96-03............................................... 04/15/96 Connection of Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent

fuel pool volumes, spent fuel pool

design-basis and operating

information.

50-259/96-05............................................... 06/18/96 Udated final safety analysis report

description of spent fuel pool

systems.

50-259/96-06............................................... 08/15/96 Continuous air monitoring systems.

50-259/96-10............................................... 11/07/96 Housekeeping issues.

50-259/96-12............................................... 12/20/96 Lay-up and preventive maintenance

program implementation.

50-259/97-03............................................... 04/22/97 Spent fuel pool cooling system

walkdown, identification that Unit 1

pool makeup valve operator had been

removed.

50-259/97-04............................................... 05/21/97 Maintenance rule implementation.

50-259/97-08............................................... 08/29/97 Sampling of a raw cooling water

discharge.

50-259/97-12............................................... 02/12/98 Repairs to a radiation monitoring

system valve.

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[[Page 16013]]

[FR Doc. 99-8164 Filed 4-1-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P