Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF)
Federal RegisterApr 12, 1999
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SUMMARY: The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) issues
regulations governing key provisions of the new welfare block grant
program enacted in 1996--the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
or TANF, program. It replaces the national welfare program known as Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the related programs
known as the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS)
and the Emergency Assistance (EA) program.
These rules reflect new Federal, State, and Tribal relationships in
the administration of welfare programs; a new focus on moving
recipients into work; and a new emphasis on program information,
measurement, and performance. They also reflect the Administration's
commitment to regulatory reform.
EFFECTIVE DATES: These regulations are effective October 1, 1999.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mack Storrs, Director, Division of
Self-Sufficiency Programs, Office of Family Assistance, Administration
for Children and Families (ACF), at 202-401-9289, or Ann Burek, Family
Assistance Program Specialist, at 202-401-4528.
Deaf and hearing-impaired individuals may call the Federal Dual
Party Relay Service at 1-800-877-8339 between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m. Eastern
time.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On November 20, 1997, the Administration for
Children and Families published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
covered key provisions of the new welfare block grant program, known as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF. We provided an
extended 90-day comment period, which ended on February 18, 1998. We
offered commenters the opportunity to submit comments by mail or
electronically via our Web site. A number of commenters took advantage
of the electronic access, but a significant portion of the comments we
received electronically duplicated comments we received in the mail.
Eight major national organizations (three associations representing
State groups, three advocacy groups, and two labor organizations) and
one Congressman requested the opportunity to present their comments to
us orally. We granted their requests, holding four meetings in
Washington in June, July, and August 1998. The national organizations
focused largely on those issues that they had identified as priority
concerns in their written statements. In a few instances, they modified
their suggestions, endorsed comments that had been offered by other
commenters, or provided clarifying information. The Congressman
expressed his interest in: (1) Providing States more flexibility in
operating their programs; (2) collecting data that would be adequate
for the effective enforcement and oversight of TANF; and (3) placing
sufficient emphasis on ensuring that States met their maintenance-of-
effort (MOE) requirements and did not supplant existing State spending.
The discussions did not introduce any new policy concerns or
proposals. They are part of the public record, and individuals
interested in reviewing notes on these meetings have the same access to
that information as they do to other comments that were submitted in
written form.
Before discussing the comments in more detail, we want to point out
that we changed the part and section references for this TANF rule. One
commenter noted that our use of parts 270 through 275 for the TANF
rules would likely cause confusion because the major Food Stamp rules
used similar section numbers. In response to that comment, we have
shifted all our part and section numbers down by ten; thus, for
example, the provisions that appeared in part 270 of the NPRM appear in
part 260 of this final rule.
To help you make your way through these changes, we include both
NPRM and final-rule section references in this preamble discussion.
Comment Overview
After accounting for the duplications, we received nearly 270
comments on the NPRM. The largest number of comments came from State
welfare agencies and social services departments, followed by advocacy
groups and other State-level organizations. We also heard from a
significant number of Governors, national associations, local
government offices, Federal legislators, community-based organizations,
State legislators, and the general public. We received a lesser number
of comments from other Federal agencies and members of the educational,
business, child care, research, Tribal, and organized labor
communities.
The only policy area that generated a significant number of
``single-issue'' comments was domestic violence. We received about 25
comments from women's, legal, and other groups that focused exclusively
on the domestic violence provisions in the NPRM. We also received a
handful of comments, mostly from the general public, that focused
exclusively on the role of education in promoting self-sufficiency.
A substantial majority of the comments that addressed our
regulatory framework were positive. Commenters generally seemed to
agree that it was helpful for our rules to provide specific guidance on
how we intended to implement the penalty process and make penalty
determinations. In fact, based on the detailed questions and comments
we received, one could conclude that some commenters were looking for
an expansion on the amount of detail contained in the rule.
On the positive side, in addition to support of particular
policies, commenters indicated that the rules provided some helpful
clarifications of the statute, expressed appreciation for our
regulatory development process, noted ``positive steps'' we had taken,
and noted numerous places where our proposed rules appropriately
reflected the statute.
In general, however, many commenters had mixed views on the policy
proposals on the NPRM, supporting some, but opposing others. For
example, with respect to the domestic violence policies, most
commenters supported the general approach and commended our
encouragement of State implementation of the Family Violence Option.
However, most also expressed a number of concerns about specific
provisions in the proposed rules.
Likewise, many of the States, advocates, and national organizations
supported the proposed rule in a number of areas (such as the
flexibility afforded States to define work activities and the reduction
in penalty liability for States that failed only the two-parent
participation rate), but expressed objections to our approach on other
major issues.
The policy issues that generated the most consistent negative
reactions were separate State programs, child-only cases, and
continuation of waivers. Commenters expressed major concerns that: the
proposed rules would stifle
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innovation; they were overly prescriptive and burdensome; they
undermined the partnership between State and Federal governments and
contravened Congressional intent; we presumed State guilt without
evidence; and these policies could ultimately harm recipients.
We also received numerous negative comments from States and State
representatives on the proposed data collection and reporting
requirements. However, these same requirements generated a largely
favorable reaction from other types of commenters.
In the preamble to the proposed rule, we discussed our general
approach on the major cross-cutting issues up front, prior to the
section-by-section analysis. Many of the commenters organized their
comments in the same way, addressing the issues thematically instead of
following the specific structure of the rule. This preamble follows
that same basic format, presenting a separate discussion of our
policies on the major cross-cutting issues (separate State programs,
child-only cases, waiver continuations, and domestic violence) before
proceeding to the section-by-section analysis.
We present most of the discussion of data collection and reporting
issues in two places--the preamble for part 265 and the preamble
discussion entitled the ``Paperwork Reduction Act'' in the ``Regulatory
Impact Analyses'' section of the preamble.
We believe that structuring the preamble this way enables us to
provide a clearer framework for the specific regulatory provisions and
to represent the commenters' concerns most accurately.
For several reasons, we decided not to attempt precise numerical
counts of the comments received. Based on the nature of the comments,
we did not believe that the number of comments was a particularly
meaningful statistic. First, because several of the comments had
multiple signatories and some commenters provided general endorsements
of the comments of other parties, we would have had to create somewhat
arbitrary rules for developing counts. Also, commenters presented their
views of the many overlapping and cross-cutting issues in many
different ways; for example, some spoke generically about the major
provisions of the rule, while others provided very specific suggestions
about individual words and phrases. This diversity in the approach of
commenters also hampered our ability to create meaningful counts.
Nevertheless, we are confident that this preamble accurately conveys
the scope and nature of the comments received.
We appreciate the time and attention that commenters gave to
reviewing the NPRM and preparing their comments. As a result of their
efforts, we have been able to resolve certain technical problems,
incorporate numerous regulatory clarifications, and consider some
alternative regulatory approaches.
Table of Contents
I. Overview: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act
II. Regulatory Framework
A. Pre-NPRM Process
B. Related Regulations under Development
C. Statutory Context
D. Regulatory Reform
E. Scope of This Rulemaking
F. Applicability of the Rules
III. Principles Governing Regulatory Development
A. Restrictions on Our Regulatory Authority
B. State Flexibility
C. Accountability for Meeting Program Requirements and Goals
IV. Discussion of Cross-Cutting Issues
A. Separate State Programs
B. Waivers
C. Child-only Cases
D. Treatment of Domestic Violence Victims
E. Recipient and Workplace Protections
F. Comments Beyond the Scope of the Rulemaking
G. Additional Cross-Cutting Issues
V. Part 260--General Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
Provisions
VI. Part 261--Ensuring that Recipients Work
VII. Part 262--Accountability Provisions--General
VIII. Part 263--Expenditures of State and Federal TANF Funds
IX. Part 264--Other Accountability Provisions
X. Part 265--Data Collection and Reporting Requirements
XI. Regulatory Impact Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866
B. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
C. Assessment of the Impact on Family Well-Being
D. Paperwork Reduction Act
E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
I. Overview: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed ``The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996''--or
PRWORA--into law. This bipartisan welfare plan built upon previous
Administration and State efforts to reform welfare. Even before PRWORA
was enacted, many States were well on their way to changing their
welfare programs into jobs programs. By granting Federal waivers, the
Administration allowed 43 States--more than all previous
Administrations combined--to require work, time-limit assistance, make
work pay, improve child support enforcement, and encourage parental
responsibility. The vast majority of States have chosen to continue or
build upon these welfare demonstration projects.
PRWORA is dramatically changing the nation's welfare system into
one that requires work in exchange for time-limited assistance. The law
contains strong work requirements, performance bonuses to reward States
for moving welfare recipients into jobs and reducing out-of-wedlock
births, State maintenance-of-effort requirements, comprehensive child
support enforcement, and supports for moving families from welfare to
work--including increased funding for child care. It provides
opportunities for State and local governments, working in partnership
with communities groups and other agencies, to serve families in new,
more creative, and more effective ways.
With the help of the strong economy, and new Federal and State
policies, the percentage of welfare recipients working has tripled
since 1992 and an estimated 1.5 million people who were on welfare in
1997 were working in 1998. All States met the first overall work
participation rates required under TANF, and welfare caseloads have
fallen to the lowest levels in 30 years.
The first title of this new law (Pub. L. 104-193) created a program
called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF, in recognition
of its focus on moving recipients into work and time-limiting
assistance. It repealed the existing welfare program known as Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which provided cash assistance
to needy families on an entitlement basis. It also repealed the related
programs known as the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training
program (JOBS) and Emergency Assistance (EA).
The new TANF program went into effect on July 1, 1997, except in
States that elected to submit a complete plan and implement the program
at an earlier date.
The new law reflects widespread, bipartisan agreement on a number
of key principles:
Welfare reform should help move people from welfare to
work.
Welfare should be a short-term, transitional experience,
not a way of life.
Parents should receive the child care and the health care
they need to protect their children as they move from welfare to work.
Child support programs should become tougher and more
effective in securing support from absent parents.
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Because many factors contribute to poverty and dependency,
solutions to these problems should not be ``one size fits all.'' The
system should allow States, Indian tribes, and localities to develop
diverse and creative responses to their own problems.
The Federal government should focus less attention on
eligibility determinations and place more emphasis on program results.
States should continue to make substantial investments of
State funds in addressing the needs of low-income families.
This landmark welfare reform legislation has dramatically affected
not only needy families, but also intergovernmental relationships. It
challenges Federal, State, Tribal and local agencies to foster positive
changes in the culture of the welfare system and to take more
responsibility for program results and outcomes. It also challenges
them to develop strong interagency collaborations and improve their
partnerships with legislators, advocates, businesses, labor, community
groups, and other parties that share their interest in helping needy
families successfully transition into the mainstream economy.
The new law provides an unparalleled opportunity to achieve true
welfare reform. It also presents very significant challenges for
families and State and Tribal entities in light of the changing program
structure, loss of Federal entitlements, creation of time-limited
assistance, and new penalty and bonus provisions.
Most of the resources in the AFDC program went to support mothers
raising their children alone. In the early years, the expectation was
that these mothers would stay home and care for their children; in
fact, in a number of ways, program rules discouraged work. Over time,
as social and economic conditions changed, and more women entered the
work force, the expectations changed. In 1988, Congress enacted the new
JOBS program to provide education, training and employment that would
help needy families avoid long-term welfare dependence. By 1994, 20
percent of the nonexempt adult AFDC recipients nationwide were
participating in the JOBS program.
In spite of these changes, national sentiment supported more
drastic change. Policy-makers, agency officials, and the public
expressed frustration about the slow progress being made in moving
welfare recipients into work and the continuing decline in family
stability. States lobbied for more flexibility to reform their
programs. While the Clinton Administration had supported individual
reform efforts in almost every State, approving 80 waivers in its first
five years, the waiver process was not an ideal way to achieve systemic
change. It required separate Federal approval of each individual reform
plan, limited the types of reforms that could be implemented, and
enabled reforms to take place only one State at a time. Governors
joined Congress and the President in declaring that the welfare system
was ``broken.''
After more than two years of discussion and negotiation, PRWORA
emerged as a bipartisan vehicle for comprehensive welfare reform. As
President Clinton stated in his remarks as he signed the bill, ``. . .
this legislation provides an historic opportunity to end welfare as we
know it and transform our broken welfare system by promoting the
fundamental values of work, responsibility, and family.''
The law gives States, and federally recognized Indian tribes, the
authority to use Federal welfare funds ``in any manner that is
reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose'' of the new program.
It provides them broad flexibility to set eligibility rules and decide
what benefits are most appropriate. It also enables States to implement
their new programs without getting the ``approval'' of the Federal
government. In short, it offers States and Tribes an opportunity to try
new, far-reaching changes that can respond more effectively to the
needs of families within their own unique environments.
PRWORA redefines the Federal role in administration of the nation's
welfare system. It limits Federal regulatory and enforcement authority,
but gives the Federal government new responsibilities for tracking
State performance. In a select number of areas, it calls for penalties
when States fail to comply with program requirements, and it provides
bonuses for States that perform well in meeting new program goals.
Under the new statute, program funding and assistance for families
both come with new expectations and responsibilities. Adults receiving
assistance are expected to engage in work activities and develop the
capability to support themselves before their time-limited assistance
runs out. States and Tribes are expected to assist recipients making
the transition to employment. They are also expected to meet work
participation rates and other critical program requirements in order to
maintain their Federal funding and avoid penalties.
Some important indicators of the change in expectations are: time
limits; higher participation rates; the elimination of numerous
exemptions from participation requirements; and the statutory option
for States to require individual responsibility plans. Taken together,
these provisions signal an expectation that we must broaden
participation beyond the ``job-ready.''
In meeting these expectations, States need to examine their
caseloads, identify the causes of long-term underemployment and
dependency, and work with families, communities, businesses, and other
social service agencies in resolving employment barriers. In some
cases, States may need to provide intervention services for families in
crisis or may need to adapt program models to accommodate individuals
with disabilities or other special needs. TANF gives States the
flexibility they need to respond to such individual family needs.
However, in return, it expects States to move towards a strategy that
provides appropriate services for all needy families.
II. Regulatory Framework
A. Pre-NPRM Process
In the spirit of both regulatory reform and PRWORA, we implemented
a broad and far-reaching consultation strategy prior to the drafting of
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). In Washington, we set up
numerous meetings with outside parties to gain information on the major
issues underlying the work, penalty, and data collection provisions of
the new law. In our ten regional offices, we used a variety of
mechanisms--including meetings, conference calls, and written
solicitations--to garner views from ``beyond the Beltway.''
The purpose of these discussions was to gain a variety of
informational perspectives about the potential benefits and pitfalls of
alternative regulatory approaches. We spoke with a number of different
audiences, including: representatives of State, Tribal, and local
governments; nonprofit and community organizations; business and labor
groups; and experts from the academic, foundation, and advocacy
communities. We solicited both written and oral comments, and we worked
to ensure that information and concerns raised during this process were
shared with both the staff working on individual regulatory issues and
key policy-makers.
These consultations were very useful in helping us identify key
issues and evaluate policy options, and several commenters commended
ACF on this process.
[[Page 17723]]
B. Related Regulations Under Development
This rule addresses the work, accountability, and data collection
and reporting provisions of the new TANF program. We have also issued
NPRM's and program guidance on several related provisions of the new
law including: high performance bonuses (TANF-ACF-PI-98-1 and TANF-ACF-
PI-98-05); illegitimacy reduction bonuses (63 FR 10263, March 2, 1998);
and the Tribal TANF and Native Employment Works (i.e., ``NEW'')
programs (63 FR 39365, July 22, 1998).
With a couple of minor exceptions, this rule does not address the
provisions of the Welfare-to-Work (WtW) program at section 403(a)(5) of
the Act, as created by section 5001(a)(1) of Pub. L. 105-33. The
Secretary of Labor issued interim rules on these provisions and the
provisions at section 5001(c), regarding WtW grants for Tribes, on
November 18, 1997. A copy of the interim rules and other information
about this program are available on the Web at http://wtw.doleta.gov.
The WtW provisions in this rule include the amendments to the TANF
provisions at sections 5001(d) and 5001(g)(1) of Pub. L. 105-33.
Section 5001(d) allows a State to provide WtW assistance to a family
that has received 60 months of federally funded TANF assistance and
specifies that ``noncash'' assistance under the WtW program is not
treated as TANF ``assistance'' for purposes of the TANF time limit.
Section 5001(g)(1) provides a new penalty that takes away WtW funds
when a State fails to meet the basic MOE requirements.
Also, this rule does not include the provision at section
5001(g)(2), which requires repayment of WtW funds to the Secretary of
Labor following a finding by the Secretary of Labor of misuse of funds.
Since the Department of Labor is responsible for administering this
penalty and receives any repaid funds, it would not be appropriate for
us to issue rules on this provision.
Under section 5001(e) of Pub. L. 105-33, we have responsibility for
regulating the WtW data reporting requirements, under section 411(a) of
the Act, as amended. On October 29, 1998, we issued an interim-final
rule that addresses these requirements, following consultation with the
Department of Labor, State agencies, Private Industry Councils, and
other affected parties (63 FR 57919).
As we pointed out in the NPRM preamble, there is an important
relationship between this rulemaking and the rulemaking on Tribal
programs. Under section 412 of the Social Security Act, federally
recognized Tribes may elect to operate their own TANF programs, and
Tribes that operated their own JOBS programs may continue to receive
those funds to operate Tribal work programs. We published the NPRM for
Tribal TANF programs on July 22, 1998 (see 63 FR 39365).
Tribal decisions on whether to elect the TANF option will depend on
a number of factors, including the nature of services and benefits that
will be available to Tribal members under the State program. Thus,
Tribes have a direct interest in the regulations governing State
programs.
Tribes also have an interest in these regulations because some of
the rules we develop for State programs could eventually apply to the
Tribal programs. In particular, we urge Tribes to note the data
collection and reporting requirements at part 265. While the statute
allows Tribes to negotiate certain program requirements, such as work
participation rates and time limits, it subjects Tribal programs to the
same data collection and reporting requirements as States.
We would also like to direct the Tribes to the maintenance-of-
effort (MOE) policies discussed at Sec. 263.1. In that section, we
provide that State contributions to a Tribal program could count toward
a State's MOE. Tribes should be aware of the important implications of
this provision for both the funding of Tribal programs and State-Tribal
relations.
In order for welfare reform to succeed in Indian country, it is
important for State and Tribal governments to work together on a number
of key issues, including data exchange and coordination of services. We
remind States that Tribes have a right under law to operate their own
programs. States should cooperate in providing the information
necessary for Tribes to do so.
Likewise, Tribes should cooperate with States in identifying Tribal
members and tracking receipt of assistance.
On December, 5, 1997, we issued a final rule to repeal the obsolete
regulations for the EA, JOBS, and the IV-A child care programs and a
few provisions covering administrative requirements of the AFDC program
(see 62 FR 64301, December 5, 1997). This action resulted in the
elimination of about 82 pages from the Code of Federal Regulations.
We have yet to issue a more detailed conforming rule that deletes
or replaces obsolete AFDC and title IV-A references throughout chapter
II. This second rulemaking will take additional time because the AFDC
provisions are intertwined with provisions for other programs that are
not repealed. Also, it is not clear that we should repeal all the AFDC
provisions because Medicaid, foster care, and other programs have
linkages to the AFDC rules. Because of these complexities and the
nonurgent nature of the conforming changes, this latter rule is not an
immediate agency priority.
PRWORA also changed other major programs administered by ACF, the
Department, and other Federal agencies that may significantly affect a
State's success in implementing welfare reform. For example, title VI
of PRWORA repealed the child care programs that were previously
authorized under title IV-A of the Social Security Act. In their place,
it provided two new sources of child care funding (which we refer to
collectively as the Child Care Development Fund). These funds go to the
Lead Agency that administers the Child Care and Development Block Grant
program. A major purpose of the increases in child care funding
provided under PRWORA is to assist low-income families in their efforts
to be self-sufficient. We issued final rules covering the Child Care
and Development Fund on July 24, 1998 (see 63 FR 39935).
We encourage you to look in the Federal Register for actions on
these related rules, take the opportunity to comment, and work to
understand the important relationships among these programs in
developing a comprehensive strategy that can provide support to all
families that are working to maintain their family structure and become
self-sufficient.
C. Statutory Context
These proposed rules reflect PRWORA, as enacted, and amended by
Pub. L. 104-327, Pub. L. 105-33, Pub. L. 105-89, Pub. L. 105-178, and
Pub. L. 105-200.
As we indicated in the NPRM preamble, the changes made by Pub. L.
104-327 are fairly limited in scope; we discuss them in the preamble on
Contingency Fund MOE requirements at Secs. 264.71, 264.72, and 264.77.
Pub. L. 105-33 (also known as The Balanced Budget Act of 1997)
created the new Welfare-to Work (WtW) program, made a few substantive
changes to the TANF program, and made numerous technical corrections to
the TANF statute. We attempted to incorporate those amendments that
were in our purview in the NPRM. However, commenters identified a
couple of places where we did not fully
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or correctly incorporate these amendments. We found a few more. We note
these in the preamble discussion that follows and have made appropriate
changes in the regulatory text.
We want to note a couple of additional legislative developments
since the drafting of the NPRM that might affect a State's liability
for penalties and the use of Federal TANF funds. We have made a couple
of conforming changes in the rules to reflect these developments.
Under Pub. L. 105-89, known as the Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 1997, Congress decreased the amount of money available to States
through the ``Contingency Fund'' and increased the amount that States
receiving contingency funds must remit, using a proportionate
reduction. We discuss this provision in more detail in the preamble for
subpart B of part 264, and we have changed the regulatory text to
reflect this change.
Under Pub. L. 105-178, known as The Transportation Equity Act for
the 21st Century, Congress: (1) (Effective in fiscal year 2001) reduced
the cap on the amount that a State could transfer to the Social
Services Block Grant from 10 percent to 4.25 percent; (2) created the
``Job Access'' competitive grant program to help communities develop
transportation services that will help current and former welfare
recipients and other low-income individuals access employment; and (3)
specified that States could use their Federal TANF funds as part of the
nongovernmental cost-sharing required under a Job Access program. None
of these provisions directly affect the TANF rules, but they do change
what would be an allowable use of Federal TANF funds. It is important
that States understand these provisions if they wish to avoid a penalty
for misuse of Federal TANF funds.
Under section 403 of The Child Support Performance and Incentives
Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-200, Congress amended section 404 of the
Social Security Act to address the use of Federal TANF funds within the
Job Access and Reverse Commute program. It imposed: (1) restrictions on
the use of Federal TANF funds for this purpose, including ``new
spending'' and ``nonsupplantation'' requirements; (2) a requirement
that the preponderance of funds go to TANF recipients, former TANF
recipients, certain noncustodial parents, and low-income individuals at
risk of qualifying for the TANF program; and (3) a requirement that the
services provided support participation in TANF work activities. It
also imposed a cap on the total amount of Federal TANF funds that a
State could use for this purpose, computed as the difference between 30
percent of the State Family Assistance Grant (SFAG) amount and the
amount that a State was transferring that year to the Child Care and
Development Block Grant or the Social Services Block Grant.
Consistent with treatment of the other restrictions on the grant at
section 404, we have not directly incorporated these restrictions into
the TANF rule. However, we note that we would consider expenditures in
violation of these new provisions a misuse of funds.
We also point out that these provisions do not conflict with the
restrictions at section 409(a)(7)(B)(iv) of the Act or Sec. 263.6(a)
and (c) of these rules. The TANF rules deal with the converse
situation--the circumstances under which other State expenditures do
not qualify under TANF's basic maintenance-of-effort provisions. The
new provisions address the circumstances under which Federal TANF funds
may count as nongovernmental expenditures under a separate program.
They do not give States the authority to use Job Access funds for basic
MOE purposes.
Further, the use of Federal TANF funds to support Job Access
activities does not constitute a transfer of Federal TANF funds within
the meaning of section 404(d)(1). Thus, they do not affect the
``adjusted SFAG'' amount that we use in determining the administrative
cost cap and penalty amounts.
The Child Support Performance and Incentives Act also added a
``rule of interpretation'' to section 404(k)(3) of the Social Security
Act, which indicates that the provision of transportation benefits to
an individual who is not otherwise receiving TANF assistance would not
be considered assistance. We have made a conforming change to our
definition of assistance at Sec. 260.31 to reflect this policy.
D. Regulatory Reform
In its latest Document Drafting Handbooks, the Office of the
Federal Register has supported the efforts of the National Partnership
for Reinventing Government and encouraged Federal agencies to produce
more reader-friendly regulations. In drafting the proposed and final
rule, we paid close attention to this guidance and worked to produce a
more readable rule. We also provided electronic access to the document
and gave readers the option to submit their comments electronically. We
received a number of positive comments about how the NPRM was written
and the electronic access.
Based in part on the positive reaction to the proposed rule, and in
the spirit of facilitating understanding, we decided to retain much of
the NPRM preamble discussion. We believe it will be useful for some
readers in providing the overall context for the final regulations.
However, where we are changing our policy in the final rule, or the
context has changed since we issued the NPRM, we have made appropriate
changes to the preamble. We also exercised some editorial discretion to
make the discussion more succinct or clearer in places. Wherever we
made significant changes in policy, the preamble notes and explains
those changes.
In the proposed rule, we decided to incorporate a few statutory
provisions as a frame of reference even though we did not intend to
regulate or enforce State behavior in those areas. We thought the
inclusion of this additional preamble discussion and regulatory text
would help establish the broader context for other parts of the
rulemaking document. These additions were primarily explanatory in
nature or restatements of the statutory requirements. We indicated that
readers could probably identify these additional provisions based on
the language used and the surrounding preamble discussion and noted
that subparts A and G of part 271 (which addressed the work provisions
other than participation rates and penalties) and Sec. 270.20 (which
included the statutory goals of the program) as specific examples.
Commenters identified an additional item that would be helpful to
include as a frame of reference--the nondiscrimination provisions found
at section 408(d) of the Act. We decided to accept the suggestion and
include these provisions in the final rule since commenters had not
generally objected to including such material in the regulatory text of
the NPRM, the inclusion will have informational value, and the change
does not materially alter the scope of the rule. (See the discussion on
``Recipient and Workplace Protections'' for additional information.)
Likewise, based on comments we received on the domestic violence
provisions in the proposed rule, we incorporated the statutory
provisions on the Family Violence Option at a new Sec. 260.52.
In the spirit of providing access to information, we included draft
data collection and reporting forms as appendices to the proposed rules
even though we did not intend to publish the forms as part of the final
rule. We thought that the inclusion of the draft
[[Page 17725]]
forms would expand public access to this information and make it easier
to comment on our data collection and reporting plans.
We believe that we succeeded in accomplishing these goals.
Commenters responded in large numbers and specific detail to both the
Paperwork Reduction Notice and the Proposed Rule. The changes to the
final rule and to the companion appendices reflect our consolidated
response to both sets of comments.
E. Scope of This Rulemaking
The NPRM and final rule reflect our decision to incorporate the
work, data collection, and penalty provisions in a single regulatory
package. While this decision resulted in a large rule, we think it
enabled us to develop a more coherent regulatory framework and provided
readers an opportunity to look at, and comment on, the many
interconnected pieces at one time.
One downside of this decision was that the concentration of all
these accountability provisions in one rule could have contributed to
the perception among some commenters that the tone was punitive and the
rule too penalty-focused. It is important to keep our broader
regulatory and program agenda in mind as you assess the impact and
meaning of this package. The total agenda includes rewards, as well as
penalties, and tracks State performance along a variety of different
measures, including job entries, success in the workplace, reductions
in out-of-wedlock childbearing, and child poverty rates. It also
includes annual reports to Congress on State program characteristics,
recipient characteristics, and performance.
Our agenda also includes extensive research, evaluation, and
technical assistance efforts. Throughout this preamble, you will find
examples of how our efforts in these areas respond, in a nonregulatory
fashion, to commenter concerns. It would be impractical and
inappropriate to use this rulemaking as the vehicle for informing the
public about the full agenda, but the ``Promising Practices National
Conferences'' held in September 1998 and in Fiscal Year 1999 provide a
good example. These meetings, which have the financial support of the
Department of Health and Human Services (including both the
Administration for Children and Families and the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration) and the Department of Labor,
will provide State and local staff and other practitioners with
practical ideas on a range of topics, such as preparing for the
difficult task of moving clients with multiple barriers into work,
creating jobs in isolated and high-risk communities, increasing support
from noncustodial parents, promoting collaboration and achieving
seamless delivery of services, changing welfare offices to job centers,
promoting success in the workplace, and maintaining the investments in
needy families.
F. Applicability of the Rules
As we indicated in policy guidance to the States and the NPRM, a
State could operate its program under a reasonable interpretation of
the statute prior to our issuance of final rules. Thus, in determining
whether a State is subject to a penalty, we would not apply regulatory
interpretations retroactively. We retained this basic policy, but
modified it to clarify that the ``reasonable interpretation'' standard
applies until the effective date of these final rules. You can find
additional discussion of this policy at Sec. 260.40 of the preamble.
III. Principles Governing Regulatory Development
A. Restrictions on Our Regulatory Authority
Under the new section 417 of the Act, the Federal government may
not regulate State conduct or enforce any TANF provision except to the
extent expressly provided by law. This limitation on Federal authority
is consistent with the principle of State flexibility and the general
State and congressional interest in shifting more responsibility for
program policy and procedures to the States.
We interpreted this provision to allow us to regulate in two
different kinds of situations: (1) Where Congress has explicitly
directed the Secretary to regulate (for example, under the caseload
reduction provisions, described below); and (2) where Congress has
charged the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) with
enforcing penalties, even if there is no explicit mention of
regulation. In this latter case, we believe we have an obligation to
States to set out, in regulations, the criteria we will use in carrying
out our express authority to enforce certain TANF provisions by
assessing penalties.
In the preamble to the proposed rule, we indicated that we
endeavored to regulate in a manner that did not impinge on a State's
ability to design an effective and responsive program. A large number
of commenters felt that our regulations would in fact have such a
negative effect. In the subsequent discussion, you will note that we
have revised provisions in key program areas that respond to these
concerns.
At the same time, however, we remain committed to ensuring that
States remain accountable for meeting TANF requirements. Thus, we will
continue to monitor program developments so that we can make
appropriate adjustments if programs fail to remain focused on TANF's
statutory objectives.
B. State Flexibility
In the Conference Report to PRWORA, Congress stated that the best
welfare solutions come from those closest to the problems, not from the
Federal government. Thus, the legislation creates a broad block grant
for each State to reform welfare in ways that work best. It gives
States the flexibility to design their own programs, define who will be
eligible, establish what benefits and services will be available, and
develop their own strategies for achieving program goals, including how
to help recipients move into the work force.
Under the law and the proposed rules, we indicated that States
could implement innovative and creative strategies for supporting the
critical goals of work and responsibility. For example, they could
choose to expend funds on refundable earned income tax credits or
transportation assistance that would help low-wage workers keep their
jobs. They could also extend employment services to noncustodial
parents, by including them within the definition of ``eligible
families.''
To ensure that our rules supported the legislative goals of PRWORA,
we indicated our commitment to gather information on how States were
responding to the new opportunities available to them. We said that we
reserved the right to revisit some issues, either through legislative
or regulatory proposals, if we identified situations where State
actions were not furthering the objectives of the Act.
A large number of commenters felt we had unduly limited State
flexibility to design their programs, particularly with respect to
expending funds in separate State programs, providing assistance to
child-only cases, and continuing waivers, but also in areas like the
definition of administrative costs, restrictions on domestic violence
waivers that affected reasonable cause, and the definition of
assistance.
We included some restrictions on State flexibility in the NPRM to
protect against possible State policies that might undermine TANF goals
or divert the Federal share of child support collections. However, in
response to
[[Page 17726]]
these concerns and in recognition of the positive steps States have
been taking to implement welfare reform, we have decided to remove some
of the direct and perceived restrictions on State flexibility. We have
also provided some important preamble language that helps clarify State
flexibility to define needy families and spend both Federal TANF and
State MOE funds in ways that support a wide range of families in
diverse ways. We provide additional discussion of these changes and
clarifications in subsequent sections of the preamble.
C. Accountability for Meeting Program Requirements and Goals
In the NPRM we recognized that States have enormous flexibility to
design their TANF programs in ways that strengthen families and promote
work, responsibility, and self-sufficiency. At the same time, however,
TANF reflects a bipartisan commitment to ensuring that State programs
support the goals of welfare reform. To this end, the statutory
provisions on data collection, bonuses, and penalties are crucial
because they allow us to track what is happening to needy families and
children under the new law, measure program outcomes, and promote key
program objectives.
Work
As we indicated in the NPRM, we believe the central goal of the new
law is to move welfare recipients into work. The law reflects this
important goal in a number of ways:
Work receives prominent mention in the statutory goals at
section 401 and the plan provisions in section 402;
Section 407 establishes specific work participation rates
each State must achieve;
Section 409 provides significant financial penalties
against any State that fails to achieve the required participation
rates;
Section 411 provides specific authority for the Secretary
to establish data reporting requirements to capture necessary data on
work participation rates; and
Section 413 calls for ranking of States based on the
effectiveness of their work programs.
The proposed and final rules reflect a similar, special focus on
promoting the work objectives of the Act and ensuring that States meet
the statutory requirements at sections 407, 409, and 411 of the Act.
You should look at the rules in part 261, and the related preamble
discussion, for specific details.
This Administration has repeatedly shown its commitment to
promoting the work objectives of this new law. Before and since the
legislation was passed, the President and the Administration have
worked very hard to ensure that Congress passed strong work provisions
and provided adequate child care funding and other program supports to
help families making the transition from welfare to work.
These include the new Welfare to Work program (WtW), the Welfare-
to-Work Tax Credit enacted in the Balanced Budget Act, Welfare-to-Work
housing vouchers included in the Fiscal Year 1999 budget for the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Job Access
transportation grants.
WtW provides grants to States, localities, Indian Tribes, and
other grantees to help them move long-term welfare recipients and
certain noncustodial parents into lasting, unsubsidized jobs.
The Welfare to Work Tax Credit provides a credit equal to 35
percent of the first $10,000 in wages in the first year of
employment, and 50 percent of the first $10,000 in wages in the
second year, to encourage the hiring and retention of long-term
recipients. (It complements the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, which
provides a credit of up to $2,400 for the first year of wages to
employers who hire long-term welfare recipients.)
Welfare-to-Work Housing vouchers will help current and former
welfare recipients who need housing assistance to get or keep a job.
Most of the housing vouchers (50,000 in FY 1999) will go to
communities on a competitive grant basis.
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21)
authorizes $750 million over five years for competitive grants to
communities to develop innovative transportation activities to help
welfare recipients and other low-income workers (i.e., those with
income up to 150 percent of poverty) get to work. (You can find more
information about the Administration's initiatives at http://
www.whitehouse/gov/wh/welfare.)
The President has also challenged America's businesses, its large
nonprofit sector, and the executive branch of the Federal government to
help welfare recipients go to work and succeed in the workplace.
In May 1997, the President helped to launch a new private-sector
initiative to promote the hiring of welfare recipients by private-
sector employers. The Welfare-to-Work Partnership, which started with
105 participating businesses, now includes over 10,000 businesses that
have hired 410,000 welfare recipients. This partnership has produced a
variety of materials to support businesses in these efforts, including
the ``Blueprint for Business'' hiring manual and ``The Road to
Retention,'' a report of companies that have achieved higher retention
rates for former welfare recipients. You can find information about the
Welfare to Work Partnership at http://www.welfaretowork.org.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) is addressing the unique
and vital role of small businesses, which account for over one-half of
all private-sector employment. It is helping small businesses make
connections to job training organizations and job-ready welfare
recipients. It is also providing training and assistance to welfare
recipients who wish to start their own businesses. Businesses can
receive assistance through SBA's 1-800-U-ASK-SBA and through its
network of centers, shops, and district offices. Information on SBA's
Welfare to Work initiative (W2W) and other activities are available
through the SBA home page at http://www.sba.gov.
In addition, the Vice President has developed a coalition of
national civic, service, and faith-based groups committed to helping
former welfare recipients succeed in the workforce--by providing
mentoring, job training, child care, and other supports.
On March 8, 1997, the President directed all Federal agencies to
submit plans describing the efforts they would make to respond to this
challenge. Under the Vice President's leadership, Federal agencies
committed to hiring at least 10,000 welfare recipients over the next
four years. Agencies have already fulfilled this commitment--nearly two
years ahead of schedule. (You can find additional information on this
effort at http://www.welfaretowork.fed.gov.)
Meeting the Needs of Low-Income Families and Children
In a number of different ways, the new law works to ensure that the
needs of low-income children and families are met. First, it provides a
guaranteed base level of Federal funding for the TANF programs. Then,
in times of special financial need, it makes nearly $2 billion in
additional funding available through a Contingency Fund and up to $1.7
billion available for loans to States. It also authorizes several
studies to monitor changes in the situations of needy children and
families that occur after enactment. For example, it requires us to
report on how certain children are affected by the provisions of the
new law. It also requires us to track whether a State's child poverty
rate increases as the result of the State's TANF program and requires
States to initiate corrective actions when such increases occur.
These regulations work to further the objectives of these statutory
provisions.
[[Page 17727]]
Most importantly, they work to ensure that the use of Federal and State
funds is consistent with the provisions and purposes of TANF, that
States maintain their investments on needy families, that recipients
and other workers have the protections available to them that are
intended under Federal law, and that we collect data from States that
are necessary to assess program performance.
IV. Discussion of Cross-Cutting Issues
Overview of Comments
As we indicated earlier in the preamble, commenters expressed a
number of major concerns with respect to our policies on separate State
programs, child-only cases, and waiver continuations. In particular,
they said: (1) In part because of the uncertainty they created, the
proposed rules would stifle innovation and undermine the States'
ability to meet the needs of their families; (2) the proposed rules
were overly prescriptive and burdensome, too concerned about
accountability and the taking of penalties, and not focused on
outcomes; (3) they undermined the partnership between the State and
Federal governments, fostered an adversarial relationship, violated the
compact between the States and Washington in creating TANF, or
contravened Congressional intent (if not the law) in regulating State
behavior in these areas; (4) we presumed State guilt when there was no
evidence that States were taking advantage of loopholes to evade the
TANF provisions; and (5) our strict penalty policies, promotion of
``work first'' strategies, and inattention to recipient protections
could ultimately harm recipients (e.g., prevent them from attaining
jobs that paid a living wage or accessing appropriate treatment).
We disagree with commenters that claimed that we exceeded our
regulatory and statutory authority in the NPRM. However, because of the
evidence we have seen about States' commitment to develop programs that
are consistent with the goals of TANF, these final rules reflect some
significant changes in our policies on these three issues. You will
find additional details in the following discussion.
A. Separate State Programs
Background
Section 409(a)(7) of the Social Security Act permits States to
assist eligible families by expending maintenance-of-effort funds (MOE)
under ``all State programs.'' Thus, we recognize expenditures under the
State's TANF program and/or separate State program(s). However,
eligible families assisted through a separate State program are not
generally subject to TANF requirements, including work participation
requirements, child support collection requirements, the time limit on
receipt of assistance, and data collection and reporting requirements.
In other words, by definition, States operating separate programs avoid
TANF requirements; they have more flexibility to use the funds
available in these programs to help eligible families.
In the NPRM preamble, in a section entitled ``Maintenance-of-Effort
(MOE),'' we stated that one of the most important provisions in the new
law designed to protect needy families and children is the basic
maintenance-of-effort (basic MOE) requirement in the TANF statute. This
provision requires States to maintain a certain level of spending on
welfare, based on historic (i.e., fiscal year (FY) 1994) expenditure
levels. Because this provision is critical to the successful
implementation of the law, Congress gave us the authority to enforce
State compliance in meeting this requirement, and it received
significant attention in the proposed rule.
We also directed readers to the data collection, work, and penalty
provisions of the proposed rule, at parts 271-275, for provisions
designed to: (1) ensure that States continue to make the required
investments in meeting the needs of low-income children and families;
(2) prevent States from either supplanting funds or using their MOE
funds to meet extraneous program or fiscal needs; (3) give us adequate
information to meet our statutory responsibility to determine what is
happening in State programs; and (4) take a broad view of work effort,
caseload reduction, and program performance.
We recognized that States have more flexibility in spending their
State MOE funds than their Federal TANF funds, especially when they
expend their MOE funds in separate State programs. However, at the same
time, we reiterated concerns that we had first expressed in our policy
guidance of January 1997, TANF-ACF-PA-97-1, that States could design
their programs to avoid the work requirements of the new law or to
avoid returning a share of their child support collections to the
Federal government. Therefore, we proposed four measures to mitigate
these potential negative consequences.
First, if we detected a significant pattern of diversion of
families to a separate State program that achieves the effect of
avoiding either the work participation rates or returning the Federal
share of child support collections, we proposed to deny reasonable
cause for certain penalties. For avoiding the work participation rates,
reasonable cause relief would not be available with respect to
penalties for failure to: meet minimum participation rates, implement
time limits, maintain assistance to a custodial parent who cannot
obtain child care for a child under age 6, and reduce assistance for
recipients refusing without good cause to work. For diverting the
Federal share of child support collections, reasonable cause would not
be available with respect to the penalties for failure to: meet minimum
participation rates, implement time limits, reduce assistance for
recipients refusing without good cause to work, and cooperate with
paternity establishment and child support enforcement requirements.
Second, for the same two diversion situations and penalties that we
just discussed, we proposed that a State would not be eligible for a
penalty reduction on the basis of making substantial progress during
corrective compliance unless it corrected the diversion.
Third, we proposed to deny a State access to two possible
reductions in the penalty for failing to meet work participation rates
unless it ``demonstrates that it has not diverted cases to a separate
State program for the purpose of avoiding the work participation
requirements.''
Finally, we proposed to require that a State collect case-record
data on participants in separate State programs if it wished to receive
a high performance bonus; qualify for work participation caseload
reduction credit; or be considered for a reduction in the penalty for
failing to meet the work participation requirements.
In making these proposals, we noted that the Secretary has
considerable discretion in determining whether to reduce penalties or
grant a good cause exception. We argued that work was the most critical
component in achieving the purposes of TANF and these limits on the
relief on the work penalty were appropriate to prevent circumvention of
this purpose.
We went on to say that implementation of the child support
provisions was the other key component to achieving self-sufficiency.
We spoke about the major Federal role in child support enforcement
(particularly with regard to the operation of the New Hire Directory
and the Federal Parent Locator Service), the continuing Federal
interest in the effectiveness of these programs, and the continued
Federal financial
[[Page 17728]]
commitment, under TANF, for needy families whose children have been
deprived of parental support and care.
We expressed concern not just about the unintended, negative
consequences of diverting cases to separate State programs for the
Federal budget and the Federal government's ability to ensure an
effective child support program, but also about reduced State
accountability for ensuring that needy families take appropriate steps
towards achieving self-sufficiency. We indicated that, in the interest
of protecting the key goals of TANF, it was appropriate for the
Secretary to use the discretion available to her to forgive penalties
and set penalty amounts so as to ensure that States do not divert cases
inappropriately.
We announced plans to monitor States' actions to determine if they
constituted a significant pattern of diversion. For example, if, based
on an examination of statistical or other evidence, we came to the
conclusion that a State was assigning people to a separate State
program in order to divert the Federal share of child support
collections, or in order to evade the work requirements, we would
conclude that this is a significant pattern of diversion and would deny
the State the specified types of penalty relief.
We said a State would have opportunity to prove that this pattern
was actually the result of State policies and objectives that were
entirely unrelated to the goal of diversion, but we would make the
final judgment as to what constitutes a significant pattern of
diversion.
We placed the specific regulatory provisions associated with these
policies in Secs. 271.51(a), 271.52(b), 272.5(c) and (d), and
272.6(i)(2) of the proposed rule.
We also indicated our intent to propose that States seeking to
receive high performance bonuses would be required to report on
families served by separate State programs in the coming NPRM on high
performance bonuses.
Comment Overview
We received dozens of comments on these proposals related to
implementation of separate State programs. The commenters universally
opposed the proposals and presented a variety of objections. Most
wanted the provisions deleted entirely, but some suggested specific
changes that we could make to the regulatory provisions if we did not
delete them.
In summarizing these extensive comments, we first address those
directed at deleting the provisions. Then we address the comments about
possible refinements that we could make.
Commenters objected to both the negative tone of these rules and
their effect in undermining State and local flexibility to serve needy
families, including those with multiple barriers to employment. They
noted that several States have created or were considering separate
State programs to serve their most vulnerable families, such as legal
noncitizens with poor language and literacy skills; single parents
taking care of a disabled child; citizens not disabled enough to
qualify for SSI, but unable to work 20 to 30 hours a week; refugees;
and victims of domestic violence. They expressed fears that the
proposed rules, if not modified, could have a significant chilling
effect on the development of innovative approaches to serve working
families and the most vulnerable populations. That is, States would be
conservative in extending assistance to hard-to-serve or working
families out of fear of incurring more and larger penalties. In fact,
some commenters argued that, since TANF was not an entitlement program,
some States might choose not to give such individuals assistance due to
concerns about the penalty consequences.
Some argued that the proposals were contrary to the statute and
Congressional intent. Their comments encompassed the following general
points: (1) There is no statutory basis for the links between penalty
relief and the operation of separate State programs. In deciding
penalty relief, we should be looking only at the TANF program. (2) The
statute clearly authorizes States to spend their basic MOE funds in
separate State programs that are not subject to TANF requirements. Our
proposals would punish States that elected to use this authority and
preempt State and local authority over their own programs. (3) Our
proposals would deny penalty relief where the statute requires such
relief. (For example, the statute says that the Secretary ``shall''
reduce work participation penalties based on degree of noncompliance;
thus, this reduction is not discretionary. The statute also provides
that the Secretary could impose lesser penalties on a State that fails
to correct a violation fully under corrective compliance.)
Categorically denying penalty relief because of a State's legal and
allowable actions on separate State programs is not appropriate.
In lieu of the proposed policies, many commenters recommended that
we monitor State actions to determine if a State is pursuing legitimate
policy objectives or avoiding TANF-related requirements. They noted the
lack of evidence so far that States were abusing the flexibility
available under the law; their view was that States have been using
separate programs for constructive and appropriate purposes. One noted,
if a few States try to take advantage of the flexibility in the law,
Congress and the Department can work together to figure out an
effective way to stop them.
Commenters also argued that the penalty consequences for operating
separate State programs exceeded the magnitude of the purported
offense. As a case example, a State could be operating a separate State
program that represented only a small percent of its MOE expenditures,
it barely missed its participation rate, and it had suffered a
catastrophic natural disaster during the course of the year. The
argument is that the State should get reasonable cause or penalty
reduction because the State's failure could be attributed entirely to
the natural disaster, the separate State program was an incidental
matter, and, by any objective measure, the State's degree of
noncompliance was minimal. Absolute loss of penalty relief in such a
case would be arbitrary, at a minimum.
A related comment was that we should limit denial of penalty relief
to situations where there is a direct relationship between the penalty
at issue and the conduct of the State. Commenters argued that we should
not deny penalty relief on four penalties when the State actions at
issue were probably only directly connected to one penalty.
One suggestion for making the consequences more proportionate to
the ``offense'' would be to not totally preclude eligibility for
penalty relief, but to consider State policies on separate State
programs as one of several factors affecting how difficult the penalty
standard was for a State to achieve.
Others noted that we had not used clear or consistent language when
articulating how a separate State program might affect the availability
of penalty relief. The lack of clarity would make it difficult for
States to predict the effect of these provisions and could produce
unfair, arbitrary, and inconsistent outcomes. It could also mean that
we unduly deter States from assisting needy families.
Commenters raised the following questions about the meaning of our
proposals: (1) What is meant by ``purpose'' and ``effect''? (2) Are the
terms meant to define different concepts? (3) Does ``purpose'' refer to
``sole purpose'' or ``one of the purposes''? (4) How would we
determine, or a State prove, whether a
[[Page 17729]]
separate State program has the specified ``purpose'' or ``effect''? (5)
What is meant by a ``significant'' pattern of diversion? and (6) What
criteria would we use to judge whether a State adequately demonstrated
that it had not diverted cases to avoid penalties or divert child
support? Relatedly, they objected to the fact that our proposed rules
shifted the burden of proof about intent onto the States and to the
difficulties attendant in proving a negative proposition.
Among the suggestions offered for addressing these concerns were:
(1) Clarify the circumstances when a State will not face loss of
penalty relief (e.g., identify reasonable and legitimate policy bases
for separate State programs, using examples); (2) allow an up-front
assessment of the acceptability of separate State programs that States
could rely upon in deciding what options to pursue under separate State
programs; (3) create clear, objective criteria for determining when a
separate State program would trigger adverse consequences; and (4) err
on the side of flexibility if we cannot make highly accurate
determinations that programs are deliberately designed to avoid Federal
rules.
Overall Response
When we were developing the proposed rules, obviously we were very
concerned that States would use the flexibility available through
separate State programs to avoid work participation requirements,
divert the Federal share of child support collections, and otherwise
undermine the goals or provisions of TANF. Within the authority that we
have to make decisions on State penalties and bonuses, we proposed
specific regulatory policies with respect to penalties, bonuses, and
reporting in response to that concern.
However, as we have seen these programs evolve, our concerns about
possible abuses have diminished. As commenters pointed out, States are
generally using separate State programs to serve a variety of policy
purposes consistent with the goals and provisions of PRWORA. For
example: (1) They are supporting work and self-support--through State
earned income credits, transportation, child care, or other work-
related assistance; (2) they are helping families with special needs
who are unable to engage in work activities for the requisite number of
hours--e.g., families dealing with substance abuse, incapacity (or
caring for a disabled child), literacy or ESL needs; (3) they are
working to increase the economic viability of families--by providing
financial aid for post-secondary education and support for other
education or training activities, including activities for noncustodial
parents; and (4) they are assisting individuals ineligible for the TANF
program (e.g., using State funds to provide ``Food Stamp'' benefits for
legal aliens who lost eligibility for assistance under PRWORA).
In the few cases where separate State programs are serving families
that we would normally expect to see in the TANF program, we often see
the same or similar level of work activity required under TANF; e.g.,
Florida's two-parent program and Maine's Parents-as-Scholars program
are part of separate State programs, but expect parents to participate
at the TANF level of hours, or more.
As commenters pointed out, if we developed policy to force States
to provide services to families within the confines of the TANF
statute, we would not necessarily achieve that end. An equally possible
outcome could be that States would elect not to serve families,
especially those hard-to-serve families that would be the most
difficult to accommodate under the standard TANF rules.
We considered ways to redraft the NPRM policy so that we would not
have the ``chilling'' effect on State innovation that commenters
feared. A variety of options were available to us, ranging from wording
changes, to clarifications of key terms, to setting up a process for
pre-clearance of State proposals, to reducing the potential negative
consequences to States if we found inappropriate diversion.
However, we were concerned that: (1) None of these options totally
eliminated the potential ``chilling'' effects on State innovation; and
(2) existing evidence did not indicate that there was a problem
sufficient to justify such a strong policy response.
Thus, the final rules eliminate the proposed link between a State's
decisions on implementing a separate State program and its eligibility
for penalty relief. In particular, we removed the provisions related to
separate State programs that were in the proposed rules at
Secs. 271.51(a), 271.52(b), 272.5 (c) and (d), and 272.6(i)(2).
However, we remain concerned about the possibility that States
could use separate State programs to avoid the TANF work requirements
(particularly for two-parent families) and to divert the Federal share
of child support collections. Thus, at Secs. 261.41(e) and 265.3(d)(1),
we retained the NPRM provisions (which were at Secs. 271.41(e) and
275.3(d)(1)) that, as a condition for receiving caseload reduction
credits or a high performance bonus, States must report data on
separate State programs and the recipients in them, through the SSP-MOE
Data Report. However, we deleted the language that was in
Sec. 275.3(d)(1)(iii) indicating that States needed to submit the SSP-
MOE Data Report if they wanted to be considered for a reduction in the
penalty for failing to meet the work participation requirements. Also,
as we discuss in the next section of the preamble, by changing the
definition of assistance, we have limited the types of programs covered
by this reporting. We have also reduced the types of data elements that
must be reported.
This data collection is part of a broad strategy to monitor the
scope and nature of separate State programs. This strategy starts with
four data sources: (1) The quarterly TANF Financial Report (Appendix
D); (2) the MOE section of the annual report (at Sec. 265.9(c) and
Appendix I); (3) the quarterly SSP-MOE Data Report; and (4) quarterly
reports on child support collections. We would review data from these
sources to identify States that might be using separate State programs
either for the purpose of avoiding work or diverting the Federal share
of child support collections. We would then make a preliminary
assessment whether these States were operating separate State programs
that were consistent with TANF goals. If we needed additional
information for this assessment, we could supplement the official
information with information gathered in single State audits or special
studies (such as studies conducted by the Department's Office of the
Inspector General).
The data collection on separate State programs will help enable us
to: (1) Monitor the nature of these programs; (2) determine the extent
to which cases are being shifted to separate State programs; (3)
determine whether such shifts are having an adverse effect on the two
work participation rates or the Federal share of child support
collections; (4) develop a sound policy response in the event of
adverse effects; (5) better assess a State's claim for a caseload
reduction credit or high performance bonus; and (6) decide if a State's
policies with respect to separate State programs should affect its
ranking under section 413(d) of the Act.
In the proposed rule, we did not mention that the creation of
separate State programs might affect the annual rankings of States
based on the success of their work efforts. However, we have concluded
that there could be circumstances under which we would
[[Page 17730]]
want to alter a State's ranking on this basis. For example, suppose the
State with the highest percentage of placements in long-term jobs for
its TANF cases achieved its placement rate and ranking by shifting all
of its hard-to-serve cases from TANF to separate State programs.
Obviously, this State would not merit a ranking as one of the five most
successful States. We will consider if a State's separate State program
had the effect of avoiding work requirements as one factor in
determining the annual ranking of successful State programs.
We will incorporate a full analysis of the information that we have
gathered on what has been happening with separate State programs in our
annual report to Congress. For example, we intend to address issues
such as: (1) What is the basic nature of these programs; (2) have there
been changes in their size or scope; (3) who do these programs serve;
(4) how do they differ from TANF recipients; (5) what types of benefits
do they provide; (6) to what extent do work participation rates apply;
(7) what participation rates are being achieved; and (8) is there any
evidence of the diversion of Federal child support collections. By
looking at this range of issues, we will be better able to assess
whether States have diverted individuals from TANF with the apparent
purpose of avoiding TANF program requirements.
In the High Performance Bonus guidance that we issued on March 17,
1998 (TANF-ACF-PI-98-01), we noted that a State's success in meeting
TANF performance goals could be affected by its decision to fund a
separate State program with its maintenance-of-effort (MOE) dollars and
that such actions might advantage one State over another. For example,
if a State had a separate State program similar to TANF in which it put
recipients who were more difficult to employ, its TANF performance
results could be unfairly inflated. In such cases, we would need to
consider including outcomes for the caseload in separate State programs
in the performance measures. We said we would analyze separate State
program data, as well as other information we receive on the
characteristics of the caseload and the nature of benefits provided in
separate State programs, in assessing how and whether to adjust a
State's TANF performance data.
On the issue of child support collections more specifically, while
States have new flexibility in the way that they administer their TANF
programs, they must continue to share a portion of child support
collections with the Federal government. The need to share TANF-related
collections could serve as a possible disincentive for States to pass
through the full amount of child support to families and could create
an incentive for States to serve needy families through separate State
programs. State spending in these separate State programs continues to
count under the basic MOE requirements, but States do not need to share
the child support collected on behalf of families served by these
programs.
At this point, we have no evidence that States are diverting child
support collections. For example, we are not seeing dramatic decreases
in the Federal share of collections or changes in the average
collection per case. In the meantime, the Administration is engaged in
a dialogue with stakeholders on child support program financing issues
to look at ways to address these and other related concerns. We will
work with these stakeholders and with Congress to develop any necessary
legislation.
As a number of commenters suggested, under these final rules, we
have adopted a strategy that includes gathering information, monitoring
developments, and keeping our options open regarding future actions.
Through our data collection, we will obtain substantial information on
the characteristics of separate State programs, the families they
serve, and the benefits they provide. This information will help us
assess their potential impact on the achievement of TANF goals. We will
consider proposing appropriate legislative or regulatory remedies,
consistent with our legal authority, if we find that States are using
the flexibility available under these rules to avoid work requirements,
divert child support collections, or otherwise undermine the goals of
TANF. However, we will not put any significant policy change into
effect without appropriate prior consultation with States, Congress,
and other interested parties.
Separate State Program Reporting
Comment: Commenters also argued that the stringent reporting
requirements and the potential loss of caseload reduction credits,
eligibility for high performance bonuses, and certain penalty relief
for States that failed to comply with the reporting requirements also
discouraged States from implementing innovative separate State
programs.
Response: As we discuss in the preamble for Sec. 260.31, we have
made significant changes to the proposed definition of assistance.
These changes have a significant effect on the scope of the
disaggregated and aggregate reporting for both TANF and separate State
programs. Like the TANF Data Report, the SSP-MOE Data Report only
captures information on families receiving ``assistance.'' Therefore,
States do not have to provide detailed program and family
characteristics data for families receiving other kinds of benefits and
work supports. Thus, the data collection in the final rules responds to
the commenters' concerns about the problems that would be inherent in
requiring detailed reporting of case-record information from programs
that bore little or no relationship, in substance or administration, to
those providing traditional welfare benefits.
However, information on separate State programs is still very
important under the final rule. Thus, we still expect States to submit
SSP-MOE Data Reports containing data on separate State programs that
are similar to the TANF program data as a condition of receiving
caseload reduction credits or high performance bonuses. Also, we have
strengthened the information we will collect on SSP-MOE spending by
expanding reporting under the TANF Financial Report and expanding
information on all MOE programs in the annual report (as discussed in
Sec. 265.9 and presented in Appendix I). Taken in combination, these
data will help us ensure that each State has met its basic MOE
requirement, properly evaluate State reports on caseload reduction
credits, assess overall State performance, and report on program
characteristics to the public, to the Department, and to Congress. We
could also use the information to identify areas in which regulatory or
legislative changes may be necessary.
Under the final rule, we do not require that States submit the SSP-
MOE Data Report in order to qualify for penalty relief because the
information in the report is not germane to the determination of its
penalty amount.
The information in the SSP-MOE Data Report is germane to
determining if States have achieved creditable caseload reductions and
to assessing a State's overall performance under TANF. Thus, as stated
previously, the final rule does require that a State submit an SSP-MOE
Data Report if it wants to receive either a High Performance Bonus or a
caseload reduction credit (though with reduced data elements).
Failure of a State to submit the MOE information required in either
the TANF Financial Report or the annual report could affect a State's
liability for a
[[Page 17731]]
reporting penalty or an MOE penalty, depending upon the nature of the
failure.
You should review the preamble discussion at Sec. 265.9 and
Appendix I for information on annual aggregate reporting for MOE
programs and the regulation at Sec. 265.3(b) and (d) and appendices E,
F, and G for more detailed information on the data collection for
separate State programs in the SSP-MOE Data Report.
Finally, in the policy announcement and proposed rule, we advised
States to think carefully about the risks to the long-term viability of
their TANF programs if they relied too extensively on separate State
programs to meet their MOE requirements. States cannot receive
contingency funds unless their expenditures within the TANF program are
at 100 percent of historic State expenditures. Thus, excessive State
reliance on expenditures outside the TANF program to meet MOE
requirements could make access to contingency funds difficult during
economic downturns.
This restriction on Contingency Fund MOE raised some concerns on
the part of commenters. However, it represents a clear reading of the
statutory language. Thus, we have made no change in this final rule.
B. Waivers
Background
We have no direct interest in regulating section 415 of the Act;
however, the continuation of waivers by a State might affect our
application of certain of the penalty provisions within a State,
specifically those regarding work and time-limit requirements. Thus, in
order to administer the penalty provisions, we are providing notice
concerning the rules that we will use in applying the penalties.
To improve access to, and understanding of, the regulations on
waivers, we have moved all the waiver provisions to a new subpart C of
part 260 of the final regulation and consolidated our preamble
discussion in this section of the preamble. First, we summarize the
NPRM provisions that appeared in various places in the NPRM and provide
an overall summary of the comments. Then we discuss each provision in
the final regulation, section by section, as well as the related
comments.
Summary of NPRM Waiver Provisions
Under section 415, States that received approval for welfare reform
waivers under section 1115 before enactment of PRWORA (August 22, 1996)
have the option to operate their TANF programs under some or all of
these waivers. For States electing this option, provisions of TANF that
are inconsistent with the waivers do not take effect until applicable
waivers expire.
Section 415 also provides for delaying the effect of provisions of
TANF related to waivers approved after enactment, but prior to July 1,
1997. However, we do not address this specific provision in these rules
because we approved no section 1115 waivers after enactment.
The meaning of the term ``waiver'' is important because it governs
the scope of section 415. The NPRM defined waiver as consisting of both
the specific technical provisions in the approved waiver list and the
AFDC and JOBS requirements under prior law that did not need to be
waived, but were integral and necessary to achieve the policy objective
of the waived provision. Thus, the proposed definition of waiver
depended on determining a State's intent.
The meaning of the term ``inconsistent'' is important because it
governs the extent to which a State may delay the implementation of
certain TANF requirements under section 415. The NPRM defined
inconsistent to mean that complying with a TANF requirement would
require a State to change a policy reflected in an approved waiver.
The proposed rule applied these definitions to determine when a
State's waivers were inconsistent with the TANF work and time-limited
assistance requirements under sections 407 and 408(a)(7) of the Act,
respectively. To the extent that we determined inconsistencies existed,
we would have based the work participation rates and time-limit
exceptions on the waiver provisions rather than the requirements of
sections 407 and 408(a)(7).
In particular, the NPRM allowed inconsistencies in two areas
covered by section 407 (i.e., related to work). The first related to
the types of activities that could count as work activities. Under the
proposed definition, in addition to the expanded or revised activities
specifically included in the technical waiver list (such as increased
hours of job search), a waiver would have included the JOBS work
activities that did not require waivers in order to be part of the
State's program. The NPRM recognized that: (1) States had asked for
waivers of the statutorily prescribed JOBS activities in order to
provide what they considered to be the right mix of work activities;
and (2) part of that mix included activities that did not require
waivers under prior law. Thus, we would have considered such activities
to be part of the waiver.
The second work inconsistency recognized in the NPRM related to the
hours of participation necessary for a recipient to be counted as
engaged in work for the purpose of calculating the participation rates.
To the extent that the mandated hours of work in the waiver reflected
the individual circumstances of the participant, either due to criteria
in the waiver itself or under an individual self-sufficiency plan, we
would have recognized an inconsistency with the fixed hours required by
section 407.
The NPRM did not recognize, as inconsistent, waivers that served to
increase the mandated hours of work for classes of recipients. The NPRM
reasoned that there was no inconsistency in this case because TANF
required those classes of recipients to participate for a greater
number of hours than prior law required.
Further, the NPRM did not recognize any inconsistencies for
exemptions that the State had had for work participation under AFDC.
Under the demonstrations, States had obtained waivers to change the
exemptions of individuals from participation in JOBS. We had assumed
that the purpose for changing the exemptions was to require more
individuals to participate. Since we believed the State's purpose was
increasing participation, we reasoned that maintaining the AFDC
statutory exemptions was not necessary or integral to achieving the
waiver's purpose. Therefore, the NPRM did not recognize the AFDC
statutory exemptions as part of the waiver for determining
inconsistency with TANF.
In applying the definitions of ``waiver'' and ``inconsistent'' to
time limits, the proposed rule recognized only those waivers that
provided for terminating cash assistance because of the passage of
time. We said that if a State would have to change its waiver policy on
terminating assistance, due to the TANF time limit at section
408(a)(7), it could apply its waiver time limit instead of the TANF
time limit. In general, individuals subject to a State time limit would
concurrently be subject to the TANF time limit. Those individuals who
were exempt from the State waiver time limit would not be subject to
the TANF time limit until the State's waiver expired. In addition, if
the extensions of the receipt of assistance under the State waiver
limit exceeded the 20-percent limit on extensions allowed under TANF,
the State's extensions would govern.
[[Page 17732]]
The NPRM did not recognize inconsistencies for States with waivers
that: (1) had time limits that triggered work requirements, but did not
result in the termination of assistance; or (2) had implemented
comprehensive welfare reform initiatives under waivers that consciously
chose not to include policies time-limiting assistance. Thus, in either
of these situations, the State would have had to comply with the TANF
time-limit requirements.
The NPRM also recognized one other type of inconsistency. TANF
cases that were part of a research group, whose treatment policies were
being maintained for the purpose of continuing an impact evaluation,
could continue to be fully subject to prior law policies, except as
modified by waivers. Further, the NPRM allowed for exclusion of such
cases from the numerator and denominator of the work participation
rates. Maintaining different requirements for these groups was
necessary to avoid compromising the evaluation. Information on the
research group would be the primary basis for impact and cost-benefit
analyses of the effects of demonstration provisions and would be
essential to all major components of an evaluation.
In the interest of balancing State flexibility with accountability
and preserving the purposes of TANF (particularly those of encouraging
work and focusing TANF on the provision of temporary support to
families as they move to self-sufficiency), the NPRM also proposed
certain other requirements. Specifically it: (1) Required Governors to
certify waiver inconsistencies that a State believed apply in order to
have the waiver rules apply in the penalty determinations; (2) denied
certain forms of penalty relief to States continuing waivers that were
inconsistent with TANF if States failed to meet work participation
rates or time-limit requirements; and (3) proposed that we would
publish information related to a State's success in meeting work
participation rates and time-limit restrictions, as measured against
both TANF and waiver requirements.
Because States operating under alternative waiver requirements
could have an advantage compared to other States, we proposed that
States continuing inconsistent waivers would not be eligible for a
reasonable cause exception from a related work participation or time-
limit penalty. Nor would they be eligible for a work participation rate
penalty reduction based on severity of the failure or under our
discretionary authority, as otherwise allowed in accordance with
Sec. 271.51(b)(3) or (c) of the NPRM. Further, in developing a
corrective compliance plan, the NPRM proposed that a State would have
to consider modifying its alternative waiver requirements as part of
that plan. If a State then continued its waivers and failed to correct
the violation, the NPRM proposed that it would not be eligible for a
reduced penalty for noncompliance regardless of whether the State made
significant progress towards achieving compliance or if the State's
failure to comply was attributable to natural disaster or regional
recession.
Overview of Comments
With few exceptions, the comments from States, organizations
representing States, other organizations, and Congress relating to the
proposed rules governing waiver inconsistencies strongly opposed our
proposals.
Specifically, most commenters argued that our application of the
proposed rule violated the spirit of the law and Congressional intent
to encourage waivers. To support this argument, they cited the language
at section 415(c), which directs the Secretary to encourage States to
continue operating their waivers. They argued that our narrow
interpretation of waiver inconsistencies, along with our decision to
deny penalty relief, would discourage continuation of waivers and
violated the principle of State flexibility in PRWORA. They asserted
that the proposed policies would force States to abandon their waiver
programs.
Finally, a number of commenters indicated that they found the
definitions of ``waiver'' and ``inconsistent'' difficult to understand
and apply to specific factual situations.
Overall Response
In response to the many comments we received, the final rules take
a different approach to the relationship between the continuation of
AFDC waivers and the TANF requirements. While the definition of
``inconsistent'' remains substantially the same, we have modified the
definition of ``waiver'' to eliminate the proposed focus on intent. The
new definition reflects the common use of the term, which refers to the
policies that implement a particular area of reform in the
demonstration. The revised definition allows the waiver to include a
cluster of AFDC provisions with regard to work participation. Thus, it
modifies how we would determine when work waivers are inconsistent.
We also made one change in the application of the term
``inconsistent'' to time limits; after further review, we believe that
the NPRM did not adequately recognize a certain type of inconsistency.
Generally, the revised definition of ``waiver'' continues to
reflect the philosophy that a narrow, technical definition would be
inappropriate. Rather, as reflected in common usage, the term should
recognize that States rarely implemented the technical waivers of the
former section 402 of the Act in isolation. Instead, technical waivers
were generally part of a cluster of policies and requirements related
to administering a component of a State's welfare program. For example,
States implemented components related to time limits, family caps, work
activities and requirements, treatment of teen parents, income and
resource eligibility, and treatment of two-parent families. Although
the substantive policies making up the components and the combination
of components differed from demonstration to demonstration, these
component areas were the core elements of the reform efforts in various
State demonstrations and were commonly referred to as waivers.
In the discussion that follows, the term ``waiver'' could have two
distinct meanings; it could refer to either the technical waiver that
was explicitly approved or the component of the demonstration. To avoid
confusion, when we mean the technical use of the term (i.e., the waiver
of an actual provision of former section 402 as reflected in the waiver
list in the demonstration's terms and conditions), we will use the term
``technical waiver.'' When we simply use the term ``waiver,'' we are
using it (as defined in these regulations at Sec. 260.71) to mean the
cluster of demonstration policies that the State implemented under its
technical waiver. It is this broader definition that we will use to
determine inconsistencies. The requirements and policies making up a
waiver begin with one or more technical waivers, but could also include
one or more related provisions of prior law.
The NPRM recognized this concept of including prior law provisions
as part of its definition of waiver, but it depended on the State's
intent in seeking the technical waiver to determine which AFDC
provisions should be included. Many commenters objected to this
reliance on the State's intent to operationalize a broader waiver
definition. The final rule contains a simpler and more objective
definition based on the demonstration component of which the technical
waiver is a part.
Since our penalty authority that might be affected by waiver
inconsistencies is related to work requirements at section 407 and time
limits at section 408(a)(7),
[[Page 17733]]
we use those two sections to define the waiver components of work and
time limits. We also limit our regulatory consideration of waivers to
whether the waiver components that relate to work requirements and time
limits are inconsistent with the respective provisions of the Act
(i.e., section 407 for the work participation component and sanctions
and section 408(a)(7) for the time-limit component). To the extent that
a State's policies in the component area differ from the TANF policies,
we will follow the waiver policies in making penalty determinations.
You can find further discussion of the application of this definition
in the section-by-section discussion that follows.
Although some commenters objected to our attempt to balance State
flexibility and accountability, accountability to the purposes of TANF
remains important under the final rule. We believe our modified
approach will ensure accountability while allowing waiver policies to
continue. We recognize that States, whether continuing waivers or not,
have generally made serious and concerted efforts to promote the TANF
objectives as they have implemented their programs. Further, as more
and more States reach or approach the end of their waivers, our
concerns about delays in the implementation of the TANF provisions have
diminished. By the effective date of these rules, waiver authority will
have expired for 14 States, and it will expire for the remaining 32
demonstration States within a few years. Moreover, for some of the
remaining demonstration States, the limited scope of their waivers
(e.g., limited to pilot sites or limited classes of recipients) means
that the TANF provisions will be implemented broadly within the State,
in spite of continuing waivers. Also, some of the remaining
demonstration States have chosen to terminate waivers or to adopt
modified policies that are more consistent with TANF than the original
waivers.
Discussion of Specific Comments and Responses, by Section
(a) Section 260.70--What Is the Purpose of This Subpart?
We added this section to the regulation to clarify that the
Department's authority and interest in identifying waiver
inconsistencies is limited to the determination of penalties in three
areas: (1) Failing to meet the work participation requirement; (2)
failing to impose sanctions on nonparticipants; and (3) failing to meet
the time-limit requirement.
Comment: A number of commenters asserted that we had totally
exceeded our authority in regulating in this area. Some cited section
417 and said its provisions prohibited us from defining waiver
inconsistencies at all, leaving authority for reasonable interpretation
to individual States. Also, some commenters believed we should give
States full authority to determine the extent to which waiver
inconsistencies apply.
Response: We added this section to the final rule to clarify our
interest in promulgating regulations on State waiver policies. In
neither the NPRM nor the final rule have we shown any direct interest
in regulating section 415, per se; however, continuation of waivers
might affect the application of certain of the penalty provisions for a
State, specifically those regarding work and time-limit requirements
(under sections 407 and 408(a)(7) of the Act). Thus, we have the
authority and responsibility to regulate in this area. In order to
administer the penalty provisions on work and time limits fairly, we
need to provide notice concerning the rules that we will use in
applying these penalties. We limit our regulatory consideration of
waivers to whether the waiver components relating to sections 407 and
408(a)(7) are inconsistent with the respective provision. To the extent
that a State's policies in the component area are inconsistent with
TANF policies, we will follow the waiver policies in making penalty
determinations.
Comment: A few commenters specifically questioned the legitimacy of
our stated objective for regulating in this area--to try to balance
State flexibility to continue and test innovations begun under welfare
reform waivers with accountability to the purposes of the TANF,
particularly related to work and time-limit requirements. As some
commenters noted, section 415 does not ``ask HHS to balance State
policies against the virtue of the law.''
Response: Section 415 contains ambiguity in using the terms
``waiver'' and ``inconsistent'' without defining them. The Department's
exercise of its work and time-limit penalty authority in a rational
manner requires that we define those terms. As they are ambiguous on
their face, we must look at Congressional intent. In this case, we find
it necessary to try to balance the two potentially conflicting purposes
of accountability and State flexibility to determine the meaning of the
terms.
(b) Section 260.71--What Definitions Apply to This Subpart?
(Sec. 270.30 of the NPRM)
In the final rule, we retain the definition of ``inconsistent''
given in the NPRM. We define inconsistent to mean that complying with
the TANF work participation rates or sanction requirements at section
407 of the Act or the time-limit requirement at section 408(a)(7) of
the Act would necessitate that a State change a policy reflected in an
approved waiver.
However, as previously discussed, we have revised and simplified
the definition of waiver. In the final rule, we define a waiver as
consisting of the work participation or time-limit component of the
State's demonstration project under section 1115 of the Act. The
component includes the revised AFDC requirements indicated in the
State's technical waiver list, as approved by the Secretary under the
authority of section 1115, and the associated AFDC provisions that did
not need to be waived.
Thus, the final rules for determining whether an inconsistency
related to work exists depend on the existence of a technical waiver
corresponding to any of the cluster of provisions included in section
407. These provisions include: allowable work activities; mandated
hours of, and exemptions from, work participation; and applicable
sanctions for noncompliance with work requirements. Under the modified
definition of waiver, if a State has any single technical waiver
enumerated in its list of approved waivers that corresponds to any
provision of section 407, it may incorporate prior AFDC (and the
related JOBS) work participation rules that were part of the cluster of
policies implemented under the waivers. Under the final rule, the
inclusion of prior law as part of the waiver does not depend on the
original purpose or objective of the State in seeking approval of the
waiver.
Finally, we have added definitions for ``control group'' and
``experimental group'' that recognize the definitions included in the
terms and conditions of the State's demonstration. The NPRM had special
rules for research, control, and experimental groups in States that
were continuing evaluations to avoid tainting the evaluations. However,
it did not define any of those terms. The final rule retains the basic
policies that were in the proposed rules, but refers only to
``control'' and ``experimental'' groups. The revisions have the effect
of making the policy clearer and addressing the concern of one
commenter that the original terminology was not consistent
[[Page 17734]]
with its waiver approval and could undermine its ability to continue
its evaluation.
Comment: Commenters generally supported certain inherent concepts
of the proposed definitions for ``waiver'' and ``inconsistent.'' In
particular, they agreed that ``waiver'' should not include only the
technical provisions listed in the documents approving the State's
waivers, but should also encompass related and integral provisions of
prior law. Similarly, they generally agreed that the term
``inconsistent'' should apply where a State would need to change its
waiver policies in order to comply with TANF.
However, many commenters asserted that the proposed rules did not
sufficiently recognize prior law as being integral to specific waivers.
Thus, they argued the NPRM provisions would compel States to abandon
policies they had implemented under waivers.
Many also objected that we presupposed State objectives in
obtaining work and time-limit waivers and thus arbitrarily narrowed the
breadth of applicable inconsistencies. In particular, they disagreed
with our characterizations of the purpose of the waivers that
eliminated exemptions from JOBS participation requirements under AFDC
law and that increased the number of hours of mandatory work
participation for certain classes of recipients, believing they were
too limited. (Under the proposed rules, we would have disallowed
inconsistencies applicable to these types of waivers based on the
rationale that TANF itself eliminated prior law work exemptions and
expanded hours of required work participation for these affected
classes of recipients, and thus TANF requirements were consistent with
the purpose of State waivers.) In effect, the commenters argued that
States increased their work requirements to establish the appropriate
universe of recipients who should be required to work and the
appropriate level of work participation. They noted that these stated
purposes were analogous to the purpose we had already recognized in the
NPRM for accepting AFDC work activities as part of the waiver, i.e., to
find the appropriate mix of participation activities.
A number of commenters further argued that section 415 did not
confer on the Secretary the authority to judge a State's objectives.
Response: The final rules reflect our continued belief that
regulating on how a State's waiver policies would affect the
application of certain penalty provisions is well within our statutory
authority. However, we recognize that the NPRM's reliance on our
ability to judge the State's purpose in seeking a specific technical
waiver was problematic, given the limited documentation available on
the specific purposes of particular waivers. Therefore, we have recast
the definition in terms of an objective demonstration component.
Components were commonly recognized as parts of the demonstration and
are readily identifiable for penalty determination purpose; one merely
has to associate a technical waiver relating to work requirements or
time limits with the corresponding TANF provision that is subject to
penalty. Thus, while maintaining the concept that ``waiver'' includes
both the technical waiver and some portion of the former AFDC
provisions, we have revised the definition to remove its reliance on
the State's purpose.
You can find a further discussion of the application of the new
definition for work and time-limit policies at Secs. 260.73 and 260.74.
Comment: Some of these commenters offered the perspective that a
waiver should encompass the whole of prior AFDC law as part of the
State's welfare reform strategy, not just specific individual waivers
and limited related extensions of prior law.
Response: We disagree with the commenters that Congress intended
waivers to cover the whole of prior AFDC law. Section 415 allows States
to continue ``one or more waivers to the extent they are
inconsistent.'' The fact that it refers to one or more waivers and does
not use the broader term, demonstration, in describing what is to be
compared for inconsistency, indicates that Congress intended the
determination of inconsistencies to be made on a more specific basis.
Comment: A number of commenters recommended that we modify the
definition of ``inconsistent'' to include any prior law policy in
effect under its demonstration that, if continued, but not recognized
as inconsistent, would give the State reason to believe that it was at
risk of being subject to a TANF penalty.
Response: We addressed this concern to some degree in the final
rule by changing the definition of ``waiver.'' A State may continue
prior law policy that is part of a demonstration component area (e.g.,
work requirements) for which the State has a waiver. Continuation of
prior law policy that is not in a policy area that is subject to
penalties under TANF (i.e., not related to sections 407 or 408(a)(7))
is outside the scope of this final rule and is left to State
discretion.
We declined to change the definition of ``inconsistent'' to mean a
situation in which the State believes that continuing the policy would
put it at risk of a penalty. Congress did not intend to eliminate
penalties for States with waivers. Rather, it intended that we judge
the conduct of such a State based on the requirements in the waiver,
rather than in those in TANF, in determining whether a penalty is
appropriate. If the State has waivers that are inconsistent with TANF,
then the State may be subject to penalties if it fails to submit the
required certification, fails to take the appropriate sanctions, fails
to achieve the required participation rates under its own waiver
policies, or otherwise violates its own waiver policies (e.g., exempts
from time limits individuals subject to the State's demonstration time
limit).
(c) Section 260.72--What Basic Requirements Must State Demonstration
Components Meet for the Purpose of Determining If Inconsistencies Exist
With Respect to Work Requirements or Time Limits? (Sec. 272.8 of the
NPRM)
In the final rules, we have eliminated those NPRM provisions that
would have denied penalty relief to States that continued waivers that
were inconsistent with TANF, but failed to meet work participation
rates or time-limit requirements. Specifically, the NPRM had proposed
that waiver States ought not be eligible for: (1) A reasonable cause
exception from any of four related work participation or time-limit
penalties; or (2) a reduction of work penalty amounts based on severity
of the failure or under our discretionary authority, as otherwise
allowed in accordance with Sec. 271.51(b)(3) or (c). We have also
eliminated proposed rules that would have required a State, in
developing a corrective compliance plan to address work or time-limit
requirement failures, to consider modifying its alternative waiver
requirements as part of its corrective compliance plan. Finally, we
have decided not to deny a State that continues its waivers eligibility
for a reduced penalty based on making significant progress towards
achieving compliance with the work or time-limit requirements (as we
had proposed and described in subparts B and C of part 271 and
Secs. 274.1 and 274.2 of the NPRM).
We had proposed imposing these rules on the basis that States
operating under alternative waiver requirements were at an advantage
compared to other States in being able to meet participation rates and
comply with time-limit requirements. However, a
[[Page 17735]]
large number of commenters questioned whether the advantage that a
waiver State had over other States in complying with specific TANF
requirements was so great as to warrant such absolute restrictions;
some noted the proposed rule was arbitrary in that we did not consider
the degree of any advantage vis-a-vis other legitimate factors and
situations that might result in noncompliance. Based on our assessment
that our proposals might discourage States from continuing successful
demonstration efforts, we have removed these restrictions on penalty
relief.
In the final rules, at Sec. 260.73(d), we retain the regulatory
expectation to publish information about a State's success in meeting
work participation rates, as measured against both TANF and waiver
requirements. We do not expect to publish dual time-limit figures for
States that have waivers of time limits that are inconsistent with the
TANF requirements. Upon further review, for such States, we do not
believe that it will be possible to compute the percentage of cases
with an adult recipient that received more than 60 months of Federal
TANF benefits under the standard TANF rules. Data reported in
accordance with section 411(a) will not be sufficient to allow this
calculation. We do not have the authority under section 411(a) to
require waiver States to report the data that this calculation would
require, and they are not germane to our penalty determinations.
Therefore, we have deleted this specific regulatory expectation.
However, we will be able to calculate dual work rates, and the final
rules indicate our commitment to follow through on that proposal.
The final rules also clarify other necessary conditions that apply
if a State wants us to use its inconsistent waiver policies and
requirements in the penalty determination process.
First, the inconsistencies claimed must be within the scope of the
approved waivers, both in terms of geographical coverage and coverage
of the types of cases specified in the waiver approval package. For
example, a State could not claim a statewide inconsistency if we
approved its waiver policies for an eight-county pilot. Similarly, a
State could not extend waivers to all adults when the approved waivers
applied only to teen parents. Nor could waivers applicable only to two-
parent families apply to other types of cases. However, a State that is
no longer maintaining control group cases for the purpose of completing
an impact evaluation may choose to apply approved waiver policies to
cases formerly assigned to a control group.
Second, the State must have applied its waiver policies on a
continuous basis from the date that it implemented its TANF program.
Section 415(d) allows the State to ``continue'' one or more individual
waivers (which, under the definitions enumerated in these final rules,
means one or more individual demonstration components). Section 415(c)
requires the Secretary to encourage States to ``continue'' their
waivers. Implicit in both these provisions is that continuation of the
waivers is necessary for a finding of inconsistency.
This ``continuation'' requirement does not prevent a State from
modifying policies begun under waivers. TANF clearly provides States
with the authority to modify waiver policies inconsistent with prior
law, but consistent with TANF (e.g., related to eligibility rules such
as income and resource standards). These rules clarify that a State may
modify waiver provisions that are inconsistent with TANF, provided
that, in doing so, it makes its policies more consistent with TANF. For
example, a State could choose to reduce the geographical scope of
waivers, applying waivers approved for statewide implementation in only
certain parts of the State, or a State could choose to eliminate some
exemptions applicable to work participation or time-limited assistance,
retaining other exemptions that are still inconsistent with TANF.
We recognize that the issue of whether a State has continued
waivers since the advent of TANF may be difficult to determine.
Although ACF requested voluntary information on continuation, absent a
final regulation, it never indicated a formal process or requirement
for the States to submit such information about the continuation of the
waiver policies. And, since States need not conduct evaluations as a
condition of operating waivers, some States may have indicated that
they were discontinuing their waivers, when in fact they intended only
to notify us that they were discontinuing evaluations of the
demonstration, not their waiver policies. Further, in the absence of
final rules, some States may not have clearly understood how they
should identify and report inconsistencies under their TANF plans.
Also, although some may have indicated that they were continuing
waivers with policies inconsistent with TANF, they may not have
identified subsequent modifications in their operating policies.
Under these final rules, to determine if a State has continued its
work participation or time-limit waiver component and, therefore, may
claim applicable inconsistencies, we will accept the certification of
the Governor regarding the actual practice of the State. Many of the
former waiver policies (for example, variations in the counting of
income and resources for eligibility purposes) are unrelated to work
and time limits and need not be addressed in the certification. A State
need address only the inconsistencies related to work provisions in
section 407 and time limits in section 408(a)(7), as explained further
below.
However, we wish to note that if a State has abandoned a policy
provision that is inconsistent with TANF, the State has voided its
waiver authority. Thus, it has lost its right to claim an inconsistency
related to that provision. For example, a State that had technical
waivers that allowed it to exempt all adult caretakers from work may
have changed its policy to require participation of adult caretakers
after it implemented TANF. While the State always had the flexibility
subsequently to reinstate a policy exempting adult caretakers, we would
not recognize this policy as an inconsistency in determining the work
participation rates because the State had discontinued the prior
technical waiver.
We treat each technical waiver separately for continuation
purposes. If a State discontinues one technical waiver, we will
continue to recognize other continuing technical waivers related to
work (for example, when a State discontinues an exemption waiver, but
continues unlimited job search as a work activity). However, there is
no authority in section 415 to restore discontinued policies; the
statute allows for consideration only of continued inconsistent
policies.
Similarly, if a State had modified its implementation of the
technical waiver to be more consistent with TANF, we would recognize
only the modified policy as a continuation of the waiver.
Third, the Governor must certify the waiver inconsistencies that
the State is claiming, including an affirmation that the State has not
expanded the scope of its policies and has continued the policies under
section 415 in the interim period since implementing TANF, as discussed
above. This requirement continues a provision of the proposed rules,
but provides new detail about the expected content of the
certification, particularly as it pertains to claiming specific
inconsistencies related to work and time-limit requirements. See
Secs. 260.73 and 260.74
[[Page 17736]]
for a more detailed discussion of work and time-limit inconsistencies.
Finally, these final rules clarify that, despite broadening the
scope of inconsistencies that a State may claim compared to the NPRM,
inconsistencies with sections 407 or 408(a)(7) do not create
inconsistencies with the penalty provisions at section 409. Thus, they
do not have the general effect of delaying the application of the work
participation rate or time-limit penalties at Secs. 261.50, 261.54,
264.1, and 264.2 or the data collection requirements at part 265.
We came to this decision because we never approved any waivers
eliminating compliance with JOBS work participation rates (while they
were operable) or voiding their applicability should they become
operable. Our work component waivers only changed the substance of the
work requirement. As for applicable data requirements, we never
approved waivers that relieved States of data reporting requirements;
thus, we approved no waivers that would be inconsistent with section
411 of the Act. The work and time-limit components affected by sections
407 and 408(a)(7) do not, of themselves, create inconsistencies because
neither encompasses data collection requirements.
Comment: One commenter noted that when the waiver expires for a
State providing extensions of assistance in excess of the 60-month
Federal time limit, a State would need to comply fully with the 20-
percent limit on extensions and that this could cause serious
transition problems. The commenter recommended that we provide that
``reasonable cause'' include a reasonable transition time in the case
of a State that had been implementing an inconsistent policy under an
approved waiver.
Response: The ``waiver terms and conditions'' for demonstration
projects affected by these regulations generally included a requirement
that the State provide, and the Department approve, a plan to phase
down and end the demonstration on the date the waiver approval expires.
We did not authorize any waiver-related activities or costs to extend
beyond the project period. Given that the project period for a waiver
demonstration already includes a phase-down period, States should not
require an additional transition period. In addition, we would remind
States that they may fund cases above the 20-percent cap with State MOE
dollars.
(d) Section 260.73--How Do Existing Welfare Reform Waivers Affect the
Participation Rates and Work Rules? (Sec. 271.60 of the NPRM)
If a State is implementing a work participation component under a
waiver as defined in this subpart, the requirements of section 407 of
the Act will not apply in determining whether a penalty should be
imposed, to the extent that they are inconsistent with the State's
waiver work demonstration component.
To determine that the State's demonstration has a work component,
the waiver list for the demonstration work participation component must
include one or more specific provisions that directly correspond to
provisions enumerated in section 407 (i.e., that cover allowable work
activities, exemptions from participation, required hours of
participation or sanctions for noncompliance with participation). In
other words, the State's waiver list must include at least one
technical waiver that changed the allowable JOBS activities, exemptions
from JOBS participation, hours of required JOBS participation, or
sanctions for noncompliance with JOBS participation.
After the Governor has certified the inconsistencies with section
407, we will calculate the State's work participation rates, if
applicable, by: (1) Excluding cases exempted from participation under
the demonstration and experimental and control group cases and not
otherwise exempted; (2) defining work activities as defined in the
demonstration in calculating the numerators of the rates; (3) including
cases meeting the required number of hours of participation in work
activities in accordance with waiver policy in calculating the
numerators of the rates; and (4) excluding other cases exempt from
participation under the waiver in calculating the denominators of the
rates.
We will also determine whether a State is taking appropriate
sanctions when an individual refuses to work based on the State's
certified waiver policies. These final rules explicitly recognize
waiver inconsistencies related to sanctions for noncompliance with work
requirements; the proposed rules were silent on this matter. They also
recognize exemptions from work and changes to the required hours of
work. Finally, they continue to recognize inconsistencies related to
allowable work activities, as we proposed in the NPRM.
It is important to stress that a State need not have a technical
waiver in a particular part of the work component (e.g., work
activities or exemptions) to claim that the related AFDC provisions for
that part of the component are part of its waiver. Rather, the State
needs one or more technical waivers related to a provision of section
407 to claim applicable prior law in all areas that are part of section
407.
Thus, a State with a waiver work component may delay implementing
TANF requirements for work participation for individuals exempt from
JOBS if such exemptions have been part of the State's continuing
demonstration policies. A State with a demonstration work component,
but without a technical waiver modifying JOBS exemptions, may still
include all prior law exemptions (or a modification of these exemptions
that is more consistent with TANF), if such exemptions have been part
of the State's continuing policies for work participation. For States
with waivers that eliminated some (but not all) JOBS exemptions, the
remaining exemptions would apply, if they have been part of the State's
continuing demonstration policy. However, because all States will need
to conform to all TANF rules once their waivers expire, we urge States
to plan accordingly.
Under these final rules, a State may claim inconsistencies
applicable to hours of work if it has technical waivers related to
section 407 and could, in an audit, provide written evidence (e.g.,
terms and conditions or policy manuals) to document that its waiver
policies, as implemented, expressly provided for alternative rules with
respect to the hours of work required of nonexempt individuals.
The ability to provide such written evidence is necessary because
prior law did not generally have requirements for the number of hours
an individual must work to be considered participating. Rather, prior
law had a calculation methodology that included any JOBS participants
as long as including them did not reduce average hours below 20 hours
per week. If no written policy was in effect, we would hold the State
to the TANF hours-of-work requirements.
Finally, a State may also choose to exempt, from the participation
rate calculation, experimental and/or control group cases that are not
otherwise exempt. It may remove experimental group cases as a class,
control group cases as a class, or both experimental and control group
cases on a class basis. However, it may not exclude such cases on an
individual basis.
Comment: All those commenting on the subject supported counting
towards the work participation rate calculation those work activities
allowed under
[[Page 17737]]
waiver authority without regard to TANF restrictions, as we proposed in
the NPRM. However, many commenters asserted that the rules should not
restrict inconsistencies related to prior law exemptions from work
participation, where those policies were part of a State's welfare
reform program. In support of their position, several organizations and
States argued that, because section 415(a)(2)(B) specifies that waivers
approved after enactment may not affect the applicability of section
407 (concerning compliance with work participation rates), Congress
fully intended the inverse to apply to waivers approved before
enactment. Therefore, we should recognize all continued policies
related to compliance with TANF work requirements as inconsistencies.
Response: Our revised waiver definition would allow the States with
waiver work components to include all prior law exemptions, and other
AFDC (and JOBS) work policies, as part of the waiver, if such policies
were part of the welfare reform demonstration that the State
implemented under its technical waiver(s).
Comment: A number of commenters asserted that hours of mandated
work that were related to waivers and increased the JOBS requirements
for a class of individuals should be claimable as an inconsistency.
Response: These comments addressed a problem with the reference to
a State's intent in our proposed definition of waiver (an issue that we
addressed earlier). Since the final rules rely on the existence of
waiver work components, rather than intent, they recognize increased
hours as part of the waiver. If the amount of the required hours under
the waiver is inconsistent with the required hours under section 407,
the Governor can certify the inconsistency.
Comment: Some commenters asserted that we could not even hold
States operating under waivers to a work participation rate
requirement--i.e., that we should delay the effect of section 407 in
its entirety until State waiver authority expires.
Response: Under section 1115, there were limits on what we approved
as part of a demonstration project. The Secretary only had authority to
waive provisions of the AFDC program that were included in former
section 402. That section contained the provisions regarding the
determination of eligibility, the amount of assistance, and required
procedures for State administration of the plan. The Secretary could,
and did, grant waivers concerning the content of the JOBS program (the
AFDC work program), which was included at section 402(a)(19). However,
the required work participation rate associated with JOBS was at the
former section 403(l). Since the Secretary had no authority to waive
this provision, we never approved any requests from States to waive it.
Thus, no State has a waiver of participation rates that would
conflict with the work participation rate penalty provision at the
former section 409(a)(3). For a State to argue that the work penalty
does not apply, it would have to show a technical waiver that is
inconsistent with any application of the work penalty. However, waivers
that create the content or substance of a State's demonstration work
program are just that--definitions of the content of a work program. As
such, they may be inconsistent with the content of the TANF work
program at section 407 and may allow the State to substitute the
substance of the work program in its demonstration for the program
specified in section 407, to the extent that the State determines there
is an inconsistency. However, there would be no inconsistency in
applying the section 409(a)(3) work participation penalty as long as
participation was determined under the State's demonstration work
program.
Since the final rule bases the penalty under section 409(a)(3) on
what was required participation under the State's demonstration work
program, there is no inconsistency. Delay of the work participation
penalty itself in these circumstances would fall outside any reasonable
definition of waiver or inconsistency.
(e) Section 260.74--How Do Existing Welfare Reform Waivers Affect the
Application of the Federal Time-Limit Provisions? (Sec. 274.1(e) of the
NPRM)
If a State is implementing a time-limit component under a waiver,
until the waiver expires, the provisions of section 408(a)(7) of the
Act will not apply in determining whether to impose a penalty, to the
extent that they are inconsistent with the waiver.
To determine that the State's demonstration has a time-limit
component, the waiver list for a demonstration time-limit component
must include provisions that directly correspond to the time-limit
policies enumerated in section 408(a)(7) (i.e., that address which
individuals or families are subject to, or exempt from, terminations of
assistance based solely on the passage of time, or who qualifies for
extensions to the time limit).
In general, the final rule requires a State with a waiver time-
limit component to count, toward the Federal five-year limit, all
months for which the adult who is subject to the State time limit
receives assistance with Federal TANF funds, just as it would if it did
not have an approved waiver.
The State need not count, toward the Federal five-year limit, any
months for which an adult receives assistance with Federal TANF funds
while the adult is exempt from the State's time limit under the State's
approved waiver. Nor need the State count, toward the Federal five-year
limit, months for which an adult subject to an adult-only State time
limit under the State's waiver receives assistance with Federal TANF
funds.
The State may continue to provide assistance with Federal TANF
funds for more than 60 months, without a numerical limit, to families
provided extensions to the State time limit, under the provisions of
the terms and conditions of the approved waiver.
After the Governor certifies time-limit inconsistencies, we
calculate the State's time-limit exceptions by: (1) Excluding, from the
determination of the number of months of Federal assistance received by
a family, any month in which the adult(s) (or children where a waiver
only terminated assistance to adults) were exempt from State's time
limit under the terms of the State's approved waiver; and (2) applying
the State's waiver policies with respect to the availability of
extensions to the time limit.
The changes that we have made to the framework of how we define
waiver inconsistencies have less effect on inconsistencies related to
time-limiting assistance than to work. The main reason for this
difference is that no prior law policies existed governing time-limited
assistance. All time limits were the result of waivers. Thus, there are
fewer issues about what a time-limit waiver includes. However, there
are significant issues about what is allowable as an inconsistency;
under these rules, the constraining factor is whether a State's
demonstration project has a time-limit component related to the
provisions in section 408(a)(7).
Prior to the passage of PRWORA, a ``time limit'' could take any
number of forms. However, under TANF, the penalty relates to the time
limit in section 408(a)(7), which recognizes only time limits that
terminate assistance with the passage of time (i.e., that terminate
assistance to families with adults who received Federal TANF assistance
for 60 months). Other parts of TANF address time limits in different
contexts, such as those that trigger work requirements. However, these
latter types of provisions are not subject to the penalty provision
under section
[[Page 17738]]
408(a)(7), and we do not address them in this regulation.
Therefore, as we proposed under the NPRM, we are allowing time-
limit inconsistencies only for those States with waiver policies that
terminate assistance solely as the result of the duration of receipt.
Under these rules, if a State has a technical waiver meeting this
requisite, we compare its provisions with those at section 408(a)(7) to
determine whether there are inconsistencies.
As with work participation, States may also choose to exempt
experimental and/or control group cases that are not otherwise exempt
from time limits. However, a State may exclude such experimental and
control group cases only on a group basis, not on an individual basis.
Comment: Commenters generally agreed that inconsistencies should be
recognized that allowed a State to: (1) exempt certain cases from
having months counted toward the 60-month time limit; and (2) provide
extensions to more than 20 percent of the caseload after reaching the
limit.
Response: We have retained these policies in the final rule.
Comment: Some commenters argued that section 415 was designed to
allow States to continue their welfare reform initiatives as a whole.
On this basis, they maintained that any State that consciously chose
not to include time-limited assistance provisions in the comprehensive
welfare reform initiatives that it implemented under waivers should be
able to claim a time-limit inconsistency.
Response: Section 415 was not designed to carry over prior law in
its entirety, nor to delay TANF requirements where waivers did not
exist prior to implementation. Rather, it allows delay in implementing
new TANF provisions ``to the extent such amendments are inconsistent
with the waiver.'' Thus, we find no statutory basis for allowing
inconsistencies to be claimed in this particular situation because no
waiver exists.
Comment: Some commenters argued that we should also allow time-
limit inconsistencies to apply where a State has implemented time
limits that serve to trigger work requirements.
Response: We do not recognize other waiver provisions, such as
those where States used ``time limits'' to trigger work requirements,
as inconsistent with time limits. The purpose of this section of the
regulation is to determine the applicability of the time-limit penalty
at section 409(a)(9). This penalty applies to any failure to meet the
time-limit requirements at section 408(a)(7). Time limits triggering
work requirements are found in sections 402 and 407, not section
408(a)(7). Therefore, such policies do not fit within the definition of
a waiver related to the time-limit component associated with 408(a)(7).
Comment: One commenter recommended that, if we retained the
proposed rules related to time-limit waiver inconsistencies, the
preamble discussion should clarify that ``reduction waivers'' (adult-
only time limits) represent an inconsistency.
Response: We have incorporated this change in the final rule.
States with waivers terminating assistance for adults only may choose
to delay counting months toward the Federal 60-month time limit for as
long as they continue to apply adult-only policies under their State
time limit. While the proposed rules had required that time against the
Federal time clock be counted for any month in which an adult was
subject to the State time limit (i.e., that the Federal and State
clocks would run concurrently), this policy would have had an effect
that was inconsistent with the waiver policy. Because time charged
against an adult would have ultimately resulted in the termination of
benefits to the whole family under TANF, the proposed policy would have
resulted in time being counted against child recipients. While children
are protected from termination of benefits while the waiver is
operable, counting time against adults in the case would have, in
effect, counted time against the family's (and children's) length of
receipt of assistance. This result would have been contrary to the
purpose of the adult-only time-limit waivers, which was to exempt
children from any effect of the time limit. Thus, in submitting a
Governor's certification of continuing waiver inconsistencies, the
State may claim a time-limit inconsistency for its adult-only time
limit.
Comment: Another commenter said that we should allow all cases
subject to a time limit adequate prior notice before a clock begins to
count against them. Thus, States that have applied a reasonable
statutory interpretation of section 415 to exempt cases from the
Federal time limit should not have to count time retroactively against
these cases (i.e., count time accrued prior to the effective date of
the final rules).
Response: As we have previously stated, these rules apply only
prospectively; until they are effective, the State's reasonable
interpretation of the statute applies. An individual who was considered
exempt from the Federal time limit under the State's reasonable
interpretation of its waiver would only have the Federal limit apply
prospectively, beginning October of 1999. This policy will allow States
time to provide the recipient with adequate notice.
(f) Section 260.75--If a State Is Claiming a Waiver Inconsistency for
Work or Time Limits, What Must the Governor Certify? (Sec. 272.8(a) of
the NPRM)
If a State is claiming waiver inconsistencies, the Governor must
certify that the State has continuously maintained applicable policies
in operating its TANF program and that the inconsistencies claimed by
the State do not expand the scope of the approved waivers. Further, the
certification must identify the specific inconsistencies that the State
chooses to continue with respect to work and time limits.
If the waiver inconsistency claim includes work provisions, the
certification must specify the standards that will apply in lieu of the
provisions in section 407. Specifically, it must include, as
applicable: (1) Descriptions of two-parent and other cases that are
exempt from participation, if any, for the purpose of determining the
denominators of the work participation rates; (2) the rules for
determining whether nonexempt two-parent and other cases are ``engaged
in work'' for the purpose of calculating the numerators of the work
participation rates, including descriptions of the countable work
activities and minimum required hours; and (3) the penalty against an
individual or family when an individual refuses to work. Again, the
certification may include a claim of inconsistency with respect to
hours of required participation in work activities only if the State
has written evidence that, when implemented, the waiver policies
established specific requirements related to hours of work for
nonexempt individuals.
If the waiver inconsistency claim includes time-limit provisions,
the Governor's certification must include the standards that will apply
in lieu of the provisions at section 408(a)(7). It must specify the
standards that will apply in determining: (1) Which families are not
counted towards the Federal time limit; and (2) whether a family is
eligible for an extension of its time limit on federally funded
assistance.
If the State is continuing policies for evaluation purposes, the
certification must specify any special work or time-limit standards
that apply to the experimental and control group cases. The State may
choose to exclude cases assigned to the experimental and
[[Page 17739]]
control groups that are not otherwise exempt, for the purpose of
calculating the work participation rates or determining State
compliance related to limiting assistance to families including adults
who have received 60 months of TANF assistance. Thus, the State may
exclude all experimental and control group cases, not otherwise exempt.
However, it may not exclude such cases on an individual, case-by-case
basis.
A State must provide the initial Governor's certification by
October 1, 1999. It would be very helpful to receive the certification
by July 1, 1999, in order to assess how inconsistencies will apply for
data collection and reporting efforts before the effective date of the
new requirements. We would like to resolve any issues about the
treatment of waiver cases before the reporting requirements take
effect, because it is much easier to code information correctly the
first time than to modify the codes retroactively. In light of the
number of States continuing waivers and some of the detailed, case-
specific questions that we anticipate might arise, we want to build in
ample time to resolve all issues by October 1, 1999. It will certainly
be in a State's interest if we can resolve all questions by the
effective date of the new requirements.
Also, we would point out that, until a State has submitted its
Governor's certification, we will treat the State as a nonwaiver State
in determining its compliance with work participation rate and time-
limit standards. Likewise, if we determine that a Governor's
certification does not comply with the requirements of this subpart, we
will advise the State of the inconsistency and give it an opportunity
to revise the certification. We will accept alternative rules for
determining penalties related to work participation rates and time-
limit exceptions only to the extent that they comply with the
requirements of this part.
If a State modifies its waiver policies, after it provides the
certification, in a way that has a substantive effect on the
calculation of its work participation rates, time-limit exceptions, or
sanctions, it must submit an amended certification by the end of the
fiscal quarter in which the modifications take effect.
Comment: A few commenters questioned whether we had the authority
specifically to require that Governors certify which waivers States
were continuing. Some of these saw this requirement as an added burden
that duplicated information already submitted in their State TANF plans
or documented as part of their waiver approval.
Response: We disagree that we have no authority to require the
certification. As discussed, the Department has had no formal process
for determining a State's decisions on the continuation of waivers. The
information that has been provided has been sporadic and is not
necessarily current or complete. Since we will be relying on the
State's determination that it has continued an inconsistent waiver
component in making penalty determinations, we must have accurate, up-
to-date information on the State's decision to continue its
inconsistent work and time-limit components in order to make those
penalty determinations correctly and on a timely basis. As such
information is necessary to our implementation of the penalty
provisions, we have authority under those provisions to collect it.
(g) Section 260.76--What Special Rules Apply to States That Are
Continuing Evaluations of Their Waiver Demonstrations? (Sec. 271.60(c)
and (d) and Sec. 274.1(e)(4) of the NPRM))
If a State is continuing policies that employ an experimental
design in order to complete an impact evaluation of a waiver
demonstration, the experimental and control groups may be subject to
prior law, except as modified by the waiver.
We have added definitions for experimental and control groups at
Sec. 260.71 (and cross-references at Sec. 260.30). These definitions
reference the terms and conditions in the State's demonstration.
Comment: One commenter suggested that we should allow any State in
which more than half of its families are subject to waiver policies as
part of a research group to apply the same waiver policies to the rest
of the families in the State, as long as the State does not expand the
geographical scope of the waiver authority. The same rule would apply
to a county operating a waiver demonstration in a county-administered
State. Another commenter indicated that States may be less likely to
continue an evaluation if we do not allow a State to apply policies
permitted for the research group to a broader set of families.
Response: While we sympathize with the commenters' desire to reduce
administrative complexity, we do not see why the complexity is any
greater when a majority of the caseload is in the experimental and
control groups than when a minority is. Furthermore, implementing this
policy would introduce complexities of its own in terms of the
measurement required to determine what rules apply in a given
jurisdiction. Since both the number of families in the experimental and
control groups currently on assistance and the total number of families
currently on assistance vary from month to month, rules could vary
month to month. In contrast, the experimental and control groups are
well-defined; a family is either assigned to them or not. Therefore,
under the final rule, determining when and to which families to apply
the pre-TANF policies is relatively simple.
C. Child-Only Cases
Background
The calculations for work participation rate and time-limit
penalties center around the concept of ``family.'' Under the proposed
rules, we indicated that a State could develop its own definition of
``family,'' with the proviso that States could not create definitions
that excluded adults from cases solely for the purpose of avoiding
penalties. To monitor that restriction, we proposed that States report
annually on the number of cases excluded from penalty calculations, and
the reasons for each exclusion. We said we would add families back into
the calculation if we found they were excluded for the purpose of
avoiding penalties. You may find the specific proposals in
Secs. 271.22(b)(2), 271.24(b)(2), and 274.1(a)(3) of the proposed rule.
These provisions reflected our concern that States might convert
cases to child-only cases to avoid the statutory work participation and
time-limit requirements. In part, our concern was a reaction to public
comments that States and advocates made shortly after PRWORA's
enactment suggesting that States might take such actions. It also
reflected our view that such conversions would seriously undermine
critical provisions of welfare reform.
Overview of Comments
Several commenters supported our decision to recognize that States
had the primary authority to define ``family.'' However, a large number
of commenters, from a diversity of groups, opposed or expressed
concerns about our specific proposals in this area. The comments
generally objected to our distrust of States and the pre-emption of
State decisions to define families as they deemed appropriate.
Several commenters challenged the statutory basis for our proposal.
Some did not directly challenge our authority, but questioned the
practicality of our proposed approach. Commenters pointed out
inconsistencies in the language that we had used in different parts of
the regulation and noted that
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the determination of whether States created definitions for the sole
purpose of avoiding penalties would involve subjective determinations
of motive. To minimize these problems, they offered several suggestions
about how we might clarify what types of cases might be subject to
recalculation.
Under one proposal, States would describe their child-only cases in
the State plan or procedures. We could then discuss beforehand with
States the appropriateness of these cases. Other commenters offered a
related suggestion that we set up a process for States to get approval
of reasons for conversions up-front, but did not identify a specific
format for the State submissions.
Another suggestion was that State definitions would automatically
prevail, but that HHS would inform Congress if distortions of
legislative intent seemed to result. In other words, in the absence of
any documented abuses, we would simply gather information on what
States are doing and permit States to use any definition of family that
has a reasonable policy basis. Then, if we discover evidence that
States were trying to subvert the TANF provisions, we could work with
Congress in developing solutions.
Some commenters noted that child-only cases existed under AFDC and
enumerated examples of child-only cases that we should acknowledge as
acceptable, including: cases in which the adults have no legal
liability for the care of the children, cases with recipients of SSI or
other disability payments, cases with adults not receiving assistance
because they exhausted shorter State-imposed time limits, cases with
noncitizen parents or adults ineligible for other reasons (e.g., SSI
receipt or a drug felony conviction), cases that were previously
converted under approved waiver policies, and cases with elderly
caretakers.
We also received suggestions that we should explicitly permit
States to continue to provide assistance to children: (1) once the
parent/relative loses eligibility due to the expiration of the five-
year time limit; (2) whose parent/relative was sanctioned for failure
to participate in work or cooperate with child support enforcement
requirements; and (3) whose parent or caretaker would be better served
by some other State program, such as if she is disabled.
In addition to specific objections or questions, many commenters
expressed the overall concern that our proposal to control for
inappropriate child-only cases may inhibit the State flexibility
essential to TANF. State anxiety about Federal recalculation of penalty
liability could create a ``chilling effect'' that caused States to
limit child-only cases unnecessarily and inappropriately. In the words
of one commenter, ``the uncertainty of knowing whether their policy
basis will be considered legitimate and how work participation rates
and time-limit compliance will be measured by HHS could simply lead
States to avoid serving children as child-only cases even if the result
is not to serve the children at all.''
Commenters did not want to see assistance to valid child-only cases
undermined by our rules. Of particular concern was the effect of our
proposals on State efforts to keep children in the homes of relatives,
in lieu of foster care placements.
Others noted that, up to this point, we do not have evidence that
States are converting cases to child-only cases for the purpose of
avoiding TANF requirements; we have not observed significant changes in
State policy or practice to create new child-only cases. Only if such
changes actually occur should HHS develop corrective procedures.
Overall Response
When we were developing the proposed rules, we were very concerned
that States would use the flexibility available in defining families to
avoid work participation requirements, time limits, and other TANF
requirements. Within the authority that we have to collect
participation rate information and make decisions on State penalties,
we proposed specific regulatory policies with respect to penalties and
reporting in response to that concern. However, as we have seen the
TANF programs evolve, our concerns about possible abuses have
diminished.
While the number of child-only cases has been increasing over time,
commenters correctly observed that the increases began well prior to
TANF and that there is little indication so far that States are
converting cases merely to avoid penalties. In fact, a couple of
internal State analyses (i.e., in Florida and South Carolina) have
found no evidence of conversion of cases to child-only cases from other
statuses.
Also, commenters correctly noted that there were numerous child-
only cases that were considered valid under prior law. Their existence
under TANF therefore does not suggest that States are working to
subvert TANF requirements in this manner. Over the past several years,
there were a number of social and demographic changes underway that
could have contributed to much of the growth in child-only cases. For
example: (1) Because of the ``crack'' epidemic, some infants moved from
the care of their mothers to the care of their grandmothers or other
adult relatives (who may or may not have been needy); (2) in some
places, immigration changes could have caused a growth in the number of
eligible children with ineligible alien parents; and (3) in other
places, States have made an effort to establish eligibility for SSI.
(If parents became SSI-eligible, the children normally received
assistance as child-only cases.)
Recently, we have seen a reduction in the total number of child-
only cases. However, because the number of other types of cases has
been declining faster, the proportion of child-only cases has not gone
down. Thus, State success in moving more families to work may actually
be causing an increase in the proportion of child-only cases.
At the same time, we disagree with the suggestion that it would be
appropriate to provide federally funded assistance to children in
child-only cases when their parents reach the 60-month limit on Federal
assistance. Such a result would be consistent with an adult-only time
limit, but does not seem consistent with the intent of the specific
provision in the law. For example, the provisions on transfers to the
Social Services Block Grant program suggest that children in families
whose adults reached their 60-month limit were not expected to continue
receiving federally funded TANF assistance.
While we disagree with the commenters' suggestion that we did not
have legal authority to regulate in this area, we understand
commenters' concern that the provisions in the proposed rules may do
more harm than good. In the absence of clear evidence that States are
converting cases to avoid the TANF rules, we have decided that the most
appropriate response at this point is to give States leeway to define
families in ways that they think are most appropriate while gathering
better information on how child-only policies might be affecting the
achievement of TANF goals.
However, the possible conversion of cases to child-only status to
avoid TANF requirements remains a major policy concern. For example,
such conversions could effectively eliminate restrictions on the amount
of time that any family could receive federally funded TANF assistance
or could undermine the statutory provisions on the treatment of
sanction cases in the participation rate calculations. We therefore
intend to track it closely. To that end, we have added one data element
to the disaggregated case-record reporting that will identify cases
that have been
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converted to child-only status since the past month. We will use the
quarterly TANF Data Report to monitor trends both in the aggregate
number and type of child-only cases and the number of conversions. By
monitoring these trends, we should be able to identify changes in State
practice or caseload characteristics that would merit further
investigation. If we saw a significant number of conversions to child-
only status in a particular State (i.e., a number that was out of line
with prior State numbers or the numbers for other States), we would
look more closely at that State.
We have a variety of investigative tools available to us, including
detailed analysis of the case-record information reported to us, the
Single State Audit, supplemental reviews, and targeted studies (like
the current ASPE study mentioned below).
We will incorporate a full analysis of the information we have
gathered on what has been happening with child-only cases in our annual
report to Congress.
As a number of commenters suggested, under these final rules, we
have adopted a strategy that includes gathering information, monitoring
developments, and keeping our options open regarding future actions.
Through our data collection, we will obtain substantial information on
the characteristics of child-only cases, trends in their number and
type, and conversions. This information will help us assess the
possible effect of such cases on the achievement of TANF goals. We will
consider proposing appropriate legislative or regulatory remedies if we
find that States are using the flexibility available under these rules
to define families to avoid work requirements or time limits or
otherwise undermine the goals of TANF. However, we will not put any
significant policy change into effect without appropriate prior
consultation with States, Congress, and other interested parties.
Tracking of Child-Only Cases
Comment: A significant number of commenters also objected to our
proposals at Secs. 271.22(b)(2)(i), 271.24(b)(2)(i), 274.1(a)(3)(i),
and 275.9(a)(1) that States annually report to us on their child-only
cases and advise us of the specific nature of each of the cases.
Commenters generally felt it was an unjustified additional burden for
States. Some objected to the specific wording of the requirement
because it suggested that we expected case-by-case reporting of such
cases rather than aggregated reporting.
Response: We have removed the requirement for annual reports on
families excluded from work-rate and time-limit calculations and the
reasons for their exclusion. The proposed language was not consistent
in different parts of the NPRM package and caused some confusion.
Monitoring trends in the number and type of such cases remains an
important issue. However, we decided that a different type of data
would be more helpful in helping us track conversions. Thus, we have
added a new data element to the TANF Data Report that will identify the
specific cases that have become child-only cases. These new data will
supplement other data on child-only cases available through the TANF
and MOE-SSP data reports and give us a solid basis of information for
assessing national and State trends in the number and nature of child-
only cases. From other data elements in those reports, we will get
disaggregated, case-level data on parents and other individuals who are
in the household, but not in the family receiving assistance. We will
get information on whether there are parents who are ineligible for
receipt of Federal benefits, whether the cases are under sanction, and
whether cases have no parent in the home. To provide still further
supplemental information, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation is undertaking a study in three States to
explore the circumstances of child-only cases in more detail.
Together, these information sources will provide valuable insight
into the nature of child-only cases and the types of services and
assistance States are providing them. We will be able to track any
significant changes in the number and types of such cases and be in a
better position to determine if we need to pursue further action.
Depending on what specifically is happening, an appropriate response
could be information-sharing, consultations, technical assistance, or
regulatory or legislative proposals.
To reflect our other decisions on child-only cases, we deleted the
provisions at Secs. 271.22(b)(2), 271.24(b)(2), and 274.1(a)(3) of the
proposed rule that prohibited conversion of child-only cases for the
purpose of avoiding penalties, indicated that we would add cases back
into the work participation rate and time-limit calculations if we
found that they had, and required separate annual reporting on child-
only cases. We also deleted comparable annual reporting langua
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