Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF)

Federal RegisterApr 12, 1999

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SUMMARY: The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) issues

regulations governing key provisions of the new welfare block grant

program enacted in 1996--the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,

or TANF, program. It replaces the national welfare program known as Aid

to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the related programs

known as the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS)

and the Emergency Assistance (EA) program.

These rules reflect new Federal, State, and Tribal relationships in

the administration of welfare programs; a new focus on moving

recipients into work; and a new emphasis on program information,

measurement, and performance. They also reflect the Administration's

commitment to regulatory reform.

EFFECTIVE DATES: These regulations are effective October 1, 1999.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mack Storrs, Director, Division of

Self-Sufficiency Programs, Office of Family Assistance, Administration

for Children and Families (ACF), at 202-401-9289, or Ann Burek, Family

Assistance Program Specialist, at 202-401-4528.

Deaf and hearing-impaired individuals may call the Federal Dual

Party Relay Service at 1-800-877-8339 between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m. Eastern

time.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On November 20, 1997, the Administration for

Children and Families published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that

covered key provisions of the new welfare block grant program, known as

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF. We provided an

extended 90-day comment period, which ended on February 18, 1998. We

offered commenters the opportunity to submit comments by mail or

electronically via our Web site. A number of commenters took advantage

of the electronic access, but a significant portion of the comments we

received electronically duplicated comments we received in the mail.

Eight major national organizations (three associations representing

State groups, three advocacy groups, and two labor organizations) and

one Congressman requested the opportunity to present their comments to

us orally. We granted their requests, holding four meetings in

Washington in June, July, and August 1998. The national organizations

focused largely on those issues that they had identified as priority

concerns in their written statements. In a few instances, they modified

their suggestions, endorsed comments that had been offered by other

commenters, or provided clarifying information. The Congressman

expressed his interest in: (1) Providing States more flexibility in

operating their programs; (2) collecting data that would be adequate

for the effective enforcement and oversight of TANF; and (3) placing

sufficient emphasis on ensuring that States met their maintenance-of-

effort (MOE) requirements and did not supplant existing State spending.

The discussions did not introduce any new policy concerns or

proposals. They are part of the public record, and individuals

interested in reviewing notes on these meetings have the same access to

that information as they do to other comments that were submitted in

written form.

Before discussing the comments in more detail, we want to point out

that we changed the part and section references for this TANF rule. One

commenter noted that our use of parts 270 through 275 for the TANF

rules would likely cause confusion because the major Food Stamp rules

used similar section numbers. In response to that comment, we have

shifted all our part and section numbers down by ten; thus, for

example, the provisions that appeared in part 270 of the NPRM appear in

part 260 of this final rule.

To help you make your way through these changes, we include both

NPRM and final-rule section references in this preamble discussion.

Comment Overview

After accounting for the duplications, we received nearly 270

comments on the NPRM. The largest number of comments came from State

welfare agencies and social services departments, followed by advocacy

groups and other State-level organizations. We also heard from a

significant number of Governors, national associations, local

government offices, Federal legislators, community-based organizations,

State legislators, and the general public. We received a lesser number

of comments from other Federal agencies and members of the educational,

business, child care, research, Tribal, and organized labor

communities.

The only policy area that generated a significant number of

``single-issue'' comments was domestic violence. We received about 25

comments from women's, legal, and other groups that focused exclusively

on the domestic violence provisions in the NPRM. We also received a

handful of comments, mostly from the general public, that focused

exclusively on the role of education in promoting self-sufficiency.

A substantial majority of the comments that addressed our

regulatory framework were positive. Commenters generally seemed to

agree that it was helpful for our rules to provide specific guidance on

how we intended to implement the penalty process and make penalty

determinations. In fact, based on the detailed questions and comments

we received, one could conclude that some commenters were looking for

an expansion on the amount of detail contained in the rule.

On the positive side, in addition to support of particular

policies, commenters indicated that the rules provided some helpful

clarifications of the statute, expressed appreciation for our

regulatory development process, noted ``positive steps'' we had taken,

and noted numerous places where our proposed rules appropriately

reflected the statute.

In general, however, many commenters had mixed views on the policy

proposals on the NPRM, supporting some, but opposing others. For

example, with respect to the domestic violence policies, most

commenters supported the general approach and commended our

encouragement of State implementation of the Family Violence Option.

However, most also expressed a number of concerns about specific

provisions in the proposed rules.

Likewise, many of the States, advocates, and national organizations

supported the proposed rule in a number of areas (such as the

flexibility afforded States to define work activities and the reduction

in penalty liability for States that failed only the two-parent

participation rate), but expressed objections to our approach on other

major issues.

The policy issues that generated the most consistent negative

reactions were separate State programs, child-only cases, and

continuation of waivers. Commenters expressed major concerns that: the

proposed rules would stifle

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innovation; they were overly prescriptive and burdensome; they

undermined the partnership between State and Federal governments and

contravened Congressional intent; we presumed State guilt without

evidence; and these policies could ultimately harm recipients.

We also received numerous negative comments from States and State

representatives on the proposed data collection and reporting

requirements. However, these same requirements generated a largely

favorable reaction from other types of commenters.

In the preamble to the proposed rule, we discussed our general

approach on the major cross-cutting issues up front, prior to the

section-by-section analysis. Many of the commenters organized their

comments in the same way, addressing the issues thematically instead of

following the specific structure of the rule. This preamble follows

that same basic format, presenting a separate discussion of our

policies on the major cross-cutting issues (separate State programs,

child-only cases, waiver continuations, and domestic violence) before

proceeding to the section-by-section analysis.

We present most of the discussion of data collection and reporting

issues in two places--the preamble for part 265 and the preamble

discussion entitled the ``Paperwork Reduction Act'' in the ``Regulatory

Impact Analyses'' section of the preamble.

We believe that structuring the preamble this way enables us to

provide a clearer framework for the specific regulatory provisions and

to represent the commenters' concerns most accurately.

For several reasons, we decided not to attempt precise numerical

counts of the comments received. Based on the nature of the comments,

we did not believe that the number of comments was a particularly

meaningful statistic. First, because several of the comments had

multiple signatories and some commenters provided general endorsements

of the comments of other parties, we would have had to create somewhat

arbitrary rules for developing counts. Also, commenters presented their

views of the many overlapping and cross-cutting issues in many

different ways; for example, some spoke generically about the major

provisions of the rule, while others provided very specific suggestions

about individual words and phrases. This diversity in the approach of

commenters also hampered our ability to create meaningful counts.

Nevertheless, we are confident that this preamble accurately conveys

the scope and nature of the comments received.

We appreciate the time and attention that commenters gave to

reviewing the NPRM and preparing their comments. As a result of their

efforts, we have been able to resolve certain technical problems,

incorporate numerous regulatory clarifications, and consider some

alternative regulatory approaches.

Table of Contents

I. Overview: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity

Reconciliation Act

II. Regulatory Framework

A. Pre-NPRM Process

B. Related Regulations under Development

C. Statutory Context

D. Regulatory Reform

E. Scope of This Rulemaking

F. Applicability of the Rules

III. Principles Governing Regulatory Development

A. Restrictions on Our Regulatory Authority

B. State Flexibility

C. Accountability for Meeting Program Requirements and Goals

IV. Discussion of Cross-Cutting Issues

A. Separate State Programs

B. Waivers

C. Child-only Cases

D. Treatment of Domestic Violence Victims

E. Recipient and Workplace Protections

F. Comments Beyond the Scope of the Rulemaking

G. Additional Cross-Cutting Issues

V. Part 260--General Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)

Provisions

VI. Part 261--Ensuring that Recipients Work

VII. Part 262--Accountability Provisions--General

VIII. Part 263--Expenditures of State and Federal TANF Funds

IX. Part 264--Other Accountability Provisions

X. Part 265--Data Collection and Reporting Requirements

XI. Regulatory Impact Analyses

A. Executive Order 12866

B. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

C. Assessment of the Impact on Family Well-Being

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

I. Overview: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity

Reconciliation Act

On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed ``The Personal

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996''--or

PRWORA--into law. This bipartisan welfare plan built upon previous

Administration and State efforts to reform welfare. Even before PRWORA

was enacted, many States were well on their way to changing their

welfare programs into jobs programs. By granting Federal waivers, the

Administration allowed 43 States--more than all previous

Administrations combined--to require work, time-limit assistance, make

work pay, improve child support enforcement, and encourage parental

responsibility. The vast majority of States have chosen to continue or

build upon these welfare demonstration projects.

PRWORA is dramatically changing the nation's welfare system into

one that requires work in exchange for time-limited assistance. The law

contains strong work requirements, performance bonuses to reward States

for moving welfare recipients into jobs and reducing out-of-wedlock

births, State maintenance-of-effort requirements, comprehensive child

support enforcement, and supports for moving families from welfare to

work--including increased funding for child care. It provides

opportunities for State and local governments, working in partnership

with communities groups and other agencies, to serve families in new,

more creative, and more effective ways.

With the help of the strong economy, and new Federal and State

policies, the percentage of welfare recipients working has tripled

since 1992 and an estimated 1.5 million people who were on welfare in

1997 were working in 1998. All States met the first overall work

participation rates required under TANF, and welfare caseloads have

fallen to the lowest levels in 30 years.

The first title of this new law (Pub. L. 104-193) created a program

called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF, in recognition

of its focus on moving recipients into work and time-limiting

assistance. It repealed the existing welfare program known as Aid to

Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which provided cash assistance

to needy families on an entitlement basis. It also repealed the related

programs known as the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training

program (JOBS) and Emergency Assistance (EA).

The new TANF program went into effect on July 1, 1997, except in

States that elected to submit a complete plan and implement the program

at an earlier date.

The new law reflects widespread, bipartisan agreement on a number

of key principles:

Welfare reform should help move people from welfare to

work.

Welfare should be a short-term, transitional experience,

not a way of life.

Parents should receive the child care and the health care

they need to protect their children as they move from welfare to work.

Child support programs should become tougher and more

effective in securing support from absent parents.

[[Page 17722]]

Because many factors contribute to poverty and dependency,

solutions to these problems should not be ``one size fits all.'' The

system should allow States, Indian tribes, and localities to develop

diverse and creative responses to their own problems.

The Federal government should focus less attention on

eligibility determinations and place more emphasis on program results.

States should continue to make substantial investments of

State funds in addressing the needs of low-income families.

This landmark welfare reform legislation has dramatically affected

not only needy families, but also intergovernmental relationships. It

challenges Federal, State, Tribal and local agencies to foster positive

changes in the culture of the welfare system and to take more

responsibility for program results and outcomes. It also challenges

them to develop strong interagency collaborations and improve their

partnerships with legislators, advocates, businesses, labor, community

groups, and other parties that share their interest in helping needy

families successfully transition into the mainstream economy.

The new law provides an unparalleled opportunity to achieve true

welfare reform. It also presents very significant challenges for

families and State and Tribal entities in light of the changing program

structure, loss of Federal entitlements, creation of time-limited

assistance, and new penalty and bonus provisions.

Most of the resources in the AFDC program went to support mothers

raising their children alone. In the early years, the expectation was

that these mothers would stay home and care for their children; in

fact, in a number of ways, program rules discouraged work. Over time,

as social and economic conditions changed, and more women entered the

work force, the expectations changed. In 1988, Congress enacted the new

JOBS program to provide education, training and employment that would

help needy families avoid long-term welfare dependence. By 1994, 20

percent of the nonexempt adult AFDC recipients nationwide were

participating in the JOBS program.

In spite of these changes, national sentiment supported more

drastic change. Policy-makers, agency officials, and the public

expressed frustration about the slow progress being made in moving

welfare recipients into work and the continuing decline in family

stability. States lobbied for more flexibility to reform their

programs. While the Clinton Administration had supported individual

reform efforts in almost every State, approving 80 waivers in its first

five years, the waiver process was not an ideal way to achieve systemic

change. It required separate Federal approval of each individual reform

plan, limited the types of reforms that could be implemented, and

enabled reforms to take place only one State at a time. Governors

joined Congress and the President in declaring that the welfare system

was ``broken.''

After more than two years of discussion and negotiation, PRWORA

emerged as a bipartisan vehicle for comprehensive welfare reform. As

President Clinton stated in his remarks as he signed the bill, ``. . .

this legislation provides an historic opportunity to end welfare as we

know it and transform our broken welfare system by promoting the

fundamental values of work, responsibility, and family.''

The law gives States, and federally recognized Indian tribes, the

authority to use Federal welfare funds ``in any manner that is

reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose'' of the new program.

It provides them broad flexibility to set eligibility rules and decide

what benefits are most appropriate. It also enables States to implement

their new programs without getting the ``approval'' of the Federal

government. In short, it offers States and Tribes an opportunity to try

new, far-reaching changes that can respond more effectively to the

needs of families within their own unique environments.

PRWORA redefines the Federal role in administration of the nation's

welfare system. It limits Federal regulatory and enforcement authority,

but gives the Federal government new responsibilities for tracking

State performance. In a select number of areas, it calls for penalties

when States fail to comply with program requirements, and it provides

bonuses for States that perform well in meeting new program goals.

Under the new statute, program funding and assistance for families

both come with new expectations and responsibilities. Adults receiving

assistance are expected to engage in work activities and develop the

capability to support themselves before their time-limited assistance

runs out. States and Tribes are expected to assist recipients making

the transition to employment. They are also expected to meet work

participation rates and other critical program requirements in order to

maintain their Federal funding and avoid penalties.

Some important indicators of the change in expectations are: time

limits; higher participation rates; the elimination of numerous

exemptions from participation requirements; and the statutory option

for States to require individual responsibility plans. Taken together,

these provisions signal an expectation that we must broaden

participation beyond the ``job-ready.''

In meeting these expectations, States need to examine their

caseloads, identify the causes of long-term underemployment and

dependency, and work with families, communities, businesses, and other

social service agencies in resolving employment barriers. In some

cases, States may need to provide intervention services for families in

crisis or may need to adapt program models to accommodate individuals

with disabilities or other special needs. TANF gives States the

flexibility they need to respond to such individual family needs.

However, in return, it expects States to move towards a strategy that

provides appropriate services for all needy families.

II. Regulatory Framework

A. Pre-NPRM Process

In the spirit of both regulatory reform and PRWORA, we implemented

a broad and far-reaching consultation strategy prior to the drafting of

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). In Washington, we set up

numerous meetings with outside parties to gain information on the major

issues underlying the work, penalty, and data collection provisions of

the new law. In our ten regional offices, we used a variety of

mechanisms--including meetings, conference calls, and written

solicitations--to garner views from ``beyond the Beltway.''

The purpose of these discussions was to gain a variety of

informational perspectives about the potential benefits and pitfalls of

alternative regulatory approaches. We spoke with a number of different

audiences, including: representatives of State, Tribal, and local

governments; nonprofit and community organizations; business and labor

groups; and experts from the academic, foundation, and advocacy

communities. We solicited both written and oral comments, and we worked

to ensure that information and concerns raised during this process were

shared with both the staff working on individual regulatory issues and

key policy-makers.

These consultations were very useful in helping us identify key

issues and evaluate policy options, and several commenters commended

ACF on this process.

[[Page 17723]]

B. Related Regulations Under Development

This rule addresses the work, accountability, and data collection

and reporting provisions of the new TANF program. We have also issued

NPRM's and program guidance on several related provisions of the new

law including: high performance bonuses (TANF-ACF-PI-98-1 and TANF-ACF-

PI-98-05); illegitimacy reduction bonuses (63 FR 10263, March 2, 1998);

and the Tribal TANF and Native Employment Works (i.e., ``NEW'')

programs (63 FR 39365, July 22, 1998).

With a couple of minor exceptions, this rule does not address the

provisions of the Welfare-to-Work (WtW) program at section 403(a)(5) of

the Act, as created by section 5001(a)(1) of Pub. L. 105-33. The

Secretary of Labor issued interim rules on these provisions and the

provisions at section 5001(c), regarding WtW grants for Tribes, on

November 18, 1997. A copy of the interim rules and other information

about this program are available on the Web at http://wtw.doleta.gov.

The WtW provisions in this rule include the amendments to the TANF

provisions at sections 5001(d) and 5001(g)(1) of Pub. L. 105-33.

Section 5001(d) allows a State to provide WtW assistance to a family

that has received 60 months of federally funded TANF assistance and

specifies that ``noncash'' assistance under the WtW program is not

treated as TANF ``assistance'' for purposes of the TANF time limit.

Section 5001(g)(1) provides a new penalty that takes away WtW funds

when a State fails to meet the basic MOE requirements.

Also, this rule does not include the provision at section

5001(g)(2), which requires repayment of WtW funds to the Secretary of

Labor following a finding by the Secretary of Labor of misuse of funds.

Since the Department of Labor is responsible for administering this

penalty and receives any repaid funds, it would not be appropriate for

us to issue rules on this provision.

Under section 5001(e) of Pub. L. 105-33, we have responsibility for

regulating the WtW data reporting requirements, under section 411(a) of

the Act, as amended. On October 29, 1998, we issued an interim-final

rule that addresses these requirements, following consultation with the

Department of Labor, State agencies, Private Industry Councils, and

other affected parties (63 FR 57919).

As we pointed out in the NPRM preamble, there is an important

relationship between this rulemaking and the rulemaking on Tribal

programs. Under section 412 of the Social Security Act, federally

recognized Tribes may elect to operate their own TANF programs, and

Tribes that operated their own JOBS programs may continue to receive

those funds to operate Tribal work programs. We published the NPRM for

Tribal TANF programs on July 22, 1998 (see 63 FR 39365).

Tribal decisions on whether to elect the TANF option will depend on

a number of factors, including the nature of services and benefits that

will be available to Tribal members under the State program. Thus,

Tribes have a direct interest in the regulations governing State

programs.

Tribes also have an interest in these regulations because some of

the rules we develop for State programs could eventually apply to the

Tribal programs. In particular, we urge Tribes to note the data

collection and reporting requirements at part 265. While the statute

allows Tribes to negotiate certain program requirements, such as work

participation rates and time limits, it subjects Tribal programs to the

same data collection and reporting requirements as States.

We would also like to direct the Tribes to the maintenance-of-

effort (MOE) policies discussed at Sec. 263.1. In that section, we

provide that State contributions to a Tribal program could count toward

a State's MOE. Tribes should be aware of the important implications of

this provision for both the funding of Tribal programs and State-Tribal

relations.

In order for welfare reform to succeed in Indian country, it is

important for State and Tribal governments to work together on a number

of key issues, including data exchange and coordination of services. We

remind States that Tribes have a right under law to operate their own

programs. States should cooperate in providing the information

necessary for Tribes to do so.

Likewise, Tribes should cooperate with States in identifying Tribal

members and tracking receipt of assistance.

On December, 5, 1997, we issued a final rule to repeal the obsolete

regulations for the EA, JOBS, and the IV-A child care programs and a

few provisions covering administrative requirements of the AFDC program

(see 62 FR 64301, December 5, 1997). This action resulted in the

elimination of about 82 pages from the Code of Federal Regulations.

We have yet to issue a more detailed conforming rule that deletes

or replaces obsolete AFDC and title IV-A references throughout chapter

II. This second rulemaking will take additional time because the AFDC

provisions are intertwined with provisions for other programs that are

not repealed. Also, it is not clear that we should repeal all the AFDC

provisions because Medicaid, foster care, and other programs have

linkages to the AFDC rules. Because of these complexities and the

nonurgent nature of the conforming changes, this latter rule is not an

immediate agency priority.

PRWORA also changed other major programs administered by ACF, the

Department, and other Federal agencies that may significantly affect a

State's success in implementing welfare reform. For example, title VI

of PRWORA repealed the child care programs that were previously

authorized under title IV-A of the Social Security Act. In their place,

it provided two new sources of child care funding (which we refer to

collectively as the Child Care Development Fund). These funds go to the

Lead Agency that administers the Child Care and Development Block Grant

program. A major purpose of the increases in child care funding

provided under PRWORA is to assist low-income families in their efforts

to be self-sufficient. We issued final rules covering the Child Care

and Development Fund on July 24, 1998 (see 63 FR 39935).

We encourage you to look in the Federal Register for actions on

these related rules, take the opportunity to comment, and work to

understand the important relationships among these programs in

developing a comprehensive strategy that can provide support to all

families that are working to maintain their family structure and become

self-sufficient.

C. Statutory Context

These proposed rules reflect PRWORA, as enacted, and amended by

Pub. L. 104-327, Pub. L. 105-33, Pub. L. 105-89, Pub. L. 105-178, and

Pub. L. 105-200.

As we indicated in the NPRM preamble, the changes made by Pub. L.

104-327 are fairly limited in scope; we discuss them in the preamble on

Contingency Fund MOE requirements at Secs. 264.71, 264.72, and 264.77.

Pub. L. 105-33 (also known as The Balanced Budget Act of 1997)

created the new Welfare-to Work (WtW) program, made a few substantive

changes to the TANF program, and made numerous technical corrections to

the TANF statute. We attempted to incorporate those amendments that

were in our purview in the NPRM. However, commenters identified a

couple of places where we did not fully

[[Page 17724]]

or correctly incorporate these amendments. We found a few more. We note

these in the preamble discussion that follows and have made appropriate

changes in the regulatory text.

We want to note a couple of additional legislative developments

since the drafting of the NPRM that might affect a State's liability

for penalties and the use of Federal TANF funds. We have made a couple

of conforming changes in the rules to reflect these developments.

Under Pub. L. 105-89, known as the Adoption and Safe Families Act

of 1997, Congress decreased the amount of money available to States

through the ``Contingency Fund'' and increased the amount that States

receiving contingency funds must remit, using a proportionate

reduction. We discuss this provision in more detail in the preamble for

subpart B of part 264, and we have changed the regulatory text to

reflect this change.

Under Pub. L. 105-178, known as The Transportation Equity Act for

the 21st Century, Congress: (1) (Effective in fiscal year 2001) reduced

the cap on the amount that a State could transfer to the Social

Services Block Grant from 10 percent to 4.25 percent; (2) created the

``Job Access'' competitive grant program to help communities develop

transportation services that will help current and former welfare

recipients and other low-income individuals access employment; and (3)

specified that States could use their Federal TANF funds as part of the

nongovernmental cost-sharing required under a Job Access program. None

of these provisions directly affect the TANF rules, but they do change

what would be an allowable use of Federal TANF funds. It is important

that States understand these provisions if they wish to avoid a penalty

for misuse of Federal TANF funds.

Under section 403 of The Child Support Performance and Incentives

Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-200, Congress amended section 404 of the

Social Security Act to address the use of Federal TANF funds within the

Job Access and Reverse Commute program. It imposed: (1) restrictions on

the use of Federal TANF funds for this purpose, including ``new

spending'' and ``nonsupplantation'' requirements; (2) a requirement

that the preponderance of funds go to TANF recipients, former TANF

recipients, certain noncustodial parents, and low-income individuals at

risk of qualifying for the TANF program; and (3) a requirement that the

services provided support participation in TANF work activities. It

also imposed a cap on the total amount of Federal TANF funds that a

State could use for this purpose, computed as the difference between 30

percent of the State Family Assistance Grant (SFAG) amount and the

amount that a State was transferring that year to the Child Care and

Development Block Grant or the Social Services Block Grant.

Consistent with treatment of the other restrictions on the grant at

section 404, we have not directly incorporated these restrictions into

the TANF rule. However, we note that we would consider expenditures in

violation of these new provisions a misuse of funds.

We also point out that these provisions do not conflict with the

restrictions at section 409(a)(7)(B)(iv) of the Act or Sec. 263.6(a)

and (c) of these rules. The TANF rules deal with the converse

situation--the circumstances under which other State expenditures do

not qualify under TANF's basic maintenance-of-effort provisions. The

new provisions address the circumstances under which Federal TANF funds

may count as nongovernmental expenditures under a separate program.

They do not give States the authority to use Job Access funds for basic

MOE purposes.

Further, the use of Federal TANF funds to support Job Access

activities does not constitute a transfer of Federal TANF funds within

the meaning of section 404(d)(1). Thus, they do not affect the

``adjusted SFAG'' amount that we use in determining the administrative

cost cap and penalty amounts.

The Child Support Performance and Incentives Act also added a

``rule of interpretation'' to section 404(k)(3) of the Social Security

Act, which indicates that the provision of transportation benefits to

an individual who is not otherwise receiving TANF assistance would not

be considered assistance. We have made a conforming change to our

definition of assistance at Sec. 260.31 to reflect this policy.

D. Regulatory Reform

In its latest Document Drafting Handbooks, the Office of the

Federal Register has supported the efforts of the National Partnership

for Reinventing Government and encouraged Federal agencies to produce

more reader-friendly regulations. In drafting the proposed and final

rule, we paid close attention to this guidance and worked to produce a

more readable rule. We also provided electronic access to the document

and gave readers the option to submit their comments electronically. We

received a number of positive comments about how the NPRM was written

and the electronic access.

Based in part on the positive reaction to the proposed rule, and in

the spirit of facilitating understanding, we decided to retain much of

the NPRM preamble discussion. We believe it will be useful for some

readers in providing the overall context for the final regulations.

However, where we are changing our policy in the final rule, or the

context has changed since we issued the NPRM, we have made appropriate

changes to the preamble. We also exercised some editorial discretion to

make the discussion more succinct or clearer in places. Wherever we

made significant changes in policy, the preamble notes and explains

those changes.

In the proposed rule, we decided to incorporate a few statutory

provisions as a frame of reference even though we did not intend to

regulate or enforce State behavior in those areas. We thought the

inclusion of this additional preamble discussion and regulatory text

would help establish the broader context for other parts of the

rulemaking document. These additions were primarily explanatory in

nature or restatements of the statutory requirements. We indicated that

readers could probably identify these additional provisions based on

the language used and the surrounding preamble discussion and noted

that subparts A and G of part 271 (which addressed the work provisions

other than participation rates and penalties) and Sec. 270.20 (which

included the statutory goals of the program) as specific examples.

Commenters identified an additional item that would be helpful to

include as a frame of reference--the nondiscrimination provisions found

at section 408(d) of the Act. We decided to accept the suggestion and

include these provisions in the final rule since commenters had not

generally objected to including such material in the regulatory text of

the NPRM, the inclusion will have informational value, and the change

does not materially alter the scope of the rule. (See the discussion on

``Recipient and Workplace Protections'' for additional information.)

Likewise, based on comments we received on the domestic violence

provisions in the proposed rule, we incorporated the statutory

provisions on the Family Violence Option at a new Sec. 260.52.

In the spirit of providing access to information, we included draft

data collection and reporting forms as appendices to the proposed rules

even though we did not intend to publish the forms as part of the final

rule. We thought that the inclusion of the draft

[[Page 17725]]

forms would expand public access to this information and make it easier

to comment on our data collection and reporting plans.

We believe that we succeeded in accomplishing these goals.

Commenters responded in large numbers and specific detail to both the

Paperwork Reduction Notice and the Proposed Rule. The changes to the

final rule and to the companion appendices reflect our consolidated

response to both sets of comments.

E. Scope of This Rulemaking

The NPRM and final rule reflect our decision to incorporate the

work, data collection, and penalty provisions in a single regulatory

package. While this decision resulted in a large rule, we think it

enabled us to develop a more coherent regulatory framework and provided

readers an opportunity to look at, and comment on, the many

interconnected pieces at one time.

One downside of this decision was that the concentration of all

these accountability provisions in one rule could have contributed to

the perception among some commenters that the tone was punitive and the

rule too penalty-focused. It is important to keep our broader

regulatory and program agenda in mind as you assess the impact and

meaning of this package. The total agenda includes rewards, as well as

penalties, and tracks State performance along a variety of different

measures, including job entries, success in the workplace, reductions

in out-of-wedlock childbearing, and child poverty rates. It also

includes annual reports to Congress on State program characteristics,

recipient characteristics, and performance.

Our agenda also includes extensive research, evaluation, and

technical assistance efforts. Throughout this preamble, you will find

examples of how our efforts in these areas respond, in a nonregulatory

fashion, to commenter concerns. It would be impractical and

inappropriate to use this rulemaking as the vehicle for informing the

public about the full agenda, but the ``Promising Practices National

Conferences'' held in September 1998 and in Fiscal Year 1999 provide a

good example. These meetings, which have the financial support of the

Department of Health and Human Services (including both the

Administration for Children and Families and the Substance Abuse and

Mental Health Services Administration) and the Department of Labor,

will provide State and local staff and other practitioners with

practical ideas on a range of topics, such as preparing for the

difficult task of moving clients with multiple barriers into work,

creating jobs in isolated and high-risk communities, increasing support

from noncustodial parents, promoting collaboration and achieving

seamless delivery of services, changing welfare offices to job centers,

promoting success in the workplace, and maintaining the investments in

needy families.

F. Applicability of the Rules

As we indicated in policy guidance to the States and the NPRM, a

State could operate its program under a reasonable interpretation of

the statute prior to our issuance of final rules. Thus, in determining

whether a State is subject to a penalty, we would not apply regulatory

interpretations retroactively. We retained this basic policy, but

modified it to clarify that the ``reasonable interpretation'' standard

applies until the effective date of these final rules. You can find

additional discussion of this policy at Sec. 260.40 of the preamble.

III. Principles Governing Regulatory Development

A. Restrictions on Our Regulatory Authority

Under the new section 417 of the Act, the Federal government may

not regulate State conduct or enforce any TANF provision except to the

extent expressly provided by law. This limitation on Federal authority

is consistent with the principle of State flexibility and the general

State and congressional interest in shifting more responsibility for

program policy and procedures to the States.

We interpreted this provision to allow us to regulate in two

different kinds of situations: (1) Where Congress has explicitly

directed the Secretary to regulate (for example, under the caseload

reduction provisions, described below); and (2) where Congress has

charged the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) with

enforcing penalties, even if there is no explicit mention of

regulation. In this latter case, we believe we have an obligation to

States to set out, in regulations, the criteria we will use in carrying

out our express authority to enforce certain TANF provisions by

assessing penalties.

In the preamble to the proposed rule, we indicated that we

endeavored to regulate in a manner that did not impinge on a State's

ability to design an effective and responsive program. A large number

of commenters felt that our regulations would in fact have such a

negative effect. In the subsequent discussion, you will note that we

have revised provisions in key program areas that respond to these

concerns.

At the same time, however, we remain committed to ensuring that

States remain accountable for meeting TANF requirements. Thus, we will

continue to monitor program developments so that we can make

appropriate adjustments if programs fail to remain focused on TANF's

statutory objectives.

B. State Flexibility

In the Conference Report to PRWORA, Congress stated that the best

welfare solutions come from those closest to the problems, not from the

Federal government. Thus, the legislation creates a broad block grant

for each State to reform welfare in ways that work best. It gives

States the flexibility to design their own programs, define who will be

eligible, establish what benefits and services will be available, and

develop their own strategies for achieving program goals, including how

to help recipients move into the work force.

Under the law and the proposed rules, we indicated that States

could implement innovative and creative strategies for supporting the

critical goals of work and responsibility. For example, they could

choose to expend funds on refundable earned income tax credits or

transportation assistance that would help low-wage workers keep their

jobs. They could also extend employment services to noncustodial

parents, by including them within the definition of ``eligible

families.''

To ensure that our rules supported the legislative goals of PRWORA,

we indicated our commitment to gather information on how States were

responding to the new opportunities available to them. We said that we

reserved the right to revisit some issues, either through legislative

or regulatory proposals, if we identified situations where State

actions were not furthering the objectives of the Act.

A large number of commenters felt we had unduly limited State

flexibility to design their programs, particularly with respect to

expending funds in separate State programs, providing assistance to

child-only cases, and continuing waivers, but also in areas like the

definition of administrative costs, restrictions on domestic violence

waivers that affected reasonable cause, and the definition of

assistance.

We included some restrictions on State flexibility in the NPRM to

protect against possible State policies that might undermine TANF goals

or divert the Federal share of child support collections. However, in

response to

[[Page 17726]]

these concerns and in recognition of the positive steps States have

been taking to implement welfare reform, we have decided to remove some

of the direct and perceived restrictions on State flexibility. We have

also provided some important preamble language that helps clarify State

flexibility to define needy families and spend both Federal TANF and

State MOE funds in ways that support a wide range of families in

diverse ways. We provide additional discussion of these changes and

clarifications in subsequent sections of the preamble.

C. Accountability for Meeting Program Requirements and Goals

In the NPRM we recognized that States have enormous flexibility to

design their TANF programs in ways that strengthen families and promote

work, responsibility, and self-sufficiency. At the same time, however,

TANF reflects a bipartisan commitment to ensuring that State programs

support the goals of welfare reform. To this end, the statutory

provisions on data collection, bonuses, and penalties are crucial

because they allow us to track what is happening to needy families and

children under the new law, measure program outcomes, and promote key

program objectives.

Work

As we indicated in the NPRM, we believe the central goal of the new

law is to move welfare recipients into work. The law reflects this

important goal in a number of ways:

Work receives prominent mention in the statutory goals at

section 401 and the plan provisions in section 402;

Section 407 establishes specific work participation rates

each State must achieve;

Section 409 provides significant financial penalties

against any State that fails to achieve the required participation

rates;

Section 411 provides specific authority for the Secretary

to establish data reporting requirements to capture necessary data on

work participation rates; and

Section 413 calls for ranking of States based on the

effectiveness of their work programs.

The proposed and final rules reflect a similar, special focus on

promoting the work objectives of the Act and ensuring that States meet

the statutory requirements at sections 407, 409, and 411 of the Act.

You should look at the rules in part 261, and the related preamble

discussion, for specific details.

This Administration has repeatedly shown its commitment to

promoting the work objectives of this new law. Before and since the

legislation was passed, the President and the Administration have

worked very hard to ensure that Congress passed strong work provisions

and provided adequate child care funding and other program supports to

help families making the transition from welfare to work.

These include the new Welfare to Work program (WtW), the Welfare-

to-Work Tax Credit enacted in the Balanced Budget Act, Welfare-to-Work

housing vouchers included in the Fiscal Year 1999 budget for the

Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Job Access

transportation grants.

WtW provides grants to States, localities, Indian Tribes, and

other grantees to help them move long-term welfare recipients and

certain noncustodial parents into lasting, unsubsidized jobs.

The Welfare to Work Tax Credit provides a credit equal to 35

percent of the first $10,000 in wages in the first year of

employment, and 50 percent of the first $10,000 in wages in the

second year, to encourage the hiring and retention of long-term

recipients. (It complements the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, which

provides a credit of up to $2,400 for the first year of wages to

employers who hire long-term welfare recipients.)

Welfare-to-Work Housing vouchers will help current and former

welfare recipients who need housing assistance to get or keep a job.

Most of the housing vouchers (50,000 in FY 1999) will go to

communities on a competitive grant basis.

The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21)

authorizes $750 million over five years for competitive grants to

communities to develop innovative transportation activities to help

welfare recipients and other low-income workers (i.e., those with

income up to 150 percent of poverty) get to work. (You can find more

information about the Administration's initiatives at http://

www.whitehouse/gov/wh/welfare.)

The President has also challenged America's businesses, its large

nonprofit sector, and the executive branch of the Federal government to

help welfare recipients go to work and succeed in the workplace.

In May 1997, the President helped to launch a new private-sector

initiative to promote the hiring of welfare recipients by private-

sector employers. The Welfare-to-Work Partnership, which started with

105 participating businesses, now includes over 10,000 businesses that

have hired 410,000 welfare recipients. This partnership has produced a

variety of materials to support businesses in these efforts, including

the ``Blueprint for Business'' hiring manual and ``The Road to

Retention,'' a report of companies that have achieved higher retention

rates for former welfare recipients. You can find information about the

Welfare to Work Partnership at http://www.welfaretowork.org.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) is addressing the unique

and vital role of small businesses, which account for over one-half of

all private-sector employment. It is helping small businesses make

connections to job training organizations and job-ready welfare

recipients. It is also providing training and assistance to welfare

recipients who wish to start their own businesses. Businesses can

receive assistance through SBA's 1-800-U-ASK-SBA and through its

network of centers, shops, and district offices. Information on SBA's

Welfare to Work initiative (W2W) and other activities are available

through the SBA home page at http://www.sba.gov.

In addition, the Vice President has developed a coalition of

national civic, service, and faith-based groups committed to helping

former welfare recipients succeed in the workforce--by providing

mentoring, job training, child care, and other supports.

On March 8, 1997, the President directed all Federal agencies to

submit plans describing the efforts they would make to respond to this

challenge. Under the Vice President's leadership, Federal agencies

committed to hiring at least 10,000 welfare recipients over the next

four years. Agencies have already fulfilled this commitment--nearly two

years ahead of schedule. (You can find additional information on this

effort at http://www.welfaretowork.fed.gov.)

Meeting the Needs of Low-Income Families and Children

In a number of different ways, the new law works to ensure that the

needs of low-income children and families are met. First, it provides a

guaranteed base level of Federal funding for the TANF programs. Then,

in times of special financial need, it makes nearly $2 billion in

additional funding available through a Contingency Fund and up to $1.7

billion available for loans to States. It also authorizes several

studies to monitor changes in the situations of needy children and

families that occur after enactment. For example, it requires us to

report on how certain children are affected by the provisions of the

new law. It also requires us to track whether a State's child poverty

rate increases as the result of the State's TANF program and requires

States to initiate corrective actions when such increases occur.

These regulations work to further the objectives of these statutory

provisions.

[[Page 17727]]

Most importantly, they work to ensure that the use of Federal and State

funds is consistent with the provisions and purposes of TANF, that

States maintain their investments on needy families, that recipients

and other workers have the protections available to them that are

intended under Federal law, and that we collect data from States that

are necessary to assess program performance.

IV. Discussion of Cross-Cutting Issues

Overview of Comments

As we indicated earlier in the preamble, commenters expressed a

number of major concerns with respect to our policies on separate State

programs, child-only cases, and waiver continuations. In particular,

they said: (1) In part because of the uncertainty they created, the

proposed rules would stifle innovation and undermine the States'

ability to meet the needs of their families; (2) the proposed rules

were overly prescriptive and burdensome, too concerned about

accountability and the taking of penalties, and not focused on

outcomes; (3) they undermined the partnership between the State and

Federal governments, fostered an adversarial relationship, violated the

compact between the States and Washington in creating TANF, or

contravened Congressional intent (if not the law) in regulating State

behavior in these areas; (4) we presumed State guilt when there was no

evidence that States were taking advantage of loopholes to evade the

TANF provisions; and (5) our strict penalty policies, promotion of

``work first'' strategies, and inattention to recipient protections

could ultimately harm recipients (e.g., prevent them from attaining

jobs that paid a living wage or accessing appropriate treatment).

We disagree with commenters that claimed that we exceeded our

regulatory and statutory authority in the NPRM. However, because of the

evidence we have seen about States' commitment to develop programs that

are consistent with the goals of TANF, these final rules reflect some

significant changes in our policies on these three issues. You will

find additional details in the following discussion.

A. Separate State Programs

Background

Section 409(a)(7) of the Social Security Act permits States to

assist eligible families by expending maintenance-of-effort funds (MOE)

under ``all State programs.'' Thus, we recognize expenditures under the

State's TANF program and/or separate State program(s). However,

eligible families assisted through a separate State program are not

generally subject to TANF requirements, including work participation

requirements, child support collection requirements, the time limit on

receipt of assistance, and data collection and reporting requirements.

In other words, by definition, States operating separate programs avoid

TANF requirements; they have more flexibility to use the funds

available in these programs to help eligible families.

In the NPRM preamble, in a section entitled ``Maintenance-of-Effort

(MOE),'' we stated that one of the most important provisions in the new

law designed to protect needy families and children is the basic

maintenance-of-effort (basic MOE) requirement in the TANF statute. This

provision requires States to maintain a certain level of spending on

welfare, based on historic (i.e., fiscal year (FY) 1994) expenditure

levels. Because this provision is critical to the successful

implementation of the law, Congress gave us the authority to enforce

State compliance in meeting this requirement, and it received

significant attention in the proposed rule.

We also directed readers to the data collection, work, and penalty

provisions of the proposed rule, at parts 271-275, for provisions

designed to: (1) ensure that States continue to make the required

investments in meeting the needs of low-income children and families;

(2) prevent States from either supplanting funds or using their MOE

funds to meet extraneous program or fiscal needs; (3) give us adequate

information to meet our statutory responsibility to determine what is

happening in State programs; and (4) take a broad view of work effort,

caseload reduction, and program performance.

We recognized that States have more flexibility in spending their

State MOE funds than their Federal TANF funds, especially when they

expend their MOE funds in separate State programs. However, at the same

time, we reiterated concerns that we had first expressed in our policy

guidance of January 1997, TANF-ACF-PA-97-1, that States could design

their programs to avoid the work requirements of the new law or to

avoid returning a share of their child support collections to the

Federal government. Therefore, we proposed four measures to mitigate

these potential negative consequences.

First, if we detected a significant pattern of diversion of

families to a separate State program that achieves the effect of

avoiding either the work participation rates or returning the Federal

share of child support collections, we proposed to deny reasonable

cause for certain penalties. For avoiding the work participation rates,

reasonable cause relief would not be available with respect to

penalties for failure to: meet minimum participation rates, implement

time limits, maintain assistance to a custodial parent who cannot

obtain child care for a child under age 6, and reduce assistance for

recipients refusing without good cause to work. For diverting the

Federal share of child support collections, reasonable cause would not

be available with respect to the penalties for failure to: meet minimum

participation rates, implement time limits, reduce assistance for

recipients refusing without good cause to work, and cooperate with

paternity establishment and child support enforcement requirements.

Second, for the same two diversion situations and penalties that we

just discussed, we proposed that a State would not be eligible for a

penalty reduction on the basis of making substantial progress during

corrective compliance unless it corrected the diversion.

Third, we proposed to deny a State access to two possible

reductions in the penalty for failing to meet work participation rates

unless it ``demonstrates that it has not diverted cases to a separate

State program for the purpose of avoiding the work participation

requirements.''

Finally, we proposed to require that a State collect case-record

data on participants in separate State programs if it wished to receive

a high performance bonus; qualify for work participation caseload

reduction credit; or be considered for a reduction in the penalty for

failing to meet the work participation requirements.

In making these proposals, we noted that the Secretary has

considerable discretion in determining whether to reduce penalties or

grant a good cause exception. We argued that work was the most critical

component in achieving the purposes of TANF and these limits on the

relief on the work penalty were appropriate to prevent circumvention of

this purpose.

We went on to say that implementation of the child support

provisions was the other key component to achieving self-sufficiency.

We spoke about the major Federal role in child support enforcement

(particularly with regard to the operation of the New Hire Directory

and the Federal Parent Locator Service), the continuing Federal

interest in the effectiveness of these programs, and the continued

Federal financial

[[Page 17728]]

commitment, under TANF, for needy families whose children have been

deprived of parental support and care.

We expressed concern not just about the unintended, negative

consequences of diverting cases to separate State programs for the

Federal budget and the Federal government's ability to ensure an

effective child support program, but also about reduced State

accountability for ensuring that needy families take appropriate steps

towards achieving self-sufficiency. We indicated that, in the interest

of protecting the key goals of TANF, it was appropriate for the

Secretary to use the discretion available to her to forgive penalties

and set penalty amounts so as to ensure that States do not divert cases

inappropriately.

We announced plans to monitor States' actions to determine if they

constituted a significant pattern of diversion. For example, if, based

on an examination of statistical or other evidence, we came to the

conclusion that a State was assigning people to a separate State

program in order to divert the Federal share of child support

collections, or in order to evade the work requirements, we would

conclude that this is a significant pattern of diversion and would deny

the State the specified types of penalty relief.

We said a State would have opportunity to prove that this pattern

was actually the result of State policies and objectives that were

entirely unrelated to the goal of diversion, but we would make the

final judgment as to what constitutes a significant pattern of

diversion.

We placed the specific regulatory provisions associated with these

policies in Secs. 271.51(a), 271.52(b), 272.5(c) and (d), and

272.6(i)(2) of the proposed rule.

We also indicated our intent to propose that States seeking to

receive high performance bonuses would be required to report on

families served by separate State programs in the coming NPRM on high

performance bonuses.

Comment Overview

We received dozens of comments on these proposals related to

implementation of separate State programs. The commenters universally

opposed the proposals and presented a variety of objections. Most

wanted the provisions deleted entirely, but some suggested specific

changes that we could make to the regulatory provisions if we did not

delete them.

In summarizing these extensive comments, we first address those

directed at deleting the provisions. Then we address the comments about

possible refinements that we could make.

Commenters objected to both the negative tone of these rules and

their effect in undermining State and local flexibility to serve needy

families, including those with multiple barriers to employment. They

noted that several States have created or were considering separate

State programs to serve their most vulnerable families, such as legal

noncitizens with poor language and literacy skills; single parents

taking care of a disabled child; citizens not disabled enough to

qualify for SSI, but unable to work 20 to 30 hours a week; refugees;

and victims of domestic violence. They expressed fears that the

proposed rules, if not modified, could have a significant chilling

effect on the development of innovative approaches to serve working

families and the most vulnerable populations. That is, States would be

conservative in extending assistance to hard-to-serve or working

families out of fear of incurring more and larger penalties. In fact,

some commenters argued that, since TANF was not an entitlement program,

some States might choose not to give such individuals assistance due to

concerns about the penalty consequences.

Some argued that the proposals were contrary to the statute and

Congressional intent. Their comments encompassed the following general

points: (1) There is no statutory basis for the links between penalty

relief and the operation of separate State programs. In deciding

penalty relief, we should be looking only at the TANF program. (2) The

statute clearly authorizes States to spend their basic MOE funds in

separate State programs that are not subject to TANF requirements. Our

proposals would punish States that elected to use this authority and

preempt State and local authority over their own programs. (3) Our

proposals would deny penalty relief where the statute requires such

relief. (For example, the statute says that the Secretary ``shall''

reduce work participation penalties based on degree of noncompliance;

thus, this reduction is not discretionary. The statute also provides

that the Secretary could impose lesser penalties on a State that fails

to correct a violation fully under corrective compliance.)

Categorically denying penalty relief because of a State's legal and

allowable actions on separate State programs is not appropriate.

In lieu of the proposed policies, many commenters recommended that

we monitor State actions to determine if a State is pursuing legitimate

policy objectives or avoiding TANF-related requirements. They noted the

lack of evidence so far that States were abusing the flexibility

available under the law; their view was that States have been using

separate programs for constructive and appropriate purposes. One noted,

if a few States try to take advantage of the flexibility in the law,

Congress and the Department can work together to figure out an

effective way to stop them.

Commenters also argued that the penalty consequences for operating

separate State programs exceeded the magnitude of the purported

offense. As a case example, a State could be operating a separate State

program that represented only a small percent of its MOE expenditures,

it barely missed its participation rate, and it had suffered a

catastrophic natural disaster during the course of the year. The

argument is that the State should get reasonable cause or penalty

reduction because the State's failure could be attributed entirely to

the natural disaster, the separate State program was an incidental

matter, and, by any objective measure, the State's degree of

noncompliance was minimal. Absolute loss of penalty relief in such a

case would be arbitrary, at a minimum.

A related comment was that we should limit denial of penalty relief

to situations where there is a direct relationship between the penalty

at issue and the conduct of the State. Commenters argued that we should

not deny penalty relief on four penalties when the State actions at

issue were probably only directly connected to one penalty.

One suggestion for making the consequences more proportionate to

the ``offense'' would be to not totally preclude eligibility for

penalty relief, but to consider State policies on separate State

programs as one of several factors affecting how difficult the penalty

standard was for a State to achieve.

Others noted that we had not used clear or consistent language when

articulating how a separate State program might affect the availability

of penalty relief. The lack of clarity would make it difficult for

States to predict the effect of these provisions and could produce

unfair, arbitrary, and inconsistent outcomes. It could also mean that

we unduly deter States from assisting needy families.

Commenters raised the following questions about the meaning of our

proposals: (1) What is meant by ``purpose'' and ``effect''? (2) Are the

terms meant to define different concepts? (3) Does ``purpose'' refer to

``sole purpose'' or ``one of the purposes''? (4) How would we

determine, or a State prove, whether a

[[Page 17729]]

separate State program has the specified ``purpose'' or ``effect''? (5)

What is meant by a ``significant'' pattern of diversion? and (6) What

criteria would we use to judge whether a State adequately demonstrated

that it had not diverted cases to avoid penalties or divert child

support? Relatedly, they objected to the fact that our proposed rules

shifted the burden of proof about intent onto the States and to the

difficulties attendant in proving a negative proposition.

Among the suggestions offered for addressing these concerns were:

(1) Clarify the circumstances when a State will not face loss of

penalty relief (e.g., identify reasonable and legitimate policy bases

for separate State programs, using examples); (2) allow an up-front

assessment of the acceptability of separate State programs that States

could rely upon in deciding what options to pursue under separate State

programs; (3) create clear, objective criteria for determining when a

separate State program would trigger adverse consequences; and (4) err

on the side of flexibility if we cannot make highly accurate

determinations that programs are deliberately designed to avoid Federal

rules.

Overall Response

When we were developing the proposed rules, obviously we were very

concerned that States would use the flexibility available through

separate State programs to avoid work participation requirements,

divert the Federal share of child support collections, and otherwise

undermine the goals or provisions of TANF. Within the authority that we

have to make decisions on State penalties and bonuses, we proposed

specific regulatory policies with respect to penalties, bonuses, and

reporting in response to that concern.

However, as we have seen these programs evolve, our concerns about

possible abuses have diminished. As commenters pointed out, States are

generally using separate State programs to serve a variety of policy

purposes consistent with the goals and provisions of PRWORA. For

example: (1) They are supporting work and self-support--through State

earned income credits, transportation, child care, or other work-

related assistance; (2) they are helping families with special needs

who are unable to engage in work activities for the requisite number of

hours--e.g., families dealing with substance abuse, incapacity (or

caring for a disabled child), literacy or ESL needs; (3) they are

working to increase the economic viability of families--by providing

financial aid for post-secondary education and support for other

education or training activities, including activities for noncustodial

parents; and (4) they are assisting individuals ineligible for the TANF

program (e.g., using State funds to provide ``Food Stamp'' benefits for

legal aliens who lost eligibility for assistance under PRWORA).

In the few cases where separate State programs are serving families

that we would normally expect to see in the TANF program, we often see

the same or similar level of work activity required under TANF; e.g.,

Florida's two-parent program and Maine's Parents-as-Scholars program

are part of separate State programs, but expect parents to participate

at the TANF level of hours, or more.

As commenters pointed out, if we developed policy to force States

to provide services to families within the confines of the TANF

statute, we would not necessarily achieve that end. An equally possible

outcome could be that States would elect not to serve families,

especially those hard-to-serve families that would be the most

difficult to accommodate under the standard TANF rules.

We considered ways to redraft the NPRM policy so that we would not

have the ``chilling'' effect on State innovation that commenters

feared. A variety of options were available to us, ranging from wording

changes, to clarifications of key terms, to setting up a process for

pre-clearance of State proposals, to reducing the potential negative

consequences to States if we found inappropriate diversion.

However, we were concerned that: (1) None of these options totally

eliminated the potential ``chilling'' effects on State innovation; and

(2) existing evidence did not indicate that there was a problem

sufficient to justify such a strong policy response.

Thus, the final rules eliminate the proposed link between a State's

decisions on implementing a separate State program and its eligibility

for penalty relief. In particular, we removed the provisions related to

separate State programs that were in the proposed rules at

Secs. 271.51(a), 271.52(b), 272.5 (c) and (d), and 272.6(i)(2).

However, we remain concerned about the possibility that States

could use separate State programs to avoid the TANF work requirements

(particularly for two-parent families) and to divert the Federal share

of child support collections. Thus, at Secs. 261.41(e) and 265.3(d)(1),

we retained the NPRM provisions (which were at Secs. 271.41(e) and

275.3(d)(1)) that, as a condition for receiving caseload reduction

credits or a high performance bonus, States must report data on

separate State programs and the recipients in them, through the SSP-MOE

Data Report. However, we deleted the language that was in

Sec. 275.3(d)(1)(iii) indicating that States needed to submit the SSP-

MOE Data Report if they wanted to be considered for a reduction in the

penalty for failing to meet the work participation requirements. Also,

as we discuss in the next section of the preamble, by changing the

definition of assistance, we have limited the types of programs covered

by this reporting. We have also reduced the types of data elements that

must be reported.

This data collection is part of a broad strategy to monitor the

scope and nature of separate State programs. This strategy starts with

four data sources: (1) The quarterly TANF Financial Report (Appendix

D); (2) the MOE section of the annual report (at Sec. 265.9(c) and

Appendix I); (3) the quarterly SSP-MOE Data Report; and (4) quarterly

reports on child support collections. We would review data from these

sources to identify States that might be using separate State programs

either for the purpose of avoiding work or diverting the Federal share

of child support collections. We would then make a preliminary

assessment whether these States were operating separate State programs

that were consistent with TANF goals. If we needed additional

information for this assessment, we could supplement the official

information with information gathered in single State audits or special

studies (such as studies conducted by the Department's Office of the

Inspector General).

The data collection on separate State programs will help enable us

to: (1) Monitor the nature of these programs; (2) determine the extent

to which cases are being shifted to separate State programs; (3)

determine whether such shifts are having an adverse effect on the two

work participation rates or the Federal share of child support

collections; (4) develop a sound policy response in the event of

adverse effects; (5) better assess a State's claim for a caseload

reduction credit or high performance bonus; and (6) decide if a State's

policies with respect to separate State programs should affect its

ranking under section 413(d) of the Act.

In the proposed rule, we did not mention that the creation of

separate State programs might affect the annual rankings of States

based on the success of their work efforts. However, we have concluded

that there could be circumstances under which we would

[[Page 17730]]

want to alter a State's ranking on this basis. For example, suppose the

State with the highest percentage of placements in long-term jobs for

its TANF cases achieved its placement rate and ranking by shifting all

of its hard-to-serve cases from TANF to separate State programs.

Obviously, this State would not merit a ranking as one of the five most

successful States. We will consider if a State's separate State program

had the effect of avoiding work requirements as one factor in

determining the annual ranking of successful State programs.

We will incorporate a full analysis of the information that we have

gathered on what has been happening with separate State programs in our

annual report to Congress. For example, we intend to address issues

such as: (1) What is the basic nature of these programs; (2) have there

been changes in their size or scope; (3) who do these programs serve;

(4) how do they differ from TANF recipients; (5) what types of benefits

do they provide; (6) to what extent do work participation rates apply;

(7) what participation rates are being achieved; and (8) is there any

evidence of the diversion of Federal child support collections. By

looking at this range of issues, we will be better able to assess

whether States have diverted individuals from TANF with the apparent

purpose of avoiding TANF program requirements.

In the High Performance Bonus guidance that we issued on March 17,

1998 (TANF-ACF-PI-98-01), we noted that a State's success in meeting

TANF performance goals could be affected by its decision to fund a

separate State program with its maintenance-of-effort (MOE) dollars and

that such actions might advantage one State over another. For example,

if a State had a separate State program similar to TANF in which it put

recipients who were more difficult to employ, its TANF performance

results could be unfairly inflated. In such cases, we would need to

consider including outcomes for the caseload in separate State programs

in the performance measures. We said we would analyze separate State

program data, as well as other information we receive on the

characteristics of the caseload and the nature of benefits provided in

separate State programs, in assessing how and whether to adjust a

State's TANF performance data.

On the issue of child support collections more specifically, while

States have new flexibility in the way that they administer their TANF

programs, they must continue to share a portion of child support

collections with the Federal government. The need to share TANF-related

collections could serve as a possible disincentive for States to pass

through the full amount of child support to families and could create

an incentive for States to serve needy families through separate State

programs. State spending in these separate State programs continues to

count under the basic MOE requirements, but States do not need to share

the child support collected on behalf of families served by these

programs.

At this point, we have no evidence that States are diverting child

support collections. For example, we are not seeing dramatic decreases

in the Federal share of collections or changes in the average

collection per case. In the meantime, the Administration is engaged in

a dialogue with stakeholders on child support program financing issues

to look at ways to address these and other related concerns. We will

work with these stakeholders and with Congress to develop any necessary

legislation.

As a number of commenters suggested, under these final rules, we

have adopted a strategy that includes gathering information, monitoring

developments, and keeping our options open regarding future actions.

Through our data collection, we will obtain substantial information on

the characteristics of separate State programs, the families they

serve, and the benefits they provide. This information will help us

assess their potential impact on the achievement of TANF goals. We will

consider proposing appropriate legislative or regulatory remedies,

consistent with our legal authority, if we find that States are using

the flexibility available under these rules to avoid work requirements,

divert child support collections, or otherwise undermine the goals of

TANF. However, we will not put any significant policy change into

effect without appropriate prior consultation with States, Congress,

and other interested parties.

Separate State Program Reporting

Comment: Commenters also argued that the stringent reporting

requirements and the potential loss of caseload reduction credits,

eligibility for high performance bonuses, and certain penalty relief

for States that failed to comply with the reporting requirements also

discouraged States from implementing innovative separate State

programs.

Response: As we discuss in the preamble for Sec. 260.31, we have

made significant changes to the proposed definition of assistance.

These changes have a significant effect on the scope of the

disaggregated and aggregate reporting for both TANF and separate State

programs. Like the TANF Data Report, the SSP-MOE Data Report only

captures information on families receiving ``assistance.'' Therefore,

States do not have to provide detailed program and family

characteristics data for families receiving other kinds of benefits and

work supports. Thus, the data collection in the final rules responds to

the commenters' concerns about the problems that would be inherent in

requiring detailed reporting of case-record information from programs

that bore little or no relationship, in substance or administration, to

those providing traditional welfare benefits.

However, information on separate State programs is still very

important under the final rule. Thus, we still expect States to submit

SSP-MOE Data Reports containing data on separate State programs that

are similar to the TANF program data as a condition of receiving

caseload reduction credits or high performance bonuses. Also, we have

strengthened the information we will collect on SSP-MOE spending by

expanding reporting under the TANF Financial Report and expanding

information on all MOE programs in the annual report (as discussed in

Sec. 265.9 and presented in Appendix I). Taken in combination, these

data will help us ensure that each State has met its basic MOE

requirement, properly evaluate State reports on caseload reduction

credits, assess overall State performance, and report on program

characteristics to the public, to the Department, and to Congress. We

could also use the information to identify areas in which regulatory or

legislative changes may be necessary.

Under the final rule, we do not require that States submit the SSP-

MOE Data Report in order to qualify for penalty relief because the

information in the report is not germane to the determination of its

penalty amount.

The information in the SSP-MOE Data Report is germane to

determining if States have achieved creditable caseload reductions and

to assessing a State's overall performance under TANF. Thus, as stated

previously, the final rule does require that a State submit an SSP-MOE

Data Report if it wants to receive either a High Performance Bonus or a

caseload reduction credit (though with reduced data elements).

Failure of a State to submit the MOE information required in either

the TANF Financial Report or the annual report could affect a State's

liability for a

[[Page 17731]]

reporting penalty or an MOE penalty, depending upon the nature of the

failure.

You should review the preamble discussion at Sec. 265.9 and

Appendix I for information on annual aggregate reporting for MOE

programs and the regulation at Sec. 265.3(b) and (d) and appendices E,

F, and G for more detailed information on the data collection for

separate State programs in the SSP-MOE Data Report.

Finally, in the policy announcement and proposed rule, we advised

States to think carefully about the risks to the long-term viability of

their TANF programs if they relied too extensively on separate State

programs to meet their MOE requirements. States cannot receive

contingency funds unless their expenditures within the TANF program are

at 100 percent of historic State expenditures. Thus, excessive State

reliance on expenditures outside the TANF program to meet MOE

requirements could make access to contingency funds difficult during

economic downturns.

This restriction on Contingency Fund MOE raised some concerns on

the part of commenters. However, it represents a clear reading of the

statutory language. Thus, we have made no change in this final rule.

B. Waivers

Background

We have no direct interest in regulating section 415 of the Act;

however, the continuation of waivers by a State might affect our

application of certain of the penalty provisions within a State,

specifically those regarding work and time-limit requirements. Thus, in

order to administer the penalty provisions, we are providing notice

concerning the rules that we will use in applying the penalties.

To improve access to, and understanding of, the regulations on

waivers, we have moved all the waiver provisions to a new subpart C of

part 260 of the final regulation and consolidated our preamble

discussion in this section of the preamble. First, we summarize the

NPRM provisions that appeared in various places in the NPRM and provide

an overall summary of the comments. Then we discuss each provision in

the final regulation, section by section, as well as the related

comments.

Summary of NPRM Waiver Provisions

Under section 415, States that received approval for welfare reform

waivers under section 1115 before enactment of PRWORA (August 22, 1996)

have the option to operate their TANF programs under some or all of

these waivers. For States electing this option, provisions of TANF that

are inconsistent with the waivers do not take effect until applicable

waivers expire.

Section 415 also provides for delaying the effect of provisions of

TANF related to waivers approved after enactment, but prior to July 1,

1997. However, we do not address this specific provision in these rules

because we approved no section 1115 waivers after enactment.

The meaning of the term ``waiver'' is important because it governs

the scope of section 415. The NPRM defined waiver as consisting of both

the specific technical provisions in the approved waiver list and the

AFDC and JOBS requirements under prior law that did not need to be

waived, but were integral and necessary to achieve the policy objective

of the waived provision. Thus, the proposed definition of waiver

depended on determining a State's intent.

The meaning of the term ``inconsistent'' is important because it

governs the extent to which a State may delay the implementation of

certain TANF requirements under section 415. The NPRM defined

inconsistent to mean that complying with a TANF requirement would

require a State to change a policy reflected in an approved waiver.

The proposed rule applied these definitions to determine when a

State's waivers were inconsistent with the TANF work and time-limited

assistance requirements under sections 407 and 408(a)(7) of the Act,

respectively. To the extent that we determined inconsistencies existed,

we would have based the work participation rates and time-limit

exceptions on the waiver provisions rather than the requirements of

sections 407 and 408(a)(7).

In particular, the NPRM allowed inconsistencies in two areas

covered by section 407 (i.e., related to work). The first related to

the types of activities that could count as work activities. Under the

proposed definition, in addition to the expanded or revised activities

specifically included in the technical waiver list (such as increased

hours of job search), a waiver would have included the JOBS work

activities that did not require waivers in order to be part of the

State's program. The NPRM recognized that: (1) States had asked for

waivers of the statutorily prescribed JOBS activities in order to

provide what they considered to be the right mix of work activities;

and (2) part of that mix included activities that did not require

waivers under prior law. Thus, we would have considered such activities

to be part of the waiver.

The second work inconsistency recognized in the NPRM related to the

hours of participation necessary for a recipient to be counted as

engaged in work for the purpose of calculating the participation rates.

To the extent that the mandated hours of work in the waiver reflected

the individual circumstances of the participant, either due to criteria

in the waiver itself or under an individual self-sufficiency plan, we

would have recognized an inconsistency with the fixed hours required by

section 407.

The NPRM did not recognize, as inconsistent, waivers that served to

increase the mandated hours of work for classes of recipients. The NPRM

reasoned that there was no inconsistency in this case because TANF

required those classes of recipients to participate for a greater

number of hours than prior law required.

Further, the NPRM did not recognize any inconsistencies for

exemptions that the State had had for work participation under AFDC.

Under the demonstrations, States had obtained waivers to change the

exemptions of individuals from participation in JOBS. We had assumed

that the purpose for changing the exemptions was to require more

individuals to participate. Since we believed the State's purpose was

increasing participation, we reasoned that maintaining the AFDC

statutory exemptions was not necessary or integral to achieving the

waiver's purpose. Therefore, the NPRM did not recognize the AFDC

statutory exemptions as part of the waiver for determining

inconsistency with TANF.

In applying the definitions of ``waiver'' and ``inconsistent'' to

time limits, the proposed rule recognized only those waivers that

provided for terminating cash assistance because of the passage of

time. We said that if a State would have to change its waiver policy on

terminating assistance, due to the TANF time limit at section

408(a)(7), it could apply its waiver time limit instead of the TANF

time limit. In general, individuals subject to a State time limit would

concurrently be subject to the TANF time limit. Those individuals who

were exempt from the State waiver time limit would not be subject to

the TANF time limit until the State's waiver expired. In addition, if

the extensions of the receipt of assistance under the State waiver

limit exceeded the 20-percent limit on extensions allowed under TANF,

the State's extensions would govern.

[[Page 17732]]

The NPRM did not recognize inconsistencies for States with waivers

that: (1) had time limits that triggered work requirements, but did not

result in the termination of assistance; or (2) had implemented

comprehensive welfare reform initiatives under waivers that consciously

chose not to include policies time-limiting assistance. Thus, in either

of these situations, the State would have had to comply with the TANF

time-limit requirements.

The NPRM also recognized one other type of inconsistency. TANF

cases that were part of a research group, whose treatment policies were

being maintained for the purpose of continuing an impact evaluation,

could continue to be fully subject to prior law policies, except as

modified by waivers. Further, the NPRM allowed for exclusion of such

cases from the numerator and denominator of the work participation

rates. Maintaining different requirements for these groups was

necessary to avoid compromising the evaluation. Information on the

research group would be the primary basis for impact and cost-benefit

analyses of the effects of demonstration provisions and would be

essential to all major components of an evaluation.

In the interest of balancing State flexibility with accountability

and preserving the purposes of TANF (particularly those of encouraging

work and focusing TANF on the provision of temporary support to

families as they move to self-sufficiency), the NPRM also proposed

certain other requirements. Specifically it: (1) Required Governors to

certify waiver inconsistencies that a State believed apply in order to

have the waiver rules apply in the penalty determinations; (2) denied

certain forms of penalty relief to States continuing waivers that were

inconsistent with TANF if States failed to meet work participation

rates or time-limit requirements; and (3) proposed that we would

publish information related to a State's success in meeting work

participation rates and time-limit restrictions, as measured against

both TANF and waiver requirements.

Because States operating under alternative waiver requirements

could have an advantage compared to other States, we proposed that

States continuing inconsistent waivers would not be eligible for a

reasonable cause exception from a related work participation or time-

limit penalty. Nor would they be eligible for a work participation rate

penalty reduction based on severity of the failure or under our

discretionary authority, as otherwise allowed in accordance with

Sec. 271.51(b)(3) or (c) of the NPRM. Further, in developing a

corrective compliance plan, the NPRM proposed that a State would have

to consider modifying its alternative waiver requirements as part of

that plan. If a State then continued its waivers and failed to correct

the violation, the NPRM proposed that it would not be eligible for a

reduced penalty for noncompliance regardless of whether the State made

significant progress towards achieving compliance or if the State's

failure to comply was attributable to natural disaster or regional

recession.

Overview of Comments

With few exceptions, the comments from States, organizations

representing States, other organizations, and Congress relating to the

proposed rules governing waiver inconsistencies strongly opposed our

proposals.

Specifically, most commenters argued that our application of the

proposed rule violated the spirit of the law and Congressional intent

to encourage waivers. To support this argument, they cited the language

at section 415(c), which directs the Secretary to encourage States to

continue operating their waivers. They argued that our narrow

interpretation of waiver inconsistencies, along with our decision to

deny penalty relief, would discourage continuation of waivers and

violated the principle of State flexibility in PRWORA. They asserted

that the proposed policies would force States to abandon their waiver

programs.

Finally, a number of commenters indicated that they found the

definitions of ``waiver'' and ``inconsistent'' difficult to understand

and apply to specific factual situations.

Overall Response

In response to the many comments we received, the final rules take

a different approach to the relationship between the continuation of

AFDC waivers and the TANF requirements. While the definition of

``inconsistent'' remains substantially the same, we have modified the

definition of ``waiver'' to eliminate the proposed focus on intent. The

new definition reflects the common use of the term, which refers to the

policies that implement a particular area of reform in the

demonstration. The revised definition allows the waiver to include a

cluster of AFDC provisions with regard to work participation. Thus, it

modifies how we would determine when work waivers are inconsistent.

We also made one change in the application of the term

``inconsistent'' to time limits; after further review, we believe that

the NPRM did not adequately recognize a certain type of inconsistency.

Generally, the revised definition of ``waiver'' continues to

reflect the philosophy that a narrow, technical definition would be

inappropriate. Rather, as reflected in common usage, the term should

recognize that States rarely implemented the technical waivers of the

former section 402 of the Act in isolation. Instead, technical waivers

were generally part of a cluster of policies and requirements related

to administering a component of a State's welfare program. For example,

States implemented components related to time limits, family caps, work

activities and requirements, treatment of teen parents, income and

resource eligibility, and treatment of two-parent families. Although

the substantive policies making up the components and the combination

of components differed from demonstration to demonstration, these

component areas were the core elements of the reform efforts in various

State demonstrations and were commonly referred to as waivers.

In the discussion that follows, the term ``waiver'' could have two

distinct meanings; it could refer to either the technical waiver that

was explicitly approved or the component of the demonstration. To avoid

confusion, when we mean the technical use of the term (i.e., the waiver

of an actual provision of former section 402 as reflected in the waiver

list in the demonstration's terms and conditions), we will use the term

``technical waiver.'' When we simply use the term ``waiver,'' we are

using it (as defined in these regulations at Sec. 260.71) to mean the

cluster of demonstration policies that the State implemented under its

technical waiver. It is this broader definition that we will use to

determine inconsistencies. The requirements and policies making up a

waiver begin with one or more technical waivers, but could also include

one or more related provisions of prior law.

The NPRM recognized this concept of including prior law provisions

as part of its definition of waiver, but it depended on the State's

intent in seeking the technical waiver to determine which AFDC

provisions should be included. Many commenters objected to this

reliance on the State's intent to operationalize a broader waiver

definition. The final rule contains a simpler and more objective

definition based on the demonstration component of which the technical

waiver is a part.

Since our penalty authority that might be affected by waiver

inconsistencies is related to work requirements at section 407 and time

limits at section 408(a)(7),

[[Page 17733]]

we use those two sections to define the waiver components of work and

time limits. We also limit our regulatory consideration of waivers to

whether the waiver components that relate to work requirements and time

limits are inconsistent with the respective provisions of the Act

(i.e., section 407 for the work participation component and sanctions

and section 408(a)(7) for the time-limit component). To the extent that

a State's policies in the component area differ from the TANF policies,

we will follow the waiver policies in making penalty determinations.

You can find further discussion of the application of this definition

in the section-by-section discussion that follows.

Although some commenters objected to our attempt to balance State

flexibility and accountability, accountability to the purposes of TANF

remains important under the final rule. We believe our modified

approach will ensure accountability while allowing waiver policies to

continue. We recognize that States, whether continuing waivers or not,

have generally made serious and concerted efforts to promote the TANF

objectives as they have implemented their programs. Further, as more

and more States reach or approach the end of their waivers, our

concerns about delays in the implementation of the TANF provisions have

diminished. By the effective date of these rules, waiver authority will

have expired for 14 States, and it will expire for the remaining 32

demonstration States within a few years. Moreover, for some of the

remaining demonstration States, the limited scope of their waivers

(e.g., limited to pilot sites or limited classes of recipients) means

that the TANF provisions will be implemented broadly within the State,

in spite of continuing waivers. Also, some of the remaining

demonstration States have chosen to terminate waivers or to adopt

modified policies that are more consistent with TANF than the original

waivers.

Discussion of Specific Comments and Responses, by Section

(a) Section 260.70--What Is the Purpose of This Subpart?

We added this section to the regulation to clarify that the

Department's authority and interest in identifying waiver

inconsistencies is limited to the determination of penalties in three

areas: (1) Failing to meet the work participation requirement; (2)

failing to impose sanctions on nonparticipants; and (3) failing to meet

the time-limit requirement.

Comment: A number of commenters asserted that we had totally

exceeded our authority in regulating in this area. Some cited section

417 and said its provisions prohibited us from defining waiver

inconsistencies at all, leaving authority for reasonable interpretation

to individual States. Also, some commenters believed we should give

States full authority to determine the extent to which waiver

inconsistencies apply.

Response: We added this section to the final rule to clarify our

interest in promulgating regulations on State waiver policies. In

neither the NPRM nor the final rule have we shown any direct interest

in regulating section 415, per se; however, continuation of waivers

might affect the application of certain of the penalty provisions for a

State, specifically those regarding work and time-limit requirements

(under sections 407 and 408(a)(7) of the Act). Thus, we have the

authority and responsibility to regulate in this area. In order to

administer the penalty provisions on work and time limits fairly, we

need to provide notice concerning the rules that we will use in

applying these penalties. We limit our regulatory consideration of

waivers to whether the waiver components relating to sections 407 and

408(a)(7) are inconsistent with the respective provision. To the extent

that a State's policies in the component area are inconsistent with

TANF policies, we will follow the waiver policies in making penalty

determinations.

Comment: A few commenters specifically questioned the legitimacy of

our stated objective for regulating in this area--to try to balance

State flexibility to continue and test innovations begun under welfare

reform waivers with accountability to the purposes of the TANF,

particularly related to work and time-limit requirements. As some

commenters noted, section 415 does not ``ask HHS to balance State

policies against the virtue of the law.''

Response: Section 415 contains ambiguity in using the terms

``waiver'' and ``inconsistent'' without defining them. The Department's

exercise of its work and time-limit penalty authority in a rational

manner requires that we define those terms. As they are ambiguous on

their face, we must look at Congressional intent. In this case, we find

it necessary to try to balance the two potentially conflicting purposes

of accountability and State flexibility to determine the meaning of the

terms.

(b) Section 260.71--What Definitions Apply to This Subpart?

(Sec. 270.30 of the NPRM)

In the final rule, we retain the definition of ``inconsistent''

given in the NPRM. We define inconsistent to mean that complying with

the TANF work participation rates or sanction requirements at section

407 of the Act or the time-limit requirement at section 408(a)(7) of

the Act would necessitate that a State change a policy reflected in an

approved waiver.

However, as previously discussed, we have revised and simplified

the definition of waiver. In the final rule, we define a waiver as

consisting of the work participation or time-limit component of the

State's demonstration project under section 1115 of the Act. The

component includes the revised AFDC requirements indicated in the

State's technical waiver list, as approved by the Secretary under the

authority of section 1115, and the associated AFDC provisions that did

not need to be waived.

Thus, the final rules for determining whether an inconsistency

related to work exists depend on the existence of a technical waiver

corresponding to any of the cluster of provisions included in section

407. These provisions include: allowable work activities; mandated

hours of, and exemptions from, work participation; and applicable

sanctions for noncompliance with work requirements. Under the modified

definition of waiver, if a State has any single technical waiver

enumerated in its list of approved waivers that corresponds to any

provision of section 407, it may incorporate prior AFDC (and the

related JOBS) work participation rules that were part of the cluster of

policies implemented under the waivers. Under the final rule, the

inclusion of prior law as part of the waiver does not depend on the

original purpose or objective of the State in seeking approval of the

waiver.

Finally, we have added definitions for ``control group'' and

``experimental group'' that recognize the definitions included in the

terms and conditions of the State's demonstration. The NPRM had special

rules for research, control, and experimental groups in States that

were continuing evaluations to avoid tainting the evaluations. However,

it did not define any of those terms. The final rule retains the basic

policies that were in the proposed rules, but refers only to

``control'' and ``experimental'' groups. The revisions have the effect

of making the policy clearer and addressing the concern of one

commenter that the original terminology was not consistent

[[Page 17734]]

with its waiver approval and could undermine its ability to continue

its evaluation.

Comment: Commenters generally supported certain inherent concepts

of the proposed definitions for ``waiver'' and ``inconsistent.'' In

particular, they agreed that ``waiver'' should not include only the

technical provisions listed in the documents approving the State's

waivers, but should also encompass related and integral provisions of

prior law. Similarly, they generally agreed that the term

``inconsistent'' should apply where a State would need to change its

waiver policies in order to comply with TANF.

However, many commenters asserted that the proposed rules did not

sufficiently recognize prior law as being integral to specific waivers.

Thus, they argued the NPRM provisions would compel States to abandon

policies they had implemented under waivers.

Many also objected that we presupposed State objectives in

obtaining work and time-limit waivers and thus arbitrarily narrowed the

breadth of applicable inconsistencies. In particular, they disagreed

with our characterizations of the purpose of the waivers that

eliminated exemptions from JOBS participation requirements under AFDC

law and that increased the number of hours of mandatory work

participation for certain classes of recipients, believing they were

too limited. (Under the proposed rules, we would have disallowed

inconsistencies applicable to these types of waivers based on the

rationale that TANF itself eliminated prior law work exemptions and

expanded hours of required work participation for these affected

classes of recipients, and thus TANF requirements were consistent with

the purpose of State waivers.) In effect, the commenters argued that

States increased their work requirements to establish the appropriate

universe of recipients who should be required to work and the

appropriate level of work participation. They noted that these stated

purposes were analogous to the purpose we had already recognized in the

NPRM for accepting AFDC work activities as part of the waiver, i.e., to

find the appropriate mix of participation activities.

A number of commenters further argued that section 415 did not

confer on the Secretary the authority to judge a State's objectives.

Response: The final rules reflect our continued belief that

regulating on how a State's waiver policies would affect the

application of certain penalty provisions is well within our statutory

authority. However, we recognize that the NPRM's reliance on our

ability to judge the State's purpose in seeking a specific technical

waiver was problematic, given the limited documentation available on

the specific purposes of particular waivers. Therefore, we have recast

the definition in terms of an objective demonstration component.

Components were commonly recognized as parts of the demonstration and

are readily identifiable for penalty determination purpose; one merely

has to associate a technical waiver relating to work requirements or

time limits with the corresponding TANF provision that is subject to

penalty. Thus, while maintaining the concept that ``waiver'' includes

both the technical waiver and some portion of the former AFDC

provisions, we have revised the definition to remove its reliance on

the State's purpose.

You can find a further discussion of the application of the new

definition for work and time-limit policies at Secs. 260.73 and 260.74.

Comment: Some of these commenters offered the perspective that a

waiver should encompass the whole of prior AFDC law as part of the

State's welfare reform strategy, not just specific individual waivers

and limited related extensions of prior law.

Response: We disagree with the commenters that Congress intended

waivers to cover the whole of prior AFDC law. Section 415 allows States

to continue ``one or more waivers to the extent they are

inconsistent.'' The fact that it refers to one or more waivers and does

not use the broader term, demonstration, in describing what is to be

compared for inconsistency, indicates that Congress intended the

determination of inconsistencies to be made on a more specific basis.

Comment: A number of commenters recommended that we modify the

definition of ``inconsistent'' to include any prior law policy in

effect under its demonstration that, if continued, but not recognized

as inconsistent, would give the State reason to believe that it was at

risk of being subject to a TANF penalty.

Response: We addressed this concern to some degree in the final

rule by changing the definition of ``waiver.'' A State may continue

prior law policy that is part of a demonstration component area (e.g.,

work requirements) for which the State has a waiver. Continuation of

prior law policy that is not in a policy area that is subject to

penalties under TANF (i.e., not related to sections 407 or 408(a)(7))

is outside the scope of this final rule and is left to State

discretion.

We declined to change the definition of ``inconsistent'' to mean a

situation in which the State believes that continuing the policy would

put it at risk of a penalty. Congress did not intend to eliminate

penalties for States with waivers. Rather, it intended that we judge

the conduct of such a State based on the requirements in the waiver,

rather than in those in TANF, in determining whether a penalty is

appropriate. If the State has waivers that are inconsistent with TANF,

then the State may be subject to penalties if it fails to submit the

required certification, fails to take the appropriate sanctions, fails

to achieve the required participation rates under its own waiver

policies, or otherwise violates its own waiver policies (e.g., exempts

from time limits individuals subject to the State's demonstration time

limit).

(c) Section 260.72--What Basic Requirements Must State Demonstration

Components Meet for the Purpose of Determining If Inconsistencies Exist

With Respect to Work Requirements or Time Limits? (Sec. 272.8 of the

NPRM)

In the final rules, we have eliminated those NPRM provisions that

would have denied penalty relief to States that continued waivers that

were inconsistent with TANF, but failed to meet work participation

rates or time-limit requirements. Specifically, the NPRM had proposed

that waiver States ought not be eligible for: (1) A reasonable cause

exception from any of four related work participation or time-limit

penalties; or (2) a reduction of work penalty amounts based on severity

of the failure or under our discretionary authority, as otherwise

allowed in accordance with Sec. 271.51(b)(3) or (c). We have also

eliminated proposed rules that would have required a State, in

developing a corrective compliance plan to address work or time-limit

requirement failures, to consider modifying its alternative waiver

requirements as part of its corrective compliance plan. Finally, we

have decided not to deny a State that continues its waivers eligibility

for a reduced penalty based on making significant progress towards

achieving compliance with the work or time-limit requirements (as we

had proposed and described in subparts B and C of part 271 and

Secs. 274.1 and 274.2 of the NPRM).

We had proposed imposing these rules on the basis that States

operating under alternative waiver requirements were at an advantage

compared to other States in being able to meet participation rates and

comply with time-limit requirements. However, a

[[Page 17735]]

large number of commenters questioned whether the advantage that a

waiver State had over other States in complying with specific TANF

requirements was so great as to warrant such absolute restrictions;

some noted the proposed rule was arbitrary in that we did not consider

the degree of any advantage vis-a-vis other legitimate factors and

situations that might result in noncompliance. Based on our assessment

that our proposals might discourage States from continuing successful

demonstration efforts, we have removed these restrictions on penalty

relief.

In the final rules, at Sec. 260.73(d), we retain the regulatory

expectation to publish information about a State's success in meeting

work participation rates, as measured against both TANF and waiver

requirements. We do not expect to publish dual time-limit figures for

States that have waivers of time limits that are inconsistent with the

TANF requirements. Upon further review, for such States, we do not

believe that it will be possible to compute the percentage of cases

with an adult recipient that received more than 60 months of Federal

TANF benefits under the standard TANF rules. Data reported in

accordance with section 411(a) will not be sufficient to allow this

calculation. We do not have the authority under section 411(a) to

require waiver States to report the data that this calculation would

require, and they are not germane to our penalty determinations.

Therefore, we have deleted this specific regulatory expectation.

However, we will be able to calculate dual work rates, and the final

rules indicate our commitment to follow through on that proposal.

The final rules also clarify other necessary conditions that apply

if a State wants us to use its inconsistent waiver policies and

requirements in the penalty determination process.

First, the inconsistencies claimed must be within the scope of the

approved waivers, both in terms of geographical coverage and coverage

of the types of cases specified in the waiver approval package. For

example, a State could not claim a statewide inconsistency if we

approved its waiver policies for an eight-county pilot. Similarly, a

State could not extend waivers to all adults when the approved waivers

applied only to teen parents. Nor could waivers applicable only to two-

parent families apply to other types of cases. However, a State that is

no longer maintaining control group cases for the purpose of completing

an impact evaluation may choose to apply approved waiver policies to

cases formerly assigned to a control group.

Second, the State must have applied its waiver policies on a

continuous basis from the date that it implemented its TANF program.

Section 415(d) allows the State to ``continue'' one or more individual

waivers (which, under the definitions enumerated in these final rules,

means one or more individual demonstration components). Section 415(c)

requires the Secretary to encourage States to ``continue'' their

waivers. Implicit in both these provisions is that continuation of the

waivers is necessary for a finding of inconsistency.

This ``continuation'' requirement does not prevent a State from

modifying policies begun under waivers. TANF clearly provides States

with the authority to modify waiver policies inconsistent with prior

law, but consistent with TANF (e.g., related to eligibility rules such

as income and resource standards). These rules clarify that a State may

modify waiver provisions that are inconsistent with TANF, provided

that, in doing so, it makes its policies more consistent with TANF. For

example, a State could choose to reduce the geographical scope of

waivers, applying waivers approved for statewide implementation in only

certain parts of the State, or a State could choose to eliminate some

exemptions applicable to work participation or time-limited assistance,

retaining other exemptions that are still inconsistent with TANF.

We recognize that the issue of whether a State has continued

waivers since the advent of TANF may be difficult to determine.

Although ACF requested voluntary information on continuation, absent a

final regulation, it never indicated a formal process or requirement

for the States to submit such information about the continuation of the

waiver policies. And, since States need not conduct evaluations as a

condition of operating waivers, some States may have indicated that

they were discontinuing their waivers, when in fact they intended only

to notify us that they were discontinuing evaluations of the

demonstration, not their waiver policies. Further, in the absence of

final rules, some States may not have clearly understood how they

should identify and report inconsistencies under their TANF plans.

Also, although some may have indicated that they were continuing

waivers with policies inconsistent with TANF, they may not have

identified subsequent modifications in their operating policies.

Under these final rules, to determine if a State has continued its

work participation or time-limit waiver component and, therefore, may

claim applicable inconsistencies, we will accept the certification of

the Governor regarding the actual practice of the State. Many of the

former waiver policies (for example, variations in the counting of

income and resources for eligibility purposes) are unrelated to work

and time limits and need not be addressed in the certification. A State

need address only the inconsistencies related to work provisions in

section 407 and time limits in section 408(a)(7), as explained further

below.

However, we wish to note that if a State has abandoned a policy

provision that is inconsistent with TANF, the State has voided its

waiver authority. Thus, it has lost its right to claim an inconsistency

related to that provision. For example, a State that had technical

waivers that allowed it to exempt all adult caretakers from work may

have changed its policy to require participation of adult caretakers

after it implemented TANF. While the State always had the flexibility

subsequently to reinstate a policy exempting adult caretakers, we would

not recognize this policy as an inconsistency in determining the work

participation rates because the State had discontinued the prior

technical waiver.

We treat each technical waiver separately for continuation

purposes. If a State discontinues one technical waiver, we will

continue to recognize other continuing technical waivers related to

work (for example, when a State discontinues an exemption waiver, but

continues unlimited job search as a work activity). However, there is

no authority in section 415 to restore discontinued policies; the

statute allows for consideration only of continued inconsistent

policies.

Similarly, if a State had modified its implementation of the

technical waiver to be more consistent with TANF, we would recognize

only the modified policy as a continuation of the waiver.

Third, the Governor must certify the waiver inconsistencies that

the State is claiming, including an affirmation that the State has not

expanded the scope of its policies and has continued the policies under

section 415 in the interim period since implementing TANF, as discussed

above. This requirement continues a provision of the proposed rules,

but provides new detail about the expected content of the

certification, particularly as it pertains to claiming specific

inconsistencies related to work and time-limit requirements. See

Secs. 260.73 and 260.74

[[Page 17736]]

for a more detailed discussion of work and time-limit inconsistencies.

Finally, these final rules clarify that, despite broadening the

scope of inconsistencies that a State may claim compared to the NPRM,

inconsistencies with sections 407 or 408(a)(7) do not create

inconsistencies with the penalty provisions at section 409. Thus, they

do not have the general effect of delaying the application of the work

participation rate or time-limit penalties at Secs. 261.50, 261.54,

264.1, and 264.2 or the data collection requirements at part 265.

We came to this decision because we never approved any waivers

eliminating compliance with JOBS work participation rates (while they

were operable) or voiding their applicability should they become

operable. Our work component waivers only changed the substance of the

work requirement. As for applicable data requirements, we never

approved waivers that relieved States of data reporting requirements;

thus, we approved no waivers that would be inconsistent with section

411 of the Act. The work and time-limit components affected by sections

407 and 408(a)(7) do not, of themselves, create inconsistencies because

neither encompasses data collection requirements.

Comment: One commenter noted that when the waiver expires for a

State providing extensions of assistance in excess of the 60-month

Federal time limit, a State would need to comply fully with the 20-

percent limit on extensions and that this could cause serious

transition problems. The commenter recommended that we provide that

``reasonable cause'' include a reasonable transition time in the case

of a State that had been implementing an inconsistent policy under an

approved waiver.

Response: The ``waiver terms and conditions'' for demonstration

projects affected by these regulations generally included a requirement

that the State provide, and the Department approve, a plan to phase

down and end the demonstration on the date the waiver approval expires.

We did not authorize any waiver-related activities or costs to extend

beyond the project period. Given that the project period for a waiver

demonstration already includes a phase-down period, States should not

require an additional transition period. In addition, we would remind

States that they may fund cases above the 20-percent cap with State MOE

dollars.

(d) Section 260.73--How Do Existing Welfare Reform Waivers Affect the

Participation Rates and Work Rules? (Sec. 271.60 of the NPRM)

If a State is implementing a work participation component under a

waiver as defined in this subpart, the requirements of section 407 of

the Act will not apply in determining whether a penalty should be

imposed, to the extent that they are inconsistent with the State's

waiver work demonstration component.

To determine that the State's demonstration has a work component,

the waiver list for the demonstration work participation component must

include one or more specific provisions that directly correspond to

provisions enumerated in section 407 (i.e., that cover allowable work

activities, exemptions from participation, required hours of

participation or sanctions for noncompliance with participation). In

other words, the State's waiver list must include at least one

technical waiver that changed the allowable JOBS activities, exemptions

from JOBS participation, hours of required JOBS participation, or

sanctions for noncompliance with JOBS participation.

After the Governor has certified the inconsistencies with section

407, we will calculate the State's work participation rates, if

applicable, by: (1) Excluding cases exempted from participation under

the demonstration and experimental and control group cases and not

otherwise exempted; (2) defining work activities as defined in the

demonstration in calculating the numerators of the rates; (3) including

cases meeting the required number of hours of participation in work

activities in accordance with waiver policy in calculating the

numerators of the rates; and (4) excluding other cases exempt from

participation under the waiver in calculating the denominators of the

rates.

We will also determine whether a State is taking appropriate

sanctions when an individual refuses to work based on the State's

certified waiver policies. These final rules explicitly recognize

waiver inconsistencies related to sanctions for noncompliance with work

requirements; the proposed rules were silent on this matter. They also

recognize exemptions from work and changes to the required hours of

work. Finally, they continue to recognize inconsistencies related to

allowable work activities, as we proposed in the NPRM.

It is important to stress that a State need not have a technical

waiver in a particular part of the work component (e.g., work

activities or exemptions) to claim that the related AFDC provisions for

that part of the component are part of its waiver. Rather, the State

needs one or more technical waivers related to a provision of section

407 to claim applicable prior law in all areas that are part of section

407.

Thus, a State with a waiver work component may delay implementing

TANF requirements for work participation for individuals exempt from

JOBS if such exemptions have been part of the State's continuing

demonstration policies. A State with a demonstration work component,

but without a technical waiver modifying JOBS exemptions, may still

include all prior law exemptions (or a modification of these exemptions

that is more consistent with TANF), if such exemptions have been part

of the State's continuing policies for work participation. For States

with waivers that eliminated some (but not all) JOBS exemptions, the

remaining exemptions would apply, if they have been part of the State's

continuing demonstration policy. However, because all States will need

to conform to all TANF rules once their waivers expire, we urge States

to plan accordingly.

Under these final rules, a State may claim inconsistencies

applicable to hours of work if it has technical waivers related to

section 407 and could, in an audit, provide written evidence (e.g.,

terms and conditions or policy manuals) to document that its waiver

policies, as implemented, expressly provided for alternative rules with

respect to the hours of work required of nonexempt individuals.

The ability to provide such written evidence is necessary because

prior law did not generally have requirements for the number of hours

an individual must work to be considered participating. Rather, prior

law had a calculation methodology that included any JOBS participants

as long as including them did not reduce average hours below 20 hours

per week. If no written policy was in effect, we would hold the State

to the TANF hours-of-work requirements.

Finally, a State may also choose to exempt, from the participation

rate calculation, experimental and/or control group cases that are not

otherwise exempt. It may remove experimental group cases as a class,

control group cases as a class, or both experimental and control group

cases on a class basis. However, it may not exclude such cases on an

individual basis.

Comment: All those commenting on the subject supported counting

towards the work participation rate calculation those work activities

allowed under

[[Page 17737]]

waiver authority without regard to TANF restrictions, as we proposed in

the NPRM. However, many commenters asserted that the rules should not

restrict inconsistencies related to prior law exemptions from work

participation, where those policies were part of a State's welfare

reform program. In support of their position, several organizations and

States argued that, because section 415(a)(2)(B) specifies that waivers

approved after enactment may not affect the applicability of section

407 (concerning compliance with work participation rates), Congress

fully intended the inverse to apply to waivers approved before

enactment. Therefore, we should recognize all continued policies

related to compliance with TANF work requirements as inconsistencies.

Response: Our revised waiver definition would allow the States with

waiver work components to include all prior law exemptions, and other

AFDC (and JOBS) work policies, as part of the waiver, if such policies

were part of the welfare reform demonstration that the State

implemented under its technical waiver(s).

Comment: A number of commenters asserted that hours of mandated

work that were related to waivers and increased the JOBS requirements

for a class of individuals should be claimable as an inconsistency.

Response: These comments addressed a problem with the reference to

a State's intent in our proposed definition of waiver (an issue that we

addressed earlier). Since the final rules rely on the existence of

waiver work components, rather than intent, they recognize increased

hours as part of the waiver. If the amount of the required hours under

the waiver is inconsistent with the required hours under section 407,

the Governor can certify the inconsistency.

Comment: Some commenters asserted that we could not even hold

States operating under waivers to a work participation rate

requirement--i.e., that we should delay the effect of section 407 in

its entirety until State waiver authority expires.

Response: Under section 1115, there were limits on what we approved

as part of a demonstration project. The Secretary only had authority to

waive provisions of the AFDC program that were included in former

section 402. That section contained the provisions regarding the

determination of eligibility, the amount of assistance, and required

procedures for State administration of the plan. The Secretary could,

and did, grant waivers concerning the content of the JOBS program (the

AFDC work program), which was included at section 402(a)(19). However,

the required work participation rate associated with JOBS was at the

former section 403(l). Since the Secretary had no authority to waive

this provision, we never approved any requests from States to waive it.

Thus, no State has a waiver of participation rates that would

conflict with the work participation rate penalty provision at the

former section 409(a)(3). For a State to argue that the work penalty

does not apply, it would have to show a technical waiver that is

inconsistent with any application of the work penalty. However, waivers

that create the content or substance of a State's demonstration work

program are just that--definitions of the content of a work program. As

such, they may be inconsistent with the content of the TANF work

program at section 407 and may allow the State to substitute the

substance of the work program in its demonstration for the program

specified in section 407, to the extent that the State determines there

is an inconsistency. However, there would be no inconsistency in

applying the section 409(a)(3) work participation penalty as long as

participation was determined under the State's demonstration work

program.

Since the final rule bases the penalty under section 409(a)(3) on

what was required participation under the State's demonstration work

program, there is no inconsistency. Delay of the work participation

penalty itself in these circumstances would fall outside any reasonable

definition of waiver or inconsistency.

(e) Section 260.74--How Do Existing Welfare Reform Waivers Affect the

Application of the Federal Time-Limit Provisions? (Sec. 274.1(e) of the

NPRM)

If a State is implementing a time-limit component under a waiver,

until the waiver expires, the provisions of section 408(a)(7) of the

Act will not apply in determining whether to impose a penalty, to the

extent that they are inconsistent with the waiver.

To determine that the State's demonstration has a time-limit

component, the waiver list for a demonstration time-limit component

must include provisions that directly correspond to the time-limit

policies enumerated in section 408(a)(7) (i.e., that address which

individuals or families are subject to, or exempt from, terminations of

assistance based solely on the passage of time, or who qualifies for

extensions to the time limit).

In general, the final rule requires a State with a waiver time-

limit component to count, toward the Federal five-year limit, all

months for which the adult who is subject to the State time limit

receives assistance with Federal TANF funds, just as it would if it did

not have an approved waiver.

The State need not count, toward the Federal five-year limit, any

months for which an adult receives assistance with Federal TANF funds

while the adult is exempt from the State's time limit under the State's

approved waiver. Nor need the State count, toward the Federal five-year

limit, months for which an adult subject to an adult-only State time

limit under the State's waiver receives assistance with Federal TANF

funds.

The State may continue to provide assistance with Federal TANF

funds for more than 60 months, without a numerical limit, to families

provided extensions to the State time limit, under the provisions of

the terms and conditions of the approved waiver.

After the Governor certifies time-limit inconsistencies, we

calculate the State's time-limit exceptions by: (1) Excluding, from the

determination of the number of months of Federal assistance received by

a family, any month in which the adult(s) (or children where a waiver

only terminated assistance to adults) were exempt from State's time

limit under the terms of the State's approved waiver; and (2) applying

the State's waiver policies with respect to the availability of

extensions to the time limit.

The changes that we have made to the framework of how we define

waiver inconsistencies have less effect on inconsistencies related to

time-limiting assistance than to work. The main reason for this

difference is that no prior law policies existed governing time-limited

assistance. All time limits were the result of waivers. Thus, there are

fewer issues about what a time-limit waiver includes. However, there

are significant issues about what is allowable as an inconsistency;

under these rules, the constraining factor is whether a State's

demonstration project has a time-limit component related to the

provisions in section 408(a)(7).

Prior to the passage of PRWORA, a ``time limit'' could take any

number of forms. However, under TANF, the penalty relates to the time

limit in section 408(a)(7), which recognizes only time limits that

terminate assistance with the passage of time (i.e., that terminate

assistance to families with adults who received Federal TANF assistance

for 60 months). Other parts of TANF address time limits in different

contexts, such as those that trigger work requirements. However, these

latter types of provisions are not subject to the penalty provision

under section

[[Page 17738]]

408(a)(7), and we do not address them in this regulation.

Therefore, as we proposed under the NPRM, we are allowing time-

limit inconsistencies only for those States with waiver policies that

terminate assistance solely as the result of the duration of receipt.

Under these rules, if a State has a technical waiver meeting this

requisite, we compare its provisions with those at section 408(a)(7) to

determine whether there are inconsistencies.

As with work participation, States may also choose to exempt

experimental and/or control group cases that are not otherwise exempt

from time limits. However, a State may exclude such experimental and

control group cases only on a group basis, not on an individual basis.

Comment: Commenters generally agreed that inconsistencies should be

recognized that allowed a State to: (1) exempt certain cases from

having months counted toward the 60-month time limit; and (2) provide

extensions to more than 20 percent of the caseload after reaching the

limit.

Response: We have retained these policies in the final rule.

Comment: Some commenters argued that section 415 was designed to

allow States to continue their welfare reform initiatives as a whole.

On this basis, they maintained that any State that consciously chose

not to include time-limited assistance provisions in the comprehensive

welfare reform initiatives that it implemented under waivers should be

able to claim a time-limit inconsistency.

Response: Section 415 was not designed to carry over prior law in

its entirety, nor to delay TANF requirements where waivers did not

exist prior to implementation. Rather, it allows delay in implementing

new TANF provisions ``to the extent such amendments are inconsistent

with the waiver.'' Thus, we find no statutory basis for allowing

inconsistencies to be claimed in this particular situation because no

waiver exists.

Comment: Some commenters argued that we should also allow time-

limit inconsistencies to apply where a State has implemented time

limits that serve to trigger work requirements.

Response: We do not recognize other waiver provisions, such as

those where States used ``time limits'' to trigger work requirements,

as inconsistent with time limits. The purpose of this section of the

regulation is to determine the applicability of the time-limit penalty

at section 409(a)(9). This penalty applies to any failure to meet the

time-limit requirements at section 408(a)(7). Time limits triggering

work requirements are found in sections 402 and 407, not section

408(a)(7). Therefore, such policies do not fit within the definition of

a waiver related to the time-limit component associated with 408(a)(7).

Comment: One commenter recommended that, if we retained the

proposed rules related to time-limit waiver inconsistencies, the

preamble discussion should clarify that ``reduction waivers'' (adult-

only time limits) represent an inconsistency.

Response: We have incorporated this change in the final rule.

States with waivers terminating assistance for adults only may choose

to delay counting months toward the Federal 60-month time limit for as

long as they continue to apply adult-only policies under their State

time limit. While the proposed rules had required that time against the

Federal time clock be counted for any month in which an adult was

subject to the State time limit (i.e., that the Federal and State

clocks would run concurrently), this policy would have had an effect

that was inconsistent with the waiver policy. Because time charged

against an adult would have ultimately resulted in the termination of

benefits to the whole family under TANF, the proposed policy would have

resulted in time being counted against child recipients. While children

are protected from termination of benefits while the waiver is

operable, counting time against adults in the case would have, in

effect, counted time against the family's (and children's) length of

receipt of assistance. This result would have been contrary to the

purpose of the adult-only time-limit waivers, which was to exempt

children from any effect of the time limit. Thus, in submitting a

Governor's certification of continuing waiver inconsistencies, the

State may claim a time-limit inconsistency for its adult-only time

limit.

Comment: Another commenter said that we should allow all cases

subject to a time limit adequate prior notice before a clock begins to

count against them. Thus, States that have applied a reasonable

statutory interpretation of section 415 to exempt cases from the

Federal time limit should not have to count time retroactively against

these cases (i.e., count time accrued prior to the effective date of

the final rules).

Response: As we have previously stated, these rules apply only

prospectively; until they are effective, the State's reasonable

interpretation of the statute applies. An individual who was considered

exempt from the Federal time limit under the State's reasonable

interpretation of its waiver would only have the Federal limit apply

prospectively, beginning October of 1999. This policy will allow States

time to provide the recipient with adequate notice.

(f) Section 260.75--If a State Is Claiming a Waiver Inconsistency for

Work or Time Limits, What Must the Governor Certify? (Sec. 272.8(a) of

the NPRM)

If a State is claiming waiver inconsistencies, the Governor must

certify that the State has continuously maintained applicable policies

in operating its TANF program and that the inconsistencies claimed by

the State do not expand the scope of the approved waivers. Further, the

certification must identify the specific inconsistencies that the State

chooses to continue with respect to work and time limits.

If the waiver inconsistency claim includes work provisions, the

certification must specify the standards that will apply in lieu of the

provisions in section 407. Specifically, it must include, as

applicable: (1) Descriptions of two-parent and other cases that are

exempt from participation, if any, for the purpose of determining the

denominators of the work participation rates; (2) the rules for

determining whether nonexempt two-parent and other cases are ``engaged

in work'' for the purpose of calculating the numerators of the work

participation rates, including descriptions of the countable work

activities and minimum required hours; and (3) the penalty against an

individual or family when an individual refuses to work. Again, the

certification may include a claim of inconsistency with respect to

hours of required participation in work activities only if the State

has written evidence that, when implemented, the waiver policies

established specific requirements related to hours of work for

nonexempt individuals.

If the waiver inconsistency claim includes time-limit provisions,

the Governor's certification must include the standards that will apply

in lieu of the provisions at section 408(a)(7). It must specify the

standards that will apply in determining: (1) Which families are not

counted towards the Federal time limit; and (2) whether a family is

eligible for an extension of its time limit on federally funded

assistance.

If the State is continuing policies for evaluation purposes, the

certification must specify any special work or time-limit standards

that apply to the experimental and control group cases. The State may

choose to exclude cases assigned to the experimental and

[[Page 17739]]

control groups that are not otherwise exempt, for the purpose of

calculating the work participation rates or determining State

compliance related to limiting assistance to families including adults

who have received 60 months of TANF assistance. Thus, the State may

exclude all experimental and control group cases, not otherwise exempt.

However, it may not exclude such cases on an individual, case-by-case

basis.

A State must provide the initial Governor's certification by

October 1, 1999. It would be very helpful to receive the certification

by July 1, 1999, in order to assess how inconsistencies will apply for

data collection and reporting efforts before the effective date of the

new requirements. We would like to resolve any issues about the

treatment of waiver cases before the reporting requirements take

effect, because it is much easier to code information correctly the

first time than to modify the codes retroactively. In light of the

number of States continuing waivers and some of the detailed, case-

specific questions that we anticipate might arise, we want to build in

ample time to resolve all issues by October 1, 1999. It will certainly

be in a State's interest if we can resolve all questions by the

effective date of the new requirements.

Also, we would point out that, until a State has submitted its

Governor's certification, we will treat the State as a nonwaiver State

in determining its compliance with work participation rate and time-

limit standards. Likewise, if we determine that a Governor's

certification does not comply with the requirements of this subpart, we

will advise the State of the inconsistency and give it an opportunity

to revise the certification. We will accept alternative rules for

determining penalties related to work participation rates and time-

limit exceptions only to the extent that they comply with the

requirements of this part.

If a State modifies its waiver policies, after it provides the

certification, in a way that has a substantive effect on the

calculation of its work participation rates, time-limit exceptions, or

sanctions, it must submit an amended certification by the end of the

fiscal quarter in which the modifications take effect.

Comment: A few commenters questioned whether we had the authority

specifically to require that Governors certify which waivers States

were continuing. Some of these saw this requirement as an added burden

that duplicated information already submitted in their State TANF plans

or documented as part of their waiver approval.

Response: We disagree that we have no authority to require the

certification. As discussed, the Department has had no formal process

for determining a State's decisions on the continuation of waivers. The

information that has been provided has been sporadic and is not

necessarily current or complete. Since we will be relying on the

State's determination that it has continued an inconsistent waiver

component in making penalty determinations, we must have accurate, up-

to-date information on the State's decision to continue its

inconsistent work and time-limit components in order to make those

penalty determinations correctly and on a timely basis. As such

information is necessary to our implementation of the penalty

provisions, we have authority under those provisions to collect it.

(g) Section 260.76--What Special Rules Apply to States That Are

Continuing Evaluations of Their Waiver Demonstrations? (Sec. 271.60(c)

and (d) and Sec. 274.1(e)(4) of the NPRM))

If a State is continuing policies that employ an experimental

design in order to complete an impact evaluation of a waiver

demonstration, the experimental and control groups may be subject to

prior law, except as modified by the waiver.

We have added definitions for experimental and control groups at

Sec. 260.71 (and cross-references at Sec. 260.30). These definitions

reference the terms and conditions in the State's demonstration.

Comment: One commenter suggested that we should allow any State in

which more than half of its families are subject to waiver policies as

part of a research group to apply the same waiver policies to the rest

of the families in the State, as long as the State does not expand the

geographical scope of the waiver authority. The same rule would apply

to a county operating a waiver demonstration in a county-administered

State. Another commenter indicated that States may be less likely to

continue an evaluation if we do not allow a State to apply policies

permitted for the research group to a broader set of families.

Response: While we sympathize with the commenters' desire to reduce

administrative complexity, we do not see why the complexity is any

greater when a majority of the caseload is in the experimental and

control groups than when a minority is. Furthermore, implementing this

policy would introduce complexities of its own in terms of the

measurement required to determine what rules apply in a given

jurisdiction. Since both the number of families in the experimental and

control groups currently on assistance and the total number of families

currently on assistance vary from month to month, rules could vary

month to month. In contrast, the experimental and control groups are

well-defined; a family is either assigned to them or not. Therefore,

under the final rule, determining when and to which families to apply

the pre-TANF policies is relatively simple.

C. Child-Only Cases

Background

The calculations for work participation rate and time-limit

penalties center around the concept of ``family.'' Under the proposed

rules, we indicated that a State could develop its own definition of

``family,'' with the proviso that States could not create definitions

that excluded adults from cases solely for the purpose of avoiding

penalties. To monitor that restriction, we proposed that States report

annually on the number of cases excluded from penalty calculations, and

the reasons for each exclusion. We said we would add families back into

the calculation if we found they were excluded for the purpose of

avoiding penalties. You may find the specific proposals in

Secs. 271.22(b)(2), 271.24(b)(2), and 274.1(a)(3) of the proposed rule.

These provisions reflected our concern that States might convert

cases to child-only cases to avoid the statutory work participation and

time-limit requirements. In part, our concern was a reaction to public

comments that States and advocates made shortly after PRWORA's

enactment suggesting that States might take such actions. It also

reflected our view that such conversions would seriously undermine

critical provisions of welfare reform.

Overview of Comments

Several commenters supported our decision to recognize that States

had the primary authority to define ``family.'' However, a large number

of commenters, from a diversity of groups, opposed or expressed

concerns about our specific proposals in this area. The comments

generally objected to our distrust of States and the pre-emption of

State decisions to define families as they deemed appropriate.

Several commenters challenged the statutory basis for our proposal.

Some did not directly challenge our authority, but questioned the

practicality of our proposed approach. Commenters pointed out

inconsistencies in the language that we had used in different parts of

the regulation and noted that

[[Page 17740]]

the determination of whether States created definitions for the sole

purpose of avoiding penalties would involve subjective determinations

of motive. To minimize these problems, they offered several suggestions

about how we might clarify what types of cases might be subject to

recalculation.

Under one proposal, States would describe their child-only cases in

the State plan or procedures. We could then discuss beforehand with

States the appropriateness of these cases. Other commenters offered a

related suggestion that we set up a process for States to get approval

of reasons for conversions up-front, but did not identify a specific

format for the State submissions.

Another suggestion was that State definitions would automatically

prevail, but that HHS would inform Congress if distortions of

legislative intent seemed to result. In other words, in the absence of

any documented abuses, we would simply gather information on what

States are doing and permit States to use any definition of family that

has a reasonable policy basis. Then, if we discover evidence that

States were trying to subvert the TANF provisions, we could work with

Congress in developing solutions.

Some commenters noted that child-only cases existed under AFDC and

enumerated examples of child-only cases that we should acknowledge as

acceptable, including: cases in which the adults have no legal

liability for the care of the children, cases with recipients of SSI or

other disability payments, cases with adults not receiving assistance

because they exhausted shorter State-imposed time limits, cases with

noncitizen parents or adults ineligible for other reasons (e.g., SSI

receipt or a drug felony conviction), cases that were previously

converted under approved waiver policies, and cases with elderly

caretakers.

We also received suggestions that we should explicitly permit

States to continue to provide assistance to children: (1) once the

parent/relative loses eligibility due to the expiration of the five-

year time limit; (2) whose parent/relative was sanctioned for failure

to participate in work or cooperate with child support enforcement

requirements; and (3) whose parent or caretaker would be better served

by some other State program, such as if she is disabled.

In addition to specific objections or questions, many commenters

expressed the overall concern that our proposal to control for

inappropriate child-only cases may inhibit the State flexibility

essential to TANF. State anxiety about Federal recalculation of penalty

liability could create a ``chilling effect'' that caused States to

limit child-only cases unnecessarily and inappropriately. In the words

of one commenter, ``the uncertainty of knowing whether their policy

basis will be considered legitimate and how work participation rates

and time-limit compliance will be measured by HHS could simply lead

States to avoid serving children as child-only cases even if the result

is not to serve the children at all.''

Commenters did not want to see assistance to valid child-only cases

undermined by our rules. Of particular concern was the effect of our

proposals on State efforts to keep children in the homes of relatives,

in lieu of foster care placements.

Others noted that, up to this point, we do not have evidence that

States are converting cases to child-only cases for the purpose of

avoiding TANF requirements; we have not observed significant changes in

State policy or practice to create new child-only cases. Only if such

changes actually occur should HHS develop corrective procedures.

Overall Response

When we were developing the proposed rules, we were very concerned

that States would use the flexibility available in defining families to

avoid work participation requirements, time limits, and other TANF

requirements. Within the authority that we have to collect

participation rate information and make decisions on State penalties,

we proposed specific regulatory policies with respect to penalties and

reporting in response to that concern. However, as we have seen the

TANF programs evolve, our concerns about possible abuses have

diminished.

While the number of child-only cases has been increasing over time,

commenters correctly observed that the increases began well prior to

TANF and that there is little indication so far that States are

converting cases merely to avoid penalties. In fact, a couple of

internal State analyses (i.e., in Florida and South Carolina) have

found no evidence of conversion of cases to child-only cases from other

statuses.

Also, commenters correctly noted that there were numerous child-

only cases that were considered valid under prior law. Their existence

under TANF therefore does not suggest that States are working to

subvert TANF requirements in this manner. Over the past several years,

there were a number of social and demographic changes underway that

could have contributed to much of the growth in child-only cases. For

example: (1) Because of the ``crack'' epidemic, some infants moved from

the care of their mothers to the care of their grandmothers or other

adult relatives (who may or may not have been needy); (2) in some

places, immigration changes could have caused a growth in the number of

eligible children with ineligible alien parents; and (3) in other

places, States have made an effort to establish eligibility for SSI.

(If parents became SSI-eligible, the children normally received

assistance as child-only cases.)

Recently, we have seen a reduction in the total number of child-

only cases. However, because the number of other types of cases has

been declining faster, the proportion of child-only cases has not gone

down. Thus, State success in moving more families to work may actually

be causing an increase in the proportion of child-only cases.

At the same time, we disagree with the suggestion that it would be

appropriate to provide federally funded assistance to children in

child-only cases when their parents reach the 60-month limit on Federal

assistance. Such a result would be consistent with an adult-only time

limit, but does not seem consistent with the intent of the specific

provision in the law. For example, the provisions on transfers to the

Social Services Block Grant program suggest that children in families

whose adults reached their 60-month limit were not expected to continue

receiving federally funded TANF assistance.

While we disagree with the commenters' suggestion that we did not

have legal authority to regulate in this area, we understand

commenters' concern that the provisions in the proposed rules may do

more harm than good. In the absence of clear evidence that States are

converting cases to avoid the TANF rules, we have decided that the most

appropriate response at this point is to give States leeway to define

families in ways that they think are most appropriate while gathering

better information on how child-only policies might be affecting the

achievement of TANF goals.

However, the possible conversion of cases to child-only status to

avoid TANF requirements remains a major policy concern. For example,

such conversions could effectively eliminate restrictions on the amount

of time that any family could receive federally funded TANF assistance

or could undermine the statutory provisions on the treatment of

sanction cases in the participation rate calculations. We therefore

intend to track it closely. To that end, we have added one data element

to the disaggregated case-record reporting that will identify cases

that have been

[[Page 17741]]

converted to child-only status since the past month. We will use the

quarterly TANF Data Report to monitor trends both in the aggregate

number and type of child-only cases and the number of conversions. By

monitoring these trends, we should be able to identify changes in State

practice or caseload characteristics that would merit further

investigation. If we saw a significant number of conversions to child-

only status in a particular State (i.e., a number that was out of line

with prior State numbers or the numbers for other States), we would

look more closely at that State.

We have a variety of investigative tools available to us, including

detailed analysis of the case-record information reported to us, the

Single State Audit, supplemental reviews, and targeted studies (like

the current ASPE study mentioned below).

We will incorporate a full analysis of the information we have

gathered on what has been happening with child-only cases in our annual

report to Congress.

As a number of commenters suggested, under these final rules, we

have adopted a strategy that includes gathering information, monitoring

developments, and keeping our options open regarding future actions.

Through our data collection, we will obtain substantial information on

the characteristics of child-only cases, trends in their number and

type, and conversions. This information will help us assess the

possible effect of such cases on the achievement of TANF goals. We will

consider proposing appropriate legislative or regulatory remedies if we

find that States are using the flexibility available under these rules

to define families to avoid work requirements or time limits or

otherwise undermine the goals of TANF. However, we will not put any

significant policy change into effect without appropriate prior

consultation with States, Congress, and other interested parties.

Tracking of Child-Only Cases

Comment: A significant number of commenters also objected to our

proposals at Secs. 271.22(b)(2)(i), 271.24(b)(2)(i), 274.1(a)(3)(i),

and 275.9(a)(1) that States annually report to us on their child-only

cases and advise us of the specific nature of each of the cases.

Commenters generally felt it was an unjustified additional burden for

States. Some objected to the specific wording of the requirement

because it suggested that we expected case-by-case reporting of such

cases rather than aggregated reporting.

Response: We have removed the requirement for annual reports on

families excluded from work-rate and time-limit calculations and the

reasons for their exclusion. The proposed language was not consistent

in different parts of the NPRM package and caused some confusion.

Monitoring trends in the number and type of such cases remains an

important issue. However, we decided that a different type of data

would be more helpful in helping us track conversions. Thus, we have

added a new data element to the TANF Data Report that will identify the

specific cases that have become child-only cases. These new data will

supplement other data on child-only cases available through the TANF

and MOE-SSP data reports and give us a solid basis of information for

assessing national and State trends in the number and nature of child-

only cases. From other data elements in those reports, we will get

disaggregated, case-level data on parents and other individuals who are

in the household, but not in the family receiving assistance. We will

get information on whether there are parents who are ineligible for

receipt of Federal benefits, whether the cases are under sanction, and

whether cases have no parent in the home. To provide still further

supplemental information, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for

Planning and Evaluation is undertaking a study in three States to

explore the circumstances of child-only cases in more detail.

Together, these information sources will provide valuable insight

into the nature of child-only cases and the types of services and

assistance States are providing them. We will be able to track any

significant changes in the number and types of such cases and be in a

better position to determine if we need to pursue further action.

Depending on what specifically is happening, an appropriate response

could be information-sharing, consultations, technical assistance, or

regulatory or legislative proposals.

To reflect our other decisions on child-only cases, we deleted the

provisions at Secs. 271.22(b)(2), 271.24(b)(2), and 274.1(a)(3) of the

proposed rule that prohibited conversion of child-only cases for the

purpose of avoiding penalties, indicated that we would add cases back

into the work participation rate and time-limit calculations if we

found that they had, and required separate annual reporting on child-

only cases. We also deleted comparable annual reporting langua

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