Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Site-Wide Environmental

Impact Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of

Decision on the continued operation of the Sandia National

Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) in the State of New Mexico. This

Record of Decision is based on the information and analysis contained

in the SNL/NM Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), DOE/EIS-

0281, and other factors, such as the mission responsibilities of DOE.

DOE has decided to implement the Expanded Operations Alternative

without the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex,

i.e., the Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS. Under the

Expanded Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency programs and

activities at SNL/NM could increase to the highest reasonable activity

levels, as set forth in the Site-Wide EIS, that could be supported by

current facilities and their potential expansion and construction of

new facilities for future actions specifically identified in the Site-

Wide EIS through 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Site-

Wide EIS or Record of Decision, or to receive a copy of the Site-Wide

EIS, contact: Julianne Levings, Document Manager, U.S. Department of

Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, P.O. Box 5400, Albuquerque, NM

87185, (505) 845-6201.

For information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy

and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence

Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at

(800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

DOE prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to the regulations of

the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing NEPA (40 CFR

Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part

1021). This Record of Decision is based, in part, on DOE's SNL/NM Site-

Wide EIS (DOE/EIS-0281). The U.S. Air Force participated as a

cooperating agency in preparing the Site-Wide EIS.

SNL/NM is located on the Kirtland Air Force Base, approximately 7

miles southeast of downtown Albuquerque, in Bernalillo County, New

Mexico. SNL/NM comprises approximately 8,800 acres of Federal land on

the Kirtland Air Force Base. SNL/NM is one of several national

laboratories that support DOE's statutory responsibilities for nuclear

weapons research and design, development of other energy technologies,

and basic scientific research. Sandia National Laboratories is composed

of four geographically separate facilities: Albuquerque, New Mexico

(SNL/NM); Tonopah, Nevada; Kauai, Hawaii; and Livermore, California.

This Record of Decision covers the level of operation of SNL/NM only.

DOE has assigned elements of each of its four principal missions

(National Security, Energy Resources, Environmental Quality, and

Science and Technology) to SNL/NM, and has established and maintains

several capabilities in support of these mission elements, including

applications of science and technology to the nuclear weapons program.

These capabilities also support applications for other Federal agencies

and other organizations in accordance with national priorities and

policies.

Facility operations are conducted within five Technical Areas (TAs)

and outdoor test areas. These TAs comprise the basic geographic

configuration of SNL/NM. TA-I is the main administration and support

area and contains several research laboratories. TA-II consists

primarily of support service facilities and waste management

facilities. TA-III conducts primarily physical testing. TA-IV contains

primarily accelerator operations. TA-V contains primarily reactor

facilities.

The Site-Wide EIS considers the environmental impacts of ongoing

and proposed activities at SNL/NM through 2008. DOE expects that it

will continue to suggest new programs, projects, and facilities for

SNL/NM (or consider SNL/NM as an alternative site for such facilities

or activities). Such new proposals will be considered in programmatic

or project-specific NEPA reviews, as appropriate, as they become ripe

for analysis. Subsequent NEPA reviews for projects or activities at

SNL/NM will make reference to, and be tiered from, the Site-Wide EIS,

and subsequent DOE decisions on these proposals may result in

amendments of this Record of Decision.

Alternatives Considered

DOE analyzed three broad alternative levels of operation at SNL/NM.

Alternative 1--No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, ongoing DOE and interagency

programs and activities at SNL/NM would continue the status quo, that

is, operating at planned levels as reflected in current DOE management

plans. In some cases, these planned levels include increases over

today's operating levels. This alternative also includes any activities

that have already been approved by DOE and have existing NEPA

documentation.

Alternative 2--Expanded Operations

Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency

programs and activities at SNL/NM would increase to the highest

reasonable activity levels, as analyzed in the Site-Wide EIS, that

could be supported by current facilities and their potential expansion

as well as construction of new facilities for future actions

specifically identified in the Site-Wide EIS.

In the Expanded Operations Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS,

DOE described two potential configurations for the Microelectronics

Development Laboratory facility. In the first configuration, the Site-

Wide EIS analyzed the expansion of operations in the existing

Microelectronics Development Laboratory (also analyzed in the Draft

Site-Wide EIS). In the second configuration, the Site-Wide EIS

presented the available information on the developing proposal for the

Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex, also known

as MESA, including impacts from the construction and operation of

additional buildings adjacent to the existing Microelectronics

Development Laboratory. DOE included in the second configuration of the

Expanded Operations Alternative all available programmatic and

environmental information on the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences

Applications Complex based on its approved Conceptual Design Plan.

DOE's Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS was Expanded

Operations in the first configuration (i.e., without the Microsystems

and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex).

The conceptual design for the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences

Applications Complex will be finalized in the January 2000 timeframe

with the issuance of the Conceptual Design Report currently under

preparation. The information on the Microsystems and Engineering

Sciences Applications Complex in the Site-Wide EIS is

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preliminary (based on the Conceptual Design Plan), and was added after

the Draft Site-Wide EIS was issued for public review and comment.

Therefore, DOE has determined that an additional NEPA review will be

conducted after the conceptual design is finalized to evaluate impacts

from the proposed construction and operation of the Microsystems and

Engineering Sciences Applications Complex. Based on the current

configuration for the proposed Microsystems and Engineering Sciences

Applications Complex, DOE is preparing an Environmental Assessment to

determine whether an EIS is required and will include an opportunity

for public participation.

Alternative 3--Reduced Operations

Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency

programs and activities at SNL/NM would be reduced to the minimum

levels of operations needed to maintain SNL/NM facilities and equipment

in an operational readiness mode.

Preferred Alternative

DOE's Preferred Alternative is the Expanded Operations Alternative

(exclusive of the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications

Complex). DOE would expand operations at SNL/NM as the need arises,

subject to the availability of Congressional appropriations, to

increase the level of existing operations to the highest reasonable

foreseeable activity levels as analyzed in the Site-Wide EIS. DOE would

only implement expansion at the existing Microelectronics Development

Laboratory, without addition of the Microsystems and Engineering

Sciences Applications Complex.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), in its ``Forty Most

Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026,

February 23, 1981), with regard to 40 CFR 1505.2, defined the

``environmentally preferable alternative'' as the alternative ``that

will promote the national environmental policy as expressed in NEPA's

Section 101. Ordinarily, this means the alternative that causes the

least damage to the biological and physical environment; it also means

the alternative which best protects, preserves, and enhances historic,

cultural, and natural resources.''

After considering impacts to each resource area by alternative, DOE

has identified Alternative 3, the Reduced Operations Alternative, as

the environmentally preferable alternative. DOE identified Alternative

3 as having the fewest impacts to the physical environment and to

worker and public health and safety because all operations would be at

the lowest levels. Therefore, the Reduced Operations Alternative would

have the lowest impacts, and the Expanded Operations Alternative would

have the highest impacts among the alternatives analyzed in the Site-

Wide EIS. However, the analyses included in the Site-Wide EIS indicate

that there would be little difference in the environmental impacts

among the alternatives analyzed and also that any impacts would be

small.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

DOE weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision

making. DOE analyzed existing environmental impacts and the potential

impacts that might occur for each alternative, including the

irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources.

Land Use and Visual Resources

No adverse impacts to land resources are expected as a result of

the No Action, Expanded Operations, or Reduced Operations Alternatives.

There would be no adverse impacts to visual resources that change the

overall appearance of the existing landscape, obscure views, or alter

the visibility of SNL/NM structures under any of the alternatives

analyzed.

Infrastructure

Electrical consumption would range from 185,000 megawatt hours per

year (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 198,000 megawatt hours per

year (Preferred Alternative). Projected water usage would range from

416 million gallons (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 495 million

gallons per year (Preferred Alternative). Annual projected utility

demands for all alternatives would be well within system capacities.

Other infrastructure-related factors, including maintenance, roads,

communications, steam, natural gas, and facility decommissioning, would

be similar for each alternative and would not pose adverse impacts.

Geology and Soils

Under all alternatives, impacts due to soil contamination would be

minimal. Under the Preferred Alternative, however, there would be the

potential for increased deposition of soil contaminants in outdoor

testing areas. These areas are not accessible to the general public.

Potential contaminants would include depleted uranium fragments,

explosive residue, and metals contained in weapons that are used in the

tests. SNL/NM performs periodic sampling and radiation surveys in these

testing areas. Depleted uranium fragments are collected after tests and

additional measures are taken to remove any contamination from the

soil.

Soil contamination from past research practices is being cleaned up

through SNL/NM's Environmental Restoration Project, which is scheduled

for completion by 2004. This clean-up would occur at the same rate

under the three alternatives.

Water Resources and Hydrology

The impact resulting from SNL/NM's contribution to drawdown in the

aquifer derives from both past and present water usage and is

considered to be adverse. The estimated SNL/NM portion of local (in the

immediate vicinity of the Kirtland Air Force Base) aquifer drawdown

from 1998 to 2008 would range from 11 percent (No Action and Reduced

Operations Alternatives) to 12 percent (Preferred Alternative). Local

drawdown of the aquifer would range from less than 1 to 28 feet across

the Kirtland Air Force Base during this period. This drawdown would not

have an immediate effect on other water users, spring flow, or land

subsidence. Long-term effects would tend to be reduced by the city of

Albuquerque's conversion to surface water use, scheduled to begin in

2004. Water demand under each alternative would be within existing

Kirtland Air Force Base water rights. As discussed above, under

Infrastructure, water usage would range from 416 million gallons per

year (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 495 million gallons per year

(Preferred Alternative).

Groundwater contamination attributable to SNL/NM activities is

present at three sites at the Kirtland Air Force Base. The

contamination in the aquifer is due to past waste management practices

rather than current operations. Investigation and clean-up at locations

with groundwater contamination would continue at the same rate under

any of the three alternatives.

Biological and Ecological Resources

Long-term restricted access and limited planned development have

benefitted biological resources at the Kirtland Air Force Base. This

benefit would continue under all alternatives. Proposed activities

under all the alternatives could result in a local displacement of

wildlife; however, the impact would be minimal and temporary. In

addition, there would be slightly increased levels of noise and

activity under the Preferred Alternative.

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However, the impacts from these increases are expected to be negligible

to biological and ecological resources. There are no endangered and

threatened species issues at SNL/NM.

Cultural Resources

Cultural resources in the Region of Influence have benefitted from

restricted access, compliance with applicable regulations, and

established procedures for the protection and conservation of cultural

resources. This benefit would continue under all alternatives. There

are no known cultural resource sites at DOE-administered land at the

Kirtland Air Force Base. For all three alternatives, there would

continue to be a potential for impacts to prehistoric and historic

archaeological resources located on Kirtland Air Force Base lands

administered by other agencies and used by DOE. These impacts would

derive from explosive testing debris and shrapnel produced as a result

of outdoor explosions, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires

and fire suppression. However, the potential for impacts due to these

factors would be minimal under all three alternatives.

DOE is involved in ongoing consultation with 15 Native American

tribes to discuss Traditional Cultural Properties at SNL/NM. To date,

no Traditional Cultural Properties have been specifically identified at

SNL/NM; however, several tribes have requested that they be consulted

under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act if

human remains are discovered within the Region of Influence. These

consultations will continue. If specific Traditional Cultural

Properties are identified, any impacts of SNL/NM activities on the

Traditional Cultural Properties and any impacts of restricting access

to the Traditional Cultural Properties would be determined in

consultation with Native American tribes, and further NEPA review would

be conducted, if appropriate.

Air Quality

Chemical emissions would be highest for the Preferred Alternative,

although emissions under all alternatives would be below levels that

would adversely affect public health. Air concentrations of criteria

and other chemical pollutants would be within regulatory standards and

human health guidelines. The impact from emissions of criteria and

other pollutants for the No Action and the Preferred alternatives would

be essentially the same.

The major source of criteria pollutants (other than mobile sources)

would be the steam plant, which supplies steam to the facilities for

heating. No increase in laboratory-wide floor space is anticipated

under the Preferred Alternative because any added floor space is

expected to be offset by facilities taken out of service; therefore, no

increase in steam production would be required. Among the three

alternatives, the Reduced Operations Alternative would require the

least steam, resulting in the lowest emissions from the steam plant.

Air quality impacts from mobile sources vary slightly among the

alternatives but are not considered adverse. The analysis indicates

carbon monoxide emissions from mobile sources as a percentage of the

Bernalillo County total would be 4.6 percent (No Action Alternative),

5.1 percent (Preferred Alternative), and 4.5 percent (Reduced

Operations Alternative).

The radiological dose impacts due to the annual air emissions from

SNL/NM facilities during normal operations under each of the

alternatives would be lower than the National Emissions Standards for

Hazardous Air Pollutants limit of 10 millirem per year to a maximally

exposed individual. The calculated radiological dose to a maximally

exposed individual would be 0.15 millirem per year under the No Action

Alternative; 0.51 millirem per year under the Preferred Alternative;

and 0.02 millirem per year under the Reduced Operations Alternative.

The calculated collective dose to the population within a 50-mile

radius of SNL/NM for each alternative from the annual radiological air

emissions due to the SNL/NM operations would be 5.0 person-rem per year

under the No Action Alternative, 15.8 person-rem per year under the

Preferred Alternative, and 0.80 person-rem per year under the Reduced

Operations Alternative.

Human Health

The composite cancer health risk estimates and the cancer health

risk estimates for specific receptor locations are below levels that

regulators consider protective of public health. The small amounts of

chemical carcinogens and radiation released from SNL/NM facilities

would increase the maximally exposed individual lifetime risk of cancer

(assuming 30 years of exposure) by less than 1 chance in 434,000 under

the No Action Alternative and by less than a possible 1 chance in

126,000 under the Preferred Alternative. Noncancer health effects would

not be expected under any alternative based on hazard index values of

less than 1. No additional nonfatal cancers, genetic disorders, or

latent cancer fatalities would be expected in the population living

within a 50-mile radius of SNL/NM. The lifetime risk to the population

in the Region of Influence would be 0.012, 0.075, and 0.24 latent

cancer fatalities for the Reduced, No Action, and Preferred

alternatives, respectively. Thus, no adverse health effects would be

expected from any of the three alternatives for SNL/NM.

Transportation

The SNL/NM material and waste truck traffic offsite would be

projected to increase from 14.5 shipments per day (1996) to 24.6 and

34.4 shipments per day under the No Action and Preferred alternatives,

respectively. However, the SNL/NM truck traffic would comprise less

than 0.03 percent of the total traffic, including all types of vehicles

entering and leaving the Albuquerque area by way of interstate

highways. Therefore, the impact under any alternative would be minimal.

The total local traffic on roadways from SNL/NM activities could

increase by a maximum of 1.8 percent under the No Action Alternative

and 3.6 percent overall under the Preferred Alternative as compared to

1996.

The overall maximum lifetime fatalities from SNL/NM annual

shipments of all types of materials and wastes due to SNL/NM operations

were estimated to be 1.7 fatalities under the Preferred Alternative. Of

these estimates, 1.2 fatalities would be due to traffic accidents; 0.33

fatalities would be due to incident-free transport of radiological

materials and wastes; and 0.06 fatalities would be due to air pollution

from truck emissions.

The maximum latent cancer fatalities in the population within a 50-

mile radius of SNL/NM from the annual transport of radiological

materials and wastes were estimated, based on a population dose of 4.9

person-rem, to be 0.0025.

Waste Generation

Operations of low-level waste and low-level mixed waste are

expected to increase by a maximum of about 200 and 70 percent,

respectively, under the Preferred Alternative, as compared to 1996. One

new operation, the Medical Isotopes Production Project, would be the

major contributor to the low-level waste increase. Approximate total

radioactive waste generation would be up to 180 cubic meters under the

No Action Alternative, up to 290 cubic meters under the Preferred

Alternative, and 110 cubic meters under the Reduced Operations

Alternative. Total chemical waste generation would be up to

approximately 380,000 kilograms under the No Action Alternative, up to

[[Page 69999]]

approximately 440,000 kilograms under the Preferred Alternative, and up

to approximately 310,000 kilograms under the Reduced Operations

Alternative. Capacity currently exists to manage the waste generated

from all operations at the Preferred Alternative level.

Noise and Vibration

Under the No Action Alternative, SNL/NM would operate at current

planned levels, which include background noise levels and short-term

noise impacts from SNL/NM test activities. By 2008, impulse noise-

producing test activities would increase an estimated 35 percent over

the 1996 level of 1,059 events. The projected frequency of impulse

noise events for the Reduced OperationsAlternative would be 65 percent

less than the 1996 levels.

Projections under the Preferred Alternative indicate a 250 percent

increase in the number of impulse noise tests over 1996 levels.

Only a small fraction of these tests would be loud enough to be

heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests

would be below background noise levels for locations beyond the

Kirtland Air Force Base boundary and would be unnoticed in

neighborhoods bounding the site. Ground vibrations would remain

confined to the immediate test area.

Socioeconomics

Direct SNL/NM employment projections range from about 7,400

(Reduced Operations Alternative) to about 8,400 (Preferred

Alternative), in comparison to about 7,600 full-time SNL/NM employees

in the 1996 base year. These employment changes would change regional

population, employment, personal income, and other socioeconomic

measures in the region by less than 1 percent. Accordingly, no adverse

socioeconomic impacts would be expected to result from any of the

alternatives.

Environmental Justice

Based on the analyses of all resource areas and demographic

information on low-income and minority population, DOE does not expect

any environmental justice-related impacts from the continued operation

of SNL/NM under any of the alternatives.

Accidents

The accident scenarios discussed are those that bound, i.e.,

provide an upper limit to potential impacts or risks, the accidents at

SNL/NM. At SNL/NM, accidents could occur that would affect workers and

the public. Potential accidents with the largest impacts would involve

radioactive materials in TA-V facilities and hazardous chemicals in TA-

I facilities. In most instances, involved workers (those individuals

located in the immediate vicinity of an accident) would incur the

largest risk of serious injury or fatality, because, for most

accidents, the magnitude of the damaging effects are highest at the

point of the accident and diminish with increasing distance. This

result would apply, for example, to releases of radioactive and

chemical materials, explosions, fires, airplane crashes, earthquakes,

and similar events. In some situations, however, the mitigating effects

of structural barriers, personal protection equipment, and engineered

safety features could offer greater protection for close-in workers

than for others in the general vicinity of the accident.

In TA-I, under all three alternatives, there could be numerous

situations in laboratory rooms where workers could be accidentally

exposed to small amounts of potentially harmful chemicals. The

potential also exists in TA-I for a catastrophic accident, such as an

airplane crash into a facility or an earthquake, in which multiple

potentially harmful chemicals could be released and expose onsite

individuals to harmful or fatal chemical concentrations. Large

quantities of hydrogen stored in outside areas of TA-I could also

explode as a result of a catastrophic event and cause serious injury or

fatality to involved workers and other nearby onsite individuals. The

probability of a catastrophic chemical or explosive accident with

serious consequences is low (less than once in a thousand years).

Should such an accident occur, emergency procedures, mitigating

features, and administrative controls would minimize its adverse

impacts.

Under the Preferred Alternative, the Microelectronics Development

Laboratory and the Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory would

remain in their present configuration. In the event of a catastrophic

accident, such as an airplane crash into either facility (but not

both), the dominant chemical release would be as much as 106 pounds of

chlorine from the Microelectronics Development Laboratory or as much as

65 pounds of arsine from the Compound Semiconductor Research

Laboratory. If an accident that causes chemical releases were to occur,

about 141 persons in the vicinity of the Microelectronics Development

Laboratory or 409 persons in the vicinity of the Compound Semiconductor

Research Laboratory could be exposed to concentrations greater than

Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) Level 2. The ERPG-2 level

is the maximum airborne concentration below which individuals could be

exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing

irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their

ability to take protective action. In the event of an earthquake,

simultaneous release of chemicals is possible, and as many as 423

persons could be exposed in TA-I to concentrations greater than ERPG-2

levels.

The potential for accidents would exist in TA-V that would cause

the release of radioactive materials, causing injury to workers, onsite

individuals, and the public. For example, if an earthquake occurred,

the impacts would range from a 1 in 33 increase in probability of a

latent cancer fatality for a noninvolved worker on the site to 1 in

120,000 for a maximally exposed member of the public. For the entire

population residing within 50 miles of SNL/NM, one or two additional

latent cancer fatalities would be expected. Involved workers, as in the

case of chemical accidents, would incur the largest risk of injury or

fatality in the event of almost any accident because of their close

proximity to the hazardous conditions.

Comments on the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement

DOE distributed approximately 500 copies of the Final Site-Wide EIS

to appropriate Congressional members and committees, the State of New

Mexico, various American Indian Tribal governments and organizations,

local governments, other Federal agencies, and other interested

stakeholders. DOE did not receive any comments on the Final Site-Wide

EIS.

Other Decision Factors

As directed by the President and Congress, DOE has a comprehensive

stewardship program which is maintaining the safety, security and

reliability of the country's nuclear weapons stockpile. In addition,

DOE has national security, energy resources, environmental quality, and

science and technology mission lines, which it supports at a number of

facilities across the United States. DOE directs and funds SNL/NM

activities in support of its programs and missions. In turn, SNL/NM's

facilities and operations are designed to meet the requirements of the

programs, projects, and activities assigned to the Laboratory.

[[Page 70000]]

DOE needs to continue to meet its responsibilities for national

security, energy resources, environmental quality, and science and

technology at SNL/NM. DOE needs to continue to fulfill its

responsibilities as mandated by statute, Presidential Decision

Directive, and Congressional authorization and appropriation, while

meeting this need in a manner that protects human health and the

environment.

As noted in the Site-Wide EIS, SNL/NM houses unique facilities and

expertise that have been developed over the past 50 years. These

capabilities have well served national security and other national

needs in the past. It is expected that, for the foreseeable future, the

U.S. will maintain a nuclear weapons stockpile and require advanced

science and manufacturing capabilities to address issues of national

importance for the maintenance of that stockpile and for other

purposes, including assuring the safety and reliability of that

stockpile. The unique facilities and expertise at SNL/NM are needed to

assist in finding solutions to these issues. These factors were also

considered (in addition to the human health and environmental impact

information discussed above) in reaching this Record of Decision.

Decision

DOE has decided to expand the scope and levels of its operations at

SNL/NM. DOE is implementing the Preferred Alternative, that is,

Alternative 2, Expanded Operations (exclusive of the Microsystems and

Engineering Sciences Applications Complex). This alternative reflects a

broad expansion of science and technology research and applications of

this research to a variety of issues of national importance. This

alternative also includes the continued maintenance of existing and

expanded capabilities, and continued support and infrastructure

activities. The following discussion describes the major actions to be

taken, with an emphasis on those areas that have had the most extensive

programmatic or public interest.

The decisions in this Record of Decision will be reflected in DOE

budget requests and management practices, consistent with mission

needs. However, implementation of these decisions depends on

Congressional funding levels.

Selected Facilities in Technical Areas I and II

The Neutron Generator Facility will continue to fabricate neutron

generators and neutron tubes. Support activities will include a wide

variety of manufacturing, testing, and product development techniques

and processes. The Neutron Generator Facility will increase

manufacturing to approximately 2,000 neutron generators per year and

associated neutron and switch tubes. An addition to an existing

building will be constructed to meet increased production needs. Also,

Building 870 will undergo extensive renovations.

The Microelectronic Development Laboratory will continue to conduct

research and development activities on microelectronic devices for

nuclear weapons. A broad range of microtechnology development and

engineering activities, including integrated circuit and wafer

production will continue. The Microelectronic Development Laboratory

will be expanded to operate in support of research and development and

production of silicon-based microelectronic devices; it will produce up

to 7,500 wafers per year. DOE anticipates that new technologies and

manufacturing processes will be required to meet expanded activities.

There will be no construction of new facilities to meet this expanded

wafer production, and the Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory

(Building 893) will remain in operation in its present location. This

Record of Decision only extends to the existing Microelectronic

Development Laboratory, without addition of the Microsystems and

Engineering Sciences Applications Complex. As discussed in the

Alternatives section of this Record of Decision, DOE is currently

preparing an Environmental Assessment for the proposed construction and

operation of the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications

Complex.

Advanced manufacturing techniques will continue to be developed and

applied at the Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory. These

activities include hardware manufacturing, emergency and prototype

manufacturing, development of manufacturing processes, and design and

fabrication of production equipment. Operations at the Advanced

Manufacturing Processes Laboratory will increase up to a maximum of

347,000 hours per year.

Research on materials and advanced components will continue at the

Integrated Materials Research Laboratory. These activities will include

basic research in chemistry, physics, and energy technologies.

Operations at the Integrated Materials Research Laboratory will

continue at its current capacity of approximately 395,000 hours per

year.

The Explosive Components Facility will continue to support the work

performed at the Neutron Generator Facility and the research and

development performed on a variety of energetic components. Activities

include research, testing, development, and quality control activities

for neutron generators, explosives, chemicals, and batteries.

Operations at the Explosive Components Facility will be expanded to

complete up to 500 neutron generator tests, 900 explosive tests, 1,250

chemical analyses, and 100 battery tests annually.

Physical Testing and Simulation Facilities

Ballistic studies and solid-fuel rocket motor tests will continue

at the Terminal Ballistics Complex. Testing capabilities will include

research in areas of armor penetration, vulnerability, acceleration,

flight dynamics, and accuracy. Projectile impact tests will include all

calibers of projectiles. The operating level at the Terminal Ballistics

Complex will be increased up to a maximum of 350 projectile impact

tests and 100 propellant tests per year.

Tests designed for the validation of analytical modeling and

weapons system certification will continue at the Drop/Impact Complex.

Test activities will focus on water and underwater tests, design

verification, and performance assessments. The Drop/Impact Complex

tests will be expanded up to a maximum of 50 drop tests, 20 water

impact tests, 5 submersion tests, and 10 underwater blast tests per

year.

Tests that simulate high-speed impacts of weapon shapes,

substructures, and components to verify design integrity, performance,

and fusing functions will continue at the Sled Track Complex. These

capabilities will include testing of parachute systems, transportation

equipment, and reactor safety. Operating levels at the Sled Track

Complex will be increased up to a maximum of 80 rocket sled tests, 239

explosive tests, 24 rocket launches, and 150 free-flight launches per

year.

The Centrifuge Complex will continue to test objects weighing

several tons at over 100 times the force of gravity. The number of

tests for the Centrifuge Complex will increase up to a maximum of 120

centrifuge tests and 100 impact tests per year.

Accelerator Facilities

The SATURN accelerator will continue to produce X-rays to simulate

the radiation effect of nuclear bursts on electronic and material

components. Tests will include satellite systems,

[[Page 70001]]

weapons materials and components, and reentry vehicle and missile

subsystems. The accelerator output for SATURN will increase up to a

maximum of 500 shots annually.

The High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III will

continue to provide gamma ray effects testing capabilities. Tests will

include electronic components and weapon systems and high-fidelity

simulation over large areas in near nuclear-explosion radiation

environments. The High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III

operations will increase up to a maximum number of 1,450 shots per

year.

The Sandia Accelerator and Beam Research Experiment will continue

to provide X-ray and gamma ray effects testing capabilities.

Capabilities will include testing of pulsed-power technologies, fusion

systems, weapons systems, computer science, flight dynamics, satellite

systems, and robotics. Testing at the Sandia Accelerator and Beam

Research Experiment will increase up to a maximum of 400 shots per

year.

The Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator will continue

to produce high-voltage accelerations to measure X-ray-induced currents

in integrated circuits and detect response in materials. Testing will

include activities in radiation measurements for a variety of weapons

components. Operations at the Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-

Radiator will increase up to a maximum of 6,000 shots per year.

The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I will continue the

development of pulsed-power technology, including high-power energy

tests. Activities will include basic scientific research, development,

and testing. The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I operations will

increase to support up to a maximum of 10,000 tests per year in either

the single or repetitive pulse modes.

The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power II will continue to develop

radiation processing applications using powerful electron or X-ray

beams. Activities will include testing of high power magnetic switches

and specialty transmission lines. The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed

Power II capacity will be expanded up to a maximum of 20 tests per week

for 40 weeks per year (800 tests).

The Z-Machine will continue to produce extremely short and powerful

pulses at various targets to simulate special atmospheric conditions

and fusion reaction conditions. The Z-Machine capability will be

expanded up to a maximum of 350 firings per year. Approximately 78

percent could involve nuclear materials.

The Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator

will continue to test plasma opening switches for pulsed-power drivers.

Other activities include basic research in science, material

development, and material testing. The operating levels at the Tera-

Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator will be

increased up to a maximum of 1,300 shots per year.

The Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module will continue to evaluate

the performance and reliability of components including next-generation

accelerators. Activities will include research and development in

pulsed-power technologies such as power storage, high-voltage

switching, and power flow. The Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module

operations will increase up to a maximum of 2,000 shots per year.

The Radiographic Integrated Test Stand accelerator will continue to

develop and demonstrate capabilities for future accelerator facility

design. Capabilities will focus on demonstrating inductive voltage

technology. The Radiographic Integrated Test Stand will increase

operations up to a maximum of 800 tests per year.

Reactor Facilities

The New Gamma Irradiation Facility will perform a wide variety of

gamma irradiation experiments under both dry and water-pool conditions.

Capabilities will include studies in thermal and radiation effects,

weapons component degradation, nuclear reactor material and components,

and other nonweapon applications. The New Gamma Irradiation Facility

will increase operations to irradiate test packages for a maximum of up

to 24,000 test hours per year.

The Gamma Irradiation Facility will supplement the capabilities of

the New Gamma Irradiation Facility. The Gamma Irradiation Facility will

continue to perform gamma irradiation experiments, and its operations

will be expanded to complete tests in two available cells.

Approximately 8,000 test hours will be performed.

The Sandia Pulsed Reactor will continue to provide multiple fast-

burst reactor, near-fusion spectrum radiation environments. Testing

activities will include a wide variety of technologies that support

both defense and nondefense projects. Modifications will be completed

to enhance and expand current capabilities. Operating levels at the

Sandia Pulsed Reactor will increase up to a maximum of 200 tests per

year.

DOE considered two possible configurations for use of a pulsed-

power reactor, the existing Annular Core Research Reactor reconfigured

for Defense Programs use, and a possible second reactor referred to as

the Annular Core Pulse Reactor II. However, a second reactor is not

ripe for decision at this time, and if this additional reactor facility

is proposed in the future, DOE will prepare a separate project-specific

NEPA review.

The existing Annular Core Research Reactor can be operated in two

ways: to produce medical isotopes or to support Defense Programs

activities. Under the Annular Core Research Reactor Defense Programs

configuration, the reactor will be reconfigured to pulse-mode operation

to conduct a short-term test series (i.e., up to about 18 months)

related to the certification of some weapons components. Once the

short-term testing is completed, the Annular Core Research Reactor will

be converted back to medical isotope production.

Under the medical isotopes production configuration, the Annular

Core Research Reactor will produce medical and research radioactive

isotopes. Under the medical isotopes production configuration, the

Annular Core Research Reactor will be operated for 24 hours per day, 7

days per week, at a maximum power level of 4 Megawatt (approximately

35,000 Megawatt-hours per year) to meet the entire U.S. demand for

molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and

iodine-125. This would require the irradiation of about 25 highly

enriched uranium targets per week (1,300 per year).

The Hot Cell Facility will primarily support medical isotopes,

including isotope extraction, isotope production purification, product

packaging, and quality control. Support to Defense Programs activities

will be provided as necessary for its short-term testing. The Hot Cell

Facility will continuously process 100 percent of the U.S. demand for

molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and

iodine-125. This will require the processing of about 25 irradiated,

highly enriched uranium targets per week (1,300 per year).

Outdoor Test Facilities

The Aerial Cable Facility will conduct a variety of impact tests

involving weapon systems and aircraft components. Capabilities include

free-fall drop, rocket pull-down, and captive flight tests, data

recording, and simulation technologies. The Aerial

[[Page 70002]]

Cable Facility will be expanded to include drop tests of joint test

assemblies that contain depleted uranium, enriched uranium, and

insensitive high explosives. These test articles will contain up to a

maximum of 45 pounds of depleted uranium, 120 pounds of enriched

uranium, and 104 pounds of insensitive high explosives (plastic-bonded

explosive [PBX]-9502 or press-moldable explosive [LX]-17). The number

of tests using this kind of test article (containing depleted uranium,

enriched uranium, and insensitive high explosives) will not exceed five

per year. The total number of drop/pull-down tests will increase up to

a maximum of 100 experiments per year. Aerial target tests will

increase up to a maximum of 30 tests per year. Up to two series of

scoring system tests will be conducted each year.

The Lurance Canyon Burn Site will continue to test, certify, and

validate material and system tolerances. Test objects will be burned

for short periods of time under controlled conditions. Up to a maximum

number of approximately 55 certification tests per year will be

conducted at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site. Model validation tests and

user tests will increase up to a maximum of 100 and 50 per year,

respectively.

The Containment Technology Test Facility--West will continue to

conduct a series of successive events leading up to ultimate failure of

test vessels. The Containment Technology Test Facility--West will

perform up to two survivability tests per year.

The Explosives Applications Laboratory will continue to design,

assemble, and test explosive materials, components, and equipment. Work

will involve arming, fusing, and firing of explosives and testing of

components. The number of explosive tests at the Explosives

Applications Laboratory will increase up to a maximum of 360 tests per

year.

The Thunder Range Complex will continue its activities ranging from

disassembly and evaluation to calibration and verification testing of

special nuclear and nonnuclear systems. Examination and testing of

objects will involve cleaning, physical examination, disassembly,

measurement, sampling, photography, and data collection. Operations at

the Thunder Range Complex will increase up to a maximum of 10 test

series per year in 2008. Equipment disassembly would increase up to 144

days per year.

Infrastructure Facilities

The Steam Plant will continue to produce and distribute steam to

SNL/NM and Kirtland Air Force Base facilities. Steam production will

remain at approximately 550 million pounds per year. The Steam Plant

will require upgrades of several boilers, steam distributors, and

natural gas supply systems. The boiler upgrade could include a

technology change to cogeneration units.

The Hazardous Waste Management Facility will continue to handle,

package, store, and ship hazardous, toxic, and nonhazardous chemical

wastes. The Hazardous Waste Management Facility will continue to

prepare wastes for offsite transportation for recycling, treatment, or

disposal at licensed facilities. Operations at the Hazardous Waste

Management Facility will increase from one to three shifts. Quantities

of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act hazardous waste managed will

be about 92,000 kilograms each year (well within the permitted

capacity).

The Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility will continue to

serve as a centralized facility for receipt, characterization,

compaction, treatment, repackaging, certification, and storage of low-

level waste, transuranic waste, low-level mixed waste, and mixed

transuranic waste. The Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility will

continue to prepare wastes for offsite treatment and disposal at

licensed facilities. Operations at the Radioactive Mixed Waste

Management Facility will be increased from one to two shifts. Annual

quantities of radioactive waste managed (including newly generated and

legacy waste) will be about 19,600 cubic feet for low-level waste.

Annually, for low-level mixed waste, transuranic waste, and mixed

transuranic waste, the quantities to be generated and managed are

approximately as follows: 260 cubic feet low-level mixed waste

generated, and 8,800 cubic feet managed; 26 cubic feet transuranic

generated, and 350 cubic feet managed; 37 cubic feet mixed transuranic

waste generated and managed. The infrastructure processing rate is 2.7

million pounds per year. A new prefabricated waste storage building

would be constructed to replace an existing building to improve

flexibility and operational efficiencies.

The Thermal Treatment Facility will continue to burn small

quantities of explosive materials and explosives-contaminated water.

The quantities of wastes treated at the Thermal Treatment Facility will

increase. Approximately 1,200 pounds of waste per year would be

thermally treated. This rate assumes that 60 burns are performed at 20

pounds of waste per burn. This rate will be implemented only if the

regulatory authority approves the changes required to the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act permit for the Thermal Treatment

Facility.

Mitigation Measures

The Site-Wide EIS included a discussion of existing programs,

plans, and controls for operations at SNL/NM, including operating

within applicable regulations, DOE Orders, contractual requirements and

approved policies and procedures. No new mitigation measures were

identified. It is unnecessary to prepare a Mitigation Action Plan under

10 CFR 1021.331.

Conclusion

DOE has considered environmental impacts, stakeholder concerns, and

national policy in its decisions regarding the management and use of

SNL/NM. The analysis contained in the Site-Wide EIS is both

programmatic and site specific in detail. It is programmatic from the

perspective of broad, multi-use facility management and site-specific

in that it analyzes detailed project and program activity. The impacts

identified in the Site-Wide EIS were based on conservative estimates

and assumptions. In this regard, the analyses bound the impacts of the

alternatives evaluated in the Site-Wide EIS.

DOE has decided to implement the Expanded Operations Alternative

without the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex,

i.e., the Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS. Thus, DOE

and interagency programs and activities could increase to the highest

reasonable activity levels, subject to mission need and Congressional

funding and as set forth in the Site-Wide EIS, that could be supported

by current facilities and their potential expansion and construction of

new facilities for future actions identified in the Site-Wide EIS.

In accordance with the provisions of NEPA, its implementing

procedures and regulations, and DOE's NEPA regulations, I have

considered the information contained within the Site-Wide EIS, public

comments received in response to the Site-Wide EIS, and other factors.

Being fully apprised of the environmental consequences of the

alternatives and other decision factors described above, I have decided

to expand, as the need arises, the use of SNL/NM and its resources as

described. This will enhance DOE's ability to meet its primary national

security mission responsibility and create an environment that fosters

technological innovation in both the public and private sectors.

[[Page 70003]]

Issued at Washington, DC, December 6, 1999.

Thomas F. Gioconda,

Brigadier General, USAF, Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense

Programs.

[FR Doc. 99-32247 Filed 12-14-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P