Supplemental Closed Broadcast Auction Scheduled for March 21, 2000

Federal RegisterDec 2, 1999

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-99-28-A (Auction No. 28); DA 99-2594]

Supplemental Closed Broadcast Auction Scheduled for March 21,

2000

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

[[Page 67570]]

ACTION: Notice; seeking comment.

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SUMMARY: This Public Notice announces the auction of certain AM, FM,

LPTV and TV broadcast construction permits to commence March 21, 2000.

All spectrum to be auctioned is the subject of pending, mutually

exclusive applications for referenced broadcast services for which the

Commission has not approved settlement agreements obviating the need

for an auction. This Supplemental Closed Broadcast Auction shall

dispose of the remaining broadcast applications not included in earlier

Auctions. In addition, included in the Supplemental Closed Broadcast

Auction are certain mutually exclusive LPTV and TV translator

displacement relief applications. Pursuant to the Broadcast First

Report and Order, participation in the auction will be limited to those

applicants identified in this Public Notice and applicants will be

eligible to bid only on those construction permits for which they

previously filed long form applications (FCC Forms 301 or 349).

DATES: Comments are due on or before December 6, 1999 and reply

comments are due on or before December 16, 1999.

ADDRESSES: To file formally, parties must submit an original and four

copies to the Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications

Commission, 445 Twelfth Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20554. In

addition, parties must submit one copy to Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions

and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,

Federal Communications Commission, 445 Twelfth Street, SW, Room No. 4-

A760, Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Shaun Maher, Video Services Division,

Mass Media Bureau at (202) 418-1600, Lisa Scanlan, Audio Services

Division, Mass Media Bureau at (202) 418-2700 or Bob Reagle, Auctions

and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, at

(717) 338-2807.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of a Public Notice

released November 19, 1999. The complete text of the public notice is

available for inspection and copying during normal business hours in

the FCC Reference Center (Room CY-A257), 445 12th Street, SW,

Washington, DC. It may also be purchased from the Commission's copy

contractor, International Transcription Services, Inc., (ITS, Inc.)

1231 20th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20035, (202) 857-3800. It is also

available on the Commission's website at http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/

auctions.

1. Construction permits will be auctioned for each of the mutually

exclusive applicant groups (``MX Groups''). In some, but not all, of

the MX Groups listed on Attachment A, a ``daisy chain'' of mutual

exclusivity exists whereby applications are directly mutually exclusive

with certain applications in the MX Group but not others (``Daisy Chain

MX Groups''). A ``daisy chain'' occurs when two or more non-table,

site-based applications propose service areas that do not directly

overlap, but are linked together into a chain by the overlapping

proposal(s) of other(s). In such cases, the potential exists to grant

more than one application and issue more than one construction permit

per MX Group and remain consistent with the Commission's separation

requirements relating to site-based services. The identification of

``daisy chains'' on Attachment A is provisional in nature, since the

final configuration of groups cannot be ascertained until after the

filing of short-form (FCC Form 175) applications, at which point mutual

exclusivity for auction purposes arises. At that time, a final

identification and enumeration of ``daisy chain'' MX Groups will be

made and a public notice will be released providing this information

(``Status PN''). It is possible that some MX Groups provisionally

identified here as constituting a daisy chain may, after the short

form-filing deadline, become directly mutually exclusive. In such

case(s), the proposal in this notice pertaining to applications that

are directly mutually exclusive with each other (``Direct MX Groups'')

become applicable.

2. The MX Groups are categorized on a service-by-service basis,

accompanied by the respective reserve prices/minimum opening bids and

upfront payments. The groups involving provisional daisy chain

situations are noted. All MX Groups identified in (Attachment A) have

been subject to competition through the opening and closing of the

period for filing competing applications through the two-step cut-off

list procedures, or through an application filing window. Pursuant to

the Broadcast First Report and Order, 63 FR 48615 (September 11, 1998)

in those specific situations where both non-commercial and commercial

applicants for full power stations filed mutually exclusive long form

applications for non-reserved band channels, auctions shall not be

conducted at this time and these applications are not included on

Attachment A.

3. The total number of long form applications being disposed of in

this proceeding is 60. These long form applications are grouped

together in a total of 14 MX groups, 8 of which are provisional daisy

chain groups.

I. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

4. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (section 30002(a), Balanced

Budget Act of 1997, Public Law 105-33, 111 Stat. 251) calls upon the

Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable reserve price

will be required or a minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses

or construction permits are subject to auction (i.e., because the

applications are mutually exclusive), unless the Commission determines

that a reserve price or minimum bid is not in the public interest.

Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureaus,

Part One Third Report and Order, 63 FR 770 (January 7, 1998) to seek

comment on the use of minimum opening bids and/or reserve prices prior

to the start of each broadcast auction. This is consistent with policy

applied in earlier spectrum auctions, including the recently completed

Closed Broadcast Auctions. These auctions (Nos. 25 and 27) concluded

October 8, 1999, after 35 rounds and 15 rounds, respectively. The

Commission has concluded that either or both of these mechanisms may be

employed for auctions and has delegated the requisite authority to make

determinations regarding the appropriateness of employing either or

both.

5. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below,

which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can

be either published or unpublished. A minimum-opening bid, on the other

hand, is the minimum acceptable bid price set at the beginning of a

multiple round auction. It too constitutes a minimum amount below which

no bids are accepted and is generally used to accelerate the

competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid scenario,

the auctioneer generally has the discretion to lower the amount later

in the auction.

6. In anticipation of these auctions and in light of the Balanced

Budget Act, the Bureaus propose to establish minimum opening bids for

Direct MX Groups and reserve prices for the Daisy Chain MX Groups. The

Bureaus believe that use of minimum opening bids, which have been

utilized in other simultaneous, multiple round auctions, is an

effective practice for conducting the auction of the Direct MX Groups,

since the competitive bidding design the Commission proposes for those

groups features simultaneous, multiple rounds.

[[Page 67571]]

For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, on the other hand, where a single round

format is proposed, the Commission will utilize published reserve

prices, which will function in a single round context much like the

minimum opening bids in the multiple round format.

7. Minimum opening bids for the Direct MX Groups will help to

regulate the pace of the auction. The proposed minimum opening bids

were determined by taking into account various factors related to the

efficiency of the auction and the potential value of the spectrum. For

the television construction permits, the Commission has based the

proposed minimum opening bids upon the type of service that will be

offered, market size, industry cash flow data and recent broadcast

transactions. For the radio construction permits, the Commission has

based the proposed minimum opening bids upon the service and class of

facility that will be offered, the population covered by the proposed

facilities for which parties intend to bid and recent broadcast

transactions.

8. Comment is sought on this proposal. If commenters believe the

reserve prices and minimum opening bids proposed will result in a

substantial number of unsold construction permits, or, in particular

instances, do not constitute reasonable amounts, they should explain

why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an alternative

approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims with specific

valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening bid

levels or formulas. Commenters should detail any alternative method

they propose for valuing given spectrum, providing examples and

citations for each part of their formula. Alternatively, comment is

sought on whether, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act; the public

interest would be served by having no minimum opening bids or reserve

prices.

II. Other Auction Procedural Issues

9. The Balanced Budget Act, at section 3002(a)(E)(I), requires the

Commission to ``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive

bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * *

before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on

proposed auction procedures * * *.'' Consistent with the provisions of

the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have

adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific provisions

that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission

directed the Bureaus, under their existing delegated authority, to seek

comment on a variety of auction-specific issues prior to the start of

each auction. Pursuant to our delegated authority as contained in the

Broadcast First Report and Order, the Commission seeks comment on the

following issues.

a. Auction Sequence, License Groupings and Auction Design

10. The Commission proposes two separate auction designs to award

these construction permits, one for the Daisy Chain MX Groups and one

for Direct MX Groups. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, the Commission

will employ an electronic single round auction to determine the

winner(s). The Commission has concluded that the disposition of these

construction permits in this manner is most appropriate because of the

complexity of the overlapping nature of the permits in these groups.

11. For Direct MX Groups, the Commission will employ an electronic

simultaneous multiple round auction format. The Commission has

concluded that the disposition of these construction permits in this

manner is the most administratively appropriate and allows bidders to

utilize the same competitive bidding design option successfully

employed in the recently concluded Closed Broadcast Auction.

12. The Commission believes that the use of these designs furthers

the public interest by enhancing efficient spectrum usage and seeks

comment on these proposals.

b. Structure of Bidding Rounds

13. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, the Commission proposes that

there will be a single round in which each bidder must place a bid that

meets or exceeds the established reserve price. Bidders will enter

their bids in whole dollar amounts. The determination of the winning

bidder in each of the Daisy Chain MX Groups shall be made by finding

the set of bids on non-overlapping coverage areas that accrue to the

greatest amount. For example, consider the case of an MX Group

consisting of a ``daisy chain'' of three potential bidders (Bidders 1,

2 and 3) interested in three construction permits in the MX Group

(respectively Construction Permits A, B and C) such that A is MX'ed

with B and B is MX'ed with C. This means that either A and C can both

be assigned or B can be assigned, but not A and B, B and C or A, B and

C. In order for Bidder 2 to win construction permit B, its bid would

have to exceed the combined bids of Bidders 1 and 3 on construction

permits A and C, respectively. All bids will be time-stamped and in the

case of tie bids, the first complete combination of bids placed first

in time shall be considered the winning bid combination.

14. For the Direct MX Groups, the Commission proposes a single

stage, simultaneous multiple round auction. In order to ensure that the

auction closes within a reasonable period, an activity rule requires

bidders to bid actively on a percentage of their maximum bidding

eligibility during each round of the auction rather than waiting until

the end to participate. A bidder that does not satisfy the activity

rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the next round or use an

activity rule waiver. The Commission proposes that, in each round of

the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is

required to be active on construction permits encompassing one hundred

(100) percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain

the requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's

bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity

rule waiver is used, see Section e.). The Commission seeks comments on

these proposals.

c. Reserve Prices and Minimum Accepted Bids

15. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, each bidder must place a bid

that meets or exceeds the established reserve price. Bidders will enter

their bids in whole dollar amounts.

16. For the Direct MX Groups, the bid level will begin at the

established minimum opening bid. Once there is a standing, high bid on

a construction permit, a bid increment will be applied to that

construction permit to establish a minimum acceptable bid for the

following round. The Commission proposes to set a minimum 10%

increment. This means that a new bid placed by a bidder must be at

least 10% greater than the previous bid received on that construction

permit. The Bureaus retain the discretion to change the methodology for

determining the minimum bid increment if they determine the

circumstances so dictate. Bidders will enter their bids as multiples of

the bid increment (i.e., with a 10% bid increment, a bid of 1 increment

will place a bid 10% above the previous high bid, a bid of 2 increments

will place a bid 20% above the previous high bid). The Commission seeks

comment on these proposals.

d. Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each Bidder

17. Bidders will be required to submit an upfront payment for each

construction permit for which they are

[[Page 67572]]

qualified and interested in placing a bid. The Bureaus have delegated

authority and discretion to determine an appropriate upfront payment

for each construction permit being auctioned, taking into account such

factors as efficiency of the auction process and the potential value of

the spectrum. Eligibility for participation depends on whether an

applicant has timely tendered its upfront payment and has otherwise

complied with all of the Commission's rules relating to participation.

Bidders will be required to submit an upfront payment for each

construction permit for which they are qualified and interested in

placing a bid. With these guidelines in mind, the Commission proposes

the schedule of upfront payments. The Commission seeks comment on this

proposal.

e. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

18. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, because of the single round

format, activity rule waivers and reducing eligibility are not

applicable.

19. For the Direct MX Groups, use of an activity rule waiver

preserves the bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's

activity in the current round being below the required minimum level.

An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding and not

to a particular construction permit. Activity waivers are principally a

mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction

eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from

placing a bid in a particular round.

20. The automated auction system assumes that bidders with

insufficient activity at the close of a round would prefer to use an

activity rule waiver (if available) rather than lose bidding

eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply a waiver

(known as an ``automatic waiver'') at the end of any bidding round

where a bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless:

(1) there are no more activity rule waivers available; or (2) the

bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing

eligibility thereby meeting the minimum requirements.

21. The Commission proposes that a bidder with insufficient

activity that wants to reduce its bidding eligibility rather than use

an activity rule waiver, must affirmatively override the automatic

waiver mechanism during the bidding period by using the reduce

eligibility function in the software. In this case, the bidder's

eligibility would be permanently reduced to bring the bidder into

compliance with the activity rules as described above. Once eligibility

has been reduced, a bidder would not be permitted to regain its lost

bidding eligibility.

22. The Commission proposes that a bidder may proactively use an

activity rule waiver as a means to keep the auction open without

placing a bid. If a bidder submits a proactive waiver (using the

proactive waiver function in the bidding software) during a bidding

period in which no bids are submitted, the auction will remain open and

the bidder's eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked

in a round in which there are no new valid bids will not keep the

auction open, under the simultaneous stopping rule. The submission of a

proactive waiver cannot occur after a bid has been submitted in a round

and will preclude a bidder from placing any bids later in that round.

23. The Commission proposes that each bidder be provided with five

activity rule waivers that may be used in any round during the course

of the simultaneous multi-round auction. The Commission seeks comment

on these proposals.

f. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal

24. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, the Commission proposes the

following bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close

of the bidding period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids

placed. By using the remove bid function in the software, a bidder may

effectively ``unsubmit'' any of its bids placed in the single round

auction. A bidder removing a bid is not subject to withdrawal payments.

Bid withdrawals after the close of the bidding round are not applicable

to the single round auction. The Commission seeks comment on this

proposal.

25. For the Direct MX Groups, the Commission proposes the following

bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a

bidding period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids placed in

that round. By using the remove bid function in the software, a bidder

may effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder

removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal

payments.

26. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.

However, in the next round, a bidder may withdraw standing high bids. A

high bidder that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round

is subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions (see 47 CFR

1.2104(g); 1.2109). The Commission seeks comment on these bid removal

and bid withdrawal procedures.

27. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, the Commission explained

that allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of

licenses and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information

becomes available during the course of an auction. The Commission

noted, however, that in some instances bidders might seek to withdraw

bids for improper reasons, including delaying the close of the auction

for strategic purposes. The WTB, therefore, has discretion, in managing

the auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent strategic

delay of the close of the auction or other abuses. The Commission

stated that the WTB should assertively exercise its discretion,

consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw

bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market it finds

that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures.

28. Applying this reasoning, the Commission proposes to limit each

bidder in the auction to withdrawals in no more than two rounds during

the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in more

than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding or the use of

withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic purposes. The two rounds in

which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's discretion;

withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the Commission's

rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high bids that may

be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals are utilized.

Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment

provisions specified in the Commission's rules. The Commission seeks

comment on these proposals.

g. Stopping Rule and Waivers

29. For the Daisy Chain MX Groups, the Bureaus propose to conduct a

single round of bidding and declare the auction over at the conclusion

of this bidding period. The Bureaus propose a single, two-hour bidding

period. The Bureaus retain the discretion to increase or decrease this

time limit by announcement before the auction if circumstances so

dictate. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal, and,

specifically, whether a bidding period of greater or less than two

hours should be employed.

30. For the Direct MX Groups, the Bureaus propose to employ a

simultaneous stopping approach. The Bureaus have discretion to

establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in

order to terminate the

[[Page 67573]]

auction within a reasonable time (see 47 CFR 1.2104(e) and 73.5001(b)).

A simultaneous stopping rule means that all construction permits remain

open until the first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive

waivers or withdrawals are received. After the first such round,

bidding closes simultaneously on all construction permits. Thus, unless

circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding would remain open on all

construction permits until bidding stops on every construction permit.

31. The Bureaus seek comment on a modified version of the

simultaneous stopping rule. The modified stopping rule would close the

auction for all construction permits after the first round in which no

bidder submits a proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any

constructions on which it is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent

any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a

construction permit for which it is the standing high bidder would not

keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureaus

further seek comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be

utilized.

32. The Commission proposes that the Bureaus retain the discretion

to keep an auction open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive

waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this

event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a

proactive waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and

a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding

eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver.

33. Finally, the Commission proposes that the Bureaus reserve the

right to declare that the auction will end after a specified number of

additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureaus invoke

this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s)

only for construction permits on which the high bid increased in at

least one of the preceding specified number of rounds. The Bureaus

propose to exercise this option only in certain circumstances, such as,

for example, where the auction is proceeding very slowly, there is

minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the auction

will not close within a reasonable period of time. Before exercising

this option, the Bureaus are likely to attempt to increase the pace of

the auction by, for example, increasing the number of bidding rounds

per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum bid increments for

the limited number of construction permits where there is still a high

level of bidding activity. The Commission seeks comment on these

proposals.

h. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation

34. The Commission proposes that, by Public Notice or by

announcement during the auction, the Bureaus may delay, suspend or

cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical

obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding

activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason

that affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive bidding

(see 47 CFR 1.2104(i)). In such cases, the Bureaus, in their sole

discretion, may elect to: resume the auction starting from the

beginning of the current bidding period; resume the auction starting

from some previous bidding period; or cancel the auction in its

entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureaus to delay or

suspend the auction. The Commission emphasizes that exercise of this

authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureaus, and its use

is not intended to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may

wish to apply their activity rule waivers. The Commission seeks comment

on this proposal.

Federal Communications Commission.

Louis Sigalos,

Deputy Chief, Auctions & Industry Analysis Division.

Attachment A.--Video Service Construction Permit: Minimum Opening Bids/Reserve Prices and Upfront Payments

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Minimum

Channel/ Bidding Upfront opening bid/ Daisy Case file

MX group Location FX units payment reserve Applicants chain numbers

price

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PST1 El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 $100,000.00 $100,000.00 Agape Church, Inc................... No BPCT-960628K

El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 KB Communications, Inc.............. No BPCT-960710K

El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 Sioux Falls 64, LLC................. No BPCT-960930K

El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 KM Communications, Inc.............. No BPCT-960930K

El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 United Television, Inc.............. No BPCT-961001L

El Dorado, Arkansas............ 43 100,000 100,000.00 100,000.00 Cardinal Broadcasting Corp.......... No BPCT-961001X

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SST1 Glide, Oregon.................. 49 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, Inc.. No BPTTL-JG0601

Roseburg, Oregon............... 49 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Trinity Broadcasting Network........ No BPTT-980601V

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SST2 Knoxville, Tennessee........... 46 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Trinity Broadcasting Network........ Yes BPTT-JG0601P

Knoxville, Tennessee........... 46 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Dwight R. Magnuson.................. Yes BPTTL-980601

Knoxville, Tennessee........... 45 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Dwight R. Magnuson.................. Yes BPTTL-980601

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SST3 Yorktown, Virginia............. 53 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 JBS, Inc............................ Yes BMPTTL-JG060

1MN

[[Page 67574]]

Virginia Beach, Virginia....... 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 B.N. Viswanath...................... Yes BPTTL-JG0601

Hampton, Virginia.............. 53 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Lockwood Broadcasting, Inc.......... Yes BPTTL-JG0601

Hampton, Virginia.............. 53 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 LWWI Broadcasting, Inc.............. Yes BPTTL-980601

Suffolk, Virginia.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 LWWI Broadcasting, Inc.............. Yes BMPTTL-98060

1UI

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SST4 Rochester, New York............ 35 30,000 30,000.00 30,000.00 Tony J. Fant........................ Yes BMPTTL-JG060

1AG

Buffalo, New York.............. 36 30,000 30,000.00 30,000.00 Tony J. Fant........................ Yes BMPTTL-JG060

1AH

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Rochester, New York............ 36 30,000 30,000.00 30,000.00 Metro TV, Inc....................... Yes BPTTL-980601

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SST5 Wichita Falls, Texas........... 46 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 Barbara Sharfstein.................. Yes BPTTL-940415

Wichita Falls, Texas........... 60 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 James W. Satterfield................ Yes BPTTL-JD0415

Ardmore, Oklahoma.............. 60 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 Buddy L. Watson..................... Yes BPTTL-JD0415

Seminole, Oklahoma............. 60 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 Bryan Westbrook..................... Yes BPTTL-JD0415

Wichita Falls, Texas........... 61 10,000 10,000.00 10,000.00 Terri Harris........................ Yes BPTTL-JE0415

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SST6 Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Christian TV System........ Yes BPTTL-820616

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Minerva Rodriguez Frias............. Yes BPTTL-EO0307

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Jose Armando Tamez.................. Yes BPTTL-GC0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 52 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Lidia Rodriguez..................... Yes BPTTL-GD0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 51 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Lo-Power TV Network........ Yes BPTTL-GK0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 49 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Lo-Power TV Network........ Yes BPTTL-GK0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 50 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Jo Ann's Balloon Boutique, Inc...... Yes BPTTL-GQ0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 50 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Raul Francisco Rivas................ Yes BPTTL-GU0308

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SST7 Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 44 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Mike A. Mendoza..................... Yes BPTTL-GE0308

Uvalde, Texas.................. 43 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Evarista Romero..................... Yes BPTTL-GG0308

Uvalde, Texas.................. 45 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Mike A. Mendoza..................... Yes BPTTL-GJ0308

Uvalde, Texas.................. 45 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Evarista Romero..................... Yes BPTTL-GJ0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 45 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Lo-Power TV Network........ Yes BPTTL-GK0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 43 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 American Lo-Power TV Network........ Yes BPTTL-GK0308

Uvalde, Texas.................. 43 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Mike A. Mendoza..................... Yes BPTTL-GK0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 44 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Jo Ann's Boutique, Inc.............. Yes BPTTL-GU0308

Eagle Pass, Texas.............. 44 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Raul Francisco Rivas................ Yes BPTTL-HD0308

Uvalde, Texas.................. 43 60,000 60,000.00 60,000.00 Evangelina Garcia Garza............. Yes BPTTL-HO0308

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SST8 Twin Falls, Idaho.............. 28 8,000 8,000.00 8,000.00 Marcie Hillyard..................... Yes BPTTL-JD0415

[[Page 67575]]

Twin Falls, Idaho.............. 44 8,000 8,000.00 8,000.00 Marcie Hillyard..................... Yes BPTTL-JD0415

Twin Falls/Jerome, Idaho....... 29 8,000 8,000.00 8,000.00 Idaho Independent Television, Inc... Yes BPTTL-JD0415

Twin Falls, Idaho.............. 29 8,000 8,000.00 8,000.00 Kevin Hillyard...................... Yes BPTTL-JE0415

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SST9 Summerville, S. Carolina....... 26 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Towers, Inc......................... No BMPTTL-JG060

1EV

Charleston, S. Carolina........ 26 1,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Charles S. Namey.................... No BMPTTL-98060

1JR

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SST10 Bakersfield, California........ 20 20,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 3 Angles Broadcasting Network, Inc.. No BPTTL-980601

Bakersfield, California........ 19 20,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Trinity Broadcasting Network........ No BPTT-980601Z

Bakersfield, California........ 19 20,000 1,000.00 1,000.00 Valley Public Television, Inc....... No BPTT-9JG0601

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[FR Doc. 99-31239 Filed 12-1-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712-01-P

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.