Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings From the United Kingdom

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-412-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings

From the United Kingdom

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews:

antifriction bearings from the United Kingdom.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (the

``Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders

on ball bearings, cylindrical roller bearings, and spherical plain

bearings (collectively, antifriction bearings) from the United Kingdom

(64 FR 15727) pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as

amended (the ``Act''). On the basis of notices of intent to participate

and adequate substantive responses filed on behalf of domestic

interested parties and inadequate response from respondent interested

parties, the Department determined to conduct expedited reviews. As a

result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the

antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Results of

Review section of this notice.

For Further Information Contact: Eun W. Cho or Melissa G. Skinner,

Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-

1698 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

Effective Date: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752(c) of

the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews

are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-Year (``Sunset'')

Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516

(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR part 351 (1998)

in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to

the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the

Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of

Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty

Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy

Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by these orders are antifriction bearings

(``AFBs'') from the U.K., which includes ball bearings (``BBs'') and

cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs'') and parts thereof. For a

detailed description of the products covered by these orders, including

a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations, refer to the

notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews on antifriction

bearings from Japan, publishing concurrently with this notice.

History of the Order

The antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings from the

United Kingdom were published in the Federal Register on May 15, 1989

(54 FR 20910).1 In those orders, the Department announced

the weighted-average dumping margins for the following companies and

all others:

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\1\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less than Fair Value;

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof from the United Kingdom, 54 FR 19120 (May 3, 1989), as

amended, Antidumping Duty Orders and Amendments to the Final

Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Ball Bearings, and

Cylindrical Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof From the United

Kingdom, 54 FR 20910 (May 15, 1989). The crux of the amendment was

to reflect the International Trade Commission's determination that

critical circumstances for certain respondents did not exist, which

was contrary to the affirmative findings thereof by the Department,

and to correct ministerial errors.

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Cylindrical

Ball roller

Company bearings bearings

(``BBs'') (``CRBs'')

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Barden Corporation (U.K.) Ltd.; the Barden ...........

Corporation.(Barden) *.......................

NSK Bearings Europe, Ltd. RHP Bearings; RHP 44.02 43.36

Bearings, Inc. (NSK/RHP).....................

SKF (U.K.) Limited (SKF)...................... 61.14 (**)

All-others.................................... 54.27 43.36

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* Barden was not subjected to the original antidumping investigation.

** SKF made no shipments or sales pertaining to this category during the

period of investigation.

[[Page 60327]]

The Department has conducted numerous administrative reviews since

that time.2 The order remains in effect for all

manufacturers and exporters of the subject merchandise. We note that,

in the 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 administrative reviews, the Department

found that duty absorption had occurred with respect to NSK/RPH and

Barden's exports of the subject merchandise to the United

States.3

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\2\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From the United Kingdom; Final Results

of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 56 FR 31769 (July 11,

1991), as amended, Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany; et al., Amended Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755

(June 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24,

1992), as amended, Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 32969

(July 24, 1992), as amended, Antifriction Bearings (Other Than

Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 59080

(December 14, 1992), as amended, Antifriction Bearings (Other Than

Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.;

Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63

FR 8908 (February 23, 1998); Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Duty

Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993), as amended, Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand,

and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 58 FR 42288 (August 9, 1993), as

amended, Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 18877 (April 16,

1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial Termination of Administrative

Reviews, and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty Orders, 60 FR

10900 (February 28, 1995), as amended, Antifriction Bearings (Other

Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From the United

Kingdom; Notice of United States Court of International Trade

Decision, 62 FR 42745 (August 8, 1997), as amended, Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United

Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 62 FR 45795 (August 29, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other

Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 64

FR 49442 (September 13, 1999); Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative

Reviews, 61 FR 66472 (December 17, 1996), as amended, Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the

United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 61963 (November 20, 1997);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and

Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore,

Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998), as amended,

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From Italy, Romania, and the United Kingdom; Amended Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 40878

(July 31, 1998). Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

\3\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,

1997); and Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

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Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the

antidumping duty orders on AFBs from the U.K. (64 FR 15727) pursuant to

section 751(c)(6)(A)(i) of the Act. The Department received Notices of

Intent to Participate on behalf of Link-Belt Bearing Division (``Link-

Belt''), The Torrington Company (``Torrington''), MPB Corporation

(``MPB''), Roller Bearing Company of America, Inc. (``RBC''), NSK

Corporation (``NSK''), and New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB'')

4 on April 16, 1999, within the deadline specified in

section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulations. Also, the

Department received a Notice of Intent to Participate on behalf of The

Barden Corporation (U.K.) Ltd. and The Barden Corporation (collectively

referred to as ``Barden'') on April 14, 1999.5

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\4\ In their Notices of Intent to Participate, both NSK and NHBB

stipulated that they are affiliated with British exporter(s) and are

domestic importers of the subject merchandise.

\5\ Although the Sunset Regulations do not require a respondent

interested party to file a Notice of Intent to Participate, Barden

filed the notice anyway.

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We received complete substantive responses on behalf of Torrington,

RBC, and NHBB on May 3, 1999 and on behalf of NSK on April 30, 1999.

Torrington, RBC, NSK, and NHBB claimed interested-party status as

wholesalers, manufacturers, and producers of domestic like products

under section 771(9)(C) of the Act. The Department received a complete

substantive response from Barden on May 3, 1999. Barden claimed

interested-party status under section 771(9)(A) of the Act as a

producer, exporter, and importer of the subject merchandise. The

Department received all the above substantive responses within 30-day

deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under section

351.218(d)(3)(i).

Also, except NHBB, all the above interested parties, both domestic

and respondent, filed rebuttal comments according to section

351.218(d)(4) of the Sunset Regulations. Moreover, NSK and NHBB filed

additional comments purportedly pertaining to the propriety of the

Department's decision to execute an expedited, 120-day, sunset

review.6

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\6\ See adequacy section of this notice, infra.

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The Department also received, on May 3, 1999, a Waiver of

Participation on behalf of SKF USA Inc. and SKF (U.K.) Limited

(collectively referred to as ``SKF''), within the deadline and

according to the contents specified in section 351.218(d)(2) of the

Sunset Regulations. SKF claimed interested-party status under section

771(9)(A) of the Act as a foreign producer and importer of the subject

merchandise.

On May 21 and May 24, 1999, we informed the International Trade

Commission (``Commission'') that, on the basis of inadequate response

from respondent interested parties, we were conducting expedited sunset

reviews of these orders consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2).

(See letter to Lynn Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations

from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)

In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the

Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a

review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,

1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the

sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from the U.K. are

extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion

of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28,

1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.7

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\7\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,

et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year

Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).

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Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department

conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the

antidumping duty

[[Page 60328]]

orders would be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of

dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in making this

determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-average

dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews

and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period

before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty order,

and it shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin of

dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.

The Department's determinations concerning adequacy, continuation

or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin are discussed

below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to the

continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin

are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to

conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we

received comments on behalf of NHBB and NSK regarding our determination

to conduct expedited reviews. Rather than arguing the propriety of the

Department's decision to execute an expedited sunset review, both NSK

and NHBB offered new arguments. In their submissions, both parties

assert that most of the domestic interested parties that submitted

substantive responses are in favor of revocation of the Department's

various antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings. These parties

also offered new argument regarding the likely effect of revocation of

these orders.

The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of

an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination

of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's

determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its

regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic

interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing

a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or

legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic

industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the

statutory provision that, if there is no domestic industry interest in

continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order

automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at 46) makes clear that the

purpose of adequacy determinations in sunset reviews is for the

Department to determine whether to issue a determination based on the

facts available without further fact-gathering. Further, the statute,

at section 751(c)(1), specifies that the Department is to determine

whether revocation of an order would be likely to lead to continuation

or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) specifies that the Department

is to consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the

investigation and subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports

of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after

the issuance of the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history

accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically

the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.

103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 1

(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the

Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on

methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for

likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on

an order-wide basis. (See section II.A.2.) In addition, the Department

indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an

antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence

of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis

after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise

ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated

after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject

merchandise declined significantly. (See section II.A.3.)

In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above,

section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall

determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation

or recurrence of dumping where a respondent interested party waives its

participation in the sunset review. In the instant reviews, the

Department received a waiver of participation from one respondent

interested party, SKF. However, at the same time, the Department also

received a complete substantive response from another respondent

interested party, Barden.

Torrington and MPB assert that dumping of the subject merchandise

would resume if the antidumping duty orders were revoked. (See May 3,

1999, joint substantive response of Torrington and MPB at 6.) In

support of their assertion, Torrington and MPB point to continued

dumping of the subject merchandise at levels above de minimis after the

issuance of the orders. Likewise, while urging the Department to

conclude that the dumping of the subject merchandise would continue or

recur if the orders were revoked, RBC claims that dumping margins have

continued to exist above the de minimis level since the issuance of the

orders. (See May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of RBC at 4 and 5.)

With respect to the import volumes of the subject merchandise,

while insisting that the consideration of the import volumes is

irrelevant because dumping of the subject merchandise did not cease

after the issuance of the orders, Torrington and MPB argue that the

post-order declines in import volumes of the subject merchandise

provide additional support for their claim that resumption of dumping

is likely were the orders revoked. (See May 3, 1999, Substantive

Response of Torrington at 9.) Between 1988 and 1989, Torrington and MPB

indicate that imports of the BBs from the United Kingdom fell 32

percent in value. Id. Also, Torrington and MPB state that the post-

order import value of CRBs in each year is lower than the pre-order

import value thereof. Id. at 10.

On the other hand, NSK argues that revocation of the orders is not

likely to lead to the recurrence of dumping of the subject merchandise.

(See April 30, 1999, Substantive Response of NSK at 3.) In support of

its contention, NSK appears to argue that the dumping margins of the

subject merchandise have declined over time and the market share of the

subject merchandise remained steady.8 Id. at 14. NSK

advocates that the Department's methodology in calculating the

weighted-average dumping margins in the original investigation was

flawed,9 that the domestic interested parties lack domestic

industry support (therefore their opposition to revocation of the

[[Page 60329]]

order is insufficient),10 and that conditions and trends in

the U.S. market for bearings are such that producers of the domestic

like product prefer the U.S. domestic production.11

Therefore, by incorporating all the above factors, the only logical

conclusion that can be drawn, according to NSK, is that continuation or

recurrence of dumping is unlikely if the orders are revoked.

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\8\ However, when NSK presents information that is relevant with

respect to the sunset reviews, it does not put forth order-specific

factual information or evidence. In other words, NSK only makes

general references. For example, NSK states that the dumping margins

for many of the most significant foreign producers and exporters

have decreased over time (NSK's substantive response at 5) and that

dumping margins from various countries have declined while subject

importations have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S.

market share (id. at 14).

\9\ In effect, NSK is asking the Department to retroactively

apply a post-World Trade Organization (``WTO'') methodology to a

pre-WTO antidumping duty determination.

\10\ But see section 351.281(e)(i)(A) of the Sunset Regulation.

A complete substantive response from at least one domestic

interested party would suffice for the Department to conclude that

the domestic interested parties have provided adequate response to a

notice of initiation. Also, see adequacy section of this notice.

\11\ As a result, NSK argues that it has expanded its BB

production facilities in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Clarinda, Iowa,

and has built new facilities in Franklin and Liberty, Indiana.

According to NSK, these were expanded to strengthen its

competitiveness as a U.S. producer of BBs in the U.S. market.

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Similarly, NHBB argues that revocation of the orders would not

result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. (See NHBB's May 3,

1999, substantive response at 5-6.) According to NHBB,

internationalization of ball bearing production a significant portion

of bearing producers from the countries subject to antidumping duty

orders have production facilities in the United States. Thus, NHBB

claims that the profit motive of those foreign parent companies would

preclude any future dumping because such dumping would undercut the

U.S. domestic price structure, thereby causing injury to the very

industry of which foreign owners are a part. Id NHBB also asserts that

import volumes have not declined since the time of the original

investigation while, at the same time, dumping margins have declined

significantly. Id.

Barden, on the other hand, notes that the likely effects of

revocation would be a status quo at current low dumping margins or even

further reduced de minimis levels. (See May 3, 1999, Substantive

Response of Barden at 5.) Barden acknowledges that the value and volume

of imports of the subject merchandise declined substantially

immediately after the issuance of the orders and that its export volume

of the subject merchandise in 1998 is much less than that of 1987

before the order. Id. at 6.

As for the consideration of the weighted-average dumping margins,

although Barden deems its most recently determined dumping margin of

2.89 percent statistically insignificant and de minimis,12

Barden does not negate outright the existence of current dumping margin

(Id. at 5.) nor does Barden try to argue that dumping of the subject

merchandise did not exist for any other investigated or reviewed

periods.

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\12\ However, Barden's suggestion that 2 percent is the de

minimis standard in an administrative review does not comport with

law. In an administrative review, the Department will treat as de

minimis any weighted-average dumping margin that is less than 0.5 %

ad valorems or the equivalent specific rate. See section

351.106(c)(1) of the Sunset Regulations.

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Barden spends the majority of its resources and energy trying to

convince the Department why Barden would not increase, and perhaps may

even decrease, its dumping margins in the future. In support of this

notion, Barden stresses that it has shifted and continues to shift its

production of the subject merchandise to its U.S. facilities, that its

dumping margins have been decreasing over time, that it should not bear

the margins from the original investigation (because it did not

participate in the original investigation), that removing home market

sales below the cost of production in the profit component of

constructed value is utterly improper and bears absolutely no relation

to the actual, profit realized on sales of foreign like product, and

that the subject merchandise, which is a highly differentiated and

mature industrial product with multifarious application, tends to breed

a certain percentage of random or intrinsic dumping. Id. at

6-9.

In its rebuttal, Torrington argues that Barden's own admission of

decreased import volumes of the subject merchandise after the issuance

of the orders strongly supports Torrington's suggestion that

continuation or recurrence of dumping is likely should the Department

revoke the orders. (See May 12, 1999, Rebuttal Comments of the

Torrington at 14.) Torrington again insists that continued dumping at

levels above de minimis since the issuance of the orders should lead

the Department to determine that recurrence or continuation of dumping

likely. Id.

Similarly, in its rebuttal comments, RBC argues that the Department

should determine that revocation of the orders is likely to lead to the

continuation or recurrence of dumping of the subject merchandise

because the import volumes of the subject merchandise substantially

declined and dumping continued after the issuance of the orders. (See

May 12, 1999, Rebuttal Comments of RBC at 2-3.)

NSK argues, while insisting that the Department should conduct a

full sunset review rather than an expedited (120-day) review, that the

major domestic bearing companies do not agree with the position of

Torrington and RBC that revocation of the orders would be likely to

lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.13 (See NSK's

May 12, 1999, Rebuttal Comments at 2-3.) NSK also claims that

Torrington's other-factors argument, which was primarily based on a

history of below-cost-sales argument, is irrelevant to the instant

review.14 Id. at 6-7. Last, NSK insists that the lack of

industry support should be a crucial factor for the Department to

consider in determining the sunset review.15 Id. 7-8.

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\13\ NSK identifies NHBB, NTN Bearing Corporation of America,

FAG Bearings Corporation, Koyo Corporation of U.S.A., NTN Bearing

Corporation of America, American NTN Bearing Manufacturing

Corporation, and NTN-BCA Corporation as opposing Torrington's view.

NSK deems this list overwhelming evidence of record that recurrence

or continuation is not likely if the orders were revoked.

\14\ According to NSK, the fact that British producers/

manufacturers could sustain or even increase their exports of the

subject merchandise to the United States while, at the same time,

substantially reducing the weighted-average dumping margins would

indicate that a history of below-the-cost-sale argument does not

amount much.

\15\ See, however, footnote 11, supra.

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In its rebuttal, Barden notes that, between 1993 and 1997, imports

of the subject merchandise increased 50 percent and that dumping

margins have declined over time. (See May 6, 1999, Rebuttal Submission

of Barden, at 4.) Barden argues that the Department should acknowledge

that, during the above five-year period, imports of the subject

merchandise have increased or remained stable and that dumping margins

have steadily decreased. Id. at 6. Therefore, should the orders be

revoked, Barden contends, dumping is not likely to recur or continue.

Id.

As indicated in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

SAA at 890, and House Report at 63-64, the Department considers whether

dumping continued at any level above de minimis after the issuance of

the order. If companies continue dumping with the discipline of an

order in place, the Department may reasonably infer that dumping would

continue were the discipline removed. After examining the published

findings with respect to the weighted-average dumping margins in

previous administrative reviews, the Department agrees with the

domestic interested parties that the weighted-average dumping margins

at levels above de minimis have persisted over the life of the orders

and currently remain in place for all U.K. producers and exporters of

the subject merchandise, in general, and Barden, in

particular.16

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\16\ See footnote 2 and 3, supra. The relevant rates for Barden

in the BB order and the subsequently administrative reviews are as

follows: all others-rate for BBs in the order--54.27; first review--

14.73; second review--0.85; third review--7.57; fourth review--4.65;

fifth review--1.48; sixth review--did not participate; seventh

review--3.99; eighth review--6.63; ninth review--2.89.

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[[Page 60330]]

In addition, consistent with section 752(c) of the Act, the

Department also considered the volume of imports before and after the

issuance of the orders. The data supplied by the domestic interested

parties and those of the United States Census Bureau IM146s and the

Commission Data indicate that, since the imposition of the orders, the

import volumes of the subject merchandise have declined substantially.

Although the import volumes of the subject merchandise during the

period 1994-1998 have stabilized and shown an increasing trend, as

Barden argued in its substantive response, the highest volume since the

issuance of the orders, that of 1997, is still well below the pre-order

import volume. (See May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of Barden at 6.)

Therefore, the Department determines that the import volumes of the

subject merchandise decreased significantly after the issuance of the

orders.

Given that dumping has continued over the life of the orders and

that import volumes of the subject merchandise decreased significantly

after the issuance of the orders, the Department agrees with

Torrington, MPB, and RBC that dumping is likely to continue if the

orders were revoked.

Insofar as the Department made this determination based on the fact

that dumping continued at levels above de minimis and that the import

volumes of the subject merchandise declined substantially after the

issuance of the orders, it is not necessary for the Department to

address Torrington's arguments regarding a history of below-cost-sales

of the subject merchandise in the British market, NSK's contention that

the U.S. market conditions and trends are such that future dumping of

the subject merchandise is not likely, NHBB's claim that the shifts of

production facilities by respondent interested parties and their

consequent profit motive preclude future dumping, and Barden's

stipulations that the exports of the subject merchandise invariably

engender a certain percentage of random or intrinsic dumping, nor is it

necessary for the Department to discuss any effects thereof upon this

finding.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will

normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in

the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for

companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not

begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department will

normally provide a margin based on the all-others rate from the

investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)

Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated

margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty-absorption

determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy

Bulletin.)

The Department, in its notice of the antidumping duty orders on

antifriction bearings from the U.K., established both company-specific

and all-others weighted-average dumping margins for the subject

merchandise from the United Kingdom (54 FR 20910, May 15,

1989).17 Since the antidumping orders, we have determined

twice that duty absorption has occurred with respect to NSK/RHP and

Barden's exports of the subject merchandise.18

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\17\ See footnote 1, supra.

\18\ See footnote 3, supra.

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In their substantive response, at 13-16, Torrington and MPB argue

that the likely-to-prevail dumping margins, if the order were revoked,

are either the ones determined for each company in the original

investigation or the most recently calculated margins adjusted to

incorporate duty-absorption rates, whichever are larger. Similarly, RBC

raises the duty-absorption issue; however, in the end, RBC just

advocates that the Department should apply the margins from the

original investigation. (See May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of RBC

at 6.)

NSK advocates that the Department should reject the weighted-

average dumping margins determined in the original investigation and

should instead calculate the likely-to-prevail margins based on the

average-to-average methodology.19 (See NSK's substantive

response at 5 and 7.) NSK argues that, if the Department follows NSK's

suggestion and use the average-to-average method, the Department would

find that the likely-to-prevail dumping margins would be de

minimis.20 Id.

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\19\ As for reasons, NSK claims that the Department departed

from its standard procedure in the investigation in order to

complete the case in a fair and timely manner, that the Department's

liberal usage of best information available seriously skewed the

results of the investigation, and that the Department did not use an

average-to-average methodology in calculating the margins. However,

see the SAA at 891. (The SAA explicitly and unequivocally prohibits

the Department, in a sunset review, from calculating margins except

under the most extraordinary circumstances.)

\20\ According to NSK, this would result for many of the

interested parties that export most, if not all, the ball bearings

from relevant countries. Therefore, the Department is not even sure

whether British producers/manufacturers, such as Barden, are

included in NSK's argument.

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NHBB insists that it would be illogical for respondent companies

with such significant investments in the United States to undercut

their interests in the United States by dumping in the future. (See

NHBB's May 3, 1999, substantive response at 6-8.) Also, NHBB claims

that, since the dumping margins have declined significantly from the

margins found in the original investigation, the Department should not

report margins from the original investigation. Id. Furthermore, in

light of changes of methodology in calculating antidumping duty margins

to reflect the WTO agreements, NHBB believes that it would be unfair to

use the rates found in the original investigation, which preceded the

WTO agreements. Id.

Also, NHBB argues that the Department arbitrarily presumed the

existence of duty absorption in the 1995-1996 and 1997-1998

administrative reviews, thereby making it impossible for respondent

interested parties to rebut. To wit, NHBB contends that the

Department's current approach pertaining to duty absorption is

unreasonable, illogical, circular, groundless, without statutory

support, and therefore contrary to law. Id. at 8-10.

Meantime, in its substantive response, at 9, Barden argues that the

dumping margin that is likely to prevail is either 2.89 percent found

in the most recent administrative review or one that is even lower

because its dumping margins have been declining while at the same time

its export of the subject merchandise remained steady.

In its rebuttal, Torrington argues that Barden's suggestion to

select a more recently calculated margin ignores the Department's duty-

absorption findings. (See Torrington's rebuttal response at 4 and 14.)

Moreover, even in the absence of duty-absorption findings,21

Torrington contends that the Department should select the investigation

margins as the margins which would likely to prevail because such

margins reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the

orders in place. Id.

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\21\ In its rebuttal, Torrington rejects respondent's arguments,

which denounce and reject the Department's duty-absorption findings,

by denoting the duty-absorption principle delineated in the Sunset

Policy Bulletin.

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Similarly, RBC argues, in its rebuttal, that the Department should

choose the margins from the original investigations because such

margins are the best gauge for understanding the behavior of

[[Page 60331]]

exporters without the discipline of an order in place. (See RBC's

rebuttal response at 3.) Also, RBC asserts that Barden's attempt to

find a defect in the Department's calculation in determining weighted-

average is not persuasive. Id.

NSK, in its rebuttal comments at 3-5, disagrees with Torrington's

suggestion that the Department should consider the duty-absorption

findings. Instead, NSK urges the Department to refrain from utilizing

information obtained from the duty-absorption investigations which,

according to NSK, violated the antidumping law.22

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\22\ NSK deems the Department' duty-absorption investigation

ultra vires. Furthermore, NSK argues that, even if the Department

was authorized to conduct such duty-absorption investigations, the

Department's use of presumption in the investigation did not fulfill

its legal obligations. Thus, NSK argues that the Department should

wait until the court has ruled on this matter.

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Similarly, in its rebuttal response at 2-6, Barden opposes

Torrington and RBC's suggestion that the Department choose the margins

from the original investigations as the likely-to-prevail margins

because the margins determined in the original investigations are

obsolete. Barden argues that because its dumping margins have declined

and its imports have increased or remained stable, the Department

should use more recently calculated margins. Barden asserts further

that, in any event, there is no mandatory requirement that these

original margins be selected as likely-to-prevail margins were the

orders revoked--in short, the Department should not presume that

dumping would continue at the original investigation margins. Id. In

addition, Barden reiterates that the duty-absorption findings should

not be used by the Department because the findings were not calculated

in accordance with the statue.23

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\23\ See May 6, 1999, Barden's Rebuttal to Domestic Party

Substantive Responses at 5. Barden considers the Department's

interpretation, expressed in the Sunset Policy Bulletin, too

expansive, thus unlawful in applying ``transition orders'' under

751(c)(6)(C) of the Act to duty absorption. In other words, Barden

argues that the Department should not have done the duty-absorption

investigations in administrative reviews that were initiated in 1996

and 1998. In addition, Barden argues that the methodology chosen by

the Department in calculation of duty-absorption rates is arbitrary

and capricious. Last, Barden notes its objection to the duty

absorption findings is pending with the Court of International

Trade. Therefore, it contends that the Department should not use the

duty-absorption findings in the instant sunset reviews. Id. at 9-11.

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We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will

provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the

rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of

the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of

a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration

of duty-absorption determinations.

With respect to NSK and NHBB's argument concerning the magnitude of

the margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do

find that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of

dumping. Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is

best reflected by the dumping margins we calculated in the original

investigations. Specifically, the Department finds that there is no

basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of

subsequent changes in methodology. Since such changes do not invalidate

margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping

margins from the original investigation are the only rates which

reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order,

regardless of the methodology used to calculate that margin or the use

of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the Act).

With respect to Barden's argument that we should use a more

recently calculated margin, we do not agree. By Barden's own admission,

the import volume of the subject merchandise declined immediately after

the imposition of the orders and thereafter stabilized at the lower

level.24 Moreover, during the period 1994 through 1995, the

increases of Barden's export of the subject merchandise to the United

States correspond with increased weighted-average dumping margins found

by the Department. For example, after steady decline of the weighted-

average margins, in the 1995-1996 administrative review, the Department

found that Barden's margin increased from 1.48 percent to 3.99 percent.

Coincidently, during the same period, Barden's exports increased.

Similarly, Barden's further increase (from 3.99 to 6.63 percent) of the

weighted-average margins during the 1996-1997 administrative review

coincided with further increased imports of the subject merchandise.

However, when Barden's weighted-average dumping margins declined (from

6.63 to 2.89 percent) in the 1997-1998 review, so did the import volume

of the subject merchandise. Thus, Barden's situation does not merit

consideration of a more recently calculated margin.

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\24\ Barden notes that import figures are leveling off over the

past five years after falling immediately after the issuance of the

orders (see May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of Barden at 6).

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Accordingly, but for the consideration of duty-absorption findings,

the Department would have determined that the likely-to-prevail dumping

margins for all British producers/exporters are those from the original

investigation were the orders revoked.25

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\25\ As for Barden's argument that it was not party to the

original investigation, and therefore should not be subjected to the

margins from the original investigation, section II.B.1 of the

Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that for companies that did not

begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department

normally will provide a margin based on the all-others rate from the

investigation. Inasmuch as Barden did not participate in the

original investigation, the all-others rate from the original

investigation, as amended, is the appropriate one to report to the

Commission as the rate that is likely to prevail if the order is

revoked.

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Section II.B.3.b of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the SAA at 885, and

the House Report at 60, provide that, if the Department has found duty

absorption, the Department normally will provide to the Commission the

higher of the margin that the Department otherwise would have reported

to the Commission or the most recent margin for that company adjusted

to account for the Department's findings on duty absorption. The

Department explained that it normally will adjust a company's most

recent margin to reflect its findings on duty absorption by

incorporating the amount of duty absorption to those sales for which

the Department found duty absorption.

In the most recent review,26 the Department found that

duty absorption existed on Barden's exports of BBs (19.43 percent) and

NSK-RHP's exports of BBs (31.46 percent) and CRBs (47.88 percent) to

the United States. Consistent with the statute and the Sunset Policy

Bulletin, the Department will notify the Commission of its findings

regarding such duty absorption for the Commission to consider in

conducting its sunset review.

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\26\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

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Consistent with the Sunset Policy Bulletin, we adjusted the most

recent margins to account for duty-absorption findings: 27

for Barden, the adjusted rate for BBs is 3.45 percent; for NSK/RHP, the

adjusted rates for BBs and CRBs are 27.63 percent and 72.65 percent,

respectively. (See October 4, 1999, Memorandum to File Regarding

Calculation of the Likely to Prevail

[[Page 60332]]

Margins.) For Barden's BBs, the all-others rate from the original

investigation is higher than the absorption-adjusted rate. For NSK/RHP,

the rate from the original investigation is higher than the absorption-

adjusted rate for BBs, whereas the opposite is true for CRBs.

Therefore, we will report to the Commission the rates as contained in

the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

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\27\ With respect to methodology, also see Preliminary Results

of Sunset Review: Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, 64 FR

46651 (August 26, 1999), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset

Review: Brass Sheet and Strip from Germany, 64 FR 49767 (September

14, 1999).

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Final Results of Review

Based on the above analysis, the Department finds that the

revocation of the antidumping duty orders would likely lead to

continuation or recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Margin (percent)

Manufacturer/ Exporter -------------------------

BBs CRBs

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Barden........................................ 54.27 ...........

NSK/RHP....................................... 44.02 72.65

All others.................................... 54.27 43.36

------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility

concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under

APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.

Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or

conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to

comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable

violation.

This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance

with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 99-28780 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P