Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings From France

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-427-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings

From France

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews:

Antifriction Bearings from France.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the U.S. Department of Commerce (``the

Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders

on ball bearings, cylindrical roller bearings, and spherical plain

bearings (collectively, ``antifriction bearings'') from France pursuant

to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the Act'').

On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and an adequate

response filed on behalf of a domestic interested party and inadequate

responses from respondent interested parties in each of these reviews,

the Department conducted expedited sunset reviews. As a result of these

reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty

orders would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at

the levels indicated in the Final Result of Review section of this

notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Martha V. Douthit or Melissa G.

Skinner, Office of Policy for Import Administration, International

Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone (202) 482-5050

or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of

the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews

are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')

Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516

(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998)

in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to

the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the

Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of

Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty

Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy

Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by these orders are antifriction bearings

(``AFBs'') from France, which include ball bearings (``BBs''),

cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs''), and spherical plain bearings

(``SPBs'') and parts thereof from France. For a detailed description of

the products covered by these orders,

[[Page 60322]]

including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations, refer to

the notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews on AFBs from

Japan, publishing concurrently with this notice.

History of the Orders

On May 3, 1989, the Department issued a final determination of

sales at less than fair value on imports of AFB's from France (54 FR

19092). On May 15, 1989, the Department published in the Federal

Register (54 FR 20902) the antidumping duty orders on the subject

merchandise.

As part of these antidumping duty orders, the Department

established a estimated weighted-average dumping margin for three

respondents, Compagnie d'Applications Mecaniques S.A. (SKF), Societe

Nouvelle de Roulements (SNR), and Roulements S.A. (INA), and an ``all

others'' rate.1 There have been several administrative

reviews of these orders.2 In the 1995-1996, 1997-1998

administrative reviews, the Department found that antidumping duties

were being absorbed.3

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\1\ In the Antidumping Duty Orders of AFBs from France, dumping

margins for French producers and exporters of BBs, CRBs, and SPBs

ranged from 11.03 percent to 66.42 percent.

\2\ 1. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 56 FR 31748 (July 11, 1991).

2. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and

Parts Thereof from France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992). 3. Final Results

of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of

an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993). 4. Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial

Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of

Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995). 5.

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and

the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews, 61 FR

66472 (December 17, 1996), as corrected, Antifriction Bearings

(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom;

Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Partial

Termination of Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 149 (January 2, 1997).

6. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and

Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the

United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 62 FR 2081 (January 15, 1997). 7. Antifriction Bearings

(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United

Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews,

62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997). 8. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than

Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom;

Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR

33320 (June 18, 1998). 9. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999)

\3\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore; Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,

1997), Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania,

Singapore; Sweden and the United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 61963 (November 20,

1997), Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania,

Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

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The antidumping duty orders remain in effect for all French

producers and exporters of AFBs from France.

Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the

antidumping duty orders on AFBs from France pursuant to section 751(c)

of the Act. By April 16, 1999, within the deadline specified in section

351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulation, we received notices of

intent to participate from the following parties: Link-Belt Bearing

Division (``Link-Belt''); The Torrington Company (``Torrington'') and

MPB Corporation (``MPB''); Roller Bearing Company of America, Inc.

(``RBC''); New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB'') 4;

and NSK Corporation (``NSK''). Each of these parties claimed status as

domestic interested parties on the basis that they are a domestic

producer, manufacturer, or wholesaler of one or more of the products

subject to these orders.5

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\4\ NHBB states that it is affliated with the following

respondent producers, exporters, and importers: Minebea Co., Ltd.,

NMB Singapore Ltd., Pelmec Industries (Pte.) Ltd., and NMB

Corporation.

\5\ Torrington, RBC, and NHBB filed with respect to BBs, CRBs,

and SPBs. Link-Belt filed with respect to BBs and CRBs. MPB filed

with respect to BBs and CRBs. NSK filed with respect to BBs only.

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Within the deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under

section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received

complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested

parties, with the exception of Link-Belt. In addition, SKF France and

Sarma (collectively ``SKF'') notified the Department that they would

not file a substantive response in the sunset reviews of the AFB

orders. We received rebuttal comments from Torrington, MPB, and NSK on

May 12, 1999, within the deadline.

On May 21, 1999, we informed the International Trade Commission

(``Commission'') that, on the basis of inadequate responses from

respondent interested parties, we were conducting expedited sunset

reviews of these orders consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2).

(See Letter to Lynn Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations

from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)

In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the

Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a

review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,

1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the

sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from France are

extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion

of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28,

1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.6

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\6\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,

et. al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year

Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).

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Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department

conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the

antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in

making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-

average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent

reviews and import volume of the subject merchandise for the period

before the issuance of the antidumping duty order and the period after

the issuance of the antidumping duty order. Pursuant to section

752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall provide to the Commission

the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail if the order is revoked.

The Department's determinations concerning adequacy, continuation

or recurrence of dumping, and magnitude of the margin are discussed

below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to adequacy, the

continuation or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin

are addressed in the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to

conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we

received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington, supporting our

determination to conduct expedited

[[Page 60323]]

reviews.7 On June 10, 1999, NHBB and NSK Corporation also

submitted comments on whether expedited sunsets review were warranted.

In their submissions, NHBB and NSK assert that most of the domestic

interested parties that submitted substantive responses favor

revocation of the various orders on antifriction bearings. These

parties also offered new argument regarding the likely effect of

revocation of the orders.

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\7\ These companies filed one submission providing comments on

all ongoing sunset reviews covering bearings.

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The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of

an order, however, is not a consideration in the Department's

determination of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the

Department's determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in

its regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic

interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing

a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or

legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic

industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the

statutory provision that, if there is no domestic industry interest in

continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order

automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at 46) makes clear that the

purpose of adequacy determinations in sunset reviews is for the

Department to determine whether to issue a determination based on the

facts available without further fact-gathering. Further, the statute,

at section 751(c)(1), specifies that the Department is to determine

whether revocation of an order would be likely to lead to continuation

or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) specifies that the Department

is to consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the

investigation and subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports

of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after

the issuance of the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history

accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically

the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.

103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1

(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the

Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on

methodological and analytical issues, including the basis for

likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

Department indicates that determinations of likelihood will be made on

an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department

indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an

antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence

of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis

after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise

ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated

after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject

merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).

In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above,

section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall

determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation

or recurrence of dumping where a respondent interested party waives its

participation in the sunset review. In the instant review, the

Department did not receive a response from any respondent interested

party. Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset

Regulations, this constitutes a waiver of participation.

In their substantive responses, Torrington, MPB, and RBC argue that

revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise

would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. All three point out

that, because dumping continued at levels above de minimis after the

issuance of the orders, therefore, a consideration of import volumes is

not necessary.

Nonetheless, using pre-and post-order import statistics for

complete unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only

product category for which full time series data are available on a

consistent basis, Torrington and MPB argue that post-order volumes are

significantly lower than pre-order volumes. Torrington and MPB also

assert that the same decline is evident from slightly aggregated value

data covering CRBs. Based on the continued existence of dumping margins

and the declining trend in imports after the imposition of the orders,

Torrington and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to consider

other factors. However, in this regard, Torrington and MPB observe

that, in each administrative review, the Department has found French

producers selling below the cost of production.

NHBB argues that, given the ``internationalization of operations''

and the large percentage of foreign ownership of U.S. based companies,

dumping would not be likely if the orders were revoked because any such

dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic price structure, thus causing

injury to the very industry of which foreign owners are a part. In

addition, NHBB argues that the downward trend in the margins coupled

with the change in the Department's margin-calculation methodology,

brought about by the URAA, results in margins that are de minimis. NHBB

asserts that dumping margins have declined significantly and trade data

generally show that import volumes have not declined since the time of

the investigations. For these reasons, NHBB claims that the decline in

dumping margins and imports show that French producers do not need to

dump to maintain U.S. market share. Therefore, it concludes, revocation

of the orders will not likely lead to dumping.

NSK also argues that dumping margins have declined significantly

and that imports have declined since the issuance of the antidumping

duty orders. NSK explains that the fact that dumping margins have

declined and imports remain at or around 20 percent of market share

demonstrates that foreign companies do not have to dump if the orders

were revoked. NSK adds that other factors for the Department's

consideration in support of revocation of these orders include the lack

of industry support and a change in the U.S. bearings industry.

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the

Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its

consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic

producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From

Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty

Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800

(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that

domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers

and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the

maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that

other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import

volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good

cause'' to consider such additional factors, which in these reviews,

they have not done.

As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins

after the order is highly probative of the

[[Page 60324]]

likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. If companies

continue to dump with the discipline of an order in place, the

Department may reasonably infer that dumping would continue if the

discipline of the order were removed. Further, as noted above, in

determining whether revocation of an order is likely to lead to

continuation or recurrence of dumping, the Department considers the

margins determined in the investigation and subsequent administrative

reviews and the volume of imports.

In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above de minimis

continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given

that dumping has continued over the life of the order and respondent

interested parties waived their participation, we determine that

dumping is likely to continue if the orders were revoked. Because we

based this determination on the fact that dumping continued at levels

above de minimis, we have not addressed the comments submitted by

Torrington and MPB with respect to ``good cause'' and sales below the

cost of production nor have we addressed the arguments of other

interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that,

consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department normally will

provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that

is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior or exporters

without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not

specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping

until after the order was issued, we normally will provide a margin

based on the ``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See section

II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this policy

include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where

appropriate, and consideration of duty-absorption determinations. (See

sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)

In their substantive responses, Torrington and MPB argue that the

margins that are likely to prevail should the orders be revoked are the

dumping margins found for each company in the original investigations

(as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual administrative

reviews), including margins based on best information available, except

where the most current margin, increased by the Department's duty-

absorption determination, exceeds the original investigation margin.

With respect to BBs, RBC argues that the margins from the original

investigation are the margins likely to prevail were the order to be

revoked.

NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the

orders were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it

would be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings

investments to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB

argues that the Department should not report margins from the original

investigations. In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA

provides that, in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on

a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance

is where, as in the bearings cases, dumping margins have declined over

the life of the order and imports have remained steady or increased.

Additionally, NHBB argues that, because the structure of the U.S.

domestic industry that exists today bears little resemblance to the

industry when the antidumping duty orders were imposed in 1989, the

rates from the original investigation are inappropriate as indicators

of the rates that would be found upon revocation. Finally, NHBB argues

that, in light of changes in the methodology used to calculate

antidumping duty margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of

margins calculated by the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair

and contrary to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

Similarly, NSK Corporation argues that the margins likely to

prevail would be de minimis. As support, NSK Corporation argues that,

were the orders not in existence, the Department would apply the

average-to-average methodology used in an investigation as opposed to

the transaction-to-average methodology common to administrative reviews

to measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK Corporation

believes that any margin found would be below the two percent de

minimis level applicable in investigations. NSK Corporation argues

further that, the Department's unorthodox approach during the original

investigation, plus the liberal use of best information available,

skewed the results of the original investigation seriously rendering

those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin

likely to prevail were the orders to be revoked.

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other

parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the

selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's

duty-absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin,

Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear ``

normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the only

margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline

of the order and rejection of margins from administrative reviews in

which the Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue

that the two-percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset

reviews. Further, they contend that there is no authority which would

authorize or justify the rejection of the investigation rate on the

basis of the particular methodology used at the time of the

investigation. Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims

that more recent margins should be used based on declining margins

accompanied by steady or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue

that it is the responsibility of such claimants to provide information

regarding companies' relative market share. Since no such information

was provided they contend, the Department should not accept these

assertions since imports of certain BBs have actually declined since

the imposition of the order.

In its rebuttal comments, NSK Corporation repeats its point that

dumping margins have declined significantly over time with respect to

imports of BBs while, at the same time, importations have remained

steady or around 20 percent of the U.S. market, showing that foreign

exporters do not have to dump to maintain market share.8

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\8\ As support, NSK Corporation cites to The Economic Effects of

Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension

Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26--14-31 (June

1995).

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We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will

provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the

rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of

the order. With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of

the margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do

find that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of

dumping. Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is

best reflected by the dumping margins we calculated in the original

investigation. Specifically, the Department finds that there is no

basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of

[[Page 60325]]

subsequent changes in methodology since changes do not invalidate

margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping

margins from the original investigation are the only rates which

reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order,

regardless of the methodology used to calculate that margin or the use

of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the Act). As

noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of a more

recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of

duty-absorption determinations.

With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin

likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that

dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports

have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provides no evidence

to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the course of sunset

proceedings indicates that imports have remained steady or increased.

In fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB indicate that 1998

import volumes of the subject merchandise are more than 8.1 percent

below pre-order volumes (see Torrington and MPB's Substantive Response

at 10). Regardless of the level of imports, dumping margins at levels

above de minimis continue, as do imports of the subject merchandise.

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, consistent with the SAA at 889-90

and the House Report at 63, we indicated that in cases where declining

(or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady or increasing

imports, it may be more appropriate to use a more recently calculated

rate. Such a rate would reflect the fact that companies do not have to

dump to maintain market share in the United States and, therefore, that

dumping is less likely to continue or recur if the order were revoked.

Alternatively, if a company chooses to increase dumping in order to

increase or maintain market share, the Department may provide the

Commission with a more recently calculated margin for that company.

The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we will entertain

considerations of such fact patterns in response to argument from an

interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of an exporter behavior absent

the discipline of an order, we normally will consider a company's

relative market-share data with such information to be provided by the

parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters

were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific

exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we

expressed a clear preference for market-share information, in past

sunset reviews where market-share information was not available, we

relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and

after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited

Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December

8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron

Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of

China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).

Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of the

orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market

remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular

company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time

maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic arguments

may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping

coupled with increased market share. In the instant proceedings, we did

not receive any company-specific arguments.

Additionally, the SAA at 885 and the House Report at 60, provide

that duty absorption is a strong indicator that the current dumping

margins calculated in reviews may not be indicative of the margins that

would exist in the absence of an order. Since, once an order is

revoked, the importer could achieve the same pre-revocation return on

its sales by lowering its prices in the United States in the amount of

the duty that was previously being absorbed. Therefore, in the Sunset

Policy Bulletin we indicated that, in the case of duty absorption, we

normally will determine that a company's current dumping margin is not

indicative of the margin likely to prevail were the order to be

revoked. Further, we indicated that normally we will provide to the

Commission the higher of (1) the margin that we would otherwise have

reported to the Commission or (2) the most recent margin for that

company, adjusted to account for our findings on duty-absorption. For

purposes of considering duty absorption for these sunset reviews, we

relied on the level of duty absorption found in the administrative

review initiated in 1998. See 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

In their comments, Torrington and MPB argue that the Sunset Policy

Bulletin requires that the Department report to the Commission the

higher of the margin from the original investigation or the margin from

a more recent administrative review adjusted to reflect duty absorption

findings. Although we found that duties were being absorbed during the

1998 administrative review (64 FR 35590) for BBs and CRBs from France

by SKF and SNR, our calculations found the adjusted margins to be less

than the rates from the original investigation.

As noted above, there is no evidence on the record to indicate that

the margin of dumping for any particular producer/exporter decreased at

the same time that it was increasing or maintaining U.S. market share

nor is there evidence on the record to indicate corresponding increases

in dumping margins and exports. Therefore, we are relying on the

margins from the original investigations as probative of the behavior

of producers/exporters without the discipline of the orders.

Based on the above analysis, we will report to the Commission the

margins indicated in the Final Results of the Review section of this

notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation

of the antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation

or recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Margin

Manufacturers/ Exporters (percent)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ball Bearings:

INA.................................................... 66.18

SKF (including all relevant affiliates)................ 66.42

SNR.................................................... 56.50

All others............................................. 65.13

Cylindrical Roller Bearings:

INA.................................................... 11.03

SNR.................................................... 18.37

All others............................................. 17.31

Spherical Plain Bearings

SKF.................................................... 39.00

All others............................................. 39.00

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This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility

concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under

APO in accordance with section 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's

regulation. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials

or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure

to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is sanctionable

violation.

These five-year (``sunset'') reviews and notice are published in

accordance

[[Page 60326]]

with sections 751(c) and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 99-28779 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P