Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings From Germany

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-428-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings

From Germany

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews:

antifriction bearings from Germany.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the

Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders

on ball bearings, cylindrical roller bearings, and spherical plain

bearings (collectively, ``antifriction bearings'') from Germany

pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the

Act''). On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and an

adequate response filed on behalf of a domestic interested party and an

inadequate response from respondent interested parties in each of these

reviews, the Department decided to conduct expedited reviews. As a

result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the

antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to the continuation or

recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Results of

Review section of this notice.

For Further Information Contact: Mark D. Young or Melissa G. Skinner,

Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-

3207 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

Effective Date: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of

the Act. The Department's procedures for conducting sunset reviews are

set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews

of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 (March 20,

1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR part 351 (1999) in general.

Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to the

Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the Department's

Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year

(``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders;

Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy

Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by these reviews are antifriction bearings

(``AFBs'') from Germany, which include ball bearings (``BBs''),

cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs''), and spherical plain bearings

(``SPBs'') and parts thereof. For a detailed description of the

products covered by these orders, including a compilation of all

pertinent scope determinations, refer to the notice of final results of

expedited sunset reviews on AFBs from Japan, published concurrently

with this notice.

History of the Orders

On May 3, 1989, the Department issued final determinations of sales

at less than fair value (``LTFV'') with respect to imports of AFBs from

Germany.1 The antidumping duty orders on AFBs were issued by

the Department on May 15, 1989, and the dumping margins that were found

in the final determinations of sales at LTFV were affirmed.2

Since the imposition of these orders, the Department has conducted nine

administrative reviews.3 The orders remain in effect for all

manufacturers and exporters of the subject merchandise. In the final

results of the 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 administrative reviews of these

antidumping duty orders, the Department found that antidumping duties

were being absorbed by German producers of AFBs.4 This

review covers all producers and exporters of AFBs from Germany.

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\1\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From the Federal Republic of Germany, May 3, 1989, 54 FR

18992.

\2\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and

Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic

of Germany; Antidumping Duty Order, May 15, 1989 54 FR 20900.

\3\ See Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and

Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic

of Germany; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,

64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999); 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); 62 FR 54043

(October 17, 1997); 62 FR 2081(January 15, 1997); 61 FR 66472

(December 17, 1996); 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995); 58 FR 39729

(July 26, 1993); 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); and 56 FR 31692 (July

11, 1991).

\4\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997) (1995-96); and Final Results

of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 Fed. Reg. 35590 (July

1, 1999) (1997-98).

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Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the

antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Germany, pursuant to section

751(c) of the Act. By April 16,1999, within the deadline specified in

section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulation, we received notices

of intent to participate from the following parties: Link-Belt Bearing

Division (``Link-Belt''); The Torrington Company (``Torrington''); MPB

Corporation (``MPB''); Roller Bering Company of America (``RBC''); New

Hampshire Ball Bearing, Inc. (``NHBB''); and NSK Corporation (``NSK

Corporation''). Each of these parties claimed status as domestic

interested parties on the basis that they are a domestic producer,

manufacturer, or wholesaler of one or more of the products subject to

these orders.5

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\5\ Torrington, RBC, and NHBB filed with respect to BBs, CRBs,

and SPBs. Link-Belt and MPB filed with respect to BBs and CRBs. NSK

Corporation filed with respect to BBs only.

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Within the deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under

section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received

complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested

parties with the exception of Link-Belt. In addition, SKF USA and SKF

GmbH (collectively ``SKF'') notified the Department that they would not

file a substantive response in the sunset reviews of the AFBs orders.

Finally, we received a complete substantive response on behalf of FAG

Kugelfischer Georg Schafer AG and FAG Bearings Corporation

(collectively ``FAG''). FAG asserts that it is a foreign manufacturer

and exporter of BBs and CRBs and is, therefore, an interested party

within the meaning of section 771(9)(A) of the Act. We received

rebuttal comments from Torrington and MPB, RBC, NHBB, NSK Corporation,

and FAG on May 12, 1999, within the deadline. On May 21 and May 24,

1999, we informed the International Trade Commission (``Commission'')

that, on the basis of inadequate response from respondent interested

parties, we were conducting expedited sunset reviews of these orders

[[Page 60310]]

consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letters to Lynn

Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations, USITC, from Jeffrey

A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)

In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the

Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a

review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,

1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the

sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Germany are

extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion

of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28,

1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.6

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\6\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,

et al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year

Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).

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Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department

conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the

antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in

making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-

average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent

reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the

period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty

order. Pursuant to section 752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall

provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail

if the order is revoked.

The Department's determinations concerning adequacy, continuation

or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin are discussed

below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to adequacy, the

continuation or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin

are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to

conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we

received comments on behalf of Torrington and MPB supporting our

determination to conduct expedited reviews. NHBB and NSK Corporation

also submitted comments on whether expedited sunsets review were

warranted. In their submissions, both parties assert that most of the

domestic interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in

favor of revocation of the various orders on antifriction bearings.

These parties also offered new argument regarding the likely effect of

revocation of the orders.

The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of

an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination

of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's

determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its

regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic

interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing

a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or

legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic

industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the

statutory provision that, if there is no domestic industry interest in

continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order

automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at 46) makes clear that the

purpose of adequacy determinations in sunset reviews is for the

Department to determine whether to issue a determination based on the

facts available without further fact-gathering. Further, the statute,

at section 751(c)(1), specifies that the Department is to determine

whether revocation of an order would be likely to lead to continuation

or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) specifies that the Department

is to consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the

investigation and subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports

of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after

the issuance of the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history

accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically

the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.

103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1

(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the

Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on

methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for

likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on

an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department

indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an

antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence

of dumping when (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis

after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise

ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated

after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject

merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).

In their joint substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that

revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise

would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this

conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de

minimis levels after the issuance of the orders. RBC also argues that,

given that dumping margins continued to exist after the issuance of the

orders, the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to

continue or recur if the orders were revoked. Torrington and MPB also

assert that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because

dumping continued. Using pre- and post-order statistics for complete

unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only category for

which statistics are available on a consistent basis, they argue that

post-order declines in import volumes provide strong additional support

for a determination that dumping is likely to continue or recur were

the orders revoked. In conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no

``good cause'' exists to consider other factors. However, if the

Department were to consider other factors, they contend, it should

acknowledge that, in each review period, it has found that home market

sales by German producers were below the cost of production requiring

that such sales be disregarded for purposes of determining formal

market value or normal value.

NHBB and NSK Corporation assert that revocation of the orders is

not likely to result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB

bases its assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S.

domestic price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of

which foreign owners are a part. NSK Corporation supports its assertion

on the basis that the margin of dumping would be de minimis. In

addition, the respondent interested party in these sunset reviews of

BBs and CRBs, FAG, asserts that revocation of the order would lead to a

continued decrease in dumping, as evidenced by the decline in the level

of dumping in recent years. FAG bases its conclusion

[[Page 60311]]

on the following factors: the decrease in value and volume of exports

of the subject merchandise; its significant reduction of its U.S.

resales of subject merchandise; its shift in production to its U.S.

facilities and its ability to source product from third countries that

are not covered by the antidumping duty orders; and decreasing dumping

margins.

Furthermore, the respondent argues that the range of subject

merchandise sold by FAG and other large bearing companies consists of

thousands of different models, sold in differing quantities and into

many different market sectors, tends to breed a certain percentage of

``random dumping.'' FAG uses charts to support its argument that the

analysis of the top ten sales for BBs and CRBs in the 1994-1995 and

1995-1996 reviews alone account for nearly 50 percent of the dumping

margins in each case.7 They argue that these sales were only

ten of tens of thousands of sales made during a full review period and

this would tend to negate any argument that there was chronic pattern

of dumping by FAG. Therefore, it asserts that these dumped sales were

extrapolated onto the wider selling and pricing patterns of the company

as a whole, which led to arbitrary and unfair results. FAG notes

further that the ``random dumping'' can explain the inevitable

percentage of dumping that recurs from year to year, as evidenced by

the fact that none of the large bearing manufacturers/exporters have

achieved a de minimis margin in the past nine reviews.

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\7\ See May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of the Respondent at

Appendix 5 Chart 3.

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In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the

Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its

consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic

producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From

Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty

Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800

(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that

domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers

and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the

maintenance of the orders. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that

other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import

volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good

cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews,

they have not done.

Torrington and MPB argue further that FAG's admission that its

imports and sales have decreased strongly supports a determination that

FAG cannot resume selling at pre-order volumes without resorting to

dumping. Torrington and MPB also note that FAG's reliance on current

margins to predict likely post-revocation margins ignores the fact that

the investigation margins are the only margins which reflect the

exporter's behavior without the discipline of the orders. Finally,

Torrington and MPB note that if FAG's ``random dumping'' is in fact

``inevitable,'' then under FAG's own argument dumping will continue.

In its rebuttal comments, FAG concurs with the substantive response

of NSK Corporation which pointed out that the Department's methodology

for calculating dumping margins in an investigation has fundamentally

changed since the original LTFV investigation in AFBs ten years ago.

FAG argues further that Torrington, MPB, and RBC erred in their

reasoning to use the original investigation margins for purposes of

these sunset reviews. According to FAG, the analyses presented by these

domestic parties were not supported by empirical data, and that they

erroneously presumed that even if dumping continued at levels above de

minimis, and import volume decreased, there is a prima facie assumption

of continued dumping at investigation levels and a mandatory

requirement that these original margins be adopted.

FAG maintains that import levels for the subject merchandise

increased 40 percent between fiscal years 1993 and 1997, and that

dumping margins have decreased. Where margins have not declined over

time, FAG contends, an explanation exists insofar as the Department

changed its methodologies during the 1994-1995 administrative review.

In light of the above, FAG argues, the Department should calculate

projected dumping rates based on more recent reviews.

As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins

after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation

or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the

discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer

that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were

removed. Further, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of

an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping,

the Department considers the margins determined in the investigation

and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports.

Whatever relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible

disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market

might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has

continued over the life of the orders.

In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above de minimis

continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given

that dumping has continued over the life of the orders, the Department

determines that dumping is likely to continue if the orders were

revoked. Because we have based this determination on the fact that

dumping continued at levels above de minimis, we have not addressed the

comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with respect to ``good cause''

and sales below the cost of production, nor have we addressed the

arguments of other interested parties regarding the condition of the

U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that,

consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department will normally

provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that

is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters

without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not

specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping

until after the order was issued, the Department will normally provide

a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See

section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this

policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where

appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations. (See

sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)

In their joint substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that

the margins that are likely to prevail should the orders be revoked are

the dumping margins found for each company in the original

investigations (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual

administrative reviews), including margins based on best information

available, except where the most current margin, increased by the

Department's duty absorption determination, exceeds the original

investigation margin. With respect to BBs, RBC argues that the margins

from the original investigation are the margins likely to prevail were

the order revoked.

[[Page 60312]]

NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the

orders were revoked are de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would

be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments

to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that

the Department should not report margins from the original

investigation, asserting that the SAA provides that, in certain

instances, it is more appropriate to rely on a more recently calculated

margin. NHBB also asserts that one such instance is where, as in the

AFBs cases, dumping margins have declined over the life of the orders

and imports have remained steady or increased. Additionally, NHBB

argues that, because the structure of the U.S. domestic industry that

exists today bears little resemblance to the industry when the

antidumping duty orders were imposed in 1989, the rates from the

original investigation are inappropriate as indicators of the rates

that would be found upon revocation. Finally, NHBB argues that, in

light of changes in the methodology used to calculated antidumping duty

margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by

the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary

to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

Similarly, NSK Corporation and FAG argue that the margins likely to

prevail are de minimis. As support, NSK Corporation argues that, were

the orders not in existence, the Department would apply the average-to-

average methodology used in an investigation as opposed to the

transaction-to-average methodology common to administrative reviews to

measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK Corporation

states that it believes any margin found would be below the two-percent

de minimis level applicable in investigations. NSK Corporation argues

further that the Department's unorthodox approach during the original

investigation, plus the liberal use of best information available,

skewed the results of the original investigation seriously, rendering

those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin

likely to prevail were the orders revoked. Finally, NSK Corporation

also argues that dumping margins have declined over time with respect

to importations of BBs while, at the same time, importations have

remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market. As support, it

cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty

Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-334, at

14-26--14-31 (June 1995).

FAG points out that 751(a)(4) of the Act permits the Department to

conduct a duty absorption inquiry during any administrative review

initiated two years or four years after the publication of an

antidumping duty order. Notwithstanding this provision, FAG notes that

the Department conducted duty absorption inquiries in the 1995-1996 and

1997-1998 administrative reviews, and, therefore, its duty absorption

inquiry is unlawful and cannot be used.

In addition to the aforementioned argument, FAG challenges the

methodology chosen by the Department to calculate duty absorption

rates, stating that it was arbitrary and capricious, as well as

contrary to language found in 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(4). FAG asserts that

the Department has merely calculated the percentage of FAG's U.S.

affiliate's sales with dumping margins versus total sales and concluded

that this figure demonstrates duty absorption within the meaning of the

statute. FAG claims that there is no connection between the percentage

of sales of a U.S. importer with dumping margins and any alleged duty

absorption by the affiliated foreign producer or exporter.

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other

parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the

selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's duty

absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, Torrington

and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear `` normal

reliance on the margins from the investigation as the only margins that

reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order

and rejection of margins from administrative reviews in which the

Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue that the

two-percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews.

Further, they contend that there is no authority which would authorize

or justify the rejection of the investigation rates on the basis of the

particular methodology used at the time of the investigations.

Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims that more recent

margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady

or increasing imports, it is the responsibility of such claimants to

provide information regarding companies' relative market share. Since

no such information was provided, the Department should not accept

these assertions since imports of certain BBs have actually declined

since the imposition of the order.

In its rebuttal comments, FAG notes that Torrington erred in

relying on the highest dumping margins calculated in each review period

rather than the average. Furthermore, FAG argues that Torrington relied

upon margins calculated using facts available. FAG asserts that, if the

Department assesses margin levels based on actual calculated dumping

rates, taken as averages for each review period, it will determine

that, but for changes in calculation methodologies, margins have

decreased over time.

We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will

provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the

rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of

the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of

a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration

of duty absorption determinations.

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with

the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in

cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady

or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects

that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the

United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue

or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses

to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the

Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated

margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we

will entertain such considerations in response to argument from an

interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent

the discipline of an order, we will normally consider the company's

relative market share, with such information to be provided by the

parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters

were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific

exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we

expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past

sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we

relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and

after the issuance of the

[[Page 60313]]

order. See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Stainless

Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December 8, 1998), and Final

Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron Construction Castings

From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of China, 64 FR 30310

(June 7, 1999).

In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an

order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.

Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the

magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific

information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of

the orders while at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market

remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular

company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time

maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument

may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping

coupled with increased market share.

FAG provided company-specific value and volume information

concerning its exports of BBs and CRBs, and it argued that exports of

the subject merchandise have generally decreased since the inception of

this case in 1987. The Department can confirm that current exports of

the subject merchandise are indeed lower than pre-order exports. FAG's

decrease in exports of the subject merchandise to the United States

over the life of the orders indicate that FAG is unable to sell subject

merchandise in the United States at pre-order volumes without dumping.

Therefore, absent such evidence, we find no reason to deviate from our

standard practice of using the margin we calculated in the original

investigation.

In the final results of the 1995/96 8 and 1997/98

administrative reviews of these orders, the Department found that

antidumping duties have been absorbed by foreign producers. With

respect to the 1997/98 administrative reviews we made the following

determinations 9:

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\8\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997) (1995-96).

\9\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999) (1997-98).

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ball bearings Percent of sales

------------------------------------------------------------------------

SKF 3.17

FAG 10.31

INA 9.14

Cylindrical Roller Bearings:

SKF 33.52

FAG 24.59

Torrington Nadellage 0.26

INA 9.24

Spherical Plain Bearings:

INA 3.53

SKF 20.31

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consistent with the statute and the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

Department will notify the Commission of its findings regarding such

duty absorption for the Commission to consider in conducting a sunset

review.

Additionally, the Sunset Policy Bulletin refers to the SAA at 885

and the House Report at 60 and provides that, where the Department has

found duty absorption, the Department normally will provide to the

Commission the higher of the margin that the Department otherwise would

have reported or the most recent margin for that company, adjusted to

account for the Department's findings on duty absorption. In this case,

the margins adjusted to account for our duty absorption findings are

less than the margins we would otherwise report to the Commission.

Therefore, the Department agrees with Torrington, MPB, and RBC

concerning the margin likely to prevail if the order were to be

revoked. We find that the dumping margins calculated in the original

investigation are the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior

of exporters without the discipline of the orders. Consistent with the

Sunset Policy Bulletin, we determine that the margins we calculated in

the original investigation are probative of the behavior of German

producers and exporters of BBs, CRBs, and SPBs if the order were

revoked. Therefore, we will report to the Commission the company-

specific and ``all others'' rates from the original investigation

contained in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation

of the antidumping duty orders would likely lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping at the margins indicated below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Margin

Manufacturer/ Exporter (percent)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ball Bearings:

SKF.................................................... 132.25

FAG.................................................... 70.41

INA.................................................... 31.29

GMN.................................................... 35.43

All Others............................................. 68.89

Cylindrical Roller Bearings:

SKF.................................................... 76.27

FAG.................................................... 52.43

INA.................................................... 52.43

All Others............................................. 55.65

Spherical Plain Bearings:

SKF.................................................... 118.98

FAG.................................................... 74.88

All Others............................................. 114.52

------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility

concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under

APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.

Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or

conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to

comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable

violation.

These five-year (``sunset'') reviews and notice are in accordance

with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 99-28776 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P