Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Cylindrical Roller Bearings From Italy

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-475-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Cylindrical Roller

Bearings From Italy

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset review: cylindrical

roller bearings from Italy.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the

Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order

on cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs'') from Italy (64 FR 15727)

pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the

Act''). On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and adequate

substantive comments filed on behalf of domestic interested parties and

inadequate response from respondent interested parties, the Department

determined to conduct an expedited review. As a result of this review,

the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty order

would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the

levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,

Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-

6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of

the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews

are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')

Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516

(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351(1998) in

general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to

the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the

Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3-- Policies Regarding the Conduct of

Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty

Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy

Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by this order are CRBs and parts thereof from

Italy. For a detailed description of the products covered by this

order, including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations,

refer to the notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews on

antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804), publishing concurrently

with this notice.

History of the Order

The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'')

determination on CRBs from Italy on May 3, 1989.1 In this

determination, the Department published a weighted-average dumping

margin of 212.45 percent for SKF Industrie S.p.A. (``SKF''). The

Department also published an all others rate of 212.45 percent. Since

that time, the Department has conducted nine administrative

reviews.2 This sunset

[[Page 60292]]

review covers imports from all Italian producers and/or exporters of

CRBs, excluding those imports from SKF.3 We note that, to

date, we have made no duty absorption findings with regards to CRBs

from Italy.4

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\1\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Spherical Plain and Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; and Final Determination of

Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value; Spherical Plain Bearings and

Parts Thereof, From Italy, 54 FR 19096 (May 3, 1989). This

determination was subsequently amended. See Notice of

Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,

Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy

and Sweden, 54 FR 20910 (March 8, 1993).

\2\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 56 FR 31751 (July 11, 1991);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From Germany; et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755 (June 17, 1997);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand,

and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 32969 (July 24, 1992);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United

Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 59080 (December 14, 1992);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23, 1998); Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in

Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From Italy; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review, 58 FR 53914 (October 19, 1993); Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France and Italy; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 58 FR 65576 (December 15, 1993);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 18877 (April 16, 1998);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From Germany, Italy, and Sweden; Amended Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 38369 (July 16,

1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From Italy; Amended Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 70100 (December 18, 1998);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From Italy; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews and Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR

10959 (February 28, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany and Italy; Amended

Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 60 FR

31142 (June 13, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from Italy; Amended Final Results

of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 60 FR 33791 (June 29,

1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore,

Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative

Reviews, 61 FR 66472 (December 17, 1996); Antifriction Bearings

(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany,

Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom: Amended Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 3003 (January 21,

1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and

the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 62 FR 2081(January 15, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other

Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, and Singapore; Amended Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, (March 26, 1997);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore,

Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997); Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the

United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other

Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy, Romania,

and the United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 40878 (July 31, 1998).

\3\ The order was revoked with respect to SKF. See Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

Italy; Final Results of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in

Part of Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995).

\4\ The Department has issued duty absorption findings for two

producers and/or exporters of ball bearings from Italy in the 1995-

1996 and 1997-1998 administrative reviews. However, no duty

absorption findings have been issued with respect to CRBs from

Italy. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,

1997); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64

FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

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Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the

antidumping duty order on CRBs from Italy (64 FR 15727), pursuant to

section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received Notices of Intent to

Participate on behalf of The Torrington Company (``Torrington'') and

MPB Corp. (``MPB''), and on behalf of the Roller Bearing Company of

America (``RBC''), New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB''), and

Link-Belt Bearing Division (``Link-Belt'') on April 16, 1999, within

the deadline specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset

Regulations. We received a complete substantive response from the

domestic interested parties on May 3, 1999, within the 30-day deadline

specified in the Sunset Regulations under section 351.218(d)(3)(i). We

did not receive a complete substantive response from Link-Belt.

Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB claimed interested party status

under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C) as U.S. manufacturers of CRBs. In addition,

Torrington stated that it was the petitioner in the original

investigation and has participated actively in all administrative

reviews of this order. MPB stated that it participated in the

Commission's injury investigation. RBC and NHBB stated that they had

not previously participated in any segment of this proceeding before

the Department.

The Department also received a complete substantive response from

FAG Italia S.p.A and FAG Bearings Corporation (collectively, ``FAG'')

on May 3, 1999. FAG stated that it participated in the original

investigation and each subsequent administrative review of the

Department's proceeding on CRBs from Italy.

Based on the information submitted by FAG concerning the volume and

value of its exports and volume of imports as reported in U.S. Census

Bureau IM146 Reports, the Department determined that FAG's exports of

subject merchandise to the United States accounted for less than 50

percent of the total volume of subject merchandise to the United States

over the five calendar years preceding the initiation of this sunset

review.5 Therefore, respondent interested parties provided

inadequate response to the notice of initiation and, pursuant to 19 CFR

351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct an

expedited, 120-day, review of this order.6

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\5\ FAG stated that it has not sold any CRBs in the United

States over the past five years.

\6\ On May 24, 1999, the Department informed the Commission

that, on the basis of inadequate response from respondent interested

parties, it was conducting an expedited sunset review of this order

consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn

Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A.

May, Director, Office of Policy.)

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In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the

Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a

review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,

1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the

sunset review of the antidumping duty order on CRBs from Italy is

extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion

of the final results of this review until not later than October 28,

1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.7

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\7\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,

et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year

Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).

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Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department

conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the

antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in

making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-

average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent

reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the

period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty

order, and it shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the

margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.

The Department's determinations concerning continuation or

recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed

below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to

continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin

are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to

conduct an expedited review of this order. On June 10, 1999, we

received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our

determination to conduct an expedited review. NHBB also submitted

comments on whether an expedited sunset review was warranted. In its

submission, it asserts that most of the domestic interested parties

that submitted substantive responses are in favor of revocation of the

Department's various

[[Page 60293]]

antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings. NHBB also offered new

argument regarding the likely effect of revocation of these orders.

The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of

an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination

of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's

determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its

regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic

interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing

a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or

legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic

industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the

statutory provision that if there is no domestic industry interest in

continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order

automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46

(2nd Session 1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy

determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine

whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without

further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1),

specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an

order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the

weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and

subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject

merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of

the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history

accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically

the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.

103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1

(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the

Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on

methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for

likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on

an order-wide basis (see section II.A.3). In addition, the Department

indicated that it will normally determine that revocation of an

antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence

of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis

after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise

ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated

after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject

merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).

In their substantive responses, Torrington and MPB argue that

revocation of the antidumping duty order on the subject merchandise

would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this

conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de

minimis after the issuance of the order. RBC also argues that, given

that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the order,

the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to continue

or recur if the order were revoked. Torrington and MPB assert further

that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because dumping

continued.

Arguing that the Department's import statistics do not permit a

comparison of pre- and post-order import volumes of CRBs, Torrington

and MPB suggest that the Department examine data regarding the import

value of all roller bearings, the narrowest category of products for

which a consistent set of data is available regarding pre- and post-

order imports. Torrington and MPB suggest that these data are

conservative because declines in import volumes could be obscured by

increases in import values and inclusion of non-covered products. They

argue that the data will demonstrate that total import value of CRBs

dropped dramatically following the order, from more than $6 million in

1988 to less than $1 million in 1993 and import values were below 1988

totals in every year until (and including) 1995.8 This data,

they argue, provides strong additional support for a determination that

dumping is likely to continue or recur were the order revoked. In

conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to

consider other factors, such as sales below the cost of production.

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\8\ Torrington and MPB note that imports of CRBs from Italy

increased sharply after 1995, coincident with the revocation of the

order on CRBs exported by SKF. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than

Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final Results

of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty

Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995).

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NHBB assert that revocation of the order is not likely to result in

continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its assertion on the

fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic price structure,

thus causing injury to the very industry of which foreign owners are a

part.

FAG asserts that the dumping margin likely to prevail if the order

were to be revoked would be 0.00 percent, the dumping margin it has

maintained since the 1993-1994 administrative review. With respect to

whether import volumes ceased following the imposition of the order,

FAG states that it has not shipped subject merchandise to the United

States over the past five years. In addition, FAG indicates that total

exports of the subject merchandise from Italy have continued throughout

the life of the order (see May 3, 1999, substantive response of FAG,

Appendix 2).

Torrington and MPB, in their rebuttal comments, state that the

cessation of imports from FAG strongly supports an affirmative

determination of likelihood of dumping in this case. Further,

Torrington and MPB note that the Department's sunset determinations are

made on an order-wide basis.

In addition, Torrington and MPB assert that the Department should

take into account the submitter's affiliation in its consideration of

comments of various parties filing as domestic producers. Further,

citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Thailand; Final Results

of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty Review and Revocation of

Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800 (May 8, 1996), they argue

that the Department has recognized that domestic producers who are

affiliated with subject foreign producers and exporters do not have a

common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the maintenance of the order.

Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that other parties' comments

addressing issues other than margins and import volumes should not be

considered unless such parties establish ``good cause'' to consider

such additional factors, which, in these reviews, they have not done.

As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins

after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation

or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the

discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer

that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were

removed. Further, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of

an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping,

the Department considers the margins determined in the

[[Page 60294]]

investigation and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of

imports. Therefore, the arguments of NHBB with respect to the effect

revocation would have on the U.S. market, even if correct, do not rebut

the fact that dumping continues and has continued over the life of the

order.

In the instant proceeding, dumping margins above de minimis

continue to exist for at least one known producer and/or exporter.

Therefore, given that dumping has continued over the life of the order,

the Department determines that dumping is likely to continue if the

order were revoked. Because we have based this determination on the

fact that dumping continued at levels above de minimis, we have not

addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with respect to

``good cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments of other interested

parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will

normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in

the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for

companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not

begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department

normally will provide a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from

the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)

Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated

margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption

determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy

Bulletin.)

The Department, in its LTFV investigation of CRBs from Italy,

published a weighted-average dumping margin of 212.45 percent for SKF.

In addition, the Department also published a weighted-average dumping

margin of 212.45 percent on all other imports of the subject

merchandise from Italy.9 As noted above, the Department has

not issued any duty absorption findings with respect to CRBs from

Italy.

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\9\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Spherical Plain and Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; and Final Determination of

Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value; Spherical Plain Bearings and

Parts Thereof, From Italy, 54 FR 19096 (May 3, 1989). This

determination was subsequently amended. See Notice of

Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,

Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy

and Sweden, 54 FR 20910 (March 8, 1993).

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In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that the

margins likely to prevail are those from the Department's original

investigation. Specifically, Torrington and MPB argue that the dumping

margins found for each company in the original investigation (as

opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual administrative

reviews) are the dumping margins likely to prevail, including margins

based on best information available, except where the most current

margin, increased by the Department's duty absorption determination,

exceeds the original investigation margin. Furthermore, RBC states that

the margins from the original investigation are most probative of the

rates likely to prevail as they are the only calculated rates that

reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order

in place.

NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the order

were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would

be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments

to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that

the Department should not report margins from the original

investigation. In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA

provides that, in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on

a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance

is where, as in the antifriction bearings cases, dumping margins have

declined over the life of the order and imports have remained steady or

increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light of changes in the

methodology used to calculated antidumping duty margins introduced by

the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by the Department prior to

the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary to the WTO Agreement on

Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade 1994.

As noted above, FAG argues that the dumping margin likely to

prevail if the order were revoked is its current dumping margin of 0.00

percent. FAG states that it has remained at a 0.00 percent dumping

level since the 1993-1994 administrative review period. FAG states

further that this is due principally to the absence of any imports of

Italian CRBs by FAG Bearings Company. Lastly, FAG states that, were the

dumping order revoked, there would be no change in FAG's current

sourcing and resale patterns of Italian CRBs.

Torrington and MPB, in their rebuttal comments, stated that FAG's

reliance on its current rate ignores the fact that current rates do not

reflect the behavior of producers and/or exporters without the

discipline of the antidumping duty order. As such, they contend, the

Department should not rely on this current rate.

Additionally, in their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue

that other parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies

regarding the selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the

Department's duty absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy

Bulletin, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are

clear--normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the

only margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the

discipline of the order and rejection of margins from administrative

reviews in which the Department found duty absorption. Torrington and

MPB argue that there is no authority which would authorize or justify

the rejection of the investigation rate on the basis of the particular

methodology used at the time of the investigation. Additionally, with

respect to claims that more recent margins should be used based on

declining margins accompanied by steady or increasing imports,

Torrington and MPB argue that it is the responsibility of such

claimants to provide information regarding companies' relative market

share. Since no such information was provided, they contend the

Department should not accept these assertions since imports of CRBs

from Italy have actually declined since the imposition of the order.

We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will

provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the

rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of

the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of

a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration

of duty absorption determinations.

With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the

margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find

that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best

reflected by the Department's dumping margins we calculated in the

original investigation. Specifically, the Department finds that there

is no basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of

subsequent changes in methodology since such changes do not invalidate

margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping

margins from the original investigation are the only rates which

reflect the behavior of exporters without the

[[Page 60295]]

discipline of the order, regardless of the methodology used to

calculate that margin or the use of best information available (see

section 752(c)(3) of the Act).

With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin

likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that

dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports

have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provided no evidence

to support these claims and nothing submitted in the course of this

sunset proceeding indicates that imports have remained steady or

increased. In fact, FAG submitted information claiming that it ceased

exporting subject merchandise, indicating that import volumes may have

decreased. Furthermore, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB

indicate that post-order import volumes (1989-1998) are lower than pre-

order volumes (1989) in each year.

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with

the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in

cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady

or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects

that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the

United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue

or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses

to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the

Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated

margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we

will entertain such considerations in response to arguments from an

interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent

the discipline of an order, we normally will consider the company's

relative market share, with such information to be provided by the

parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters

were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific

exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we

expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past

sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we

relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and

after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited

Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December

8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron

Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of

China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).)

In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an

order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.

Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the

magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific

information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of

the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market

remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular

company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time

maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument

may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping

coupled with increased market share.

With respect to FAG's arguments concerning the dumping margin

likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. FAG participated in and

had shipments during both the 1991-1992 and 1993-1994 administrative

reviews. The SAA at 890 and the House Report at 63-64 state that the

cessation of imports after the order is highly probative of the

likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. Furthermore, if

imports ceased after the order is issued, it is reasonable to assume

that exporters could not sell in the United States without dumping and

that, to reenter the U.S. market, they would have to resume dumping. As

such, we find that the 0.00 percent dumping margin we calculated for

FAG for the 1993-1994 administrative review is not probative of the

dumping margin likely to prevail if the order were to be revoked. The

cessation of imports by FAG following the establishment of this margin

strongly suggests to the Department that FAG cannot sell subject

merchandise in the United States without dumping. Consequently, we find

that the dumping margins calculated in the original investigation are

the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior of exporters

without the discipline of the order. Consistent with the Sunset Policy

Bulletin, we determine that the margins we calculated in the

Department's original investigation is probative of the behavior of

Italian producers and exporters of CRBs if the order were revoked.

Therefore, we will report to the Commission the ``all others'' rate

from the original investigation contained in the Final Results of

Review section of this notice.10

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\10\ The Department calculated only one company-specific rate in

the original investigation. The order was subsequently revoked with

respect to this one company, SKF (see Antifriction Bearings (Other

Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final

Results of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of

Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995). Because of

this, the Department will report to the Commission only the ``all

others'' rate from the original investigation.

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Final Results of Review

As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of

the antidumping duty order would likely lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping at the margin listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manufacturer/ Exporter Margin (percent)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

SKF........................................ Revoked

All Other Producers/Exporters.............. 212.45

------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility

concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under

APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.

Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or

conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to

comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable

violation.

This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance

with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 99-28773 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P