Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Ball Bearings From Singapore

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-559-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Ball Bearings From

Singapore

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce

ACTION: Notice of final Results of expedited sunset review: ball

bearings from Singapore.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the

Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order

on ball bearings (``BBs'') from Singapore (64 FR 15727) pursuant to

section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the Act''). On

the basis of a notice of intent to participate and adequate substantive

comments filed on behalf of domestic interested parties and inadequate

response (in this case, no response) from respondent interested

parties, the Department determined to conduct an expedited review. As a

result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of the

antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Results of

Review section of this notice.

For Further Information Contact: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,

Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-

6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of

the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews

are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')

Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516

(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998)

in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to

the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the

Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of

Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty

Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy

Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by this order are BBs and parts thereof from

Singapore. For a detailed description of the products covered by this

order, including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations,

refer to the notice of final results of expedited sunset review on

antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804), publishing concurrently

with this notice.

History of the Order

The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'')

determination of BBs from Singapore on May 3, 1989.1 In this

determination, the Department published a weighted-average dumping

margin of 25.08 percent for NMB/Pelmec Singapore (``NMB/Pelmec''). The

Department also published an all others rate of 25.08. Since that time,

the Department has conducted eight administrative reviews.2

This sunset review covers imports from all Singaporean producers and/or

exporters of BBs. With respect to duty absorption, the Department

issued a duty absorption finding for NMB/Pelmec in the 1995-1996

administrative review.3

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\1\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:

Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3,

1989).

\2\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:

Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3,

1989); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From Singapore; Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review, 56 FR 31759 (July 11, 1991); Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

Germany; et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755 (June 17, 1997); Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other

Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the

United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 32969 (July 24, 1992); Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23, 1998); Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in

Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 18877 (April 16, 1998);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From France, et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, Partial Termination of Administrative

Reviews, and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty Orders, 60 FR

10900 (February 28, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial

Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of

Antidumping Duty Orders, 61 FR 66472 (December 17, 1996);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From Singapore: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review, 61 FR 68228 (December 27, 1996); Antifriction

Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom;

Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 2081

(January 15, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and

Singapore; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews; 62 FR 14391 (March 26, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other

Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043

(October 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore; Sweden and the United Kingdom; Amended Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 61963

(November 20, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 33320

(June 18, 1998).

\3\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,

1997).

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Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the

antidumping duty order on BBs from Singapore (64 FR 15727), pursuant to

section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received Notices of Intent to

Participate on behalf of The Torrington Company (``Torrington''), MPB

Corp. (``MPB''), the Roller Bearing Company of America (``RBC''), NSK

Corp. (``NSK''), New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB'') and Link-

Belt Bearing Division (``Link-Belt'') on April 16, 1999, within the

deadline specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset

Regulations. We received a complete substantive response from

Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB on May 3, 1999, within the 30-day

deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under section

351.218(d)(3)(i). The Department received the complete substantive

response from NSK on April 30, 1999. The Department did not receive a

[[Page 60288]]

complete substantive response from Link-Belt.

Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB claimed interested party status

under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C) as U.S. manufacturers of BBs. NSK claimed

interested party status under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9). In addition,

Torrington stated that it was the petitioner in the original

investigation and has participated actively in all administrative

reviews of this order. MPB stated that it had participated in the

International Trade Commission's (the ``Commission'') injury

investigation. RBC and NHBB stated that they have not participated

previously in any segment of this proceeding before the Department. We

did not receive a substantive response from any respondent interested

party to this proceeding. As a result, pursuant to 19 CFR

351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct an

expedited, 120-day, review of this order.4

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\4\ On May 21, 1999, we informed the Commission that, on the

basis of inadequate response from respondent interested parties, we

were conducting an expedited sunset review of this order consistent

with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn

Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A.

May, Director, Office of Policy.)

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In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the

Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a

review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,

1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the

sunset review of the antidumping duty order on BBs from Singapore is

extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion

of the final results of this review until not later than October 28,

1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.5

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\5\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,

et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year

Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).

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Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department

conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the

antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in

making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-

average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent

reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the

period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty

order, and it shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the

margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.

The Department's determinations concerning continuation or

recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed

below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to

continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin

are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to

conduct an expedited review of this order. On June 10, 1999, we

received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our

determination to conduct an expedited review. NHBB and NSK also

submitted comments on whether an expedited sunset review was warranted.

In their submissions, both parties assert that most of the domestic

interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in favor of

revocation of the Department's various antidumping duty orders on

antifriction bearings. These parties also offered new argument

regarding the likely effect of revocation of these orders.

The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of

an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination

of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's

determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its

regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic

interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing

a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or

legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic

industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the

statutory provision that if there is no domestic industry interest in

continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order

automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46

(2nd Session 1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy

determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine

whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without

further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1),

specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an

order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the

weighted average dumping margins determined in the investigation and

subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject

merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of

the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history

accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically

the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.

103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1

(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the

Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on

methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for

likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on

an order-wide basis (see section II.A.3). In addition, the Department

indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an

antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence

of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis

after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise

ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated

after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject

merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).

In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above,

section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall

determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation

or recurrence of dumping where a respondent interested party waives its

participation in the sunset review. In the instant review, the

Department did not receive a response from any respondent interested

party. Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset

Regulations, this constitutes a waiver of participation.

In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that

revocation of the antidumping duty order on the subject merchandise

would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this

conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de

minimis after the issuance of the order. RBC also argues that, given

that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the order,

the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to continue

or recur if the order were revoked. Torrington and MPB assert further

that an examination of import

[[Page 60289]]

volumes is not necessary because dumping continued.

Should the Department decide to consider import volumes, Torrington

and MPB assert that the data will demonstrate that 1998 import volumes

of the subject merchandise are more than nineteen percent below the

1988 pre-order volumes. Using pre-and post-order statistics for

complete unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only

category for which statistics are available on a consistent basis, they

argue that post-order declines in import volumes provide strong

additional support for a determination that dumping is likely to

continue or recur were the order revoked. In conclusion, Torrington and

MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to consider other factors,

such as sales below the cost of production.

NHBB and NSK assert that revocation of the order is not likely to

result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its

assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic

price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of which

foreign owners are a part. NSK appears to support its assertion on the

basis that the margin of dumping has fallen during the life of the

order.

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the

Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its

consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic

producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From

Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty

Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800

(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that

domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers

and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the

maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that

other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import

volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good

cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews,

they have not done.

As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins

after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation

or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the

discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer

that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were

removed. Thus, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of an

order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, the

Department considers the margins determined in the investigation and

subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. Whatever

relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible

disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market

might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has

continued over the life of the order.

Dumping margins above de minimis continue to exist. Therefore,

given that dumping has continued over the life of the order and

respondent interested parties have waived their right to participate in

this review before the Department, we determine that dumping is likely

to continue if the order were revoked. Because we have based this

determination on the fact that dumping has continued at levels above de

minimis, we have not addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and

MPB with respect to ``good cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments

of other interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will

normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in

the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for

companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not

begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department

normally will provide a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from

the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)

Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated

margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption

determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy

Bulletin.)

The Department, in the LTFV determination of BBs from Singapore,

published a weighted-average dumping margin of 25.08 for NMB/Pelmec. In

addition, the Department also published a weighted-average dumping

margin of 25.08 percent on all other imports of the subject merchandise

from Singapore.6 As noted above, the Department issued a

duty absorption finding for NMB/Pelmec in the 1995-1996 administrative

review with respect to BBs from Singapore.

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\6\ See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:

Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Singapore, 52 FR 19112 (May 3,

1989).

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In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that the

margins likely to prevail are those from the Department's original

investigation. They also note that the Department issued a duty

absorption finding with respect to BBs from Singapore in the 1995-1996

administrative review and should consider this in determining the

margin likely to prevail. Specifically, Torrington and MPB argue that

the dumping margins found for each company in the original

investigation (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual

administrative reviews) are the dumping margins likely to prevail,

including margins based on best information available, except where the

most current margin, increased by the Department's duty absorption

determination, exceeds the original investigation margin. Furthermore,

RBC states that the margins from the original investigation are most

probative of the rates likely to prevail as they are the only

calculated rates that reflect the behavior of exporters without the

discipline of the order in place.

NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the order

were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would

be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments

to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that

the Department should not report margins from the original

investigation to the Commission. In support of this argument, NHBB

notes that the SAA provides that, in certain instances, it is more

appropriate to rely on a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts

that one such instance is where, as in the antifriction bearings cases,

dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports

have remained steady or increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light

of changes in the methodology used to calculate antidumping duty

margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by

the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary

to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

Similarly, NSK argues that the margins likely to prevail would be

de minimis. As support, NSK argues that, were the order not in

existence, the Department would apply the average-to-average

methodology used in an investigation, as opposed to the transaction-to-

average methodology common to administrative reviews, to

[[Page 60290]]

measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK states that it

believes any margin found would be below the two percent de minimis

level applicable in investigations. NSK argues further that, the

Department's unorthodox approach during the original investigation,

plus the liberal use of best information available, skewed the results

of the original investigation seriously, rendering those results

inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin likely to

prevail were the order revoked. Finally, NSK also argues that dumping

margins have declined over time with respect to BBs while, at the same

time, imports have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market.

As support, it cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and

Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900,

Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 1995).

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other

parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the

selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's duty

absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, Torrington

and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear--normal reliance

on the margins from the investigation as the only margins that reflect

the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order and

rejection of margins from administrative reviews in which the

Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue that the two

percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews.

Further, they contend that there is no authority which would authorize

or justify the rejection of the investigation rate on the basis of the

particular methodology used at the time of the investigation.

Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims that more recent

margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady

or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue that it is the

responsibility of such claimants to provide information regarding

companies' relative market share. Since no such information was

provided, they assert that the Department should not accept these

assertions, given that, imports BBs from Singapore have actually

declined since the imposition of the order.

We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will

provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the

rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of

the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of

a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration

of duty absorption determinations.

With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the

margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find

that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best

reflected by the Department's dumping margins we calculated in the

original investigation. Specifically, the Department finds that there

is no basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of

subsequent changes in methodology. Such changes do not invalidate

margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping

margins from the original investigation are the only rates which

reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order,

regardless of the methodology used to calculate that margin or the use

of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the Act).

With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin

likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that

dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports

have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provided no evidence

to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the course of this sunset

proceeding indicates that imports have remained steady or increased. In

fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB indicate that 1998

import volumes of the subject merchandise are more than nineteen

percent below pre-order volumes. Regardless of the level of imports,

dumping margins above de minimis levels continue as do imports of the

subject merchandise; dumping continues to exist.

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with

the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in

cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady

or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects

that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the

United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue

or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses

to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the

Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated

margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we

will entertain such considerations in response to arguments from an

interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent

the discipline of an order, we will normally consider the company's

relative market share, with such information to be provided by the

parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters

were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific

exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we

expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past

sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we

relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and

after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited

Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December

8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron

Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of

China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).)

In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an

order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.

Therefore, it is appropriate that we base our determinations regarding

the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail on company-specific

information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of

the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market

remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular

company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time

maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument

may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping

coupled with increased market share. In this review, we did not receive

any such company-specific arguments.

As noted above, the Department determined in the final results of

the 1995-1996 administrative review that NMB/Pelmec was absorbing

duties.7 Consistent with the statute and the Sunset Policy

Bulletin, the Department will notify the Commission of its findings

regarding duty absorption when conducting a sunset review.

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\7\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,

1997).

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Additionally, the Sunset Policy Bulletin refers to the SAA at 885

and the House Report at 60 and provides that,

[[Page 60291]]

where the Department has found duty absorption, the Department will

normally provide to the Commission the higher of the margin that the

Department otherwise would have reported or the most recent margin for

that company, adjusted to account for our findings on duty absorption.

In this case, the margins adjusted to account for the Department's duty

absorption findings are less than the margins we would otherwise report

to the Commission.

Therefore, the Department agrees with the domestic interested

parties concerning the margin likely to prevail if the order were to be

revoked. We find that the dumping margins calculated in the original

investigation are the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior

of exporters without the discipline of the order. Consistent with the

Sunset Policy Bulletin, we determine that the margin calculated in the

Department's original investigation is probative of the behavior of

Singaporean producers and exporters of BBs if the order were revoked.

Therefore, we will report to the Commission the company-specific and

``all others'' rates from the original investigation contained in the

Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of

the antidumping duty order would likely lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping at the margin listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Margin

Manufacturer/ Exporter (percent)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

NMB/Pelmec................................................. 25.08

All Other Producers/Exporters.............................. 25.08

------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility

concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under

APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.

Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or

conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to

comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable

violation.

This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance

with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 99-28772 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P