Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Antifriction Bearings From Sweden

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-401-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Antifriction Bearings

From Sweden

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset review:

antifriction bearings from Sweden.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the

Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders

on ball bearings (``BBs'') and cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs'')

(collectively, antifriction bearings) from Sweden (64 FR 15727)

pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the

Act'').1 On the basis of a notice of intent to participate

and adequate substantive comments filed on behalf of domestic

interested parties and inadequate response (in these cases, no

response) from respondent interested parties, the Department determined

to conduct expedited sunset reviews. As a result of these reviews, the

Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty orders on

antifriction bearings from Sweden would be likely to lead to

continuation or recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the

Final Results of Review section of this notice.

\1\ The orders on antifriction bearings from Sweden include CRBs

and BBs. The Department has no antidumping duty order on spherical

plain bearings from Sweden.

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For Further Information Contact: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,

Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-

6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

Effective Date: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of

the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews

are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')

Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516

(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998)

in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to

the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the

Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--``Policies Regarding the Conduct of

Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty

Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy

Bulletin'').

Scope

The products covered by these orders are CRBs and BBs and parts

thereof from Sweden. For a detailed description of the products covered

by these orders, including a compilation of all pertinent scope

determinations, refer to the notice of final results of expedited

sunset review on antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804),

publishing concurrently with this notice.

History of the Order

The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'')

determination of antifriction bearings from Sweden on May 3,

1989.2 In this determination, the Department published a

weighted-average dumping margin of 105.92 percent for BBs for SKF

Sverige AB (``SKF'') and 105.92 percent for all other producers and/or

exporters of Swedish BBs. The Department also published a weighted-

average dumping margin of 13.69 percent for CRBs for SKF and 13.69

percent for all other producers and/or exporters of Swedish CRBs. Since

that time, the Department has conducted eight administrative

reviews.3 These sunset reviews cover

[[Page 60283]]

imports from all Swedish producers and/or exporters of antifriction

bearings. With respect to duty absorption, the Department issued a

duty-absorption finding for SKF for BBs from Sweden in the 1995-1996

administrative review. In addition, the Department determined that SKF

was absorbing duties with respect to BBs and CRBs in the 1997-1998

administrative review.4

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\2\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Needle Roller Bearings, Spherical

Plain Bearings, and Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

Sweden; and Final Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair

Value: Needle Roller Bearings and Spherical Plain Bearings, and

Parts Thereof, From Sweden, 54 FR 19114 (May 3, 1989); Notice of

Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,

Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy

and Sweden, 58 FR 12932 (March 8, 1993).

\3\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Needle Roller Bearings, Spherical

Plain Bearings, and Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From

Sweden; and Final Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair

Value: Needle Roller Bearings and Spherical Plain Bearings, and

Parts Thereof, From Sweden, 54 FR 19114 (May 3, 1989); Notice of

Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,

Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy

and Sweden, 58 FR 12932 (March 8, 1993); Antifriction Bearings

(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Sweden;

Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 56 FR 31762

(July 11, 1991); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany; et al.; Amended Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755

(June 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France; et al.; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24,

1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania,

Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom; Amendment to

Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR

32969 (July 24, 1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 59080 (December 14,

1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)

and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23,

1998); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and

Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July

26, 1993); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany, Italy, and Sweden; Amended

Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR

38369 (July 16, 1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial

Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of

Antidumping Duty Orders, 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995);

Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts

Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and

the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews, 61 FR

66472 (December 17, 1996); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043

(October 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 33320 (June 18,

1998); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64

FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

\4\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,

1997), and Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews,

64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

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Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the

antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings from Sweden (64 FR

15727), pursuant to section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received

Notices of Intent to Participate on behalf of The Torrington Company

(``Torrington''), MPB Corp. (``MPB''), the Roller Bearing Company of

America (``RBC''), the NSK Corp. (``NSK''), New Hampshire Ball

Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB''), and Link-Belt Bearing Division (``Link-

Belt'') on April 16, 1999, within the deadline specified in section

351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulations. We received complete

substantive responses from Torrington, MPB, RBC and NHBB on May 3,

1999, within the 30-day deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations

under section 351.218(d)(3)(i). The Department also received the

complete substantive response from NSK on April 30, 1999. The

Department did not receive a complete substantive response from Link-

Belt.5

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\5\ All participants, except Link-Belt and NSK, filed

substantive responses on both CRBs and BBs from Sweden. Link-Belt

did not file a substantive response to the notice of initiation for

either of these sunset reviews. NSK filed a substantive response on

only BBs from Sweden.

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Torrington, MPB, RBC and NHBB claimed interested-party status under

19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C) as U.S. manufacturers of bearings. NSK claimed

interested-party status under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9). In addition,

Torrington stated that it was the petitioner in the original

investigations and has participated actively in all administrative

reviews of these orders. MPB stated that it had participated in the

International Trade Commission's (``the Commission'') injury

investigations. RBC and NHBB stated that they have not participated

previously in any segment of these proceedings before the Department.

On May 3, 1999, the Department received a waiver of participation

on behalf of SKF. We did not receive a response from any other

respondent interested party to these proceedings. As a result, pursuant

to 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct

expedited, 120-day, reviews of these orders.6

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\6\ On May 24, 1999, we informed the Commission that, on the

basis of inadequate response from respondent interested parties, we

were conducting expedited sunset reviews of these orders consistent

with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn

Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A.

May, Director, Office of Policy.)

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In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the

Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a

review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,

1995). On August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the sunset

reviews of the antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings from

Sweden are extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for

completion of the final results of these reviews until not later than

October 28, 1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the

Act.7

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\7\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,

et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year

Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).

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Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department

conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the

antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in

making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-

average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent

reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the

period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty

order, and shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin

of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.

The Department's determinations concerning continuation or

recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed

below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to

continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin

are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to

conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we

received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our

determination to conduct expedited reviews. NHBB and NSK also submitted

comments on whether expedited sunsets review were warranted. In their

submissions, both parties assert that most of the domestic interested

parties that submitted substantive responses are in favor of revocation

of the orders. These parties also offered new arguments regarding the

likely effect of revocation of the orders.

The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of

an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination

of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's

determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its

regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic

interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing

a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or

legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic

industry

[[Page 60284]]

support during the course of a sunset review (other than the statutory

provision that if there is no domestic industry interest in

continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order

automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46

(2nd Session 1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy

determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine

whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without

further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1),

specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an

order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the

weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and

subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject

merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of

the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history

accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically

the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.

103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1

(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the

Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on

methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for

likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on

an order-wide basis (see section II.A.3). In addition, the Department

indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an

antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence

of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis

after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise

ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated

after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject

merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).

In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above,

section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall

determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation

or recurrence of dumping where a respondent interested party waives its

participation in the sunset review. In the instant reviews, the

Department received a waiver of participation on behalf of SKF and did

not receive a response from any other respondent interested party.

Pursuant to section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset Regulations, this

constitutes a waiver of participation.

In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that

revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise

would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this

conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at above de minimis

levels after the issuance of the orders. RBC also argues that, given

that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the

orders, the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to

continue or recur if the orders were revoked. Torrington and MPB assert

further that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because

dumping continued.

Torrington and MPB contend, however, that should the Department

decide to consider import volumes, Torrington and MPB assert that the

data will demonstrate that 1998 import volumes are significantly below

the 1988 pre-order volumes. Moreover, according to Torrington and MPB,

post-order import volumes are lower than pre-order volumes in every

year since the imposition of the orders. Using pre-and post-order

statistics for complete unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert

is the only category for which statistics are available on a consistent

basis, they argue that post-order declines in import volumes provide

strong additional support for a determination that dumping is likely to

continue or recur were the orders revoked. In conclusion, Torrington

and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to consider other factors,

such as sales below the cost of production.

NHBB and NSK assert that revocation of the orders is not likely to

result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its

assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic

price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of which

foreign owners are a part. NSK appears to support its assertion on the

basis that the margin of dumping has fallen during the life of the

order.

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB assert that the

Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its

consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic

producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From

Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty

Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800

(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that

domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers

and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the

maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that

other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import

volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good

cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews,

they have not done.

As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the

SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins

after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation

or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the

discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer

that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were

removed. Thus, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of an

order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, the

Department considers the margins determined in the investigation and

subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. Whatever

relevance the arguments of NHBB and NSK concerning possible

disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market

might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has

continued over the life of the order.

In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above de minimis

continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given

that dumping has continued over the life of the orders and respondent

interested parties have waived their right to participate in this

review before the Department, we determine that dumping is likely to

continue if the orders were revoked. Because we have based this

determination on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de

minimis, we have not addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and

MPB with respect to ``good cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments

of other interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will

normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in

the final determination in the original

[[Page 60285]]

investigation. Further, for companies not specifically investigated or

for companies that did not begin shipping until after the order was

issued, the Department normally will provide a margin based on the

``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the

Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this policy include the use of a

more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration

of duty-absorption determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the

Sunset Policy Bulletin.)

The Department, in its LTFV determinations, published a weighted-

average dumping margin of 105.92 percent for BBs for SKF and 105.92

percent for all other producers and/or exporters of Swedish BBs. The

Department also published a weighted-average dumping margin of 13.69

percent for CRBs for SKF and 13.69 percent for all other producers and/

or exporters of Swedish CRBs. As noted above, the Department issued

duty-absorption findings for SKF for BBs from Sweden in the 1995-1996

administrative review and for BBs and CRBs in the 1997-1998

administrative review.8

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\8\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,

1997); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64

FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

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In their substantive responses, Torrington and MPB argue that the

margins likely to prevail are those from the Department's original

investigations. They also note that the Department issued a duty-

absorption finding with respect to BBs from Sweden in the 1995-1996

administrative review and should consider this in determining the

margin likely to prevail. Specifically, Torrington and MPB argue that

the dumping margins found for each company in the original

investigation (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual

administrative reviews) are the dumping margins likely to prevail,

including margins based on best information available, except where the

most current margin, increased by the Department's duty-absorption

determination, exceeds the original investigation margin. RBC states

that the margins from the original investigations are most probative of

the rates likely to prevail as they are the only calculated rates that

reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the orders

in place.

NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the

orders were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it

would be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings

investments to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB

argues that the Department should not report margins from the original

investigation. In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA

provides that, in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on

a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance

is where, as in the antifriction bearings cases, dumping margins have

declined over the life of the order and imports have remained steady or

increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light of changes in the

methodology used to calculated antidumping duty margins introduced by

the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by the Department prior to

the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary to the WTO Agreement on

Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade 1994.

Similarly, NSK argues that the margins likely to prevail would be

de minimis. As support, NSK argues that, were the order not in

existence, the Department would apply the average-to-average

methodology used in an investigation, as opposed to the transaction-to-

average methodology common to administrative reviews, to measure the

extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK states that it believes any

margin found would be below the 2.0 percent de minimis level applicable

in investigations. NSK argues further that the Department's unorthodox

approach during the original investigation, plus the liberal use of

best information available, skewed the results of the original

investigation seriously, rendering those results inappropriate

indicators of the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail were the

orders revoked. Finally, NSK also argues that dumping margins have

declined over time with respect to BBs while, at the same time, imports

have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market. As support,

NSK cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing

Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-

334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 1995).

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other

parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the

selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's

duty-absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin,

Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear--

normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the only

margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline

of the order and rejection of margins from administrative reviews in

which the Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue

that the two-percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset

reviews. Further, they contend that there is no authority which would

authorize or justify the rejection of the investigation rate on the

basis of the particular methodology used at the time of the

investigation. Additionally, with respect to claims that more recent

margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady

or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue that it is the

responsibility of such claimants to provide information regarding

companies' relative market share. Since no such information was

provided, they contend, the Department should not accept these

assertions. In fact, they assert, imports of BBs have actually declined

since the imposition of the orders.

We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will

provide the Commission with a margin from the original investigation

because that is the rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent

the discipline of the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy

include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where

appropriate, and consideration of duty-absorption determinations.

With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the

margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find

that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best

reflected by the dumping margins calculated in the original

investigations. Specifically, the Department finds that there is no

basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation due to

subsequent changes in methodology because such changes do not

invalidate margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore,

the dumping margins from the original investigations are the only rates

which reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the

orders, regardless of the methodology used to calculate those margins

or the use of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the

Act).

With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin

likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that

dumping margins have declined over the lives of

[[Page 60286]]

the orders and imports have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB

provided no evidence to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the

course of these sunset proceedings indicates that imports have remained

steady or increased. In fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB

indicate that post-order import volumes (1989-1998) are lower than pre-

order volumes (1989) in each year. Furthermore, the Department finds no

consistent downward trend in dumping margins over the lives of the

orders with respect to either BBs or CRBs from Sweden. Regardless of

the level of imports, dumping margins above de minimis levels continue

as do imports of the subject merchandise; dumping continues to exist.

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with

the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in

cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady

or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects

that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the

United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue

or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses

to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the

Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated

margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we

will entertain such considerations in response to arguments from an

interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent

the discipline of an order, we normally will consider the company's

relative market share, with such information to be provided by the

parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more

recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters

were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific

exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we

expressed a clear preference for market-share information, in past

sunset reviews where market-share information was not available, we

relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and

after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited

Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December

8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron

Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of

China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).)

In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an

order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.

Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the

magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific

information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of

the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market

remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular

company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time

maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic arguments

may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping

coupled with increased market share. In these reviews, we did not

receive any such company-specific arguments.

In their comments, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department

should report to the Commission the higher of the margin from the

original investigation or the margin from a more recent final results

of administrative review, adjusted to reflect the finding of duty

absorption. In the instant cases, the Department agrees. As noted

above, the Department determined in the final results of the 1995-96

administrative review of BBs that SKF was absorbing duties.9

Furthermore, the Department determined in the final results of the

1997-1998 administrative review of BBs and CRBs that SKF was absorbing

duties.10 Therefore, consistent with the statute and the

Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department will notify the Commission of

its findings regarding duty absorption when conducting a sunset review.

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\9\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller

Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,

1997).

\10\ See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

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Additionally, the Sunset Policy Bulletin refers to the SAA at 885

and the House Report at 60 and provides that, where the Department has

found duty absorption, the Department normally will provide to the

Commission the higher of the margin that the Department otherwise would

have reported or the most recent margin for that company, adjusted to

account for the Department's findings on duty absorption. In the case

of BBs from Sweden in both the 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 administrative

reviews, the margins adjusted to account for duty-absorption findings

are less than the margins we would otherwise report to the Commission.

In the case of CRBs from Sweden in the 1997-1998 administrative review,

SKF's margins adjusted to account for duty-absorption findings are

higher than the margins we would otherwise report to the Commission.

Therefore, the Department agrees with the domestic interested

parties concerning the margins likely to prevail. We find that the

dumping margin calculated in the original investigation for BBs is the

only calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters without

the discipline of the order. With respect to CRBs produced and/or

exported by SKF, the Department finds that the margin adjusted for the

Department's duty-absorption findings from the 1997-1998 administrative

review is the most appropriate to report to the Commission. Consistent

with the Sunset Policy Bulletin, we will report to the Commission the

company-specific and ``all others'' rates for BBs from the original

investigation and the adjusted margin from the 1997-1998 administrative

review for CRBs produced and/or exported by SKF. These margins are

contained in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation

of the antidumping duty orders would likely lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Margin

Manufacturer/ Exporter (percent)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

For BBs:

SKF.................................................... 105.92

All Other Producers/Exporters.......................... 105.92

For CRBs:

SKF.................................................... 27.38

All Other Producers/Exporters.......................... 13.69

------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility

concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under

APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.

Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or

conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to

comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable

violation.

[[Page 60287]]

This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance

with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 99-28771 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P