Year 2000 Airport Safety Inspections

SUMMARY: This rule requires operators of certificated airports to

conduct one-time operational readiness checks of certain airfield

equipment and systems on, or shortly after, January 1, 2000, and report

the results of these checks to the FAA. In addition, this rule

temporarily revises the time period these airport operators have to

repair or replace certain emergency equipment. These temporary

requirements are needed to ensure that operators of certificated

airports maintain safety by identifying and addressing any unforeseen

problems with date-sensitive equipment and systems at the earliest

practical time after January 1, 2000.

EFFECTIVE DATES: January 1, 2000 to January 5, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert E. David, Airport Safety and

Operations Division (AAS-300), Federal Aviation Administration, 800

Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-

8721.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Final Rules

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem

and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section

of the FedWorld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: (703)

321-3339) or the Government Printing Office's (GPO) electronic bulletin

board service (telephone: (202) 512-1661).

Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/

avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the GPO's web page at http://

www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently published rulemaking

documents.

Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a

request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking,

ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling

(202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the amendment number or

docket number of this final rule.

Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future

rulemaking documents should request from the above office a copy of

Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution

System, which describes the application procedure.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of

1996, requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for

information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations

within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a

question regarding this document may contact their local FAA official.

Internet users can find additional information on SBREFA in the ``Quick

Jump'' section of the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov and may send

electronic inquiries to the following Internet address: 9-AWA-

[email protected]

Background

On January 1, 2000, many computer systems worldwide could

malfunction or shut down because of the year change from 1999 to 2000.

The problem, often referred to as the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem, is the

result of how computers and other microprocessors have traditionally

recorded and computed dates. Typically, these machines have used two

digits to represent the year, e.g., ``98'' for 1998, to save electronic

storage space and reduce operating costs. However, this format fails to

distinguish the year 2000 (represented as ``00'') from the year 1900.

Software and computer experts are concerned that this could cause

computers and equipment with internal microprocessors to malfunction in

unforeseen ways or to fail completely.

Many airport operators use computers or equipment with embedded

microprocessors to meet certain requirements of Title 14, Code of

Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 139, Certification and Operations:

Land Airports Serving Certain Air Carriers. For example, an operator of

a certificated airport may have computer systems that control when

airfield lighting is turned on, or that control access to the airfield

through vehicle and passenger gates. Safety and maintenance vehicles,

such firefighting trucks, and emergency communications systems may

likewise have computerized systems.

Since October 1998, the FAA has worked with operators of airports

certificated under part 139 to ensure that all airfield equipment and

systems used to comply with part 139 requirements are Y2K compliant, or

that the airport operator has developed an alternative means of

complying with the part 139 requirements. The FAA also formed an

internal Y2K airport team to contact operators of certificated airports

to monitor the Y2K status of each of these operator's systems that are

used to comply with part 139 requirements. This team will continue to

work with the operators of certificated airports throughout the

remainder of 1999 to ensure that the agency is kept informed of the Y2K

status at each part 139 airport.

Despite these efforts, the FAA is concerned that part 139

inspection and reporting requirements will not be adequate to address

the unique circumstances associated with the date rollover to January

1, 2000. Part 139 requires operators of certificated airports to

conduct daily inspections of their facilities to ensure compliance with

the regulation. Such inspections include a visual check of movement

areas (areas used by air carriers to land, takeoff, and taxi) and

operational tests of equipment and systems used to comply with part 139

requirements. As a matter of practicality, various elements of the

self-inspection are conducted throughout the day. As such, the existing

inspection requirements do not require inspections early on January 1,

2000, before most operations begin, and do not necessarily require the

kind of tests that would determine if there is a Y2K-related problem

that was not detected by pre-January Y2K validation testing.

In addition, part 139 provisions regarding the repair or

replacement of inoperative aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF)

vehicles, and associated reporting requirements, are not well adapted

to the unique circumstances of the possible Y2K disruption on

equipment. Emergency equipment required by part 139, unlike other

aviation systems, is intended for use only in an emergency, and under

the current requirement may not be tested and reported to the FAA until

an actual emergency or scheduled maintenance require it, both of which

may occur well after operations begin on January 1, 2000.

Part 139 also allows certain airport operators a 48-hour grace

period to repair or replace inoperative ARFF vehicles, with no effect

on the number and type of ARFF equipment an airport must provide,

commonly known as the ARFF index. The ARFF index for an airport is

determined by the size of the aircraft using the airport and the number

of daily departures. The index establishes the number and size of ARFF

trucks needed. Conversely, the ARFF equipment available determines

[[Page 60069]]

the index and, thereby, limits the size of the aircraft that the

airport may serve. The 48-hour provision is intended to allow airport

operators sufficient time to acquire parts to repair a required ARFF

vehicle, or to arrange for a replacement vehicle, without impacting air

carrier operations.

Under normal operations, this is an acceptable procedure as an

inoperative ARFF vehicle is a rare occurrence, and parts can be

obtained quickly. However, since some ARFF vehicles may have embedded

computer chips, a Y2K-related problem, while highly unlikely, is

possible. Since similar models of ARFF vehicles are widely used, a

failure of even one model of ARFF equipment could affect many airports.

As such, a delay in repairing a Y2K problem at a number of airports

could have a system-wide impact.

Alternatives

The FAA evaluated four alternatives to address Y2K issues. The FAA

first considered not making changes to part 139 for the January 1,

2000, date rollover. Under this alternative, operators of certificated

airports would continue to comply with current part 139 requirements.

Alternatively, the FAA then contemplated making the determination that

Y2K compliance is an ``unusual condition'' under Sec. 139.327(a)(2),

thus requiring all certificate holders to conduct an inspection within

a specified time period to identify and correct any deficiencies.

Further, the FAA considered requiring these inspections only at

airports holding an airport operating certificate (those certificate

holders serving scheduled operations of air carrier aircraft with more

than 30 passenger seats). In this alternative, operational readiness

checks would not have been required at airports holding a limited

airport operating certificate (those certificate holders serving

unscheduled air carrier operations).

Finally, the FAA considered, and ultimately pursued, mandating both

the self-inspections and reporting requirements, as well as the

suspension of the 48-hour grace period for repair of ARFF vehicles.

While this alternative is the most comprehensive and costly of the four

alternatives considered, the FAA has determined that associated costs

would be minimal and only marginally greater than the other

alternatives considered, and that the benefits of mandatory safety

inspections fully justify this approach.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)

On July 8, 1999, the FAA published in the Federal Register a notice

of proposed rulemaking (64 FR 37026) that proposed to require operators

of airports certificated under part 139 to conduct one-time operational

readiness checks of certain airfield equipment and systems starting

January 1, 2000. In addition, this notice proposed to temporarily

revise the time period these airport operators have to repair or

replace certain emergency equipment.

In response to this proposal, the FAA received 14 comments from

industry associations, airport operators and owners, and one

individual.

Commenters were generally in favor of the SFAR but recommended

several modifications to and clarifications of certain testing and

reporting requirements. Two commenters (Airports Council International

and American Association of Airport Executives) recommended the FAA

rescind the proposal, claiming that existing part 139 requirements are

more than adequate to address any Y2K issues. In particular, both

associations strongly opposed the temporary revocation of the 48-hour

grace period for repair and replacement of inoperative ARFF vehicles.

Neither association provided operational and cost data to substantiate

their positions. All of these comments are discussed in detail in the

Section-by-Section analysis below.

Section-by-Section Discussion of Comments

General

After consideration of the comments received, the FAA has modified

the proposed SFAR and this final rule reflects those changes.

As noted above, comments received were generally supportive of the

proposal. Several airport operators noted that they already plan to

conduct readiness tests very similar to those proposed. Air carrier and

pilot organizations offered their support of system-wide testing to

ensure the safety and integrity of airports certificated under part

139.

While most commenters agreed with the FAA's conclusion that the

possibility of a systemic failure due to the date rollover to January

1, 2000, is small, a few commenters challenged the FAA's conclusion

that the date rollover is a significant event that warrants special

attention. The FAA disagrees with such comments and believes Y2K issues

present unique problems for part 139 airports.

One commenter stated that the SFAR is unnecessary since the

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or Transport Canada

are not requiring similar Y2K tests. The FAA disagrees. ICAO does not

impose requirements, and in any event, the U.S. system of airports is

far larger and more complex than Canada's or most member countries of

ICAO. If by chance there is a system-wide problem resulting from the

date rollover, it will have a far greater impact on the U.S. aviation

system.

A majority of commenters further expressed the concern that the

testing required by the SFAR would be redundant to those tests airport

operators are currently conducting to ensure Y2K compliance. Many

airport operators noted that they have spent considerable time and

money testing part 139 systems and equipment, and obtaining

certification from vendors. As such, they would not support protracting

such tests. The FAA concurs and did not intend for this SFAR to require

a repeat of the extensive Y2K testing that certificated holders have

already completed.

Instead, the FAA intends that this SFAR merely require certificate

holders to conduct operational readiness checks to verify that certain

part 139 systems and equipment are functioning normally after the Y2K

date rollover. For the most part, this will require airport operators

to ensure a system, such as runway lighting, has turned on properly,

and that equipment is functioning adequately, e.g., vehicle radios turn

on and allow for communication between users.

The FAA believes that concerns about the burden of this SFAR are

due to the use of the term ``test'' throughout the SFAR. For clarity,

the term ``test'' has been replaced throughout the SFAR with the term

``operational readiness check.'' To further clarify this rule, the

systems and equipment that must be checked, and suggested methods for

completing such checks, are discussed in the Operational Readiness

Check Requirements section.

Also, many commenters expressed general confusion over the relation

of this SFAR to part 139. Unless otherwise noted, the requirements of

part 139 are still applicable during the duration of this SFAR. For

example, the notification requirements of Sec. 139.339 (Airport

condition reporting) will still be applicable from January 1 to January

5, 2000, even though airport operators will have additional reporting

requirements under the SFAR.

Finally, another commenter recommended that the FAA prohibit

[[Page 60070]]

airport operators from closing their facilities to conduct required

operational readiness checks. The FAA disagrees with this

recommendation. Even though an airport operator has the authority to

close its facility, or portions thereof, for safety reasons, the FAA

believes that closing an airport to conduct required operational

readiness checks will not be an issue. Typically, operators of these

airports are able to conduct part 139 self-inspections and accommodate

air carrier schedules without interruption of those schedules. However,

if an air carrier still is concerned that required Y2K operational

readiness checks will affect its operations, the FAA encourages the air

carrier to contact the airport operator as soon as possible.

Section 1: Operational Readiness Check Requirements

Paragraph 1(a)

As proposed, this paragraph defines the applicability of this SFAR.

Other than clarifying changes, this paragraph remains the same. Several

commenters recommended that the FAA revise this section to extend this

SFAR to operators of those airports that air carriers use as alternate

airports. The FAA disagrees with this recommendation. Under part 121

(Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations)

air carriers are required to operate at airports that are certificated

under part 139. Part 121 also requires that under certain conditions

air carriers designate an alternate airport as part of their required

flight planning. However, Sec. 121.590 permits an air carrier to

designate a required alternate airport that is not certificated under

part 139.

Since an air carrier could designate any airport as an alternate,

extending this SFAR to operators of alternate airports would

effectively extend its requirements to all airport operators. Yet, the

requirements of this SFAR are intended to check systems and equipment

specially required at airports certificated under part 139

(approximately 568 civilian airports). The FAA does not require

compliance with these safety standards at any other U.S. airport.

Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the FAA to require airport

operators to check systems and equipment that they are not required to

have, and in many instances, do not own or maintain.

In addition, the term ``unless otherwise authorized by the

Administrator'' has been added to this paragraph. Since the rule

language cannot be specific enough to address every unique circumstance

at all certificated airports, the FAA has determined that this change

will allow for alternative means of compliance. For example, some

airport operators will not be able to conduct the required operational

readiness checks of emergency communications with the air traffic

control tower prior to the first air carrier operation. Not all air

traffic control towers are in operation 24 hours a day and air carrier

operations may normally occur when the tower is closed. On a case-by-

case basis, the FAA will determine the appropriate compliance methods

to address such local issues.

Paragraph 1(b)

As proposed, this paragraph sets forth general descriptions of

those systems and equipment that needed to be checked for Y2K

compliance. A majority of commenters recommended that this paragraph be

expanded to identify all airport systems and equipment that the FAA

would require to be checked. The overall concern was that airport

operators needed more information to determine whether or not required

operational readiness checks could be accomplished within the specified

time frame and make adequate preparations. The FAA concurs that this

section needs clarification, and has expanded the section to specify

each part 139 system and piece of equipment that must undergo an

operational readiness check.

In addition, several commenters expressed concern over a reference

in the NPRM preamble regarding systems that control access by vehicles

and pedestrians to the airfield. This reference was interpreted to mean

that required operational readiness checks would include a

functionality test of access control systems required under 14 CFR part

107 (Airport security). This is not the case. Operational readiness

checks are only required of part 139 systems and equipment. The

reference to access control was intended to only illustrate possible

part 139 systems and equipment that may contain computers or

microprocessors that could be affected by the date rollover, including

those automated systems that control inadvertent entry to the movement

area by unauthorized personnel, as required under Sec. 139.335, Public

protection.

One commenter recommended that airport operators be required to

consult with their tenant air carriers when determining which part 139

systems and equipment will be checked. The FAA does not concur with

this recommendation. The certificate holder should already know what

systems and equipment to check since required operational readiness

checks cover the same systems and equipment as the daily checks

conducted by airport operators to comply with part 139 self-inspection

requirements. These checks should not affect air carrier operations any

differently than a daily airfield self-inspection. Further, if problems

arise as the result of operational readiness checks, the same

procedures airport operators use to notify their tenant air carriers of

airfield conditions under Sec. 139.339 still are applicable. Systemic

problems will be reported to air carriers on a national basis (see

discussion under Reporting Requirements). The FAA encourages any air

carrier that is uncertain as to an individual airport's notification

procedures to contact the airport operator as soon as possible for

clarification.

Based on comments received, the FAA also has modified proposed

paragraph 1(b)(5). Several commenters felt that this paragraph is so

broad that it would essentially allow the FAA to indiscriminately

require any type of system or equipment check. This was not the FAA's

intent. Instead, this paragraph of section 1 was included to ensure the

flexibility to accommodate local circumstances or address problems with

systems and equipment not discovered until after the publication of

this SFAR.

In the final rule, this proposed paragraph is renumbered as

paragraph 1(b)(9) and has been combined with proposed paragraph 1(d)

(notification information). This modification is intended to clarify

that the FAA will consult with an airport operator if additional

operational checks of part 139 systems or equipment are needed.

However, the final determination of any additional operational

readiness checks needed to ensure safety of air carrier operations will

remain with the FAA.

The FAA still will notify individual certificate holders to confirm

systems and equipment that will be checked, address any local or unique

issues, and provide specific details on reporting procedures, including

regional contact names and telephone numbers. In addition, this

notification will provide guidance on methods to conduct operational

checks to minimize the impact on operations. For example, certificate

holders will be advised that operational readiness checks of snow and

ice removal equipment need only involve the starting and operating of

each make and model of motorized equipment and corresponding

attachments, such as blades, blowers, and brooms.

One commenter suggested that the FAA complete this notification no

later than October 15, 1999. While the FAA

[[Page 60071]]

hopes to complete all such notifications as soon as possible after the

publication of the final rule, the FAA believes further time may be

needed to address any unforeseen delays and to finalize internal

reporting procedures.

Finally, commenters recommended that the FAA conduct operational

readiness checks of its own equipment located at part 139 airports,

such as navigation aides, and report the results of these checks to the

local airport operator. While the FAA concurs with this recommendation,

it is beyond the scope of this SFAR. However, to ensure such

notification occurs during the effective date of this SFAR, the FAA

will instruct managers of its air traffic control towers to meet with

airport operators prior to the date rollover and develop a mutually

acceptable notification procedure. This type of coordination already

exists at many airports certificated under part 139, but this

additional effort will help ensure there are no gaps in the information

flow. At airports where there are no air traffic control towers, the

FAA will use existing notification procedures to alert airport and

aircraft operators of equipment problems.

Paragraph 1(c)

As proposed, paragraph 1(c) would require that all ARFF vehicles

discharge fire extinguishing agents, regardless of the type of agent.

ARFF vehicles typically carry two types of fire extinguishing agents,

aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) that is dispensed with water and dry

chemical that is dispensed by pressured gas. Several airport operators

raised concerns regarding the operational readiness checks of ARFF

vehicles that carry dry chemical extinguishing agents. These commenters

pointed out that most dry chemical extinguishing agents are harmful to

the environment and special care must be taken to dispose of it once

discharged from an ARFF vehicle. They stated this would be difficult,

and possibly unsafe, to do during hours of darkness. Also, these

commenters noted that once a truck that carries dry chemical discharges

its agent, it takes more time to recharge pressurized gas tanks and

restore the truck to service than a truck that carries AFFF.

The FAA agrees that dispensing dry chemical agent is more

problematic than dispensing AFFF. Further, systems used to discharge

dry chemicals are mechanical and do not contain microprocessors. As

such, the FAA has determined that it is not necessary for certificate

holders to conduct an operational readiness check of systems that

dispense dry chemical or other similar secondary agents. Subsequently,

paragraph 1(c) has been modified to require certificate holders to

dispense only AFFF extinguishing agents. Regardless of the type of fire

extinguishing agent that these vehicles carry, the certificate holder

is still required to check the operation of all ARFF vehicles, i.e.,

starting the vehicle and driving it at speeds typically used to respond

to an emergency and verifying that radios and emergency communications

are operational.

Finally, this paragraph has been modified to clarify the extent of

operational readiness checks of ARFF vehicles. This change requires

that the certificate holder start vehicles and drive them at speeds

normally driven in an emergency, in addition to dispensing fire-

extinguishing agents. The FAA believes this change will eliminate any

confusion as to the extent of the operational readiness check required

for each ARFF vehicle.

Section 2: Schedule

Prior to the discussion of scheduling requirements, it should be

noted that the order of proposed section 2 (Reporting Requirements) and

section 3 (Test Schedule) have been reversed and renumbered. Section 2

is now titled Schedule, and section 3 is now titled Reporting

Requirements. This change is intended to present the requirements of

this SFAR in a more logical sequence.

Paragraph 2(a)(1)

This paragraph (proposed paragraph 3(a)) establishes schedules for

conducting operational readiness checks. This paragraph has been

modified based on comments received.

Some airport operators recommended that the certificate holders be

given additional time to complete required operational readiness

checks, particularly at those airports where air carrier operations are

scheduled before 1:00 a.m. on January 1, 2000. Suggestions ranged from

one to six additional hours to complete operational readiness checks.

The FAA believes these commenters based their concerns on the

assumption that operational readiness checks proposed in section 1 were

more extensive than the FAA intended (see above discussion under

Operational readiness checks). As such, it was difficult for these

commenters to determine whether or not required operational readiness

checks could be accomplished within the specified time frame. Even so,

the FAA has reevaluated time estimates for airport operators to

complete required operational readiness checks and concurs that an

additional hour is warranted, especially for those operators with early

morning operations on January 1, 2000.

Conversely, another commenter recommended that the FAA require

certificate holders to conduct all operational readiness checks within

two hours after midnight on January 1, 2000, regardless of when the

first flight is scheduled to occur. This commenter also suggested that

the FAA allow a certificate holder that can document no air carrier

operations within the first 48 hours of the date rollover additional

time to complete operational readiness checks so long as required

checks are completed 24 hours before the first scheduled operations.

While this approach would simplify the schedule for required checks by

requiring certificated holders with air carrier operations on the first

two days of the new year to complete operational readiness checks at

the same time, the FAA believes it would be unduly burdensome for most

certificate holders. In particular, for those certificate holders that

do not have scheduled air carrier operations until later in the day on

January 1, 2000, and would be required to make arrangements for staff

to be available at times other than their normal duty hours.

Many certificate holders have indicated to the FAA that, regardless

of the time of the first scheduled air carrier operation, they plan to

have operational and maintenance personnel on duty during the date

rollover, and will begin operational readiness checks immediately after

midnight on January 1, 2000. Not all certificate holders have such

staffing levels and the FAA believes that it is a more reasonable

approach to allow operational readiness checks to be conducted closer

to the time of the first scheduled operation when airport personnel are

routinely on duty.

Paragraph 2(b)

Proposed paragraph 3(b) that would require all operational

readiness checks to be completed by January 5, 2000, has been

renumbered 2(c). A new paragraph 2(b) has been added to allow those

certificate holders at airports that have scheduled air carrier

operations on January 1, 2000, some flexibility in completing

operational readiness checks of systems and equipment that are

operating and remain operational during the date rollover, but that may

pose a safety hazard if they are turned off and could not be returned

to operation.

A majority of commenters expressed concern that certain operational

readiness checks of systems that are operational at the time of the

date

[[Page 60072]]

rollover may inadvertently initiate a failure of these systems or

pieces of equipment. On the other hand, if these systems or pieces of

equipment were left alone, they would continue to work on January 1,

2000, until their normal shut down time. At that point, commenters

suggested they could be checked without adversely affecting air carrier

operations scheduled to occur in the early morning. The FAA concurs

with this recommendation.

A good example of such systems and equipment is runway and taxiway

lighting systems that automatically turn on at dusk and remain lit

until sunrise the following day. On the evening of December 31, 1999,

such a lighting system would automatically turn on, and if there is no

interruption in its power source, should remain lit until daybreak the

following morning. While unlikely, if such a system has a date

sensitive micro-processor it is most likely used to turn the system on

or off, and if it were to fail, this would probably occur when the

system switches on the evening of January 1, 2000.

A new paragraph 2(b) has been added to address systems and

equipment that are operational at the time of the date rollover to

January 1, 2000. Specifically, certificate holders that have scheduled

air carrier operations on January 1 will have until 1 p.m. that day to

check runway/taxiway lighting and lighted sign systems, and motorized

snow and ice removal equipment if such systems and equipment are

operational as of midnight on January 2000. In some instances, this

means a certificate holder whose first scheduled operation will occur

in the afternoon or evening of January 1 will be required to complete

operational readiness checks on these systems or pieces of equipment

earlier than other checks required by this SFAR.

Another commenter requested that the final rule clarify that times

required for conducting operational readiness checks be based on

published or scheduled times, not actual arrival or departure time of

the first air carrier operation. Without clarification, the commenter

worried that if a flight scheduled for departure on the evening of

December 31 is delayed until early the next morning, this flight could

be interpreted as the first air carrier operation scheduled for January

1, 2000, rather than a flight scheduled to depart later in the day.

The FAA agrees. Since it is difficult to plan for unforeseen delays

and other schedule problems, certificate holders should interpret the

phase ``first air carrier operation is scheduled to occur'' as meaning

required operational readiness checks shall be planned around the

departure or arrival time that is published or scheduled for first air

carrier operation after midnight on January 1, 2000, not actual arrival

or departure times.

In addition, comments were received suggesting that the schedule

for completing operational readiness checks be expanded to include

other possible problematic dates, such as February 29, 2000. The FAA

disagrees with this recommendation. During the duration of this SFAR,

the FAA believes problematic systems or equipment will be identified

during both operational readiness checks and routine operations. Based

on this experience, certificate holders can repair or replace such

systems and equipment in order to remain in compliance with part 139

safety standards during other similar date rollovers.

Section 3: Reporting Requirements

As noted above, the order of proposed section 2 (Reporting

Requirements) and section 3 (Test Schedule) has been reversed and those

sections have been renumbered. New section 3 is now titled, Reporting

Requirements. As proposed, this section establishes a deadline for

reporting the results of operational readiness checks. The FAA has

modified and reorganized the reporting requirements under new section 3

pursuant to comments received.

Several commenters requested clarification on the type of

information certificate holders are required to report and how this

information should be reported. Other commenters recommended that the

expansion of reporting requirements include any contingency measures

that are implemented, and additional reports once the airport has

returned to normal operations.

New paragraph (a) of this section requires all certificate holders

to report the results of required operational readiness checks, plus

report contingency measures implemented, and any changes that may

affect ARFF Index levels or air carrier operations. New paragraph (b)

of this section specifies when a certificate holder is required to

report. Finally, new paragraph (c) reminds certificate holders of their

obligations under part 139 to collect and disseminate airport condition

information to air carriers, including use of the Notice to Airmen

(NOTAM) system.

The FAA believes these modifications will clarify the certificate

holder's reporting responsibilities under this SFAR. In addition, the

FAA will include reporting guidance that is specific to each airport in

the confirmation notice to be sent to each certificate holder (see

discussion of paragraph 1(b)). This guidance will include a reporting

form, airport-specific information on how and when to report, and

alternative means to contact the FAA in the event of a telephone system

failure.

Two commenters also recommended that the FAA amend the SFAR to

require certificate holders that experience no Y2K problems, and do not

implement any contingency measures, to report an ``all clear.'' These

commenters felt that this would eliminate any ambiguity regarding the

status of part 139 airports, and allow pilots and dispatchers as much

time as possible to take appropriate action. The FAA agrees, and has

modified proposed section 2 (new paragraph 3(a)) to clarify that all

certificate holders must report the results of required operational

readiness checks, even if these checks reveal no problems. Information

that an airport has experienced no Y2K problems with airfield safety

systems will be useful to the FAA, air carriers, other airport

operators, and the traveling public.

In addition, several commenters expressed concern about the FAA's

ability to gather and disseminate information reported by certificate

holders. One commenter went so far to remind the FAA of how many

airports it certificates and questioned the agency's ability to field

telephone calls from all of these airports.

The FAA does not agree with these comments. The FAA is satisfied

that the existing communication system established through the FAA's

Regional Airports Division Managers is adequate for reporting the

results of required operational readiness checks. Certificate holders

routinely report information regarding part 139 compliance to the

Regional Airports Division Manager using these established procedures.

These established communication procedures will be utilized to

report the results of operational readiness checks to the FAA. FAA

regional offices will then communicate these results to FAA

Headquarters for further dissemination. In addition, air carrier

operations occur at different times at each part 139 airport so

certificate holders will be contacting the FAA at various times between

January 1 and January 5, 2000, so the FAA does not anticipate a flood

of telephone calls at the same time.

As noted above, each certificate holder will be notified of

reporting procedures specific to its locality. This will include

procedures to notify the

[[Page 60073]]

FAA in the event of a failure of telephone systems. Working with its

telephone service providers, and air traffic control and flight service

systems, the FAA has developed several alternative communication

systems for both local and systemic telephone failures.

Finally, a commenter suggested that the results of operational

readiness checks be disseminated to airlines, airports, and other users

through FAA's Air Traffic Control System Command Center. The commenter

felt this would greatly assist all parties involved in taking timely

and adequate actions should problems arise.

The FAA concurs. As the FAA receives reports from airport

operators, those reports will be disseminated through the FAA's air

traffic control system and regional airports division offices. The

status report for each part 139 airport will either contain an ``all

clear;'' or include a brief description of changes to ARFF Index level,

failure of any part 139 systems and equipment, and a description of any

limitation or reduction in airport services, up to a notice of closure.

Again, such status reports required by this SFAR would be in addition

to local airport condition reporting, required under Sec. 139.339.

Section 4: Contingency Measures (New)

Comments were received from several airport operators that the

proposed SFAR was unclear as to what action a certificate holder would

be required to take if a system or equipment required to be checked

failed due to the date rollover to January 1, 2000. The FAA agrees and

has added this section to clarify certificate holders' obligations to

implement contingency measures.

The FAA assumed that certificate holders would revert to existing

contingency measures contained in the Airport Certification Manual

(Specifications) in the event of equipment or system failure. As noted

above, the requirements of part 139 are still applicable during the

duration of this SFAR (with the exception of certain ARFF vehicle

readiness requirements--see discussion under section 5, Vehicle

Readiness). Operators of part 139 certificated airports already have

developed and specified such contingency measures in their Airport

Certification Manual (Specifications) to address failure of part 139

systems and equipment.

However, to eliminate any possible confusion, the final SFAR

contains a new section 4, Contingency Measures. This section specifies

that a certificate holder will implement contingency measures to remain

compliant with part 139 in the event that a system or equipment

required to be checked fails to operate, or functions improperly due to

the date change to January 1, 2000.

This new section is not intended to allow part 139 certificate

holders to use their discretion in implementing contingency measures if

they believe that a system or equipment failure is not due to the date

rollover. If a required system or piece of equipment fails to operate,

or performs improperly after a required operational readiness check is

performed, the certificate holder must implement contingency measures

and sort out the cause of the problem later.

Section 5: Vehicle Readiness

This section (proposed section 4) temporarily rescinded the

requirements of Sec. 139.319(h)(3) pertaining to inoperative ARFF

vehicles. This section has been renumbered as section 5 and modified

based on comments received.

Most comments received concerned the proposed changes to the ARFF

vehicle readiness provisions of Sec. 139.319(h)(3). These comments

varied widely, ranging from suggestions to expand the proposal to

recommendations that it be rescinded.

Commenters that requested the FAA to reinstate the 48-hour grace

period to replace or repair ARFF vehicles felt the temporary

elimination of this provision of part 139 would increase the likelihood

of disruptions and do nothing to accelerate repair of ARFF equipment.

Instead, they suggested the FAA contact the manufacturers of ARFF

vehicle about the possibility of systemic failures, and then simply

require airport operators to arrange for adequate back up prior to the

date rollover.

The FAA disagrees. The FAA has contacted the manufactures of ARFF

vehicles and they have not provided adequate certification that all

components of their vehicles are Y2K compliant, particularly those

components that they did not manufacture. Without such assurances, the

FAA believes additional efforts must be made to address the

possibility, however small, of a system-wide failure of similar models

of ARFF vehicles. Part 139 provisions regarding the repair or

replacement of inoperative ARFF vehicles do not adequately address this

possibility.

Further, these same commenters seemed unclear as to the

applicability of part 139 during the effective dates of the SFAR or do

not have a clear understanding of the regulation. In particular, these

commenters questioned how many backup ARFF vehicles would be needed in

the event primary equipment become inoperable and were alarmed by the

language of this section that would require any inoperative equipment

to be replaced ``immediately with equipment having at least equal

capabilities.''

The only part 139 ARFF requirement that changes while the SFAR is

in effect is the time period for replacing or repairing inoperable ARFF

vehicles. Instead of 48 hours, the time period temporarily has been

reduced. Otherwise, certificate holders would comply with part 139 as

they do under normal conditions, including implementing contingency

measures in the event required ARFF equipment cannot be repaired or

replaced in the time specified. Such contingency measures may include

lowering the ARFF index (some airport operators maintain a higher Index

level than required), implementing mutual aid agreements with the local

community, bringing into service older vehicles that are no longer used

to meet the required ARFF Index, or closing the airport to certain air

carrier operations. Further, the requirement to replace inoperative

equipment immediately with the equivalent equipment is currently a

requirement of part 139 and would not change under this SFAR.

In addition, part 139 allows for some flexibility in the event the

certificate holder cannot maintain its ARFF index level, and this SFAR

will not change this. Specifically, part 139.315(c) allows the

certificate holder to serve up to four daily operations of an air

carrier aircraft requiring the next higher ARFF index level before the

operator is required to have more equipment or limit the operations of

these larger aircraft. Also, a certificate holder may temporarily

deviate from part 139 requirements in the event of an extreme emergency

situation, as described under Sec. 139.113.

Due to this confusion, a commenter interpreted the proposal to mean

that a certificate holder was required to provide duplicate ARFF

vehicles if a primary vehicle failed its operational readiness checks.

This commenter noted that it is unlikely that sufficient redundant

vehicles could be procured or leased at any price, and such new

vehicles would be more likely to contain hidden computer chips and be

more susceptible to Y2K problems. As such, the commenter disagreed with

the FAA's conclusion that because the probability of an ARFF vehicle

failing its operational readiness check is low, the expense of ARFF

backup is minimal. In actuality, this commenter felt, this section

would be more expensive than calculated because certificate holders

would be required to purchase backup

[[Page 60074]]

ARFF vehicles at an average cost of $200,000 each.

The FAA disagrees and believes these concerns are the result of the

commenter making an assumption that certificate holders must have ARFF

vehicle backup available the instant that an ARFF vehicle fails its

operational readiness check, and that an identical replacement to the

vehicle is required. As explained above, the FAA did not intend that

duplicate vehicles be idling next to the ARFF station during

operational readiness checks, rather that the certificate holder must

initiate contingency measures immediately. Several options are

available for contingency measures and are currently used by

certificate holders if a required ARFF vehicle becomes inoperative and

cannot be repaired or replaced within 48 hours.

These contingency measures would be used until the inoperative

vehicle is fixed or, in an extreme case, replaced. So the cost to

repair or replace an ARFF vehicle would eventually be incurred even if

the FAA did not implement this SFAR. However, if an ARFF vehicle were

to fail its operational readiness check, the certificate holder will

incur costs for implementing contingency measures that it would not

normally incur during the 48-hour grace period. Thus an assessment of

the expected cost that may be incurred should include the probability

of a Y2K failure even if this probability is small.

Two commenters supported the temporary suspension of the 48-hour

grace period but recommended that airport operators be required to make

arrangements with local governments to ensure that backup equipment

also remains operational. The FAA does not concur with this

recommendation. It would be unreasonable to require certificate holders

to conduct operational readiness checks on equipment that they do not

own. Such backup equipment is the property of local governments,

national guard units or the Department of Defense, all of which have

their own efforts underway to ensure such equipment is Y2K compliant

and remains operational after the date rollover to January 1, 2000.

Also, comments were received from individual operators of part 139

airports. These were very helpful in refining this section, and the FAA

has adopted a modified approach to vehicle readiness as a result of

their input. Primarily, these commenters were concerned that if no

grace period was allowed, then certificate holders could not comply

with the SFAR, as backup measures cannot be implemented immediately.

For example, certificate holders relying on assistance through a mutual

aid agreement need time to initiate this assistance, and emergency

personnel responding need time to assemble and reposition equipment to

the airport. Recommendations were made to allow certificate holders a

minimum of six to eight hours to implement their ARFF contingency

measures.

The FAA agrees with these concerns, and did not intend when it

proposed to eliminate the grace period to mean that backup personnel

and equipment must be on ready status as the certificate holder

conducts required operational readiness checks of primary equipment.

Instead, the FAA intended for certificate holders to implement

contingency measures immediately to ensure compliance with part 139

requirements. To remedy this, the final SFAR allows certificate holders

to repair or replace inoperative vehicles as soon as possible, but

within four hours of completion of operational readiness checks with

equipment having at least equal capabilities of inoperative equipment.

If the vehicle cannot be replaced within four hours (and is needed to

maintain the index for aircraft currently serving the airport), the

revised section requires the certificate holder to either implement

contingency measures required under new section 4 or lower the ARFF

index to that corresponding to the remaining operative equipment.

Another airport operator noted that the SFAR lacks a provision that

would allow certificate holders, during the effective period of the

SFAR, to revert to the 48-hour grace period for repairing or replacing

vehicles once these vehicles successfully pass their operational

readiness checks. For example, if a certificate holder successfully

conducts a operational readiness check of an ARFF vehicle on January 2

and reports this to the FAA but two days later the same vehicle breaks

down due to a mechanical problem. Under the proposal, this commenter

worried that such a mechanical problem would require immediate repair

or replacement even though the breakdown was not Y2K related. The FAA

agrees, and has added a new paragraph to this section (paragraph 5(b))

that allows the certificate holder, after complying with the section 3

reporting requirements, 48 hours to repair or replace aircraft rescue

and firefighting vehicles that subsequently become inoperative.

Finally, several airport operators also raised concerns regarding

the operational readiness checks of ARFF vehicles that carry dry

chemical extinguishing agents. These comments are addressed under

paragraph 1(c).

Section 6: Self-Inspection Requirements

Proposed section 5 (new section 6) has been shortened for clarity.

The requirements of the section did not change.

Section 7: Effective Times

Proposed section 6 (new section 7) specifies all times in the SFAR

are in local time at the airport.

Several comments were received regarding the requirements of this

section. Some commenters agreed with the use of local time, while

others recommended using Universal Time Coordinate (UTC). One commenter

even suggested that required checks should commence at 1:00 a.m. local

time at the International Dateline.

All these recommendations are valid. There are several different

times that time-sensitive equipment could be using. For example, a

date-sensitive micro-processor manufactured in California for worldwide

distribution may be set to the local, Pacific time zone. Conversely,

such a part manufactured for a specific airport may be set to the local

time of the airport. So the uncertainty of the functionality of unknown

date-sensitive systems and equipment is further complicated by the

uncertainty of which time such systems and equipment are set to.

To simplify matters, the FAA has determined the final rule will

continue to reference local time. At some airports, this may result in

certain time-sensitive systems or equipment making the date change to

January 1, 2000, prior to midnight local time, while at other airports

this event may take place well after midnight local time. Nevertheless,

the FAA believes using local time is the most reasonable approach for

certificate holders to comply with the requirements of this SFAR.

To lessen the potential impact of varying times, the FAA is

exploring the possibility of operators of certificated airports located

in the South Pacific voluntarily conducting additional operational

readiness checks to obtain information on the reliability of commonly

used systems and equipment as soon as possible after midnight at the

International Dateline. These airports will be the first part 139

certificated airports to experience the date rollover to January 1,

2000.

Such operational readiness checks will help alert the FAA, and

subsequently certificate holders, of equipment and systems that are

experiencing problems. Further, as the FAA receives reports from other

airport

[[Page 60075]]

operators, both domestic airports and international airports, this

information will be disseminated to those certificate holders still

waiting the date rollover (see discussion under Reporting Section).

Section 8: Expiration.

Proposed section 7 (new section 8) has been shortened for clarity.

The requirements of the section did not change.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Information collection requirements in the amendment to part 139

previously have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44

U.S.C. 3507(d)), and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0063.

International Compatibility

In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on

International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and

Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA

determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices

that correspond to these proposed regulations.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic

analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency

shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination

that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second,

the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the

economic effect of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the

Office of Management and Budget directs agencies to assess the effect

of regulatory changes on international trade. And fourth, the Unfunded

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to

prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects

of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to

result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in

the aggregate, or by private sector, or $100 million or more annually

(adjusted for inflation).

In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this

rulemaking does not meet the standards for a ``significant regulatory

action'' under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and under the

Department of Transportation's Regulatory Policies and Procedures for

Simplification, Analysis, and Review of Regulations (44 FR 11034,

February 26, 1979) and, therefore, is not subject to review by the

Office of Management and Budget. Additionally, this rule would not have

a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities, would

not constitute a barrier to international trade, and does not contain a

significant intergovernmental or private sector mandate.

If an agency determines that the expected impact is so minimal that

the rule does not warrant a full evaluation, a statement to that

effect, and the basis for it, is included in the preamble to the final

rule. The FAA has determined that the expected impact of this rule will

be so minimal as to not warrant a full regulatory evaluation.

In summary, this SFAR establishes a one-time operational readiness

check and reporting requirement that is essentially identical to the

existing self-inspection requirements. The SFAR requires that certain

airport operators arrange for backup ARFF services or implement

contingency measures, as currently required, but in a more timely

manner, if an ARFF vehicle fails its operational readiness check. Since

self-inspections and reporting are already required under

Sec. 139.327(a), this regulation imposes little additional costs on

airport operators. The FAA estimates that the operational readiness

checks required by this rule may be completed in less than two hours,

including reporting results to the FAA. In addition, the expense of

complying with the ARFF backup requirement in a more timely manner is

small and considered a low-probability event.

This SFAR requires airports certificated under part 139 to maintain

the current ARFF Index level, reduce their ARFF Index level, or

implement contingency measures, as currently required. Operators of

most certificated airports are required to maintain the required ARFF

Index to serve current scheduled air carrier operations. Many of these

operators already have in place an ARFF backup plan. Those that do not

have a backup plan can, on short notice, make such arrangements, at a

nominal cost. Such contingency measures may include lowering the ARFF

Index (some airport operators maintain a higher ARFF Index level than

required), implementing mutual aid agreements with the local community,

bringing into service older vehicles that are no longer used to meet

the required ARFF Index, or closing the airport to certain air carrier

operations. Further, the requirement to replace inoperative equipment

immediately with equivalent equipment is currently a requirement of

part 139 and would not change under this SFAR.

An economic impact could occur in the following scenario. For those

operators of certificated airports that are required to meet a

specified ARFF Index, this rule does not allow the currently permitted

48-hour grace period to repair or replace inoperative ARFF equipment.

Rather, this time period has been temporarily reduced to 4 hours in

which the certificate holders must implement ARFF backup measures, as

described above. Using this scenario, the rule could result in ARFF

costs equal to the 44-hour expense of providing these backup ARFF

measures.

In such an event, the cost of maintaining an airport's current ARFF

Index for 44 hours is very low in terms of overall airport expenses.

For such an expense to occur, all of the following conditions must be

met:

1. A vehicle necessary to maintain the ARFF Index does not pass the

Y2K operational readiness check.

2. No other ARFF equipment is readily available to maintain the

ARFF Index.

3. Air carrier aircraft serving the airport on that day do not

allow the airport operator to temporarily step down to a lower ARFF

Index.

The probability of a series of connected events in which each event

must occur is calculated by multiplying across all events the

probability assigned to each event. In this case, the probability of

the first event (a required ARFF vehicle does not pass the Y2K

operational readiness check) is multiplied by the probability assigned

to the second, and then multiplied by the probability of the third

event. If the probability of just two events each equal 10 percent, the

probability assigned to an airport incurring an ARFF expense resulting

from this rule cannot be higher than one percent. Thus, while an ARFF

expense can occur, the expected likelihood is thought to be very low.

The FAA has determined that it is unlikely that all three events

will occur. However, in the event an airport does incur the cost of

having backup ARFF vehicles available, only 44 hours of that cost is

attributable to this rule because the current rule imposes the same

requirement after a 48-hour grace period. The cost for an airport that

might need to provide a backup vehicle could be zero, if the vehicle is

obtained from other fire units of the airport owner, or from other

local governments through a mutual aid agreement. Accordingly, the

costs that an airport operator may incur to obtain the services of one

or more backup ARFF

[[Page 60076]]

vehicles is expected to be very small. Finally, if the ARFF Index level

is affected, an airport operator may choose to accept a lower ARFF

Index level temporarily, with no effect on scheduled service, if

aircraft currently used for scheduled service at the airport do not

require the higher index. Thus the FAA expects this element of the rule

to be minimal.

The benefit of the rule is that it provides assurances that airport

operator's preparations for the date rollover have been effective and

that compliance with part 139 requirements is not compromised due to

the January 1, 2000 date rollover. In the unlikely event that this date

rollover will interrupt systems that are used to comply with part 139,

the rule will ensure an early knowledge of such interruption and

facilitate immediate action to maintain safety.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (the Act), as amended,

establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall

endeavor, consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable

statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale

of the business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject

to regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the Act requires agencies

to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain

the rationale for their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small

entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and

small governmental jurisdictions.

Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or

final rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. If the determination is that it would, the

agency must prepare a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (RFA) as

described in the Act. However, if an agency determines that a proposed

or final rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on

a substantial number of small entities, Sec. 605(b) of the Act provides

that the head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility

analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement

providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning

should be clear.

As detailed above in the regulatory evaluation summary there are

two costs that may be incurred. First, the inspection costs are

expected to be minimal as the expected inspection time is thought to be

two hours or less. Second, the probability that the requirement may

impose an ARFF cost is expected to be very low.

Of the 568 civilian certificated airports, 177 meet the criteria

for small entities. At least 135 of those 177 airports are approved for

air carrier operations using mutual aid, or have other arrangements

that do not require the airport operator to have ARFF equipment on the

airport to meet a particular index requirement. These airports will not

be financially affected by the reduction of the 48-hour ARFF grace

period. The remaining 42 airports that are considered small entities

must comply with ARFF Index requirements of part 139 and potentially

could be affected by the SFAR. The expected ARFF cost that this rule

could impose on these 42 airports is expected to be minimal.

The rule will allow airport operators only 4 hours, versus the

currently permitted 48-hour grace period, to repair or replace

inoperative ARFF equipment or implement contingency measures. Thus,

using this scenario, the rule could impose an ARFF cost equal to a 44-

hour expense to implement ARFF backup measures, as described above in

the Regulatory Evaluation Summary.

Accordingly, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Federal Aviation Administration certifies that this rule

will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of

small entities.

International Trade Impact Statement

The rule will not constitute a barrier to international trade,

including the export of U.S. goods and services to foreign countries,

or the import of foreign goods and services into the United States.

Federalism Implications

The regulations herein will not have a substantial direct effect on

the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the

States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive

Order 12612, it is determined that this rule will not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a federalism

assessment.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act),

codified as 2 U.S.C. 1501-1571, requires each Federal agency, to the

extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment of the effects

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may

result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in

the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more

(adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.

Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal

agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by

elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal

governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A

``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the Act is any

provision in a Federal agency regulation that would impose an

enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the

aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one

year.

Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section

204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements

that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the

agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides

for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a

meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development

of regulatory proposals.

This rule does not contain a Federal intergovernmental or private

sector mandate that exceeds $100 million in any one year. Therefore,

the requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of

1995 do not apply.

Environmental Analysis

FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically

excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

environmental assessment or environmental impact statement. In

accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this

rulemaking action qualifies for a categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

The energy impact of the notice has been assessed in accordance

with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) P.L. 94-163, as

amended (43 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been determined

that the final rule is not a major regulatory action under the

provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 139

Air carriers, Airports, Aviation safety, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements.

[[Page 60077]]

The Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation

Administration amends part 139 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations

as follows:

PART 139--CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: LAND AIRPORTS SERVING

CERTAIN AIR CARRIERS

1. The authority citation for part 139 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C 106(g), 40113, 44701-44706, 44709, and

44719.

2. Part 139 is amended by adding Special Federal Aviation

Regulation No. 85 to read as follows:

SFAR 85--YEAR 2000 AIRPORT SAFETY INSPECTIONS

1. Operational readiness check requirements. (a) Unless

otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each certificate holder

shall conduct an operational readiness check of each piece of

equipment and system described in paragraph (b) of this section to

verify that compliance with part 139 requirements has not been

affected by the date change to January 1, 2000. The operational

readiness checks shall demonstrate that the equipment and system is

sufficiently operational to continue to support the certificate

holder's compliance with the requirements of part 139.

(b) The operational readiness checks required by paragraph (a)

of this section shall include a check of--

(1) Each lighting system and lighted sign system;

(2) Each system used to notify aircraft rescue and firefighting

units during an emergency;

(3) Each aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicle identified in

the Airport Certification Manual or Airport Certification

Specifications;

(4) Each radio used to communicate with Air Traffic Control and

aircraft;

(5) Each radio used for communication between aircraft rescue

and firefighting vehicles and fire dispatch or command;

(6) Each system used by airport operations and maintenance

personnel for internal airport communications;

(7) Each piece of motorized equipment used to remove snow and

ice from movement areas;

(8) Each system used to transmit airfield condition information

to air carriers, including the system used to issue a NOTAM; and

(9) Any other system or piece of equipment that the

Administrator determines, after consultation with the certificate

holder, is used to support the holder's compliance with part 139

requirements, and is critical to the safety and efficiency of

aircraft operations.

(c) The operational readiness check of each aircraft rescue and

firefighting vehicle shall include starting the vehicle and driving

the vehicle at speeds typically used to respond to an emergency. In

addition, the operational readiness check of each vehicle that

carries AFFF and water fire extinguishing agent shall include

dispensing of this agent.

2. Schedule. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this

section, after midnight December 31, 1999, each certificate holder

shall complete the operational readiness checks required by section

1 of this SFAR, as follows:

(1) By 2:00 a.m. on January 1, 2000, if the first air carrier

operation is scheduled to occur at or before 3:00 a.m. on this date.

(2) At least one hour before the first air carrier operation is

scheduled to occur, if the operation is scheduled to occur after

3:00 a.m. on January 1, 2000.

(b) For an airport where air carrier operations are scheduled to

occur on January 1, 2000, each certificate holder shall have until

1:00 p.m. on January 1, 2000, to complete the required operational

readiness checks of lighting and lighted sign systems, and motorized

snow and ice removal equipment that are in use on 12:00 a.m. on

January 1, 2000.

(c) All required operational readiness checks shall be completed

before January 5, 2000, whether or not the airport has served air

carrier operations from January 1 through January 4, 1999.

3. Reporting Requirements. (a) Each certificate holder shall

report the results of its operational readiness checks to the

Regional Airports Division Manager. This report shall include--

(1) A confirmation that the systems and equipment specified

under section 1(b) are functioning as required under part 139;

(2) A description of any changes to ARFF Index level required

under Sec. 139.315;

(3) Any failure of part 139 systems and equipment specified

under section 1(b) and the subsequent contingency measure

implemented; and

(4) Any limitations or reductions in part 139 measures that

would place a restriction on air carrier operations, including a

notice of closure.

(b) The report required by paragraph (a) of this section shall

be submitted no later than one hour following the completion of

operational readiness checks required by section 1 of this SFAR. For

systems and equipment described in section 2(b), a report on the

required operational readiness checks shall be submitted no later

than one hour following the completion of those checks.

(c) This reporting requirement is in addition to the

notification requirements of part 139.

4. Contingency measures. Except as provided in section 5, the

certificate holder shall implement contingency measures, if

necessary, to remain compliant with part 139 in the event that a

system or piece of equipment required to be checked under this SFAR

becomes inoperative due to the date change to January 1, 2000.

5. Vehicle readiness. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of

this section, until January 5, 2000, each vehicle required under

Sec. 139.317 that becomes inoperative shall be replaced as soon as

possible with equipment having at least equal capabilities,

notwithstanding Sec. 139.319(h)(3). A vehicle is considered

inoperative if it cannot perform as required by Sec. 139.319(h)(1).

In any event, the vehicle must be replaced with four hours of

failure to pass its operational readiness check. If the vehicle

cannot be replaced within four hours, the certificate holder shall--

(1) Implement contingency measures required under section (4);

or

(2) Limit air carrier operations on the airport to those

compatible with the ARFF Index corresponding to the remaining

operative rescue and firefighting equipment.

(b) Any ARFF vehicle that subsequently becomes inoperative after

the certificate holder complies with the reporting requirements of

section 3(a), may be replaced, as provided in Sec. 139.319(h)(3), if

the vehicle:

(1) Passed the operational readiness check required by section

1, or

(2) Is a replacement vehicle provided in accordance with

paragraph (a) of this section.

6. Self-inspection requirements. Operational readiness checks

conducted in compliance with this SFAR may be used to fulfill

applicable part 139 self-inspection requirements.

7. Effective times. All of the times described in this SFAR are

in the local time of the airport.

8. Expiration. This SFAR expires on January 5, 2000.

Issued in Washington, DC, on October 28, 1999.

Jane F. Garvey,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 99-28616 Filed 11-2-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P