Indiana Michigan Power Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]

Indiana Michigan Power Company; Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos.

DPR-58 and DPR-74 issued to Indiana Michigan Power Company (the

licensee) for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant,

Units 1 and 2, located in Berrien County, Michigan.

The proposed amendments involve the resolution of an unreviewed

safety question (USQ) related to certain small-break loss-of-coolant

accident scenarios for which there may not be sufficient containment

recirculation sump water inventory to support continued operation of

the emergency core cooling system and containment spray system pumps

during and following switchover to cold leg recirculation. Resolution

of this issue consists of a combination of physical plant

modifications, new analyses of containment recirculation sump

inventory, and resultant changes to the accident analyses to ensure

sufficient water inventory in the containment recirculation sump. In

addition, the licensee proposes to change the Technical Specifications

(T/S) dealing with the refueling water storage tank (RWST)

inventory and temperature, the required amount of ice in each ice

basket in the containment, and the delay to start the containment air

recirculation/hydrogen skimmer fans.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the

Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of

the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;

or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As

required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of

the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented

below:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the

probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously

evaluated?

The proposed T/S changes are a result of the planned

modifications being performed to ensure the original design basis

functional capability of the containment recirculation sump. These

planned modifications, and the associated changes to input

assumptions of related safety analyses, do not result in a condition

where the material and construction standards that were applicable

prior to the changes are altered. The integrity of safety-related

systems, structures, and components is maintained within the limits

previously approved. The planned modifications to the facility do

not create any new initiators for any accident, nor do they create

any new credible limiting single failure, nor do they result in any

event previously deemed incredible being made credible. The existing

separation of the control and protection functions for the reactor

core and fuel, reactor coolant system, and the containment and

containment systems are not adversely affected. In addition, the

functional requirements of safety-related systems, structures, and

components, which are related to accident mitigation, have not been

altered.

The proposed T/S changes increasing the minimum RWST contained

inventory have no impact on the initiation of an accident. The RWST

is used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. There are no

new failure modes involving the RWST that could differently initiate

any of the previously evaluated accidents. This is because the RWST

is located outside containment in an area where it is not credible

for a failure of the RWST to affect the reactor core and fuel,

reactor coolant system, and the containment and containment systems.

The proposed T/S changes reflect planned modifications to the

ESFAS [engineered safety features actuation system] actuation logic

and to the time delay for starting of the CEQ [containment air

recirculation/hydrogen skimmer] fans, and opening of the component

cooling water supply and return valves and hydrogen skimmer valves

to the CEQ fans. The proposed changes have no impact on the

initiation of an accident. The planned modifications do not

introduce any new failure modes for the CEQ fans or associated

valves.

The proposed T/S changes reflect the minimum ice weight used in

the existing analyses of containment recirculation sump inventory

and the associated analyses, plus an allowance for weighing

uncertainty. The proposed changes have no impact on the initiation

of an accident.

Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated

will not be increased by these changes.

The proposed T/S changes, and the associated modifications being

performed, will ensure the capability of the containment

recirculation sump, and the containment structures, systems, and

components, to meet the original design basis requirements for the

facility. The proposed changes will ensure that the minimum required

water inventory is maintained in the containment recirculation sump

at levels sufficient to prevent vortexing in the sump. Therefore,

the original evaluation of the consequences of previously evaluated

accidents as described in the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be affected.

The proposed T/S changes do not affect the integrity of the fuel

assembly or reactor internals, or any fission product barrier, such

that their function in the control of radiological consequences is

affected. In addition, the response of safety-related systems to

mitigate previously evaluated accidents as described in the CNP

UFSAR, will not be adversely affected or prevented. There is no

effect on the assumptions previously made in the radiological

consequence evaluations, and mitigation of the radiological

consequences of the accidents described in the CNP UFSAR is not

affected as further described below. The accident analyses performed

to determine the effects of a LOCA demonstrate that decay heat is

removed, and long-term core cooling is assured with these changes.

As a result, design basis accident analyses affected by these T/S

changes remain valid with the incorporation of the revised accident

analyses input assumptions. Therefore, the consequences of an

accident previously evaluated will not be increased by these

changes.

The proposed T/S changes for the RWST do not increase the

consequences of any previously evaluated accident. Increasing the

minimum deliverable RWST volume of water provides assurance that the

ECCS and CTS are capable of performing their design basis functions

to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA or main steam line break

(MSLB) by ensuring adequate containment recirculation sump

inventory.

The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves do not

increase the consequences of any previously evaluated accident. The

design basis functions of the CEQ fans and valves in maintaining

containment integrity following a LOCA or MSLB continue to be met.

In addition, the proposed change provides additional assurance that

the ECCS and CTS remain capable of performing their design basis

functions in mitigating the consequences of a LOCA or MSLB by

ensuring adequate containment recirculation sump inventory. The

planned modification to shorten the time delay for the CEQ fans and

valves will delay initiation of CTS for a small break LOCA. Delaying

CTS initiation results in a period when any fission products

released from the reactor core due to possible fuel damage are not

absorbed by CTS and held in solution in the containment

recirculation sump. However, a small break LOCA does not result in

reactor fuel damage of the magnitude that would increase offsite

dose because of the lack of fission product removal by CTS. For a

large break LOCA involving the possibility of more significant fuel

damage, there will be no discernable delay in CTS initiation because

of the

[[Page 58459]]

proposed T/S changes. Therefore, the consequences of a LOCA will not

be increased by the proposed T/S changes.

The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight do not

increase the consequences of a LOCA or MSLB. The minimum end-of-

cycle ice weight is consistent with the assumptions in the accident

analyses. Additional ice is loaded into the ice baskets based on

sublimation of 10% over an eighteen-month period so that the minimum

ice weight of 1132 pounds is available at the end of each operating

cycle. At other times throughout the cycle, there is additional

margin because the ice that is assumed to sublime later in the cycle

is still in the ice basket. The 1% weighing allowance provides

additional assurance that the actual weight of ice meets the

analyses requirement of 1132 pounds.

Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of

accidents previously evaluated are not increased.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Sufficient containment recirculation sump inventory is necessary

during the mitigation of both MSLB and LOCA events. The proposed T/S

changes do not create the possibility of any other type of accident.

The proposed T/S changes are a result of the planned modifications

being performed to ensure the original design basis functional

capability of the containment recirculation sump. These planned

modifications, and the associated changes to input assumptions of

related safety analyses, do not result in a condition where the

material and construction standards that were applicable prior to

the changes are altered. The integrity of safety-related systems,

structures, and components is maintained within the limits

previously approved.

The planned modifications to the facility do not create any new

initiators for any accident, nor do they create any new credible

limiting single failure, nor do they result in any event previously

deemed incredible being made credible. The existing separation of

the control and protection functions for the reactor core and fuel,

reactor coolant system, and the containment and containment systems

are not adversely impacted. In addition, the functional requirements

of safety-related systems, structures, and components, which are

related to accident mitigation, have not been altered.

The proposed T/S changes for the RWST cannot create the

possibility of an accident. There are no failure modes involving the

RWST that could initiate an accident. This is because the RWST is

located outside containment in an area where it is not credible for

a failure of the RWST to affect the reactor core and fuel, reactor

coolant system, and the containment and containment systems.

The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves cannot

create the possibility of an accident. The changes do not introduce

any new failure modes for the CEQ fans or associated valves.

Operation of the CEQ fans and valves cannot initiate an accident.

The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight cannot

create the possibility of an accident. The ice condenser has no

function during normal operation. It is a passive system that

functions after an accident has already occurred. The proposed T/S

changes to the ice weight do not alter any other physical

characteristics of the ice condenser, nor does it change the

function of the ice condenser. The proposed ice weights are less

than the maximum weight supported by the structural analyses for the

ice baskets. No new failure mechanisms are introduced by this

change.

Therefore, it is concluded that the change does not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin

of safety?

The margin of safety pertinent to the proposed T/S changes

includes providing assurance that emergency core cooling,

containment cooling and pressure suppression, and containment spray

functional requirements will be met following a design basis

accident, specifically for LOCA or MSLB events. Assurance of minimum

required containment recirculation sump inventory during and

following switchover of suction for the ECCS and CTS pumps from the

RWST to the containment recirculation sump provides this assurance.

The planned modifications have no adverse effect on the

availability, operability, or functional performance of the safety-

related systems, structures, and components required for mitigating

the effects of design basis accidents. In fact, these planned

modifications are intended to ensure the original design basis

functional capabilities of the containment recirculation sump, and

other containment systems, structures, and components, to support

ECCS, ice condenser, and CTS operation, and to ensure that the

containment structure and systems provide an effective fission

product barrier. However, the planned modifications do require

changes to the T/S, but they do not prevent the performance of any

surveillance requirement currently specified in the CNP T/S.

The proposed T/S changes for the RWST provide assurance that

sufficient water is available to support the ECCS and CTS in

performance of their design basis functions to mitigate the

consequences of a LOCA or MSLB. Therefore, the margin of safety

provided by the ECCS and CTS associated with containment integrity

and with assurance of post-LOCA long-term core cooling is preserved

by these proposed changes.

The proposed T/S changes for the CEQ fans and valves provide

assurance that the original design basis functional capabilities of

the containment are preserved. In addition, by increasing ice melt

rate in the early stages of a small break LOCA, the design basis

functions of the ECCS and CTS during and after switchover to cold

leg recirculation are preserved. Finally, the changes to containment

pressure response resulting from starting the CEQ fans and opening

the associated valves earlier in a LOCA than in previous analyses do

not result in a reduction in the capability of ECCS during the

reactor vessel reflood period. Therefore, the margin to safety

provided by the CEQ fans and valves associated with containment

integrity, assurance of post-LOCA long-term core cooling, and ECCS

performance is preserved by these proposed changes.

The proposed T/S changes for the ice condenser ice weight

provides assurance that the ice condenser will provide sufficient

pressure suppression capability to limit the containment peak

pressure transient to less than the design limit and will contain

sufficient heat removal capability to condense the RCS volume

released during a LOCA. The proposed T/S changes maintain the

appropriate distribution of ice through the containment bays. The

required concentration of sodium tetraborate in the ice bed is not

changed. There is sufficient boron in the ice bed to ensure adequate

boron concentration in the containment recirculation sump following

a LOCA when combined with the water inventory from the RWST, RCS

leakage, and safety injection accumulators. The increase in the

allowance for ice sublimation does not reduce the margin of safety.

The original allowance was conservatively estimated to be 10% over

an eighteen-month period. There was no operating ice condenser plant

data for determining actual sublimation at the time that allowance

was made. Since that time, actual data obtained has demonstrated

that 10% is a reasonable, bounding value. Stating the ice weight

requirement as an end-of-cycle value does not impact the margin of

safety because the allowance for sublimation will be verified during

the as-found weighing of the ice baskets.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances

change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely

way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,

the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of

the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that

the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public

[[Page 58460]]

and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it

will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide

for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects

that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of

this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to

Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of

written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to

intervene is discussed below.

By November 29, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing

with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility

operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this

proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding

must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene

shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice

for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested

persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is

available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library,

500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085. If a request for a hearing or

petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or

the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of

hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene

shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in

the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of

the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the

Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of

the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the

proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition

should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of

the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person

who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of

the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy

the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to

the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions

which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must

consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be

raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a

brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the

contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the

contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references

to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is

aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those

facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information

to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material

issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within

the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be

one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A

petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be

permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,

subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,

and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-

examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves

no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the

amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the

request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance

of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place

before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must

be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and

Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the

Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jeremy J. Euto, Esquire, 500 Circle

Drive, Buchanan, MI 49107, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended

petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not

be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding

officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the

petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the

factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the

application for amendment dated October 1, 1999, which is available for

public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library,

500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of October 1999.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Carl F. Lyon,

Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of

Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 99-28415 Filed 10-28-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P