Amended Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

19 CFR Part 351

[Docket No. 990521142-9252-02]

RIN 0625-AA54

Amended Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and

Countervailing Duty Orders

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Commerce.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce (the ``Department'' or ``DOC'') is

amending its regulation, which governs the revocation of antidumping

and countervailing duty orders, in whole or in part, and the

termination of suspended antidumping and countervailing duty

investigations, based upon an absence of dumping or subsidization,

respectively. The amended regulation conforms the existing regulation

to the United States' obligations under Article 11 of the Agreement on

the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade 1994 (``Antidumping Agreement'') and Article 21 of the

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (``SCM Agreement'').

The amended paragraph relating to revocation or termination based on

absence of dumping provides that the Secretary, upon considering

whether producers or exporters have sold subject merchandise at not

less than normal value for at least three consecutive years, and

whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is

otherwise necessary to offset dumping, will revoke an antidumping duty

order if warranted. The amended paragraph relating to revocation or

termination based on absence of countervailable subsidy provides that

the Secretary, upon considering whether the government of the affected

country has eliminated all countervailable subsidy programs covering

the subject merchandise for at least three consecutive years, or

exporters or producers have not applied for or received countervailable

subsidies for at least five consecutive years, and whether the

continued application of the countervailing duty order is otherwise

necessary to offset subsidization, will revoke a countervailing duty

order if warranted.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 1, 1999.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melissa G. Skinner, Office of Policy,

Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, at (202) 482-1560,

or Myles S. Getlan, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, at (202) 482-5052.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On June 3, 1999, the Department published a Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking which proposed to amend 19 CFR 351.222(b).1 See

64 FR 29818 (the ``Proposed Rule''). The Department explained that the

process of amending this regulation arose from the findings of a

dispute settlement panel convened under the auspices of the World Trade

Organization (``WTO'') that considered various aspects of the

Department's final results of administrative review in Dynamic Random

Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) Of One Megabit Or Above From Korea

(62 FR 39809, July 24, 1997) (``DRAMs From Korea'').

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\1\ This amendment does not affect the Department's regulations

at 19 CFR 351.218, which implements the statutory provision at 19

U.S.C. 1675(c) and governs the Department's five-year sunset

reviews, in which the Department determines whether revocation of an

order ``would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of

dumping or a countervailable subsidy (as the case may be) and of

material injury.''

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On January 29, 1999, the Panel determined that the Department's

standard for revoking an antidumping duty order contained in 19 CFR

353.25(a)(2) (the precursor to 19 CFR 351.222(b)) was inconsistent with

the United States' obligations under Article 11.2 of the WTO

Antidumping Agreement. See United States--Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic

Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above

From Korea, WT/DS99/R (``Panel Report''). Specifically, the Panel

determined that requiring the Secretary

[[Page 51237]]

to conclude that ``it is not likely'' that the persons requesting

revocation will dump merchandise subject to an antidumping duty order

in the future did not implement properly Article 11.2 of the

Antidumping Agreement. This provision requires an administering

authority to consider whether ``the continued imposition of [an

antidumping] duty is necessary to offset dumping'' in determining

whether to revoke an antidumping duty order. Thus, the Panel

recommended that the United States ``bring section 353.25(a)(2)(ii) of

the DOC regulations * * * into conformity with its obligations under

Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement.'' The Dispute Settlement Body

(``DSB'') adopted the Panel Report on March 19, 1999. On April 15,

1999, the United States announced its intention to implement the

recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Consistent with section 123(g)

of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), which governs the

Department's implementation of adverse panel reports, the Department is

revising 19 CFR 351.222(b) and (c).

Explanation of the Final Rule

The proposed amendment to the Department's revocation regulation

concerned only antidumping proceedings, as the Department focused upon

implementing the specific findings contained in the Panel Report.

Consequently, at that time, the Department did not propose amending the

companion revocation provision applicable to countervailing duty

proceedings. However, we believe that a decision not to amend the

countervailing duty provision would render the revocation standards in

antidumping and countervailing duty cases inconsistent with each other.

The ``not likely'' standard in 19 CFR 351.222(b), which governs the

revocation of antidumping duty orders, is identical to the standard in

19 CFR 351.222(c), which governs revocation in countervailing duty

cases. In addition, the ``necessary'' standard in Article 11 of the

Antidumping Agreement, to which we have conformed the antidumping

regulation, is identical to the standard in Article 21 of the SCM

Agreement which regulates the duration of countervailing duties. Since

the revocation standards in the two WTO agreements are identical, and

since at least one party commented on this issue during the public

comment period, we conclude that the public was on notice that the

countervailing duty regulation could similarly be revised. Therefore,

we are making conforming amendments to the countervailing duty

provision as well in order to maintain consistency between the

Department's procedures governing revocation in both antidumping and

countervailing duty cases and the standards in both the Antidumping

Agreement and SCM Agreement.

In addition, in response to comments, the final rule incorporates

several changes to the Proposed Rule. First, the language which read

``[t]he Secretary may revoke an antidumping order * * *'' has been

altered to read ``[t]he Secretary will revoke the antidumping duty

order.'' Second, the final rule no longer states that the Secretary

will consider whether the continued application of the order is ``no

longer necessary to offset dumping.'' Instead, the final rule provides

that, inter alia, the Secretary will consider ``whether the continued

application of the antidumping duty order is otherwise necessary to

offset dumping.'' These changes are discussed in more detail below.

We received comments concerning the Proposed Rule from various

parties. One commenter believes that the proposed revision to the

Department's regulation, which incorporates the standard set forth in

Article 11.2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, responds appropriately

to the concerns articulated by the WTO panel decision and represents a

fair implementation of the panel's recommendation. Moreover, this

commenter states that the proposed revision should not negatively

affect the protection afforded U.S. industries against unfairly traded

imports.

Several commenters insist that the revised ``necessity'' standard

is ``effectively not a standard at all.'' In this respect, these

commenters note the Panel's finding that there must be a demonstrable

basis for consistently and reliably determining that the maintenance of

an order is necessary to offset injurious dumping. These commenters

contend that the Proposed Rule contains no guidelines or definitions of

the ``evidence'' that would be relevant to the continued necessity of

an order. Consequently, these commenters argue that the Proposed Rule

will not improve the demonstrability, consistency, and reliability of

revocation decisions or ensure that decisions to maintain antidumping

or countervailing duty orders are based upon positive evidence

demonstrating the continued need for the order. One commenter suggests

that using a ``likely to recur'' standard ``would have been the most

logical, direct means to meet the WTO requirement that a positive

finding is necessary to support continuation of an [antidumping duty]

order.''

However, another commenter noted that the amended regulation

establishes a ``necessity'' standard which reflects the same standard

established in the Antidumping Agreement. Thus, this commenter believes

the revised standard does in fact provide the ``demonstrable basis upon

which to reliably conclude that the continued imposition of the duty is

necessary to offset dumping.''

We disagree with those commenters who state that the revised

``necessity'' standard is ``effectively not a standard at all.''

Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement allows interested parties to

request authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the

duty is ``necessary'' to offset dumping. To say that the ``necessity''

standard contained in the Department's revised regulation is

effectively no standard at all is to say that Article 11.2 contains no

standard. This is illogical given that this process of revising the

revocation regulation stems from a panel finding that the Department's

existing regulation did not properly implement the ``necessary''

standard contained in Article 11.2. On the other hand, we agree that

each determination made pursuant to this new regulation will need to be

supported by positive evidence. Moreover, we are confident that the

revised standard, along with our established practice of considering

evidence relating to the likelihood of future dumping, will provide for

consistent and reliable decisions regarding revocation.

One commenter urges the Department to discontinue its practice of

applying a presumption in favor of revocation in the absence of dumping

for three consecutive years. As support, this commenter refers to the

Court of International Trade's (``CIT'') characterization of the

Department's regulation as a three-part test for revocation and states

that the ``not likely'' (or the revised ``necessary'') prong

constitutes an independent criterion that must be established to attain

revocation. See Hyundai Electronics Co., Ltd. v. United States, Slip.

Op. 99-44 (Ct. Int'l Trade, May 19, 1999). This commenter believes that

the presumption nullifies the satisfaction of the second

(``necessary'') prong.

In this regard, two commenters assert that a presumption favoring

revocation unfairly and improperly shifts the burden to petitioners to

come forward with affirmative evidence. Since respondents are in

possession of information relevant to revocation, as argued by these

commenters, the burden

[[Page 51238]]

of producing such evidence should rest with the respondents. One

commenter requested that the Department include in its initial

questionnaire a solicitation of data and other information from the

respondent seeking revocation on why the antidumping duty order in the

respondent's opinion is no longer needed to offset dumping. While this

commenter conceded that this procedural element could be implemented

without regulatory modification, the commenter contended that there was

no reason that such a provision could not be incorporated in the

regulations.

By contrast, several commenters stated that the revised regulation

continues to place a burden on respondents to prove eligibility for

revocation, rather than placing the burden on the Department to find

positive evidence establishing that the maintenance of the order is

necessary. These commenters contend that placing the burden on the

Department necessitates a reformulation of the regulation, such that

the revised regulation should not treat maintaining the order as the

norm. Thus, these commenters suggested that the new regulation require

the Secretary to revoke if the respondent has not dumped for three

consecutive years and has furnished the required reinstatement

agreement, ``unless the Secretary reliably demonstrates on the basis of

a foundation of positive evidence that the continued application of the

antidumping duty order as to the exporter or producer is necessary to

offset dumping.''

However, one commenter welcomed the Department's confirmation that

the regulation reflects a rebuttable presumption that favors revoking

an order when there is an absence of dumping for three or more years.

In this regard, this commenter states that the initial burden should

clearly rest on the petitioners, as the beneficiaries of the

continuation of the order, to provide evidence that the order is still

necessary. Thus, this commenter states that the Department should not

request information from a respondent until petitioners make

allegations supported by tangible evidence that the order is still

necessary.

As discussed in the Proposed Rule, in situations where there is an

absence of dumping (or subsidization) for three (or five) consecutive

years, the Department intends to presume that an order is not necessary

in the absence of additional evidence. We believe that such a

presumption is consistent with prior Department practice as well as

U.S. obligations under Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and

Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement. As the Panel recognized, a decision

to maintain an order must be substantiated by positive evidence. If the

only evidence on record is a respondent's ability to sell subject

merchandise at not less than normal value for three consecutive years,

the record would not support a decision to maintain the order in light

of the requirement in Article 11.2, as interpreted by the Panel, that

there be positive evidence reflecting the continued necessity of the

order.

We decline at this time to adopt the commenter's suggestion that we

solicit information from respondents at the outset of an administrative

review. The absence of dumping for three consecutive years,2

while satisfying the first prong of the regulatory standard, is also

sufficient evidence relevant to the continued necessity of the order to

shift the burden of production to the petitioners. However, if a party

raises an issue relating to the necessity of an order, the Department

may seek additional information relevant to that issue. Nonetheless,

since the manner in which we collect evidence is not necessarily a

regulatory matter, we may revisit this issue at a later time in the

development of our practice in applying the revised regulation.

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\2\ In accordance with 19 CFR 351.222(e)(ii), to be considered

for revocation, the producers and exporters must have sold the

subject merchandise in commercial quantities in each of the three

years.

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We disagree with those commenters who suggest that the revised

regulation continues to place a burden on respondents, rather than the

Department, to prove eligibility for revocation. The threshold

requirement for revocation continues to be that respondents not sell at

less than normal value for at least three consecutive years and that,

during each of those years, respondents exported subject merchandise to

the United States in commercial quantities. See 19 CFR 351.222(d)(1).

The Panel did not disturb this aspect of the Department's revocation

practice. Moreover, we re-emphasize our statement in the Proposed Rule

that ``the absence of dumping for three consecutive years served as a

presumption in favor of revoking the order, which could be rebutted by

positive evidence indicating that dumping may recur if the order were

revoked.'' Thus, we disagree that an impermissible burden is placed on

respondents. Instead, a thorough analysis of all relevant information

requires a system in which there is a shifting burden of production

such that the parties in the best position to provide relevant

information are compelled to do so. All parties may be in a position to

provide information concerning trends in prices and costs, currency

movements, and other market and economic factors that may be relevant

to the likelihood of future dumping. If no party provides information

addressing these issues, we rest with the presumption that an order is

not necessary in the absence of dumping. If the petitioner comes

forward with information demonstrating that the maintenance of the

order is necessary, that initial presumption is rebutted, and the

burden of production shifts to respondents. While the burden of

producing evidence shifts among the parties, we emphasize that the

Department does not impose a burden of proof on any party. The

Department must weigh all of the evidence on the record and determine

whether the continued application of the order is necessary to offset

dumping (or subsidization). Each revocation determination must be based

upon substantial, positive evidence and be otherwise in accordance with

law.

One commenter stated that, unlike the ``not likely'' standard,

``necessity'' is a minimum standard that has no shades or degrees

within it. Stated differently, something that is not ``no longer

necessary'' is necessary.

However, another commenter claimed that the Department's revised

standard retains the negative and passive elements which rendered the

prior regulatory standard inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement.

This commenter noted the Panel's distinction between failing to

establish something as a negative finding and establishing something as

a positive finding in the context of the ``not likely'' criterion and

concluded that this same principle applies to the proposed regulation.

We have formulated the final rule in a way that clarifies that the

Secretary must make an affirmative finding of necessity in order to

retain an antidumping or countervailing duty order. While this

reformulation does not affect the process by which the Department

considers revocation, the reformulated regulation more closely tracks

the wording of Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article

21.2 of the SCM Agreement.

Several commenters argue that the continued use of the

discretionary term ``may'' in the Proposed Rule conflicts with the

mandatory term ``shall'' contained in Article 11.2 of the Antidumping

Agreement. These commenters suggest that the Panel rejected the

existing regulation, in part, because the regulation allows the

[[Page 51239]]

Department to maintain an order where Article 11.2 of the Antidumping

Agreement requires revocation. Thus, these commenters believe that the

Proposed Rule, which contains the permissive ``may'' and not the

mandatory ``shall'' or ``must,'' is inconsistent with the Panel's

findings.

In the final rule, we have substituted the term ``will'' for

``may.'' We do not agree that the use of the term ``may'' imbued the

Department with unbridled discretion in making revocation

determinations, as argued by these commenters. The Department's

determinations are constrained by general legal principles. Every

decision must be based upon substantial evidence and otherwise in

accordance with law. In addition, each decision must be consistent with

prior practice unless we reasonably explain the departure from prior

practice. However, by adopting the ``necessary'' standard contained in

the Antidumping and SCM Agreements, we are persuaded that it is more

appropriate to use the term ``will'' instead of the term ``may'' in the

amended regulation. The ``necessary'' standard represents the full

spectrum of circumstances under which the Department could maintain an

order and be consistent with the United States' WTO obligations under

Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM

Agreement. In other words, considering the comprehensive nature of the

new standard, the Secretary can only retain an antidumping or

countervailing duty order if there is positive evidence on the record

indicating the continued necessity of such order to offset dumping or

subsidization. Thus, in accordance with Article 11.2 of the Antidumping

Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement, we are substituting

the term ``will'' for ``may'' in the amended regulation.

Several commenters took issue with the Department's claim in the

Proposed Rule that the ``Panel's ruling was not based upon the

Department's application of the standard in DRAMs from Korea.'' These

commenters note that the Panel specifically found that the regulation

and the third review final results in DRAMs were inconsistent with

Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.

While we accept that, based upon the inconsistency of the

revocation regulation applied in DRAMs from Korea with the Antidumping

Agreement, the Panel invalidated the third review final results, we

maintain that several aspects of our practice were not invalidated by

the Panel and, thus, do not require revision. As discussed above and in

the preamble to the Proposed Rule, we continue to believe that, while

an absence of dumping for three years is evidence that the antidumping

duty order is no longer necessary, it is not conclusive in all cases.

Evidence relating to the likelihood of future dumping will still be

considered under the revised regulation because such evidence relates

to the necessity of the order. Thus, while the Panel decision

necessitated revising the standard by which the Department considers

revocation, it did not necessitate changes to these specific aspects of

our practice.

One commenter, citing Hyundai Electronics, in which the CIT

affirmed the Department's final results of administrative review in

DRAMs from Korea, argued that it is unnecessary to amend the regulation

because the CIT determined that the ``not likely'' standard is

consistent with U.S. international obligations and with U.S.

obligations under Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.

The CIT decision in Hyundai does not preclude amending the

regulation in question. While the Court stated that the Panel Report

was not binding precedential authority on the Court, it recognized that

``Congress provided that the response to an adverse WTO panel report is

the province of the executive branch and, more particularly, the Office

of the U.S. Trade Representative.'' The United States Trade

Representative and the DOC have decided to respond to the Panel Report

by amending the regulation in question, and we are confident that the

amended regulation, if challenged, will be found to be consistent with

the statute as well as U.S. obligations under the WTO Antidumping

Agreement.

Another commenter expressed concern with the Department's practice

of relating an absence of dumping to declining imports following the

imposition of an order. This commenter asserts that numerous factors,

including changes in the strengths of alternative markets, exchange

rates, changes in production capacity, changes in marketing strategies,

and changes in the technology of production, may contribute to the

decline in imports rather than the exporter's inability to sell in the

U.S. market without dumping.

This matter is appropriate for consideration on a case-by-case

basis, rather than in a rulemaking proceeding because, as the commenter

suggests, numerous factors underlying an absence of dumping may be

considered when evidence relating to those factors is developed on the

record of each proceeding.

Classification

Executive Order 12866

This rule has been determined to be not significant under Executive

Order 12866.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This rule contains no new collection of information subject to the

Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35.

Executive Order 12612

This rule does not contain federalism implications warranting the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

In issuing the proposed regulation, the Chief Counsel for

Regulation of the Department of Commerce certified to the Chief Counsel

for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration that this rule would

not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small

entities. The Department's existing regulations provide a procedural

and substantive process by which the Secretary considers whether to

revoke an antidumping duty order. The rule retains the current

procedural process and revises the substantive standard used by the

Secretary to make the appropriate revocation determination. As

discussed above, the regulation would not significantly change the

Department's practice in determining whether to maintain an antidumping

duty order. Moreover, as the revised regulation only changes the

standard by which the Department considers whether to revoke an

antidumping duty order, this action, in and of itself, will not have a

significant economic impact. Therefore, the Chief Counsel concluded

that the rule would not have a significant impact on a substantial

number of small business entities, and a regulatory flexibility

analysis was not prepared. We received no comments concerning this

conclusion.

List of Subjects in 19 CFR Part 351

Administrative practice and procedure, Antidumping duties, Business

and industry, Cheese, Confidential business information, Countervailing

duties, Investigations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

[[Page 51240]]

Dated: September 16, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

For the reasons stated, 19 CFR part 351 is amended to read as

follows:

PART 351--ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

1. The authority citation for part 351 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 19 U.S.C. 1202 note; 19 U.S.C. 1303

note; 19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.; and 19 U.S.C. 3538.

Subpart B--Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Procedures

2. Section 351.222 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) to

read as follows:

Sec. 351.222 Revocation of orders; termination of suspended

investigations.

* * * * *

(b) Revocation or termination based on absence of dumping. (1)(i)

In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order or terminate

a suspended antidumping investigation, the Secretary will consider:

(A) Whether all exporters and producers covered at the time of

revocation by the order or the suspension agreement have sold the

subject merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of at

least three consecutive years; and

(B) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order

is otherwise necessary to offset dumping.

(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in

paragraphs (b)(1)(i)(A) and (B) of this section, that the antidumping

duty order or suspension of the antidumping duty investigation is no

longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order or terminate the

investigation.

(2)(i) In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order

in part, the Secretary will consider:

(A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the order

have sold the merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of

at least three consecutive years;

(B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary

previously has determined to have sold the subject merchandise at less

than normal value, the exporter or producer agrees in writing to its

immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any exporter or

producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary concludes that the

exporter or producer, subsequent to the revocation, sold the subject

merchandise at less than normal value; and

(C) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order

is otherwise necessary to offset dumping.

(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in

paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the

antidumping duty order as to those producers or exporters is no longer

warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order as to those producers or

exporters.

(3) Revocation of nonproducing exporter. In the case of an exporter

that is not the producer of subject merchandise, the Secretary normally

will revoke an order in part under paragraph (b)(2) of this section

only with respect to subject merchandise produced or supplied by those

companies that supplied the exporter during the time period that formed

the basis for the revocation.

(c) Revocation or termination based on absence of countervailable

subsidy. (1)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty

order or terminate a suspended countervailing duty investigation, the

Secretary will consider:

(A) Whether the government of the affected country has eliminated

all countervailable subsidies on the subject merchandise by abolishing

for the subject merchandise, for a period of at least three consecutive

years, all programs that the Secretary has found countervailable;

(B) Whether exporters and producers of the subject merchandise are

continuing to receive any net countervailable subsidy from an abolished

program referred to in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) of this section; and

(C) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty

order or suspension of countervailing duty investigation is otherwise

necessary to offset subsidization.

(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in

paragraphs (c)(1)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the

countervailing duty order or suspension of the countervailing duty

investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the

order or terminate the suspended investigation.

(2)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty order

or terminate a suspended countervailing duty investigation, the

Secretary will consider:

(A) Whether all exporters and producers covered at the time of

revocation by the order or the suspension agreement have not applied

for or received any net countervailable subsidy on the subject

merchandise for a period of at least five consecutive years; and

(B) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty

order or suspension of the countervailing duty investigation is

otherwise necessary to offset subsidization.

(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in

paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(A) and (B) of this section, that the

countervailing duty order or the suspension of the countervailing duty

investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the

order or terminate the suspended investigation.

(3)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty order

in part, the Secretary will consider:

(A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the order

have not applied for or received any net countervailable subsidy on the

subject merchandise for a period of at least five consecutive years;

(B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary

previously has determined to have received any net countervailable

subsidy on the subject merchandise, the exporter or producer agrees in

writing to their immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any

exporter or producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary

concludes that the exporter or producer, subsequent to the revocation,

has received any net countervailable subsidy on the subject

merchandise; and

(C) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty

order is otherwise necessary to offset subsidization.

(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in

paragraphs (c)(3)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the

countervailing duty order as to those exporters or producers is no

longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order as to those

exporters or producers.

(4) Revocation of nonproducing exporter. In the case of an exporter

that is not the producer of subject merchandise, the Secretary normally

will revoke an order in part under paragraph (c)(3) of this section

only with respect to subject merchandise produced or supplied by those

companies that supplied the exporter during the time period that formed

the basis for the revocation.

* * * * *

[FR Doc. 99-24675 Filed 9-21-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P